Check against delivery! 

Good afternoon.

Today’s meeting - as I said this morning - has focused largely on the [European Union’s] military support to Ukraine and how to make the EU defence ready for the threats we are facing.  

It is clear that the mood has changed a lot in a couple of years. Before the war in Ukraine, when we were presenting the Strategic Compass and we were talking about the Rapid Deployment Force,  

I remember that the word “force” was not being used. Rapid Deployment Force? No, no, no – let's talk about Rapid Deployment Capacity. [There] was a certain [reluctance] to use military terms. 

So, some weeks before the start of the war, we did not want to use the word “force” when, in fact, we were talking about military force. We used the word “capacity” - neutral, more fuzzy.  

Today, we would have called it “Rapid Deployment Force”, for sure. That is what we are talking about: how do we increase our military capacities, on the military side?  

In this meeting, we have been joined by the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, Rustem Umerov – not from Kiev but from the front line. He was there and [joined via] videoconference to explain the situation on the ground.  

Then, [NATO] Secretary-General [Jens] Stoltenberg joined us in person. We had a lively debate on our military support to Ukraine, both from the European Union and NATO.  

We discussed a lot of things. I cannot summarise all of them because there are many.  

We review[ed] the commitments on air defence systems and interceptors. Germany informed about their air defence initiative. Some Member States increased their contribution to the air defence. 

We analysed in detail the ammunition supply, [through] different channels - from the Czech initiative to the European Union initiative, [to] the joint procurement, [to] bilateral [procurement] by Member States, [or buying] directly from industries.  

It is clear that this is one of the key issues to stop Russian advances: how we can help to fund all these initiatives and how we can help the Ukrainians to develop their own industrial capacities. 

It is important to know that at [this] moment we have seven legal acts to be approved, to mobilise €6.6 billion under the Ukrainian Assistance Fund.  

This has not been possible [for] quite a long time because there is not [an] agreement for the consensus needed. 

You know that we need unanimity – unanimity [has] not [been] there for months. I was complaining yesterday about that at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting. We did the same thing today.  

There is €6.6 billion pending allocation, and the legal instruments necessary for that are still pending approval; including the ones from the Ukraine Assistance Fund that was approved by the leaders at the [European Council] level.

This is more than a theoretical discussion. Every delay of military support [delivery] has real consequences, and these consequences are measured in human lives, in infrastructure damaged, towns destroyed, or more battlefield setbacks for Ukraine. 

That is why it is so important.

And, in particular, it is more important because we are going to go to the use of the windfall profits. The debate has started at the COREPER this week. 90% of the windfall profits [stemming from the frozen Russian assets] will be allocated through the European Peace Facility. We have to avoid any kind of blockage to use these new resources.

We also discussed about something that has been high in the media, [with] Secretary-General of NATO [Jens Stoltenberg] referring to it. It is the possibility of lifting restrictions on Western weapons used by Ukrainian forces to target military objectives in Russia’s territory. In self-defence, but in Russia’s territory. 

It is clear that this is a legitimate action under international law, when it is being used in a proportionate manner. But it is also clear that it is a decision for each individual Member State to take, and to take their responsibility in doing that or not.

Some Member States were against it, and they have changed their mind. Today, they are accepting to lift these limitations on the arms that they supply to Ukraine. But it is a Member State capacity. No one can force a Member State to lift this limitation on the arms they are supplying to Ukraine. 

Some Member States, as I said, some weeks ago considered that not appropriate – now, they decided to do it. Maybe others continue having reluctancies in taking this decision. It is up to them. Nobody will be forced at the EU level to act in one way or the other. 

Regarding the windfall profits, I already explained you that 90% [of them] will be used to increase military support [to Ukraine]. We are talking about €3 billion per year. 

Ukraine needs more training. They are going to mobilise more soldiers, so they need more training.  

Our training mission (EUMAM Ukraine) has been very successful. It has trained over 50,000 soldiers, and we hope [we will have trained] 60,000 by the end of the summer. 

We have to adapt our training capacities and offers to the Ukrainians’ needs. We will soon define new training targets. There is a growing consensus on the need to increase the level of ambition of our training capacity, but I do not want to advance any other figure before being sure that we can get it. 

About doing part of the training in Ukraine, there has been a debate. But there is not a clear common European position on that. 

The second item on our agenda was “how to enhance the European Union’s defence readiness”. “Defence readiness” are two words which are going to be used more and more in the political vocabulary of the Union. 

It is clear that, once again, two years ago no one was talking about it. “Defence readiness” was to be ready, now it is clear why we should be ready and there is a lot of attention on defence readiness. 

Readiness is not growing on the trees. Readiness has to be built. It has to be built [by] engaging resources, mobilising resources, through a strong political will because it requires changes, it requires efforts, it requires funding. But it is clear that we have to spend better. We have to spend together as much cooperative as we can. And we have to spend more European – not only European, but certainly more European. 

Since the beginning of the war, two thirds of the military acquisitions done by the European armies have been done out of the European Union. We have been looking for suppliers out of the European Union in a very high proportion. This shows that we are too much dependent – we rely too much – on suppliers which are not “our” suppliers. So, we need to [decrease] that. 

We need to spend better, to spend together, [and] to spend more European. These three things interact among them: to spend better, we have to spend more together – and in order to spend more together, we should spend more European. 

It is a triangle with “more” in the centre, but in the vertices: “better”, “together” and ”European”. The best way of doing more is combining these three approaches. 

We discussed about the European Defence Industrial Strategy.  

We took stock of the result of the last EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum, with more than 400 participants. It is clear that we need to anchor the Ukrainian defence industry in our industrial ecosystem.  

We could perfectly finance directly the Ukrainian defence [industry for] the products of the Ukrainian defence [industry] to go directly to the Ukrainian needs. We do not need to produce to buy and to send.  

It would be much easier. We should avoid transportation costs and we will develop the Ukrainian autonomy if we develop the Ukrainian industry. 

The next European Council will discuss the proposal on how to finance the big efforts on security and defence. I want to remark that to decide “how” I have to finance something, first I should know “how much” I have to finance, what is the level of need. It is not the same thing [if] we are talking about €10 billion or €100 billon. Our efforts should not [be to] say how we have to finance, but the amount that we have to finance. And this depends on the capacities and the needs of European armies. 

The European Defence Agency has been working a lot on that, without not a lot of people paying enough attention to their work. But they have been producing every year the CARD analysis – the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence - [on] what the European armies need, and which are the plans of each European army to develop their military capacities. 

Well, you have to put a figure on this request to have an idea of what we are talking about, at which door we have to knock – private sector, public sector, [or] financial institutions. The role of the European Investment Bank has also been discussed. 

All in all, everything was in the Strategic Compass. Allow me to be a little bit self-congratulatory because everything we are discussing was in the Strategic Compass. 

Only, at that moment, nobody was paying attention. Now, everybody is looking and willing to invent the wheel. The wheel was already invented. It is in the Strategic Compass pages. There is everything that we have to do.  

One thing that we have to do is to reach out more to our partners. 

That is why, this afternoon, this evening - in this marathonian week - we will inaugurate the second edition of the Schuman Forum [on Security and Defence], where Ministers of Defence from all over the world will attend [upon our] invitation. 

More than 60 countries will be represented here, plus regional, and international organisations to discuss about the current challenges we are facing. 

This will be a unique opportunity to discuss with our partners, from the Indo-Pacific [region] to Africa, to Latin America, in order to listen and discuss with them how we can work forge the partnerships that could allow us to address better the common challenges and threats that we are facing – from the Black Sea, to the Red Sea, to the Yellow Sea. The three colours of the seas in which the challenges are accumulating - the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus Strait, the Oman Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Taiwan Strait.  

In one case, it is food; in another case, it is oil; in another case, it is chips. Technology, energy, and food – the three critical variables that have always been the drivers of the conflicts and the peaceful coexistence of the nations. 

I remain at your disposal, but we do not have a lot of time. 

Q & A 

Q. High Representative, you said there was some discussion about conducting some of the training inside Ukraine. Can you give us a sense of that discussion? Where is the momentum? What were the arguments for and against?  

[For] the time being there is no consensus.  

And do you have a view on it? In terms of how dangerous or not it would be to have European boots on the ground, even if only training.

Well, some Member States believe that the advantage of training people on the scenario of war, avoiding people going back and forth, has advantages. Certainly, the ecosystem will be better adapted to the real circumstances of the war. Others believe that at the end it is sending trainers, and the trainers are military. One way or another, it would [not] be to send fighting troops, but military agents in the Ukrainian territory with the risk that [this] certainly implies.  

You know, [with] 27 [Member States] there are different views. I cannot say that there was consensus to do that tomorrow. But things change. 

Q. High Representative, you said that some countries dropped their vetoes in terms of the use of equipment they shipped to Ukraine. I am not going to ask you which countries, you will not respond to me on that. Can you at least say the number? How many? Just to give us a sense of where we are going. Secondly, pretty harsh words today from the Kremlin. Putin said that Stoltenberg – he remembered when Stoltenberg was not deranged. He implied that his remarks in these days were crazy. You said similar things, so be aware. What I am going to ask to you is: do you think that this is hitting the spot? Is Russia afraid that these weapons could be used against their military positions, and is this a real threat for them? Do you think that this is the reason why they are getting worried?  

How many countries [have] already agreed [that] the arms they provide to Ukraine could [to] be used targeting objectives in Russian territories?  

One and a half? Two? To tell the truth, I could not say that. I could not say the number. Some explicitly said: “I am going to lift this limitation.” Others have said that but not in such a clear way. Others said, “well, yes but let me think about it.” So, I cannot say; “this is the number that agree or not.” In any case, the number will change. Look, one week ago or one month ago, people did not want to call for the Association Council with Israel. Yesterday, they agreed. So, events change, and people change.  

Certainly, Russia considers that an important step. You can imagine they can attack Ukraine from [their] territory, considering that [there] could not be an attack to the installations and form the places from where they attack. Certainly, it is an advantage. It is a certain ‘sanctuarisation’. I am attacking you, but you cannot attack me. At least not to the places from [which] I am attacking you.

It is understandable the Ukrainians would like to be able to do that. It is quite logical. Then it comes all considerations about the escalation. All that you read every day in the newspapers – you read, and you write in the newspapers – I understand these concerns. But in life you have to choose. If you want to provide Ukraine with a stronger capacity, you have to provide them with the arms that could be used to protect themselves from the attacks they are suffering from. If you consider that the risk of escalation is greater than the advantages for the war, you will take another position.  

Member States have different approaches. I know some that are strongly opposed to it, and others who are definitely in favour. I cannot tell you [if it] is going to be the majority, but in any case it is not [for] the European Union. Nobody can prevent a Member State [of providing] arms to Ukraine and letting the Ukrainians use these arms to target military objectives inside the Russian territory. We cannot prevent them from doing [it]. The same way that we cannot oblige them to do it. No country has to be afraid that they will be obliged to do something that they do not want to do.  

Q. I would like to ask you whether the joint Greek-Polish proposal for a European defence shield was raised today by the Ministers of the relevant countries - that is Greece and Poland. What is your general assessment of this proposal and the observations or/and reservations, if any, of the Member States? 

It makes sense – absolutely logical. You cannot divide the airspace – yes, you can divide the airspace, certainly, in fact it is divided. “This is my airspace; this is your airspace.” But at [the] speed of a rocket, [the] speed of an air attack, you go quickly from [one] airspace to another.  

So, it would make a lot of sense to have a common defence system to protect all together all the airspaces. We have an internal market for trading, why not to have a common airspace to defend the whole airspace with a common capacity? Yes, certainly it makes sense. But this is [for] the Ministers of Defence to decide about it.  

It is not a matter of funding; it has a certain level of technical [complexity]. The devil is in the details. How is it going to work, who will be in command – who will command this common defence system? Where [will] the batteries of this common defence system be located? Who is going to work [on it]? Who is going to take decisions? In this case, the financial issue is maybe the less important one. That is why this is not an issue to be dealt from the European Union budget. First, because the European Union budget cannot fund arms. [Second], because it is the typical system that has to be conceived, decided and managed by the military, who know how to work.  

I mean, how does it work? I do not see the civil servants at the Commission deciding how to build an air defence system.  

Q. Vous soulignez que, pendant les deux réunions d’aujourd’hui et hier, vous avez fait part de votre frustration devant le blocage persistant depuis deux semaines des décisions à prendre pour soutenir financièrement l’aide militaire à l’Ukraine, par la Hongrie. Est-ce-que vous avez des raisons de croire qu’au bout de ces jours de pression par vous et d’autres ministres, les choses peuvent changer ? Du moins, avant les élections ? Ou est-ce qu’au contraire, vous pensez que cette saga va se prolonger une fois de plus jusqu’au sommet européen de la fin juin ? Et puis une question beaucoup plus concrète. Ça fait aussi des semaines, si [ce n’est] pas des mois, que les autorités ukrainiennes disent qu’il leur faudrait au moins sept systèmes de défense antiaérienne du style Patriot ou d’autres. On sait qu’il y a donc plusieurs initiatives qui sont en cours, notamment celle de l’Allemagne, qui cherchent également à assembler des parties de ce système en prenant cela à gauche à droite dans différents États membres. Est-ce qu'aujourd’hui, en fonction de toutes ces discussions vous pouvez dire si, au-delà du système Patriot que l'Allemagne a déjà promis, on est passé à un chiffre au-delà de ce “un” pour se diriger vers celui de “sept” ? 

Esto corresponde decirlo a los Estados miembros, porque yo no puedo hablar en su nombre. Puedo hablar en su nombre si puedo hablar colectivamente en su nombre. Si tengo que hablar uno a uno, entonces ellos son mayorcitos para poderlo hacer por su cuenta.  

Sí, ha habido alguna iniciativa de algún Estado que ha sugerido que tiene una capacidad de proporcionar más capacidad de defensa antiaérea basada en Patriots, utilizando este procedimiento que usted ha dicho, uniendo varias partes del mismo. El sistema Patriot es un sistema complicado que consta de radares, de lanzadores, de los interceptadores. No es como un cañón clásico de artillería.  

Algún Estado miembro ha demostrado su disposición y su capacidad para hacerlo. Pero prefiero que sean ellos quienes lo digan.  

Sobre la primera pregunta, la frustración. Es inevitable decir que el sentimiento de que no estamos haciendo las cosas tan rápidamente como es necesario, porque no somos capaces de construir la necesaria unanimidad. La frustración no es mía, la frustración es de todos los Estados miembro. 

Todos los Estados miembros han manifestado su malestar por el hecho de que todavía no hayamos conseguido llegar a un acuerdo que nos permita hacer más de lo que ya hemos hecho. Que, por cierto, es mucho. Tampoco minusvaloremos lo que hemos hecho que es mucho, [solo] porque nos quedan cosas que hacer. No sé cuándo esta objeción se va a levantar. No lo sé, francamente. Solo sé que tengo siete actos legales sobre la mesa pendientes de aprobación, que permitirían movilizar 6,6 [mil millones] de euros en capacidad militar.  

Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-257541