Dear guests,

It’s good to be here, 

And it’s also good to see that after the break, everybody’s in the room already!

We were a bit late as well. It’s a very busy day today.

But I’m really glad to address you at this conference.

We can never accuse the EU of being out of character.

When it was clear some years back that disinformation was seeping into our societies, the EU did what it usually does best: we established a new department, carried out extensive analysis and created many new acronyms in the process.

STRATCOM came first. 

Then came the one we are discussing today – FIMI.
But behind these acronyms, an extremely important operation is taking place.  

We are steadily equipping Europe to fight one of the biggest international threats our societies face. 

A threat that cuts into the heart of liberal democracy.
Because democracy is built on trust.

If the people can’t trust what they know or hear, they also don’t participate in elections and all these worries that come with it.

Falsehoods presented as facts. 

We have data that is being manipulated. 

Outright lies being told. 

Last week I was in the United Nations Security Council. 
And although all the other countries were super positive about Europe and what we are doing, including China by the way, and Pakistan, Russia’s intervention was so full of lies, rewriting history.

When it was my turn to react, I actually said this is a clear illustration of why we really need to fight together [against] false information. Because it’s coming from a very, very high level. 

I was not surprised. Russia has a history of spreading lies at home and also abroad. 

But when the headlines have been printed, and the seeds of doubt have already been sown, it is extremely dangerous.

If disinformation is a bullet through the heart of democracy, FIMI is the gun, the shooter and their entire arsenal. 

Our latest reporting shows that Russia and China have massive digital infrastructure in place to conduct FIMI operations. 

Last year alone, more than ninety countries and over three hundred organisations were targets of attacks.
From the Paris Olympic and Paralympic games, to the Presidential elections in Romania and Moldova.

We saw everything from disinformation about farmers’ protests in Germany, to biased material trying to legitimise Russia’s influence in the Middle East.

It is a major global threat.

So, the question is, what can we do about it?

Three examples of what we’re already doing.

First, by exposing networks, we raise the cost for perpetrators. 

They have to create new accounts, websites and content. 

They have to rebuild their audiences and face additional scrutiny, so it also slows them down.

Last year we uncovered an information laundering operation. We called it ‘False Façade’. 

Much like a money laundering scheme, it was hiding the source of information to make it seem legitimate.
That’s one of the biggest problems with FIMI. 

Sometimes it doesn’t come directly from the mouth of the Russian Ambassador. It comes from where you least expect it.

For example, the Kremlin-operated Doppelgänger campaign imitated the websites of Le Monde, Die Welt, The Guardian and other renowned outlets.

Second, increasing our awareness also improves our defence.

Today we have the world’s largest public database of its kind – EUvsDisinfo and the numbers are mindblowing. 

Experts in the European External Action Service have uncovered more than 18 thousand cases of pro-Kremlin disinformation. 

Last year alone, 38 million people, including fact-checkers, made use of the EUvDisinfo website and social media channels. 

We need more work like this.  

And third, by sanctioning perpetrators, we cause them major inconveniences.

Today there are more than 50 individuals and two dozen outlets on the EU’s sanctions list.

These are outlets under full editorial control of a government waging an illegal war in Europe.

Sanctions slow them down. 

They have to work hard to circumvent sanctions. 

They have to use VPNs to bypass geographical restrictions. 

And they have to set up new sites to mirror sanctioned outlets, or build them from scratch.

FIMI is not a communications issue. 

FIMI is not about a “battle of narratives” or “my truth versus your truth”.

Our information space is nothing less than a geopolitical battleground where we are currently losing the war.

Russia has invested over a billion euros in their state-controlled propaganda outlets in the last few years. It is increasing [this] year on year.

And this doesn’t include what they are spending on their intelligence services or for their covert proxies operating worldwide. 

And of course they are not the only one. We can only guess how much China is investing in their own FIMI armoury. And they have the means for it. 

Like I always say, the Chinese have the technologies but are not that good in social sciences.

The Russians, vice-versa, are very good in social sciences but not that good in technology.

Combining the two means it’s very, very dangerous. 

Our own budget is a hundred times smaller at least.  

We may not have so much money, but we are making the most of what we do have. 

And that is our community.

The EU’s rapid alert system connects every Member State to a network where experts can flag to everyone when they see something suspicious.

One Member State recently alerted another Member State to the possibility of an impending cyberattack. 

When the attack finally struck, the Member State in question was already prepared and able to limit the damage.

But it is obvious we need to allocate more resources and take this threat more seriously.

Again, I want to stress, FIMI is not a communications issue. It is a tactic of war.

So what more can we do?

We need to reap the benefits of Artificial Intelligence and not just address the risks. 

Artificial Intelligence can:

•  detect patterns by analysing large datasets;
  uncover networks of bots;
• verify information by cross-referencing it with trusted sources;
• and help identify key influencers in operations.

And we have to ask, why is it possible for offenders to use openly available resources like the App Store or Google Play? 

Why are they able to use western payments systems? 

We cannot let our adversaries use our own tools against us!

This is also a totally asymmetric fight. 

One side is sticking to a set of internationally agreed rules. The other is not. 

Let me be clear: we should never forego our fundamental values and integrity. 

But we can physically counter attacks and explore how we can use our own cyber measures to take out parts of FIMI machinery.

Internationally, there is now a growing coalition of liberal democracies working together to fight FIMI.

Last summer, Poland hosted EU Member States, the UK and the U.S. to analyse Russian operations in Africa.

In Asia, EU diplomats trained in this area are in high demand. They are seen as more neutral than the U.S. in this part of the world.

International work to fight the threat is really just beginning. And the EU is well-placed to address it.

We have over 140 Delegations and 20 civilian and military missions and operations across the globe. And we are now training hundreds of our diplomats on countering FIMI. 

The G7 has also been active for some time. 

I just got back from Canada, from the G7 foreign affairs meeting in Charlevoix.

Last year, G7 leaders – true to form for a multilateral forum – called for a ‘Collective Response Framework’. 

But again, behind this jargon, there are also results.

We recently exposed funding and orders from the Kremlin telling Russia Today and the Social Design Agency to subvert societies using global disinformation and influence campaigns.

When you have the evidence, you can call a spade a spade. This is a state-sponsored attack. 

This is why NATO has also set up a department specialised in data analysis. They now have a NATO Cyber Defence Centre. 

But the point is we are starting to understand this as a serious security threat from the outside.

We have fought half of the battle because we recognise this problem exists.

Now we must also fight back. 

For a start, we have to build up our resilience as individuals.

Whether it is at the UN Security Council or in the comfort of our own homes, we cannot take anything we read or hear today as given.  

We know a lie travels half way across the world while the truth gets its pants on. 

We know free speech is not the same as speech free of lies. 

We know we have to live with this.

It means that for a healthy, resilient democracy, we have to be active participants and readers too. 

We must be curious and check the information we get, especially when it comes from dubious sources. 

We have to educate ourselves.

Back when I was the Prime Minister of Estonia, we did campaigns for media literacy. 

And it’s not so much a problem for the young people who understand it much better.

It’s a much bigger problem amongst the aging population that have been used to believing everything they read from the media. But the sources are very different now and you have to be a source critique. 

Education also includes education about the threat we face. 

This is not just disinformation or lies. This is manipulation with intent to destroy democracy.

We must also support our independent media and journalists.

And that’s why we also need to support Radio Free Europe.

It’s also why fighting FIMI will be a strong part of the new European Democracy Shield. You will hear it all about it from my dear colleague in the Commission here.  

On social media, face-to-face or on stage at a conference, our democracies should not be spaces where foreign actors can pressure us to think in certain ways.

Let me conclude here.

FIMI is a fundamental part of hybrid war. It often precedes conventional attacks. We have seen this all over Europe, including Ukraine. 

There are malign actors including Russia and China that have built industrial-scale machinery to manipulate our information environments.

Their aim is to polarise societies and make it impossible to engage in constructive, informed dialogue. 

We must consider the integrity of our information space as important as our territorial integrity. 

We must fight back. 

Thank you.