Thank you, thank you very much for being here. Thank you for your time and your attention. Yes, I studied at Stanford fifty years ago, fifty years ago! When I left, I said to myself that I had to come back, because I had here the best time of my life. As I am sure you have.

Well, it only took fifty years but finally I am here [and] I am very happy for your invitation. Thank you so much for that, this was a very good opportunity for me to coming back to the Stanford campus.

Our relationship - between the European Union and the US- has been at the core of our peace and prosperity. It was true 20, 30, 50 years ago and it is still true today. We greatly value the Transatlantic relationship, but this Transatlantic relationship is not just about Washington. It is also about California, [that has] a strong European, Spanish, heritage.

If you were a country, you would be the fifth economy in the world. And today you are leading the artificial intelligence revolution and I am happy to know that we are partners on building a responsible and human-centric technological innovation.

But let’s go to the subject, you are not here to listen about my life, although you may understand that for me is very moving to be here in Stanford. Then I went into politics and four years ago I became High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy. At the beginning, foreign policy was the most important part of my portfolio, of my job, but today is about security and defence, because the world has changed a lot in these last four years.

At the beginning when I took my office, I said a sentence that was very much noticed: “Europe has to learn to use the language of power”. And it was important because the  power was not in the European Union DNA, because our project was driven by the rejection of power, the rejection of force, the rejection of power politics among us, among Europeans. And we managed and we succeed a lot in avoiding power politics among Europeans.

Our foreign policy was mostly oriented towards market integration among us, and market trade was the most important part of our foreign policy. We wanted to develop partnerships through trade, believing that a partnership based on trade will bring peace and good relationships around the world.

Now we have to change gear. We have to adjust our software. We have to reset our minds, because certainly power politics today is a reality - unhappily, it's not an insanity. It's something that dominates the world. And if we want to protect our values and our interests, then we have to look at the world the way it is and not the way we want it to be: a peaceful place.

We made peace among us, and we believed that the rest of the world also was a peaceful place. Unhappily, that's not true. And now we are living – as someone says – a Demosthenes moment or as others say in a Hamiltonian moment. We are facing the tragedy of great powers.

And we need to redefine our position with respect to the international system, at least for three major reasons.

First. A strong, a fierce competition among major powers, and the rise of an intense interstate rivalry. The weaponisation of interdependency, if you are dependent, this is going to be used as an [arm] against you, and this changes everything.

The second one, is that our economic way, the EU’s economic way is declining. You, the US, 30 years ago you were 25% of the world GNP. You are still 25% of the world GNP. All of us has been growing, but you kept your size, your share of the world economy.

Us? No. We have been decreasing, our share of the world economy has been declining, and we have the risk, we face the risk, of becoming or suffering a collateral damage from the US-China competition, which will be the most important factor of international relations in the next decades.

And this is going to be the century of Southeast Asia and China in particular. Before the war in Ukraine, you, the US, moved to the Indo-Pacific because you were convinced - and I think you are still convinced - that there is the new front line in the world. And we, Europeans, we can be a collateral damage of this competition.

And the third one is that the security landscape has dramatically changed, in particular in our geography, the war against Ukraine is at some kilometres of the European Union. The Russian aggression against Ukraine has changed everything for us.

I remember Javier Solana, who was (as I was) also a Fulbright scholar, saying when he left his job as High Representative: “Europe has never been so secure, in peace and tranquility”. Well, that's not exactly what I'm saying today.

When I presented the Strategic Compass, weeks before the start of the war against Ukraine, my words were quite different. I said: “Europe is in danger”. Javier Solana said: “We have never been so peaceful and so secure”. I said: “Europe is in danger and we have to increase our capacity to face difficult challenges.”

This difference between the words of my friend Solana and my words are due to some changes. What have been these changes in the last four years?

First the Russian challenge and how we manage it. And we managed to put an end to our dependency in an incredible short period of time. Forty per cent of our gas was coming from Russia. You from the U.S. warned us: “Don't do it. It's very dangerous. Putin is not a reliable partner. He's not a reliable supplier.” In spite of that, we continued building pipelines - Nord Stream One, Nord Stream Two - in order to get more and more gas coming from Russia. Until the war came and then we cut 40% and today [is just] 9%. [In just] a couple of years. This is remarkable. And we did that also thanks to [to the fact that] you are a great provider of liquefied natural gas.

Second, we have been able to build a common vision vis-a-vis Russia and Ukraine. I know I am talking in front of one to the best specialists on Russia. Well, the Europeans were quite divided about Russia, but we managed to be united in front of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. And we are united on considering Russia an existential threat to the Europeans. Not everybody agrees exactly on this definition: there is at least one or maybe two countries who don't believe that Russia is an existential threat. But the rest of us, and in particular, the ones who are closer to the border, consider that we have to behave with this state of mind.

And the third thing we need is to be one of the biggest security providers to Ukraine. Maybe the biggest. If you add up the civilian support and the military support, we have disbursed, paid effectively, since the beginning of the war, €96 billion Euros, which makes a figure that, if I am not wrong, is bigger than the figure provided by the US. You are much better on military support, but [we are] in overall  [support], military and civilian; and even [on] military support we can discuss [it].

And by the way, what a pity that you have been six months discussing about maintaining or not this support:  this six months could make a big difference on the front line. The last news I got this morning  [in the] daily report from my people in Brussels, is that Russia is starting a new offensive, opening a new front in the north of Kharkiv. I was there some days before the war started, and now maybe this may be the place where a decisive development affects us, and events could happen this springtime.

Yes. There is a new offensive in Kharkiv, and maybe - why not - if Putin wins this war, they could destabilise other European Union countries. All of them are knocking at the door of NATO to become members of NATO. Finland and Sweden, traditionally neutral, because they are very much convinced that, if they want to avoid to be invaded, aggress[ed] by Russia, the best thing they can do is to become members of NATO.

We will be confronting huge challenges in terms of war sustainability. Ukraine will need our support. Everyone [wish that] Ukraine resists. We have to do more and quicker. [And] this six month delay on the US support, and also some delays in our support on providing ammunition, can unhappily make the difference, and in any case, to be paid in terms of lives, a lot of lives.

And the final thing I want to transmit to you is that indeed, Europeans, we have a strong concern [about]: will the US continue with the same security priorities? Depending on who is going to go to the White House. This is your business, but this will affect us around the world and in particular us. And we are looking at what's going to happen in the US, because certainly we Europeans alone will be [in] difficulty to continue providing Ukraine with the support they need in order to continue their fight.

I was talking with the Prime Minister of Ukraine one week before the war started, in his office, and he asked me: “They will invade us. On the other side of the border, there are 150,000 troops, with heavy arms and they are not there with their coffee. They will invade us. And when they would invade us, what are you going to do? Are you going to help us? Sure you will not send the young Europeans to be killed to defend Kiyv. But are you going to provide us with the arms necessary in order to defend our homeland?”

At that moment, I couldn’t answer. But later, yes, we answer with strong unity on supporting Ukraine. I think that we Europeans and the US have to continue strongly on this line, because it's our security and it's the peace and stability in the world which is at stake.

And then after, another front line was opened: Gaza. And we are extremely alarmed by the terrible situation in Gaza. I was in Gaza in 2008-2009; and this is, I think, the third or the fourth time that Gaza is being destroyed. But this time is being destroyed to the roots, flattened completely. People are dying and starving and suffering in unimaginable proportions.

And yes, we provide humanitarian support as much as we can. But humanitarian support in this case is not the means, it is not an end. It is not a natural catastrophe what is happening in Gaza: it is not the earthquake, it is not a flood, when you come and help people suffering the consequences. [It] is a manmade disaster, is a manmade catastrophe. And we are pushing as much as we can in order to reach a ceasefire; to get the hostages back home, certainly; to get a better access to humanitarian aid entering Gaza.

You could have a look through a satellite on the border, as I do every morning. You could see more than 1000 trucks waiting, queuing, in order to be able to enter, when on the other side of the line, there are hundreds of thousands of people - according to the United Nations - on the highest level of starvation.

We have to start a political process to empower the Palestinian Authority. I don't see any other solution. And we have to make loud and clear that the only way to get out of this tragedy is to reach a two-state solution. Difficult as it could be, as it is. I don't see any other way of stopping this tragedy, which will remain a stain on the human consciousness.

I don't see any [other] way of stopping one generation after the other from funeral to funeral, if we want to make the Palestinians and the Israelis to share the land, for which they [have been] fighting for more [than] 100 years. In Gaza, the Europeans have been strongly divided. Very much united in front of Russia, with some exceptions, very much united in putting money and supporting Ukraine politically, economically, from any point of view.

In Gaza, we have been very much divided. Look at the United Nations vote a couple of days ago, or when the ceasefire was voted: 18 in favor, 2 against, the others abstaining. That, for historical reasons, that you could easily imagine. But it doesn't mean that we don't have to take a stronger part of responsibility because we have delegated [to] the US looking for a solution. I see a certain fatigue from the US side to continue engaging in looking for a solution. And we are trying to push with the Arab people in order to build together, the Arabs and Europeans, to make this two-state solution a reality. In the meantime, release of hostages and humanitarian support. But it is certainly not [going] to be enough.

Looking ahead. I think the Europeans have to increase our strategic responsibility. We have to spend more in our defence and to better allocate our common resources. Easy to say, difficult to implement. We are not a state, not even a federal state: we are 27 sovereign states, with 27 different armies. Altogether, we spend four times more than Russia on military. And theoretically as much as China: I say theoretically because in fact, nobody knows how much China is spending. But we do that in a fragmented manner.

So we have to work and we are working, and I am working on building a pillar within NATO because there is not alternative for the territorial defence of Europe but NATO. But we have to be stronger inside NATO altogether. As I said: easy to say, difficult to achieve.

And then we have to mobilise our resources in order to prevent Europe to loose competitively vis-a-vis the US, also, not only about China, it's also about you. If the gap between the US and the  European Union increases, our savings will be rushing to the US capital market, which is much more broader and deeper, and where energy costs are much lower than in Europe. And some choices made by the U.S. government to revamp your economy, and fight back against China,  - for example, the I.R.A. - may create a problem for European firms that certainly it is going to be a big, massive subsidy. And we should not engage in a war of subsidies. That's what we blame China for doing. That is what in a way or another you are doing too.

And when I talk with American friends and they tell me: “You are not happy with that? Do the same thing. We don't care. Do the same thing as we do”. Well, the problem is we cannot do it because we are not a federal state. We don't have a Pentagon and we don't have a U.S. Treasury. So, who is going to put on the table $300,000 million dollars or 400,000, don't know how many? Who? There is not a federal authority. If we let each member state to do it, with their own capacities, then we are going to break our internal market. So it is not easy to do the same thing that you are doing. And in some cases, it is clear that we are strong allies, but we are not aligned, in particular on China.

And this brings me to China again: the big elephant in the room. We are talking every day about Gaza, every day about Ukraine, every day about Russia. We look at the Sahel, to Africa, to Latin America. We don't talk enough about China. And we have a systemic problem with China, as you have. Market rules are being trumped by security and policy rules. Market access is limited. New investment opportunities are lower than expected.

There are no new entrants in China economy from Europe. The ones who where [there], they stay. But the newcomers are looking for other places in the Southeast Asia.

China is flooding us with electric vehicles as they did with solar panels. 80% of all solar panels in Europe are being produced in China. And, the same thing may happen with batteries, with electric cars. Everything that has to do with the digital revolution.

We were very much depending on Russia on oil, hydrocarbons. Now we are as much dependent from China on the critical materials needed for the digital revolution as we were from Russia on the hydrocarbons which was supposed to be the past.

China is doing extraordinarily well on anything related with renewables. In a single year, they have created much more power capacity on renewables that the US on the whole history, than you in the whole history. And in spite of that, they still produce 60 / 70% of their energy consumption by hydrocarbons: coal, oil or gas. But they need everything. And they use everything. And China is producing more CO2 than the rest of the world together. So no way of looking for a solution to climate change without a strong commitment and engagement with China.

And that we say China is a rival, is a partner, and it is a competitor: the three things at the same time. And it is difficult to manage relations as complex as this one. But I want to insist in this idea: we cannot become the adjustment variable of the Chinese economy, which is confronted with internal imbalances and the potential loss of the American market. If the Chinese lose the American market, they will direct to Europe their excess of capacity. We cannot be the adjustment variable of this confrontation.

And please, for the ones who studied geo-economics, don't make a confusion between excess production capacity and internal imbalances of the economy. As far as the Chinese economy will be so much unbalanced between internal consumption and production, they will have one way or another to look for a solution through exports. And this puts the question of competitiveness, [and] relative advantages. But the public opinions in Europe are not ready to accept the dismantling of the European industry. You are not neither.

Therefore, if China is not responsive enough, we would have to protect our industries as you do. But the important message here in Stanford is that we have to try to do it in a coherent and coordinated manner.

If you do that on your side and we do that on our side, we will be paying each one the price of the adjustment. So more coordination in front of China should be one of the most important thing that the Europeans and the Americans should do in order to balance the challenges of this world.

Yes. We have to learn to speak the language of power. Power is not only military power. But it is also military power. So we have to increase our military capacities, but we have to act using all the tools that we have. And we still have a lot of them. We have to build the political will to use it, as we have done in front of Russia, to face the challenges of the world, increasing our strategic responsibility.

This is not a luxury. This is not something that you may have or not. This is indispensable if we want to protect our lifestyle and our social fabric and our values.

I used to say that in Europe we have been able to look for a good combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion. You cannot be secure at home, if your neighbour is not having dinner. Security at home depends on the social cohesion, on the strength of the social fabric. And this goes hand in hand with political freedom. This is the first competition in the world not only with military means. It's also intellectual means, to conquer the mind of the people. And China and Russia are spending a lot of money and capacities in order to develop a narrative about which political system is better. And this is the most important battle and the free world cannot lose it. Thank you.