On Saturday 24 June, I was woken up by a phone call telling me that Wagner militia forces had taken control of the regional headquarter of the Russian army in Rostov on the Don and that they had set off towards Moscow.  

During a video conference of G7 foreign ministers we agreed not to comment publicly on these events, to avoid giving Vladimir Putin and his propaganda machine any pretext for trying to blame Western countries for this internal Russian issue. Now that the mutiny is over, we can and should however draw lessons from what happened in Russia that Saturday. 

The weakening of Putin’s regime 

The first lesson is that the war of aggression against Ukraine has weakened Vladimir Putin's regime far more than many observers had thought. Since February 2022, he seemed to have maintained or even strengthened his grip on power despite some crushing defeats of the Russian army in Ukraine. At the same time, many observers argued that the Russian economy had not (yet) been seriously affected by the war and our sanctions.  

Prigozhin’s mutiny, and the fact that hardly any forces actively opposed the capture of the main Russian headquarter in the war against Ukraine, and the subsequent march on Moscow, showed the depth of the divisions within the Russian army and state apparatus.  

The fact that a state-funded group of mercenaries opened fire on the regular state army illustrates the degree of pathology of Putin’s Russia.

On 27 June, Putin publicly admitted for the first time that the Wagner Group had indeed been massively supported and funded by the Russian state. As I said at our last Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Putin created a monster, and now the monster has bitten him. The fact that a state-funded group of mercenaries opened fire on the regular state army illustrates the degree of pathology of Putin’s Russia.  

It was symbolic that Prigozhin on the eve of his attempted coup, challenged the official narrative used by the Kremlin to justify the war, denying any aggressive plans of Kyiv and NATO. Instead, he blamed Defence Minister Shoigu for spreading lies out of his personal ambition. I hope that more and more Russian citizens, but also more people globally, will start questioning the manipulative official narrative used by Putin, Lavrov and others about this war.

A serious loss of authority 

Even if this attempted coup ultimately failed, Putin has suffered a serious loss of authority, with real consequences for the future. Putin and his regime may now try to consolidate again their power, clamping down on military bloggers who dared to criticise the army, or purging the military, security and state apparatus. However, it is obvious that the Russian state is in a profound crisis.  

The risk of growing instability in Russia is another serious consequence of Prigozhin’s mutiny, especially for a country that holds nuclear weapons. But here comes another lesson learnt from the ongoing Russian war of aggression: Putin’s Russia represents the biggest threat to European and global security and its nuclear arsenal makes it not less but more dangerous for the entire civilised world.  

A Ukrainian victory would open a possibility for Russia to start a process of change, a prerequisite for a lasting peace.

This is another reason why we must continue supporting the Ukrainian armed forces to drive Russian troops out of the country. A Ukrainian victory is the best way to reach the just peace, based on international law that Ukraine needs and deserves. Such a peace would also open a possibility for Russia to start a process of change, a prerequisite for a lasting peace. Russian history has shown that when change comes, it may come fast. We should be prepared for that.  

Then, there is the Belarus angle. Officially, Lukashenko played a prominent role in containing Prigozhin's mutiny. His regime, which is rejected by the vast majority of Belarusians, can only hold together thanks to Russian support, and any challenge to Putin's power would very likely lead to Lukashenko’s downfall. 

Keeping a close eye on Belarus 

We are keeping a close eye on developments in Belarus, and in particular the installation of Wagner mercenaries in the country. Their possible involvement in aggressive actions of Lukashenko's regime towards its neighbours, would necessarily result in a strong response from our side.  

Last week I met again with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaia and other democratic and civil society leaders from Belarus to assure them of our continued support to a free and democratic Belarus. We agreed to set up a regular Consultative Group to enable a permanent dialogue between the EU and the Belarusian opposition. 

Finally, Foreign Minister Lavrov was instructed to reassure the world that Russia “will emerge stronger” after the mutiny. However, I think that close partners of Russia are the first to worry. In particular, China may now realise that its support for Putin’s war could have been a miscalculation in terms of its long-term interests. The refusal of the President of Kazakhstan to support Vladimir Putin during these events also marks further weakening of Russia’s influence in his neighbourhood.   

China may now realise that its support for Putin’s war could have been a miscalculation in terms of its long-term interests.

The admission that Wagner is in reality a Russian state controlled entity has also far-reaching consequences beyond Russia and Ukraine, given the multiples crimes committed by the members of this organisation not only in Ukraine but also in all the countries where it operates, in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali or Sudan.  

Alongside the powerful Russian propaganda apparatus, which is constantly spreading lies across the globe, Wagner has been used by the Putin regime as a privileged tool to destabilise countries, particularly in Africa, with very negative consequences for the local populations but also for EU interests. Prigozhin himself has admitted that Wagner’s actions in Africa were financed by the Kremlin. In these countries, Russia can however hardly replace these pseudo “private” militias with regular forces. Here too, we are following developments very closely in Africa and call on leaders to stop relying on these lawless mercenaries.

We are following developments very closely in Africa and call on leaders to stop relying on these lawless mercenaries.

It is still too early to measure all the consequences of Prigozhin’s mutiny but it has become clear already that they will be significant and negative for Putin's regime. We will use this momentum to increase our support to Ukraine. We are on track to train 30 000 Ukrainian soldiers until the end of the year and we have decided a €3.5 billion top-up to the European Peace Facility (EPF) to provide Ukraine with more much needed arms to defend itself against Russia.