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Delegations will find enclosed "Main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP (Part II, point E, paragraph 25 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013) – 2013 – Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament", as endorsed by the Council on 22 July 2014.
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PART I: LOOKING BACK AT 2013

INTRODUCTION

2013 was a significant year for the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The European External Action Service (EEAS), led by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton, played a substantial role in two landmark diplomatic breakthroughs: the Belgrade-Pristina agreement and an agreement with Iran on a Joint Plan of Action on its nuclear programme.

From the troubled transition in the Arab world, conflict in the Sahel region of Africa to natural disasters, the year saw many pressing policy challenges. The EU used its range of tools – CFSP and non-CFSP – to tackle crises in a comprehensive way and to alleviate their impact on the countries concerned and on Europe.

In order to reflect this comprehensive approach, this report includes, when appropriate, references to non-CFSP instruments and policies, such as development cooperation, trade and humanitarian aid.

The EU underpinned its diplomacy through new and existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions on the ground and through development aid for those in need. We also worked closely with our international, regional and local partners.

Throughout the year, the EU endeavoured to maintain a genuinely global reach by supporting peace, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Whether it be helping Europe's immediate neighbours in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, helping stabilise the Horn of Africa or supporting the democratic transition in Myanmar/Burma, we played a positive and constructive international role. In Syria, we were the largest donor and worked to support UN mediation efforts. Around the world, from Jordan, Kenya to Pakistan, the EU sent observers to elections to promote the spread of democracy. To ensure aim at wider effectiveness in meeting current threats and challenges, we intensified as much as possible cooperation with our regional and strategic partners.
The EU’s contribution to global peace and security is apparent in a number of areas. First, we are directly involved in – and indeed often lead – international peace negotiations on behalf of the international community, for example between Belgrade and Pristina and in the Iran nuclear talks. Second, we can assemble a wide range of tools – such as diplomacy, civil and military missions, economic tools – to tackle important foreign policy challenges using what we call the 'comprehensive approach'. The EU has the instruments – and in sufficient strength – to make a credible impact such as in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Third, we work closely with – and materially support – international and regional partners to deal with regional challenges where only collective efforts can deliver results, such as climate change and disaster relief.

Moreover, despite the economic difficulties Europe has experienced, the EU did not succumb to the temptation to turn inwards. Instead the HR, the Commission, the 28 Member States and the European Parliament worked together to keep the EU visible, credible and relevant in a turbulent world. Two new CSDP missions were launched in 2013: EU Training Mission in Mali to train Malian armed forces and EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya to build the capacity of Libyan government to manage its land, air and sea borders.

Change in our strategic environment and rising demands gave a push to accelerate the development of Common Security and Defence Policy. The December 2013 European Council made the point that defence matters and in its conclusions gave several taskings to ensure progress in this field, ranging from defence industry to capability development projects to the financing arrangements for crisis management.

The EEAS Review, presented in July 2013, saw that the EEAS had developed into a modern and operational foreign policy service, equipped to promote EU interests and values. However, the Review process also identified a number of issues where further work is necessary in order to make the HR/VP and the service more effective in the future.
1. Examples

Here are a few examples of recent EU activity which illustrate our 2013 agenda:

**Belgrade-Pristina dialogue**

The remarkable progress achieved in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue was the highlight of the year for the region. The HR/VP led 23 meetings between Serbia and Kosovo*, in Brussels which resulted in a landmark agreement between the two sides in April 2013. The two sides worked intensively in the following months to implement all the elements of the April Agreement and all other past agreements. In recognition of the progress, EU leaders decided in June to open accession negotiations with Serbia and agreed in December the date for the formal launch of negotiations. Following the adoption of a negotiating mandate by the Council in June, the Commission started negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo in October. The historic breakthrough was a testament to the EU's commitment to peace and reconciliation in the Western Balkans. It also showed the continuing attraction of closer ties to the EU.

**Iran**

The resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue remained amongst the international community's most urgent concerns in 2013. On 24 November 2013 a landmark interim agreement between Iran and the international community, known as the Joint Plan of Action, was reached. As agreed in the Joint Plan of Action, based on a UN Security Council mandate and on behalf of the E3+3, the HR/VP has continued to lead negotiations to find a lasting and comprehensive diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

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* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
The Joint Plan of Action includes the implementation, by both sides, of a series of voluntary measures to address the international community's most pressing concerns regarding Iran's nuclear activities. It also provides Iran with limited sanctions relief (including the suspension by the EU of certain restrictive measures). The EU has been encouraged by some steps Iran has taken to improve relations with regional neighbours and the international community. However, Iran's continuing involvement in Syria and the human rights situation in the country remain a source of concern.

**European Neighbourhood**

The EU continued to support the transition to democracy in the Southern Neighbourhood despite much political instability and struggling economies in 2013. The EU remained committed to the overall goal of supporting transitions and development through different means, including stepped-up financial assistance, the offer for stronger mobility partnerships and the launch of negotiations for Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas for greater market access. The HR/VP, Commissioner Füle and the EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Bernardino León engaged with all sides to bridge political differences.

The tragic events that took place in the Mediterranean have, once again, put a spotlight on how irregular immigration is fraught with human drama. The Task Force for the Mediterranean has played an important role in this regard. All these challenges can only be addressed comprehensively, through the adoption of both short- and long-term measures, in the European Union and also in third countries.

In Egypt, the EU was the only international player that all parties were talking to – attested by the many visits the HR/VP made to Egypt. A constitutional referendum in November was observed by EU experts. In Tunisia the EU worked to bring the country out of its political impasses and agreed a mobility partnership with the government. Across the region, the EU built on the foundations laid by the 2012 Task Forces and kept all the relevant players – parliamentarians, international, regional, private and public stakeholders – involved in supporting the democratic transition.
The scale of human suffering and the regional and international implications of the war in Syria were a primary concern for the EU in 2013. In June 2013, the HR/VP and Commissioner Füle presented a set of proposals to increase the EU engagement in the crisis, mobilising EUR 400 million of additional resources. We worked closely with the UN and with the UN-League of Arab States envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to support his work. The EU was the largest donor of humanitarian and development aid, including for refugees, supporting the work of international relief organisations. The EU also made plans for Syria's reconstruction and rehabilitation in preparation for an eventual political solution. In this context, the Commission continued to convene and strengthen the international core donor group on coordination of the response to the Syrian crisis. In the wake of the August chemical attack, the EU supported diplomatic efforts by Russia and the US to agree the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. In January 2014 the HR/VP attended the peace conference on Syria ('Geneva 2') that followed from the UN Security Council resolution. The EU also provided financial and logistical support to the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the implementation of the agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons.

During 2013, the EU continued to implement the Eastern Partnership. At the Vilnius Summit on 28-29 November the EU initialled Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. It also signed a Visa Facilitation Agreement with Azerbaijan, a Framework Agreement for Participation in CSDP missions with Georgia and initialled a Common Aviation Area Agreement with Ukraine. The decision by the Ukrainian President not to sign the Association Agreement at the last moment dominated the Vilnius Summit and triggered internal turmoil in the following weeks and months.
During the Vilnius Summit leaders expressed the intention to deepen political association, increase political and security convergence and to make cooperation in the field of foreign policy more effective. They also called for a further strengthening of the multilateral and bilateral security dialogues and practical CSDP cooperation between the EU and interested partner countries, including the newly created CSDP Panel, under the Platform on Democracy, Good Governance and Stability. The EU remained committed to making progress on the resolution of protracted conflicts in the region ('5+2' talks on Transnistria, Geneva process) with the first ever '5+2' meeting in Brussels in October.

**Middle East Peace Process**

The European Union continued to prioritise the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) throughout 2013, as part of its engagement in a region that is facing constant political tension and fragile security due, primarily, to developments in Syria, Egypt and Iran. The US efforts leading to the resumption of direct negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians at the end of July were encouraged by the EU and re-enforced thanks to concerted diplomatic activities, particularly within the Quartet and in cooperation with the Arab League and other key international partners. The HR/VP was personally engaged in constant contacts with the parties and all major stakeholders. The EU supported the US-led MEPP initiative in the UN Security Council in April. In July the Council welcomed the resumption of peace talks, welcoming the personal commitment demonstrated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Mahmoud Abbas. The EU played a key role in ensuring the adoption by the Quartet, in the margins of the UN General Assembly in September, of a statement reaffirming support to the parties and their shared commitment to reach a permanent status agreement within nine months. In December, the Council put forward an offer of an unprecedented package of political, economic and security support to both parties in the event of a final status deal.
Comprehensive approach: Somalia, Mali and the Gulf of Guinea

The EU's engagement in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa region is a good example of how the EU tackles different dimensions of an international crisis through its comprehensive approach. Somalia had suffered decades of crisis. Piracy threatened international shipping lanes and World Food Programme ships. Over the last three years, a combination of diplomatic engagement, development assistance and maritime and military training missions reduced piracy by over 95 per cent. It has pushed back militias and allowed the Somali government to assert itself. The EU took a leading role in supporting the development of a Somali 'Compact' for 2014-16 to assist the establishment of peace and the building of Somali state institutions. In September, the EU and Somalia co-hosted a high-level conference during which the international community endorsed the Somali Compact and pledged EUR 1.8 billion in support.

The EU's reaction to the crisis in Mali is another example of the EU's comprehensive approach. Political support for an interim administration, with elections observed by the EU, restored the constitution, peace and order. To improve security, the EU supported African nations which contribute to African-led support missions to Mali. It also launched a training mission to help the Malian army restructure and enhance their ability to defend their people against such threats. The EU pledged EUR 1.28 billion in support.

As a mark of the success of the comprehensive approach, the HR and Commission adopted a Joint Communication in December 2013 to take on board all the lessons learned and embed the comprehensive approach in the EU's approach to external conflict and crises. The preparation of the EU Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea constituted an important example of the application of the comprehensive approach method both in the definition of its content and in the process of its negotiation.
**Myanmar/Burma**

2013 was a landmark year for relations between the EU and Myanmar/Burma. The relationship between the EU and Myanmar/Burma changed dramatically during 2013 and demonstrated how we can support a country in democratic transition. The EU supported and further encouraged the reforms undertaken by President U Thein Sein to open up the country and, in recognition of the new atmosphere, lifted virtually all restrictive measures previously in place. The EU reinstated Myanmar/Burma's access to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). The EU adopted the Comprehensive Framework for the European Union's policy and support to Myanmar/Burma which identifies the EU's goals and priorities until 2015. Peacebuilding, democracy, development and trade and Myanmar/Burma's engagement with the international community are key areas of engagement. President U Thein Sein visited Brussels in March for talks with European Council and Commission Presidents Herman Van Rompuy and José Manuel Barroso in October, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi collected the 1990 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought at the European Parliament and met with EU Foreign Ministers and European Council and Commission Presidents. In November, the HR/VP led an EU-Myanmar task force, which brought together EU Commissioners, senior Myanmar leaders, parliamentarians, politicians, development officials, the business community and civil society. The EU increased its development assistance for Myanmar/Burma significantly to EUR 75 million in 2013, while continuing its humanitarian assistance programme.

2. **Global issues**

These are tangible examples of how the HR/VP and the EEAS added value to the work of the 28 Member States and the Commission. However, this report also shows, that the EU made progress across a much wider range of global issues in 2013.
**Human Rights**

Promoting human rights is the silver thread which runs through the core of the EU's foreign policy and external action. 2013 was the first full year to implement the new Strategic Framework and Action Plan for human rights. The EU Special Representative for Human Rights Stavros Lambrinidis focused on greater cooperation on human rights with the EU's strategic partners and the human rights challenges that countries in transition face. The year also saw action to promote civil and political rights, with the Council adopting guidelines on human rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people and guidelines on freedom of religion or belief. Throughout the year, the EU continued its global role for the abolition of the death penalty and the fight against torture and human trafficking.

**Civil Society**

Support for civil society organisations plays a fundamental role in the EU's engagement with the world. This recognises the role civil society has played in changes in the Arab world, in the tough transition Myanmar/Burma has faced after decades of authoritarian rule, in the Great Lakes Region of Africa and in the promotion of human rights around the world. Civil Society continued to be the main recipient of funding from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

**Water, climate change, energy**

Last year the EU focused on global challenges, such as climate change, water scarcity and energy security. In June, the Council adopted conclusions on climate diplomacy. A month later we adopted the first ever conclusions on EU water diplomacy – acknowledging the increased risks for tensions and conflict over access to water that could have a bearing on European interests, as on international peace and security. On energy security, the EEAS and Commission services worked closely together with Member States to enhance the use of foreign policy tools to reflect the changing landscape of global energy security with a view to strengthening cooperation to tackle energy security challenges.
Towards a Post-2015 Development Agenda

The EU is also involved in the work towards a post-2015 Development Agenda that will follow on from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In September 2013 the UN General Assembly laid out a special roadmap for these new goals, The EU reaffirmed its commitment to sustainable development, with a Commission Communication and Council conclusions on the post-2015 framework.¹ Both note that poverty eradication and sustainable development are linked and mutually reinforcing and underscore that basic human development, management of natural resources, human rights, equality, justice, peace and security and gender are EU priorities in this area. Additionally, in December, EU Member States and the Council adopted Conclusions on "Financing poverty eradication and sustainable development beyond 2015".²

¹ See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region: A decent life for all: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future, COM(2013) 92 final, 27.2.2013.

3. **Strategic partners**

To advance its interests and values around the world, the EU continued to deepen its relationship with strategic partners in 2013. In the course of the year the EU held productive summits with China, Japan, South Korea and Brazil. 2013 was also the occasion to mark fifty years of cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Korea. The HR/VP who visited China in April 2013, was one of the first foreign leaders to meet the new Chinese leadership. A new EU-China 2020 agenda was also agreed which focuses on investment, innovation, fighting climate change and people to people contacts. Our relations with the US have traditionally been the bedrock of our international engagement. In 2013 cooperation was particularly active on the Iran nuclear talks and the Middle East Peace Process. The relationship continued to deepen, with the launch of negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The relationship with Russia also continued to be a priority, not least because of challenges in our common neighbourhood. Negotiations for a Strategic Partnership Agreement and Free Trade Agreement with Japan were launched in April and in October 2013, the HR/VP visited Japan, providing new momentum to EU-Japan cooperation in security matters.

In 2013 there was a deepening of political and peace and security ties between EU and Africa, not only concerning the preparation of the 4th EU-Africa Summit, but also regarding the work done on peace and security in Africa, the increased cooperation and results in the field of democracy and human rights, joint cooperation on global issues.
4. UN and regional organisations

The EU aims to tackle critical challenges to international peace and security through effective multilateralism, with the United Nations at its core. The longstanding and unique cooperation between the EU and the UN spans many areas and is particularly important when it comes to crisis management. Throughout the year, the EU focused on the promotion of international peace and security, sustainable development and human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The EU’s support for the UN and increased cooperation between the two took many forms: The EU fully participated at the 68th UN General Assembly in September as well as in the UN's main committees and working groups. It also stepped up practical cooperation with the UN on military and civilian crisis management, notably Somalia, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya or Kosovo. In Mali, for instance, the EU started to provide satellite imagery to the UN mission. In Libya, the EU and the UN were engaged closely on the setting up of the EU Border Assistance Mission in the country.

Europe can be all the more effective when it does not act alone, and that is why 2013 saw increased cooperation with regional organisations, from the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to the African Union, from ASEAN to the Organisation of American States.

5. Challenges ahead

Considerable challenges lie ahead for European foreign and security policy. However, the real achievements of 2013 can give us all confidence that the EU can tackle global challenges and promote peace, democracy, the rule of law and human rights around the globe.
A. OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES BY REGIONS

1. Southern Neighbourhood, Middle East Peace Process and Arabian Peninsula

1.1. North Africa

1.1.1. Algeria

After a long absence from his functions and the country, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika undertook on 11 September a major government reshuffle entailing the renewal of half of the members of government, including the key posts of interior, defence and foreign affairs. The political debate was dominated by the upcoming presidential elections of April 2014, while constitutional and political reforms were still to be finalised.

The high-level political dialogue between the European Union and Algeria was intensified, especially in view of the security challenges in the Sahara/Sahel region. Under the EU-Algeria Association Agreement, several meetings of sub-committees took place in 2013. Negotiations for a European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan started in the second half 2013. President Barroso visited Algeria (7-9 July 2013), where he signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic energy partnership. The EU Special Representative for the Sahel, Michel Dominique Reveyrand-de Menthon, and the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, also paid visits to Algeria (23-25 June 2013), illustrating the interest of both sides to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on security and regional issues. The visit of a European Parliament delegation (28-31 October 2013) was used to underline the need for economic and political reforms and for increased commitment of Algeria to regional cooperation and integration in the Maghreb.
1.1.2. Morocco

Following the withdrawal of the Istiqlal party, replaced by the National Rally of Independents party (RNI), headed by current Foreign Minister Selaheddine Mezouar, a government reshuffle took place on 10 October 2013. As in 2012, progress in terms of the effective implementation of the 2011 constitution was also limited in 2013. The year saw a positive general development in EU-Morocco bilateral relations: negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area started in April 2013, the political declaration for a mobility partnership was signed on 7 June 2013, a new Protocol on Fisheries signed on 18 November 2013 was approved by the European Parliament in December and the new EU-Morocco Action Plan for the period 2013-2017 was endorsed by the Association Council on 16 December 2013. Morocco is the first country in the Southern Mediterranean to sign a mobility partnership with the EU and to engage in negotiations for a deep and comprehensive free trade area. The joint EU-Morocco parliamentary commission intensified its exchanges and held a meeting in September 2013. President Barroso visited Morocco in March accompanied by Commissioner Cecilia Malmström.

On Western Sahara, as in previous years, the EU expressed its support to the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and of his personal envoy Ambassador Christopher Ross to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution. The EU has also actively raised Human rights issues in Western Sahara.³

Morocco was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council until 31 December 2013 and was elected to the UN Human Rights Council. Morocco organised a regional conference on the security of borders on 14 November 2013, in which the EU participated.

1.1.3. Tunisia

2013 was a difficult year for the Tunisian transition. It was marked by political instability, low performance of the economy and growing socio-economic difficulties. Tensions culminated in the murder of left wing opposition figure Chokri Belaïd on 6 February 2013 and the consequent resignation of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali and his government. On 22 February, Ali Larayedh (previously Minister of Interior) was appointed as new Prime Minister. Although composed by the same Troika parties, several key ministries were attributed to independent personalities, including the Interior.

Following the murder of Mohamed Brahmi, a left wing opposition Member of Parliament, on 25 July 2013, massive public protests against the government took place and the President of the National Constituent Assembly decided to temporarily suspend proceedings. This resulted in further delays in the political process, increasing political polarisation between secular and Islamist forces (also following events in Egypt during the summer) amidst a number of worrying security incidents in different parts of Tunisia, followed by two attempted terrorist attacks on 30 October 2013.

The HR/VP, Commissioner Füle and EU Special Representative Bernardino León supported and encouraged the internal process of democratic dialogue in Tunis through frequent visits and meetings with different political leaders. In the course of the year, Tunisia was able to move peacefully out of the political impasse towards positive results. A National Dialogue initiated by a 'Quartet' composed of UGTT (main trade union), UTICA (representing businessmen), Union of Lawyers and the Tunisian League for Human rights, was launched on 26 October 2013 to find a compromise on the different issues at stake (new government, finalisation of the constitution, electoral framework).
Most of the parties, including the main government party (Ennahda), adhered to a road map leading to the designation on 15 December 2013 of a new Prime Minister, Mehdi Jômaa (former Industry Minister), who was tasked to form a new technocratic government. A political agreement was also found to launch the concrete works on the adoption of the new constitution by the National Constituent Assembly.4

Despite political uncertainty, EU-Tunisia relations continued to progress. In the area of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy, the political agreement at the end of 2012 on the Action Plan (creating a privileged EU-Tunisia partnership) was followed by discussions on the annexed matrix on priority actions.5 On 14 November 2013, agreement was reached on the text of a joint political declaration, launching the second mobility partnership concluded in the region. The text has already been adopted by the EU and its final signature was expected to take place in the first quarter of 2014.

Several EU experts missions ('peer review') took place in Tunisia in 2013 in the security sector and, in particular, in the field of border management and control. The recommendations contained in the reports may become a basis for a more structured and comprehensive cooperation between the EU, Member States and Tunisia on security sector reform, once adopted by the Tunisian authorities.

The CFSP Decision imposing restrictive measures against persons responsible for misappropriation of state funds and persons or entities associated with them was extended at the end of 2013.

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4 On 3 January 2014, the Assembly started voting article by article the fundamental law. On 9 January 2014, the Laarayedh government resigned, and on 10 January 2014 Mr Jômaa was formally requested to form a government.

5 The Action Plan contains ambitious joint commitments in the area of governance, rule of law, human rights, trade (including DCFTA), transport (Open Sky), energy, and migration-related issues (paving the way to a mobility partnership). New discussions took place in January 2014 in Tunis with a view to finalising the matrix in order to rapidly adopt the whole Action Plan.
1.1.4. Libya

2013 was a testing year for the Libyan democratic transition process. The political landscape was dominated by the constitutional process, the political isolation law and the deteriorating security situation in the country.

The lack of political settlement led to delays in the process of drafting a new constitution, a failure to start an effective disarmament and reintegration process and resulted in increased lawlessness and regional factionalism. The blockade of oil exports by militias and minority groups illustrates the inability of the central authorities to exercise effective control over the country.

Following a fact finding mission in November 2012 and a technical assessment mission in March 2013, the proposed future Head of Mission of the EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission (EUBAM Libya) and his core team were deployed to Libya in April under the terms of the preparatory measures. Following the Council Decision on 22 May 2013 on the establishment of EUBAM Libya, more experts were gradually deployed. EUBAM Libya was able to develop good relations with the Libyan authorities and started providing training and advice. By the end of 2013 45 EU staff were deployed; staff levels were set to be further scaled up in early 2014.

The fragile political and security environment complicated the work of the mission; for instance, fewer movements in the country could be carried out than foreseen. An important challenge was faced at the strategic level where the absorption capacity of the Libyan authorities has proven to be very limited. Nonetheless, work on developing a Libyan integrated border management strategy commenced. Despite repeated support from the political level, the process of securing a status of mission agreement was still ongoing at the end of 2013.
EU support to the transition process through financial assistance now stands at EUR 130 million focusing on security, economic recovery, health, public administration, migration, civil society and protection of vulnerable groups.

From the CFSP budget, EUR 5 million were earmarked to deal with weapon proliferation. From the Instrument for Stability support was provided for capacity building for crisis response, criminal investigation, unexploded ordnance clearance and protection of vulnerable groups. Also under the Instrument for Stability, the EU contributed to a number of successful mediation efforts and improved dialogue between conflicting parties.

The EU underlined on several occasions throughout the year serious concerns regarding the deteriorating security situation. Council Conclusions of November 2013 expressed concern with the significant deterioration of the political and security situation; condemned the use of violence; underlined the importance of an inclusive and credible electoral process and reiterated the EU's commitment to support the Libyan democratic transition process.

Following the tragedies in the Mediterranean, the EU emphasised that tackling irregular migration requires a comprehensive approach, with Libya playing an important role.

With the intention to establish long-term and mutually beneficial relations, initial steps were taken that should lead to re-launching the process of negotiations of an EU-Libya Framework Agreement.
1.2. Middle East

1.2.1. Egypt

2013 was a very challenging year for Egypt. The first six months were tainted by the negative atmosphere created by the rushed constitutional process and the circumstances in which a new constitution was adopted by the end of 2012. The process had been controversial and heavily criticized by the opposition and there was little real attempt by the government of President Mohamed Morsi towards political reconciliation and a genuinely inclusive political process. This led to a deeply divisive political crisis that culminated by the end of June in massive demonstrations against the government throughout the country. Following an ultimatum set by the armed forces, Mr Morsi was ousted from the Presidential office on 3 July 2013 and put under house arrest. Chief Judge Adly Mansour was appointed as interim President and nominated an interim government, led by Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawy and made up mainly of technocrats. A political road map was adopted by the new authorities envisaging a revision of the constitution, with parliamentary and presidential elections to follow by mid-2014 to complete the process.

The EU was invited by the interim government on 4 November to observe the constitutional referendum and sent a team of senior election experts to the poll on 25 December 2013.\(^6\)

\(^6\) The referendum was held on 14-15 January 2014, and led to an overwhelming approval of the draft constitution. However, turnout was relatively low and there was little room left to the opposition in the electoral campaign, casting serious doubt on the fairness of the process and of the outcome.
Formal dialogue under the European Neighbourhood Policy, which had been suspended since January 2011, resumed through an Association Committee meeting in February 2013, following the commitment made at the EU-Egypt Task Force in November 2012. Egypt committed to exploratory talks in view of starting negotiations on a new Action Plan. It was also agreed to start the preparation of several sub-committee meetings. Both initiatives had to be postponed due to the events leading to President Morsi's ousting on 3 July 2013.

Throughout the year, the EU remained heavily engaged, talking to all sides to overcome the stalemate and seek a fully inclusive solution. The HR/VP travelled to Egypt several times. She was also the only non-Egyptian leader to meet Mr Morsi in prison. EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean region, Bernardino León, and the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, also undertook several missions to Egypt. An extraordinary Council meeting on 21 August 2013 adopted Conclusions that firmly condemned the violence and acts of terrorism and called for an end to the state of emergency, the release of political prisoners, restoration of the democratic process and respect for human rights. The Council agreed a review of EU assistance, underscoring that assistance to the Egyptian people (socio-economic support) and civil society will continue. Member States also agreed to suspend export licenses for equipment which might be used for internal repression, to re-assess arms export licenses and review their security assistance.

The EU’s initial Decision in March 2011 to impose restrictive measures against 19 individuals closely associated with the regime of former President Mubarak, was extended for another year in March 2013.

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7 Egypt featured prominently in the agenda of the European Parliament in 2013. HR/VP Ashton delivered statements in plenary session on the situation in Egypt on 13 March and on 11 September 2013. An exchange of views was held on 3 July 2013 whilst a debate on the human rights situation in Egypt took place on 4 July 2013. Parliament also adopted three resolutions on the Situation in Egypt: on 14 March 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0095), 4 July 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0333) and 12 September 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0379), respectively.
1.2.2. Jordan

Despite an unstable and extremely volatile neighbourhood, Jordan has managed to preserve its
domestic stability and has shown great resilience in the face of regional turmoil.

Parliamentary elections for the 17th House of Representatives took place in January 2013. For the
first time, a European Union Election Observation Mission was deployed across the country to
assess the whole electoral process.

The political dialogue on foreign and security matters continued to take place at the most senior
level with the HR/VP visiting Jordan frequently. Commissioner Štefan Füle visited the country in
early June while HM King Abdullah paid an official visit to the European institutions in December.

The Syrian crisis continued to affect Jordan and caused huge socio-economic challenges. The
country faced an increasing wave of refugees from Syria (over 570,000 registered by end of 2013),
exerting tremendous pressure on its educational system, health care services and informal labour
market.

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the EU allocated to Jordan EUR 133 million in
humanitarian aid responding to the needs of the Syrian refugees. In addition, over EUR 107 million
of stabilisation and development aid was granted for the host communities for the purpose of
education, job creation and basic public services.
1.2.3. Lebanon

Throughout 2013 Lebanon was affected by the conflict in Syria. It had to deal with massive influx of refugees (approximately 910,000 by the end of 2013), violent confrontation, several terrorist attacks, a political assassination, overt involvement of Lebanese actors in the Syrian fighting, and repercussions of the conflict on the economy. The government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned in March 2013 and no new government was formed until the end of the year. A reform of the electoral framework was not agreed, which led to the postponement of legislative elections from June 2013 to November 2014. The parliament extended its mandate but did not convene since. Lebanon thus had neither an effective government nor an operational parliament during most of this highly challenging year.

Lebanon's security agencies, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, while overstretched, continued to play a major role in preserving the stability of the country. Commendably, Lebanon kept its borders open for refugees, although it strained its resources. The authorities remained committed to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and to working with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the south, where the security situation remained calm. In July, the EU designated the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, while making clear that dialogue with all political actors in Lebanon and cooperation with state institutions would continue.

Despite the political, security and refugee crisis affecting the country, Lebanon remained committed throughout 2013 to strong engagement with the EU. High-level dialogue between the EU and Lebanon remained frequent. The HR/VP visited Beirut in June. Commissioners Füle, Kristalina Georgieva and Michel Barnier paid visits to Lebanon in March, May and November, respectively. The European Neighbourhood Policy dialogue with Lebanon continued with two meetings of the Association Committee and five sub-committee meetings. Lebanon and the EU agreed to start implementing the second European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan as from the beginning of 2013 while awaiting the completion of legal procedures.
In December, the Council adopted Conclusions on Lebanon, calling for the implementation of the Baabda Declaration (keeping Lebanon away from regional and international disputes), urging the formation of a Government, looking forward to the timely holding of parliamentary and presidential elections, and recalling the EU's commitment to support Lebanon. The HR/VP issued a number of statements to swiftly respond to major events, particularly to condemn repeated bombing attacks while expressing support to the institutions and people of Lebanon.

In 2013 the EU committed more than EUR 150 million of assistance in Lebanon, thus tripling the amounts allocated for the country before the Syrian crisis, and highlighting the EU's role as the largest donor. Lebanon and the EU started discussions on new programmes to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in addressing the current challenges.

1.2.4. Syria

The year 2013 witnessed a continuing escalation of the Syrian conflict with new fronts opening between al-Qaeda affiliated groups and other rebel groups. By the end of the year the death toll exceeded 100,000 and the number of refugees stood at over 2 million. The scale of human suffering and the regional and international implications of the war made Syria a primary concern for the EU. In June 2013, the HR/VP and Commissioner Füle presented a set of proposals to increase the EU engagement in the crisis, mobilising EUR 400 million of additional resources.

8 The UN stopped officially updating the estimated death toll given methodological difficulties.
In order to support a peaceful solution to the conflict and to promote a political process that opens the way to a peaceful, free and democratic Syria, the EU worked closely with the Joint Representative of the United Nations and League of Arab States Lakhdar Brahimi, provided assistance to the opposition and participated in the preparations for Syria's reconstruction and rehabilitation following a political solution. In parallel, the EU engaged with the Syrian regime on humanitarian issues and supported the work of international relief organisations by providing unprecedented amounts of financial assistance to humanitarian efforts.

The EU also promoted a political solution to the conflict and applied restrictive measures to the Syrian regime. On 22 April 2013, the Council amended the oil and banking restrictions on Syria in order to exempt the National Coalition, thereby allowing funds to be generated for civilians and the political opposition. In May, the EU renewed its sanctions package with the exception of the arms embargo. In this regard, Member States committed to assess the export licence applications on a case-by-case basis, taking full account of the criteria set out in Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. Finally, in December, the EU amended the derogation from the freezing of funds necessary for humanitarian assistance, ensuring such funds could only be released to the UN Syria appeals. In addition, it mobilised a range of assistance instruments to help cover the needs of the growing number of people suffering from the conflict and its implications.

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9 The European Parliament remained actively engaged on Syria in 2013 and held four plenary debates (January, March, May, and September), with the HR/VP participating on two occasions (March and September), and adopted a resolution on the situation in Syria on 12 September 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0378).

The EU remained actively engaged with international partners and in international fora. In the wake of an August chemical attack, the international community focused its attention on a possible reaction by the US. Russia and the US re-engaged on finding a political solution based on the Geneva Communique of 30 June 2012, which agreed on principles that would guide a possible transition based on UN Security Council Resolutions 2042 and 2043. The UN Security Council resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013, apart from authorising the chemical destruction mission of the UN and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), also paved the way for the Geneva Conference on Syria (so-called Geneva 2) to take place on 22 January 2014. The EU supported the UN/OPCW mission politically, financially and logistically, and continued to support Joint Representative Brahimi in preparation of Geneva 2.

The Council adopted four sets of Conclusions on Syria in February, May, October, and November 2013, with the last ones dealing with the regional impact of the crisis. In addition, the European Council adopted Conclusions on Syria in February and December, which called to assess and review, if necessary, the sanctions regime on Syria.\footnote{The European Parliament engaged very actively on the issue of Syria and hold five plenary debates on Syria (January, March, September and two in October) with the HR/VP participating twice (March and September). It adopted three resolutions on Syria.}
In line with the Joint Communication "Towards a comprehensive EU approach on the Syrian crisis" adopted by the Commission and the HR in 2013, the EU continued its actions on delivering humanitarian aid to the population in Syria and refugees in the neighbouring countries, as well as development aid, in particular to support Syria’s neighbours and host communities in coping with the burden. The combined assistance effort of the EU and its Member States exceeded EUR 2 billion at the end of 2013. The EU welcomed the Presidential Statement of the UN Security Council, which called on the Syrian regime to take immediate steps to facilitate the expansion of humanitarian relief operations and lift bureaucratic impediments and other obstacles including, inter alia, across borders from neighbouring countries. The EU expressed its full support for all diplomatic measures to ensure protection of medical and humanitarian personnel and the safety of passage, also possibly through local ceasefires.

The EU welcomed the declaration of 20 April 2013 by the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) – which the EU accepts as legitimate representatives of the Syrian people – setting out the principles of a democratic, pluralistic and inclusive Syria respectful of human rights, including the protection of persons belonging to religious and ethnic minorities, and the rule of law, rejecting extremism and committing to guaranteeing the security of the chemical weapons present in Syria as well as to supporting international non-proliferation efforts and complying with its international obligations on that matter.

The EU maintained its engagement with different factions of the opposition and called on the SOC to prepare itself for participating and leading the opposition delegation in the Geneva 2 conference. The EU also called on the SOC and all opposition groups to continue to work towards a political settlement and to enhance inclusiveness in order to represent a credible alternative for all Syrians.

On 22 May 2013, the European Parliament held a debate on the situation of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries and subsequently adopted a resolution on the situation of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries on 23 May 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0223). On 9 October 2013, it adopted a resolution on the EU and Member States’ measures to tackle the flow of refugees as a result of the conflict in Syria (P7_TA(2013)0414).
Throughout the year, the EEAS and Commission services led several missions related to the Syrian crisis including high-level visits to the Gulf countries, Russia, the United States, the neighbouring countries Jordan and Lebanon, as well as Damascus.

1.2.5. Middle East Peace Process

In 2013 the European Union continued its engagement in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), including through the efforts of the EU Special Representative for the MEPP, Andreas Reinicke. The EU adopts a multi-faceted approach to a region that is facing ceaseless political tensions and security fragility due to developments in Syria, Egypt and Iran. US efforts lead to the resumption of direct negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian sides in July. This was encouraged by the EU and re-enforced thanks to concerted diplomatic activities, particularly within the Quartet and in cooperation with the Arab League and other key international partners. The EU officially supported US Secretary of State John Kerry's MEPP initiative in the UN Security Council in April. In July 2013 the Council welcomed the resumption of peace talks and personal commitment demonstrated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Mahmoud Abbas. In the margins of the UN General Assembly in September the EU co-signed the Quartet statement reaffirming support to the parties and their shared commitment to reach a permanent status agreement within nine months. Finally, the EU Council in December 2013 reiterated the Union's readiness to contribute substantially to post-conflict arrangements for ensuring the sustainability of a peace agreement, and offered 'an unprecedented package of European political, economic and security support to both parties in the context of a final status agreement'.

In the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and priorities of the EU-Palestinian Authority Action Plan adopted in 2013, the EU's consistent political and economic endeavours focused on supporting Palestinian state-building and private sector development. The HR/VP hosted the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee in Brussels in April and participated in its high-level meeting in New York in September; an urgent need for a political horizon in the MEPP was high-lighted once again besides coordination with the GCC donors. The EU also participated in high-level meetings in support of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
Continued attention was paid to acts threatening the viability of a two-state solution, in particular the continuous expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, which are illegal under international law, demolitions, house evictions, restrictions on movement and civil infrastructure development, namely in the Area C of the West Bank. Attention was also given to incitement. Fully recognising Israel’s legitimate security needs and taking into consideration the Gaza ceasefire agreement of November 2012, the EU continued to appeal for an end to the Gaza Strip closure and took action to tackle its humanitarian and socio-economic repercussions. The EU condemned rocket attacks on Israel emanating from Gaza. Protection of all civilians must be ensured.

While an upgrade of bilateral relations with Israel depends on effective progress in the MEPP as well as reinforced commitment to shared values, bilateral cooperation continued to develop on the basis of the 2005 EU-Israel Action Plan. Successes in 2013 include the entry into force of the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products giving Israeli industries improved access to the EU market (January) and the signature of the civil aviation agreement in June. Furthermore, the negotiations for Israel’s participation in the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme were completed by the end of the year. This agreement duly reflected guidelines issued by the Commission in July to ensure that Israeli entities and their activities in the occupied territories will not benefit from grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards, in coherence with EU position of non-recognition of Israel's sovereignty over occupied territories.
The EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) continued to serve as an essential vector of overall EU support to Palestinian state-building through its contribution to the reform and development of the Palestinian security and justice sectors. As the lead international advisor of the Palestinian Civil Police and in close partnership with the Palestinian judicial institutions, the mission has continued to work on advancing the priority objectives of the EU-Palestinian Authority Action Plan under the European Neighbourhood Policy and helped to ensure that technical conditions for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain in place until a political agreement is reached. The Mission has reinforced its support at the strategic and policy making levels. It has widened its scope to the full range of institutions in the criminal justice sector to advise, *inter alia*, on legislation, policies, structural reforms, operational work-streams and mechanisms, whilst building and further developing capacities for the implementation of international standards and best practices, in particular on human rights and gender.

In December 2012, in the wake of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Israel, the European Union expressed its readiness to support the efforts of both parties, including the possible reactivation – as appropriate – of the European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM Rafah). The mission maintains its capability and preparedness to redeploy to the Rafah Crossing Point once political and security conditions allow.
1.3. Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq

1.3.1. Gulf Cooperation Council and its Member States

Dialogue with the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and with the GCC Secretariat continued at the highest level with the 23rd EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting in Manama, Bahrain in June, with bilateral meetings in New York in the margins of the UN General Assembly in September, and at working level throughout the year. On all of these occasions, the two sides discussed EU-GCC relations, key regional issues, and global issues. The HR/VP closely monitored the situation in Bahrain and condemned the use of violence and human rights violations from all sides, calling for genuine national reconciliation through dialogue, and for the implementation of the recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (and the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review) two years after their publication. The EU initiated a programme under the Instrument for Stability, to train staff from the Police Ombudsman's Office, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice and Attorney General's Office in Bahrain.

In September 2013, the EU opened a new Delegation accredited to the United Arab Emirates in Abu Dhabi. The EU and the United Arab Emirates agreed on the establishment of an EU-UAE Human Rights informal working group, whose first meeting was held in November. The EU, more broadly, closely monitored the human rights situation in the Gulf countries, notably delivering demarches and issuing statements calling for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty as a first step towards abolition.

1.3.2. Iran

International concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme remained at the centre of EU-Iran relations throughout 2013. The HR/VP, in her role as negotiator on behalf of the E3+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom as well as China, Russia and the United States) based on a mandate of the UN Security Council, was actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to find a lasting and comprehensive diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

Following President Hassan Rouhani's election on 14 June 2013, the HR/VP and E3+3 Foreign Ministers agreed with new Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to re-launch nuclear talks on 15-16 October 2013 in Geneva. After three rounds of talks, an interim six-month agreement, known as the Joint Plan of Action, was reached on 24 November 2013 as a first step towards the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. It includes the implementation, by both sides, of a series of voluntary measures aimed at addressing the international community's most pressing concerns regarding Iran's nuclear activities, while providing Iran with limited sanctions relief (including the suspension by the EU of certain restrictive measures). Based on a decision of the Foreign Affairs Council, implementation of the Joint Plan of Action started on 20 January 2014 for a duration of six months.

Iran remains subject to UN, US and EU sanctions. EU measures include a ban on the import of Iranian oil and restrictions on trade and financial transfers. EU measures are targeted on the nuclear programme and on sources of revenue for its financing. They allow legitimate trade with Iran to continue, as long as it is within the legal framework of the sanction regime.

The EU has been encouraged by some steps Iran has taken to improve relations with regional neighbours and the international community. However, Iran's continuing involvement in Syria, and the human rights situation in the country, remain a source of serious concern.
More than 500 executions took place over 2013. The EU continued to address the human rights situation in contacts with Iran and in public statements. As was the case in 2011 and 2012, the EU in 2013 supported a UN General Assembly Resolution by Canada. The EU welcomed the release of a number of prisoners of conscience, including European Parliament Sakharov prize winner Nasrin Sotoudeh, in September. Since then, however, no major release of prisoners has taken place. Progress was limited also in other related areas such as press freedom and access to uncensored Internet.

1.3.3. Iraq

The HR/VP visited Iraq in June, where she met with the government and political leaders to discuss ways to tackle rising sectarian violence and to give an impetus to bilateral cooperation. The HR/VP issued a number of statements condemning terrorist attacks and sectarian violence, urging Iraq to adopt a moratorium on the death penalty, as well as condemning attacks against the camps of Iranian dissidents belonging to the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) and calling on the Iraqi authorities to protect them from further violence. Council Conclusions were issued in April recalling the EU’s commitment to support Iraq's democratic transition and calling on all sides to engage in dialogue and refrain from using violence. The EU strongly supports the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the good offices of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General.

14 The European Parliament held a plenary debate on Iraq on 16 January 2013 and adopted two resolutions on the country on 17 January 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0022) and 10 October 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0424), respectively, in which it condemned acts of terrorism and sectarian violence in Iraq, called for the release of MEK Iranian dissidents allegedly abducted during an attack on their camp in September, called on all political leaders to take the necessary measures to provide security and protection for all people in Iraq and encouraged religious dialogue between Sunni and Shia clerics as a necessary tool for conflict resolution.
The EU and Iraq began implementation of their Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, based on provisional application of those parts that relate to trade and sectoral cooperation. The energy and related policies, trade and related policies as well as democracy and human rights sub-committees met at technical level while the Cooperation Committee met at senior officials level. Iraq initiated the ratification process of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which remained under provisional application pending notification of the completion of Iraq's ratification and ratification by all EU Member States (eight of which had ratified the agreement as of December 2013).

During dialogue undertaken in the framework of the democracy and human rights sub-committee the EU raised concerns relating to the current status of Iraq's institutional framework for the protection of human rights, reports of abuse in the criminal justice system, the rights of women and of persons belonging to minorities, as well as the increasing use of the death penalty. The need to associate Iraqi civil society to the dialogue on human rights was also evoked.

EU assistance to Iraq focused on capacity building to strengthen Iraq's public sector and national institutions in the areas of good governance, human rights, basic services and the rule of law. Under the EU's Development Co-operation Instrument two new projects were adopted in favour of good governance (EUR 22 million) and education/vocational training (EUR 18.2 million) while implementation continued on a programme of support to civil society organisations active in human rights. In June 2013 the EU and Iraq signed a convention to establish the EU-Iraq Energy Centre, the first project for Iraq initiated under the EU's ICI+ cooperation instrument. The EU also continues to support the relocation of MEK Iranian dissidents to third countries with Instrument for Stability funding for relevant UN agencies.

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In the final year of its mandate, the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX-Iraq) continued to provide training, mentoring, monitoring and advising to officials of Iraq's criminal justice system. Between the start of its operational phase in 2005 and its closure on 31 December 2013, the mission undertook capacity building for 7,000 officials, helping to strengthen the rule of law and promote a culture of respect for human rights in Iraq.

1.3.4. Yemen

In line with the 2012 Transition Agreement brokered by the UN on the basis of a Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, the National Dialogue started in March with the aim to conclude in September. Due to delays at the start of the process and a number of particularly difficult negotiations, including on the Southern issue, its conclusion was delayed to January 2014. Many issues remained at stake and the overall situation in the country remained very fragile, but the President and the Transitional Government took important steps notably in the reform of the military and civil security sectors, with the EU actively involved in the latter. The international community, and the EU in particular, are important actors in supporting this process, both politically and financially through the Friends of Yemen and local formats in Sana’a, which accompanied and monitored the transition process closely in close collaboration with the UN special adviser Jamal Benomar and will continue to do so.

The EU’s close attention on Yemen was also shown through participation in the Friends of Yemen meetings in London and New York and two sets of Council Conclusions in June and October and statements by the HR/VP, in which she expressed support of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and the transitional government while warning opponents not to derail the reform process by creating instability and insecurity in the country. The EU repeatedly expressed great concern over the deteriorating security situation in the country.
The EU was closely monitoring the human rights situation in Yemen, notably the issue of the juvenile death penalty and the rights of children, and in particular regarding a minimum age at marriage, on which the HR/VP issued a statement. The EU also contributed substantially to the improvement of health systems, social protection, food security and nutrition and to resolving other pressing humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable people in Yemen.

1.4. Regional co-operation

1.4.1. League of Arab States

During 2013, the EU and League of Arab States (LAS) cooperated closely, both in the political field as well as in implementing the Joint Work Programme, agreed in 2012.

In 2013, the high-level dialogue between the HR/VP and the LAS Secretary-General Nabil Elaraby was conducted regularly (two direct meetings and additional telephone exchanges). The development and diversification of regular contacts between senior officials continued with meetings organised in January, May and November. Contacts were as well maintained through the visit to Brussels of Ambassador Hesham Youssef, Advisor to the LAS Secretary-General, the study visit of the Head of the Arab Parliament to the European Parliament in May, as well as the visit of the EU PSC Ambassadors to Cairo in May and the visit of the Arab Ambassadors to the LAS to Brussels in November.

The concrete cooperation on the basis of the joint work programme was progressing as well. Following the inauguration of the LAS Situation Room, in 2013 the EU continued assisting LAS to develop its own crisis response architecture and capabilities through a series of workshops and seminars. Diplomatic training and exchanges took place – a special memorandum of understanding in this regards was signed in November 2013 –, and training on electoral observation continued, including through direct cooperation with the newly established LAS department of electoral observation and assistance. An EU-LAS civil society seminar took place in Malta in June 2013 while a study visit by the LAS Charter Committee to Brussels took place in December 2013.
EU representatives have as well been meeting the Arab League representatives concerning counter-terrorism cooperation. The EEAS organised a study trip to Brussels for the representatives of the Arab security and defence institutes in October.

1.4.2. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

The EU continued strengthening its relations with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Engaging together has proven to be a good way towards better mutual understanding and helped fostering a stronger joint effort for more tolerance and respect in the world. The intensification of contacts was demonstrated by the inauguration of the OIC Permanent Observer Mission in Brussels, opened during the official visit of the OIC Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu in June.¹⁷

1.4.3. Union for the Mediterranean

The activities of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) gained pace since the EU and Jordan took over the Co-presidencies in 2012. The UfM has modernised and adapted its priorities, focusing on youth, job creation, local development, civil society support and the role of women in society. Secretary-General Fathallah Sijilmassi, heading the UfM Secretariat in Barcelona, directed the organisation towards developing concrete projects: from the most ambitious (Gaza desalination and MED Solar Plan, development of Motorways of the Sea and land highways, de-pollution of the Mediterranean) to smaller ones (Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, network of chambers of commerce, training, etc.). These projects are in fact highly symbolic (water, women, education, etc.), but at the same time have proven their true economic potential (jobs, agriculture, services). The UfM has certified to date almost 20 projects.

¹⁷ As of 2014, the work of the OIC is led by a new Secretary-General, Mr Iyad ben Amin Madani of Saudi Arabia.
During 2013, regular bimonthly meetings of senior officials allowed to develop political dialogue and a broad cooperation between various institutions. Moreover, after a lapse of several years, the UfM Ministerial meetings resumed in 2013. Three ministerial meetings were held in the autumn of 2013 (Women in September 2013, Transport in November 2013 and Energy in December 2013). Perspectives for further practical collaboration seem promising and more Ministerial meetings are planned for 2014.

2. Russia, Eastern Neighbourhood and Central Asia

2.1. Russian Federation

During the period concerned, implementation of the 'Common steps towards visa free short-term travel of Russian and EU citizens' continued. The Commission published its first progress report on the implementation by Russia. Negotiations on an upgraded visa facilitation agreement continued. Implementation of the Partnership for Modernisation also advanced. Announcement by Russia of revised negotiation directives gave hope for resumption of talks on a New Agreement to replace the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The crisis in Ukraine gathered pace following the period covered by this report.

Unfortunately, following its accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2012, Russia failed to live up to many of its commitments and has continued to introduce protectionist measures. In response, on 9 July the EU requested for the consultations and on 25 November a dispute settlement panel was established. Furthermore Russia has not yet honoured its commitments to cancel the system of Siberian overflight royalties as of 1 January 2014 and stopped implementing the International Road Transport (TIR) convention on most of the Russian Federation territory.

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In the second half of the year Russia put mounting pressure on the EU's Eastern Partnership countries which sought to deepen their relationship with the Union. The pressure, which included increases in energy prices, import bans and excessive and discriminatory customs checks – at a certain point also targeting Lithuania – infringed on the fundamental sovereign right of states to freely determine their foreign and trade policy. The Russian Federation also aimed at discrediting, including through spreading misleading information, the Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, offered by the EU. Russia's actions were denounced strongly by the Union, including in a joint statement by Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso shortly prior to the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit.¹⁹

The year saw frequent contacts between the HR/VP and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. A meeting between the Commission and the Russian government took place in March 2013, covering a wide area of issues. An EU-Russia Summit in Yekaterinburg on 3-4 June took place in a constructive atmosphere although yielding little progress in key cooperation areas.²⁰ Formal political dialogue meetings were held at various levels in 2013. The EU continued to engage with Russia on many of the issues at the top of the EU's foreign policy agenda, such as Syria, Iran, the broader Middle East, Afghanistan and the protracted conflicts in the common neighbourhood. The EU also continued cooperation with Russia on global issues such as climate change, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, illegal trafficking and energy security.

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²⁰ A second summit initially foreseen for December was rescheduled to January 2014.
The human rights situation in Russia remained a source of concern in 2013 despite amnesties or pardons in certain emblematic cases towards the end of the year. New legislation and continuing targeted action against opposition figures limited the space for civil society activities and the exercise of the freedoms of expression and assembly. The investigation into the death in detention of lawyer Sergey Magnitsky was closed and Mr Magnitsky himself convicted in a posthumous trial. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for visa-bans and asset freezes targeting Russian officials allegedly involved in the case, and adopted a resolution on rule of law in Russia in June. The EU continued to raise these issues in its political dialogue meetings with Russia, including at summits and the bi-annual EU-Russia human rights consultations, the latest round of which was held in November 2013. Russia once again refused to hold the consultations in Moscow as well as to take part in the side-event in which civil society would have taken part.

In external security a framework agreement for Russian participation in EU crisis management operations remained elusive. Although little progress was made to sign an accord which would allow Russia to participate in the EU-lead crises management missions, the Yekaterinburg summit confirmed the wish of both sides to cooperate in a pragmatic way on an ad hoc basis. Some steps were taken to reach an arrangement on the provision of strategic airlift for EU-led military crisis management and anti-piracy operations, an area where the two sides have already good experience in cooperating.

The EU’s energy relationship with Russia continued to be marked by strong interdependence, as Russia remained the EU's main external energy supplier and the EU the biggest external consumer of Russian hydrocarbon resources.

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21 The European Parliament held a plenary urgency debate on the situation of human rights in Russia on 13 June 2013 and adopted a resolution on the rule of Law in Russia on 13 June 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0284). It also held a plenary debate based on an oral question to the Commission on the rule of law in Russia especially with respect to xeno-and-homophobia.
2.2. Eastern Partnership: multilateral relations

During 2013, progress has been achieved in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership. The Vilnius Summit on 28-29 November saw the initialling of Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, the signature of a Visa Facilitation Agreement with Azerbaijan, signature of a Framework Participation Agreement with Georgia and the initialling of a Common Aviation Area Agreement with Ukraine.22

The Vilnius Summit expressed the intention to deepen political association, increase political and security convergence and to make cooperation in the field of foreign policy more effective. The summit also called for a further strengthening of the multilateral and bilateral security dialogue and practical CSDP cooperation between the EU and interested partner countries, including through the work to be carried out by the newly created CSDP Panel, which plays an important role in getting Partners accustomed with the CSDP, providing an advisory forum on their possible participation in CSDP missions and operations. The summit also underlined the role to be played by such a forum in support of the developing cooperation with interested partner countries in the areas covered by the Framework Participation Agreements.

Cooperation between the EU and partner countries, as well as regional cooperation projects and EU assistance programmes, emphasised peaceful conflict resolution and confidence-building measures.

The work of multilateral platforms continued, providing assistance to partner countries in advancing their reforms. Active contributions, support and expertise for seminars and training programmes were offered by partner countries, EU Member States, EU institutions and international organisations. International financing institutions also provided assistance via various channels.

The multilateral Eastern Partnership Platform on Democracy, Good Governance and Stability focused mainly on public administration reform, asylum and migration, improving the functioning of the judiciary, the safe management of state borders (Integrated Border Management) and cooperation in the area of CSDP. The implementation of the activities of the Platform was supported by the Council of Europe under a facility to cover activities on election standards, judicial reform, good governance, fight against corruption and cooperation against cybercrime.

A new Panel on cooperation in the area of CSDP was established and started its work under the Platform on Democracy, Good Governance and Stability. The Panel facilitates dialogue on political and practical aspects of participation by interested partner countries in CSDP missions and operations, provides experience sharing on engagement in international crisis management and peacekeeping activities, and further develops national capabilities for those purposes, as well as for overall security sector reforms. A number of seminars and workshops were organised in 2013 in cooperation with EU Member States and the European Security and Defence College.

In the field of Integrated Border Management the implementation of projects in the framework of the Flagship Initiative helped achieve the Eastern Partnership Roadmap objectives, namely increasing the security and effectiveness of checks at border crossings and improving the overall effectiveness of partner countries' border agencies and customs officers.

The Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters Flagship Initiative continued support in building up the participating countries’ capacity for disaster prevention, preparedness and response at local, national and regional levels. The Electronic Risk Atlas for all partner countries was prepared and its implementation in each country is under way.
The Informal Eastern Partnership Dialogues (second and third meetings in Tbilisi and Yerevan respectively) promoted regular, informal exchanges between the Eastern Partnership Foreign Ministers and the EU on foreign policy issues of mutual interest. Sectoral ministerial dialogues took place on the occasion of both dialogues in 2013. In October 2013, Eastern Partnership Justice and Home Affairs and Transport ministerial meetings were held in Luxembourg.

2.3. Black Sea Synergy

During 2013 the regional cooperation in the Black Sea had some progress in sectoral cooperation, such as the environment, maritime affairs and fisheries, research and innovation, cross border cooperation and civil society. The aim of the Black Sea Synergy initiatives is to foster regional cooperation between the riparian countries.

The CBC Black Sea basin program 2007-2013 has its budget increased for the second call of proposals based on the good absorption of the funds for projects after the first call of proposals. This programmes proved its efficiency by developing several concrete projects in the region.

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23 The second Informal Eastern Partnership Dialogue with the sector dialogue on transport was held in Tbilisi 12-13 February 2013, and the third in Yerevan in September 2013 dealing with education. The fourth meeting is to be hosted by Azerbaijan in spring 2014 with energy as sectoral theme.

24 As regards the environment, the new regional project under the Black Sea Synergy Environment Partnership: Improving Environmental Monitoring in the Black Sea officially started in January 2013. The aim of this project is to better coordinate the Black Sea monitoring activities with the Shared Environmental Information System programme. As for maritime affairs and fisheries, the preparations for the Black Sea stakeholders’ conference started in 2013. The preparatory meeting for this conference with all the Integrated Maritime Policy contacts points from the riparian countries took place in October in Brussels. The aim of this cross-sectorial event was to bring together at the same table all the Black Sea actors to discuss future activities in the region. Also, there was growing cooperation with the Black Sea countries in the sphere of research and innovation. A Black-Sea ERA-NET project for alignment of national research programmes, funded under the Seventh EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development, was successfully completed.
During 2013, EU interaction with regional organisations increased. EU’s accession to the Black Sea Commission as member became EU's medium term priority. EU also increased its participation at the BSEC high level meeting and some working groups.

2.4. Eastern Partnership: bilateral relations

2.4.1. Ukraine

During the 16th EU-Ukraine summit on 25 February 2013, Ukraine confirmed its determination to comply with elements set out in the Council Conclusions of 10 December 2012, in which the EU reaffirmed its commitment to sign the Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), as soon as Ukraine demonstrates determined action and tangible progress in three areas: actions to remedy electoral shortcomings, progress in addressing the issue of selective justice and preventing its recurrence, and action to implement reforms set out in the Association Agenda.

Against this background, intensive high-level political contacts took place during 2013: the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council was held in June in Luxembourg and there were frequent bilateral visits to Kyiv and Brussels at the level of the HR/VP and Commissioners. The Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius noted that important progress had been achieved with regard to the three areas set out by the Council in December 2012.

On 21 November 2013 then President Yanukovych of Ukraine unexpectedly decided to suspend preparations for the signature of the Association Agreement, referring to national security interest and the need to restore lost trade with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States partners. In a joint statement of 25 November, Presidents Barroso and Van Rompuy expressed their disapproval of the Russian position and actions with regard to the Association Agreement. The European Council of 20 December 2013 emphasized the right of all sovereign states to make their own foreign policy decisions without undue external pressure. In the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit on 28-29 November Ukraine reiterated its commitment to the signing of the Association Agreement, but its intentions for the next steps remained unclear.
Overall, Ukraine presented a mixed picture of developments on deep and sustainable democracy. Some positive developments took place in the field of legal reform, including the judiciary. However, the steps taken by the Ukrainian authorities to respond to the massive, sustained 'Euromaidan' protests in support of political association and economic integration with the EU, led to deterioration of fundamental rights, including human rights. Against this background the HR/VP issues several statements. The HR/VP and Commissioner Füle also undertook several high-level visits to de-escalate the situation in December 2013.

Some progress was made on the cases of selective use of justice. The European Parliament’s mission led by the former President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the former President of the European Parliament Pat Cox was instrumental in addressing this. Yulia Tymoshenko's case remained unresolved in 2013.

A third Commission's report on the implementation by Ukraine of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan was issued in November 2013, noting substantial progress in all four blocks of the Action Plan and identifying remaining first phase requirements to be met. The EU continued to be concerned about the lack of progress in adopting comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. Amendments introduced to the visa facilitation agreement in 2012, which broadened the scope of categories of citizens covered by the agreement, entered into force on 1 July 2013.

Ukraine continued its participation in operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta.
2.4.2. Belarus

Throughout 2013, the EU consistently reiterated its commitment to the policy of critical engagement with Belarus, including through dialogue and participation in the Eastern Partnership.\(^{25}\) The EU has recalled that the development of bilateral relations under the Eastern Partnership is conditional on progress towards respect by Belarus for the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The EU reiterated its willingness to assist Belarus to meet its obligations in this regard.

The EU has throughout 2013 at numerous occasions expressed its grave concern about the lack of respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles. The EU, in its contacts with interlocutors in the Belarusian administration, continuously raised the importance of immediately releasing and rehabilitating political prisoners, as well as concerns regarding cases of harassment of human rights defenders, civil society and opposition activists, or further restrictive legislation. The EU co-sponsored the resolution at the Human Rights Council which extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Belarus for a further year. The HR/VP made specific statements regretting the issuing of three new death sentences in Belarus.

Following an annual review, the Council on 29 October extended the EU restrictive measures against Belarus (until 31 October 2014). The annual review updated the list of those targeted with a travel ban and asset freeze within the EU. 232 persons and 25 entities remained subject to EU restrictive measures, as not all political prisoners had been released, no released prisoner had been rehabilitated, and the respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles had not improved.\(^{26}\)

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\(^{25}\) The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the EU policy towards Belarus on 12 September 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0382).

\(^{26}\) On 12 September, the European Parliament approved recommendations on the EU's Policy towards Belarus. The text of the recommendation was based on a report on Belarus drafted by Justas Vincas Paleckis MEP, following his visit to Minsk on 18-21 May and indicated that 'the general situation with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms is deplorable and remains a great concern'.
In November, at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius Belarus replied positively to the Commission's offer of 2011 to start negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements.

The project 'Mobility Scheme for Targeted People to People Contacts' (MOST), with a total budget of EUR 5 million, was signed by the Belarusian authorities in December. Objectives of the project were to organise an exchange and mobility scheme between Belarus and the EU for researchers, students, low ranking civil servants, and the private sector on a wide range of topics: culture, youth, science, technology.

In November, the EU Delegation in Belarus signed a support project (with a total budget of EUR 5 million) for the European Dialogue on Modernisation with the Belarusian society. Several consultations took place between the EEAS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus with a view to determine the best future form of cooperation between the EU and the Belarusian government on modernisation issues.

2.4.3. Republic of Moldova

EU-Republic of Moldova relations continued to deepen in 2013, with a high level of regular engagement, including visits from Commissioners Füle and Dacian Cioloș, after being challenged during the first half of the year by a political and institutional crisis in the Republic of Moldova. For a brief period the crisis called into question the country's ability to uphold its objectives of political association and economic integration with the EU, but, following the formation of a new government in May, the Republic of Moldova confirmed these objectives and made concrete progress, with negotiations on the Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, being substantively completed in June. This agreement was initialled at the Eastern Partnership Vilnius Summit in November and both sides confirmed the intention to sign the agreement by the end of August 2014. Subsequently, the EU affirmed the commitment to sign this agreement with the Republic of Moldova as soon as possible, and no later than June 2014.
In September 2013, Russia banned the import of wines and spirits from the Republic of Moldova, due to alleged health and safety concerns. The EU, which did not find evidence for such concerns, eliminated its wine import quota for the Republic of Moldova in December, taking effect from 1 January 2014. In addition, the EU also started the process of authorising the import of egg products from the Republic of Moldova and increasing assistance to the quality assurance system that will allow exporting more agricultural products, notably products of animal origin, to the EU.

In 2013 the Republic of Moldova received a EUR 35 million 'more for more' aid allocation, in addition to its EUR 100 million bilateral assistance budget. The additional money was partly for funding projects against corruption and in support of media pluralism as part of the Council of Europe Action Plan (adopted in November). The plan focuses on the political, institutional and constitutional reforms made necessary following the Republic of Moldova's political and institutional crisis.

Amendments to the Visa Facilitation Agreement entered into force in July 2013, extending the existing facilities to new categories of citizens. The Commission positively assessed the implementation of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation and, in November 2013, proposed lifting visa requirements for citizens of the Republic of Moldova.27

Although no new agreements were signed between the EU and the Republic of Moldova, significant efforts and resources were deployed to implement those concluded earlier in the areas of aviation, agriculture, civil protection, participation in EU agencies and programmes, and in CSDP operations.

The EU continued to step up its engagement in the confidence-building and settlement processes between the Republic of Moldova and its breakaway region of Transnistria. The first ever '5+2' meeting in Brussels took place on 3 October, and bilateral talks between Prime Minister Iurie Leanca and Transnistrian leader Yevgeny Shevchuk took place in September and October 2013. Although concrete progress in the subsequent meetings was limited, it succeeded in restoring a positive atmosphere and clarifying issues linked to freedom of movement across the Nistru River.

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27 This issue was due to be discussed by the European Parliament and the Council in the first half of 2014.
The EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine continued its valuable work in assisting, training and advising the two countries' border guard and customs services, reinforcing their capacity to tackle customs fraud, detect cases of smuggling and trafficking in human beings, and carry out effective border and customs controls and border surveillance.

2.4.4. Georgia

EU-Georgia relations continued to deepen in 2013, with regular engagement at all levels, including visits to Georgia by Commissioners Füle and Malmström. Significant progress was achieved towards the objectives of political association and economic integration with the EU, with the conclusion of negotiations of the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area in June 2013 and their initialling at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November. Also at Vilnius, Georgia and the EU signed a Framework Participation Agreement on CSDP cooperation, which will enable Georgia's participation in EU-led crisis management operations. Georgia received the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan in February and made subsequently good progress in its implementation, as reflected in the EU's first progress report published on 15 November 2013.

The EU assisted the transition and cohabitation process in Georgian politics following the October 2012 parliamentary election and change of government. This included the appointment of a Special Adviser for Legal and Constitutional Reform and Human Rights (Thomas Hammarberg, former Commissioner for Human Rights in the Council of Europe) to work directly with the Georgian government, Parliament, and President. Mr Hammarberg's report published in September included recommendations which provide a baseline for Georgia's Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan under preparation, as well as an important framework for the EU-Georgia Association Agenda currently under preparation. The important point now is for Georgia to implement the recommendations. Successful presidential elections in October 2013 marked further progress in consolidating Georgia's democratic credentials.
During 2013 Russia remained in non-compliance with its obligations under the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 and its subsequent implementing measures of 8 September 2008, including providing the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) with access to the breakaway regions. Continued and even increased activities by Russian security forces to erect fences and other obstacles along administrative boundary lines caused particular concern. In 2013, EUMM Georgia continued to play an important role in the region by contributing to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence-building efforts on the ground. The mandate of EUMM Georgia was further extended until December 2014. The Mission is implementing its current mandate with more than 200 monitors, with a focus on stabilisation and confidence-building measures. Georgia continued good cooperation with the EU Monitoring Mission. The Mission assisted in ensuring impartial and objective sharing of information about continued activities to install barriers to free movement along the Administrative Boundary Lines.

Through the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, Ambassador Philippe Lefort, the EU continued to play a leading role in the Geneva International Discussions, which it co-chairs jointly with the UN and OSCE. The Geneva International Discussions were set up to address the consequences of the 2008 conflict. This includes in particular issues related to security and stability, as well as humanitarian matters, including the situation of Internally Displaced Persons and refugees, and the population affected by the conflict. The question of non-use of force and international security arrangements continued to be core subjects of the Geneva International Discussions while the absence of a clear non-use of force commitment by Russia remained the main obstacle to further progress. The EU’s conflict resolution efforts were supported by actions undertaken through the Instrument for Stability; by EU-financed confidence-building and early response activities; and by people to people contacts. Going forward, it will be important that the different EU elements in Georgia have a coherent approach and that the Georgian government understands the EU’s offer.
2.4.5. Azerbaijan

During 2013 EU-Azerbaijan political dialogue remained intensive, including visits to Baku by Commissioners Füle and Oettinger. In 2013 a visa facilitation agreement was signed at the Vilnius Summit of the Eastern Partnership. Negotiations on a readmission agreement were concluded in 2013 and the agreement was signed on 28 February 2014 following the completion of the EU’s internal procedures. A Mobility Partnership with Azerbaijan was signed on 5 December. Negotiations on an EU-Azerbaijan common aviation agreement were launched. Negotiations on an Association Agreement continued albeit at a slow pace. Negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area can only begin once Azerbaijan accedes to the World Trade Organisation. Negotiations continued on a 'Strategic Modernisation Partnership' (SMP).

Reforms in the area of democracy and human rights showed regress with a presidential election that was severely criticised by the international community. Politically motivated pressure against dissenting opinion continued.\(^{28}\)

The final investment decision taken by the 'Shah Deniz II' consortium on 17 December 2013 opened the way for the launch of the Southern Gas Corridor.

The Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia met in November 2013 for the first time since January 2012 at a summit in Vienna, facilitated by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. The Presidents agreed to advance negotiations toward a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to meet again in the months ahead. The EU worked in close coordination with the OSCE Minsk Group to support their conflict resolution efforts. The EU also financed confidence-building measures in support of the peace process.

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2.4.6. Armenia

2013 was a difficult year for EU-Armenia relations, marked by Yerevan's decision to apply to join the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and to participate in the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union. As a consequence, the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area which the EU and Armenia had negotiated could not be initialled at the November Vilnius Summit. Nevertheless, at Vilnius, the EU and Armenia reconfirmed their commitment to further develop and strengthen their comprehensive cooperation in all areas of mutual interest, within the Eastern Partnership. Moreover, the EU and Armenia agreed to revisit the basis for their relations, building upon the existing framework for cooperation.

The EU-Armenia visa facilitation agreement and the readmission agreement were ratified in 2013 and entered into force on 1 January 2014. Furthermore, the procedure leading to the conclusion of the protocol on the framework agreement on Armenia's participation in EU programmes advanced and was close to finalisation.

Political dialogue with the Armenian government was intensive in 2013. The Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian visited the EU institutions several times and a number of high-level EU officials visited Armenia (Commissioner Füle in July and again in September together with Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou).

The EU continued to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in Armenia. While Armenia continued to address some of these issues, further work remained necessary, especially as regards the implementation and enforcement of relevant legislation, the fight against corruption, and reform of the judicial system.

The EU worked in close coordination with the OSCE Minsk Group to support its efforts towards a solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The EU also financed a number of confidence-building measures in support of the peace process.29

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29 See above Section A.2.4.5. on Azerbaijan.
There was no real progress towards the normalisation of Armenia-Turkey relations, as promoted by the EU without preconditions by any side, although a face-to-face meeting between the two Foreign Ministers took place in the margins of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation Foreign Ministers meeting in Yerevan in December.

2.5. Central Asia

2.5.1. Regional relations

During the course of 2013, implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia intensified further, including through political dialogue and technical cooperation. The EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Patricia Flor, continued to coordinate the EU’s comprehensive action in the region and engage with countries in the region on cross-cutting and security issues, notably concerning the water and energy nexus and the search for mutual and consensual solutions, beneficial for the whole Central Asia region.

The EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting took place in Brussels in November 2013. The meeting provided an opportunity to exchange views on the Central Asia Strategy and the implementation of key initiatives of the strategy, with a focus on education, rule of law, environment and water. The relevance of the 2013 Ministerial was enhanced as it was organised back to back to the programming seminar for 2014-2020 financial framework for co-operation, which allowed a direct operational follow-up to the issues discussed at political dialogue.

An EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting on environment and water took place in Bishkek in March 2013, where a joint communiqué establishing joint cooperation priorities was endorsed.

The newly-created EU-Central Asia High Level Security Dialogue to deepen the dialogue on foreign policy issues and to intensify the cooperation on tackling trans-national threats took place in June at the level of Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
As part of the Education Initiative, a regional conference on the Torino Process took place in Astana in February. A regional seminar on the right to a fair trial, addressing issues related to criminal justice took place in April in Bishkek, as part of the Rule of Law Initiative. Issues related to border management and regional security, were addressed during the 11th meeting of the Central Asia Border Security Initiative (CABSI) meeting in Ashgabat in October. The updated EU-Central Asia Action Plan on Drugs for the period 2014-2020 was endorsed by the joint senior officials meeting on drugs in Brussels in November.

Negotiations of a trilateral agreement with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on a legal framework for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline continued throughout the year.

2.5.2. Bilateral relations

The negotiations on a new enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan resumed. The fourth round of negotiations took place on 9-10 October in Astana. The enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is intended to provide a broad framework for reinforced political dialogue, cooperation in home and justice affairs, and to promote mutual trade and investment. President Barroso paid a first official visit on 2-3 June.

In September, President Almazbek Atambayev of Kyrgyzstan visited Brussels. A framework agreement between Kyrgyzstan and the European Investment Bank and an EU programme to support the rule of law reform were signed in the margins of the visit. The political dialogue addressed security issues, particularly inter-ethnic relations and border tensions throughout the year. The EU also provided support under the Instrument for Stability.

On 28 October, the EU issued a local statement expressing deep regret about the ruling of the Supreme Court to uphold decisions not to investigate complaints of torture by imprisoned human rights defender Azimzhan Askarov.
The Spokesperson of the HR/VP issued a statement on the presidential elections in Tajikistan (6 November 2013), calling on the Tajik authorities to effectively address the restrictions and irregularities mentioned in the preliminary statement by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. President Emomali Rahmon visited Brussels in March.

Bilateral discussions with Turkmenistan continued throughout the year to promote a trilateral agreement with Azerbaijan on a legal framework for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline.

The 11th Conference of the Central Asia Border Security Initiative gathered border services from Europe, Central Asia and Afghanistan, as well as international stakeholders, in Ashgabat in October. It addressed both border security challenges and the promotion of cross-border cooperation and legitimate movements of people and goods.

The EU tabled a joint statement on child labour during the annual International Labour Organisation (ILO) conference in June, which paved the way towards restoring confidence and cooperation between Uzbekistan and the ILO. As a result, an ILO High Level Monitoring Mission was deployed to Uzbekistan in October and November to monitor the use of child labour during the cotton harvest.
3. Western Balkans

The Western Balkans and the enlargement strategy remained a key policy of the European Union in 2013. The Council reaffirmed in Conclusions in December 2013 its unequivocal commitment to the region's European perspective, which remains essential for its stability, reconciliation and its future. It also highlighted the need for fair and rigorous conditionality, in the framework of the Copenhagen political criteria and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which continued to provide the overarching policy framework for relations with the Western Balkans. Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are essential elements of this process.

Significant progress was achieved in the region throughout 2013 with the accession of Croatia to the European Union on 1 July, the agreement reached by Belgrade and Pristina in April on the principles governing the normalisation of their relations, the decision to start accession talks with Serbia, the launch of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo, and the continued accession talks with Montenegro. The HR/VP visited the region on 15-19 April passing an overall message of the EU's commitment to the Western Balkans. The EU reinforced its engagement with political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to move forward the country's European perspective. The EU welcomed the adoption of key reform measures with cross-party consensus in Albania and the successful conduct of parliamentary elections in June 2013.

The remarkable progress achieved in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue was the highlight of the year for the region.
Council Conclusions in December 2012 urged for further progress in the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo including irreversible progress towards delivering structures in northern Kosovo which meet the security and justice needs of the people. In this context, the EU-facilitated dialogue continued at an accelerated pace in 2013 with a focus on addressing the issues related to northern Kosovo, which constituted the most difficult and sensitive part of the dialogue. A landmark agreement was reached on 19 April and an implementation plan was adopted a month later. The main elements of the agreement concerned particular arrangements for northern Kosovo and the Kosovo Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, and provided for the integration of all structures (municipal, police and security, and justice) into the Kosovo legislative framework. The agreement also foresaw the holding of local elections in the northern municipalities for the first time according to Kosovo law.

They worked intensively in the following months to implement all the elements of the April agreement and all other past agreements. Local elections were held successfully on 3 November 2013 in northern Kosovo (and the second round on 1 December) with good participation of the local population. In her report to the Council on 16 December, the HR/VP underlined that all the elements of the April agreement were being implemented in substance. In accordance with the objective of the dialogue that both Serbia and Kosovo can advance on their European perspective, EU leaders decided to open accession negotiations with Serbia and to start negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo.\(^\text{30}\)

\(^{30}\) The two sides committed to continuing the normalisation process, and meetings in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue continued to take place in 2014.
Serbia achieved significant progress on its path towards the European Union in 2013. The country's efforts in the normalisation with Kosovo resulted in the 19 April agreement with Kosovo. In order to facilitate the normalisation process with Kosovo and promote the implementation of the April agreement, the HR/VP visited Serbia twice in 2013.

Following the entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement on 1 September 2013, the first meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between Serbia and the EU was held on 21 October 2013 and was chaired by the HR/VP.

Following the decision of the European Council in June 2013 to open accession negotiations with Serbia, the European Council in December 2013 gave its green light to the official opening of the accession negotiations with Serbia and adopted the general EU position on the accession negotiations, including the relevant Negotiating Framework.\textsuperscript{31}

In this new phase and recalling all previous conclusions, the Council also called on Serbia to pay particular attention to the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to continue to constructively engage in regional cooperation and strengthen relations with neighbouring countries.

Following a Decision by the Council in June in recognition of Kosovo’s efforts in the normalisation with Serbia which resulted in the 19 April agreement, the Commission started negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo in October 2013. The Council's authorisation followed a joint report by the Commission and HR in April, which confirmed that Kosovo had addressed the key priorities identified in the Commission's 2012 feasibility study and had continued to participate constructively in the EU-facilitated dialogue with Serbia. In April, the Commission issued proposals for the Council to sign and conclude a framework agreement allowing Kosovo to participate in EU programmes.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31} The first EU-Serbia Inter-Governmental conference took place on 21 January 2014, opening a new phase in the relations between the European Union and Serbia.

\textsuperscript{32} The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the European integration process of Kosovo on 18 April 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0187).
Two rounds of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement took place between September and December. The Council, in Conclusions adopted in December 2013, took note of the intention of the Commission to complete the negotiations in the course of 2014. EU rule of law mission EULEX Kosovo continued its valuable work in supporting the development of Kosovo's rule of law institutions, working increasingly in mixed teams and thus increasingly transferring responsibilities to the Kosovar authorities. EULEX incorporated the results of the facilitated dialogue agreements into its work as appropriate and facilitated their implementation. Discussions with Member States on the review of the mission's mandate started in December and should be completed in spring 2014.

In 2013, the EU continued to implement its strategy vis-à-vis Bosnia and Herzegovina as set out by the Council Conclusions adopted in March 2011. Only limited progress was made by Bosnia and Herzegovina towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria and the requirements of the roadmap for the entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement as well as for a credible membership application. The country still needs to step up its efforts to implement the EU agenda. Despite intensive facilitation efforts by the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina's political leaders are yet to find a political agreement on the implementation of the European Court on Human Right's ruling in the Sejdic/Finci case. Amending Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitution to remove incompatibilities with the European Convention on Human Rights ruling remains a critical first step forward. Also, no progress was made in establishing more functional, coordinated and sustainable institutional structures.

33 The current constitution and the electoral law prevent Jews, Roma and other national minorities from standing for election to the House of Peoples (second chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly) and for the State Presidency. These institutions are reserved only for persons belonging to the three constituent peoples Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. The ECHR ruled in 2009 that this amounts to discrimination, and breaches electoral rights of Mr. Sejdic and Mr. Finci.
The HR/VP continued to engage on Bosnia and Herzegovina through regular dialogue with the country's leaders, but also through political support to the High Level Dialogue on the Accession Process. To further reinforce this engagement, the HR/VP visited Bosnia and Herzegovina on 15-16 April to encourage the authorities to take the necessary steps to move the country closer towards fulfilment of its European perspective.

In December, the Council expressed its concern regarding the limited progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina on its EU path, particularly due to the lack of political will among Bosnia and Herzegovina's political leaders. As a result, the country lost a significant part of funds planned in 2013 under the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (53% of Bosnia and Herzegovina's IPA funds in 2013 were reallocated to the Regional Housing Programme and Kosovo).

After the reconfiguration of the Operation Althea in September 2012, the mission had up to 600 troops and focused on maintaining the safe and secure environment, principally through capacity-building and training of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Armed Forces. In November 2013, the executive mandate of the mission was extended by the UN Security Council for another year.

On 24 December 2012, a dispute broke out in the Parliament of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in connection with the adoption of the 2013 State Budget and the opposition Members of Parliament and media representatives were evicted from the Parliament by decision of the Speaker. As a result, the main opposition party boycotted Parliament and the existing dialogue between the government and media representatives ground to a halt.

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34 The High Level Dialogue on Accession Process (HLDAP) was launched by Commissioner Füle in June 2012 with the aim of facilitating the cooperation among Bosnia and Herzegovina's political leaders to move the country forward on its EU path. Within the HLDAP, political leaders committed themselves to a road map towards the implementation of the ECHR ruling in the Sejdic/Finci case, but no progress has been achieved so far.
On 1 March, following intense negotiations and the European Commission’s mediation, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and then opposition leader Branko Crvenkovski reached an agreement, which envisaged an investigation of these events and ensured the opposition's return to Parliament and participation in the March/April local elections. The local elections, as assessed by ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights), were highly competitive and efficiently administered, but marked by a number of minor incidents while partisan media coverage and a lack of a clear distinction between state and party activities did not provide a level playing field. On 16 April, the Commission issued a report, requested by the Council, on progress in EU-related reforms and good neighbourly relations. In the country, an Inquiry Committee was established by June and in late August agreed on common recommendations regarding the 24 December events. A working group was subsequently established in Parliament to seek agreement on how to implement those recommendations. By the end of the year, the working group had not concluded its work due to the withdrawal of one of the parties.

In October, the Commission reiterated its recommendations to open accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In its 17 December Conclusions the Council welcomed the fact that the EU agenda remained the country's strategic priority and that it had made further progress in improving its ability to take on the obligations of membership, took note of the recommendation to open accession negotiations and underlined the importance of effective implementation and enforcement of existing legal and policy frameworks. It gave particular attention to the rule of law, freedom of expression and the media, interethnic relations and the blurring of the distinction between state and party. The Council also recalled that maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated and mutually accepted solution to the name issue under the auspices of the UN remained essential. It indicated that it would revert to the issue of opening accession negotiations in 2014, on the basis of an update by the Commission on the further implementation of reforms in the context of the High Level Accession Dialogue, including the implementation of the 1 March political agreement, and on tangible steps taken to promote good neighbourly relations and reach a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue.
Following repeated disputes since the 2009 general elections in Albania between the government led by Prime Minister Sali Berisha and the opposition led by Socialist Party leader Edi Rama, the parliament adopted key judicial, public administration and parliamentary reform measures with cross-party consensus followed by the successful conduct of general elections on 23 June, which saw a clear defeat of Mr Berisha’s Democratic Party. A coalition government was formed under the leadership of the Socialist Party (with Edi Rama as new Prime Minister) together with the Socialist Movement for Integration (new Parliament Speaker Ilir Meta).

The new government declared that it aimed to achieve EU candidate status for Albania and opening of accession negotiations as soon as possible. In October the Commission recommended that Albania be granted the status of candidate country on the understanding that Albania continued to take action in the fight against organised crime and corruption. In December the Council adopted Conclusions welcoming further action taken in the fight against corruption and organised crime and encouraged the authorities to maintain this new momentum, including by making further progress in judicial reform strategies and proactive investigations. The Council asked for a report by the Commission and, in light of that report, the Council looked forward to a decision regarding granting candidate status to Albania in June 2014, subject to endorsement by the European Council.

The EU continued accession negotiations with Montenegro. The screening meetings were completed in June 2013. By the end of 2013, seven chapters had been opened, of which two had also been provisionally closed. The government's efforts to improve judicial independence and elaboration of a detailed Action Plan on the rule of law allowed the Council to open the chapters dealing with the rule of law (chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights, and chapter 24 – Justice, freedom and security) in December 2013. With regard to regional cooperation, Montenegro continued to play a constructive role, thereby contributing to the overall stability in the region.
4. Turkey and Western Europe

4.1. Turkey

Turkey, both as a candidate country and as a key regional partner, continued to be an important interlocutor for the EU, considering its dynamic economy and strategic location. The EU recognised Turkey's role on Syria, especially with regard to the important humanitarian support provided to a very significant number of Syrians fleeing violence across the border. Turkey continued to be active in its wider neighbourhood remaining a key regional player in the Middle East, the Western Balkans, Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Southern Caucasus, and the Horn of Africa. In this context, the HR/VP remained committed to further developing and enhancing the political dialogue between the EU and Turkey on foreign policy issues of common interest as well as on counter-terrorism and met several times with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. President Van Rompuy also paid a visit to Turkey in May 2013. The EU continued to encourage Turkey to develop its foreign policy as a complement to and in coordination with the EU and to progressively align with EU policies and positions.

The EU appreciated the strong Turkish engagement in CSDP missions, particularly EUFOR Althea and EULEX Kosovo. Turkey expressed interest, in principle, in future CSDP missions, including the EU missions in Mali and Libya.
The Council reaffirmed the importance it attaches to EU relations with Turkey and called for the regained momentum in the accession negotiations to be sustained in the interest of both parties. To this end, the Council stressed that Turkey will be able to accelerate the pace of negotiations by advancing in the fulfilment of benchmarks, meeting the requirements of the Negotiating Framework and respecting its contractual obligations towards the EU. The EU should remain the anchor for reforms in Turkey, especially in the areas of rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms. Turkey continued to make important progress on reforms, but further sustained efforts towards fully meeting the Copenhagen criteria are required in a number of areas, in particular as regards fundamental rights and freedoms and enhancing implementation of all the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The excessive use of force by police and the overall absence of dialogue during the protests in Turkey in May/June 2013 raised serious concerns and underlined the urgent need for further reforms. This was stressed by several EU statements by the HR/VP, Commission and the European Parliament.35

The EU strongly supported the ongoing peace process launched by the Turkish authorities which should bring an end to terrorism and pave the way for a political solution to the Kurdish issue.

The EU welcomed the signing of the readmission agreement on 16 December, as well as the initiation of the dialogue on visa liberalisation between the Commission and Turkish authorities. The EU noted that it looks forward to the swift ratification of the readmission agreement and its full and effective implementation vis-à-vis all Member States. Progress in the dialogue on visa liberalisation will be founded on a performance based approach and conditioned on effective and consistent implementation by Turkey of the requirements in the visa roadmap vis-à-vis the EU and its Member States.

In its Conclusions of 17 December 2013, the Council reiterated that Turkey needs to commit itself unequivocally to good neighbourly relations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. In this context, the Union expressed once again serious concern. It urged Turkey to avoid any kind of threat or action directed against a Member State, or source of friction or actions, which could damage good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Moreover, the EU stressed again all the sovereign rights of EU Member States, which include, *inter alia*, entering into bilateral agreements, and to explore and exploit their natural resources in accordance with the EU *acquis* and international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It also stressed the need to respect the sovereignty of Member States over their territorial sea.

In its Conclusions of December 2013 the Council also noted with deep regret that Turkey, despite repeated calls, continued refusing to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement towards all Member States. This could provide a significant boost to the negotiation process. In the absence of progress on this issue, the Council will maintain its measures from 2006, which will have a continuous effect on the overall progress of the negotiations. Furthermore, Turkey has regretfully still not made progress towards the necessary normalisation of its relations with the Republic of Cyprus. The Council reiterated its call for progress without any further delay. In this regard the EU called on Turkey to stop blocking the accession of Member States to international organizations and mechanisms.

The Council also recalled that Turkey is expected to actively support the ongoing negotiations aimed at a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded. Turkey’s commitment and contribution in concrete terms to such a comprehensive settlement is crucial.
4.2. Western Europe

The EU’s relations with the non-EU Western Europe countries are based on comprehensive cooperation agreements such as the European Economic Area Agreement (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) or Schengen agreement (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland).

In the CFSP area, EU cooperation with the European Economic Area/European Free Trade Association states was further deepened in 2013 through their alignment with a large number of CFSP declarations as well as through cooperation in certain joint actions. The EU also had regular political dialogues at different levels and in different contexts; with an increase of more informal ones in the margin of important international events.

There is very good and close cooperation between the EU and Norway in the field of foreign policy, notably on the Middle East (where Norway is the Chair of the Ad-hoc Liaison Committee), Myanmar, Syria (providing assistance to the chemical weapons destruction process), and Arctic issues. It is also involved in peace talks in Colombia (co-facilitator with Cuba). Regular dialogues have been taking place in 2013 at all levels. Norway, as Iceland, is a strong supporter of the EU's application for observer status in the Arctic Council. Norway remains a key partner in the area of energy security, crisis settlement and development aid, promotion of human rights.

Cooperation continued with Switzerland in areas such as the South Caucasus, the democratic process in North Africa, the Middle East Peace Process and Iran. There is no formalised political dialogue, but an informal political dialogue takes place at Political Director level. The Swiss Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter met the HR/VP on 17 October 2013. In addition, several meetings took place between Swiss Ministers and their Commission counterparts throughout the year. Exchanges between the EU and Switzerland took place in the second half of 2013 ahead of the Swiss-Serbian co-chairmanship of the OSCE in 2014.
Although there is no alignment agreement between the EU and Switzerland, Switzerland continued to frequently aligning itself to EU positions and measures.

Concerning CSDP cooperation, **Norway** participated in EUNAVFOR Atalanta with staff officers at Operational Headquarters level, EULEX Kosovo (4 experts), EUJUST LEX-Iraq (1 participant), EUPOL COPPS (1 expert and additional bilateral support with important donor funding), and EUCAP Nestor (1 expert). It is also part of the Nordic Battle Group. **Switzerland** participated in the EU military operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (with 21 persons) and in the civilian missions in Kosovo (EULEX) (with 6 persons), Mali (1 media analyst), and Libya (6 persons). Both Norway and Switzerland are also important partners in capability development.

**Iceland** put on hold its accession negotiations. It continued its CFSP dialogue with the EU in the framework of the European Economic Area.

In November, the Commission adopted a report on EU relations with the Principality of **Andorra**, the Principality of **Monaco** and the Republic of **San Marino**. In December, the Council adopted Conclusions welcoming the report and inviting the Commission to present a recommendation for the opening of negotiations on one or several Association Agreement(s) with these countries by the end of April 2014.
5. Asia and the Pacific

5.1. East Asia

5.1.1. China

2013 was marked by the completion of the Chinese leadership transition and the 10th anniversary of the EU-China's Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The EU was successful in establishing links with the new Chinese administration and in laying the groundwork for EU-China relations over the next decade. The HR/VP paved the way with a visit to China in April, while the 16th EU-China Summit in November established the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation which will enhance collaboration over the coming years in a comprehensive way. The 2020 Agenda focuses especially on strategic issues, investment, innovation, urbanisation, climate change and environmental protection, people-to-people exchanges as well as defence and security matters. A major urbanisation forum and an exhibition were held in Beijing at the sidelines of the Summit which involved city mayors from both sides.36

In the course of 2013 new EU-China dialogues were launched on innovation, global development, the international trade in endangered species and sustainable tourism. This brings the number of EU-China official dialogues, including lower level working groups, to over ninety, in very diverse areas.

Economic and trade relations continued to expand. EU-China trade in goods and services almost reached a half trillion euros in value in 2013, not far from the current value of EU trade with the United States when it comes to goods. Further intensification of economic activity is expected after the re-launch of the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue in October 2013. Negotiations were launched at the 16th EU-China summit on an EU-China bilateral investment agreement aiming to improve investment protection and market access for both sides. An EU-China cluster cooperation initiative for small- and medium-sized enterprises was launched. There were some high-profile trade disputes but were managed through dialogue and according to the rules.

Human rights remained high in the EU's agenda with China. The latest round of the Human Rights Dialogue was held in June. The EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, visited China, including Tibet, in September. Three statements were issued by the HR/VP, one in March on the death penalty, one in August on the arrest of Human Rights defender Xu Zhiyong and one in September on the disappearance of Human Rights defender Cao Shunli.

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37 The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the EU-China negotiations for a bilateral investment agreement on 9 October 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0411).
The EU and China continued to consult each other regularly on major international issues, with China supporting the HR/VP role in the E3/EU+3 talks with Iran and playing a constructive role on North Korea. The EU and China have good practical cooperation on counter-piracy with regular contacts between Atalanta mission and Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) on the ground. They remain committed to working on global, international and regional issues as well as in the fields of defence and security at the multilateral and bilateral levels. The HR/VP issued a declaration on behalf of the EU in November regarding the establishment by China of the East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone. 39

5.1.2. Japan

Twin negotiations for a Strategic Partnership Agreement, a framework agreement on political, sectoral and global cooperation, and a Free Trade Agreement with Japan were launched in April 2013. Once completed, these will bring about a significant upgrade of the relationship, lifting it onto a higher, more strategic plane. The launch was announced by President Van Rompuy and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on 25 March and negotiations started soon after in April. Three rounds of negotiations took place in 2013 for each agreement.

President Van Rompuy and Prime Minister Abe also met in the margins of the G8 meeting in Lough Erne in June 2013.

39 In a resolution on EU-China relations adopted on 14 March 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0097), the European Parliament expressed alarm on the escalating tension in South China Sea. The Resolution appealed to all parties to refrain from unilateral political and military actions and to settle their conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea by means of international arbitration in accordance with international law.
The HR/VP visited Japan in October 2013. Her discussions with Japanese counterparts, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera focused on the deepening of bilateral cooperation on security issues, which constitutes a keen interest of the Abe administration. This also became the leitmotiv of the summit, which was finally held in Tokyo on 19 November 2013. Apart from agreeing to seek enhanced collaboration on global security issues, crisis management and peacekeeping efforts, leaders also gave further impetus to the negotiations on the Strategic Partnership Agreement and Free Trade Agreement. They took stock of the three negotiating rounds held for each agreement and exchanged views on topics such as Iran, Syria, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the East and South China Sea.

Several Commissioners visited Japan in 2013 and a number of high-level dialogues took place, showing that relations continue to expand on a broad basis. Areas covered included trade and investment, development policy, disaster management, urban policy and the agrofood sector.

The Spokesperson of the HR/VP in late December 2013 issued a statement on the visit of Prime Minister Abe to Yasukuni Shrine.
5.1.3. Republic of Korea

The EU and the Republic of Korea marked 50 years of bilateral relations during the seventh summit held in Brussels on 8 November 2013.\(^\text{40}\)

During the summit, EU's leaders expressed their support to President Park Geun-hye's 'trust-politik' and welcomed the North East Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative. Discussions on foreign policy confirmed a high degree of convergence on security crises in each other's neighbourhoods. Both parties also expressed an interest in consolidating cooperation in security and crisis management, in particular in the context of CSDP operations, on the basis of the recently concluded Framework Participation Agreement to be signed in 2014. Leaders also agreed to launch new consultations on cyber security issues and on industrial policy; new arrangements were signed to promote the hosting of Korean researchers in Europe and a joint declaration on higher education cooperation will provide a framework to develop cooperation on policies and best practices and boost student mobility. The organisation of a public diplomacy forum and a seminar on security issues and regional cooperation was endorsed by the leaders.

\(^\text{40}\) The summit had been prepared by the Joint Research, Science and Technology Cooperation Committee, by the third Political Directors Dialogue (HLPD) on 26 July 2013 in Seoul and by the Joint Committee in Seoul on 13 September 2013 and the Joint Trade Committee held in Seoul on 15 October 2013. The accession protocol of Croatia to the Free Trade Area was initialled on 8 November 2013 in Brussels and concluded on 25 March 2014.
5.1.4. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

EU’s relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) were guided by its policy of critical engagement. In 2013 the EU continued to follow closely the situation in the region and in the DPRK in particular. A number of DPRK policies continued to pose serious concerns (in particular on proliferation matters and in terms of serious human rights violations), and the EU raised these issues at every opportunity both bilaterally and in multilateral fora. The EU co-initiated with Japan a resolution in the UN Human Rights Council that established a Commission of inquiry on human rights in the DPRK, the final report of which was issued in February 2014. The EU co-sponsored a resolution by the UN General Assembly (adopted in December 2013 without a vote) that once more condemned the human rights abuses in the country. It kept monitoring the situation, calling for an improvement of the situation, also in relation to DPRK refugees abroad.

DPRK’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and the subsequent raising of tensions in the peninsula represented a particularly worrying development. The EU condemned the test and transposed the new set of UN Security Council sanctions approved in March. It had previously transposed the UN Security Council sanctions adopted in February and adopted restrictive measures of its own. The EU continued to call on the DPRK to refrain from further provocations and choose a path of dialogue with the international community. The EU welcomed the reduction of tensions in the region in the second half of 2013 and maintained communication channels with the DPRK open in order to encourage the necessary changes.

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5.1.5. Mongolia

2013 marked a qualitative step in EU-Mongolia relations with the signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and high-level exchanges, including visits by the HR/VP, Commissioner Cioloș and President Barroso – the first visit of a President of the Commission to the country. Cooperation intensified on trade and development assistance and extended to new areas such as agriculture and rural development, research and innovation, as well as people-to-people contacts. The EU supported Mongolia's activities during its Chairmanship of the Community of Democracies and had regular exchange of views on regional (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Central Asia, China) and global issues.

5.2. Southeast Asia

5.2.1. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

In 2013, EU-ASEAN cooperation was further strengthened, through the implementation of the Brunei Plan of Action 2013-17. Working towards a more ambitious EU-ASEAN political partnership, several high-level visits and meetings took place that confirmed the positive momentum. Furthermore, the HR/VP visited the ASEAN Secretariat on 4 November. She met with ASEAN Secretary-General Lê Lương Minh and opened the new EU programme office at the ASEAN Secretariat.

42 These high-level visits and meetings included notably the Joint Cooperation Committee in Jakarta (January), the visit to Brussels of the ASEAN Committee of the Rights of Women and Children; the EU-ASEAN Business Summit; the EU-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting in Hanoi (May), and the EU-ASEAN Ministerial in Brunei Darussalam (July).
In the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN and the EU, together with other partners, have continued to address regional and international security issues of common interest and concern. The HR/VP took part in the 20th ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial in Brunei Darussalam in July, setting out the EU’s stance on the nature of the main security challenges affecting the region and on the need for comprehensive and rules-based solutions. She also reiterated the EU’s ambition to take part in the East Asia Summit.

Negotiations for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with South-East Asian countries have seen significant progress. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Singapore was initialled on 14 October 2013 and the one with Thailand was initialled on 7 November 2013. At the same time, negotiations with Brunei – launched in 2012 – progressed well in 2013. The national ratification process of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Vietnam and the Philippines moved forward, while the national ratification of the Agreement with Indonesia was completed. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the South-East Asia partners will give more scope for EU cooperation with the region.

5.2.2. Myanmar/Burma

2013 was a landmark year in EU-Myanmar/Burma relations and the opening of a lasting partnership. The Joint Statement of President Van Rompuy, President Barroso and President U Thein Sein, issued during the latter's visit to Brussels in March, marked an important milestone in EU-Myanmar relations by setting a vision to build a lasting partnership and contribute to plans for democratisation, national reconciliation and economic liberalisation.⁴³

⁴³ The European Parliament adopted two resolutions on Myanmar/Burma: on the situation of Rohingya Muslims on 13 June 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0286) and on reinstatement of Myanmar/Burma's access to generalised tariff preference on 23 May 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0228).
In April, the EU lifted all restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma, with the exception of the arms embargo, in recognition of the positive changes taking place and in the expectation that they will continue. Furthermore, in July 2013, the EU reinstated the Generalised Scheme of Preferences for Myanmar/Burma, granting trade preferences to the country after its efforts to improve the political, social and labour environment. On 22 July, the Council adopted Conclusions on the Comprehensive Framework for the European Union's policy and support to Myanmar/Burma which defines the EU's engagement with Myanmar/Burma and priorities for support to the ongoing reforms in the fields of peace, democracy, development and trade.

In October, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi visited the EU to receive in person the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought 1990 at the European Parliament. She also met with EU foreign ministers.

The first meeting of the EU-Myanmar Task force was held on 13-15 November and co-chaired by the HR/VP. She was accompanied by Commission Vice-President Antonio Tajani, Commissioners Andris Piebalgs and Cioloş, EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, and a European Parliament delegation led by Vice-President Isabelle Durant. The Task Force was the most visible expression of the EU's strong commitment to Myanmar/Burma's transition by bringing together politicians, development actors, business and civil society. Council Conclusions of 16 December 2013 welcome the outcome of the EU-Myanmar Task force and highlight the EU's focus of attention on the main challenges which Myanmar/Burma faces in 2014. These include the constitutional review, national reconciliation process and inter-communal tensions.
To stress the importance of EU-Myanmar relations, the EU Office in Yangon was upgraded to a full-fledged delegation with a resident ambassador. The EU assisted Myanmar/Burma in setting-up the Myanmar Crisis Response Centre and provided capacity building for its staff. The EU was the largest donor of grants to peacebuilding activities, including for the Myanmar Peace Centre, ethnic groups and civil society. The EU also provided technical assistance to the reform of the Myanmar Police Force in the areas of community policing and crowd management, with a particular focus on respect for human rights and best international practices in policing. The EU was the main sponsor of the UN General Assembly resolution on the situation of the human rights in Myanmar/Burma, which was adopted by consensus at the end of 2013.

5.2.3. Thailand

Cooperation and high-level contacts intensified substantially with Thailand during 2013. Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra visited Brussels on 6 March and met with President Barroso, President Van Rompuy and the HR/VP.

The HR/VP visited Bangkok on 13 November, where she met with the Prime Minister. Towards the end of 2013, severe political tensions in Thailand resulted in early elections being called for 2 February 2014. The EU, including at the level of the HR/VP, called on all parties to resolve the political crisis peacefully within Thailand's democratic and constitutional framework.

5.2.4. Cambodia

The EU monitored carefully the Human Rights situation in Cambodia, in particular in the run-up and after the July parliamentary elections. Special attention was given to freedom of expression and of assembly. Land rights have also remained central to the discussions between the EU and the government. The EU is strongly supporting civil society, including trade unions, to foster democracy and promote social dialogue in the country.
5.2.5. Indonesia

The HR/VP met Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa on 4 November in Jakarta to discuss topics of regional and global interest, taking into account the increasingly prominent role played by Indonesia in world affairs, for instance on the South China Sea issue, North Korea and ASEAN’s future. The HR/VP underscored during her visit that Indonesia, as a successful democracy and the world’s largest Muslim country, could serve as a role model for other countries in transition in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood.

5.2.6. Philippines

The EU and the Philippines met at senior officials level in June to advance the dialogue on a broad range of bilateral issues, including disaster risk reduction and energy. The EU continued to support the Mindanao Peace Process by taking the lead on the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development component of the International Monitoring Team, enhancing capacity of the civilian protection component and delivering peace dividends through the reduction of explosive remnants of war.

Typhoon Haiyan (locally named Yolanda), one of the strongest ever recorded, struck the Philippines in early November, causing massive devastation and loss of life and property in the central regions. The Commission made available EUR 40 million in emergency and early recovery and reconstruction aid for the worst-hit communities and Commissioners Georgieva and Piebalgs visited the affected areas. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism was activated and the Commission earmarked funds for the transportation of European assistance to disaster zones, and civil protection experts from the Commission's Emergency Response Coordination Centre were dispatched within days to coordinate rescue efforts with Philippine authorities and humanitarian organisations.
5.2.7. Vietnam

General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Phu Trong visited the EU institutions in Brussels and met with Presidents Barroso and van Rompuy on 17-18 January 2013. High-level political consultations were held in Brussels on 15 April on bilateral, regional and global issues of common interest, including EU-ASEAN matters, given Vietnam’s role as coordinator for EU relations in ASEAN.

On 10-12 September the Vietnam-EU Human Rights Dialogue was held in Hanoi. The main issues were: freedom of expression, death penalty, legal and judicial reforms, persons of concern and cooperation on Human Rights in international and regional fora.

5.2.8. Singapore

The negotiations of the EU-Singapore Partnership and Cooperation Agreement were concluded on 1 June 2013, during the visit of the HR/VP to Singapore. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement complements the Free Trade Agreement concluded in December 2012 and will take EU-ASEAN relations to a new level. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement aims to enhance the cooperation in key new sectors such as non-proliferation, energy, maritime transport, air services, science and technology. The agreements were initialled on 20 September (FTA) and 14 October (PCA), respectively.

Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Law K. Shanmugam visited the European Parliament on 9-10 September and expressed his wish that EU-Singapore relations become a model for the relations the EU has with other countries in the region.
5.3. South Asia

5.3.1. India

The efforts aimed at strengthening the political and strategic dimension of the EU-India strategic partnership continued throughout 2013. The 13th Ministerial meeting was held at the beginning of the year, giving the HR/VP the opportunity for useful exchanges on regional and global issues as well as on security cooperation. These exchanges with Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid continued throughout 2013. A very promising expert level counter-piracy dialogue was held in Brussels in September and the regular human rights dialogue was held in Delhi in November. The unresolved case of two detained Italian marines who were captured when on official duty in the framework of international efforts against piracy was also regularly raised with Indian interlocutors. Commissioners Piebalgs and Joaquín Almunia visited India in 2013.44

5.3.2. Nepal and Bhutan

The EU deployed an Election Observation Mission headed by Eva Joly MEP to observe the second Constituent Assembly Elections in Nepal on 19 November 2013. The EU welcomed the successful poll with a high voter participation of about 79 percent, which marked a further step in the consolidation of the democratic transition of the country. The second Constituent Assembly has the mandate to complete the drafting of the constitution, which the first Constituent Assembly (elected in 2008) did not achieve.

The 5th Biennial Bhutan-EU Consultations were held in Brussels on 29 November 2013 in keeping with the spirit of friendship and cooperation that exists between Bhutan and the EU. Discussions focused on political and economic developments, global and regional issues, human rights developments in Bhutan, and ongoing and future EU-Bhutan development cooperation.

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5.3.3. Afghanistan

The security transition process made further progress and President Karzai announced the fifth and final tranche of the security transition on 18 June 2013. The gradual draw-down of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, to be completed by the end of 2014, continued. As the Afghan National Security Forces increasingly took the lead across the country, they bore increasingly heavy casualties, particularly on the police side. The attacks throughout the fighting season underlined the continuing threat posed by the insurgency and the difficulty of operating effectively in the country. On 24 November, the Loya Jirga endorsed the Bilateral Security Agreement with the US. President Karzai remained reluctant to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement, trying to leverage further progress in the peace process and/or additional assurances by the US. The future deployment of US troops and related establishment of NATO post 2014 mission depend on the finalisation of this agreement.

The security situation remained tense with numerous suicide and insider attacks as well as a pattern of violence aimed at influential religious, tribal and community figures as well as local and central governmental bodies.

In June, the Council reiterated the long-term commitment of the EU to Afghanistan and emphasised the need to progress with the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, in particular as regards human rights, elections and governance. No further progress was achieved in the negotiation of the EU-Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development which still awaits an official Afghan reply to the EU proposal from December 2012.\(^{45}\)

In 2013, the EU issued several public statements on occasions of major human rights violations. This included expressing deep concerns in light of a report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan on conflict-related detention (20 January). The EU frequently expressed concerns regarding the high number of civilian casualties as a result of terrorist attacks, armed conflict and the fragile security situation. On 12 June, the HR/VP deplored the callous targeting of civilians in the attack on the Supreme Court in Kabul. The EU also issued a statement underlining its strong and principled position against the death penalty in Afghanistan. Furthermore, there were a number of statements, in particular on women's rights at different occasions.

A new double-hatted Head of Delegation/EU Special Representative, Franz-Michael Mellbin took office in September 2013. The Special Representative continued to play an important role in coordinating and strengthening EU presence on the ground, as foreseen in the EU Action Plan on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

During 2013, the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) continued to support Afghan counterparts across its three operational pillars (institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior, professionalisation of the Afghan National Police, and linking the police with the justice sector), in close cooperation with international partners. Inter alia the draw-down of the international military presence in Afghanistan led to the reduction of EUPOL's presence outside Kabul, with two Field Offices remaining (Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif) at the end of 2013. In line with the transition process the mission placed further attention to ensuring the sustainability of achievements and on increased Afghan ownership. In this regard, EUPOL transferred a major part of mission-led training activities and the administration of training institutions (Police Staff and Crime Management Colleges) to the Afghan authorities by the end of 2013.
5.3.4. Pakistan

The EU continued to work closely with Pakistan to support the on-going electoral cycle reform in the country. The Council, in March 2013, underlined that the strengthening of democracy in Pakistan is at the heart of the EU’s commitment to widening and deepening relations with the country. In support of that commitment, the EU fielded an Electoral Observation Mission, led by Chief Observer Michael Gahler MEP, for Pakistan’s general elections in May 2013. Council Conclusions on Pakistan in June 2013 welcomed as historic the first-ever handover in the country from one civilian government to another following the elections, and welcomed the new government’s priorities in tackling economic, fiscal and energy reform. The Conclusions reiterated the EU’s concerns about the continuing terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

The EU continued to work with Pakistan on addressing human rights issues through dialogue and cooperation. In November 2013, the European Parliament awarded Pakistani schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai the Sakharov Prize in recognition of her courage in promoting the rights of girls to education in Pakistan. In a first encounter with the new government, President Van Rompuy met with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in New York.

Pakistan continued to benefit from the emergency autonomous tariff preferences that were granted following the floods in Pakistan in 2010, and which expired at the end of 2013. In December, the EU announced that a group of countries, including Pakistan, would benefit from the EU’s preferential trade scheme GSP+ from January 2014, thus enabling Pakistan to continue benefitting from improved access to the EU market.

5.3.5. Bangladesh

The EU continued the dialogue with the government and other relevant actors in Bangladesh on health and safety issues in factories serving the EU market. Following the deadly collapse of the Rana Plaza commercial building in April, in which more than 1,100 people died, Bangladesh, the EU and the ILO signed a Sustainability Compact in July to improve labour conditions and health and safety standards in Bangladeshi factories. 47

The EU expressed concern about political violence in Bangladesh and the use of capital punishment, including in cases heard by the International Crimes Tribunal. 48 In the run-up to parliamentary elections, the EU called on all actors to refrain from violence and on the leaders of political parties to agree on a mutually acceptable formula for holding such elections. 49 In the absence of any such agreement, and following the decision by the key opposition party to boycott the elections announced for 5 January 2014, the HR/VP decided not to send an EU Election Observation Mission to the country.

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47 The European Parliament adopted resolutions on recent casualties in textile factory fires, notably in Bangladesh on 17 January 2013 (P7_TA(2013) 0027), and on labour conditions and health and safety standards following the recent factory fires and building collapse in Bangladesh on 23 May 2013 (P7_TA(2013) 0230).


The EU's key priorities remained support to democratic institutions, poverty alleviation, social inclusion, treatment of refugees and ethnic minorities, and the fight against climate change. The EU pursued these themes through development cooperation programmes and through political dialogue.

5.3.6. Sri Lanka

At the United Nations Human Rights Council in March 2013, EU Member States co-sponsored a resolution, urging the government of Sri Lanka to make further progress on reconciliation, and conducting an independent and credible investigation into alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.\(^{50}\)

The 1995 EC-Sri Lanka Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development provides the basis for the EU cooperation with Sri Lanka. The engagement under this agreement was revived with the Joint Commission meeting for the first time since five years in December 2013 in Brussels. The meeting discussed a wide range of cooperation issues, including human rights.

In 2013, the EU issued several statements, including on the impeachment of the Chief Justice in January; on the right to peaceful protest and freedom of religion in August; on the International Day of the Disappeared (30 August); and on the International Human Rights Day (10 December).

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\(^{50}\) These issues were also highlighted by the European Parliament during a visit to Sri Lanka of its Delegation for Relations with South Asia in July and in a resolution on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka in December 2013 adopted on 12 December 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0604).
5.3.7. Maldives

The second democratic presidential elections in the country's history took place on 16 November 2013, when Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom was elected the new President. The presidential elections were an essential step forward, after the controversial transfer of power in February 2012, to re-establish a legitimate, duly elected president and to overcome the political divides which were at the root of many problems. The EU followed the political crisis in the Maldives closely. The HR/VP issued a number of statements and declarations on behalf of the EU, calling upon the responsible Maldivian authorities to safeguard the integrity of the democratic process and to ensure inclusive and credible elections.\footnote{A delegation from the European Parliament visited Malé on 14 July. Preparations for the elections were already being made and most of the talks revolved around the election campaign.}

The Maldives was selected by the EU as a democracy pilot country aiming for coherent analysis and action in support of democratic processes in the country. The EU raised human rights issues actively in its interactions with Maldivian political and civil society actors.

5.4. Pacific

5.4.1. Australia

Building on the visits of President Barroso in September 2011 and of the HR/VP in October 2011, the EU and Australia continued exchanges and dialogues with a view to expanding cooperation on foreign affairs and security issues, crisis management, development assistance and global issues such as climate change or energy. Following the adoption of the EU-Australia Framework Agreement mandate in October 2011, good progress was made in 2013 towards conclusion of negotiations.
The EU-Australia Political Dialogue on Asia was held on 19-20 June 2013 in Brussels with detailed exchanges on developments in the broader Asia-Pacific region, where both parties have converging views and many shared interests and where Australia welcomes greater EU engagement. The EU-Australia Security/Strategic Dialogue at Political Directors' level was held on 30 October in Brussels with an extensive agenda covering security issues in the Asia Pacific, Maritime Security, Myanmar/Burma, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Iran, Syria, Egypt, the Middle East Peace Process, Afghanistan, Pakistan, counter-terrorism, cyber security and cooperation in crisis management.

The EU invited Australia to take part in the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya. Negotiations on a Framework Participation Agreement for Australia's participation in crisis management operations were concluded and the Council approved the conclusion of the Agreement on 22 July.52

An agreement on delegated cooperation between the EU and Australia will allow, for the first time, implement cooperation projects on behalf of each other. An EU funded project in Fiji on Vocational Education will be implemented by Australia while the EU will implement a project in South Sudan on behalf of Australia.

52 After signature planned in March 2014 and ratification by Australia foreseen for mid-2014, the Agreement will provide a platform for enhanced participation of Australia in CSDP operations.
5.4.2. New Zealand

Exchanges on matters of geopolitical importance and of mutual interest were held in the course of the year. In February, consultations between Minister of Defence Jonathan Coleman and the HR/VP took place at the margins of the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, where both sides agreed on the desirability of an ambitious, broad approach to bilateral cooperation.

In November, the HRV/VP held a meeting with Foreign Minister Murray McCully in the margins of the ASEM Foreign Ministers' meeting in Delhi, covering the latest developments on Iran, the Middle East Peace Process and Myanmar, as well as touching upon the excellent partnership on development cooperation following the EU-New Zealand co-hosted Pacific Energy Summit held in Auckland in March.

Following New Zealand's valuable role in the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan from 2007 until the end of 2012, New Zealand was invited to take part in the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and the EU Training Mission in Mali. Further exchanges were held on the potential for cooperation in the field of maritime security.

5.4.3. Fiji

The EU continued to monitor closely the democratisation process of Fiji, where the new constitution entered into force in September 2013. The EU decided to extend the so-called appropriate measures (under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement and Article 37 of the Development Cooperation Instrument) for further 18 months whilst engaging in an enhanced high-level political dialogue, accompanying Fiji during its crucial pre-electoral period. The first such dialogue took place in October 2013, covering the issues of respect of democratic principles, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the EU decided to provide technical assistance to the electoral process leading to the elections promised to be held by September 2014 at the latest.
5.4.4. Solomon Islands

The withdrawal of the military component of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands in July was a milestone in the country's return to stability after the tensions in 1998-2006. The elections in 2014 will be a further test of whether the root causes of the conflicts have been sufficiently addressed. The EU provides support to election preparations through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. Through political dialogue as well as financial assistance, the EU promotes increased women participation in politics and the fight against the high prevalence of gender-based violence in the country.

5.4.5. Regional issues

Following, *inter alia*, US re-balancing of its interest to the Asia-Pacific region combined with increased awareness of the potentially rich natural resources, the region attracted renewed interest from a number of countries, not only China but also Russia, Indonesia, India and others.

The EU continued to strengthen its dialogue and partnership with the Pacific Island countries and its regional organisations. Commissioner Piebalgs participated in March 2013 in the Pacific Energy Summit co-hosted by EU and New Zealand, aiming at securing access to sustainable energy for the island states. He met with Pacific Island countries representatives in Samoa in April 2013 to discuss EU support to the region in the framework of the next financial cycle. Commissioner Connie Hedegaard's participation in the annual meeting of the Leaders of the Pacific Island Forum in Majuro, Marshall Islands in September 2013, contributed to strengthening EU-Pacific partnership and our common interest of progress in the global Climate Change negotiations.
Tensions increased within the Pacific Islands Forum, the main structure for regional cooperation and integration. Fiji launched the independent Pacific Islands Development Forum with its own secretariat, challenging the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. In parallel, the review of the Pacific Plan also called for a change in how the Pacific Islands Forum operates. The EU is a stern supporter of regional integration and provides considerable support from the European Development Fund's regional programme. The EU therefore follows developments closely.

6. Africa

6.1. African Union

The EU and the African Union (AU) continued their dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters.

The Political and Security Committee of the EU (PSC) and the Peace and Security Council of the AU (AUPSC) held on 11 June their 6th Joint Consultative meeting in the framework of the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The meeting took place in the context of the Organization of African Unity/African Union 50th anniversary year. It was marked by encouraging developments on the African continent, including high economic growth and a steady reduction in conflict, despite several complex political, security and humanitarian crisis situations in West Africa, the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, as well as situations of unconstitutional change of government. The meeting highlighted the need for continued cooperation between the African Union and the European Union to achieve our common goals of ensuring peace and security, promoting democratic governance, respect for human rights, the rule of law, protection of civilians and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and combating terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The discussions focussed on Mali/Sahel, Guinea Bissau, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes Regions, Central African Republic and the campaign for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army. The AUPSC and PSC reaffirmed their commitment to enhance joint efforts towards conflict prevention and resolution, and stressed the importance of coordinated responses to unconstitutional changes of government and addressing root causes of conflict.
Under the African Peace Facility, EUR 232 million were contracted in support of African peace and security activities, including the EU's continued financial support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The EU also supported two further peace support operations in Africa: the International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), which took over the responsibilities of the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX), and the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord Resistance Army.

6.2. West Africa

6.2.1. Security and development in the Sahel

While the EU Sahel Strategy predated the Mali crisis, political developments since 2011 – including the effects of the revolutions in Tunisia and Libya, and the political and military crises in Libya and Mali – have confirmed the relevance of this strategic approach.

53 Following the UN Security Council Resolution of April 2013, a UN stabilisation mission in Mali (MINUSMA) succeeded AFISMA as from July 2013.
As soon as the political and security crisis arose in Mali, it was widely recognized by the international community that national, regional and international efforts to help stabilize the country would not achieve lasting results if the root causes of regional instability in the wider Sahel region were not addressed simultaneously, including governance and development challenges.\textsuperscript{54}

The implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel continued throughout 2013, with a review demonstrating concrete progress and delivery in all the four main strands: political, development, security, and countering violent extremism. It was recognized that the link between security and development should remain at the heart of national policies and international strategies for the Sahel, but that increased efforts would need to be made to integrate those two dimensions in the Sahel-Sahara region. In that context, efforts were made to mobilize, for the coming seven years, EUR 5 billion for the Sahel region, including Burkina Faso and Chad.

Taking into account the severe security situation in Mali and its regional implications, the Council decided to create the post of EU Special Representative for the Sahel and appointed Michel Reveyrand-de Menthon to the position. He will coordinate the EU’s comprehensive approach to the regional crisis, on the basis of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.

Throughout the year, increased attention was given to international coordination and synergies with other partner organisations, in particular the UN, African Union, Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and others.

Criminal activity in the Gulf of Guinea was on the rise, especially piracy and oil theft (bunkering and pipeline sabotage). The EU progressed in preparation for the Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea in support of actions envisaged by the regional organisations concerned, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC).

### 6.2.2. Mali

Since the beginning of the political and security crisis in Mali – a rebellion in the north in January 2012 and a coup d'état the following March –, the EU has continuously supported Mali’s territorial integrity, return to constitutional order and a political settlement of the crisis through dialogue. In February 2013, following the adoption of a political roadmap, the EU resumed its political dialogue with the interim administration and provided substantial support to the transition process leading to the restoration of constitutional normalcy, peace and order following successful and transparent presidential and legislative elections in 2013. Both were observed by the EU and other international partners.
On the security side, the EU – both individually and collectively – provided crucial support to the fight against terrorist groups, particularly since January 2013. The EU undertook to support those African countries providing troops for the UN-African Union mandated African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). It also launched a military Training Mission (EUTM Mali) and started the preparations for a civilian capacity building mission to help the Malian Army and security forces restructure and enhance their ability to defend the people against such threats. EUTM Mali trained four battalions of the Malian armed forces in 2013.

The consequences of the presence in northern Mali of these groups for a long time had become clearer in 2012 – abuses of human rights, desecration of holy and cultural sites, trampling of political and cultural freedom and a threat posed to neighbouring countries. In order to help re-establish state authority, the rule of law, and public services throughout the territory, in particular in the north of Mali, the EU resumed its development cooperation gradually as soon as the political roadmap was adopted. On 15 May 2013, more than EUR 3.25 billion was pledged during the Brussels high-level donors' conference for Mali. The EU alone pledged EUR 1.28 billion, including budget support. The Commission, moreover, provided significant levels of humanitarian aid.\(^{55}\)

\(^{55}\) The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali on 13 June 2013 (P7_TA(2013) 0281).
6.2.3. Nigeria

Violent attacks by Boko Haram and other terrorist organisations continued and increased in the North East of Nigeria claiming the lives of many innocent people. In that context, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan imposed a state of emergency in the three North Eastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa in May 2013, which was prolonged in November 2013 and May 2014. Heavy military operations in these states followed, with allegations of serious human rights abuses by the military forces – such as indiscriminate mass arrests and killings amongst the local population and huge numbers of deaths in detention facilities due to starvation, lack of medical treatment, torture, etc. – never investigated properly. Access to these facilities for international observers was constantly denied.

The EU firmly condemned all terrorist attacks and expressed firm support and solidarity, while stressing the paramount importance of respect for human rights and the rule of law in security actions.56

2013 also brought an end to the seven-year self-imposed death penalty moratorium with the execution of four prisoners in Edo state. A draconian anti-LGBTI law was adopted by the Nigerian Parliament, signed by the Nigerian President in the first days of 2014.

Statements and demarches were issued, and the Ministerial dialogue in May 2013 and the human rights dialogue in March 2013 focused on these human rights issues.

A first session of the newly created peace and security dialogue was held in March with encouraging results. The dialogue on security challenges and appropriate solutions was further deepened when the Nigerian National Security Advisor met the Political and Security Committee in November 2013. A counter-terrorism package in support of the National Security Advisor's Office and the ongoing reform of the criminal justice sector was a concrete result from the scoping mission organised in December 2012. Emphasis was constantly put on the need for a more comprehensive approach to be taken by the Nigerian authorities, including job creation, development and governance measures in complement to the security activities.

The second half of 2013 saw also the political temperature rising in view of the early 2015 Presidential elections.

6.2.4. Niger

During 2013, Niger proved to be a committed partner and key beneficiary of the EU Sahel Strategy. It contributed actively to the international community's efforts in the Mali crisis, *inter alia* by providing 600 troops to the UN operation in Mali MINUSMA. There was also a convergence of views on important domestic issues such as the rule of law, good governance and the fight against poverty. Nonetheless, during 2013, Nigerien politics showed some worrying signs of instability marked by increased tensions between government and opposition leaders.
In 2013, EUCAP SAHEL Niger successfully finalized its full establishment and a Status of Mission Agreement was signed on July 30. The mission reached a sustained pace in the implementation of its mandate to improve Nigerien capacities to fight terrorism and organised crime.\textsuperscript{57}

6.2.5. Gambia

In the Gambia, following the execution of nine death row inmates in August 2012, the political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement was reinforced. The Gambian government unilaterally cancelled the meeting scheduled for 11 January 2013, which was deplored in a statement by the Spokesperson of the HR/VP. The Government subsequently reconsidered its position, and the Article 8 dialogue was resumed on 11 July 2013, at which the human rights issues were raised despite being a highly sensitive matter in the country. The EU continued to address the governance and human rights situation in the Gambia with the authorities – with the support of regional actors, notably the African Union – in its political dialogue and through development cooperation. Several local statements were issued in 2013 on the key matters and urging the Gambia to respect its international commitments, including on arbitrary detention and on the refusal of access to the Supreme Court to review the passing of judgment of persons sentenced to death for treason.

\textsuperscript{57} The mission aims at contributing to the development of an integrated, multidisciplinary, coherent, sustainable, and human rights-based approach among the various Nigerien security actors in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. It promotes the interoperability of Niger's security forces, and strengthens the rule of law by developing criminal investigation capacities and ensuring respect for the criminal justice system, including by the Nigerien Armed Forces. Further, EUCAP SAHEL Niger plays a key role in supporting the coordination of the international community's efforts in the civilian security sector domain. Nigerien authorities have expressed their appreciation for the mission's support at a moment where the country suffers from the consequences of a degraded regional security situation.
6.2.6. Côte d’Ivoire

In Côte d’Ivoire the general security situation improved, except in the western regions, where intercommunity violence, mainly generated by land disputes, continued. The EU maintained its support to post-crisis stabilization, including through mediation in land use conflicts, to transitional justice and to the restoration of police services throughout the country. It also decided to contribute to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process of 5000 young persons previously associated with the rebels. Côte d’Ivoire made insufficient progress in the fight against impunity and in the governance of the security sector, where too many abuses were committed. The EU therefore strengthened its political dialogue with Ivorian authorities to promote reconciliation, impartial justice and the reform of the security sector.

6.2.7. Guinea Bissau

The political and security situation remained fragile following the coup d'état in April 2012, with violation of human rights, persistent intimidation by the military, serious deterioration of the economic and financial situation and worrying levels of drug trafficking and increasing levels of local resources pillage, including illegal logging and uncontrolled fisheries. An agreement between the main parties allowed the establishment of a more inclusive transitional government in June 2013. However, due to important delays in the electoral process, fuelled by the transitional authorities in an attempt to prolong their stay in power, the general elections, scheduled for 24 November 2013, had to be postponed to 13 April 2014. The EU cooperation remained suspended (only humanitarian aid and direct support to the population continued to be provided), and the EU restrictive measures against military leaders involved in the 'coup' were renewed in May 2013. The EU actively coordinated its efforts with the African Union, United Nations, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Community of Portuguese Language Countries in order to achieve a peaceful transition and rapid restoration of constitutional order, through free and credible elections. Security sector reform, renewal of the military hierarchy and non-interference of the security forces in civilian matters and the fight against impunity remain pre-requisites for any lasting solution.
6.2.8. Guinea

On 28 September 2013, the long overdue legislative elections finally took place peacefully in Guinea, notwithstanding the tense political climate. The EU actively supported the UN mediator, Said Djinnit, in facilitating a compromise between political parties on the holding of elections. The Spokesperson of the HR/VP made several statements stressing the importance of dialogue. The EU-ACP Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution on Guinea in the context of the overdue elections. The EU deployed an Election Observation Mission, which concluded that the Guineans peacefully expressed their desire to end the transition.

The holding of legislative elections constituted the last benchmark in the roadmap adopted by the EU under the Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. The EU considered that these elections marked an important step forward in the return to constitutional rule and the consolidation of democracy in Guinea and decided to lift the Article 96 measures, thus resuming full cooperation with Guinea under the 10th European Development Fund. Accordingly, EUR 140 million is available to support justice reform, security sector reform, macroeconomic stabilisation, and the construction of roads.

The restrictive measures in place, consisting of individual sanctions against five individuals for their presumed responsibility in the September 2009 massacre, and the arms embargo, were renewed for one year until October 2014. The fight against impunity remains a priority of the EU.

Given the fragile political and security context in Guinea, the EU approved three projects under the Instrument for Stability, for a total amount of EUR 15.5 million, to support: the professionalisation of the police forces; conflict resolution and reconciliation in the Forestière region of Guinea, following an outburst of social violence in July 2013; and the destruction of old dangerous ammunitions present in a number of sites throughout the territory.
6.2.9. Mauritania

With the holding of local and legislative elections in November and December 2013, Mauritania entered an electoral period that will culminate with presidential elections in the summer of 2014. Both legislatives and presidential should consolidate the path of constitutional normality after 2008 coup. Mauritania has become an essential partner within the EU Sahel Strategy, proving to be a relatively stable country in the region in spite of the Malian crisis. The EU encouraged the country's growing engagement with its neighbours, in particular through greater cooperation with Mali, Niger and Senegal, and welcomed its increasing role in the region, including as a bridge between Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa. Mauritania's Presidency of the African Union in 2014 brings new avenues for cooperation with the EU.

The EU monitored the legislative elections through an Electoral Expert Mission and through several high-level visits to the country by European officials. In addition to dialogue on security matters and conflict prevention, the EU will implement in Mauritania pilot programmes on counter-radicalisation and security. Nevertheless, concerns remained over underlying factors of domestic instability, in particular the rise of the Islamist party, ethnic tensions and serious human rights issues, in particular related to slavery and gender.\(^{58}\)

\(^{58}\) Also during 2013, the European Parliament gave its consent to the Fisheries Protocol between the EU and Mauritania, the most important one signed by the EU in recent times. In 2014, negotiations will start for its renewal.
6.2.10. Togo

In Togo, legislative elections were held in July 2013. The participation of major opposition groups was made possible only thanks to a last-minute agreement with the government, supported by the EU. The post-electoral political context was characterized by a persistent crisis of confidence between the government and the opposition. National reconciliation remained an important challenge.

6.3. East Africa

6.3.1. Horn of Africa

In 2013, the EU continued to actively implement its Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, in further pursuit of the comprehensive approach of its actions in the region. The EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, Alexander Rondos, and the EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan, Rosalind Marsden, contributed to these efforts.

The EU naval operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta continued to be a recognized leader in the international fight against piracy and collective efforts led to a dramatic reduction of the number of attempted and successful pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. In 2013, there were less than 20 attacks and suspicious events off the Somali coasts. No large ship has been pirated since May 2012.

The EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor), launched in 2012, carried out activities in 2013 in Djibouti, where it has its headquarters, Somalia, Tanzania and Seychelles. The possible further expansion of EUCAP activities in Somalia was discussed in 2013.

The EU Operations Centre coordinated and strengthened civil-military synergies between the three CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa and facilitated the EU’s comprehensive approach in the region.

6.3.2. Somalia

In January, the EU adapted its comprehensive approach to Somalia, in response to the new political and security situation in the country. The EU, particularly through the efforts of its Somalia Mission, stepped up activities and presence in Somalia, with a more direct engagement with the Somali Federal Government and regional authorities. It continued to provide political and security support to Somalia and the African Union for the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).60

The EU took a lead role in drafting a Somali Development Plan ('Compact') for 2014-16, in the framework of the New Deal agreement for fragile countries, to support political, security and development efforts for peace and state building activities. In September, High Representative/Vice-President Catherine Ashton and President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud co-hosted a high-level conference, at which the international community endorsed the Somali Compact and pledged EUR 1.8 billion in support of its implementation. The Compact includes a political roadmap to federalise Somalia and prepare elections in 2016, priorities and strategic plans to develop the Somali security sector.

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60 The EU continued its significant support to AMISOM through its African Peace Facility, totalling EUR 600 million, thereby contributing to improving the security situation in Somalia in support of African troops.
In August, through the efforts of the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa and the EU Mission to Somalia, the EU supported (both politically and financially) the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development's mediation of an agreement between the Somali Federal Government and the Ras Kambone leader on the establishment of the Interim Jubba Administration. The accord ended a local conflict in the region and paved the way for further political accommodation between the federal government and Somali regions.

In the course of the year, the EU continued to support the development of Somalia's own security forces and began to deploy its military training mission EUTM Somalia in Mogadishu. In December, it transferred the EUTM mission headquarters, which had been based in Uganda, to Mogadishu. EUTM-trained troops re-deployed in Somalia form the core of the Somali National Armed Forces. The EUTM also began advisory activities within Somalia, to strengthen Somali strategic level capacity. EUCAP NESTOR, the EU regional maritime capacity building mission, provided strategic advice to the federal government in support of Somali maritime security and maritime governance.

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61 By the end of 2013, the EU had contributed to the training of around 3000 Somali soldiers. The training also covered international humanitarian law and human rights, as well as the protection of civilians, including specific protection needs of women and children.
6.3.3. Sudan and South Sudan

Despite the signing of an Implementation Matrix to the 2012 Addis Agreements in March 2013 and several successful summits between the Presidents, the EU remained concerned about the volatility of relations between Sudan and South Sudan. Implementation of the agreements remained delayed and there was no progress in resolving outstanding Comprehensive Peace Agreement issues, in particular as regards the disputed region of Abyei. The security situation and resulting humanitarian crises in the Sudanese regions of Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Darfur remained a focus for the EU. 62

On 15 December 2013, deep rifts within the ruling party SPLM led to an outbreak of violence in South Sudan between rival supporters of President Salva Kiir and of former Vice-President Riek Machar within the national army SPLA that plunged the whole country to the brink of an ethnically motivated civil war. At the end of December, an estimated 10 000 people had been killed and more than 400 000 newly displaced. Ethiopia and Kenya, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development and supported politically and financially by the EU, led mediation efforts, which resulted in a ceasefire agreement in early 2014. 63

As part of the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan, EUAVSEC South Sudan, the CSDP mission deployed in response to South Sudan's request for EU support to strengthening security at Juba International Airport, continued its activity in 2013. In October 2013, it was decided not to renew the mission's mandate.

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The EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan and, following the end of her mandate on 31 October 2013, the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, continued to be at the core of EU policy towards Sudan and South Sudan and were in close contact with international partners and key actors in both countries.

### 6.3.4. Kenya

Following the largely peaceful general elections of 4 March 2013, the EU congratulated the people of Kenya and those elected, and commended those that had conceded defeat and appealed for peace. An EU Election Observation Mission was present in Kenya from 19 January to 4 April 2013 to observe the elections, led by MEP Alojz PETERLE. In total, the EU deployed 65 observers across the country to assess the whole electoral process.

The terrorist threat in Kenya remained high as was illustrated by the attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi in September.

### 6.3.5. Madagascar

During 2013, Madagascar remained an 'Article 96' country (under the Cotonou Agreement). However, the year saw major developments on the transitional process with the holding of elections, which were observed by an EU observation mission led by MEP María Muñiz De Urquiza. The first round of presidential election took place on 25 October and second round coupled with the legislative elections on 20 December. A statement by the Spokesperson of the HR/VP issued on 23 December 2013 congratulated the Malagasy people and commended the political and electoral stakeholders for their contribution to the smooth organisation and holding of the elections.
6.3.6. Ethiopia

Active cooperation with the Ethiopian government continued in working towards peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, especially in the two Sudans and Somalia. Ethiopia's role as a host, and 2013 Chair, of the African Union, as well as its ongoing responsibilities as presidency of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have driven the country's growing engagement in preventing surrounding fragility, with a special focus in the Horn of Africa region, but also accelerating regional economic integration. In November 2013, the government announced the integration of Ethiopian troops into the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), of which the EU is one of the key supporters both politically and financially. In December 2013, after the crisis in South Sudan erupted, Ethiopia initiated talks in Addis Ababa between the government and the rebels, in the framework of mediation efforts by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development. Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn visited Brussels in April and met Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso. The Ethiopian economy continued to grow significantly and, thanks to high pro-poor spending, Ethiopia made commendable progress towards most Millennium Development Goals. However, the EU continued to be concerned about the human rights situation in the country, including the restricted space for political opposition, media and civil society.
6.3.7. Djibouti

Djibouti remained a major partner in the international fight against terrorism and piracy in the Horn of Africa. It contributed troops to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), and notably hosts the headquarters of the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor). Djibouti held legislative elections in February 2013, with the participation of the opposition coalition Union pour le Salut National (USN). The EU sent an Electoral Experts Mission, whose recommendations were later shared with the government. The official results were contested by the opposition USN, leading to a political crisis. On 12 March, the HR/VP’s Spokesperson issued a statement calling for the respect of the rule of law, urging to abstain from the use of force and political dialogue instead.

6.3.8. Eritrea

UN sanctions imposed as a reaction to the role played by the Eritrean government in supporting Al Shabaab remained in place, and the economic, social and human rights situation inside the country continued to be dramatic. On 18 September 2013, the HR/VP issued a statement on the situation of political prisoners in Eritrea. The dramatic situation led thousands of Eritreans to leave the country in search for a better future. During their journey, many of them become victims of human rights violations and of human trafficking. The tragedy of Lampedusa in October 2013, when hundreds of refugees, mostly from Eritrea and Somalia, died trying to reach European shores, shocked the international community and prompted an EU-wide reflection on a comprehensive approach to migration.

64 The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation in Djibouti on 4 July 2013 (P7-TA(2013) 0334).
6.3.9. Tanzania

Tanzania, due to its internal stability, is an active promoter of peace and political consolidation in a turbulent region. Its strategic location off the Horn of Africa, on the coast of the Western Indian Ocean and amongst the African Great Lakes countries, makes Tanzania an important player in several regional political and security endeavours.

Following the invitation by Tanzania of the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) to the country, an EUCAP Liaison Officer was deployed in Dar es Salaam. The first training activity for the navy and maritime police was carried out in December 2013. The orientations of future EUCAP Nestor activities were to be defined in cooperation with the Tanzanian authorities and within a broad focus on anti-piracy activities. They could include support to the maritime police, strategic advice on maritime security strategy development and targeted cooperation with the Navy.

6.3.10. Uganda

Uganda continued to play an important role in promoting peace and stability in the region. Uganda was the leading troop contributor to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and chaired the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region. The country acted as facilitator for peace negotiations between the insurgent group M23 and the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which led to the conclusion of a joint declaration in December 2013. Uganda also continued to play a key role in the African Union Regional Task Force tasked with the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army.

During 2013, the EU continued its dialogue with Uganda concerning the reform of electoral legislation. The EU issued statements in May 2013 regretting the closure of four media outlets, and in December 2013 expressing concern at the adoption by Parliament of a draconian anti-LGBTI bill. Uganda took a number of important steps to strengthen public financial management following the revelation of misappropriation of donor funds in 2012.
6.3.11. Mauritius

Mauritius took an active role in the fight against piracy in the Western Indian Ocean. The EU has concluded a transfer agreement of suspected pirates with Mauritius in 2011. Based on this agreement, 12 suspected pirates have been transferred by EUNAVFOR to Mauritius for the first time on 25 January 2013.

A framework between the EU and Mauritius on the retransfer of convicted pirates to serve their sentence in Somalia is under discussion. This framework will help building even more confidence in our established partnership and the strategic model where the flow of pirates is followed from the transfer until pirates go back to their homeland.

16 Mauritian Coast Guards have been trained in February at sea on-board EUNAVFOR flagship this year with a financial support from the Indian Ocean Commission to Mauritius under the 11th MASE programme.

6.3.12. Seychelles

The Seychelles were a very active partner of the EU in the fight against piracy. Under the Transfer Agreement between the EU and the Seychelles, nine suspected pirates were transferred to the Seychelles in February 2013. In March 2013, the Seychelles retransferred 12 convicted pirates to Somalia. In January 2014, EUNAVFOR requested to transfer 5 pirates to the Seychelles.

The EU mission EUCAP Nestor continued to provide assistance to the Seychellois authorities to enhance the country's maritime security and governance capacities.
6.4. Central Africa

6.4.1. Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes region

The EU continued to contribute to the achievement of durable peace and security in the Great Lakes region, supporting international efforts to bring stability, to address the root causes of conflict and to pursue development.

In February, the Peace, Security and Co-operation Framework for the DRC and the Region (‘the PSC Framework’) was signed in Addis Ababa by Heads of State of the region. This framework included important commitments for the international community: among these were the strategic review of the UN Stabilization Mission MONUSCO and the appointment of a UN Special Envoy, Mary Robinson, to support efforts to reach durable solutions in a plan allowing convergence of all initiatives in progress.

The work of the UN Special Envoy was supported during 2013 by a group of international envoys including the EU Senior Coordinator for the Great Lakes region, Koen Vervaeke. Regional and international diplomatic efforts stressing the importance of implementing commitments made in the PSC Framework paved the way for the signature, in December 2013, of the Nairobi declarations between the DRC government and M23 movement.

A joint HR and Commission Communication to the Council was adopted in June 2013. The Communication proposed a strategic framework for the Great Lakes region based on five building blocks: efficient and accountable government in the DRC, security, economy, cooperation and trust between the countries of the region, and engagement by the international community in encouraging regional actors to fulfil their undertakings and act responsibly both internally and towards their neighbours.
In July and December 2013, the Council adopted Conclusions on the Great Lakes region, confirming the EU's determination to continue to contribute to lasting stability and development in the region.

In 2013, the EU issued 14 statements regarding the situation in the DRC and the Great Lakes region, including four joint statements from the team of Special Envoys for the Great Lakes region.

**Democratic Republic of Congo**

The political and security situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was overshadowed by the M23 rebellion. However, other armed groups also operated in eastern DRC, taking advantage of the incapacity of the state authorities to control their territory and meet the needs of local populations. The link between armed groups and the exploitation of natural resources, including minerals and wildlife, remained a major concern.\(^{65}\)

In the DRC, two CSDP missions on security sector reform are currently deployed: EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo. The mandate for both missions was extended until 30 September 2014, to allow for a final transition phase with the aim of handing over their tasks. During 2013, the EU began preparations to preserve and maintain the achievements of the missions with a long-term package of activities, conducted in partnership with the DRC authorities, using available EU instruments and resources.

EUPOL RD Congo, in 2013, continued to support security sector reform in the field of police and its interaction with the justice system, both at strategic and operational levels, while strongly encouraging local ownership of the reform process. Under the coordination of the Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police, which turned out to be an essential actor for ensuring the coherency and efficiency of the process, a progressive legal framework was put in place for the police reform implementation.

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**Burundi**

During 2013, the EU continued to engage actively with Burundi, in support of accountable government, an open society respectful of the fundamental rights and the rule of law. In particular, the EU emphasized the importance of an inclusive process in the run-up to the 2015 elections taking into account the fundamental elements of the Arusha peace agreement and its support for a continued UN role in this respect. The EU Senior Coordinator for the Great Lakes region undertook two visits to Burundi. The EU and Burundi also pursued mutual commitments (to supporting stability and promoting democracy) which had been made at the 'Conférence des partenaires du développement du Burundi' in 2012. In June 2013, the HR/VP and Commissioner Piebalgs' Spokespersons issued a statement on the promulgation on the media law in Burundi. A number of local statements were also issued.

**Rwanda**

Three meetings were held with the President of Rwanda by the International Envoys for the Great Lakes, including the EU Senior Coordinator, and a political dialogue was held with Rwanda under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement.
6.4.2. Central African Republic

In 2013, the EU became increasingly preoccupied by the continuously deteriorating security, political and humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic. Renewed conflict had erupted in December 2012, which culminated in the violent seizure of power by Seleka rebel groups in March 2013, despite the previous signature of a political transition agreement in January 2013. These developments had catastrophic effects on the population, with insecurity, massive violations of human rights, gender-based violence, and the use of child soldiers. The conflict was politically exploited along religious lines, leading to the emergence of religiously-based militia across the country and further violence.66

Throughout 2013, the EU strongly supported the regional and international efforts to find a political resolution to the crisis and to restore security. The EU welcomed the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) authorizing an African Union-led force, the International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), as the successor to the MICOPAX peace support operation, led by the Economic Community of Central African States. The EU also supported France's intervention in support of MISCA.

The EU and its Member States quadrupled their humanitarian assistance to the Central African Republic in 2013 compared to the previous year, and worked closely with the UN and other agencies to maximize assistance on the ground.

In December 2013, the European Council expressed its willingness to use available instruments, including in the framework of the CSDP, to contribute to stabilization efforts in the country. The Council adopted Conclusions on the Central African Republic in October and December 2013, while the HR/VP issued five statements on the country in the course of the year.

6.5. Southern Africa

6.5.1. Southern African Development Community

The EU continued strengthening its relation with the Southern Africa Region and will focus on the political situations in the different countries and the economic crisis. The ministerial-level meeting between the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the EU was held in Maputo, Mozambique, on 20 March 2013. The meeting marked 20 years of SADC-EU dialogue and re-launched a dynamic process of strong interaction between the two parties. It was preceded by a preparatory senior officials meeting on 15 February in Gaborone, Botswana. The Parties discussed their efforts in pursuance of peace and stability in the region as well as at continental level. The meeting discussed the important economic linkages that exist between the EU and SADC.

6.5.2. South Africa

The sixth EU-South Africa Summit was held in Pretoria, on 18 July 2013 – Nelson Mandela's 95th birthday – and allowed Presidents Barroso and Van Rompuy to pay tribute to the South African leader through joint community work. In 2013, specific emphasis was laid on employment creation through expanded investment and deepening trade relations. The summit was preceded by the second South Africa-European Union Business Forum that provided a unique opportunity for EU and South African companies to discuss business developments and build partnerships.
The themes tackled at the summit were prepared by three high-level political events. The first EU-South Africa structured Dialogue Forum on Human Rights, taking place in Pretoria on 27 May 2013 and co-chaired by the EU Special Representative for Human Rights Stavros Lambrinidis, provided an opportunity for the two sides to discuss issues of common interest and mutual concern. The 5th South Africa-EU Political and Security Committee Meeting in Pretoria on 29 May and the 12th Ministerial Dialogue in Brussels on 10 June 2013, hosted by the HR/VP and attended by the South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, were instrumental in facilitating exchanges on African crises and beyond, the 2014 EU-Africa Summit, maritime security and development cooperation.

Nelson Mandela, South Africa's most iconic figure and the country's first post-apartheid President, passed away on 5 December 2013 in Johannesburg. Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso attended the State Memorial Service at the FNB Stadium in Soweto.

6.5.3. Angola

The 'Angola-EU Joint Way Forward' signed in July 2012 paved the way for a more ambitious political partnership and enhanced cooperation, leading to greater openness for dialogue during 2013. Consultations focused on Angola's role in peace and stability in the region, in particular in view of the Presidency of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, which the country assumed in January 2014, and where it has been demonstrating to be an honest power broker in the region, with a pragmatic approach that might be decisive for a long-term solution to this conflict-prone area. Angola was elected Vice-Chair of the Kimberley Process in Johannesburg on 19-22 November 2013.

The 14th Joint EU-South Africa Cooperation Council scheduled to take place in Brussels on 5 November 2013 had to be postponed on request of the South African side.
6.5.4. Malawi

The EU welcomed the turnaround in economic policies and respect of human rights since President Joyce Banda took office in April 2012, and was pleased to note that the country is on a path to economic recovery. The EU recognised President Banda's commitment to social justice, human rights and encouraged her to maintain the ambitious new policies to set the course for sustainable economic growth in the long run. However, following the discovery in September of a widespread government fraud scandal, dubbed 'Cashgate', the EU and other donors suspended budget support until sound governance of public resources is restored. The EU attaches great importance to the Malawi's 2014 elections and has been gearing up its support to their preparations and, following an invitation, included Malawi in the EU’s priority list for election observation missions in 2014. 68 In March, Commissioner Piebalgs visited Malawi, together with the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, José Graziano, to discuss joint approaches to food security with the Malawian government. Since June, Malawi is member of the G8 New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition, and the EU is the lead donor in facilitating the process.

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68 The EU observed the last two general elections in Malawi in 2004 and 2009 and sent an election observation follow-up mission in December 2012 to assess progress and take stock of preparations for the 2014 elections.
6.5.5. Zimbabwe

The EU, pursuing a policy of gradual re-engagement, suspended the travel ban imposed on six members of the government of Zimbabwe and delisted 21 persons and one entity from its visa ban and assets freeze list in February 2013. Following the holding of a peaceful and credible referendum on the constitution on 16 March, the EU suspended a majority of remaining restrictive measures, suspending the application of measures against 81 individuals and 8 entities. On this occasion, the HR/VP issued a declaration on behalf of the European Union with regard to the successful referendum and the review of EU restrictive measures. On 22 August 2013, the HR/VP issued another declaration on behalf of the Union, commending the people of Zimbabwe on the conduct of peaceful presidential elections and taking note that, following the declaration of the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe, the electoral process was formally concluded. The declaration also underlined the importance that the EU attaches to the need to continue strengthening reforms to ensure that future elections are fully transparent and credible as well as peaceful. In September 2013, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation was delisted allowing imports to the EU from ZMDC-controlled companies.

6.5.6. Mozambique

In 2013, a new electoral cycle started. The EU closely followed tensions between the RENAMO opposition party and the government. In this context, the EU asked for restraint and encouraged dialogue as a means to address political differences (in a statement by the Spokesperson of the HR/VP on 22 October 2013) and called for peaceful local elections (in a local EU statement on 6 November 2013). A diplomatic watching exercise by the European Union (EU Delegation, locally represented Member States, together with the missions of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) observed the local elections on 20 November. Recommendations were subsequently transmitted to the National Elections Commission.
Moreover, the occurrence of kidnappings in urban areas in Mozambique gave rise to a number of contacts with Mozambican authorities, where the EU expressed concern and offered its support.

6.5.7. Zambia

Commissioner Piebalgs paid an official visit to Zambia in June 2013 to consult with the Zambian authorities on various areas, including development cooperation, regional integration and governance. Meetings with civil society and political parties' representatives took place at that occasion and issues related to human rights and democracy were discussed.

6.5.8. Namibia

The conclusions of a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with several Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries was at the centre of the EU's relations with Namibia. While no major bilateral issues precluded Namibia from entering into such an accord, complex regional issues were at stake which remained to be addressed. Commissioner Karel De Gucht paid an official visit to Namibia in July 2013 to advance negotiations in this challenging context. The visit was positive and served to strengthen the top political leadership's engagement. Namibia chaired the Southern African Development Community's Organ for Defence, which contributed to increasing dialogue with the EU on regional developments.

6.5.9. Botswana

Commissioner De Gucht paid an official visit to Botswana in July 2013 to advance negotiations on a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the countries of the Southern African Development Community. His visit was also an occasion to strengthen the EU's dialogue with a country that is in many respects a model for the EU-Africa partnership.
6.5.10. Swaziland

Parliamentary elections took place on 20 September 2013 and were based on the customary 'Tinkhundla' system, excluding political parties from participation. In political dialogues and direct engagements with King Mswati III, the EU called for democratisation and the implementation of the constitution, which provides for freedom of association, assembly and expression. The EU's concerns with regard to fundamental freedoms were also conveyed during an EEAS high-level visit to the country in March 2013.

6.5.11. Lesotho

Lesotho managed to maintain a stable coalition government since the country went to the polls in May 2012. Lesotho's governance and human rights situation was positive. However, challenges remain in a number of areas such as discrimination against women, independence of the judiciary and access to justice for vulnerable groups. In 2013, the EU continued its support to the justice sector. Lesotho is an important partner in regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community. Its membership of the Southern African Customs Union and the Common Monetary Area results in its economic policy being intertwined with these organisations and their members, in particular South Africa.
7. Americas

7.1. United States and Canada

7.1.1. United States

The EU-US relationship continued to strengthen, with the launch of negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in June 2013. The TTIP goes far beyond trade and investment, serving as a platform to further EU-US values worldwide with regard to open markets, democracy and the rule of law, as well as promoting global standard-setting. ⁶⁹

Revelations of surveillance activities by the National Security Agency (NSA) led to the establishment of an EU-US ad hoc working group on data protection to discuss questions related to personal data of EU citizens that are affected by the US surveillance programmes. While recognising the vital nature of the EU-US partnership for security in Europe and beyond, the European Union conveyed to the United States its concerns and recommendations regarding the privacy and data protection rights of EU citizens. ⁷⁰

The HR/VP maintained an effective and productive relationship with the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, allowing for close and intense EU-US cooperation on many foreign and security policy issues, in the Balkans, in the European neighbourhood – and beyond, namely Iran. ⁷¹ In Europe's eastern neighbourhood, the US supported EU diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions in Ukraine, while in the southern neighbourhood, close coordination with the US was essential to ensure effective action and communication. In addition, the EU and the US are strengthening cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

⁷¹ The US Secretary of State was invited and attended the working session of Informal meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Gymnich) in Vilnius on 7 September.
The US cooperated with EU civilian and military operations, maintaining seconded personnel with EUSEC RD Congo and EULEX Kosovo, while also assisting other missions, especially in Africa. Close EEAS-State Department consultations took place in advance of the 1 January 2014 take-over by the EU from the US of the chairmanship of the multilateral Contact Group for Piracy off the coast of Somalia. Military-to-military dialogue, between the EU Military Staff and US Combatant Commands (AFRICOM and EUCOM) picked up pace, helped by the US decision to designate formally its defence attaché to Belgium also as defence attaché to the EU. The EU-US security and development dialogue included an initiative to combine their respective strengths in support of the Myanmar/Burma transition. Cooperation also took place on conflict prevention, particularly as far as fragile or post-conflict states are concerned. As part of the security-climate/energy dialogue – one of the newest strands in EU-US relations – the US-based Centre for Naval Analyses and the Royal United Services Institute launched in Washington on 5 June 2013 an EEAS-funded report on 'The Climate Change and Energy Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Transatlantic Security'.

The EU and US collaborated effectively in the field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. US signed the Arms Trade Treaty, joint outreach efforts were made in support of the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, and both parties consulted closely on the mission of the UN and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to remove chemical weapons from Syria.
7.1.2. Canada

EU-Canada relations were dominated in 2013 by a set of high-profile negotiations, in particular on upgrading the 1976 Framework Agreement, and on a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). On 18 October 2013, EU and Canada reached a political agreement on the key elements of CETA, which however could not be concluded until the end of the year.72

In 2013, the EU maintained a full programme of political dialogue with Canada including the re-launching of the EU-Canada counter-terrorism dialogue. Canada continued to contribute to EU CSDP missions in Afghanistan, the Palestinian Territories, and Kosovo. In 2013 Canada contributed financially to the mission in Mali. There was close cooperation on issues such as sanctions against Iran and Syria. Also, Canada participated in EU Election Observation Missions such as the one in Pakistan.

7.2. Latin America and the Caribbean

7.2.1. Bi-regional relations

The EU's bi-regional strategic partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean held its biennial Summit on 26-27 January 2013, in Santiago de Chile, under the theme 'an Alliance for Sustainable Development to Promote Investments of Social and Environmental Quality'. It was the first Summit with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) as counterpart, heralding a renewed dynamism in EU relations with the region. There was an excellent level of attendance from EU Heads of State and Government and Ministers, including Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso and the HR/VP. At the summit, the EU-CELAC Action Plan was expanded by two new chapters dedicated to gender and investments, reflecting bi-regional priorities.

The implementation of the Action Plan continued. As regards bi-regional thematic dialogues, several EU-CELAC high-level meetings took place, in fields such as science and technology (May, Brussels), the world drug problem (June, Quito/Ecuador), migration (November, Brussels), and corporate social responsibility (October, Brussels).

The European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation, operating from its headquarters in Hamburg, continued to implement activities in support of the bi-regional partnership, in accordance with its objectives.

### 7.2.2. Sub-regional relations

Negotiations with MERCOSUR for an Association Agreement slowed down in 2012. Efforts were since made to reinvigorate them. In the margins of the EU-CELAC summit in Santiago de Chile in January 2013, the EU and MERCOSUR agreed to reinvigorate the negotiations and to proceed to an exchange of offers on goods, services and establishment, and government procurement. Negotiations continued during 2013. The exchange of offers has, however, been delayed.

As regards Central America, one of the main EU priorities in 2013 continued to be security, the fight against drug trafficking and criminality. A political dialogue at the highest level, addressing *inter alia* these priority issues, was conducted by Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso with Central American Heads of State and Government in the margins of the EU-CELAC Summit in Santiago. In September, the EU strengthened its presence in the region with the reinforcement of its Delegations to Honduras and El Salvador and the appointment, for the first time, of a Head of Delegation in both countries. Moreover, the EU adopted various major cooperation programmes for Central America at national and regional level to support the reform and modernisation of the justice and penitentiary systems, including prevention and reinsertion policies for young offenders, the protection of human rights, and reforms in the security sector. The trade pillar of the Association Agreement has been provisionally applied since August 2013 with Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, since October 2013 with Costa Rica and El Salvador, and since December 2013 with Guatemala.
Pursuing and strengthening political dialogue with the Caribbean region remained a priority. A high-level political dialogue between the European Union and the Forum of the Caribbean Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM) took place in January 2013 in the margins of the EU-CELAC meeting in Chile. In September 2013, Commissioner Piebalgs took part in a seminar in Guyana to discuss development cooperation under the 11th European Development Fund for the Caribbean region.

In May 2013, the EU Head of Delegation to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean formalised in Saint Lucia the establishment of diplomatic relations between the European Union and the Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States. 73

7.2.3. Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly

The Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) continued to provide inputs to bi-regional policy definition and follow closely developments in Latin America and the EU. The Executive Bureau met in January in Santiago de Chile, and in July in Vilnius, Lithuania. Meetings of the Committees on political, economic and social affairs and on sustainable development held during 2013 facilitated continuing dialogue on key issues for the strategic partnership between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean, including the global economy, free trade and association agreements, migration and security-related matters.

73 Members of the Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) are Antigua and Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are associate members of the OECS.
7.2.4. Brazil

The Strategic Partnership maintained an intense working rhythm throughout 2013. The sixth EU-Brazil Summit was held in Brasilia, Brazil, on 24 January 2013. The HR/VP met Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota at the margins of the EU-CELAC Summit in Santiago de Chile in January, and his successor Luis Figueiredo at the UN General Assembly in September. Political dialogue at senior official level (Political Directors) took place in Brussels in December. The Director for Political Affairs of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, Antonio Paranhos, met EEAS Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont on 22 November. Dialogues on international peace and security, UN coordination, and disarmament and non-proliferation were held in Brussels in July. The first bilateral EU-Brazil dialogue on drugs was hosted by the EEAS on 27 June. Commissioner Tajani visited the country in October, heading a business delegation in the framework of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Investment, Competitiveness and Innovation, which was to report to the next EU-Brazil Summit in 2014.

7.2.5. Mexico

Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso met the new Mexican President, Enrique Peña Nieto, in the margins of the EU-CELAC Summit in Santiago de Chile in January 2013. Confirming the excellent state of the bilateral relation, the Presidents agreed to establish a working group to analyse the scope and options for modernising the EU-Mexico Global Agreement. In October, a working group explored the options for updating the trade pillar. Meetings for a full review (political dialogue, cooperation and trade pillars) were under preparation for 2014. Mexico and the EU continued their constructive dialogue on climate change and the environment. The two sides also carried out preparatory work on strengthening their dialogue and cooperation on human rights, internal and transnational security challenges, and crime prevention.
7.2.6. Venezuela

EU followed closely the developments in Venezuela after the death of Hugo Chavez in March 2013. The presidential elections were held in April and local elections later the year. The EU paid particular attention to the continuing polarization of Venezuela’s society and encouraged all parties to engage constructively in peaceful dialogue.

7.2.6. Honduras

The European Union conducted an electoral observation mission in Honduras for the presidential and legislative elections in the country held in November 2013, lead by MEP Ulrike LUNACEK. It was considered a successful EU engagement in support for the democratic consolidation in the region.

7.2.7. Paraguay

General elections in Paraguay took place on 21 April 2013, observed by the EU lead by MEP Renate WEBER. Elections were well managed and the EU Election Observation Mission concluded that the results were a reliable measure of the will of the people. Horacio Cartes paid his first visit as President-elect of Paraguay to the EU institutions in Brussels in June 2013. A new Parliament was inaugurated on 1 July and President Cartes took office on 15 August. MERCOSUR and the Union of South American Nations lifted the suspension of Paraguay's membership that had been introduced following the impeachment of President Fernando Lugo in June 2012.

The visit of Commissioner Piebalgs to Paraguay in August 2013 provided an opportunity to discuss future priorities for EU-Paraguay development cooperation. In September the EU strengthened its presence in Paraguay with the reinforcement of its Delegation and the appointment, for the first time, of a Head of Delegation based in Asunción.
7.2.8. Uruguay

The EU and Uruguay reaffirmed their shared interests in dialogue and cooperation on global issues, in areas such as human rights, climate change, the millennium development goals and international peacekeeping. The two sides continued to explore possibilities to further strengthen cooperation in the fields of security and crisis management.

7.2.9. Cuba

The Commission, on 18 April 2013, adopted a recommendation to the Council for negotiating directives for an EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation agreement. Discussions with the Member States on the draft negotiating directives continued during the remainder of the year. Human rights questions remained central to the EU’s relations with Cuba and were raised with the Cuban authorities both in Brussels and in Havana.

7.2.10. Haiti

On 12 December, the EU and Haiti launched, in the presence of Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe, a structured regular political dialogue, as provided for by Article 8 of the Cotonou agreement.

EUR 5 million were allocated under the Instrument for Stability to supporting the electoral process in Haiti, including through capacity building. The assistance measures provided, *inter alia*, support to the newly created ‘Transitional Electoral College’, an interim institution that should lead to the establishment of a full-fledged Permanent Council.

The EU engaged with the Haitian and Dominican authorities with a view to encouraging the two countries to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution to the human rights situation resulting from the Dominican Constitutional Court ruling on citizenship. The retroactive application of this ruling could strip several thousand Dominican citizens of Haitian origin of their Dominican nationality.
7.2.11. Andean Countries

The EU closely followed the peace negotiations in Havana between the **Colombian** authorities and the FARC, a process in which progress was made in 2013. During the visit of President Barroso to Colombia on 12 December 2013, the EU reiterated its support to the process and its readiness to lend concrete support to the implementation of a peace agreement. This visit – the first ever by a Commission President to this country – also showed possibilities for upgrading political relations, with President Juan Manuel Santos expressing interest in an agreement on political dialogue and sectoral cooperation and an agreement allowing Colombia's participation in EU-led crisis management operations. The EU-Colombia dialogue on human rights was upgraded. Senior officials met in Brussels in June 2013 for an open discussion on areas of concern, most notably the proposed extension of military jurisdiction, which was later put into question by a ruling of Colombia’s Constitutional Court. This was also an opportunity to take stock of a number of positive steps taken by Colombia. The Multi-party Trade Agreement between the EU and Colombia and Peru came into force in March 2013.

Political dialogue with **Ecuador** was also further upgraded in 2013 with the first ever bilateral consultations taking place in Brussels in June. The EU voiced concerns about Ecuador's new legislation on media, which it fears could restrict freedom of expression, as well as about the new decree on non-governmental organisations. Ecuador continued to negotiate with the EU with a view to joining the Multi-party Trade Agreement.
The EU-CELAC Summit held in Santiago in January 2013 was an opportunity for bilateral contacts at the highest political level between EU and Chile. In the Santiago Declaration the parties agreed to explore the options to modernise the EU-Chile Association Agreement. In this context, coinciding with the 10th anniversary of the implementation of the agreement, the Chilean party presented a proposal for the modernisation the accord in October. The negotiations of a framework agreement aimed at facilitating Chile's participation in EU crisis management operations ('Framework Participation Agreement') were successfully concluded. Chile continued its participation in EUFOR ALTHeA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ALTHeA Operation Commander visited Chile in November.

The HR/VP visited Peru in January; Commissioner Piebalgs visited Bolivia in August. Meetings of the EU-Peru high-level consultation mechanism and of the EU-Bolivia high-level consultation mechanism were held in November.
B. ADDRESSING THREATS AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES

1. Non-proliferation and Disarmament

Non-proliferation and disarmament continued to be an integral part of the EU's foreign policy in 2013, contributing to the effective implementation of the European Security Strategy.\(^{74}\)

Further efforts have been undertaken to strengthen coordination between EU institutions as well as between EU institutions and Member States, and with third countries and international partners, taking advantage of the new opportunities provided by the Lisbon Treaty. Priority was given to bringing together all instruments and tools at the disposal of the EU to ensure complementarity and consistency, as well as a comprehensive approach. Specifically, the EU continued to support universal accession to relevant international treaties and instruments as well as their full and effective implementation in 2013, particularly with regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the newly negotiated Arms Trade Treaty. The EU also continued to promote the inclusion of clauses on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as on small arms and light weapons, into agreements between the EU and third states, in particular with Canada.\(^{75}\) The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium organised its second International EU Non-proliferation and Disarmament Conference in Brussels on 30 September and 1 October 2013.

\(^{74}\) The EU’s engagement across the spectrum of activities in this field was based on a set of strategic documents: The 2003 European Security Strategy; the 2003 EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the 2008 New Lines for Action in combating the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems; the 2005 EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the 2008 Common Position on conventional arms exports. For more details on conventional weapons, see below Section B.2.

\(^{75}\) For more details on conventional weapons, see below Section B.2.
1.1. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

1.1.1. Non-Proliferation Treaty

In 2013, the EU continued to actively pursue the implementation of the Action Plan adopted by the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, and reported on its efforts to the second NPT Preparatory Committee (Geneva, 22 April to 13 May 2013). The EU delivered, *inter alia*, a general statement and three specific cluster statements focused on the three pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The EU also presented a working paper on priority issues for discussion and progress with regard to the implementation of the NPT 2010 Review Conference conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions (2010 Action Plan). It organised a well-attended side event presenting the EU regional system of safeguards (EURATOM) to the conference. It continued to support the Facilitator's efforts towards the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction*76 to be convened by the UN Secretary-General, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.77

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76 The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference regarding the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction on 17 January 2013 (P7_TA(2013) 0028).

77 Efforts undertaken by the EU regarding Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are outlined above in Sections A.1.3.2. and A.5.1.4., respectively.
1.1.2. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The EU continued to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to further support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO). Building on the new Council Decision adopted in November 2012 providing additional financial support through the CFSP budget of around EUR 5.2 million to the CTBTO, it organised jointly with the CTBTO and the Government of Angola a seminar in Luanda, Angola, to support the entry into force of the Treaty. The seminar will serve as a model to pursue similar support and diplomatic action in other regions. An EU statement was delivered at the Article XIV Conference (ministerial level) held in New York on 26 September 2013.

1.1.3. International Atomic Energy Agency

The EU also continued to provide support through various instruments to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.\(^{79}\) In 2013, the Union provided more than EUR 8 million of additional financial assistance to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.\(^{80}\) The primary aim of the support provided to the IAEA is to make sure that when nuclear activities are undertaken by third countries, the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards are met. A first Senior Officials Meeting took place on 25 January 2013 bringing together for the first time officials of the Commission, the EEAS and the IAEA to discuss how mutual cooperation that encompasses financial assistance of more than EUR 110 million since 2007 could be further enhanced. Close cooperation was also maintained between the EU and IAEA on the Iranian nuclear issue.\(^{81}\)

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\(^{79}\) The EU remains a key donor to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund for the benefit of more than 80 countries in Africa, Middle East, Latin America and Asia, with nearly EUR 40 million contributed since 2004 (including the contribution provided in 2013).

\(^{80}\) See Council Decision 2013/517/CFSP of 21 October 2013 on the Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 281, 23.10.2013, p. 6).

\(^{81}\) On the EU’s activities related to Iran see above Section A.1.3.2.
1.1.4. Chemical Weapons Convention

The EU continued to pursue the universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to promote new activities in support of specific projects. The Council Decision in support of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) activities adopted on 23 March 2012 is under implementation. Prior to the Third CWC Review Conference in April 2013, the EU undertook universalisation demarches to virtually all countries that are yet not party to the Convention. Following the Review Conference, the EU also prepared a set of demarches targeting 47 countries that lack effective national implementation of the Convention. The EU expressed deep concern about the threat to international peace and security posed by the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The EU welcomed the international agreement on the dismantling and total elimination of the Syrian chemical arsenal and the subsequent accession by Syria to the CWC. The EU supported – financially and in kind – the OPCW efforts towards that objective.

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1.1.5. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Following the seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) that took place in Geneva from 5 to 22 December 2011, and based on the Common Position adopted by the Council on 18 July 2011, the EU actively engaged in the 2012-2015 inter-sessional programme. It issued statements and presented working papers on Assistance and Cooperation (Article X) and on measures to mitigate risks from scientific and technological advances. The EU also adopted new Council Decisions in support of the BTWC (July 2012) and WHO activities in the areas of bio-safety and bio-security (November 2013). Their implementation is contributing to raising awareness among relevant stakeholders on bio-safety and bio-security and on the importance to adhere and fully to implement the BTWC. In view of the next BTWC review conference in 2016, the EEAS is planning to have an internal workshop at expert levels to help identify EU priorities and objectives, including on measures to comply with the convention.

1.1.6. Export control

As regards export control processes, the EU in 2013 continued to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1673 and 1810 through a 2008 Council Joint Action. The 2008 Joint Action as well as the recent Council Decision in support of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 adopted in July 2013 aim at strengthening the skills and capacities of third countries' state officials. Over the last five years the EU outreach programme for Export Controls on Dual Use, financed under the Instrument for Stability's long-term component, has promoted export control activities within 28 countries with a contribution of EUR 17 million aiming at combating the spread of WMD. The EU delivered statements on the occasion of the Australia Group plenary held in Paris on 3-7 June 2013, the Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary held in Prague on 13-14 June 2013, and the 25th Missile Technology Control Regime plenary held in Rome on 16 October 2013.

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1.1.7. Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles

The EU used the Council Decision in support of the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles adopted in 2012 to continue its outreach to non-subscribing states. It did so in particular through several events, in Vienna on 30 May 2013, in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the HCoC, in New York in the margins of the UN General Assembly First Committee on 11 October 2013, and in Singapore on 27 November 2013 at the Asia regional outreach seminar.

1.1.8. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence

Under the Instrument for Stability, in its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation component, the creation of CBRN Centres of Excellence in targeted regions progressed well and the first four Regional Centres were established in: African Atlantic Façade (Rabat), Middle East (Amman), South-east Europe/Southern Caucasus/Republic of Moldova/Ukraine (Tbilisi) and South-east Asia (Manila). Their remit is to strengthen regional and international cooperation on all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks independent of their origin. In addition to 40 projects adding up to EUR 49 million previously contracted, new projects amounting to around EUR 10 million are being contracted with different consortia, including from Member States.

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85 The UN Security Council welcomed the establishment of these Centres (UNSC Presidential Statement of 19 April 2012).
1.1.9. **Outer space activities**

The EU advanced its initiative for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities through two rounds of open-ended consultations on the draft Code, bringing together more than 60 countries in Kiev (May 2013) and Bangkok (November 2013). These meetings, open to all interested countries, served as a platform to exchange views on the draft Code in a transparent and inclusive manner, with a view to building international support for the text. The EU further engaged throughout 2013 with the UN Group of Governmental experts on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, which in its report noted the EU’s work on the Code of Conduct and endorsed efforts to pursue political commitments, such as 'a multilateral code of conduct to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, outer space'. All EU Member States co-sponsored the related Resolution on Space Transparency and Confidence Building Measures that was approved by consensus by the UN General Assembly.

1.2. **Conventional weapons**

1.2.1. **Arms Trade Treaty**

After a process of more than six years, the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations were concluded at a UN Conference on 19-28 March 2013 in New York. The Treaty’s text was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013. The legally binding agreement aims at strengthening responsibility and transparency in arms trade and will enter into force in three months upon the 50th ratification.
Over the entire elaboration process, the EU and its Member States actively supported the Arms Trade Treaty\(^{86}\) and engaged in its final negotiation in March 2013. Following a Council decision authorizing them to do so, all EU Member States signed the Treaty after it was opened for signature in June 2013. In the meantime, a majority of EU Member States have ratified the Treaty. In the remaining Member States, national ratifications are now completed or underway, depending on the relevant national procedural requirements.

In line with its early committed support to the Arms Trade Treaty, the EU is now focusing on promoting its early entry into force, effective implementation and universalization. A dedicated implementation assistance programme was adopted in this regard\(^{87}\). It will assist a number of third countries upon their request in strengthening their arms transfer systems in line with the requirements of the Treaty. There will also be a consistent effort to reach out to countries not yet party to the Treaty.

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1.2.2. Small arms and light weapons

After extensive consultations with a broad range of actors, the Council adopted a Decision in June 2013 to help ensure sound physical security and stockpile management of Libya's weapons arsenals by the Libyan state institutions, complementing the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya. The EU also promoted more systematic tracing of conventional weapons in conflict zones ('conflict tracing'). In November 2013, the Council decided to establish the first global reporting mechanism for systematically tracing illicit conventional weapons by creating a publicly accessible online system to track illicit conventional weapons, plotting specific weapon types, suppliers, transfer vectors and illegal recipients. The project will also conduct in-field research in conflict-affected areas to gather relevant evidence. It fits into the broader efforts by the EU and the UN to provide currently lacking monitoring and diagnostic capacity to better discern proliferation patterns and combat diversion in the framework of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW).

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88 See Council Decision 2013/320/CFSP of 24 June 2013 in support of physical security and stockpile management activities to reduce the risk of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in Libya and its region (OJ L 173, 26.06.2013, p. 54).

89 See Council Decision 2013/698/CFSP of 25 November 2013 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit small arms and light weapons and other illicit conventional weapons and ammunition to reduce the risk of their illicit trade (OJ L 320, 30.11.2013, p. 34).
In December 2013, the Council adopted a Decision to provide continued EU support to SALW control in south-east Europe. The Decision provides for the support of activities by the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia. It will help, *inter alia*, further increase stockpile security, destroy SALW and their ammunition, improve marking and tracing of SALW, foster closer regional cooperation on SALW issues and support the collection of illegal SALW held by the population of South East European countries.

### 1.2.3. Anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions

In the run-up to the 2014 Maputo Summit, the implementation of the EU Council Decision on the Cartagena Action Plan reached full swing. In 2013, mine clearance workshops took place in Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru (co-hosted by Ecuador), and Tajikistan. On victim assistance, technical support missions and national seminars took place in Ethiopia and Peru. HRH Prince Mired of Jordan and HRH Princess Astrid of Belgium have agreed to form part of the Council Decision's High Level Task Force to support the universalisation of the Convention and Prince Mired conducted his first mission to China in October 2013. The EU and its Member States provided together over EUR 120 million for mine action in 2013, of which EUR 30 million came from the Union budget, making the EU as a whole the largest donor worldwide.

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1.2.4. Export controls

Regarding export control of conventional arms, the EU action remains guided by the principles of responsibility and transparency as enshrined in the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008. The EU continued in 2013 to promote such principles to a number of third countries in its close neighbourhood through the export control assistance activities under Council Decision 2012/711/CFSP, such as study visits, legal reviews and workshops.

1.2.5. Wassenaar Arrangement

The EU delivered a statement on the occasion of the Wassenaar Arrangement plenary meeting held in Vienna on 3-4 December 2013.

2. Terrorism

The EU remained fully committed to preventing and fighting terrorism, promoting the rule of law and criminal justice while respecting human rights. The EU’s key objectives at global level remain to deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism.

Political dialogues on counter-terrorism with key partners of the EU have continued in 2013. The EEAS leads these political dialogues on the EU side. Specific dialogues were held with the UN, the United States, Russia (all bi-annual), Canada, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (all on annual basis). Terrorism-related issues are also discussed in a range of other EU dialogue meetings including foreign policy security dialogues.
One of the key topics raised in political dialogues was the issue of foreign fighters in Syria: those travelling from abroad to fight in Syria, becoming (further) radicalised there, and on return to their home countries either committing acts of terrorism or acting as catalysts for it. According to estimates, there are currently foreign fighters from around 70 countries in Syria, with a significant contingent from the EU. This poses a significant risk to European security, as well as regionally (e.g. Iraq, Lebanon). Sharing our analysis of the threat, and co-ordinating policy responses, were central elements of the dialogues with the EU's partners.

The EU continued to promote the key role of the UN in multilateral cooperation in combating and preventing terrorism. The EU supported UN efforts to implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Specifically, the EU assisted UN efforts to implement agreed regional Counter-Terrorism Action Plans in Central Asia and is financing the second phase of this UN programme. Furthermore in 2013, the EU awarded a grant to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to support projects on rule-of-law compliant investigations and prosecutions in the Maghreb region.

The EU remained a strong supporter of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF). At the fourth GCTF Ministerial meeting in New York in September 2013 the HR/VP underlined the EU's continuing commitment to the GCTF. The EU actively participated in the GCTF activities throughout the year.
The EU is a key supporter of non-EU countries in their fight against terrorism and builds upon the nexus between security and development. EU counter-terrorism assistance focused on the South Asia region (in particular Pakistan, Afghanistan), Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger) and Nigeria, Horn of Africa and Yemen, with a thematic emphasis on the implementation of global UN standards on counter-terrorism. The EU also initiated various projects throughout transition countries in the Middle East and Maghreb in 2013 in order to increase state efficiency in the areas of security, rule of law, law enforcement and human rights.

On terrorist financing, the EU closely worked with the Financial Action Task Force to ensure the implementation of its international standards on terrorist financing and money laundering worldwide.92

In January 2013, the Council adopted the Counter-Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen, implementing the counter-terrorism strand of the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa of November 2011. The EU also funded two counter-terrorism projects addressing the Horn of Africa, in particular on terrorist financing (strengthening financial intelligence units and law enforcement, prosecution and judicial capacities) and on counter-radicalisation and recruitment (support to related projects in Somalia and Mombasa also linked with law enforcement cooperation).

92 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.
Following the French military operation in Mali in early 2013, the EU accelerated the implementation of a comprehensive and holistic approach towards the Sahel region in the framework of the 2011 Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. The EU started in 2013 its funding of an additional counter-terrorism project, extending its work of the ongoing EU Sahel counter-terrorism programme from Mali, Mauritania and Niger to other countries in the region. In 2013, the EU financed a specific study on the threat and impact caused by Boko Haram in Nigeria and possible links of Boko Haram with other terrorist groups in Africa and recommendations for possible EU action.

3. Organised crime

Serious and organised crime represents an often underestimated threat, both in the EU and in third countries. It remained on the agenda of EU political dialogues with many countries and regional and international organisations. EU-funded assistance programmes and CSDP missions contributed to translating political orientations into practice. These actions also seek to complement the outgoing EU (internal) Policy Cycle for Organised and Serious International Crime 2011-13 as well as the new Policy Cycle 2014-2017.
The 'Cocaine' and 'Heroin Route' programmes, funded by the Instrument for Stability, continued to build law enforcement capacities and international linkages along their respective trafficking routes. The production of and trafficking in falsified medicines is another threat to public health, where developing countries are particularly exposed and vulnerable – a new Instrument for Stability project thus aims at raising state and public awareness in Ghana, Senegal, Jordan, Morocco and Cameroon. The Instrument for Stability also continued supporting a number of regional, trans-regional and global projects to fight the illicit accumulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and address their destabilising effects. Furthermore, the Commission committed almost EUR 76 million on maritime security across the globe through its various cooperation instruments (European Development Fund and Instrument for Stability).

93 With a total budget of almost EUR 35 million since 2009, the Cocaine Route Programme covers 38 countries in Africa, essentially West Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and supports partner countries' capacities to fight organised crime and drug trafficking along the entire route, focusing on the interception of the illicit flows of drugs, the fight against money laundering and information sharing. In the second half of 2013, two new contracts have been signed to extend the geographical scope of the AIRCOP project to new countries in Africa and Latin America over the next three years (EUR 3 million) and to support the roll out of the West Africa Police Information System (WAPIS) to its first five pilot countries, notably Benin, Ghana, Niger, Mali and Mauritania (EUR 3 million).

Support to the fight against organised crime on the heroin route continued, with work across 15 countries in Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and Western Balkans under Heroin Route Programme's umbrella which has two phases that are currently running in parallel: the first phase (2009-2014) is a project of EUR 9.5 million comprising four components with the main bulk of its activities focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan, while the second phase consists of three stand-alone projects with a total budget of EUR 6 million (2012-2015). During 2013, two new interventions commenced under the banner of the Programme's second phase: one project with an objective to strengthen co-operation between law enforcement agencies at an operational level particularly in Central Asia (2013-2015, EUR 2.7 million); and another 18-month project (2013-2014, EUR 1.5 million) tackling the issue of human trafficking in countries along the Heroin Route with activities focusing on enhancing the capacities of Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Moldova and Turkey in data / intelligence gathering, analysis and systematic information sharing.

94 See above Section B.2.2.
4. Cyber Security

Cyber security is a relatively new concern related to existing global and trans-regional threats, which can no longer be effectively tackled without addressing their cyber dimension. The February 2013 EU Cyber Security Strategy calls for improved EU-wide efforts in the various policy areas of the cyber domain: cyber resilience, cybercrime, EU international cyberspace policy and cyber defence. Priorities for EU international cyberspace policy are: to preserve freedom and openness in cyberspace; to develop norms of behaviour and apply existing international law in cyberspace; to raise cyber security capacity in third countries and to foster international cooperation on cyberspace issues.

Accordingly, Council Conclusions for the strategy were adopted; cyber consultations with the US, China and a structured dialogue with India took place; a Council Working Group on Cyber (Friends of Presidency) was set up and meet regularly; confidence-building measures were adopted in the OSCE framework; the EU played an active role in the London process on norms of behaviour; progress was made towards defining a coherent capacity building approach; and, on cyber defence, an EU Cyber defence framework is under development.\(^\text{95}\)

\(^{95}\) The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the EU cyber security strategy: an open, safe and secure cyberspace on 12 September 2013 (P7_TA(2013) 0376).
5. **Energy security**

EU action to address the need to strengthen external energy relations was given further impetus in 2013 by the Commission’s report on the state of external energy relations, followed by a review by Member States and the adoption of a Council Report in December 2013, where the need of further strengthening cooperation to tackle energy security challenges was stressed. Both documents take account of the work of the EEAS and the efforts of the HR/VP in this field.

In 2013, the EEAS continued to work closely with the Commission to enhance the use of foreign policy tools and assets in implementing the external energy policy of the EU as outlined in the relevant Council Conclusions of November 2011 and various other documents. Additionally, the EEAS worked to strengthen its internal capacity, resources and awareness with regard to the role of the changing global energy landscape in shaping foreign and security policy.

In strategic terms, the decisive steps taken towards the opening of the Southern Natural Gas Corridor were some of the key developments of 2013. Following a decision by the Shah Deniz Consortium to select the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) as the first European route for the project, the Final Investment Decisions for TAP and other pipelines of the corridor (South Caucasus Pipeline, Trans-Anatolian Pipeline) was finally taken on the 17 December 2013. Together with its linked pipelines/interconnectors (Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline, Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector), the physical opening of this corridor by the end of this decade is a central element of the EU's goal to strengthen the energy security of the EU and its Member States. The Council held a strategic debate on the issue in April 2013. In a related development, the EU supported negotiations on the Trans-Caspian Pipeline project have continued with some successes among the relevant parties.

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96 See Council Conclusions on strengthening the external dimension of the EU energy policy of 24 November 2011. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the issue on 12 June 2012 ('Engaging in energy policy cooperation with partners beyond our borders: A strategic approach to secure, sustainable and competitive energy supply').
The EU continued in 2013 its dedicated and high intensity energy engagement with key partners globally and particularly in the neighbourhood. Marking a success of external energy policy, the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community decided at its annual meeting in October 2013 to extend the lifetime of the Energy Community treaty by another 10 years beyond the original terminating date of 2016. The Community also opened negotiations on Georgia's accession to the organisation.

The continued engagement within the southern neighbourhood had its highlight at the Energy Ministerial Council of the Union for the Mediterranean in December 2013; while engagement towards the eastern neighbourhood continued within the framework of the Eastern Partnership.

The EU's energy relationship with regards to Russia continued in an ambivalent fashion. Russian hydrocarbon deliveries to the EU significantly increased in 2013. At the same time, 2013 also saw the continuation of difficult negotiations on, for example, the de-synchronisation of the Baltic electricity networks, or the Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung (OPAL), as well as complex discussions on further infrastructure projects, such as South Stream.

Further afield the EU continued the energy dialogue with key partners such as the United States and China while also opening up new dialogues, exemplified in the first energy committee meeting between the European Union and Iraq. The EU was also actively engaged in the activities of the various energy governance organisations. These include the 'association' initiative of the International Energy Agency, and the modernisation of the International Energy Charter Organisation.
In the development cooperation area, 2013 was marked by the preparation for the EU's next seven year financial framework, under which over two dozen partner countries have indicated energy issues to be among their top priorities. The EU also continued to be a key supporter of the Sustainable Energy for All initiative launched by the United Nations.

In the nuclear field, the Commission continued its active international engagement in 2013, concluding a EURATOM agreement with South Africa, and strengthening the relationship with neighbourhood states (particularly Ukraine and Armenia) in the framework of the post-Fukushima 'stress tests' on nuclear safety. A positive development in this area was the renewed engagement with Russia.

6. Climate diplomacy

EU action to address the security challenges of climate change was given further impetus in 2013 by Council Conclusions on climate diplomacy adopted on 24 June 2013 and an underlying joint reflection paper of the EEAS and the Commission. Complementary Conclusions on water diplomacy were adopted in July 2013. In addition, the potential specific consequences for the military were further explored in a reflection paper of the EU Military Staff and subsequent discussions with Member States. At the international level, a joint declaration of Foreign Ministers of G8 countries and the HR/VP on the climate-security nexus was issued on 11 April 2013 and followed by expert work focusing on the specific challenges for the most fragile states.
At the regional level, political awareness of the rising vulnerabilities and preventative diplomacy initiatives to address these was further heightened by the continuation of a series of high-level international conferences on climate security in Seoul in March 2013 with close EEAS involvement. Underlying analytical work on emerging security threats was also advanced, for instance in the framework of the Climate-Induced Changes on Water and Security cluster of research projects that delivered their final assessments in 2013. Work continued as well on environmental security Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus in the framework of a three year project with the ENVSEC consortium of international organisations. EU coordination and information sharing on the matter continued via an ad hoc steering group.

The 19th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 9th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol took place in Warsaw in November. The decisions taken in Warsaw put the international climate negotiations on a good track and set up an agenda towards adopting an ambitious and legally-binding climate agreement including all countries in Paris in 2015. In particular, the Warsaw conference tasked all parties to do their 'homework' and prepare proposed contributions in the context of adopting that agreement and communicate them well in advance of the Paris climate summit of 2015, or by first quarter of 2015 by those ready to do so. Warsaw also made a number of implementation decisions in areas such as finance, reducing forest emissions and 'loss and damage' enabling smooth operation and development of the UNFCCC institutions.
From a formal perspective, the Warsaw summit managed to avoid the blockage of negotiations by the Russian Federation, which, earlier that year, demanded a revision of the decision-making process under the Convention. It has also submitted a formal note to the UN Secretary General indicating a violation of the draft rules of procedure while taking the decision on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol at COP18 in Doha. The discussion on the decision-making process will continue and may demand diplomatic involvement to facilitate or even enable the adoption of the global climate agreement in 2015.

7. Water security

In 2013, water security and EU water diplomacy acquired greater attention. The Council in July 2013 adopted Conclusions on water diplomacy acknowledging the increasing risks for tensions and conflicts over access to water that could have a direct bearing on European interests, as on international peace and security. The Council Conclusions recognised the need for proactive EU engagement in trans-boundary water security challenges as a concrete objective of water diplomacy with the aim of promoting collaborative and sustainable water management world-wide. They also identified concrete actions and priorities in support of these goals.
The immediate water diplomacy priorities recognised in the Conclusions were the Nile and Central Asia. However, other areas such as the Mekong, the Middle East or the Sahel region were also recognised as big challenges. The importance of EU engagement on trans-boundary challenges and cooperation with countries in the EU neighbourhood was stressed. The HR/VP, EEAS and EU Special Representatives for Central Asia and the Horn of Africa in particular were actively engaged throughout the year. They maintained political contacts and worked closely with the Commission in trying to contribute to addressing some of the political challenges posed by issues such as the planned Rogun and Grand Renaissance dams in Tajikistan and Ethiopia respectively.

2013 was also the UN Year of Water Cooperation, which was marked by different events across the world, to some of which the EU contributed. Examples were the EU statement delivered at the High-level Interactive Dialogue of the UN General Assembly on Water Cooperation on 22 March in New York, and the EU intervention at the High-Level International Conference on Water Cooperation on 20-21 August 2013 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
C. CONTRIBUTION TO A MORE EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL ORDER

1. United Nations

As a staunch supporter of multilateralism, the EU continued to work towards strengthening the UN and reinforcing further the cooperation between the Union and the UN. The EU continued to focus on the promotion of international peace and security, sustainable development and human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as on the improvement of the effectiveness of the UN.

During the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly, the EU made full use of the provisions of Resolution 65/276 on the participation of the EU in the work of the UN (adopted in May 2011). The EU actively participated in the UN General Assembly, its main committees, its working groups, in international meetings and conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly and in United Nations conferences.\(^\text{97}\)

In its priorities for its work at the UN,\(^\text{98}\) the EU reaffirmed its overall aim of ensuring a strong and efficient UN at the apex of the international system. Within the framework of the UN General Assembly, the EU contributed actively to several high-level meetings with an impact on development, notably the Millennium Development Goals Special Event, the High-Level Meeting on Disabilities and Development and the High Level Meeting on Migration and Development. The EU has also contributed to the negotiations and adoption of several UN General Assembly Resolutions with a direct impact on development.

\(^{97}\) The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the recommendations to the Council on the 68\(^{\text{th}}\) session of the United Nations General Assembly on 11 June 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0234).

In the field of **peace and security**, the EU and UN pursued their cooperation on conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, crisis management, and peacebuilding. In the field of crisis management, the EU made further progress in implementing its Plan of Action of 2012 to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping. This includes the preparation of a clearing house model to create a policy agreement on the EU facilitating coordinated Member States' contributions to UN operations; a joint project 'Building African Union Capacities in Security Sector Reform' aimed at enhancing EU-UN coordination of assistance to the African Union; improvement of the modalities for EU-UN coordination during the planning and conduct of missions and operations deployed in support of UN operations; and cooperation in training and exercises as well as in the area of lessons learned. The already close cooperation with the UN Departments of Peacekeeping and Political Affairs as well as in-country teams continued to be strengthened through the EU-UN Steering Committee on cooperation in crisis management. In 2013, the Union cooperated with the UN in military and civilian crisis management in various countries, notably in Somalia, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya and Kosovo. In Mali, for instance, the EU started to provide satellite imagery to the UN mission, share burdens on monitoring and cooperate closely on training. In Libya, the EU and UN engaged closely on the setting up of the EU Border Assistance Mission in the country.

The operationalisation of the Responsibility to Protect remained a priority for the EU at the UN, as well as in relation to EU instruments and policies. To this end, the EU actively took part in discussions at the UN General Assembly and in the context of the Global Network of Responsibility to Protect Focal Points. The EU supported further development and operationalizing of the concept of protection of civilians in armed conflict, including through the UN peacekeeping operations and EU missions.99

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The EU played an active role in the UN Peacebuilding Commission and its six country configurations as the major donor to the countries on the Peacebuilding Commission's agenda (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic). The EU also cooperated with other countries in situations of fragility in the framework of the implementation of the New Deal for engagement in fragile states, endorsed in the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011, such as Somalia and East Timor.

The EU enhanced its cooperation with the UN in areas of conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, including through the EU-UN Partnership on Natural Resources and Conflict Prevention; peacebuilding assistance in Liberia; the EU-UN Women partnership on promoting 'women, peace and security'; EU assistance to the UN Development Programme on mediation; and other regular contacts with UN counterparts on these issues. The EU continued to support the UN Department of Political Affairs' Mediation Support Unit and further strengthened its own mediation support capacities.

**Human Rights** are covered in detail elsewhere in this report,\(^{100}\) and in this context, it is sufficient to recall that the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law remained a silver thread in the EU's action at the UN throughout 2013. The EU successfully worked for support for the EU's country initiatives on human rights situations in the Third Committee and continued to engage strongly on key priorities such as freedom of religion or belief with third countries, with the aim of reaffirming and consolidating further the previous achievements regarding EU-led initiatives for UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council resolutions.

\(^{100}\) See below Chapter D.
In the field of **sustainable development**, key priority issues were the follow-up to the Rio+20 Conference and the preparation of the post-2015 framework for poverty eradication and sustainable development. The outcome of the UN General Assembly Special Event on the Millennium Development Goals in September 2013 adopted by the UN General Assembly in October 2013 provides a good basis for continued discussions and provides a road map for the process ahead, with an intergovernmental process as of the 69th UN General Assembly leading towards a Summit in September 2015. On 27 February 2013, the Commission adopted a Communication on the review of the Millennium Development Goals, the follow-up from Rio+20 and the post-2015 agenda, entitled 'A decent life for all: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future'.  

On 25 June 2013, the Council adopted Conclusions on 'An overarching framework post 2015'. Both the Communication and the Conclusions highlight that the eradication of poverty and sustainable development are linked and mutually reinforcing and should therefore be integrated into a single overarching post-2015 framework. They list EU priority elements for an overarching framework, including addressing basic human development; the drivers for sustainable and inclusive growth; sustainable management of natural resources; human rights, equality, equity and justice; and peace and security and gender. Both documents reaffirm our commitment to addressing the gaps in the Millennium Development Goals. In July, the Commission adopted a Communication entitled 'Beyond 2015: towards a comprehensive and integrated approach to financing poverty eradication and sustainable development' and, on 12 December 2013, the Council adopted Conclusions on Financing poverty eradication and sustainable development beyond 2015.

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Moreover, the EU supported the transformation of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) into a body with universal membership by actively taking part in the negotiations on the new institutional arrangements for the universal UN Environment Assembly of UNEP. The EU also actively engaged in the establishment of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, which will replace the Commission on Sustainable Development, and on the reform of the UN Economic and Social Council. The outcome on the High-Level Political Forum meets to a large extent the EU's ambition to create a body which allows for engagement at the highest political level. The first meeting of the High-Level Political Forum was held in September 2013 under the auspices of the UN General Assembly. Combating climate change also remained a key objective for the EU at the UN.

The EU has also contributed to the adoption of several Resolutions related to development at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), as well as at the 51st Session of the UN Commission on Social Development focusing on the theme 'Promoting empowerment of people in achieving poverty eradication, social integration and full employment and decent work for all'. The EU significantly contributed to the successful adoption of Agreed Conclusions of the Commission on the Status of Women focusing on the elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against women and girls. The guiding principles for the EU were: preserving and strengthening the international agreements and commitments on gender equality and the empowerment of women; defending the gender equality acquis, and pursuing a rights based approach. The strong outcome is a good basis for the future work of the UN system, particularly that of UN Women, on gender equality and the empowerment of women.
The EU also promoted the **reform of the UN System**. It remained committed to ensuring that UN financial resources are managed efficiently and effectively, according to the principles of budgetary discipline and coherence and in conformity with the highest international standards, as well to the strengthening of field-level effectiveness.

2. **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

The EU remained in 2013 a major supporter and strong contributor to the work of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Representing almost half of the OSCE membership, the EU continued to support the OSCE's efforts to enhance security through cooperation in all areas.

Despite rather limited progress made throughout the year, the EU continued its active engagement in the resolution of protracted conflicts dealt with in the OSCE framework, notably on the Transnistria settlement talks and the Geneva International Discussions. The EU also continued to support the efforts to achieve progress in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The EU provides significant funding for building confidence between the parties of each of these conflicts.

The EU also attached great importance to the full implementation of human dimension commitments, especially in the area of fundamental freedoms, and emphasized the role of the autonomous OSCE institutions: the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the High Commissioner on National Minorities in monitoring the implementation of commitments by the participating states and assisting them in improving their record in this respect. This includes election observation throughout the OSCE area. Cooperation with the OSCE was developed further in the areas of human rights, and addressing transnational threats, including on issues related to border management and cyber security. The EU also continued to support the work of the OSCE field missions notably in the Western Balkans, South Caucasus and Central Asia. The EU provided significant support to the Community Security Initiative in Kyrgyzstan. The EU welcomed the OSCE's role in facilitating the organisation of the local elections in northern Kosovo early November.
The EU contributed actively to the dialogue on the future of European security, including through the discussions on the Helsinki+40 process, and the OSCE’s work on strengthening and modernising arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. The EU took an active stance in the ‘Conflict Cycle’ discussions aiming to bolster the OSCE’s capacity for early warning and early action in response to developing or potential crises, conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The EU engaged constructively with all partners during the preparations for the Kyiv Ministerial Council (5-6 December) and welcomed progress in all dimensions of the OSCE as well as on cross-dimensional issues, such as the decision on combating trafficking in human beings.

3. Council of Europe

The EU continued its active engagement with the Council of Europe in line with the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two organisations in 2007, notably in the European neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. The cooperation covered all three pillars of the Council of Europe's activities: democracy, rule of law and human rights. The EU continued to cooperate with the Council of Europe on legal issues, standards setting and joint programmes and to support implementation of the Stockholm Programme, for example in the areas of efficiency of justice and data protection.

The EU particularly appreciated the work of Council of Europe expert bodies in monitoring and advising Council of Europe member states on human rights and rule of law standards, in particular the expertise and advice of the Venice Commission. Examples for these activities include the advice on the Egyptian law on non-governmental organisations, co-operation with Georgia on its constitutional reform and with Ukraine on the reform of the Public Prosecution service, advice on amendments to the electoral legislation of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, and assistance to the Central Electoral Commission in Albania.
Negotiations for EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights reached an important milestone in April 2013 with the agreement at a technical level on a draft Accession Agreement, on which the EU Court of Justice was due to give its opinion.

On 18 November 2013, the EU Council adopted the EU Priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe for the period 2014-2015. The identification of a set of non-exclusive strategic priorities on a limited number of geographic and thematic areas is expected to foster reinforced and result-oriented cooperation. In the field of human rights, the EU aims at working with the Council of Europe to reinforce the European Convention on Human Rights system and fight against discrimination. The reform of the judiciary and fight against corruption remain priorities for cooperation in the field of the rule of law. In the area of democracy, the two organisations will work to promote intercultural dialogue, local and regional democracy.

4. **Group of Seven, Group of Eight and Group of Twenty**

The Commission and the European Council President participated in a number of summits and meetings of the Group of Seven (G7), Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20) throughout 2013, dealing mainly with the global economy. The G8 Summit in Loch Erne in June discussed the 'three T' priorities: trade, taxation and transparency.

As regards development cooperation, the G8 continued to focus on agriculture and food security. The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition was expanded. The EU continued to play an active role in building a partnership between partner governments in Africa, G8 countries and the private sector with the aim of lifting 50 million people out of poverty in the next ten years by supporting agricultural development. The EU also provided strong support to the UK initiative on trade in Africa.  

The UK-led G8 transparency initiative covered several important areas, including: the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, aid transparency, tax transparency and reducing money laundering and improving tax systems in developing countries. These are all areas where the EU is very active.
D. SUPPORT TO DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW

1. Promotion of human rights, international humanitarian law, democracy and the rule of law

The EU continued to actively promote respect for human rights across the world in 2013. The guiding reference for work in this area remained the Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted in June 2012, which aims to improve the effectiveness and consistency of the EU's human rights policy and to place human rights and democracy at the core of the Union's external action. This includes policy areas such as CFSP, trade, investment and development as well as the external dimensions of justice and home affairs and employment and social policy. The EU continued to be a major advocate for international humanitarian law, which is embedded in its foreign policy, development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

2. Human rights throughout EU policy

2013 marked the first full year of the mandate of the EU Special Representative on Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis. Special Representative Lambrinidis focused primarily on strengthening the EU’s human rights engagement with strategic partner countries; addressing human rights challenges with countries in transition in pivotal world regions; elevating the EU’s visibility and engagement with multilateral and regional human rights mechanisms (United Nations, Council of Europe, OSCE, ASEAN, African Union, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation); and heightening EU cooperation with and empowering civil society throughout the world.

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Thematically, the Special Representative continued his focus on protecting non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders, and expanding the space in which they operate; advancing the universality of human rights; raising the effectiveness of EU human rights dialogues; and promoting key EU thematic priorities, including those reflected in recently adopted human rights guidelines.

The adoption of human rights country strategies, which identify the priority human rights issues on which the EU will take action in every country in which it is represented, was almost completed in 2013. 146 strategies were drafted, and 123 were given final endorsement by the Political and Security Committee.

The EU held human rights dialogues and consultations with 30 partner countries and regional groupings. A human rights dialogue with South Africa and consultations with the Republic of Korea were held for the first time. In addition, many of the 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries that are party to the Cotonou Agreement engaged in a dialogue with the EU. Most human rights dialogues were preceded by consultation meetings with civil society organisations in Brussels and the countries concerned, and followed by debriefings for these organisations. Efforts were made to improve the impact and effectiveness of the dialogues. The HR/VP and her Spokesperson issued numerous statements on human rights, while confidential demarches were used in a number of instances.
All EU Delegations and CSDP missions had appointed a human rights and democracy focal point by the end of 2012. The human rights focal points play a crucial role in implementing the human rights country strategies, liaising with local civil society organisations, and coordinating the work of EU missions on human rights issues. The training of EU staff on human rights and democracy policies continued throughout the year.

Civil Society continued to be the main recipient of funding from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). More than 530 new EIDHR initiatives were launched, adding to the more than 2500 ongoing EIDHR projects already being implemented in the field. Moreover, the EIDHR small grant scheme was activated in more than 50 cases, providing emergency assistance to hundreds of at-risk human rights defenders. EU Delegations in 107 countries opened calls for proposals for projects by grassroots civil society organisations in the fields of human rights and democratisation, conflict resolution and political participation.

3. Implementing EU human rights priorities

During 2013, the EU continued to promote respect for civil and political rights, and human rights guidelines were adopted in a number of fundamentally important areas. The EU repeatedly expressed concern at the trend of increased restrictions on freedom of association and on the activities of civil society organisations. Smear campaigns, restrictions on access to funding from abroad, and the use of intimidation and violence against activists are just a few examples of the grave challenges faced by many human rights defenders in their daily work. The EU raised cases of human rights defenders during its contacts with many third countries and issued declarations to support their work, including in cases where activists were detained, harassed or assassinated. EU diplomats on the ground attended the trials of human rights defenders, and made efforts to secure their release.105

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The Council adopted the Guidelines to promote and protect the **enjoyment of all human rights by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex** (LGBTI) persons in June 2013. The guidelines set out the EU’s approach to targeting discriminatory laws and policies, promoting equality and non-discrimination, and combating violence against LGTBI persons. In parallel, the EU continued to be actively engaged in efforts at the regional and multilateral level to tackle discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. At the bilateral level, the EU expressed its position on LGBTI issues, including its stance against homophobia and in favour of the decriminalisation of homosexual relations, both in public statements and in private diplomatic contacts. The EU monitored and addressed worrying trends in the area of LGBTI rights, most notably in a number of African countries, and in Russia.

Also in June, the EU adopted Guidelines on **Freedom of Religion or Belief**, following consultations with a wide range of stakeholders including civil society organisations, churches, religious associations and communities, and philosophical and non-confessional organisations. In the guidelines, the EU recalls the international human rights standards in this area, and reaffirms its determination to defend the freedom of religion or belief as a right to be exercised on the basis of the principles of equality, non-discrimination and universality. The guidelines will further support EU action in support of religious freedom, against the background of a worrying trend of violations around the world. The EU raised its concerns through bilateral diplomatic action, public statements, and Council Conclusions.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{106} The European Parliament adopted resolutions on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion and belief on 13 June 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0279); on the situation of Rohingya Muslims on 13 June 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0286); and on the recent cases of violence and persecution against Christians, notably in Maaloula (Syria) and Peshawar (Pakistan) and the case of Pastor Saeed Abedini (Iran) on 10 October 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0422).
Throughout 2013, the EU repeatedly condemned restrictions on freedom of expression and on internet access, as well as the arrests of journalist and bloggers. In the Guidelines on Freedom of Religion or Belief the EU established a specific link with freedom of expression, due to the interdependence and mutually reinforcing nature of both rights. The EU also took the position that fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law need to be protected on the internet under the same norms, principles and values that the EU upholds offline. Accordingly, the EU continued work on the preparation of guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, which will be finalised in 2014.  

The EU continued to play its key global role in pushing for the abolition of the death penalty, building on the momentum that followed the December 2012 adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution calling for a global moratorium. The Guidelines on Death Penalty, originally adopted in 1998, were updated in the course of 2013, and the new text is a consolidation of the EU’s experience in its activities towards abolition. The EU targeted retentionist countries at bilateral and multilateral level, and continued to raise its opposition to the death penalty in all relevant forums, in particular at the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The EU Special Representative for Human Rights led the EU's engagement in the June 2013 World Congress against the Death Penalty in Madrid.

The EU carried forward the implementation of the Guidelines on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and continued to raise individual cases of torture and ill-treatment during the human rights dialogues with third countries. The EU made a number of statements, including within multilateral fora such as the UN and the OSCE, and considered ways to better coordinate with the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture. Finally, the EU provided a wealth of financial support to civil society organisations around the world. In the framework of the EIDHR 'Fighting Impunity' programme, 25 new initiatives in support of at-risk human rights defenders were launched, with a total value of EUR 20 million.

The EU took an active stance in defence of women's rights during the March 2013 57th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women. The EU and UN Women continued to implement their partnership agreement, including by jointly organising the April 2013 High-Level Conference on Women’s Leadership in the Sahel Region, in collaboration with the UN Special Envoy for the Sahel. The EU took further steps to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, notably by including gender consideration in all CSDP missions. More than half of CSDP missions currently deployed have at least one gender adviser.108

In 2013 the EU continued efforts to promote child rights around the world. Following a joint effort between the EU and UNICEF, a toolkit for child rights mainstreaming in development cooperation was completed and launched through regional training organised for EU Delegations and other donors. In autumn 2013, the EU, in partnership with the African Union, organized a workshop on children affected by armed conflict in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Through the Children for Peace initiative – a legacy of the EU’s Nobel Prize – the EU committed an additional EUR 4 million to education of children in crisis situations. As regards child labour, the EU participated in the October 2013 Third Global Conference on Child Labour in Brasilia, Brazil, and was actively engaged in the negotiation of the tripartite declaration on child labour.

The EU actively promoted respect for the rights of persons with disabilities, including by consistently advocating for the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which the EU itself ratified in 2011, and by raising disability rights issues in human rights dialogues with partner countries. The EU continued to protect and promote the rights of disabled persons outside the Union, by systematically considering disability rights issues in development cooperation programming, and by implementing projects to advance the rights of persons with disabilities.
The EU continued to promote economic, social and cultural rights, working in close cooperation with UN Special Rapporteurs, and violations of these rights were regularly raised in human rights dialogues with third countries. On the occasion of World Water Day on 22 March, the HR/VP underlined that access to safe drinking water and sanitation is a human right, derived from the right to an adequate standard of living. The EU consistently encouraged partner countries to ratify and implement International Labour Organisation Conventions, and the Annual Non-governmental Organisation Forum (5-6 December 2013) was largely devoted to ensuring accountability for the respect and full achievement of economic, social and cultural rights.  

4. Human rights in all external policies

The EU continued to work during the year to incorporate human rights in its trade, development and other external policies. Further steps were taken in the direction of incorporating a rights-based approach in development cooperation, including by developing a toolbox. During 2013, a guidance note for EU Delegations on EU Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society was developed.

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The legislative package on the EU’s external instruments, on which agreement was reached by the European Parliament and the Council in December 2013, focused greater attention on human rights, democracy and good governance. The EU followed a human rights-based approach in the preparation of the first outlines of the 2014-2020 strategy papers, multi-annual indicative programmes and budget support programmes. In parallel to the programming exercise, the EU worked intensively on the follow-up to Rio+20 and the post-2015 development agenda, and consistently emphasised the need to integrate human rights, governance, democracy and the rule of law into the post-2015 framework.\(^{110}\)

Throughout the year, the EU repeatedly stated its position that the fight against terrorism must be conducted with respect for the rule of law and in full conformity with applicable international law. In October 2013, the EU and many Member States participated in the Istanbul International Conference on National and International Coordination in Counter-Terrorism. The EU continued to implement its Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-16, with EU Delegations in priority countries playing an active role. Work began on the development of an inventory that will map anti-trafficking funding instruments and projects operated by the EU and its Member States in priority countries and regions.

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In the area of trade policy, the EU lifted the suspension of preferential treatment under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) for Myanmar/Burma, which was originally imposed in 1997, in response to substantial improvements in the area of human and labour rights in the country. Preparations continued for the application of the new GSP Regulation, including a review of the first group of applications for GSP+ status. Human rights impact assessments were carried out for all trade negotiations launched in 2013, including the EU-US trade negotiations.

The EU continued to mainstream its human rights and gender equality policies within the Common Security and Defence Policy. 8 out of the 11 ongoing CSDP civilian missions, and all CSDP military operations, had a human rights or gender adviser as part of their staff in 2013. New Crisis Management Procedures adopted in June 2013 stipulate that a gender and human rights analysis should always be developed during the planning cycle for new missions.\footnote{The Annual Meeting of the Human Rights and Gender Advisers and Focal Points in CSDP missions was held in Brussels in July 2013. For the first time, human rights focal points working in EU Delegations in countries where there is a CSDP mission were invited to attend, so as to facilitate networking and the implementation of a more comprehensive approach. The meeting focussed on a discussion of challenges and best practices, comprehensive action and tools to advance human rights and gender work, and the implementation of EU’s human rights and gender policies in predominantly Islamic societies. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability began to set up a network of rule-of-law experts in CSDP missions, which will facilitate the exchange of information and best practices.}

Training modules on human rights, child protection and gender, corresponding to the EU’s minimum training standards, were piloted during the year in cooperation with training institutes from EU Member States and civil society groups. These training modules are intended for the use of Member States in the pre-deployment training of all mission and operation personnel.
In 2013, the EU maintained its commitment to the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which were endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in June 2011. The EU worked to ensure that the Guiding Principles are fully adhered to by European businesses, while also promoting their implementation in other countries. In 2013, the Commission published human rights guidance for three business sectors: employment and recruitment; information and communication technology; and oil and gas. The guidance is intended for the use of enterprises operating in the three selected sectors both inside and outside the EU.

5. Democracy and the rule of law

In 2013, the EU supported electoral processes across the world by deploying Election Observation Missions and Electoral Expert Missions, as well as providing technical assistance to election bodies and financial support to domestic observers. In total, the EU deployed 11 Election Observation Missions and 8 Electoral Expert Missions in the course of 2013. These missions supported democratic transition in the EU’s neighbourhood (Jordan and Kosovo), oversaw the consolidation of fragile democratic institutions (Kenya, Paraguay and Pakistan), witnessed the election of a Constituent Assembly (Nepal) and contributed to the consolidation of democracy in countries emerging from military conflict or going through political transition (Madagascar, Honduras, Guinea Conakry and twice in Mali). Electoral Expert Missions were sent to Bhutan, Cambodia, Togo, Swaziland, Rwanda, Maldives, Zimbabwe and Mauritania. The exploratory mission to Egypt recommended an Electoral Expert Mission for the constitutional referendum, which was deployed in December 2013.
In addition, as the follow-up to recommendations by Election Observation Missions is a priority, Heads of Delegations began regular reporting on the implementation of recommendations, and work began on the development of follow-up guidelines. First follow-up missions have been sent to Malawi (December 2012), Bolivia and Mozambique. Several other follow-up missions are planned for 2014. In 2013, the EU also focused on further strengthening its partnership on election observation with other regional organisations such as the African Union and the League of Arab States.

The EU also sought to intensify its work on democracy support. The EU reported on the implementation of the democracy support action plans in nine pilot countries112 and proposed a list of second-generation pilot countries for democracy support.

The EU also continued to sustain and enhance its engagement to reinforce the rule of law through its CSDP missions, including in particular EULEX Kosovo, EUJUST LEX-Iraq, EUPOL COPPS in the occupied Palestinian Territories, EUCAP SAHEL Niger and EUPOL Afghanistan. Despite a challenging security environment, EUJUST LEX-Iraq, in its final year, actively responded to Iraqi needs with training, mentoring, monitoring and advisory activities involving all branches of the Iraqi criminal justice system. Before its closure on 31 December 2013, the Mission successfully handed over all its activities, curricula and training material to its Iraqi counterparts. In the occupied Palestinian Territories, EUPOL COPPS continued to serve as an essential vector of the overall EU support to Palestinian state-building, through its contribution to the reform and development of the Palestinian security and justice sectors. In the recent period, the mission reinforced its support at the strategic and policy making levels, and widened its scope to the full range of institutions in the criminal justice sector to advise, inter alia, on legislation, policies and structural reforms.

112 The pilot countries are Benin, Bolivia, Ghana, Lebanon, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Mongolia and the Solomon Islands.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUPOL RD Congo continued to support security sector reform in the field of policing and its interface with the justice system. Great importance was attached to the strict application of both the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. In addition to supporting the fight against terrorism, EUCAP SAHEL Niger aimed at reinforcing the rule of law in Niger by enhancing local capacities in the field of criminal investigation. In 2013, the mission strengthened its advice to the Ministry of Justice and delivered a number of courses to the security and defence forces in the areas of the rule of Law, human rights and gender. The support by EUPOL Afghanistan continued to complement the EU's assistance through development programmes in the field of the rule of law. As part of its mandate, EUPOL Afghanistan continued to pursue the appropriate interaction between police and the wider criminal justice system through the mission's three rule of law related strategic objectives: anti-corruption, human rights and gender, and police-justice linkages.

The European Endowment for Democracy, a foundation under Belgian private law, but with all EU Member States on its Board of Governors, is designed to support pro-democracy activists struggling for democratic transition in the European neighbourhood and beyond. It became operational in July 2013, when the first staff members took up their duties. By the end of 2013, 425 proposals had been received; out of which 273 were for the East, 128 for the South and 24 for elsewhere. Of these, 28 were funded by mid-December. The budget for 2013-15 is about EUR 27 million. The Commission and 13 participating states are contributing, including Switzerland.

113 The European Endowment for Democracy is designed to complement already existing instruments, including the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. The Endowment's added value stems from rapid and flexible support for actors who are not yet supported, or who are insufficiently covered or have difficulties in obtaining support from the existing EU instruments. The most obvious cases are civil society organisations, movements and individual activists acting in favour of a pluralistic multiparty system regardless of their size or formal status.
6. Promoting universality, working at multilateral and regional levels

The EU continued to work to promote the universality of human rights. At bilateral level, most notably during human rights dialogues, the EU regularly encouraged third countries to ratify and effectively implement the UN human rights instruments, and to reconsider or withdraw reservations. In particular, the EU continued to promote the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and encouraged those countries that have ratified the Statute to honour their legal obligations. The EU remained committed to the preservation of the integrity of the Rome Statute, including during the International Criminal Court's Assembly of States Parties, which was held in The Hague on 20-28 November 2013. All EU Member States signed the landmark Arms Trade Treaty, regulating the international trade in conventional arms, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013.

The EU achieved its objectives at the 2013 Human Rights Council in Geneva, including extending the mandates of the Special Rapporteurs for Myanmar, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Belarus, Iran and Freedom of Religion or Belief, as well as securing the mandate for the Commission of Inquiry on Syria. Likewise, at the UN General Assembly Third Committee, all four EU initiatives were adopted. EU resolutions on Myanmar and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea passed with broad, cross-regional support. Resolutions on Iran and Syria were also passed, again with strong EU and cross-regional backing.

The EU continued its extensive co-operation with a broad range of regional partners. It remained a strong supporter and leading contributor to the work of the OSCE. Similarly, human rights, the rule of law and democratisation were at the heart of the EU's co-operation with the Council of Europe. The EU continued to finance joint programmes and activities with the Council of Europe in the fields of the rule of law, democracy and human rights, amounting to more than EUR 100 million a year.

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E. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, CONFLICT PREVENTION, MEDIATION AND CRISIS RESPONSE

1. Conflict prevention and mediation

The Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention of June 2011 highlighted three specific areas: strengthening early warning capacities and bridging the gap with early action; strengthening EU’s mediation capacities and conflict analysis tools; and building/ intensifying partnerships with non-governmental and international organisations and relevant institutions.115 With their Joint Communication on the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises of December 2013 the High Representative and the Commission aimed at making EU external action more effective and cohesive, drawing on the full range of instruments and resources available.116 Within this policy framework, the following activities relating to conflict prevention, mediation and the security/development nexus were undertaken in 2013:

In terms of early warning, the focus was on building systems, tools and culture to identify (1) countries at medium- to long-term risk of violent conflict, and (2) options for early action to address these risks. A methodology was developed and piloted in 2013 in the wider Sahel region, which contributed, inter alia, to revisions to the Sahel Strategy and the initiation of conflict analysis for Chad. Preparations for further roll-out of the early warning system in Central Asia are on-going.

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In terms of **high-level dialogue facilitation** efforts, during 2013, the HR/VP was actively engaged in efforts with respect to supporting a workable solution for the implementation of the agreements reached in the framework of the EU facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. She has led also the successful E3/EU+3 talks with Iran, which resulted in an agreement in November, now under implementation. The HR/VP was also very active with regard to the situations in Egypt and Ukraine.

In addition to these high-level efforts, at working level the relevant EEAS services continued to work on strengthening **mediation support capacities** and **conflict analysis** tools. Operational mediation and conflict prevention support was provided to geographical services (both at headquarters and in-country) working on conflict situations in nearly a dozen countries (including Mali, Myanmar, Syria, South Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic, Senegal and Guatemala). A new programme, 'European Resources for Mediation Support' (ERMES), funded under the Instrument for Stability, was launched in December 2013 and aims at facilitating technical assistance to third parties engaged in inclusive peace mediation.

During the first half of 2013, the EEAS, together with the European Parliament and the Irish Presidency of the Council, organised the ‘EU as a Peace-maker’ conference series on mediation. Workshops in Paris, Berlin and Sofia were followed by a high-level conference at the European Parliament in Brussels in May. As a concrete result of the conference, the EEAS developed a methodology to debrief, in the form of end-of-assignment discussions, senior EU officials who have been active on mediation- or dialogue-related activities.
In 2013, support to conflict analysis was provided for the following countries and regions: Lebanon, Great Lakes/Democratic Republic of Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guinea Bissau and Libya – including through the organisation of joint conflict analysis workshops under the Civil Society Dialogue Network funded by the Instrument for Stability. The EEAS organised a facilitated consultation of civil society as part of a strategic review of the CSDP mission EUCAP Sahel Niger. A 'light-touch' conflict analysis methodology that allows rapid diagnostics of conflict risks and possible EU responses was further developed, and the EEAS and the Commission's Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation jointly issued a guidance note on the use of conflict analysis. The EEAS also produced an internal 'how to guide' for facilitators of 'light-touch' conflict analysis workshops.

Sustainable development and poverty eradication require peace and security, and the reverse is equally true: fragile or conflict-affected countries still remain the furthest away from meeting the Millennium Development Goals. In 2013 the EU continued to recognise that peaceful societies are interconnected with whole-of-society issues including economic revenue management, youth employment and effective governance. Long term engagement in peace and state building and long-term sustainable development are essential to address the underlying causes of conflict and to build peaceful, resilient societies. The security/development nexus was therefore a key underlying principle in the application of an EU comprehensive approach. For further examples of how this has worked in practice, see section 1 above (Somalia and Mali). The advantage of shared analysis from an early stage, for example to ensure that shorter term CSDP missions can successfully transition to longer term development measures, has also been increasingly recognised (for examples, see Section F.3.1 below).
Special attention is needed in challenging environments on governance issues where the government may lack legitimacy or capacity and where a greater partnership may need to be sought with non-governmental actors and local authorities. Such flexibility was increasingly applied particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states. Inclusive politics and local ownership in such situations were promoted by building on the principles of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

**Joint Programming** is the concept where the EU and its Member States agree on a single EU wide strategic country programming document for their development cooperation interventions (instead of separate bilateral strategies). It includes a joint analysis of and joint response to the partner government's national development plan; identification of priority sectors and division of labour; as well as indicative allocations. Through Joint Programming the EU and its Member States aim to increase their impact in partner countries and make their development cooperation more effective. At the same time, they will present a united package of support that significantly increases the EU's leverage and political weight as a donor. Joint Programming exercises are in-country driven and led by the EU Delegations and Members States embassies.

In 2013 there have been 53 countries identified where Joint Programming will be pursued the coming years. In around 40 of these countries the process of Joint Programming has been started, and in 15 of these cases actual Joint Programming documents have already been developed. Out of the 53 countries, 27 are considered as fragile states, according to the OECD/DAC and World Bank definitions.
The EU continued to **strengthen partnerships with key actors** on conflict prevention and mediation. It continued to co-operate with, and fund, the UN Mediation Support Unit and the UN Development Programme's activities on natural resources and conflict and on insider mediation. The Union also continued work under the Joint Declaration of the EU, UN and World Bank on Post Crises Assessments and Recovery Planning. Partnerships with civil society were mainly based on the Civil Society Dialogue Network, which held twelve events in 2013, focusing notably on geographic, thematic and funding aspects of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. A further contract was signed with the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), extending Civil Society Dialogue Network activities until the end of 2016. The EU established a dialogue on security and development with the US State Department and USAID, covering, *inter alia*, conflict prevention and peace-building issues in Myanmar, Mali and Senegal.

2. **Crisis response and operational coordination**

Crisis response is the immediate mobilization of EU resources to deal with the consequences of crises caused by political and/or armed conflict, technological incidents, or man-made and natural disasters. Ensuring a coherent response to crises is part of the EU’s wider efforts in its external relations, in close cooperation with Member States, to turn the 'comprehensive approach' into comprehensive action, i.e. the effective use and sequencing of the entire range of tools and instruments. The EEAS crisis response system contributes to ensuring coherence between various aspects of EU action, in particular in the security, political, diplomatic, consular, developmental, space-related, environmental and corporate fields. Effective coordination of the full range of EU crisis response and management tools remained an important challenge in 2013.
A crucial element of this architecture is the **EU Crisis Platform** within the EEAS, which was convened in 2013 in response to the crises in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, Syria, Kenya, Mali, Lebanon and South Sudan.\textsuperscript{117}

The **EU Situation Room**, in 2013, further developed its mission focussing on its core business: alerting the EEAS, Commission, Council Secretariat and Member States to all sources of political and physical risk worldwide and monitoring a very large perimeter of unstable situations. It developed, in addition to the Daily HR AM/PM Headlines, information services relating to emerging crisis situations in Syria, Egypt, Mali, Myanmar, Ukraine, Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Tunisia, Libya, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, and Algeria. Overall, the Situation Room delivered more than 1500 monitoring products in 2013. An increasing proportion of these products were tailor-made in response to requests from the HR/VP and EEAS senior management.

\textsuperscript{117} The EU Crisis Platform can be convened on an ad hoc basis and is a crucial mechanism to guarantee EU responsiveness during external crises. It brings together various EEAS and Commission representatives and is chaired by the HR/VP, the EEAS Executive Secretary-General or the EEAS Managing Director for Crisis Response. Participating EEAS services include the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, Crisis Response Department, EU Military Staff, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, EU Situation Room, and relevant geographical and horizontal departments. Other participating EU services and bodies include the Chair of the EU Military Committee as well as the Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), Directorate-General for Development Cooperation – EuropeAid and Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.
Strengthening cooperation with partner countries and organisations in the field of crisis response was a clear priority for the EEAS. It assisted Myanmar's authorities to enhance the national crisis response system through capacity building and knowledge sharing, in particular through supporting the establishment of the Myanmar Crisis Response Centre. The EU also assisted the Arab League and Organisation of American States in strengthening their situational awareness architecture in the field of crisis response. Similar cooperation arrangements were being developed with ASEAN.

In December 2013, the EEAS organised in Brussels a High-level Conference entitled 'Towards a global network of crisis rooms'. The conference focused on Crisis Coordination Centres or Crisis Rooms – be they national, regional or global – and their interaction in major multi-sector crises. The conference focused on four main areas: enhancing early warning and preparation; information sharing and communication; strengthening Civilian Military Cooperation; and establishing a Global Network of Crisis Rooms.
In the field of consular crisis management, the EEAS assisted the EU Delegations and Member States in consular crisis cooperation and contingency planning (China, Lebanon, South Sudan, Nepal). It supported the rotating Council Presidency in the elaboration of a strategy on consular issues, such as crisis coordination and the coordination of travel advisories. The EEAS also continued to administer the Consular-on-Line (CoOL) web-page, used by the consular divisions and crisis centres of Member States and some partner countries (such Norway, Switzerland, Canada and US) as well as by military staff, for the purposes of information sharing and contingency planning.  

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In November 2013, the EEAS organised in Brussels and in Beirut, Lebanon, a table-top crisis management exercise. Named 'Beirut 13', the exercise was organised in close cooperation with EU Member States and the Union Delegation in Beirut. The main aim of the exercise was to evaluate and improve the EU's preparedness and capability to react to an emergency situation in the lead-up to a possible evacuation operation. In January 2013, the EEAS organized a similar crisis management exercise in Beijing, China (Exercise 'Pegasus 13'). The exercise was organized in close cooperation with the EU Delegation in China, the Council Presidency and EU Member States present in Beijing. Pegasus 13 was based on a fictitious crisis scenario that entailed a simulated catastrophic earthquake. The exercise evaluated the EU crisis response capabilities both at EEAS Headquarters in Brussels and the Delegation in Beijing.
F. COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

1. More capable

1.1. Capabilities

Throughout 2013, the EU and its Member States conducted intensive preparations for the European Council in December, fulfilling its commitments to enhance the effectiveness of the CSDP as a tangible contribution to international crisis resolution and management. The December European Council focused on security and defence, the first time the European Council did so since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.\(^\text{119}\)

In its 25 November 2013 Conclusions on CSDP, endorsed by the European Council on 19-20 December, the Council reiterated its call to Member States to stand ready to provide future-oriented capabilities, both in the civilian domain and in the field of military capabilities. It underlined the need to enhance the development of capabilities, as they underpin the EU’s ability to act as security provider. It encouraged also the Commission, the European Defence Agency and the EEAS to examine modalities for dual-use capabilities.\(^\text{120}\)

\(^{119}\) The European Parliament adopted resolutions on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence on 21 November 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0513) and on the EU’s military structures: state of play and future prospects on 12 September 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0381).

\(^{120}\) See below Section F.3.3.
The European Council on 19 and 20 December invited the HR to present a report on the financial aspects of military and civilian missions. The report will have to build up on the work conducted in 2013 on the improvement of the management of civilian CSDP missions and will include suggestions for the financing of military operations in the context of the upcoming review of the Athena mechanism.

As for civilian missions the European Council Conclusions referred to the need 'to ensure that the procedures and rules for civilian missions enable the Union to be more flexible and speed up the deployment of EU civilian missions.' In this respect, the Commission and EEAS will work on analysing options for improving financial management and procurement procedures in civilian CSDP missions.

In 2013 the Council agreed new procedures for the political supervision of the CFSP budget. They will allow for a better priority-setting and reactivity to the challenges in the CFSP area, which by its nature are unforeseeable. The work will continue on the horizontal support to civilian CSDP missions, taking into account the Cost Benefit Analysis on a shared services centre, which was completed in May 2014.

The November 2013 Council Conclusions put more emphasis on greater efficiency and better synergies between civilian and military planning. The need for making optimal use of all CSDP structures, also in the context of the revised Crisis Management Procedures and EEAS review, was highlighted.
1.1.1. Civilian capabilities

The December European Council called for the enhanced development of civilian capabilities and stressed the importance of fully implementing the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan. Work on this continued through 2013. The third consecutive report on Member States' progress in facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel to CSDP missions was finalised in May, forming a comprehensive picture of the EU's civilian crisis management capability under CSDP.

The fifth High-level Seminar 'Facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel for CSDP' was again an excellent opportunity for Member States' representatives to share progress made and challenges encountered at national level in development of civilian capabilities for crisis management. The focus of this year's seminar was on best practices, lessons and experiences from civilian CSDP missions as well as challenges relevant to the Force Generation process.

By the end of 2013, Member States had replied to the questionnaire on Integrated Police Units, Formed Police Units, national and multinational police expert teams and other civilian 'niche' capabilities. A detailed overview of what kind of specialised police and other civilian capabilities exist in Member States is ongoing with the aim of enabling the EEAS and Member States better to focus the efforts to develop civilian capabilities under CSDP.
Work continued on exploring ways to improve access to, and cooperation with, the European Gendarmerie Force in the framework of CSDP. A Framework Paper defining the nature and scope of engagement was developed and provides a sound basis for improving cooperation between the CSDP crisis management structures and the potential resources of the European Gendarmerie Force.

During 2013, much progress was made with continued support from Member States towards finalisation of the Goalkeeper software environment,\textsuperscript{121} which is envisaged by mid-2015.

Further work on civilian capability development will be guided by the Council Conclusions on CSDP of November 2013, underlining the Member States' determination to improve the generation of civilian capabilities and fully implement the Civilian Capability Development Plan, which will continue throughout 2014.

In July, the EEAS proposed a detailed roadmap for different strands of this exercise. Progress was achieved on many aspects. Suggestions for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations were approved, which, inter alia, foresee a quicker procedure for establishing the missions, their early presence on the ground and access to the Union budget for the build-up phase. Further discussions were planned for 2014, including staff rules for the contracted personnel and pooling of administrative, logistic and financial support to the missions.

1.1.2. Military capabilities

Building on intense preparatory work throughout the year, the European Council gave a strong impulse to the development of defence capabilities. At their 2013 December meeting, Heads of State and Government called for further cooperation, crucial to maintaining key capabilities, remedying shortfalls and avoiding redundancy.

Cooperative approaches to developing capabilities will allow participants to benefit from economies of scale and enhanced military effectiveness.

The European Council also committed to delivering key capabilities and addressing critical shortfalls through concrete projects by Member States, supported by the European Defence Agency. It welcomed four important initiatives:

- The development of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems for 2020-25;
- The development of Air-to-Air refuelling capacity;
- Preparations for the next generation of Governmental Satellite Communication; and
- Developing a roadmap and concrete projects in Cyber defence.

In order to foster more systematic and long term cooperation, which has become essential to preserve and develop military capabilities, the HR and the European Defence Agency were invited by the European Council to put forward an appropriate policy framework by the end of 2014, in full coherence with existing NATO planning processes.
In particular, Member States were encouraged to deliver key capabilities through cooperative projects and to make, on a voluntary basis, best use of the EU Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing in their national defence planning processes, with the support of the European Defence Agency. Progress achieved in this area through this tool was welcomed by the European Council, which encouraged the further development of incentives for, and innovative approaches to, such cooperation. Member States were also encouraged to explore ways to replicate, as appropriate, existing cooperative models, such as the European Air Transport Command model, in other areas.

In mid-2013, the Capability Development Plan revision was initiated in order to provide the overall short-, mid- and long-term picture of capability shortfalls in 2014. Achievements in EU Military Capability Development conducted under the guidance of the European Union Military Committee were presented in a Single Progress Report on the Development of EU Military Capabilities. Among them were the development of a conceptual framework for cyber defence, military involvement in the Single European Sky initiative, military and civil-military concept development, and logistical support for CSDP operations. Persistent capability shortfalls continue to limit Member States’ support to the EU Maritime and Air Rapid Response.

In line with the decisions of the European Council, the defence community continued to deepen its engagement in horizontal European projects, such as Single European Sky initiative and Galileo. The implementation of the EU Cyber Security Strategy continued in the field of cyber defence. Military and civil-military concept development was taken forward under the EUMC. Logistical and contractor support for CSDP operations continued to be developed.

Close cooperation between the EU and NATO continued, through intensive staff-to-staff contacts, including between the European Defence Agency and NATO's Allied Command Transformation, ensuring complementarity and mutual reinforcement on military capability development in the two organisations.
1.1.3. EU Satellite Centre

2013 continued the trend towards an increasingly important role of the EU Satellite Centre in CSDP. By providing analysis of satellite imagery in countries and regions in conflict, the Satellite Centre supports the decision-making process for the launch and conduct of CSDP missions and operations.

The EU Satellite Centre's capability is increasingly well-recognised, and demand from international organisations (UN, AU, etc.) is growing steadily. The Satellite Centre represents a unique capability for the EU as a security provider that can support the missions and operations of EU partners in a timely manner. Satellite imagery is a key dual-use civilian/military capability, and as such is a political tool that will play a part in our strategic objectives with partners.

The importance of space grows not only for us, but also for others, especially the US, which is increasingly looking to the EU as a partner in developing space security.

In November, the Council emphasised the 'need to make optimal use of the EU Satellite Centre by effectively addressing requirements for high resolution satellite imagery, including from governmental sources, to support the EU’s decision-making and CSDP missions and operations'.
1.2. Lessons learned and training

1.2.1. Lessons-learned process

The system for learning lessons on the common aspects of the civilian and military dimensions of CSDP was reinforced, in full respect of the existing EU military lessons-learned process, agreed by Member States in July 2011. After a comprehensive report on common civilian and military CSDP lessons and best practice on 24 April, Member States endorsed on 5 November the EEAS 'Suggestion on a way forward on the implementation of lessons learned, including in field operations'. An EEAS Lessons Management Group was created and includes all relevant stakeholders within the EEAS\(^{122}\) and the Commission\(^{123}\).

The Lessons Management Group is assisted by a Lessons Working Group at expert level, which met several times and started practical work. The Lessons Management Group oversees the identification and implementation of the most important lessons originated by EEAS and other EU stakeholders within their respective areas of responsibility. Every year, it will identify up to five key lessons and submit them to the attention of Member States. Furthermore, it will initiate a peer review process on lessons learned involving the UN and possibly other relevant international actors.

\(^{122}\) The EEAS stakeholders include the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, EU Military Staff, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate, Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department, Chair of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Chair of the Politico-Military Group, and relevant geographic departments. In addition, the Chair of the EU Military Committee also participates in this group.

\(^{123}\) The Commission stakeholders include Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), and Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.
1.2.2. Training and exercises

The EU training efforts in the field of CSDP can be defined as a 'training regime, conducted in common, which contributes to a better understanding and sense of purpose of CSDP and provides knowledge and, if required, skills for its implementation.'\textsuperscript{124}

Major efforts were made in 2013 at the levels of EEAS, EU institutions, Member States and training providers in order to meet the objectives and needs arising from the comprehensive approach and its impact relative to training. To this end, the EEAS, in close cooperation with its training providers and the Commission, in full respect of national competences, developed mechanisms and procedures providing tailor made training on relevant CSDP priorities across all categories of personnel working on CSDP matters or deploying to CSDP missions and operations. A revised draft Exercise Policy, taking into account operational experience and changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, was circulated to Member States at the end of 2013, for processing in the Council in 2014.

With the inception of its second project phase at the beginning of April 2013, Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRI)\textsuperscript{125} significantly broadened its scope of activities geared towards improving human security in crisis-prone areas where crisis management missions are deployed. ENTRi works on developing training methodologies, improving coordination with staff-contributing countries, and cooperating with the planning and operational bodies of international organisations to share and further develop training standards and identify needs.

\textsuperscript{124} Council of the European Union, \textit{Draft EU Training Policy in ESDP}, 14176/2/03 REV2, 7.11.2003, par. 11.

\textsuperscript{125} ENTRi is a unique capacity-building program that was initiated in early 2011 by the European Union’s Instrument for Stability and is guided by the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), which is co-located with the European External Action Service. The project is funded by the European Commission (90%) and co-funded by its 13 implementing partners under the lead of the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin. The second phase of the project, which lasts from 2013 to 2016, will be funded with a total of 3.3 million Euros. The implementing partners are from different Member States of the European Union and Switzerland.
In October 2013, the EEAS organised for the second time a meeting bringing together heads of training units and training experts from CSDP missions and operations, from EU institutions and the main training providers in the crisis management area. The event was organised back-to-back with another CSDP training-related event, the seminar on Military Training and Education, organised by the EU Military Staff. The event aimed at enhancing the networking among people responsible for training in CSDP missions and operations, in Member States and in the EU Institutions, with a view to exchange best practices, seeking synergies and striving for harmonisation of training activities conducted in support of CSDP operational activities.

An action plan that addresses military training and education at EU level in a coherent and coordinated manner is under consideration at the EU Military Committee. According to this plan, Member States will focus their efforts in the short term to review the military training requirements in CSDP, increase the structured dialogue with NATO training authorities at the strategic level in the format of informal staff-to-staff discussions, in order to identify common areas of interest for both organisations and optimise the use of scarce training resources, in the interest of all EU Member States, further identify projects as part of pooling and sharing in the area of training and education, and develop web-based tools to better share the relevant information and consolidate the EU military training and education community.

In November 2013, a military exercise was held (MILEX 13), which included activating the Operations Centre (OPSCEN) in the EU Military Staff buildings as the Operational Headquarters to run the exercise CSDP operation.
Other important training activities addressed, *inter alia*, issues such as the preparation of potential future senior mission leaders for CSDP missions and operations, EU-China relations, security sector reform, rule of law, conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity and international standards for the protection of individuals and groups.

Pre-deployment training also for international contracted staff was another issue within the training concept. The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate provided a short-term solution for the implementation of this type of training, which has already been agreed. At the same time, the EEAS will work on the draft New Training Policy with a view to, *inter alia*, establishing a sustainable solution for pre-deployment training of both seconded and international contracted staff.

1.3. Concepts for CSDP activities

The development of concepts, standardisation and best practices is an important contribution to enhance operational effectiveness. In this context, the term 'concept' is specifically understood to refer to a tool serving to guide CSDP action in a given field. Keeping a set of concepts, standard operating procedures and best practice under constant review, and developing new ones, is therefore important in laying the groundwork for the more effective planning, conduct and support of missions and operations. This process is based on lessons derived from the EU's own crisis management missions, as well as the experience of other international actors. In 2013, conceptual work included, *inter alia*, the revision of the concept for 'Border Missions in the framework of Civilian Crisis Management' from 2006. This built on the report on lessons learned in 2012, as well as the planning of EUBAM Libya in spring 2013. The Political and Security Committee took note of the EU Concept on CSDP Support to Integrated Border Management on 17 December 2013.
EU concepts also provide the first step in developing capabilities that are needed for CSDP operations and missions. The EU military concept on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems is one concrete example of this. Additionally, in the fields of cyber defence and Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency in EU military operations, as well as on the Concept Development Implementation Programme more generally, work is progressing.

Europe's maritime security is an integral and crucial part of its overall security. The EU has strategic maritime security interests around the globe and needs to be able to safeguard them against significant maritime risks and threats. In 2013, the EEAS and Commission initiated work on developing a Joint Communication with elements for a European Union Maritime Security Strategy, which would support a strategic, coherent, functional and cost-effective approach to maritime security and bind ongoing initiatives together. This work, to be finalised early 2014, was supported by a seminar with Member State experts on threats and risks to maritime security on 16 June 2013 and benefitted from Member State contributions in the form of seminars and papers/non-papers.\footnote{126}

2. More effective

2.1. Partnerships

The partnership dimension was prominent in the preparations for, and the outcomes of, the European Council in December 2013, highlighting the EU's commitment 'to working in close collaboration with its global, transatlantic and regional partners' and considering that 'such collaboration should be further developed in a spirit of mutual reinforcement and complementarity'. CSDP co-operation with partners stayed fully within the existing agreed frameworks and respected the fundamental principle of EU decision-making autonomy. Priority was given to those who share with the EU common values and principles and are able and willing to support EU crisis management efforts.

\footnote{126} The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the maritime dimension of the common security and defence policy on 12 September 2013 (P7_TA(2013)0380).
The CSDP partnerships translate into concrete engagement in crisis areas: 11 partner countries (Albania, Canada, Chile, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the US) participated in 8 CSDP missions and operations. There are various examples of mutually beneficial co-operation and activities pursued hand in hand with CSDP missions: Canada offered financing of a project run by EUTM Mali; the Republic of Korea offered further financial support through the International Maritime Organization to capacity building activities of the Djibouti Regional Training Centre in line with the objectives of EUCAP Nestor; and close co-operation continued with the US, Kenya and Uganda in the context of EUTM Somalia.

The EU signed a Framework Participation Agreement with Georgia, while those with Australia and Chile were concluded and ready for signature. Negotiations with the Republic of Korea were finalised.

Co-operation with interested Eastern partnership countries was of unprecedented intensity in the run-up to the Vilnius Summit, featuring the setting up of the Eastern Partnership Panel on CSDP. The Republic of Moldova and Georgia have been invited to civilian CSDP missions and responded positively. Contacts were being (re)launched with selected Southern Neighbourhood countries, such as Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

The EU engaged with a new dynamic with regional and international fora. The EU co-chaired from autumn 2013 to spring 2014 the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy and the related Defence Officials Dialogue, which underlined the EU's willingness to step-up co-operation with its Asian partners. In recognition of its role in counter-piracy, the EU was entrusted with chairing the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in 2014. This offered further opportunities in the run-up period to develop security partnerships with the Contact Group Member States and private sector.
The gradual implementation of the concrete proposals forwarded by the HR/VP to the NATO Secretary General in 2011, in line with the mandate given by the European Council of September 2010, was pursued. The HR/VP regularly met the Secretary-General of NATO. Staff-to-staff contacts continued on various aspects of crisis management and have contributed to further enhancing mutual awareness and understanding, avoiding duplications and identifying complementarities, notably in areas where both organisations have a mandate to take action. Informal meetings between all NATO Allies and EU Member States would be useful in further developing the EU-NATO relationship.

Transparency on the preparations for the European Council in December 2013 on security and defence was ensured with the NATO Secretary-General and NATO allies, also in view of the NATO Summit of September 2014. The HR/VP report to the European Council stressed that a strong, coherent and mutually reinforcing cooperation between the EU and NATO remains as important as ever. On 19 December, the NATO Secretary-General was also invited to present his views to the members of the European Council, which emphasised in its Conclusions the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in crisis management.

2.2. Train and equip

In September 2013, the EEAS developed a food-for-thought paper to address operational experience in recent years regarding requirements for – and current limitations on – providing equipment (including transport or infrastructure) necessary for local or regional forces and services to be trained effectively and sustainably by CSDP missions. As part of the overall picture, it also pointed to some of the sensitivities and complexities involved. It underlined that existing policies and competencies regarding development aid, humanitarian aid, export controls and non-proliferation should be fully respected. The HR's final report on CSDP from October took up the initiative and stated the need to learn lessons from the experience with bilateral support through Member States, clearing house mechanisms, trust funds and project cells in missions.
In the same period, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden issued the non-paper 'Enable & Enhance Initiative' underlining similar issues.

Experience proved that some actions are possible, but also highlighted difficulties and questions when it comes to the intended implementation of the 'Train and Equip' policy in terms of funding and financing.

The Political and Security Committee (and the Politico-Military Group), discussing these issues since October, underlined the need for a clear mapping of categories of equipment and associated possibilities to fund them under EU financial instruments and mechanisms; and the identification of the remaining limitations, possible gaps and ways to address them. These recommendations have been taken up by the European Council in December and the Council in November inviting the HR/VP to make proposals on a conceptual approach and priority areas of implementation. A working group within the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate is currently working on these taskings and elaborating options for funding and a comprehensive listing of categories and equipment.

2.3. Battlegroups and rapid response

The EU Battlegroups were extensively discussed in 2013 in the context of the preparations for the December European Council on security and defence. Indeed, the case for highly capable and interoperable forces, available at very short notice for CSDP operations, is stronger than ever. On that basis, in its Conclusions on CSDP, the European Council on 19-20 December emphasised 'the need to improve the EU rapid response capabilities, including through more flexible and deployable EU Battlegroups as Member States so decide'.

Such development builds on the recommendations set out in the HR’s final report on CSDP from October, in the light of which EU defence ministers adopted a new approach aimed at improving the effective employment of the EU Battlegroups – and their operational relevance – as part of the broader EU rapid response. The related proposals were endorsed by the Council, which underlined in its Conclusions on CSDP in November the need for developing a more flexible, multi-service suite of assets, and related mechanisms for making them available on a voluntary basis. This includes, amongst other things, improving the operational usability and deployability of the EU Battlegroups by strengthening their modularity in order to make them more adaptable to the entire range of possible crises. The HR was invited to further elaborate the proposals with the Member States with a view to a swift implementation. In this regard, the revision of the EU military rapid response concept will be an important step to improve the usability of the EU rapid response assets.

3. More coherent

3.1. Comprehensive approach

In December 2013, the HR and the Commission adopted a Joint Communication setting out concrete steps that the EU, collectively, is taking towards an increasingly comprehensive approach in its external action.\(^{127}\) The EU has been applying this concept in recent years, however, this document serves as a blueprint on how to put this principle into use every time the EU engages in external conflict and crisis prevention and resolution. Having various tools at the EU’s disposal and the ability to approach each crisis in a tailor-made fashion is one of EU’s greatest strengths. The comprehensive approach is being implemented including by several missions and operations.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo for instance, the EEAS, together with the Commission, was setting up a transition plan that aims at ensuring a continuity of EU actions as the CSPD missions EUPOL and EUSEC phase out from September 2014 onwards. The 'acquis' of what has been achieved with these missions will be preserved with the actions undertaken by other EU programmes. In the same vein three CSDP missions and operations were deployed in the Horn of Africa in order to help stabilise the region and fight against piracy. This was done under the wider framework of the EU strategy for the Horn of Africa, and was articulated with the actions undertaken by other EU programmes such as MASE (Maritime Security). The activated EU Operations Centre plays a useful role in co-ordinating the three CSDP missions deployed in the region, as well as in providing their respective commanders with information on other EU activities.

3.2. Link between internal and external security

The European Council on 19-20 December 2013 called for increased synergies between CSDP and Freedom, Security and Justice actors to tackle horizontal issues such as illegal migration, organised crime and terrorism. In the framework of the 'Strengthening Ties Between CSDP and Freedom, Security and Justice' road map, a second annual progress report was presented to the Political and Security Committee and the Standing Committee on Internal Security in November 2013, where delegations took note of the progress made.

From a crisis management perspective, the enhanced support of EU agencies and Interpol in the (strategic and operational) planning and conduct of CSDP operations can be assessed as a successful implementation of points for action previously identified. There are good grounds now for Member States and EU agencies involved to increase their efforts and support. A more structured and top-down approach on the different priorities will be pursued.

Further important processes that highlight the link between internal and external security include the work on a maritime security strategy and the role of the Commission in light of December 2013 European Council Conclusions in security and defence-related matters, in particular in dual-use research, the defence market and Member States owned capabilities.

3.3. Civilian-military synergies

Work on promoting synergies in developing civilian and military capabilities was guided and inspired by the Conclusions of the December 2012 European Council, which launched the preparatory work for the European Council on Security and Defence at the end of 2013. In response to the tasking, both the HR and the Commission contributed substantially to the European Council agenda through a report and a communication. In both, the need for greater synergy in the capability development featured prominently. Of particular importance is the acknowledgement for the increasingly dual-use nature of the technology and therefore for the considerable potential for synergies between civil and defence research, as a basis and underpinning the capability development.
PART II: LOOKING AHEAD AT 2014

In 2014 the European Union's neighbourhood, east and south, will continue to be a priority for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

1. Neighbourhood

Following the signing of the remaining provisions of the Association Agreement with Ukraine including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, the EU will work closely together with Ukraine to ensure its implementation. The EU will continue to support the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and to promote the country's political and economic stabilisation. The EU will continue with the implementation of its support to the necessary reforms, including institutional, civilian security sector reform and reform of the energy sector.

In 2014 it will be crucial to follow up on the gains made at Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2013, particularly in relation to the initialling of the Association Agreements, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and their signing as soon as possible, but no later than June 2014. To ensure that these agreements can be signed by the end of June 2014, it will be important to take account of recent lessons learned, notably regarding the need to intensify communication and public diplomacy activities that strengthen EU visibility and disseminate correct information about the benefits of the Association Agreements.

Further progress from the Republic of Moldova on visa liberalisation would be an important step towards closer relationship with the EU and a clear signal that the EU delivers on its commitments.

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The EU will seek to foster a process of political association and economic integration with other advanced Eastern European countries, including concluding negotiations and signing a Strategic Modernisation Partnership with Azerbaijan and starting negotiations on a new bilateral agreement with Armenia. The EU will also pursue the 'Interim Phase' with Belarus regarding the country's modernisation, which will include trilateral actions with civil society. This would hopefully pave the way for an improving the human rights situation and a reciprocal softening of the sanctions regime against the Belarussian leadership.

On protracted conflicts, the EU will continue to work closely with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to achieve some tangible results in the 5+2 Transnistria conflict settlement talks – for instance opening of the Gura Bicului bridge across the Nistru. We will also seek to make progress in the context of conflict resolution efforts for Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh. The EU mission presence in some of these areas (EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine and EUMM Georgia) carries the potential to further contribute to providing an adequate and stable environment for possible further steps.

The situation in many parts of the Southern Neighbourhood will continue to be high on our political agenda. The European Union's overarching goal remains supporting long-term democratic change and inclusive economic development in the region, through the various international and local mechanisms already established. In 2014 attention will focus on countries in transition. While the EU's support will be differentiated according to circumstances, it will always be based on incentivising key EU values, notably democracy, human rights and inclusiveness.
Supporting efforts to stop the ongoing conflict in **Syria** will be a top priority in line with the Joint Communication "Towards a comprehensive EU approach on the Syrian crisis" by the Commission and the High Representative of June 2013. The EU will work closely with its international partners to support the Geneva II process that began in January, aimed at stopping the violence and securing a political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of all Syrians. We will also continue to address the terrible humanitarian situation inside the country by providing sufficient EU assistance to the people affected by the conflict and by encouraging others to do likewise in the context of the EU's leading role on the donor scene. Another critical factor will be to ensure that all parties to the conflict grant humanitarian access.

The EU will also work hard to mitigate the threat of political and insecurity spill over from Syria into neighbouring countries and to minimise the destabilising effect of large scale refugee arrivals. **Lebanon** is particularly at risk. Therefore, the EU plans to step up its engagement to back the new government of Prime Minister Tammam Salam, implement the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan, deliver assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, as will be discussed at the International Conference to be held in Rome in June, and speed up the implementation of refugee cooperation programmes. **Iraq** will also require sustained attention, given that the country is in a critical period of government formation following elections in April 2014 and faces an escalating insurgency. The European Union will also urge the government of Iraq to better integrate Sunnis and Kurds, and implement those elements of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which can be provisionally applied, including human rights, energy cooperation, and trade. The EU will work on launching a EUIJUST LEX follow-up programme. In **Jordan**, the EU will encourage political reform, promote the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan, and hasten its refugee cooperation programme.
Progress is urgently needed on the Middle East Peace Process. The European Union will continue to fully support current US efforts and those of Israel and the Palestinian Authorities. In particular, in the event of a final status agreement, we are offering a package of incentives (a 'Special Privileged Partnership') to support both sides in making the difficult compromises necessary for an agreement. It is in the EU's fundamental interest to see an end to the conflict, establish lasting peace and prosperity along its southern borders, and simultaneously develop its political, economic and trade relations with both parties. The objective remains a two-state-solution resulting in an agreement on all final status issues, and fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of both parties. The EU will remain actively involved and will continue to work towards peace, including within the Quartet, with both parties as well as with Arab states and other members of the international community.

The EU will continue to follow events in Egypt closely. We express our willingness to work closely with the new authorities in Egypt, with a view to creating conducive political conditions for strengthening our bilateral relations and find ways to ensure that the democratic gains made by the overthrow of former President Hosni Mubarak are not squandered. We will focus particularly on speeding up the implementation of cooperation programmes in favour of civil society and socio-economic development in line with the Council Conclusions of August 2013, and discussing with the authorities the possibility to agree on a new bilateral action plan and deploy other EU instruments.

In Libya, helping the central authorities manage risks associated with the rise of militias and divisions within the country will be a test for EU diplomacy. In line with the outcome of the International Conference on Libya held in Rome in March 2014, it will be necessary to step-up our engagement in close coordination with others to support political transition, improve the security situation, and build up public institutions. The EU acknowledges the present need to focus its attention on the deteriorating political and security situation in Libya. Hence, the role of the Special Envoy of the HR/VP, Bernardino Leon will be of great value. EUBAM Libya remains key in building up integrated border management capacities.
Tunisia's new and fragile democracy will need the EU's full support. It will be important to help the country to sustain the democratic gains. The country's experience of a successful transition also sets a positive example that can inspire other countries in the region and beyond. To support Tunisia the EU will provide financial assistance for the implementation of the EU-Tunisia Action Plan, work towards the swift disbursement of macro-financial assistance, help prepare and start negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, and work towards the implementation of the Mobility Partnership.

The acceleration of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area negotiations and the implementation of the Mobility Partnership (including the launch of the negotiations of the first ever visa facilitation/readmission agreement with a Southern Mediterranean partner), will be important for making progress in our relations with Morocco. Completion of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan will be a priority for our relation with Algeria. In Yemen it will be important to support the efforts of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi to draft a new constitution and to step up cooperation programmes on the rule of law and economic development. The deterioration of the security situation remains a significant concern and the EU will continue to support the Government of Yemen to increase its ability to disrupt, detain and prosecute suspected terrorists in line with rule of law and international human rights standards.

To complement the multilateral track of the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council, in addition to efforts aimed at signing the Free Trade Agreement and new Action Plan, the EU will step up political engagement with individual Gulf countries. The preparations (for negotiation directives) for bilateral agreements currently prepared by the EEAS and the Commission could well lead to this result.
The EU will continue to promote regional cooperation in the Mediterranean region, in particular by encouraging the launch of concrete and meaningful projects in the context of the Union for the Mediterranean, strengthening dialogue with the League of Arab States and promoting greater regional dialogue and cooperation in the Maghreb.

2. Europe and Central Asia

In Europe the EU will pursue the negotiations on a framework agreement with Switzerland and for the renewal of the financial contribution to the European Economic Area. We also intend to launch negotiations for an Association Agreement with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino.

For the EU’s relationship with Turkey, the Association Council in June will be an important event. The regained momentum in the accession negotiations should be sustained in the interest of both parties and the EU should remain the anchor for reforms in Turkey. The continuation of the Kurdish peace process is an essential element to bring an end to violence and terrorist activity to enhance peace and stability for the benefit of all citizens. It will also be important to develop ideas on tackling the shared threat from foreign fighters in Syria. The EU will also use opportunities to recall that Turkey is expected to actively support the ongoing negotiations aimed at a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The Western Balkans will remain an important area of activity for the EU. Following last year's landmark agreements and elections in Kosovo, there is still much work to do on Serbia and Kosovo, both on the ground and in maintaining the dialogue and implementing commitments. To enable progress, the EU will need to take account of concerns on both sides and possible sources of friction, such as the possible indictment of Kosovo Liberation Army figures.
The EU can and must continue to play a central role and will continue to engage deeply with both sides to consolidate progress. The aim is – as laid down in the framework for the accession negotiations with Serbia – to achieve comprehensive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, in the form of a legally binding agreement by the end of Serbia's accession negotiations that gives both Serbia and Kosovo positive perspectives of their respective European futures. Serbia's EU accession negotiations, and negotiations and signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo, will move forward depending on the progress made in the normalisation of relations between them.

Further engagement with other members of the former Yugoslavia remains important. We hope that Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will make real progress on their paths towards accession. 2014 could also be important for the EU's relationship with Albania given that a decision on its candidate status is expected in June. We hope that Montenegro will continue the reform process with a view to register further progress in the accession negotiations.

The European Union heard the public protests and calls by the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina for social and economic reforms and strongly urges Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutions and elected leaders to engage with civil society and provide responsible and immediate answers to their legitimate concerns. Ahead of the general elections in October 2014, more needs to be done, not less, including with the assistance of the EU's Compact for Growth initiative. Bosnia and Herzegovina's leadership must engage as soon as possible after the October elections on a broader set of issues in order to address the challenges the country continues to face as it progresses towards the EU. The EU is clear that the key requirements and criteria for Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress towards the EU must be fully met.
Relations with **Russia** will remain challenging. The EU will need to carefully assess its Strategic Partnership with the country in light of developments in Ukraine and other countries in our common neighbourhood. It will not recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea. Progress towards solution of the Ukraine crisis will remain a prerequisite to re-engagement in the many areas of shared interest such as re-launch of negotiations on a New Agreement, visa dialogue and implementation of 'common steps' towards possible visa liberalisation. The EU and Russia share an interest in cooperating on global issues such as climate change, terrorism and in the G20, and on international security issues such as Syria, the Iranian nuclear programme and the Middle East Peace Process. The EU will also continue to call on Russia to respect its commitments taken in the WTO. It will continue to press for the rule of law and good governance and convey concerns regarding the human rights situation in the country.

The European Union will remain engaged with the countries of **Central Asia** and continue the efforts to implement the EU Strategy for Central Asia. In **Afghanistan**, we will assist in preparing for security challenges that might follow the planned scaling-down of the international security presence. The EU will also contribute to progress in resolving the situation with the Roghun Dam. We will aim for a successful second round of the EU-Central Asia High-Level Security Dialogue, with the participation of all five Central Asian countries. The dialogue will address challenges such as drug trafficking, fight against terrorism, CBRN risks and regional cooperation. The EU will work to ensure conclusion of negotiations for an enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with **Kazakhstan**. We will also continue to assist the country in its accession talks with the World Trade Organization. The EU will also encourage steps in the same direction for **Uzbekistan** and **Tajikistan**.
To advance **regional cooperation**, the European Union will pursue the further development of our **Arctic policy**, including through Council discussion and Conclusions in May 2014. We will also work to overcome obstacles regarding full implementation of the Union's Arctic Council observer status.

3. **Africa**

The **EU-Africa Summit** in Brussels in April was a top priority in the first half of 2014. The Summit manifested the strength of the EU-Africa Partnership. The successful event was an important opportunity to elevate the relationship to the level of joint responsibility for building peace and prosperity and confirm the European Union as Africa's partner of choice. As a concrete result of the Summit, the two parties committed themselves to stepping up the political dialogue at all levels and to implement the priority areas that were identified for the 2014-2017 road map: peace and security; democracy; good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; global and emerging issues.

Stability of the **Horn of Africa** is another major priority. The situation in **South Sudan** is extremely volatile. It is also important not to neglect maritime security issues in **Somalia** and sustain the immense progress achieved in reducing piracy and helping to rebuild democratic state institutions. The EU will remain heavily engaged in the peace process in South Sudan and the reconstruction effort in Somalia, through the activities of EU Special Representative Alexander Rondos, our Delegations in the region, and support from EEAS headquarters and the Commission. Within the framework of the Comprehensive Approach, CSDP missions will remain at the heart of our activity in this region.
In 2014 it will be critical to deal with the worsening political and humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) and remain alert regarding other potential crises in the 'belt of instability' from Somalia to the Sahel. The degree of state disintegration in the Central African Republic will require a major and well-coordinated international effort to rebuild the country. The EU military operation that was launched in April 2014 will play an important role in contributing to a secure environment in the CAR. This crisis highlights the importance of intensifying the EU's day-to-day cooperation with the African Union and United Nations.

The EU will continue to implement its Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel across the region. The EU acknowledges the pivotal nature of the Sahel and the impact it has on neighbouring regions: to the north, in the Maghreb and to the south, in the Gulf of Guinea. The developmental and security challenges present in the Sahel are intertwined with the broader West African dynamics. The EU is fighting the nexus between drug trafficking and organised crime, and other illegal activities on the West African coast and, on the other hand, the financing of terrorist groups active in the Sahel and several contraband activities, all of them taking advantage of the region’s porous borders, an issue well identified in Mali, Niger or Guinea-Bissau.

Across the Sahel region, the problems in southern Libya and northern Mali remain an important focus for EU action. The EU's EUTM mission, launched in February 2013, will continue to support the rebuilding of the Malian armed forces, and EUCAP Sahel Mali will help rebuild the internal security forces. EUCAP Sahel Niger is supporting the Nigerien authorities in combating terrorism and organized crime.
Given the deteriorating situation in the Gulf of Guinea, another priority for the EU will be to press ahead with the implementation and communication of the EU Gulf of Guinea Strategy, adopted by the Council in March 2014. The next step will be to undertake an outreach exercise to the countries in the region.

The European Union will remain an integral part of the international effort to resolve the problems in the Great Lakes region. We will redouble efforts to tackle the multiple roots of the crisis (at the level of the region, nationally in the Democratic Republic of Congo and, locally in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo). The EU has agreed to safeguard the achievements of the EUPOL and EUSEC operations once they close. We will also continue collaboration with African and international partners, in support of UN initiatives to bring lasting stability to the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. To avoid risking a slide back into conflict, pressure must be maintained on the country to deliver on its commitments.

In 2014 the EU will finalise the preparations for the 11th European Development Fund throughout Africa. The EU will also be engaged to fully support progress towards implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement with West Africa, where negotiations were concluded, as well as with the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community, where negotiations are in a final stage. The EU will need to assess the results of elections in South Africa and Malawi (both in May) as a bellwether of the political direction of both countries.

The EU's deep engagement in Africa is illustrated by the nine CSDP missions it presently deploys on the continent. They will remain a key component of EU support to efforts to build democracy, security and prosperity.
4. Americas

In 2014 the European Union will concentrate on milestones that shape the future of our relations with our four strategic partners in the Americas:

The EU-US Summit of 26 March was a good opportunity to advance work on, and renew support for, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and our cooperation on foreign and security policy cooperation with the United States. Shortly afterwards, the EU-US Energy Council was held in Brussels.

The EU's priority in its cooperation with Canada will be to conclude ongoing technical work on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement to secure final agreed texts, and to advance on the Arctic Council and cooperation on foreign and security policy. The forthcoming Strategic Partnership Agreement will enshrine the EU and Canada's joint values and aims at taking relations to another level. It promotes a deepening of ties in all fields of cooperation, beyond trade and economics.

The EU will produce a report for a new agreement with Mexico and enhance work on multilateral dialogues and cooperation.

The EU-Brazil Summit in January 2013 set the scene for further cooperation on global issues. We will also take forward work on the ongoing negotiations on the EU-Mercosur Agreement.

The EU will continue to work with Central America and the Caribbean and towards an early Council Decision on the Comprehensive Strategy on Public Security, to enable preventive action, broadened cooperation and better coordination of Member States' engagement in our relations with the region.
The EU will focus on strengthening Colombia in making progress towards solving its internal conflict. We will focus on concrete deliverables such as a framework agreement on participating in CSDP operations, work on a new agreement on political dialogue and sectoral cooperation. We also seek to provide specific support for implementing the Peace Agreement with the FARC.

In our relations with Cuba we will seek to advance negotiations on a Cooperation Agreement, which were launched in April 2014. It will be essential not to miss this important opportunity which also opens the way for renewed high-level political dialogue provided the human rights situation allows for progress.

The EU will send an election observation mission to the legislative and presidential elections in Bolivia in autumn 2014.

5. Asia-Pacific

In Asia the EU will focus on engaging with its four strategic partners in the region.

A key priority for our cooperation with China will be to sustain cooperation on the basis of the Agenda 2020 which was agreed at the last EU-China Summit held in November 2013 in Beijing. President Xi Jinping’s visit to Brussels on 31 March, the 5th round of EU-China Strategic Dialogue, and the 17th EU-China Summit will be important steps towards advancing our cooperation, particularly on defence and security.

The European Union will work to advance the negotiations on a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Japan, as well as Free Trade Area negotiations, and to deepen security cooperation. Given Japan's interest to contribute more to global peace and stability efforts, we will explore the scope for Japanese cooperation with EU crisis management operations. To this end, the EU-Japan Summit in Brussels on 7 May will be an important opportunity.
The EU will look to engage with the new Indian government after the elections and will continue to work on cooperation in energy and innovation, to improve EU visibility and understanding in the country, and on 'track II' initiatives. Global and regional challenges such as non-proliferation, piracy, terrorism and threats to cyber security will be an important dimension in expanding EU cooperation with India. In that context, the EU will continue to raise with Indian interlocutors the unresolved case of the two detained Italian marines, who were captured when on official duty in the framework of international efforts against piracy.

The EU's objective for its partnership with the Republic of Korea will be to implement the 8 November 2013 Summit Joint Statement. In particular we will seek to expand security cooperation through dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament, closer consultations on security developments in the Korean Peninsula and a new dialogue on cyber security.

The 20th EU-ASEAN Ministerial (Brussels, July 2014) and 10th ASEM Summit (Milan, 16-17 October), will be significant opportunities to convey a strong message of commitment to relations with Asia and emphasise our commitment to play a constructive role in the evolving regional architecture.

2014 will be a key year for Afghanistan regarding presidential elections scheduled for 5 April and the end of ISAF by the end of the year. The European Union and its Member States will set out their vision for post-2014 engagement in a joint strategic document. This will include the rule of law and civilian policing based on input from the current EUPOL police mission. It will be important to engage early on with the new government, in order to conclude a Cooperation Agreement for Partnership and Development. The Ministerial meeting on the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, to be organised in the UK in October/November will provide another opportunity for the HR/VP to engage with the Afghan government, including on human rights, women's rights, governance and democratisation.
For **Pakistan**, a priority will be to ensure continued progress on implementing the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan, which is overseen by the Strategic Dialogue. The second EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue is planned for 25 March 2014 in Brussels. It will be the first substantive discussion with the new Pakistani government following last year's parliamentary elections and since the country was granted GSP+ status on 1 January, which enhances market access to the EU for Pakistani products.

In **Bangladesh**, the European Union will continue to monitor the governance and human rights situation and encourage the two main political parties to engage in genuine dialogue. This should lead to the holding of transparent, inclusive and credible elections. The EU will continue to engage with **Sri Lanka**, **Thailand** and **Cambodia**, in particular on issues where the EU has significant leverage and where unstable political situations or fragile post-conflict reconciliation may call for particular attention.

The EU will continue to support the ongoing transition in **Myanmar/Burma** and build upon the outcome of the first meeting of the EU-Myanmar Task Force in November 2013 and the comprehensive framework for engagement which was agreed by EU Member States. EU engagement with Myanmar/Burma will also be important in the context of the country's chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014 and reforms before elections in 2015.

**Indonesia** is a key partner for the EU in an important region. The EU corroborated this fact through its participation in the Bali Democracy Forum in November 2013. The EU will continue to nurture the relationship with this increasingly important international ally.

The EU relations with **Australia** and **New Zealand** remain positive. Both will benefit from the G20 Presidency Summit in Brisbane, on 15-16 November, which will be attended by President Van Rompuy.
6. International Security

The agreement on a Joint Plan of Action in November 2013 by the E3/EU+3 and Iran has been a first confidence-building step addressing the most urgent concerns regarding Iran's nuclear programme and an important contribution to the EU's regional security and non-proliferation objectives. After implementation of the Joint Plan of Action began on 20 January 2014 with a decision of the Council, the E3/EU+3 and Iran embarked on new negotiations with the goal to reach agreement on a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Several rounds of talks between the E3/EU+3 and Iran took place in Vienna. The EU will remain actively engaged in these diplomatic efforts to seek a long term comprehensive solution which would fully address the international community's concerns about the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

Iran has an important role to play regarding the prospects of peace and security in the region. The new government under President Hassan Rouhani and the possibility of reaching agreement on the nuclear issue potentially offers new opportunities for addressing our broader concerns with Iran; the EU will be ready to seize every opportunity to make progress.

The European Union will need to continue to monitor tensions in North and South East Asia, and to call for dialogue and cooperation in the region. The behaviour of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains a major potential factor of regional instability, in particular with regard to key regional partners, the Republic of Korea and Japan. The EU will monitor the situation in the region and stay in touch with all our partners. We will actively support the UN Security Council in pressing Pyongyang to cease its WMD activities and abide by its international obligations. The EU will also maintain its policy of critical engagement, including through restrictive measures, with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
A dangerous aspect of the Syrian conflict with far-reaching effects is the spread of sectarianism and the rise of extremist terrorist groups, which has given a new lease of life to the Al Qaeda franchise. This includes the phenomenon of foreign fighters, coming to Syria from other countries. The EU will continue to work with international partners, particularly in its neighbourhood, to develop shared solutions to combat these threats. This is of immediate relevance to Europe: Syria is close to our borders, and these groups have been successful in recruiting European citizens.

Linked to this, the EU continuing effort to counter-terrorism will focus on our strategic priorities – South Asia, the Horn of Africa and Yemen, as well as the Sahel and North Africa. Our response will be framed by the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and we will work across its four pillars (prevent, pursue, protect, and respond). The EU will continue to work through our integrated regional strategies and in dialogues with key partners, as well as at the multilateral level.

The EU's activities in the area of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export controls will respond to developments high on our foreign policy agenda in the Neighbourhood, Middle East and Africa and address global security threats as set out in the EU strategies. The Syrian chemical weapons case illustrates the need for a strong international framework to deal with these challenges. Universal and effective implementation of international instruments (Chemical Weapons Convention, Arms Trade Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, etc.) remains a priority. Action will focus notably on EU support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, and the entry into force and effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. The EU will also work towards further progress in building international consensus on the draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. We will strengthen efforts to engage with third country partners and to ensure an active EU role at the UN General Assembly's First Committee, the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference, as well as the current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's review cycle.
The EU will define strategic priorities under the **Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace** (EUR 2.34 billion), with a view to adopting programming documents later in 2014 and organising, jointly with the Commission, a high-level event in the autumn.

The EU will seek to make progress on relevant aspects of the December 2013 European Council Conclusions, in particular on increasing the effectiveness, impact and visibility of the **Common Security and Defence Policy**. To complement EEAS's broader approach, we will focus on priority areas described by the EU Military Committee (CHODS): defence reform and capability planning (and in this developing our relationship with the European Defence Agency), military rapid response, maritime security strategy, and partnerships. This will include providing greater support for security partners and regional organisations on shared challenges such as terrorism, international crime and piracy, and on building capacity through training, advice, equipment and resources, where appropriate. An initial assessment of the implementation of all aspects of the European Council Conclusions is due to be included in a progress report to be presented by mid-2014, in accordance with the November 2013 Council Conclusions on CSDP.

Missions and operations will continue to be at the heart of CSDP. We will continue outreach to partners, through actively promoting participation in CSDP missions and operations, regular security and defence dialogues, and organising joint seminars with strategic partners in line with the relevant recommendations by the Political and Security Committee. We will also seek to reinforce multilateral/regional partnerships including UN, NATO, African Union and the Eastern Partnership.

The EU will also work towards improving our rapid response capabilities to deploy the right civilian and military assets, and properly dealing with security challenges, in particular those resulting from inter-linkages between internal and external challenges. This will require taking forward our work on the EU Policy Framework on Defence Co-operation, the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (with an emphasis on capacity building), an EU Maritime Security Strategy (from June 2014), and operationalising synergies between CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice actors to tackle horizontal issues such as illegal migration, organised crime and terrorism. We will also continue to use restrictive measures as an instrument of our broader CFSP objectives.
Tackling global factors affecting, directly or indirectly, the stability of states and international peace and security are likely to become even more pressing priorities. The EU will need to strengthen our early warning, conflict prevention and mediation support capacities, including the development of shared conflict analysis.

The EU will remain engaged in conflict prevention and in facilitating dialogue in the Nile (Renaissance dam) and Central Asia (Rogun dam). Together with other relevant partners we need to remain alert and ready to help to prevent escalations of these disputes.

7. **Global issues**

The Union's core values such as encouraging democratic governance, respect for human rights and political inclusiveness underpin all our external action. We will work closely with partners, multilateral forums and international organisations dealing with **human rights** and **democracy**. The EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy will remain a key vehicle for this, and the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy will guide our engagement. The EU Special Representative on Human Rights will continue to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of the EU’s human rights work. Cooperation with the Council of Europe, and the completion of the process of EU accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, will remain a priority for the EU.

**Election observation**, both domestic and international, is increasingly requested by national stakeholders to increase transparency and confidence in the election process. The EU aims at enhancing coherence and complementarity between election observation/experts' missions and electoral assistance. Follow-up to election observation missions' recommendations will remain a high priority.

The EU will be firmly engaged to creating the political momentum for the leaders' climate summit in September 2014 and promoting an ambitious **EU 2030 climate and energy package**. The summit will be crucial for the success of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015.
Energy will remain a key example linking short term and long term foreign policy goals. The current crisis in Ukraine demonstrates the necessity of adopting a long term perspective regarding the disruption of energy flows, in particular when major EU energy providers such as Russia are involved. The crisis has brought about the need to diversify the sources of our energy supplies. A good development of the energy connections between the European countries could help diversify the energy supply in Europe, including the gas and renewable energy from North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Given the role of raw materials in financing conflicts, good knowledge of trade in raw materials is central to crisis prevention. Based on the approach developed in the Great Lakes region, we need better knowledge of the sourcing of raw materials in a wider geographic context. Particular attention will be paid to the issue of 'conflict minerals'.

Migration will be another major challenge to top domestic agendas in many EU Member States, including in countries that hold the Council Presidency, such as Greece and Italy. The external dimension of migration will become increasingly important, in particular with a view to the upcoming evaluations of major international processes on migration (for instance the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility and the post-Stockholm Justice and Homes Affairs Programme), also in light of adopting a more comprehensive approach to the issue.

The EU will focus on further progress on the Millennium Development Goals as well as defining the post-2015 agenda. In particular, we will need to ensure that the new framework builds on past lessons and integrates critical dimensions such as peace, security and fragility, human rights, good governance, the rule of law and gender equality.

The EU will continue to modernise its development cooperation through its Agenda for Change, and to improve its effectiveness, for instance by promoting Joint Programming between the EU and Member States. EU assistance will focus on two priority areas: human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance, and inclusive and sustainable growth.
Finally, the EU will ensure that the framework for the comprehensive approach remains a cornerstone of EU activities. This will allow the EU, including its Member States, to use the full range of options at their disposal to best effect. This approach is particularly pertinent for crisis management and in all stages of a conflict cycle – from early warning and conflict prevention, crisis response and management to recovery, peace building and long term development efforts.

There is no doubt that dealing with the range of issues that will dominate the future EU foreign policy agenda will be challenging. Yet, given the progress we have made in 2013 we are confident that we will advance even further and demonstrate the added value of our joint action for greater peace and prosperity around the world.

In December 2013 the European Council noted that the new security challenges continued to emerge, and in this regard invited the HR to assess the impact of changes to the global environment and to report to the Council in 2015 on challenges and opportunities arising for the Union.
ANNEXES

ANNEX I: OVERVIEW OF CFSP LEGAL ACTS CONCERNING RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN 2013

Afghanistan/Taliban

Council Implementing Decision 2013/73/CFSP of 31 January 2013 implementing Decision 2011/486/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in Afghanistan (OJ L 32, 1.2.2013, p. 21)

Council Implementing Decision 2013/145/CFSP of 21 March 2013 implementing Decision 2011/486/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in Afghanistan (OJ L 82, 22.3.2013, p. 55)

Council Implementing Decision 2013/219/CFSP of 16 May 2013 implementing Decision 2011/486/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in Afghanistan (OJ L 133, 17.5.2013, p. 22)

Belarus


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This list concerns CFSP Decisions imposing restrictive measures only. The implementation of the measures falling within the scope of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union also requires the preparation of a Council Regulation or Council Implementing Regulation as appropriate.
Bosnia and Herzegovina


Central African Republic


Democratic People's Republic of Korea


Democratic Republic of Congo

Egypt

Council Decision 2013/144/CFSP of 21 March 2013 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (*OJ L 82, 22.3.2013, p. 54*)

Republic of Guinea


Guinea-Bissau


Iran (weapons of mass destruction)


Iran (human rights)


Libya


Republic of Moldova


Myanmar/Burma

Somalia


Syria


Tunisia


Council Implementing Decision 2013/409/CFSP of 30 July 2013 implementing Decision 2011/72/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia (OJ L 204, 31.7.2013, p. 52)

Zimbabwe


Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on combating terrorism

Council Decision 2013/395/CFSP of 25 July 2013 updating and amending the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision 2012/765/CFSP (OJ L 201, 26.7.2013, p. 57)
## ANNEX II: APPEARANCES OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE/VICE-PRESIDENT BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN 2013

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<td>Key role of development in the EU external action</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/06</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/06</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/06</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Joint debate on: Freedom of press and media in the world – Annual Report on human rights and democracy in the world 2012 and the European Union's policy on the matter – Promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief</td>
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<tr>
<td>27/06</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Debriefing on the Foreign Affairs Council of 24 June, and recent foreign policy developments</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/09</td>
<td>Conference of Presidents</td>
<td>Syria and Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/09</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/10</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Join debate on: Main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP and the CSDP (Article 36 TEU) – Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the CFSP in 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>18/12</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Debriefing on the Foreign Affairs Council of 16 December</td>
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### ANNEX III: APPEARANCES OF SENIOR EEAS REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>EEAS Representative</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09/01</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs Working Group</td>
<td>PSC Chair Olof Skoog</td>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/01</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs Conference</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
<td>The role of the EEAS in consular protection and services for EU citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/01</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs Enlarged Bureau</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer David O'Sullivan</td>
<td>EU-Russia Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>16/01</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
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<tr>
<td>21/01</td>
<td>EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee</td>
<td>Managing Director Luis Felipe Fernandez De La Pena</td>
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<tr>
<td>22/01</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Managing Director Hugues Mingarelli</td>
<td>Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>23/01</td>
<td>Socialists &amp; Democrats Group seminar</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Bernardino León</td>
<td>Arab Spring and asset recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>24/01</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence</td>
<td>Managing Director Nick Westcott, Crisis Management and Planning Director Walter Stevens</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/01</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Human Rights</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Stavros Lambrinidis</td>
<td>9th EU-African Union Human Rights Dialogue</td>
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<td>24/01</td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly – Union for the Mediterranean</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Bernardino León, Managing Director Hugues Mingarelli</td>
<td>Committee on Women and Political Committee</td>
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<td>06/02</td>
<td>Plenary session, Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>EEAS Representative</td>
<td>Subject</td>
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<td>19/02</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Sahel</td>
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<tr>
<td>19/02</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Managing Director Viorel Isticioaia-Budura</td>
<td>EU agreements with countries in the Asia-Pacific region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/02</td>
<td>Committee on Development</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
<td>Sahel</td>
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<tr>
<td>19/02</td>
<td>Committee on Organised Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering</td>
<td>EU Military Staff Director Lt Gen Ton Van Osch</td>
<td>Operation Atalanta, combating piracy in Somalia</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
<td>EU Defence Ministers and European Council meetings</td>
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<td>Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Budgets Bureaux</td>
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<td>26/02</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Security and Defence</td>
<td>EU Military Staff Director Lt.Gen Ton Van Osch</td>
<td>Future of European Defence</td>
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<td>26/02</td>
<td>Green/EFA Group roundtable</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer David O'Sullivan, Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
<td>EEAS review</td>
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<td>Delegation to the Euro-Latin America Parliamentary Assembly</td>
<td>Managing Director Christian Leffler</td>
<td>EU-CELAC Summit</td>
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<td>13/03</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont, Deputy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
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<td>19/03</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Security and Defence</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
<td>EEAS review, CSDP structures</td>
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<td>EU Special Representative Alexander Rondos</td>
<td>Situation in the Horn region</td>
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<td>Subcommittee on Human Rights workshop</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Rosalind Marsden</td>
<td>South Sudan and Human Rights</td>
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<td>Delegation for relations with Afghanistan</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Director Hansjörg Haber</td>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
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<td>ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly</td>
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<td>15/04</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Helga Schmid</td>
<td>Political Directors' Dialogues, Iran, DPRK and Eastern Partnership</td>
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<td>16/04</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs Enlarged Bureau</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Helga Schmid</td>
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<td>16/04</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
<td>Revision of the 2002 Inter-institutional Agreement</td>
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<td>17/04</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs Working Group</td>
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<td>Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>23/04</td>
<td>Committee on Development</td>
<td>Managing Director Nick Westcott</td>
<td>Inter-parliamentary meeting with national Parliaments</td>
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<th>Subject</th>
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<td>24/04</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Security and Defence</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Vygaudas Usackas</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Joint Committee Meeting Foreign Affairs and Budgets</td>
<td>PSC Chair Olof Skoog</td>
<td>CFSP budget</td>
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<td>25/04</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Security and Defence</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council (Defence)</td>
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<td>Conference</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
<td>EU and emerging Powers</td>
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<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs conference</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
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<td>EU Special Representative Bernardino León</td>
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<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
<td>Human rights urgencies</td>
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<td>28/05</td>
<td>Irish Presidency conference</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
<td>The EU as a Peacemaker: EU Mediation Capacity</td>
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<td>29/05</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer David O’Sullivan</td>
<td>Negotiations with Switzerland</td>
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<td>Delegation for relations with Israel</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Andreas Reinicke</td>
<td>Middle East peace process</td>
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<td>05/06</td>
<td>Conference</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer David O’Sullivan</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>11/06</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski, EU Special Representative Stavros Lambrinidis</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/06</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski, EU Special Representative Stavros Lambrinidis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>EEAS Representative</td>
<td>Subject</td>
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<td>18/06</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Managing Director Viorel Isticioaia-Budura</td>
<td>EU-Afghanistan cooperation agreement on development and partnership</td>
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<td>03/07</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
<td>NSA surveillance of EU premises, Egypt</td>
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<td>09/07</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont, Head of Delegation João Vale de Almeida</td>
<td>NSA surveillance activities, Egypt</td>
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<td>09/07</td>
<td>Committee on Development</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Rosalind Marsden</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>10/07</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Security and Defence</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Director Hansjörg Haber, Head of Mission Karl Åke Roghe</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Subcommittee on Human Rights</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Stavros Lambrinidis</td>
<td>Human rights in Burma</td>
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<td>28/08</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
<td>Egypt, Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/09</td>
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<td>Chief Operating Officer David O'Sullivan</td>
<td>Annual Conference for EU Heads of Delegation</td>
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<td>18/09</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Human Rights</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Patricia Flor</td>
<td>Child labour in Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>24/09</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer David O'Sullivan</td>
<td>Association Agreement with Ukraine</td>
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<td>24/09</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Stavros Lambrinidis</td>
<td>China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>EEAS Representative</td>
<td>Subject</td>
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<td>25/09</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Gary Quince</td>
<td>EU support to UN and African Union Peacekeeping operations</td>
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<td>25/09</td>
<td>Inter-parliamentary Committee Meeting with National Parliaments (Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Human Rights)</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Stavros Lambrinidis</td>
<td>Implementation of the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Internal/external coherence of EU human rights policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/10</td>
<td>European People's party Group conference</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Rosalind Marsden</td>
<td>The Lord’s Resistance Army conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/10</td>
<td>Socialists &amp; Democrats Group conference</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
<td>Raw materials and development</td>
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<td>07/10</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs Enlarged Bureau</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Helga Schmid</td>
<td>UN General Assembly ministerial week</td>
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<td>14/10</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Security and Defence</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Director Hansjörg Haber</td>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
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<td>14/10</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Human Rights Contact Group</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
<td>Implementation of the Human Rights Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>21/10</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs Trilogue</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer David O'Sullivan</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>22/10</td>
<td>Committee on Development Trilogue</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer David O'Sullivan</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>23/10</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont</td>
<td>CFSP/CSDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/11</td>
<td>Joint meeting Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence (with the participation of Committee Chairs of National Parliaments)</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
<td>Future of European defence: preparations for European Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/11</td>
<td>S&amp;D Group conference</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Andreas Reinicke</td>
<td>Middle East peace process</td>
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<tr>
<td>18/11</td>
<td>25th Anniversary Conference of the Sakharov Prize</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Stavros Lambrinidis</td>
<td>EU Human Rights Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>25/11</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer David O’Sullivan</td>
<td>EEAS review</td>
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<tr>
<td>26/11</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer David O’Sullivan</td>
<td>EU-Japan and EU-China summits</td>
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<tr>
<td>27/11</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Security and Defence</td>
<td>PSC Chair Walter Stevens, EU Military Staff Director Lt Gen Wolfgang Wosolsobe</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council (Defence), European Council on defence and security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>EEAS Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/12</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs Enlarged Bureau</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Helga Schmid</td>
<td>Geneva talks between E3/EU+3 and Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/12</td>
<td>Conference with National Parliaments</td>
<td>Managing Director Agostino Miozzo</td>
<td>Summit of Chairmen of EPP Parliamentary Groups</td>
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<td>10/12</td>
<td>Plenary session</td>
<td>EU Special Representative Stavros Lambrinidis</td>
<td>Human rights in the world 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>18/12</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Affairs and Delegations for relations with Afghanistan and Central Asia conference</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General Maciej Popowski</td>
<td>Afghanistan and Central Asia</td>
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## ANNEX IV: CFSP BUDGET 2013

### 19.030101 EUMM Georgia

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**Subtotal** 26,650,000.00

### 19.030102 EULEX Kosovo

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**Subtotal** 110,000,000.00

### 19.030103 EUPOL Afghanistan

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**Subtotal** 77,800,000.00

### 19.030104 Other crisis management measures and operations

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<td>2013/30/CFSP EUSEC Congo – CD 2013/468/CFSP</td>
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<td>2013/25/CFSP EUPOL COPPS – CD 2013/354/CFSP</td>
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<td>2013/05/CFSP EUJUST LEX-Iraq – CD 2013/364/CFSP</td>
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<td>2013/24/CFSP EUBAM RAFAH – CD 2013/355/CFSP</td>
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<td>2013/41/CFSP EUCAP Sahel Niger – CD 2013/533/CFSP</td>
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<td>2013/40/CFSP EUCAP NESTOR – CD 2013/660/CFSP</td>
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<td>2013/10/CFSP EUBAM LIBYA (CSDP Libya) – CD 2013/233/CFSP</td>
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**Subtotal** 89,133,066.95
19.0302 Non-proliferation and disarmament

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</table>

19.0304 Emergency measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19.0305 Preparatory and follow up measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External audits, legal services and assessments</td>
<td>176,043.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory measure for potential CSDP mission in Libya</td>
<td>1,980,071.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,156,114.59</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/16/CFSP EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia – CD 2013/353/CFSP</td>
<td>1,050,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/19/CFSP EUSR Central Asia – CD 2013/306/CFSP</td>
<td>1,050,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/15/CFSP EUSR Afghanistan – CD 2013/382/CFSP</td>
<td>6,585,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/22/CFSP EUSR Kosovo – CD 2013/366/CFSP</td>
<td>1,870,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/23/CFSP EUSR MEPP – CD 2013/350/CFSP</td>
<td>506,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/20/CFSP EUSR Southern Mediterranean Region – CD 2013/307/CFSP</td>
<td>945,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/38/CFSP EUSR Horn of Africa – CD 2013/527/CFSP</td>
<td>2,720,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/17/CFSP EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan – CD 2013/384/CFSP</td>
<td>690,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/26/CFSP EUSR African Union – CD 2013/383/CFSP</td>
<td>585,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/18/CFSP EUSR Human Rights – CD 2013/352/CFSP</td>
<td>837,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/21/CFSP EUSR BIH – CD 2013/351/CFSP</td>
<td>5,285,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/03/CFSP EUSR SAHEL – CD 2013/133/CFSP</td>
<td>1,350,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,473,500.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>352,932,973.54</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2013 a total of 552 statements and declarations were issued, belonging to one of the following four categories:

- **Declarations by the High Representative on behalf of the EU**: reflect the official position of the EU and are issued under the High Representative's authority with prior consultation of the Member States. Where no such official position exists, these declarations are agreed by Member States within the Council. Third countries can align when invited.

- **Statements by the HR/VP**: used most frequently to respond to events requiring quick EU reaction and issued under the HR/VP's authority without formal consultation of the Member States.

- **Statements by the Spokesperson of the HR/VP**: used for quick EU reaction in cases when the personal involvement of the HR/VP is not necessarily required.

- **Local EU Statements**: used in the context of a specific local/regional issue.

**Breakdown per category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number (share of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR declarations</td>
<td>32 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR/VP statements</td>
<td>252 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokesperson’s statements</td>
<td>201 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local statements</td>
<td>67 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>552 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Geographic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number (share of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>125 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>92 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe / Western Balkans</td>
<td>115 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>10 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>89 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East / Gulf</td>
<td>90 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-lateral / North America</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Thematic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number (share of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>128 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections / reform</td>
<td>99 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict / stabilisation processes</td>
<td>129 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security incidents</td>
<td>90 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congratulations / condolences messages</td>
<td>27 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-proliferation</td>
<td>9 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>70 (13%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Joint statements

A total of 40 statements were made jointly with one or more other Commissioners. Six statements were made jointly with representatives of third countries or international organisations. The table shows the number of joint statements each Commissioner participated in.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commissioner</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Štefan Füle</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andris Piebalgs</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristalina Georgieva</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karel De Gucht</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecilia Malmström</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viviane Reding</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>László Andor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonio Borg</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Damanaki</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Tajani</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>