2026 Churchill lecture: ‘A Rules-Based Global Order in an Era of Power Politics’

Dear Federal Councillors Cassis and Pfister,

Dear Prof. Andreas Kellerhals, Director of the Europa-Institut,

Dear Sir Noel Quinn from Bank Julius Bär,

Dear guests,

Dear friends,

Eighty years ago on this very stage, Winston Churchill called for a new, peaceful, and united European structure, “a kind of United States of Europe.”

The backdrop of the speech was the opposite of his proposal: Europe was devastated, wrecked by famine, fractured politically. The Second World War had destroyed our cities, scattered our people, and sown deep mistrust among nations, including former wartime allies.

In Eastern Europe and beyond, the Soviet Union was occupying and annexing some countries – including my own – while tightening its grip over others. New fears of tyranny and instability were taking hold. The Cold War had begun, as Churchill made clear exactly 80 years ago when he coined the term: “Iron Curtain.”

What would follow was not yet known. As Churchill spoke from this stage, the world was in a geopolitical Twilight Zone. And we find ourselves here again.

It is fashionable these days to speak of the postwar international order crumbling before our eyes. I am guilty of this myself. But what we truly seek is change.

This is why I propose we follow the advice of psychotherapists and proponents of ‘12-step groups.’ They say the starting point for change is to identify and name the problem: Europe is collectively addicted to the way the world was, when there was understanding on the primacy of international law and the UN Charter. These did not work perfectly of course. But they were a foundation.

Today, the chaos we see around us in the Middle East is a direct consequence of the erosion of international law. It started when Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, invaded its neighbour, with impunity and a good measure of cynicism.

This has not gone unnoticed. Instead, it has sent a signal around the world that there is no accountability for one’s actions; that the rulebook has been thrown out the window.

Without restoring international law, together with accountability, we are doomed to see repeated violations of the law, disruption and chaos.

I will elaborate on this challenge.

We in Europe have an existential threat on our doorstep. Russia’s military campaign began with Georgia in 2008, then Crimea in 2014, Syria as a testing ground in 2015, followed by a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. But the Donbas is not Russia’s endgame.

Europe is already fending off:

• Russian cyberattacks on our economy,
• Russian sabotage against our undersea infrastructure;
• and Russia’s attempts to fracture our alliances and      undermine our societal cohesion.

Beyond that, Russia is weaponizing oil and gas, engaging in military intimidation and even brandishing its nuclear arsenal.

Make no mistake: Russia is not the emerging superpower it was 80 years ago, when the post-war global order was defined:

• Russia’s economy is in shreds, disconnected from Europe’s energy markets.
• And after more than a decade of conflict, including 4 years of full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia has barely advanced beyond the 2014 lines, at a cost of 1.2 million casualties. This is the very opposite of blitzkrieg.

But Russia will remain a major threat to any international order as it was in 1946. Why?

• Because Russia is executing the most outrageous breeches of international law in United Nations history. And doing so with impunity;
• Because Russia has turned its back on its international duty as a Permanent Member of UN Security Council and primary guarantor of the United Nations and its credibility.
• Because Russia backs this up with the world’s biggest nuclear arsenal;

China, too, is taking advantage of this erosion of rules. China has been preparing the ground for decades to assume its place as a great power. It is expanding its nuclear stockpile faster than anyone else. With impressive strategic patience, China has been creating dependencies around the world, threatening countries in the East and South China seas, bankrolling Russia’s war against Ukraine and reimagining the world order in its own image.

This is not only posing a risk to Europe’s economic model, but more broadly undermines the multilateral system that has ensured that rules actually rule.

And then there is the fundamental reorientation across the Atlantic, which goes by a variety of names from “realignment,” to “new dynamic” and even “rupture.”

The shift in U.S. foreign policy has already rocked the transatlantic relationship to its foundation, with aftershocks in other parts of the world. But the impact on the international order is seismic.

Cumulatively, these trends point to a paradigm shift. The current direction is a new world order characterised by competition and coercive power politics; a world order dominated by a handful of military powers who aim to establish and secure spheres of influence.

We can already see the weakening of existing international norms, rules and institutions that we have built over 80 years.

How we respond to this moment says less about the new dispensation than it does about us. Because we have been here before.

The current fragmentation bears similarities to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, now somewhat mistakenly seen by some politicians as a period of stability, interdependence and peace in Europe. Nationalism and populism were also seen as attractive alternatives to the globalism that many found wanting.

Robert Kagen recently wrote of the downside to the multipolarity that emerged back then, which many still advocate for today.

The so-called “long peace” in Europe from 1815 to 1914 was far from it. To bring just a few examples, France invaded Spain, Prussia and Austria fought Denmark, then Prussia and Austria fought each other, and in the Crimean War pretty much every European power took part until half a million people were killed.

Multipolarity was neither peaceful, stable nor particularly conducive to economic development. Ultimately it ended in global devastation.

In the aftermath of the First World War, in the heady days of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the world community decided to try something different: multilateralism instead of multipolarity. And a League of Nations was born.

But this idea was nascent, and countries were perhaps not yet ready. In the United States, for example, partisan politics meant that Congress never ratified the Treaty of Versailles to join the League.

From the start, the League was shackled by a lack of economic weight, military credibility, and diplomatic authority with the absence of the emerging superpower. It also lacked legitimacy in Germany and beyond because it was seen as a product of Versailles and therefore punitive in nature.

Still, as Churchill reminded us here in 1946, “The League did not fail because of its principles or conceptions. It failed because those principles were deserted by those states which brought it into being.”

The multilateral system established after the Second World War was therefore a natural evolution. It, too, had its downsides, not least because it reflected the wartime power landscape of the victors. But there were three positive differences, three signs of collective growth.

First, it evolved as the world community evolved. The defeated were soon brought in and the system also benefitted from a general sense that punishing the defeated may well cause another round of war. This evolution also meant embracing the many nations that emerged from under colonial rule and including a big chunk of Europe that had been occupied by the Soviet Union.

Second, it had the buy-in from the United States, protected from other great powers as it was by virtue of strength as well as geographic distance.

Third, and even more astonishing, was the willingness of other great powers and emerging powers to buy in, at least at the time and at least partially. They opted to legitimise this system at their own expense, giving up ambitions, lands and influence for the sake of peace and the collective good.

And that is the essence of any functional international order. It is also what connects the three disruptors I referred to at the start. In their own way, at varying degrees, each is now pursuing foreign policy mainly for their own interests. Much of it is at the expense of others. They are players in a zero-sum game.

But that has never been Europe’s game. In fact, the history of the European Union has followed a similar trajectory to the development of the international order.

It, too, has not been a smooth, linear arc. Rather our realising the necessity, as crisis after crisis exposed the limits of national solutions and pushed our Member States toward deeper cooperation.

From the devastation of the Second World War to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, each shock revealed structural vulnerabilities—whether economic, geopolitical, or institutional—that individual governments could not resolve alone.

The response was always the same: pool sovereignty in a new domain, create a new institution, or strengthen existing ones.

This dynamic produced:

• The European Coal and Steel Community after the Second World War;
• The European Economic Community after the failure of early defence plans;
• The Single Market after the economic turmoil of the 1970s;
• And the European Union itself after the geopolitical upheaval of 1989.

In the 21st century, this pattern has only intensified:

• The eurozone crisis forced the creation of fiscal and banking mechanisms unthinkable a decade earlier;
• The migration crisis expanded EU-level border and asylum tools;
• The COVID-19 pandemic triggered the first large-scale issuance of joint EU debt;
• And Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine accelerated defence coordination, energy diversification, and opened another window for enlargement.

The EU’s evolution was never a grand masterplan. It was a series of pragmatic responses to moments when the status quo could no longer hold. It was possible because of the guiding principle of mutually beneficial cooperation.

The same is true of Europe today as it is of the international order we all belong to.

When it comes to Europe, we will find our European way, as we always have.

For a start, Europe does not and cannot choose between our values and our interests because our values are our interests.

For Europeans who have lived under occupation like myself or those who have had their rights taken away by autocratic leaders, Europe truly is the land of the free.

Our point of departure is not bad:

• We have achieved the conditions to lead an excellent quality of life;
• In health care, culture, education, infrastructure and stability Europe is among the best in the world;
• Europeans are safe, healthy, happy and breathing clean air;
• There’s social cohesion;
• And our fundamental freedoms are protected, including media freedom.

But we also need to make some improvements. We have to even out performance among the 27 and better our competitiveness, boost our growth and deepen integration. And all of this is necessary for us to be able to also fulfil our global calling.

One of our key challenges in Europe today is to define our goals when it comes to security.

In my eyes, security has a wide definition – from our goal of being an economic powerhouse, and the challenges we face here, to our aim of becoming a hard power force.

At the height of the financial crisis, Mario Draghi said we would do “whatever it takes to save the euro.” That worked because he meant it. My goal is to get to the same stage when it comes to our own security.

Europeans have always grown through crises by:

• Working together;
• Creating new ways to cooperate;
• And finding solutions to challenges that serve the collective interest.

And that is why, when it comes to the international order, Europe can be part of the solution.

There is a famous three-word phrase from philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his 1651 book Leviathan. Hobbes describes the state of anarchy in a world without order. You all know it. But few recall the full quote as an appeal to working with others, lest life be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Coming as it did just three years after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which set the framework for sovereign states – including Switzerland –, Hobbes’s call is a ringing endorsement from way back in the 17th century for cooperation. And cooperation is what Europe does best.

And that is why today, when states search for someone to lead the effort to bolster alliances and defend international law, more and more they turn to the EU. I hear this every single time I meet with foreign leaders in Brussels or abroad. Because the European Union is a reliable partner.

This is today’s paradox: the decline in multilateralism has in fact put it back on the table. Even if the biggest military powers are not interested, everyone else is. The question is how to cater for this vast majority?

Pundits near and far have been speaking of Europe’s reaction to the state of the world in terms of bereavement. The Economist refers to the late psychiatrist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross—who was born right here in Zürich—describing how Europe has worked its way through the five stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, arriving at acceptance.

But acceptance is not the same as agreeing on how to adapt.

Considering how much of my time goes to seeking a common position among the 27 EU Member States, I cannot but agree. The time of acceptance is over; the time for action is at hand.

Action means transforming the multilateral system into one that meets the expectations of participating states. It must be shown to deliver, it must work for all.

This brings me back to Churchill’s observation that failures stem not from wrong principles but because the current principles need further development.

The events of the last days in the Middle East underline this observation. The people of Iran now stand before the chance for a different future. But I am concerned about how we got to this point, specifically because it is only international law that stands between us and full-blown chaos.

So what can we do?

For starters, it is time to speak seriously about reform of the international system.

In these discussions, we must recognise that our current system – including the United Nations, its Charter, and the international legal environment – exists above all to prevent wars from starting – including by curbing poverty, championing equality, and tackling climate change. Any revision or replacement is doomed to fail if it leaves this part out.

The EU has its own long experience reviewing, adjusting and transforming itself. We know that doing so is not a one-shot project. It involves listening, negotiation, political compromises and a healthy dose of humility.

But today, we have no choice. Knowing that others are also looking to counter entropy, understanding our strengths but also what we have learned from our failures, the EU is ready to lead in these efforts to transform the multilateral system. Because we believe that adjustment will lend us the stability we seek.

Moving forward on reform is a process that is neither easy nor simple. It means recognising the problem, which we have. It means mustering the political willingness to go forward, which we are working on. And it means engaging in the tough discussions it will require: taking a seat at the table instead of leaving an empty chair. It means making decisions stick, for everyone, through perseverance and follow through.

While we consider these big questions, we can take another page from the EU playbook. Whether you call it Hegelian or Schumanian, the EU learned that focusing on practical, incremental steps eventually leads to qualitative change.

Take international law for example. The UN Charter is an excellent basis, but it was written in analog times. We need an international legal foundation for the digital era where our rights in the digital space are protected. We need to rethink the rules governing the maritime space now our seabeds are full of cables carrying data across the globe.

From cyberspace to outer space, Artificial Intelligence to the Arctic, there are so many areas where we can and should move forward together.

But if we do this, we need to strengthen accountability too. Because international law is only as effective as we are willing to make it. Enforcement is essential, no one should be above the law.

And whether we speak of…

• bilateral partnerships,
• or alliances,
• regional organisations,
• or coalitions of the willing,
• or minilateral,
• plurilateral,
• or variable geometry arrangements…

…all of these are all complementary to the multilateral, rules-based order that most states want.

And in fact, doing more of this, cross regionally and with a critical mass, could strengthen the system as a whole. The idea is to incubate ideas in smaller formats that could then be taken before the rest of the world to ripen.

Dear friends,

We stand before an opportunity. Europe can step onto the global stage united and strong, or resign ourselves to the sidelines.

Our illusions are gone. But as Estonia’s first post-Cold War President Lennart Meri said, “where illusions are shattered, hope is born.”

Paraphrasing Winston Churchill in June 1940, during the period of the Battle of France, this may not be Europe’s finest hour. But it is Europe’s Hour of Decision.

Do we allow the ongoing downward spiral to firm up and cement into place, with predictable consequences for Europe and the world? Or do we heed the clarion call to lead, in defence of values, the law, together with others?

My fellow Europeans, we may feel disheartened and disempowered by much of what is happening around us.

But now is our time to decide.

Thank you