Thank you, and good day everybody.  

Before updating you on the college meeting, I will raise two issues. 

First, today, the EU and NATO hold a Chinese state-backed actor responsible for a malicious cyber-campaign against the Czech Republic. This attack is an unacceptable breach of international norms. The EU will not tolerate hostile cyber actions, and we stand in solidarity with the Czech Republic. 

Then, on the Middle East, the situation in Gaza remains dire. Israel’s strikes in Gaza go beyond what is necessary to fight Hamas. Bypassing the UN in aid deliveries undermines humanitarian principles. And incidents challenging the special status of Jerusalem risk further escalating tensions.  

Now, turning to the College meeting. First, we discussed the EU Strategy for Start-ups and Scale-ups. Executive Vice-President Stephane Séjourné and Commissioner Zaharieva will join you in the press room later after this conference is over to present this initiative. 

We also appointed Elisabeth Warner as Director-General for the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI). The date of effect is 1^st of June 2025. The Spokesperson’s service will publish further details on this. 

Today, we also adopted a technical, but important, proposal to make EU aid tools more user-friendly. This includes simpler rules for faster and more accessible loans. We also propose moving surplus funds across guarantee funds. 

Commissioner Síkela will provide details on this, but the key point is that this could unlock several hundred million euros for external investment and aid.  We had a discussion on Monday with development Ministers in the Foreign Affairs Council regarding these issues, and how to really do more.  

The second proposal today is a Joint Communication on the Black Sea.  

The Black Sea region is of great strategic importance to the European Union because of the connection between Central Asia and Europe. It is important because of security, trade, and energy. 

Also, the region’s countries are strengthening their ties with the European Union. Again, the feel of geopolitical shifts is there.  

Ukraine and Moldova are moving towards membership of the EU. Georgia too, if it returns to the EU path. And Türkiye is an EU partner of strategic importance and a candidate country. 

But the region’s potential is marred by Russia’s war. Recurring airspace violations and attacks on ports and shipping lanes highlight this reality.  

Commissioner Kos will address other elements, but on security, our focus is on three priorities:  

First, we are proposing a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub. This hub will be Europe’s early warning system in the Black Sea. It will enhance situational awareness and help protect critical infrastructure, like offshore installations and subsea cables. The Hub could also help monitor any peace between Russia and Ukraine. In parallel, we will put greater efforts into demining, that is also a very big threat in the Black Sea. Programmes such as the EU’s Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund can help map the threat posed by mines.   

Second, military mobility. We propose additional upgrades of regional ports, railways, roads, and airports to handle heavy military gear. Upgrades will help ensure troops can be where they are needed, when they are needed. Getting equipment to the region faster strengthens deterrence and also supports NATO. Alongside upgrades, we want better screening of foreign owners in ports and key facilities.  

The third point is on hybrid threats. The Black Sea region is the prime target for hybrid actions. The European Union aims to boost cooperation to combat cyberattacks, disinformation, and other hostile actions. We will invest in Artificial Intelligence to fight disinformation, promote media literacy, and enhance fact-checker networks. 

Once again, the security of the Black Sea is vital also to European security. 

Thank you.

Q&A

Q. How will the Black Sea strategy help Ukraine? That is the first question.
And then the second one is quite specific. How does the Black Sea strategy tie in to preventing circumvention of EU sanctions? We have mentioned Russian disinformation cyber warfare several times. 
And then the third and final question is specifically that oil section, that exporting or crude, can you confirm that 50 US dollars is something that is being mentioned? Is that a figure that we can move towards? And when would we see the 17^thpackage?  

Thank you. So how will this help Ukraine? First, Ukraine and Moldova are Black Sea countries, and we see the Black Sea being weaponised, really. We see that the trade route to export grain is via the Black Sea. And we also see that this war is really making it much, much harder. So, we have different steps here. Of course, first we need to see the war ending [so] that we can also step up with this approach here, but what is important is that we keep the Black Sea in mind andthat we help with the security guarantees when it comes to the Black Sea as well. We have the Coalition of the Willing discussing different security guarantees. We see that we have to also come up with different proposals to support these security guarantees from our side. So, in this strategy, we have points that we are putting forward: military mobility – I already mentioned. Also, the ownership of the ports, because it is also important to know who is behind the critical infrastructure.
It is also about the undersea cables' protection, and there we are closely working with NATO. What more can we do? It is about patrolling the lines, it is about [combatting] the hybrid threads in the region that are also beneficial for Ukraine's security. It is [very] much interlinked.  

Then on the prevention of circumvention. It does not really address these issues, but I think that if we have information sharing, for example, about the ports’ ownership and these things, we have more monitoring and also cooperation with the countries around. Then we also have more information. If we have more information on these things, we can also address the circumvention [better].  

And, on the oil price gap, if you recall, in the beginning when the oil price gap was introduced, the agreement was that it [would] always be 5% lower than the market price. So, this was the initial agreement. It has not been executed in a way, but we are looking into different ways to do it. And, of course, the Council needs to approve all this, so the discussions are ongoing. And when are we going out with the sanctions package? The intense work is going on as soon as possible, I would say. Thank you. 

Q. I have a couple of questions for the High Representative on the new Maritime Security Hub. Is there already an idea of where this Hub will be located? 
How much will it cost? Is there already also an idea of what assets this would require from Member States? My second question, as you mentioned that the hub could support the negotiations and monitoring of ceasefires. Can you share any details on how you would envisage that could be operationalised?  

So, we will work with the Member States on the suitable location and also the operational model. Because I think, again, it is important that it will be regional, not national, because it is a European project. And of course, as you know, the discussions on the next MFF are ongoing. 
So, the cost of this hub also very much depends on the location and the operational model that we need to agree with the Member States. So, for the MFF, the discussions are ongoing, but I think it is important also that we need the Member State's input for the hub. Because the understanding is there; that is necessary, but we also need to see financial support for that. 

Yes, the ceasefire monitoring. First of all, we need to have a ceasefire - what we do not have right now. We do not see any signs of that yet. When we have the ceasefire, then we have different options. First is the information exchange of the security situation – and there also what Member States are willing to do in order to [achieve] that. It is also more integrated and interoperable systems to monitor the situation because it is important to have the understanding of who does what. And then also the tools that we can put forward to the maritime security. But it is in cooperation with NATO, and it also needs a decision of the Council.  

Q. I noticed that the strategy speaks about the shadow fleet. This has been a recurrent concern for the European Union for a long time now. Do you think that, given the threats that the Shadow Fleet poses to Europe’s security in environment, do you think that the next step should be an EU military operation or EU mission to monitor, inspect, and possibly seize these vessels from the shadow fleet? Do you think this should be the next step in the crackdown? And second question on the oil price cap that my colleague mentioned, do you think that the European Union can lower the price cap without the support of the United States? 

Thank you. So, the shadow fleet is becoming a bigger problem for the European Union. We see also our adversaries finding new ways to use it. 
It's not only a threat to security, but it's also a threat to the environment [based on] what we see.  

And, of course, we are coming up with proposals, but our adversaries are also finding new ways. That is why we have the Baltic Sentry from NATO operating in the Baltic Sea, but I think we also need a more comprehensive approach for other maritime environments because we see those threats and the shadow fleet operating everywhere. So, the discussions are ongoing about the rules because right now in the maritime domain, if you look at the international agreements, there are many limitations on addressing these threats. Therefore, we need to work also with our international partners to address these concerns: when you can stop a ship and all these things that need much broader attention than only the European Union. 
 

And then on the oil price cap, of course, we are working so that it would be the unified approach with the United States as well as European Union. We have heard President Trump saying that he is losing patience with Putin and then we know that there is also a senators’ package proposed. So, we hope to work with the United States in the same direction. Thank you. 

Q. To follow up on the security center. The idea of a center which could control the security and ceasefire on the Black Sea was proposed to Bulgaria during the meeting of the Coalition of the Willing in Paris in March. Are these ideas in some way connected? Could it be considered as a part of the Coalition of Willing this participation of Türkiye, Bulgaria, I think Romania, and maybe other countries? Thank you. 

Thank you. It shows how fast and agile the European Union is. If the proposal was in March and -  voilà - we are coming up with the strategy already. But jokes aside, yes, the Coalition of the Willing is discussing the different security guarantees. And of course, we as the European Union are also thinking about what we can bring to the table. The Black Sea strategy is a very comprehensive approach, taking all these ideas and putting them together. The maritime hub is one of the flagship projects for this, to address the concerns and also keep in mind that if the ceasefire is in place, we also need the security guarantees. So, it shows good cooperation also by member states, and the ideas and also the implementation need to be together with them. Thank you. 

Q. Since you mentioned the latest news from the Czech Republic about potential Chinese hacking, I was wondering whether this new development could, in any way, jeopardise the upcoming EU-China Summit in July. 

Thank you. Yes, we are determined to counter malicious behavior in cyberspace. And again, everything is very much connected to cyberspace nowadays. So, these threats are actually very, very serious. What we have done is really to address these things [on a] case-by-case basis. We have put sanctions on companies who have done it before. Of course, we will raise them with our Chinese counterparts as well, because it poses threat to our security and we definitely remain ready to also impose costs for these kinds of attacks. Thank you. 

Q. I would like to know still whether this could have any impact on the summit. Is it something which could make the EU-China summit kind of difficult, and will there be any turmoil because of this? 

Yes, I heard your question, but I do not have a good answer to this. The presidents of the [European] Council and the Commission are very much determined to have this summit and the agreements are there. So, I think we will still have the summit, but it is just my opinion. So that is why I do not have a direct answer to you. I think it is important that we have places where we can address these issues, the threats that are imposed on us. And it is better to have the opportunity to talk about these things and hopefully have a change of behaviour. 

Q. HR/VP, you mentioned Gaza in your introductory remarks. I was wondering if you can confirm that EU aid is being distributed under the new system that the Israeli government has implemented and if you are okay with it, considering that shots have been fired at people who were trying to get that aid. I was also wondering, as in the past you have mentioned that you have offered help to the Israel government to distribute aid: how is that going? Is there in any way [an] involvement of the EU in this process? And are you in contact with the US regarding all this? Thank you. 

Thank you. The majority of the aid is sponsored by Europe but it is behind the borders and is not reaching [the] people. And that is why we are addressing this also with our Israeli counterparts, that the humanitarian aid is there to go for the people. We have also been very clear on not supporting any kind of privatization of the distribution of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid cannot be weaponized. It has to be in accordance with humanitarian principles. And therefore, humanitarian aid organizations that are able to provide that aid. We have been very, very clear about that. And of course, we are working with our counterparts in Israel and hoping that our allies everywhere will do the same to really help the people, because the suffering of the people there is untenable, and we have the tools to help them. 

Q. My question is on Gaza. High Representative since you mentioned Gaza in your introductory remarks. I would like to ask you, it has been one week [since] you launched a review of the Association of Agreement with Israel. Are there any updates on the timeline of this review? 

Yes, thank you. So, we had a very intense discussion with the Foreign Affairs Ministers, and we decided to launch the review. So, the review is being conducted right now, and the aim is to also have it so that we can have the discussion with Foreign Affairs Ministers in June with results. Also, I intend to present options for the Member States then. 

Q. Sorry to jump a bit, but a recent letter from the transport ministers of the Baltic states, addressed to the Commission, concerned the fact that the Rail Baltic project is running gravely over budget and it requires more EU funding. Considering this is also an important project in another region, still, but for military mobility as well. Do you think there are options for more EU funding under this umbrella? 

No, I can answer in very general terms that the discussions on MFF are ongoing. And of course, it is clear that where we have had those discussions so far, there are very many needs, and Rail Baltic, of course, ticks the box when it comes to military mobility, for example. But we need to discuss all these things together, and these discussions are ongoing as we speak. 

Q. We have read various media reports of election meddling and foreign interference during these democratic contests. I am thinking about Romania, for example, but I work for the Polish public broadcaster. So, there is going to be the second round of that presidential election runoff occurring this weekend, which is why it is an important question: how significant are free and fair elections to guarantee stability and security within Europe? And what is the EU doing to ensure that these contests occur within this framework? 

Thank you. Free and fair elections are extremely important because democracy is built on trust. And when people do not trust elections, it has a concrete effect on democracy. And this is dangerous because then we see, you know, autocratic powers on the rise. And there we know that the interests are completely different than in democracies where you take everybody's views into account. So, what are we doing about this? We have developed, in the External Action Service, tools to fight foreign malign influence, especially in elections. For example, the toolbox that we have has also been given or made available for Moldova, for example, because there we see a lot of Russian interference really trying to not have free and fair elections. And of course, there are many, many elements in those toolboxes. I mean, one is really the media literacy of people, but then the other part is also the fact-checkers. And this is very complex. But it is important that we work with this. It is important that we also make these things transparent and show people, because like I said, democracy is based on trust. And if people do not know what exactly to trust, what is true, what is not, then they will not make their choices based on informed decisions. But saying all that, it is extremely hard because we are living in an information age and lies travel very fast. 

Q. On the Black Sea strategy and on Türkiye. The first question to the High Representative. I understand that the strategy would obviously aim for closer cooperation with Ankara. Did you receive any indication from the Turkish side what they would be willing to contribute possibly in the future? And another question for Commissioner Kos, and it is on enlargement. Ankara's accession process has been frozen for many years. Do you view the strategy as a potential opening for a reset, or do you consider it independent from this discussion? 

Thank you. So, this new Black Sea strategy is also an invitation to work more closely together on the topics that are of interest to all countries around the Black Sea, including Türkiye.  

So, we are committed to enhance maritime situational awareness and work closely together with our partners, and also [to share] information on what is happening and what we can do about this with all the Black Sea partners. And this is in the interest of Türkiye too. All the countries around the Black Sea can benefit from these outcomes. So, it is also clear that the security of this region cannot lay on the shoulders of a few countries only, but [there really] has to be really a cooperative approach to this. So, of course we are also working together with Türkiye regarding this. 

Q. Does the strategy proposed have the component of energy? As the EU is moving forward to end Russian energy supply to the member countries and the candidate countries eventually, because they are some of them are part of the region. Thus, the strategy has a component of the Russian energy supplies to the countries? 

Just a general comment. I think in this strategy it is also very, very important to look at the maps to understand how important this region really is, also [in terms of] energy and also connectivity. But Marta can talk about it in detail. Thank you. 

Link to the video:https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-272405