HRVP Josep Borrell – Jakarta Post interview – 12 July 2023

Q: There has been a number of disagreements between the EU and Indonesia about trade recently, including nickel exports and the EUDR policy. How far is the EU willing to compromise to bridge these differences? What can we expect from the joint task force recently established?

To start with and most importantly: there is a huge untapped potential for trade and investment between the EU and Indonesia. Right now, Indonesia is only our fifth trade and outbound investment partner in ASEAN despite being a key country and a very large economy in South-East Asia. This has to change.

The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement we are currently negotiating can play an important role in achieving this and in boosting our bilateral trade and investment. This week, the 15^th negotiation round is taking place and we work on making significant progress.

Regarding Indonesia’s export ban on nickel, the WTO panel has issued a ruling upholding the EU claims and I am sure that Indonesia will choose to engage constructively. As I always say: trade disputes, even between closest partners, are normal. What is important is that they are resolved.

The Joint Task Force on deforestation between Indonesia, Malaysia and the EU is a good example of such constructive cooperation. When it comes to the implementation of the EU’s Deforestation Regulation, it will provide an additional instrument facilitating our ongoing dialogue. As partners, we respect each other’s concerns and jointly discuss the best way forward. We want to enable producers, especially smallholders, to ensure that their supply chains are deforestation-free. And we will work together to ensure European consumption of the relevant commodities are not a deforestation driver in Indonesia or elsewhere. The EU is a very steady customer of Indonesian palm oil and timber, we have every interest in maintaining the trade.

Q: In the some debates, political narratives such as "developing vs developed countries" and claims of "the EU being "neo-imperialist" have emerged, not just in Indonesia but other countries like Malaysia. These claims at times come from high-ranking officials. How does this affect the political relationship between the EU and Indonesia? How is the EU planning to dispute these claims beyond declarations?

We take such claims seriously and we have to ask ourselves where they come from and what they are based on. Clearly, there are unmet expectations and legitimate demands that the EU, together with other partners, must listen to and act upon. I hear from some of our partners in the so-called ‘Global South’ that the so-called ‘West’ has been self-serving when it comes to a number of key global issues – for instance on debt relief, climate finance, and the reform of international institutions.

Overall, however, the record of the EU and its member states is without doubt much better than that of others and what we get credit for. To give just some examples: we are and remain the first source of official development aid and humanitarian aid. We provide 30% of global climate finance. We are actively favouring debt relief and with the Global Gateway Initiative we provide high-quality investments, promoting the green and digital transition, as well as better connectivity.

Crucially, we already have enough conflicts in the world and the EU is doing all in its power to avoid anything like "developing vs developed countries", and our strategic partnership with ASEAN as well as our inclusive Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific are the best proof of that.

 Q: The ARF is focused on the political-security aspects of the Indo-Pacific. What will be the EU's main proposal at the forum to upkeep stability in the region?

The ASEAN Regional Forum is a crucial multilateral platform and plays a pivotal role in advancing regional stability. The EU takes pride in being an active member and a key partner. Europe is economically interdependent with many partners in Asia and we therefore have a direct stake in each other’s security. We are geographically distant, but economically we are neighbours.  It is only natural that our cooperation with ASEAN is expanding rapidly.

Our security cooperation covers a wide array of issues, including cyber security, counter-terrorism, crisis management and peace keeping, foreign information manipulation and interference, as well as disaster reduction and human security. Maritime security is a cornerstone of our efforts, with EU Member States' navies and coast guards actively involved. We are eager to further enhance cooperation in this area and are committed to expand concrete engagements with ASEAN partners.

Q: You said the EU and the Indo-Pacific are "inextricably linked" on several problems, including climate change, disrupted supply chain, cybersecurity issues, etc. In solving some of these problems, it is expected that differences will occur. What is the EU's strategy to help resolve these issues while upkeeping ASEAN Centrality?

In a global world there is no ‘far away’, and the success and stability of Europe and Asia boils down to peace, prosperity and regional integration. At a time when major tensions around Southeast Asia are on the rise and there is the potential for major conflicts, and when the EU is facing the multiple challenges linked to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU and ASEAN must remain in a position to make their own choices in support of regional stability.

The EU and ASEAN share a joint responsibility to address today’s acute challenges and we have a very concrete stake in Southeast Asia’s peace and prosperity: not only the EU is the third main trading partner of ASEAN and the second main investor in the region, but much of our international shipping goes through the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.

Two years ago, we established our “Strategic Partnership”, which reflects the important political momentum between us. As the two most advanced regional integration organisations in the world, the EU and ASEAN understand each other on a deeper level and we are closer than ever. The EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy exemplifies this, with ASEAN centrality as a key component.

Q: China is an unalienable part of Indo-Pacific security. While ASEAN has maintained their collective neutrality on China, viewing it as mostly an economic partner, you wrote a blogpost explaining that the EU "will [find it] extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the European Union to maintain a relationship of trust with China", adding that the EU's position sees China as "partner, competitor and systemic rival". How can the EU work with ASEAN to decrease geopolitical tensions in the region?

I said that it will be difficult for the EU to maintain a relationship of trust with China if it does not use its influence on Russia to stop its illegal war of aggression, which blatantly violates international law, the UN Charter and Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Russian troops must withdraw once and for all from Ukraine. The huge human suffering as well as the economic turbulences around the globe must stop. We expect China’s active support as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to achieve this.

Many ASEAN partners have supported efforts to end this violence and have condemned Russia, and many experience destabilising actions that affect their sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly in the South China Sea. The ASEAN model, particularly the ARF, demonstrates that tensions can be resolved through dialogue, and that external actors can contribute positively to addressing regional and global challenges. And this is what we want to do together.

When it comes to EU-China relations more generally, our cooperation with China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival will still be at the centre of our policy, while we will continue engaging bilaterally and globally, based on our interests and values. This means that our “multi-faceted approach” with China prevails, but we also must engage even when there are difficult issues to discuss.