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Good evening, sorry for being so late. It has been one of the most intense Foreign Affairs Ministers [meeting] of the last five years.  

To start with, we had a discussion with Minister Kuleba on how to best support Ukraine at all levels: militarily – tomorrow, we will discuss in depth with the ministers of defence – but diplomatically too, given the proximity of the United Nations General Assembly in New York and Ukraine’s proposal for a second summit. As you can imagine, both tracks are intertwined. 

Let me start by reiterating what I said earlier – well, I said many times: Ukraine’s counter-offensive operation in Kursk has dealt a blow to Putin’s narrative. Ukraine has shown strategic audacity and has made Putin’s narrative about the “Special Operation” completely futile. 

Many Member States expressed support to the Kursk operation as part of Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence in accordance with the United Nations Charter. [Minister] Kuleba stated how this operation has eroded the myth of Russia’s invincibility. 

In February [2022], two and half years ago, Putin launched a war believing that it was going to last a couple of weeks – and it is lasting more than a couple of years. And he is not in Kyiv. He is withdrawing and even Russian territory is being attacked. 

These months have been very difficult. This summer has been very difficult and bloody. This Monday 26 August, we saw Russia’s massive [air] attack. 300 missiles and drones in a single day against Ukrainian cities, targeting critical energy infrastructure. But not only – hospitals and health centres are being bombed too.  

And we will see more, because Russia wants to put the whole Ukraine in the darkness and in the cold. And believe me, in Ukraine in winter, it is very cold. This is the purpose: to annihilate the electricity capacity of Ukraine before the winter. 

We got a lot of information about how things are going on the battlefield, how the attack to Kursk is changing the game on the frontline in Donbass. 

But the air defence remains existential for Ukraine. And the message of [Minister] Kuleba was crystal clear –  our support, the European support – makes a difference, but your delays are too costly. It has been too costly yesterday, it is too costly today, it will be too costly tomorrow. 

You heard me this morning: Ukraine can be very successful in the battlefield if we truly do whatever it takes. As we like to say: “whatever it takes and on time.”  Delays are measured in lives. They cannot only hold and defend, but with the adequate support they can push back against the aggressor. So we must speed up and increase deliveries. 

There was also something clear, a clear demand by Member States for harsher measures against sanctions circumvention. This work starts at home: the increase of exports from Europe to some states which are close to Russia, the increase of European exports to these states close to Russia, from the East and from the South. It is difficult to explain this appetite for European goods, immediately after the war started, skyrocketing, increasing every day. There is no explanation without prospecting that there is circumvention of sanctions behind it. So we have to start by due diligence on European companies themselves, not only sanctioning third country companies, but start looking at ourselves. If we want to fight against circumvention, this has to start at home.  

We also tackled the diplomatic track, which is growing in importance. Our strategic objective is clear: a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine, based on the United Nations Charter and international law. So far, only [Ukrainian President, Volodymyr] Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula fulfils this requirement. 

We exchanged with Minister Kuleba on our joint global outreach and the UNGA High-level Week in September. This is a priority meeting. We are very interested of course in President Zelenskyy’s plans for a second summit. But it is clear that Ukraine wants to negotiate towards a real peace, whereas Putin, so far, only wants Ukraine’s surrender and subjugation. This is the reality. 

That is why we continued by discussing the ever-deteriorating situation in Ukraine. The war continues, the scenario has changed radically this August. It is true that Russia is pushing in the Donbass, it is true that the pressure of the Russian army in Donbass has not decreased but now the frontline has different focal points which complicates logistics and requires more effort from both sides. But now Ukraine is taking the initiative. Who could have imagined that in February two years ago? Certainly not Putin.  

Then, we went to the situation in the Middle East, joined by Sigrid Kaag, United Nations Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator for Gaza. She shared her assessment on the horrific humanitarian situation in Gaza, the day after fully [United Nations] humanitarian workers were shot at as they were moving towards an Israeli army checkpoint.  

86% of Gaza is now under evacuation order. United Nations activities have been suspended. The amount of humanitarian food assistance that entered southern Gaza in July was one the lowest recorded since the beginning of the war. The lowest since the beginning of the war – who can believe honestly that there is no obstruction for this humanitarian support entering into Gaza? Let me summarise a little bit what has been a long discussion.   

The horrific terrorist attack by Hamas has triggered a war, and the war has triggered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, which in turn has led to an extremely serious health crisis. Polio is back to Gaza and thousands of children can be paralysed forever. That is why it is so important. I simply hope that a call for a ceasefire in order to vaccinate the population in Gaza against polio will be implemented. It seems so, let’s hope it is not too late. Let’s hope that a drop of hope in a sea of despair can save lives and avoid the tragedy of children getting polio. 

Since the summer, violence has spread in the West Bank, in Jerusalem and in the border between Lebanon and Israel. Six months ago, we were still talking about the “Day After” and today, the only thing that we do is to look for a provisional ceasefire, which we are told is “imminent”.  

Every day, we are told it is imminent, while just informing us that it is not yet for tomorrow. One month of “[it is] for tomorrow”. Probably because the degree of trust between the belligerents is null, and there is little contempt for the suffering of the people of Gaza from both sides. 

In military terms, Israel has carried out a large-scale operation first in the North, then in the Centre, and finally around Rafah. These operations have undoubtably considerably weakened Hamas, but the extent of the consequences and the extent of the destruction and the human losses is still to be known. 

But the important thing today is the situation not only in Gaza, but also in the West Bank. 

The Secretary-General of the United Nation [António Guterres] has issued a statement this afternoon asking for a stop of the military operations in the West Bank, with an important number of airstrikes and casualties. The conflict has been extended to the West Bank and Jerusalem, because they are at the heart of the conflict. Because they combine both the territory and the symbolism. This is a fight for the territory, but also for the symbols. 

A case in point is the desire of extremist Israeli ministers to rebuild the Temple Mount on the ‘Esplanade of the Mosques’ (Al Aqsa Mosque compound), we are thus witnessing a form of radicalisation of some parts of Israeli far right for whom Gaza has always been a minor issue compared to the West Bank and Jerusalem. 

Maybe they do not care about the settlements in Gaza, since any return to calm would make it more difficult to pursue the colonial agenda they have for the West Bank – the expansion of the colonies.  

That is why I proposed to the Member States to study sanctioning, listing in our listing two Israeli ministers. We have discussed about it. Certainly, there was not unanimity. Reminding [you] that this is not an executive Council. We do not take decisions, we only discuss politically. But I will use my capacity as High Representative that, according to the Treaty can make proposal to the Council, and I tabled a proposal to the technical bodies of the Council in order to study the proposal of including these two ministers in the listing for violation of human rights.  

The Ministers will decide, it is up to them, as always. But the process will be launched. It is clear that the case will be studied carefully in accordance with the circumstances and the ministers will take a political decision considering all circumstances.  

A good news is that, we have an agreement to hold a High-Level meeting in New York during the UNGA. I hope it will take place, but by the time being, I have an agreement, and I want to thank our Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process for all the efforts. We have an agreement in order to invite everybody, nobody excluded. If Israel wants to come, it will be invited; in fact, everybody will be invited, no exclusion. The European Union will launch the invitations and I have the commitment from the Arab people, even from the United States that they will attend this important meeting.  

So, finally, we will have a high-level event during the UNGA week. It would be very strange not to have it because we had it last year when the Middle East was calm. It would be very strange not to have it one year later, when the Middle East is exploding that the UNGA was not holding a high-level event in order to take care of what is happening there. 

I insist: the violence spreading in the West Bank shows the will of not ending the war. The current terrible situation bears the seeds not only for generalised war between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but also a conflict inside the Israeli society, and also making the whole Middle East on the edge of a precipice.  

I understand [that] the situation is complex. I understand that there is a shared nature of responsibilities. But the complexity must not paralyse us. On the contrary, it should spur us to take action to ensure compliance with a certain number of minimal rules, which once again have been clearly laid down by international law. The conflict is not solved because we do not have the will to use those instruments in an effective way. 

So, I hope that this meeting at the United Nations will bring some good perspective. 

On Iran, some Member States referred to Iran and the threat of Iran providing ballistic missiles to Russia. Just before entering the meeting, I sent a message to the new Iranian Minister [for Foreign Affairs, Seyed Abbas Araghchi] expressing my concerns. I got an immediate answer saying that it is false information and asking for a meeting in New York at the end of the month. 

About the mission on the Rafah border (EUBAM Rafah), we are ready to go. We have the capacity, we have the human capital, the organisation, the resources, but it has to be in accordance and with the participation of the Palestinian Authority. Not of some Palestinians. Some Palestinians, no – the Palestinian Authority. And this is a requirement also from the Egyptian side. And [until] there is an agreement and Israel accepts that this mission operates with the presence of the Palestinian Authority, we will be there. 

And believe me, it is very much needed because the amount of people wounded without any kind of assistance is being counted by thousands. So, the opening of the border will provide an extraordinary relief to the immense suffering for the people in Gaza, and the ceasefire should provide the release of the hostages.

Both things have to go hand in hand, but the situation there is not only horrific, but it is also the reason why the situation in the West Bank is becoming worse and worse every day. So, you have to be blind and deaf not to perceive the gravity of what is going on in the West Bank and the responsibilities of the people, who put oil on the fire saying that they have to destroy the mosques and build synagogues instead of it. This is not acceptable. 

We discussed also about Venezuela. I will summarise. On Venezuela, we invited Edmundo [González Urrutia] the candidate who has presented a certain number of actas – the results of the elections according the certification of each voting table that show that he has got strong support, much bigger than the one got from Maduro. 

We insisted to the national electoral body – CNE – , the one who has responsibility to present results.  

Edmundo González explained us the situation; we have been asking for the actas once and again, but one month later there is no hope for Maduro presenting the actas.  It is too late to continue asking for that. 

So, the result of our discussion is that first we will defend the democratic process. We will maintain close contact with and support to the opposition. Since there is no actas, since there is no verification and we are afraid there will never be, we cannot accept the legitimacy of Maduro as elected president. The Council decided that Maduro does not have the democratic legitimacy as president. He will remain President de facto, but we deny democratic legitimacy based on a result that cannot be verified. That is important because it is a strong statement from the Council of ministers not to recognise the democratic legitimacy of Maduro. 

Third, we will continue to focus on human rights. More than 1500 Venezuelan citizens have been arrested since the elections. The Venezuelan authorities must put an end to the repression and respect the dignity, freedom and rights of the opposition, starting with Edmundo González, María Corina Machado, all opposition members, civil society and journalists. Political prisoners have to be freed. The [Office of the] High Commissioner for Human Rights has to come back to Venezuela. 

Fourth, we will continue supporting the dialogue and the efforts of the regional partners, particularly Brazil and Colombia, performing a dialogue that initiates a democratic transition, provides guarantees to both sides, and leads to the restoration of democracy. 

We also briefly discussed the situation in Georgia, where we are increasingly concerned about the trajectory of this country moving away from the European Union. 

We had a lunch with the Foreign Minister from Türkiye [Hakan Fidan]. It was a long time without Türkiye being invited to the [informal] meeting [of EU Foreign Ministers]. It was a good thing that he came. I thank all Member [States] that made it possible that he could come. We reviewed all the geopolitical situation in our neighbourhood and beyond, and in particular the issues that make our relationship difficult, with some problems related to the situation in Cyprus and the situation in the Middle East, but in particular the situation in Cyprus which has been referred to by many Member States. 

We expressed the solidarity of the European Union with the position of Cyprus and our will to look for a solution through political dialogue. Let’s hope that this invitation to the Foreign Affairs Minister of Türkiye to our [informal] meeting will be the first step to re-take a process of dialogue in order to look for a solution to this problem – to all the problems, but in particular the Cyprus one.

And that is why this Council was so long. And that is why you have been waiting so long also, excuse me. 

Q&A 

Q.  España ha puesto sobre la mesa la opción de varias herramientas para dar el próximo paso en Venezuela, entre ellas el de las sanciones. Independientemente de que sea un consejo informal, que no se puedan tomar decisiones, parece que no hay consenso, porque cuáles es ahora el apetito que está bloqueando las sanciones en Venezuela? Y si usted personalmente cree que es un buen paso para responder a esta no presentación de las actas. Y también sobre sanciones pero en Israel parece que los Estados miembros han acogido con mucha frialdad su propuesta para imponer sanciones a los ministros israelíes. No sé si confía en que tenga recorrido y en que aunque se tarde igual que vimos con los colonos, en algún punto vaya a lograrse el acuerdo para ello.  

Sobre Venezuela, la realidad es que tenemos las 55 personalidades políticas de Venezuela ya sancionadas. Entre ellas la vicepresidenta [Delcy Rodríguez] y - que ahora es ministra creo de Petróleos -  que ahora es ministro del Interior . Ya hemos llegado hasta casi casi la cúpula más alta. Maduro no está en la lista, señor Rodríguez creo que tampoco, y pocos más. más sanciones personales implicaría ir directamente a la sanción a los máximos responsables políticos. Ya sólo quedan dos o tres que no estén sancionados y por eso los estados miembros han pensado que era mejor ver cómo se desarrollaban los acontecimientos después de las manifestaciones de hoy y la manera en la que el Gobierno trata o busca alguna clase de negociación. Sobre la propuesta de incluir en la lista de sanciones a esos dos ministros israelíes, pues ha habido opiniones para todos los gustos, pero ciertamente no he cortado las dos orejas y el rabo, como diríamos en España, no? Pero bueno, hay un proceso. El proceso se ha puesto en marcha, los grupos técnicos de trabajo lo estudiarán, analizarán cada caso. Somos un estado de derecho, los juristas intervendrán, analizaremos lo que la gravedad o lo que han dicho o hecho y los Estados miembros decidirán. Pero yo tengo una responsabilidad y una capacidad y las he usado para poner en la mesa lo que yo creo que hay que hacer.  

Q. Have the ministers reached any kind of agreement, political agreement around the Ukrainian request to relieve all restrictions on use of weapons on Russian military objectives in Russian territory? The second question on the money, you mentioned that you are considering the option to overcome so called “one-country veto” on EPF fund. Could you specify please which kind of solutions could be reached? 

About the second question, the answer will be quick and disappointing because the answer will be: no, I cannot tell you because this kind of things cannot be publicised. More than concrete things, it is a will, you know. I cannot accept this blockade for months. I cannot accept to have €6 billion in my current account – in the current account the [European] External Action Service, I mean. This money has to go to the Member States. They have been providing military support to Ukraine and they are waiting to be reimbursed. So it has to be one way or another. We looked for a way to find a solution to the Hungarian opposition to use the revenues from the frozen assets in order to support Ukraine. By the way, we have sent the first more than one and a half billion [euro] to Ukraine in order to support the Ukrainian industry at home. Not to send arms, but to help them produce arms at home. So, if we found a way for that, maybe there is another way to avoid this blockade. 

And yes, we discussed about the possibility of lifting the limits for the range of use of the arms provided to Ukraine. In the end, the conclusion is mainly that it is a national decision and Member States want to keep it as a national decision, and each one will take the decision that they consider appropriate. You know, some Member States do not send any kind of arms, not in any case rockets or missiles, so it is not a decision in which they can have any practical participation. And others said: “well, it is my decision to decide what I think, in accordance with my internal political decision.” So, not a decision at the European level. 

Q. On Ukraine, both you and Minister Kuleba this morning spoke about delays in delivery of weapons. He was clear that this was partly about Patriots and air defence, but it is my understanding that it may be about more than that and that it may include ammunition and delays in delivery of ammunition. Is that correct? And if so, why is that happening? 

You just said that you just spoke to Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi and you have been in touch with him. It is now several weeks since [Ismail] Haniyeh was assassinated in Teheran. Iran continues to threaten that it will attack Israel, but they have not done so. Do you believe that there will be an attack, or do you think Iran has decided not to do so in the foreseeable future? 

Esto no es un problema de creer. Esto es un problema algo más científico que la creencia. Hemos hecho todo lo posible para evitar la escalada y hemos insistido diplomáticamente a Irán de no responder, de manera que entremos en una espiral de ataques mutuos. Hasta ahora tal cosa no ha ocurrido. ¿Es porque ha habido un cambio en la presidencia de Irán? ¿Es porque hay un nuevo leadership político en Irán? No lo sé. Pero hay un nuevo leadership político in Iran. ¿Es porque están buscando la ocasión? No lo sé. La buena noticia es que hasta ahora no ha ocurrido. Un día que pasa, el tiempo avanza y por lo tanto, la esperanza de que no ocurra aumenta. Esperemos que no haya una escalada y que no ocurra como este domingo, donde Israel lanzó un ataque preventivo contra Hezbolá en el Líbano, y que no ocurra lo mismo con Irán. Por lo tanto, este frente está calmo, más vale no agitarlo. 

Sobre los retrasos. Mire, en materia de municiones en los dos últimos meses o en el mes y medio desde que en Bruselas empezaron las vacaciones, el ritmo de entrega de munición – es entendido por eso los proyectiles del calibre 155 – se ha acelerado mucho. Y la cifra que me dieron mis servicios al llegar ayer a Bruselas es que hemos entregado según ellos la orden de 150.000 más. Esto es un fenómeno que coge velocidad, se acelera y el ritmo aumenta. Cuesta arrancar, pero cuando se ha arrancado, pues cada vez se va más aprisa. Ha habido retraso simplemente porque la industria no tenía capacidad. Se está creando capacidad, la capacidad se está poniendo a trabajar y se produce cada día más. Si hay pedidos, si hay demanda, la industria va a suministrar productos, pero necesita un tiempo para aumentar la capacidad. El ministro [Kuleba] se refería a casos concretos de entrega de Patriots por algunos países concretos, de cuyo nombre no quiero acordarme. Y tampoco hay que generalizar. El esfuerzo que se hace es grande, pero ciertamente se debe y se puede hacer más y más aprisa. More and quicker. Si fuera un conde, tuviera un escudo, este sería mi emblema: “More and quicker.” Esto hay que hacerlo más y más aprisa. Lo llevo diciendo desde el principio de la guerra. Queremos dar a Ucrania, sí. Pues, hay que hacerlo más y más aprisa.  

Q. Could you confirm that the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Türkiye asked for a restart in the EU negotiations for Türkiye? How would this be possible? Would it be connected to the Cyprus issue? What should Türkiye do to have a restart in this level?  

Turquía es un país candidato; lo es y lo sigue siendo. Y es normal que el gobierno turco se pregunte por el reino de unas negociaciones que llevan paradas mucho tiempo. Por lo tanto, sin decirle que ha pedido expresamente día y hora para empezar las negociaciones. Es evidente que la cuestión de Turquía como país candidato ha sido uno de los temas que se ha comentado, pero no ha habido una petición formal de a ver cuándo empezamos otra vez.  

Q. Alto Representante, ¿qué significa que no reconocen la legitimidad del gobierno de Maduro? ¿Qué significa? ¿No van a hablar con él, no lo van a invitar a la cumbre de la CELAC en Bogotá el próximo año? Y la segunda parte, ¿qué espera de la CELAC? Hasta el momento ha habido un gran silencio con respecto a las elecciones el 28 de julio.  

En las reuniones, la CELAC invita a quien ella cree que le invitar. Nosotros no decimos a quién tienen que invitar o no por su parte. ¿Qué quiere decir que no reconocemos la legitimidad democrática? Pues es la consecuencia lógica inmediata de decir que consideramos que la victoria electoral que él proclama no ha sido probada y como no ha sido probada, no tenemos por qué creerlo. Y si no creo que haya ganado las elecciones, no le puedo reconocer la legitimidad democrática que dan las elecciones. Es una serie de silogismos lógicos evidentes. ¿Y eso qué quiere decir? Pues quiere decir que no lo consideramos como un presidente elegido democráticamente. Y en cada caso esto tendrá sus consecuencias. Pero no es el único caso. Mire, en la vida diplomática no se reconocen gobiernos, se reconocen estados. Se reconoce el Estado de Venezuela que tiene el gobierno de facto o de jure. Hay gobiernos de facto resultantes de golpes de Estado militares o de elecciones trucadas. Hay muchos casos en el mundo que no les reconocemos legitimidad democrática, pero existen y tienen el control del territorio, y tenemos embajadas enfrente en Venezuela, tenemos embajadas en Nicaragua. ¿Cree usted que reconocemos la legitimidad democrática del señor Ortega? No, pero tenemos embajadas y nos relacionamos, claro, con muchos países con los cuales no reconocemos que ese gobierno sea un gobierno legítimo en el sentido de elegido democráticamente por ciudadanos. Cuando se convocan elecciones y ocurre lo que ocurre, pues si no reconocemos el resultado, no podemos decir que ha un presidente elegido democráticamente. Entonces me dirá “Sí, pero sigue sentado en el Palacio presidencial”. Si estaba sentado allí antes y sigue sentado después. Pero eso es algo que no tiene que ver con la calidad del resultado, desgraciadamente.  

Q. Mr Borrell, you said at the beginning that you contacted the Iranian Foreign Minister, the new one.

 Hemos intercambiado mensajes. 

Q. He denied the information that Iran is providing drones and weapons to Russia is false. Did you really believe him on that?  

No. 

Q. A short question on Cyprus. When you discussed with the Turkish Foreign Minister on the Cyprus issue, I would like to know if the Guterres so-called 5 parameters for solution of the Cyprus issue are still relevant? Because last time, I think there were discussions negotiations going on. On the solution, it was said that the two sides were very close to a solution, a matter of few percent of disagreement. So what is the status now? 

Sobre Irán, hagamos la distinción entre drones y misiles. El temor, la sospecha, la posibilidad se refiere a los misiles. Y es eso lo que el ministro ha dicho; de eso no hay nada. Y por nuestra parte, tampoco tenemos ninguna prueba de que sea así. Es realmente un sentimiento de precaución ante la posibilidad de que ocurra. Y una llamada de atención de que eso obviamente tendría consecuencias en nuestra relación. Pero me estoy refiriendo estrictamente al suministro potencial de misiles. Y la discusión con Turquía no ha entrado en este nivel de detalle. No hemos entrado a considerar si los puntos de las Naciones Unidas, no hemos entrado en ese nivel de detalle. Ha sido una primera aproximación a un restart de la relación con Turquía que tendrá que tener otras fases para llegar a eso. 

Muchas, muchas gracias y gracias por su paciencia.  

Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-260137