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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



EUROPEAN COMMISSION - DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR  
DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION - EUROPEAID

## **GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN**

### **EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION INSTRUMENT**

### **MULTI-ANNUAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 2014-2020**

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>AGO</b>	Attorney General Office
<b>AIHRC</b>	Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
<b>AISA</b>	Afghanistan Investment Support Agency
<b>AITF</b>	Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund
<b>AMS</b>	Afghanistan Mortality Survey
<b>ANA</b>	Afghan National Army
<b>ANDS</b>	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
<b>ANP</b>	Afghan National Police
<b>ANSF</b>	Afghan National Security Forces
<b>ARAP</b>	Afghanistan Rural Access Project
<b>ARD</b>	Agriculture and Rural Development
<b>ARTF</b>	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
<b>BPHS</b>	Basic Package of Healthcare Services
<b>CAM</b>	Common Assessment Mechanism
<b>CBRF</b>	Capacity Building for Results Facility
<b>CDC</b>	Community Development Council
<b>CM</b>	Community Monitoring
<b>CRIS</b>	Common Relex Information System
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defense Policy
<b>CSO</b>	Central Statistics Organisation
<b>CSO-LA</b>	Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities
<b>DP</b>	Development Partners
<b>DPT3</b>	third dose of diphtheria toxoid, tetanus toxoid and pertussis vaccine
<b>DRR</b>	Disaster Risk Reduction
<b>EAMR</b>	External Assistance Management Report
<b>ECFP</b>	Extended Credit Facility Programme
<b>EIA</b>	Environmental Impact Assessments
<b>EIDHR</b>	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
<b>EPHS</b>	Essential Package of Hospital Services
<b>ESMF</b>	Environmental and Social Management Framework
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>(E)VAW</b>	(Elimination of) Violence Against Women
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GIRoA</b>	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
<b>GoA</b>	Government of Afghanistan
<b>HCWMP</b>	Health Care Waste Management Plan
<b>HHS</b>	Health and Human Services
<b>HMIS</b>	Health Management Information System
<b>HNSS</b>	Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy
<b>HoO</b>	High Office of Oversight
<b>IACSRC</b>	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
<b>IC</b>	International Community
<b>IDP</b>	Internal Displaced Persons
<b>IEC</b>	Independent Election Commission
<b>IFES</b>	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>IPCB</b>	International Police Coordination Board
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>ISD</b>	Infrastructure Services Department
<b>IWRM</b>	Integrated Water Resources Management
<b>KFOC</b>	Kabul Friends of Chicago

<b>LOTFA</b>	Law and Order Trust Fund
<b>LRRD</b>	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
<b>MAIL</b>	Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock
<b>MDG</b>	Millenium Development Goals
<b>MDTF</b>	Multidonor Trust Fund
<b>MEW</b>	Ministry of Energy and Water
<b>MICS</b>	Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey
<b>MIP</b>	Multiannual Indicative Programme
<b>MoC</b>	Ministry of Commerce
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of Defense
<b>MoI</b>	Ministry of Interior
<b>MoJ</b>	Ministry of Justice
<b>MoPH</b>	Ministry of Public Health
<b>MoWA</b>	Ministry of Women Affairs
<b>NAPWA</b>	National Action Plan for Women
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<b>NEPA</b>	National Environment Protection Agency
<b>NERAP</b>	National Emergency Rural Access Program
<b>NPP</b>	National Priority Programme
<b>NRVA</b>	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
<b>NSA-LA</b>	Non-State Actors and Local Authorities
<b>NSP</b>	National Solidarity Programme
<b>NTA</b>	National Technical Assistance
<b>O&amp;M</b>	Operations and Maintenance
<b>OBI</b>	Open Budget Index
<b>OCB</b>	Oversight and Coordination Body
<b>PCD</b>	Policy Coherence for Development
<b>PEFA</b>	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
<b>PFM</b>	Public Finance Management
<b>PMF</b>	Performance Measurement Framework
<b>PPP</b>	Public Private Partnership
<b>SEA</b>	Strategic Environmental Assessment
<b>SEHAT</b>	System Enhancement for Health Action in Transition
<b>SSC</b>	Strategic Steering Committee
<b>SWAp</b>	Sector Wide Approach
<b>TA</b>	Technical Assistant
<b>TI</b>	Transparency International
<b>TMAR</b>	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Report
<b>TMAF</b>	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHRC</b>	United Nations Human Rights Commission
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>WB</b>	World Bank

## 1. Overall lines for the EU response to Afghanistan's development strategy

Afghanistan faces significant political, security and economic challenges as it transitions to take increasing control over its affairs. How the new Government is able to navigate those challenges will largely determine the future stability and prosperity of the country. But it is clear that Afghanistan will for some time to come remain a fragile state with stubbornly high poverty rates and some of the lowest human development indicators globally. The most vulnerable segments of the Afghan population will continue to need humanitarian assistance for the foreseeable future. With the overarching goal of supporting the development of Afghanistan's institutions to provide the resilience needed to safeguard progress to date and provide a countrywide platform for the development of a more effective and ultimately sustainable Afghan state, the EU will continue to support poverty reduction by focusing its efforts in areas in which it adds most value and respecting its commitments towards aid efficiency and effectiveness, in line with the "Policy Coherence for Development" (PCD).

The credibility and success of the political, security and economic transition depend on strengthening democratic and accountable governance in Afghanistan at all levels. This is a long-term, generational task. In a best case scenario, if the government is able to negotiate an inclusive political settlement with all major insurgent and militia groups, Afghanistan could accelerate progress in consolidating and building on the gains made over the last decade. Yet, in the absence of an inclusive peace deal, it is likely that the operating environment in the country will require flexible and differentiated ways of implementing development assistance, ranging from state-building to humanitarian approaches.

A critical factor will be the leadership provided by the Government of Afghanistan, which will need to tackle difficult political challenges and deep-seated vested interests to restore confidence and lead reform in the areas set out under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). The International Community (IC) agreed at the Tokyo Conference in 2012 to strive for a 'soft landing' for the economy by continuing to provide the exceptional levels of aid the country has received over the past decade. This continued funding will help cushion the impact of the reduced international presence post-2014.

Combating corruption and improving access to justice are areas of particular importance in ensuring government legitimacy. A transparent and accountable public finance management should enable provincial and sub-provincial authorities to deliver services to the population in a sustained and progressive way. This could be a key marker for retaining popular support. Equally, systemic action to tackle the culture of corruption and impunity for financial crimes is required. Without concrete improvements in these areas, it will be difficult to sustain political and public support in the EU and elsewhere for largescale resource transfers to Afghanistan.

Although receiving less attention than security and political challenges, the economic challenges are perhaps the most acute. At present, donor funding provides 65% of the core budget and almost 100 % of the development budget. Growth slowed notably in 2013, mainly due to the uncertainty about the political and security landscape post-2014. This impacted on revenue collection, setting back Afghanistan's ambitions for greater sustainability. The Government of Afghanistan committed to increase revenues and the quality of the revenue collection systems both under the TMAF and the Extended Credit Facility Programme (ECF) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to eventually achieve economic self-reliance. While progress is undeniable (Afghanistan's domestic revenues grew from almost zero to 11 percent of GDP in the decade since 2002), collection remains below projected targets. Systemic action to improve current levels of revenue mobilization will be crucial for Afghanistan's transformation.

The Government of Afghanistan must take a lead in restoring economic confidence. In particular, the need to create a more congenial climate for domestic and foreign investment will be critical and necessary to reverse the substantial capital outflows seen in recent years. In addition, 70 percent of Afghanistan's population is estimated to be under 25, with an estimated 400,000 young Afghans joining the job market every year. Afghanistan's natural resources - its land, water, forests and mineral deposits - are critical to the country's development prospects, though exploitation needs to be undertaken in a sustainable and responsible way that is consistent with the climate change National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA).

In the short- to medium-term, economic growth will depend principally on the agricultural sector. Facilitating private sector led-growth and resulting job creation will be key to both tackling the problems stemming from un(der)employment and the need for increasing domestic revenue generation. In the longer term, there is the potential to generate considerable resources and jobs from mining. But the right framework needs to be in place, ensuring the appropriate oversight and avoiding mining exploitation becomes a driver of conflict.

### **1.1. Strategic objectives of the EU's relationship with the partner country**

At the Kabul Conference in 2010 the government started to set out its priorities in the form of 22 National Priority Programmes (NPPs). At the Tokyo Conference in 2012, the Government of Afghanistan presented its vision to achieve self-reliance through transformation over the next decade. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) established a new reinvigorated development partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community based on the principle of mutual accountability. The Government committed to a series of political and economic governance reforms in return for international pledges of continued exceptional levels of funding through the transition period (EUR 4 billion a year until 2016) and increased aid effectiveness. It was agreed that donors would increase the share of incentive funding to 10 percent by 2014 and to 20 percent by the end of the "transformation decade"<sup>1</sup> (2024). The international community reconfirmed its commitment to align 80 percent of aid with the NPPs and channeling at least 50 percent of its development assistance through the national budget of the Afghan Government.

The EU will fulfil its TMAF commitments by providing EUR 1.1 billion for the period 2014-20, with a further EUR 300 million set aside for allocations depending on the progress made against the TMAF commitments. The EU will maintain and strengthen its efforts to enhance donor coordination. This will include the continuation of its role as one of the five biggest donors in the TMAF coordination mechanisms and where appropriate, as a coordinator and convener of the strategic policy dialogue with the government. The focal sectors of the MIP map well onto the five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States (inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenue and services).

Significant progress has been made in promoting a comprehensive, coordinated and unified EU approach in Afghanistan. The Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014-2020 will enhance this by aligning with the new EU strategy on Afghanistan until 2016 to be adopted by the Council, which will replace the EU Action Plan of 2009.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, the EU's overall strategic objectives in the implementation of development aid in Afghanistan in 2014-2020 are:

- a. Promoting peace, stability and security, by advocating an inclusive peace accord mitigating threats from drugs and organised crime and supporting the development of professional and accountable civilian police force;
- b. Reinforcing democracy: functioning democracy needs to be embedded through democratic oversight at national, provincial and district levels, inclusive and transparent elections, and through capacity building in key institutions of governance;
- c. Encouraging economic and human development including the establishment of a transparent economic framework to encourage investment, raise revenue and allocate finances, strengthen resilience and improve access to health and education, including for the most vulnerable segments of the population;
- d. Fostering rule of law and respect for human rights, in particular the rights of women and children: by advocating respect for human rights, in particular the full implementation of statutory protections for the rights of women and girls, supporting greater equality before the law of all citizens and the development of a comprehensive framework for reinforcing and reforming the justice sector.

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<sup>1</sup> Towards Self-Reliance: Strategic vision for the transformation decade, 8 July 2012, Tokyo conference on Afghanistan

<sup>2</sup> Council Conclusions of 23 June 2014 (doc 11197/14)

This MIP may be reviewed in 2015/16 in light of the events that will shape Afghanistan in post-2014 : i) first ministerial conference to track progress against the Tokyo Framework with focus on the fair election process, ii) military disengagement and follow-up international military presence, iii) new political administration, iv) economic transition results.

EU partners have committed to consider a move to Joint Programming, which will be assessed on an ongoing basis and ahead of any review.

## **1.2. Choice of sectors**

### *Commitment to Aid Effectiveness principles*

Afghanistan is a pilot country under the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The proposed focal sectors map well onto the five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services.

Afghanistan has put in place a framework which should enable the extensive, predictable, and sustained international aid necessary to meet key development targets. This MIP proposes focal sectors aligned with the current Afghan National Development Strategy, the National Priority Programmes, and its 10-year strategic vision for Self-Reliance as presented at the Tokyo conference.

From a development perspective, it is important that EU's engagement with Afghanistan is aligned with the principles of the Agenda for Change. The EU will focus its support on the development of a vital economic and employment sector (agriculture and rural development), a social sector with a track record of achieving results (health), the provision of physical and legal security for citizens through the increased professionalisation of civilian policing and application of the rule of law, and enhancing the accountability of the state to its citizens through greater democratisation. This will require a critical mass of EU finance in each sector to help leverage policy dialogue and ensure impact on institutional development and service delivery, as well as on improving the country's investment climate.

While adhering to its commitments to aid effectiveness, the EU will continue to strive to:

- align its aid with national priorities (the NPPs and related funding mechanisms), by working where possible with national institutions and on-budget, in line with its TMAF commitments; and
- harmonise its aid by working closely with EU Member states and other donors, e.g. through joined-up financing modalities such as trust funds.

### *The choice of sectors*

The four sectors provide a balanced approach that, as said above, fits well with the principles of the New Deal and is consistent with the Agenda for Change.<sup>3</sup> They set out continuing support for critical human development and productive sectors and signpost clearly the high profile commitment made by President Barroso to support policing and the rule of law and the expectation of continued EU support to deepening the democratic culture in Afghanistan. This support fits well with ambitions to increase the culture of accountability in Afghanistan through improved parliamentary, media and civil society scrutiny.

### **Sector 1: Agriculture and Rural Development (DAC 311, 43040)**

Building on past experiences, the EU's support for Agriculture and Rural Development (70-80% of employment) will continue to improve food and nutrition security as well as rural livelihoods and employment, including the sustainable management of natural resources; reduce dependence of farmer households on income from poppy; and help build institutional capacity.

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<sup>3</sup> The Agenda for Change foresees, as a general rule, support for a maximum of three sectors. However, the joint EEAS/European Commission "Instructions for the Programming of the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – 2014-2020 of May 2012 [Ares(2012)593622]] foresee the possibility to include an additional sector where required due to "specific circumstances, such as transition from humanitarian to development assistance, or emerging security threats/conflict risks". This has been applied in the case of Afghanistan.



## **Sector 2: Health (DAC 120)**

Together with education, progress in the health sector is crucial to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals as well as government's outreach in the provinces. Success in the Health sector is largely credited to the government's Basic Package of Healthcare Services (BPHS) and Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) and the decentralised system of basic health delivery. The EU will continue its support to the sector aiming at improvement and expansion of basic health care delivery services and strengthening the government's capacity. Nutrition will receive due attention under this focal sector.

## **Sector 3: Policing and Rule of Law (DAC 152)**

Despite extreme poverty, Afghan citizens define a lack of security as their greatest problem. The EU will continue its support to this crucial sector for government's efforts towards achieving the MDGs, in fulfilment of the EU high level commitment to support policing and the rule of law, at the Chicago Conference (2012).

## **Sector 4: Democratisation and accountability (DAC 151 with focus on elections, civil society and public financial management)**

Support under this focal sector aims to increase the culture of accountability in Afghanistan through increased parliamentary, media and civil society scrutiny. Support will focus on actions to improve economic governance and to tackle corruption.

### **Cross-cutting priorities**

In all sectors, EU assistance will mainstream, where possible, the below cross-cutting issues, reflecting also the comprehensive strategic objectives mentioned in 1.1:

- gender sensitivity and human rights (in particular the rights and empowerment of women, girls, and children);
- sustainable economic growth and job creation, including green jobs;
- anti-corruption and transparent management of public finances; and
- counter-narcotics.

The bilateral programme will ensure coherence with the EU Asia regional programming (2014-2020), including, where possible, the Confidence-Building Measures agreed under the Istanbul/Heart of Asia process. It will in particular aim at enhancing growth through regional trade and improving Afghanistan's environment for domestic and foreign investment.

### *Resilience, Disaster Risk Reduction and Linking Relief and Rehabilitation*

Afghanistan is an archetypal test case for building resilience and linking relief, rehabilitation, and development (LRRD) in protracted crises. While moving towards more aligned/on-budget support, the context of state fragility, instability and unpredictability of the political and security beyond 2014 requires development interventions to be flexible with a close humanitarian-development approach, building the resilience of the Afghan society at different levels. The high vulnerability to natural disasters country-wide (3/3 on the Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) Vulnerability and Crisis Index Score, the most severe category) will be addressed by promoting effective disaster risk reduction approaches within the agriculture and rural development sectors and through a close coordination between development and humanitarian actors. Complementary actions, funded through thematic budget lines and the Aid to Uprooted People (re Asia Regional Strategy 2014-2020), will continue to support the most vulnerable population groups including returnees and Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs).

EU interventions, particularly in the agriculture and rural development sector, will pay particular attention to the cumulative impact of repeated shocks and stresses subsequent to natural hazards and climate change on small subsistence farmers, in line with the 2009 climate change National Adaptation Plan of Action, which significantly focuses on agriculture and disaster risk reduction.

Any programme or project identified under the 4 focal sectors above may be subject to an environmental and climate change screening according to the Guidelines for Integration of Environment and Climate Change in EU Development Cooperation, to identify the need for an EIA or a SEA.

In case a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is considered necessary, it will be carried out prior to formulation, in coordination with the Government and other donors active in the concerned sector.

SEA screening may provide an indication of environmental and climate change aspects to be taken into account during the formulation phase.

### **Implementation modalities**

EU bilateral assistance to Afghanistan will continue to be primarily delivered through the major Afghanistan Multi-donor Trust Funds – Indirect Management with International Organisations – and through non-governmental organisations. The current move towards sector wide approaches (SWAp), particularly in the EU sectors of intervention (health and, though to a lesser extent, agriculture), could in principle lead to some form of budget support if and when the eligibility criteria are assessed as met. In the meantime, multidonor trust funds (MDTFs) such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF) will continue to be the preferred tools to channel funds on-budget. In the complex aid environment of Afghanistan, MDTFs ensure enhanced donor coordination and the possibility to channel development assistance through country systems, improving budget transparency and building human resources capacity. In addition, major MDTFs are closely aligned with the National Priority Programmes.

Civil Society will continue to play an essential role in implementing the EU development assistance not only in their role as watchdog and advocate, but also in ensuring service delivery to the populations (e.g. in health and agriculture) unless and until government capacities to deliver quality public services are strengthened.

Blending mechanisms will be pursued in trying to unlock public and private resources and thereby increasing the impact of external cooperation and development policy.

### **Overall risks and mitigation measures**

*Security situation:* the security situation has the potential to make operating conditions extremely difficult, if not impossible. This might necessitate a spectrum of approaches with more stable areas continuing to develop more normalised state-building relationships and other conflict-afflicted areas reverting to humanitarian-led approaches. Conflict sensitivity will be important in ensuring that interventions are effective and do not exacerbate existing problems, particularly in trying to involve local communities from the onset and sustaining Afghan ownership.

*Pervasive corruption:* the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index<sup>4</sup> ranks Afghanistan 175 out of 177 countries. Potential deviation of resources by local powerbrokers and widespread corruption at all levels of government and society remain real challenges for the implementation of development programs. Fiduciary systems have improved but remain weak. The EU will work closely with other stakeholders, including anti-corruption bodies, in ensuring funds are used for the intended purposes and in an accountable manner.

*Lack of capacities:* in all sectors, Afghanistan faces numerous challenges to build capacities and effective institutions able to administer and deliver essential public services to the population. Often this process is further complicated by the absence of clear responsibilities or by vested interests. The recruitment and retention of qualified technical advisors and skilled public servants will continue to be a challenge, posing a risk to the effective roll-out of programmes.

*Absorption capacity:* current weaknesses relate mostly to national absorption capacity, weak inter-ministerial coordination, sub-optimal donors' coordination, and the poor interaction between central and sub-national level. The EU will aim to address these through technical cooperation and promotion of stronger government-led donor coordination.

*Doing more with less:* the possibility of an overall reduction of international assistance will require increased efficiency through clear focus on priority areas and interventions with higher potential for

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<sup>4</sup> Transparency International, <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/>

impact and results. A degree of flexibility in the EU approach will need to be maintained so that programmes can respond to a changing funding environment.

*Political buy-in for reform* as agreed under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) - ensuring Human Rights, particularly the rights of women, integrity of public finances, revenue growth, progression towards achievement of Millennium Development Goals – will continue to be pursued including through a donors' common assessment mechanism (CAM) to judge progress of Government's fulfilment of TMAF commitments by the government.

The MIP and risk mitigation measures may be reviewed in 2015/16 (see 1.1. above) also taking into account developments related to the above key risks.

### ***1.2.1. Agriculture and Rural Development***

After more than 30 years of conflict, much infrastructure and many private economic assets in Afghanistan have been destroyed or depleted despite considerable restoration and reconstruction since 2002. Chronic natural disasters, vulnerability to climate change, disruption of the social fabric, and frequent strategic shifts in policies and approaches to agricultural development have contributed to a major decline in productivity and production, a distortion of traditional agricultural practices and the degradation of the irrigation infrastructure, water and natural resources management as well as quality of agricultural inputs and extension of services. This is reflected in the often dismal living conditions in rural areas, where, for example, 28% of the population remains severely food insecure<sup>5</sup>, and where especially women and children suffer from poor nutrition.

With agriculture accounting for about a quarter of GDP (excluding opium which contributes with 4%) and with 80% of Afghans living in rural areas, mostly relying on subsistence agriculture, this is the sector with the largest potential to generate jobs and economic growth in the short and medium term. Unleashing the agricultural sector growth potential implies tackling the sub-optimal productivity that affects small-holder farmers and the near landless and further promoting the entrepreneurial capacity of better-off farmers driven by growing and stable regional and national markets. Particular attention also needs to be paid to sustainably managing natural resources and ecosystem services, as well as improving resilience to climate change to ensure a robust basis for agriculture. Interventions in this area have the potential to significantly improve the living conditions of rural Afghans and to positively affect other sectors. The alarming 36% increase in poppy cultivation in 2013 highlights the strategic and security-related importance of supporting the rural populations in making a living through alternative licit crop production and rural enterprises. Achieving long lasting results will, however, require a long term approach based on four pre-requisites: security; rule of law; the sustainable management of natural resources and opportunities to engage into licit, long-term and more profitable agricultural production.

The challenge of gender mainstreaming in agriculture in Afghanistan is not simply to create spaces and opportunities for women to participate to the value-adding activities. Changing societal attitudes towards women's socio-economic role requires accompanying programmatic measures in awareness raising, education and reform of the regulatory framework.

Strong synergies between focal sectors will be developed. Improved access to food will have a positive impact in health and nutrition; better natural resource management will contribute to the wider process of peacebuilding, given that disputes over water and land are commonly reported reasons for violent conflict.

Significant steps forward are being made through the EU supported National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), to build effective development policies in favour of the most vulnerable population, including surveillance systems for food security and nutrition. Continued technical and financial support in the next seven years will be needed to reinforce and advance these progresses.

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<sup>5</sup> NRVA 2011-2012

### **1.2.2. Health**

In just a decade, access to health care made extraordinary progress, from 9% in 2000, during Taliban times, to 66% in 2010<sup>6</sup>. Despite these improvements, health indicators remain near the bottom of international tables. Life expectancy is low, infant under-five and maternal mortality are very high, and there is an extremely high prevalence of chronic malnutrition, poor sanitation, a widespread occurrence of micronutrient deficiency diseases and a high burden of disease, from malaria and tuberculosis to mental health conditions.

The Health NPP, entitled “Health for all Afghans”, and the Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy (HNSS) plan to provide basic and essential services through the expansion of the coverage of BPHS and EPHS. The government is planning to develop Public Private Partnerships (PPP) to ensure secondary and tertiary care. Donors are looking at cautiously supporting a future PPP Department inside the Ministry, within a proper legal framework.

The training and retention of professional health staff remains a considerable problem for the ambition to significantly expand health services delivery. The referral system needs to be improved, with a clear plan of key intervention areas and geographical coverage. Afghanistan also faces a challenge to make the most of much of the health infrastructure that has been put in place through often uncoordinated interventions in development and humanitarian aid. Some rationalisation may be necessary to sustain and develop facilities where need is most acute. Maternal health, child health and vaccination will continue to be the main focus. Issues such as hospital care, pharmaceuticals (including quality control), nutrition, vaccination, and the development of an adequate referral system will be duly and increasingly included.

The EU's planned interventions will focus on supporting the government to improve the quality and expand basic health provision with particular attention to ensuring health care to the very poor, vulnerable minorities (e.g. nomadic Kuchi tribes), vulnerable people including women, girls and children; as well as addressing disability and mental health care. Improved access to healthcare also plays an important role in increasing women's empowerment.

### **1.2.3. Policing and Rule of Law**

Afghanistan's path towards sustainable peace and development is dependent on its capacity to maintain a relatively stable security environment, political stability, consolidated state and rule of law-based state institutions and society. Prolonged failure to ensure public service delivery throughout the country will determine the country's resilience as well as if and when it will move out of fragility. An effective formal justice system will weaken the insurgent's narrative, improve investors' confidence and facilitate progress on advancing women's rights.

The EU's engagement in this sector has a direct impact on the lives of Afghanistan's citizens. It is a pre-condition, complementary and cross-cutting with engagement in other key sectors covered by this MIP. Civilian policing and rule of law depend, possibly more than other sectors, on the level of coordination and commonly agreed objectives within wider international engagement.

The fragile security situation and the involvement of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the counter-insurgency efforts have hampered its transformation into a civilian police force as advocated for by the EU and other partners. According to public opinion and consistent anecdotal evidence, corruption is a wide-spread ailment, undermining trust in and legitimacy of the police force, impeding its effectiveness as well as overall economic development. The financial efforts required for sustaining the security sector with around 350.000 policemen and women as well as Afghan National Army (ANA) service personnel are only guaranteed by prolonged external support. Without rigorous PFM reforms and human resource development plans, security sector expenditures present a serious systemic threat to the country's fiscal stability.

The 2004 Constitution provides a relatively progressive basis for a legislative framework which overall guarantees the most fundamental rule of law principles, including judicial independence. However,

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<sup>6</sup> NRVA 2011-2012: “[...] urban population has virtually universal access to health care of any type within two hours. [...] around nine in ten of the non-urban population can reach the nearest health facility within two hours.

Afghanistan has one of the weakest performing justice systems in the world. The institutional capacities of the three main justice institutions - Supreme Court, Ministry of Justice and Advocate General's Office - are weak and poorly coordinated. The current Afghan judicial system has been described as highly inefficient, lacking the capacity to exercise even basic functions of legal order. The legal process is hampered by political interference, corruption, influence of armed groups and lack of oversight mechanisms. Also of great concern are the often inadequate security arrangements for prosecutors and judges, the lack of reach outside urban areas, as well as the limited availability of Afghan legislative texts for practitioners. Court management is ineffective, central judicial and prosecutorial authorities often have no technical means of communicating with colleagues in the provinces. This is compounded by a significant shortage of qualified personnel at all levels: judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, particularly in rural Afghanistan where about one third of the prosecutorial and judicial staff work, though most with inadequate capacities. Given the persistent weakness and limited reach of the formal justice system, many Afghans turn to traditional community-based dispute settlement carried out by local councils of elders (*jirgas*). While providing access to a largely accepted traditional notion of justice, they are often not reconciled with the national legal framework and international human rights norms.

A joint sector development strategy was agreed by Afghanistan's justice institutions and endorsed by the international community in mid-2013. In assisting Afghanistan in addressing structural and political bottlenecks for judicial reform, the EU can build on groundwork established by the CSDP Mission (EUPOL) in the sector since 2007 and more effectively link civilian police and the justice sector through a coherent rule of law approach .

#### ***1.2.4. Democratisation and Accountability***

Afghanistan faces critical challenges in its decade of transformation as it strives to deepen its democratic culture and to reinforce the formal bodies responsible for strengthening the accountability of the state and good governance. Years of experience of a weak state, often perceived as predatory, have undermined citizens' trust and the quality of the state-citizen relationship. EU involvement will contribute to strengthening the democratic institutions and accountability mechanisms that will be critical in establishing popular support to state-building in Afghanistan.

Elections will be a key element of accountability and stability, as well as a litmus test of democratic progress in Afghanistan. The EU, currently one of the largest donors, will continue to be prominently involved in supporting Afghanistan's elections. Focus will be on consolidating and strengthening the established electoral system and capacities, contributing to reduced electoral fraud and ensuring that institutions remain impartial. In this perspective, support to the implementation of the EU Election Observation Mission's recommendations, as requested by the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, represents an important factor.

Advancing public administration and civil service reform will remain a focus of international engagement, with particular focus on specific line ministries, improving their capacity and performance in carrying out their mandates and delivering services with the resources available. Legitimacy of the central state-building agenda is to a large degree determined by its capacity to deliver effective and transparent public services at the local level. This requires empowered local governance structures, and a clearer legal framework for local governance, allowing for a transparent allocation of resources to the sub-national level. The EU's approach to sub-national governance will promote a nationwide approach, supporting Afghan-owned programmes that build bridges between different implementation structures and aim at diminishing the urban-rural divide.

EU interventions will tackle corruption and strengthen public finance management in concert with the wider international community, acknowledging that government-wide efforts have been uneven and that political leadership is essential for an effective fight against corruption. Yet without major improvements in these areas, further progress on the aid effectiveness agenda and more aligned aid modalities will be delayed. While the Government of Afghanistan achieved positive results under the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment and the Open Budget Index (OBI), low absorption capacities, lack of internal controls and insufficient safeguards against corruption, if not improved, will continue to affect overall donor capacity to support Afghanistan's institutions. The EU will support public

scrutiny and oversight mechanisms, as well as increased oversight capacities and control bodies within sectors, both government-wide and through non-governmental bodies.

Interventions within this sector will aim at capacitating and empowering parliament and elected sub-national institutions to fulfil their constitutional mandate of holding the executive accountable. These will focus on support for institutional development and capacity-building, strengthening the two Houses of the Afghan National Assembly as well as provincial and other local governance entities in establishing more effective representational institutions, generating legitimacy, inclusive governance and executive oversight.

The EU will promote informal scrutiny and oversight by the media and civil society, with the ultimate goal of strengthening systemic checks and balances. The EU will support the independent media, in particular the capacity for investigative journalism that can hold institutions and persons to account and raise awareness of key issues, including culture. Support in this sector will explore options on how to utilize new media and cultural organisations for Afghanistan's development, while recognizing that many Afghans rely on more traditional means of information. Civil society organisations have a critical role to play as a watchdog as well as in monitoring and evaluating government performance. EU support will focus on increasing their capacity and supplement interventions through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the budget line for Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities where needed.

## 2. Financial overview (indicative)

In Tokyo, the international community committed to support Afghanistan's transition through its transformation decade with USD 16 billion in assistance. In line with its Tokyo commitments, the EU will maintain the same exceptional levels of assistance to Afghanistan. **The MIP 2014-2020 amounts to a total of EUR 1.4 billion, and thus continues to be EUR 200 million per year on average.** In line with TMAF provisions agreed by the international community, the EU will use approximately 20 percent, or EUR 300 million, of its allocation to incentivize Government's fulfilment of its commitments agreed under the Tokyo Framework, using in principle a joint donors' Common Assessment Mechanism. Incentives will be programmed to increase further the results and impact of EU assistance in the focal sectors.

Funds are indicatively earmarked as follows:

FOCAL SECTORS (*)	appr. %.	MEUR
1. Agriculture and Rural Development (DAC 311, 43040)	30.5	337
2. Health (DAC 120)	25	274
3. Policing and Rule of Law (DAC 152)	29	319
4. Democratisation and Accountability (DAC 151)	15	163
Support measures (identification, formulation, macroeconomic and political risk assessments, PFM assessments, policy dialogue, visibility, statistics, other occasional studies related to the focal sectors)	0.5	7
<i>Sub-total</i>	100	1100
Incentive based mechanism (e.g. TMAF related)		300
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1400</b>

## 3. EU support per sector

A long-term funding commitment by the International Community, characterized by a gradual drawdown of aid (Tokyo, 2012) aims at providing the minimum financial stability in Afghanistan (to overall finance approximately 23.2% of GDP, or about US\$ 7.9 billion in 2020). The government of Afghanistan

committed to key reforms through transition to the transformation decade aiming at ensuring the gradual reduction of the fiscal gap "towards self-reliance" and to narrow the overall financing gap significantly from the 2011's level of 95.6% of GDP. This will be done through delivering on key reforms in governance and by maintaining a careful and disciplined investment strategy in key economic sectors. This gap is expected to shrink to about 11.8% by 2025. Precise information on Government financial commitments per sector is not available at this stage. Whereas, own resources cover, on average 32.5% of the national budget; specifically for the security sector, the government of Afghanistan has committed to a contribution of around half a billion dollars (from domestic revenues), equivalent to 3 percent of its GDP and has committed to increase its security contribution over time in line with GDP growth (Chicago, 2012).

### **3.1 AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: APPR. 30 % OF MIP**

#### **3.1.1 Objectives**

**Overall Objective:** to improve the sustainability and increase the wealth of the rural populations, by enhancing the social and economic development of rural communities and reducing hunger and vulnerability.

**Specific Objective 1 (SO1):** to improve participative development processes and increase the institutional capacity toward a sector wide approach to agriculture and rural development.

**Specific Objective 2 (SO2):** to generate sustainable agriculture wealth via improved market driven agriculture production and productivity and increased on and off-farm enterprises.

**Specific Objective 3 (SO3):** to improve food and nutrition security, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and reduce dependency of subsistence and marginal farmers and labourers on narcotic crops.

The intervention will be inspired by an integrated agro-ecological approach that promotes food security and climate change adaptation and reinforces synergies with health and nutrition.

#### **3.1.2 – 3.1.3. Main expected results and related indicators:**

(SO1) R1: Progress is made towards a sector wide approach in ARD, in alignment with the national policies, aiming at continued provision of services in rural areas;

(SO 1) R2: Institutional and organizational capacity of the sector relevant public and private institutions at national and sub national level is strengthened;

(SO 2) R3: Following a tailored Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), water and land resources are sustainably managed and better protected; precipitation run-off is reduced, while irrigated and rain-fed cultivated land is extended and improved in the Panj-Amu River Basin and later on country-wide;

(SO 2) R4: The traditional subsistence production system is gradually transformed into a dynamic, modern, environmental and climate-friendly market-driven agricultural sector through the creation of an enabling environment conducive of private sector investments and relying on strong public/private sectors partnership;

(SO 3) R5: Food and nutrition security and household resilience to shocks and are increased in rural areas;

(SO 3) R6: Contribution of licit agriculture and other rural activities to the household and national economy is increased;

#### **3.1.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:**

The National Priority Programmes' architecture has contributed to aid coordination but more needs to be done to translate them into practice, especially empowering the Agriculture and Rural Development Ministerial Cluster.

Donor coordination board meetings for key national development programs led by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development are the main coordination fora for Rural Development.

The EU has an active role in the Agriculture Donor Group and supports the Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock's fora for coordination of agriculture activities. Moreover, the EU is engaged with relevant national institutions, UN agencies and NGOs through the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster. Increased coordination in this sector is needed.

#### **3.1.5. The Government's financial and policy commitments:**

The Government's poverty alleviation strategies aim, inter alia, at promoting rural development and fostering service delivery at the local level. These include the Afghan National Development Strategy; the National Priority Programmes (NPPs); the Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition Agenda, and the Strategic Framework for Agricultural and Rural Development (ARD) cluster, which includes the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Ministry of Energy and Water and Ministry of Commerce and Industries. In the field of natural resource management, the Water Law and the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) approach are the reference documents; MAIL continues to support the public-private partnership scheme envisaged in the perennial horticulture, animal health and seeds sub-sectors and continues to make significant progress in the fulfilment of the commitments made under the animal health, horticulture and seed components of the different policy documents.

#### **3.1.6. Environmental assessment:**

In line with EU policies, strategies and commitments, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) will be considered during the identification phase of the programmes/projects. Since a significant amount of EU support for Afghanistan will be implemented under Indirect Management with International Organisations, the EU Delegation will also rely on the rules of the Development Partners implementing the programmes and projects.

EIAs will collect or refer to the relevant data, including climate change issues. It is not expected that global environmental issues will require separate analysis in project specific EIAs. Opportunities to identify win-win options (development and environment/climate change) for mainstreaming climate resilience into the programme will be addressed where relevant and feasible in policy and sector work, given the climate vulnerability of the country.

EIAs will respect the EU guidelines and lessons learned and will include, inter alia, project description, baseline data, environmental impacts, analysis of alternatives, mitigation plan, environmental mitigation measures, sustainable use of the environment and training requirements, monitoring plan, interagency coordination, and consultation with affected communities and local non governmental organizations (NGOs).

#### **3.1.7. The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention:**

The "Overall Risks" under chapter 1.2 apply to the sector of Agriculture.

In addition, efficiency of counter narcotics inter-ministerial policies will be crucial towards reduction of poppy cultivation.



## **3.2 HEALTH: APPR. 25 % OF THE MIP**

### **3.2.1 The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:**

**Overall Objective:** To support the Government of Afghanistan towards the improvement of the health and nutrition status of the Afghan population.

**Specific Objective:** To strengthen the public health system and the delivery of public health care through support to the Ministry of Public Health.

### **3.2.2-3.2.3. Main expected results:**

R1: Health and nutritional status of the population improved;

R2: Inequality in access to quality health services through BPHS and EPHS reduced;

R3: Health system strengthened in key areas;

R4: Health human resources management and development are strengthened.

The main indicators for measuring the aforementioned results are contained in the sector intervention framework attached in annex 3.

### **3.2.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue :**

Donor coordination in the Health sector takes place through a Strategic Steering Committee (SSC) as a supreme coordination body, three subcommittees (Policy, Planning and Technical Affairs; Health Care Services Commission; Administration and Finance) and a third layer that includes working groups, task forces and other technical bodies. Based on the “*Partnership Protocol for Health Sector Development in Afghanistan*” between the Ministry of Public Health and development partners. The EU is a permanent member of the SSC.

The Development Partners Coordination Forum gathers USAID, EU, World bank, CIDA, JICA, ISAF, Cooperation Agencies of EU Member States and UN Agencies (UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO). It meets biweekly and acts as the main mechanism for donor alignment and harmonization of aid.

A 3+ *SEHAT Donors Coordination Platform*, established in September 2013 ensures coordination between the three major donors in the Health sector (USAID, EU and WB).

### **3.2.5. The Government's financial and policy commitments :**

*The National Priority Programme (NPP5) "Health for all Afghans"* (July 2010) aims at improving aid effectiveness. It has main three components: a) Strengthen and Expand Existing Health Service Delivery; b) Increase and Improve Human Resources for Health and Good Governance; and c) Improve health financing.

*The National Health and Nutrition Policy 2012-2020* outlines the key policy directions for the development of the health sector. The policy highlights four main directions: stewardship, health financing, resource generation, and health service delivery. The policy is strengthened by a Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) for outcome and impact assessment.

*The Strategic Plan for the MoPH (2011 – 2015)*, the result of a collaborative effort among MoPH staff and national and international partners, identifies ten Strategic Directions<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> 1) Improve the nutritional status of the Afghan population; 2) Strengthen human resource management and development; 3) Increase equitable access to quality health services; 4) Strengthen the stewardship role of MoPH and governance in the health sector; 5) Improve health financing; 6) Enhance evidence-based decision making by establishing a culture that uses data for improvement; 7) Support regulation and standardization of the private sector to provide quality health services; 8) Support health promotion and community empowerment; 9) Advocate for and promote healthy environments; and 10) Create an enabling environment for the production and availability of quality pharmaceuticals

Annual work plans and processes are assessed annually in the spirit of continuous quality improvement and with an enhanced focus on results. The Strategic Plan 2011-2015 builds on the Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy and lays the foundation to a progressive Sector Wide Approach in the Health and Nutrition Sector in Afghanistan.

*The National Strategy on Human Resources Capacity Building/ In-service Training* is an HR strategy aligned with the ANDS.

### **3.2.6. Environmental assessment:**

No significant environmental impact is expected for specific activities under this sector other than those mentioned under cross cutting priorities (1.2)

### **3.2.7. The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention:**

The overall risks identified above (1.2) apply.

Risks affecting the Technical Assistance part of the envelope mainly concern continued buy-in from the Government. Timely dialogue with the new top management of MoPH also based on long standing relations with the MoPH staffs will mitigate this risk.

Climate change will continue to impact upon the spread of food, water, and vector-borne diseases in Afghanistan undermining Afghanistan's ability to achieve its goals in reducing malaria morbidity and mortality. Activities aimed at increasing household resilience to external shocks, as foreseen in focal sector 1 (agriculture and rural development), will contribute to mitigate this risk.

## **3.3 POLICING AND RULE OF LAW: APPR. 30% OF MIP**

### **3.3.1 The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:**

**Overall Objective:** to stabilize and improve the security situation through an effective police force and increase the enforcement of law and order through strengthened justice sector institutions.

**Specific Objective 1 (SO1):** to enable the Afghan National Police (ANP) to effectively and efficiently perform its tasks, specifically in its civilian policing mandate.

**Specific Objective 2 (SO2):** to improve access to justice for all and ensure judicial integrity and independence through empowered, effective and transparent justice institutions.

**Cross-cutting issues** to be mainstreamed into both specific objectives are: anti-corruption and sound public finance management, human rights, empowerment and professionalism of female staff including female police officers and senior management nominations.

### **3.3.2-3.3.3 Main expected results:**

(SO1) R1: Capacity of the ANP to sustain and maintain security throughout Afghanistan in the decade of transformation reinforced:

(SO1) R2: Performance and capacity of the Afghan National Police as a civilian police force under civilian control improved in line with the 10-year vision of the Ministry of Interior.

(SO2) R1: Reach of the formal judicial system extended throughout Afghanistan with quality of legal services improved through, inter alia, better coordination between the justice institutions and the police for more effective case management.

(SO2) R2: Prosecutorial autonomy and judicial integrity and independence are strengthened through oversight mechanisms and improved protection for all institutions in the criminal justice chain, increasing transparency, effectiveness and credibility of the formal justice system.

The main indicators for measuring the aforementioned results are contained in the sector intervention framework attached in annex 3.

#### **3.3.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:**

Donor coordination and policy dialogue in the security sector, including civilian police, remains largely outside the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and is dominated by the military and political context of transition. The joint Oversight and Coordination Body (OCB) coordinates donor commitments against validated and budgeted force level requirements and provides general oversight of the funding provided for ANSF sustainment. It has the potential to strengthen Afghan ownership and the quality of the policy dialogue, involving MoI, MoD and MoF.

Donor coordination in the justice sector is facilitated through the Justice Board of Donors. This forum has been relatively effective in sharing information among donors and the main justice sector support programs, while the policy dialogue with the Afghan Justice Sector Institutions has been hampered by the low level of inter-institutional coordination.

#### **3.3.5. The Government's financial and policy commitments:**

Fiscal sustainability of the security sector is a major issue. The Afghan National Police is second in budget allocation only to the Afghan National Army with overall security spending surpassing projected total domestic revenue (one tenth of GDP), and the sector is dependent on financial inflows from Afghanistan's partners. The outlook for a more balanced burden-sharing is dependent on the capacity for increased revenue collection and an improvement in the security situation, which would allow to gradually reducing numbers of policemen and soldiers. In April 2013, the MoI presented a 10-year vision for the Afghan National Police, to be implemented by rolling two-year strategic plans.

The National Priority Program 'Law and Justice for All' is considered a credible sector reform strategy. The NPP includes a three-year budget of USD 299 million.

#### **3.3.6. Environmental assessment:**

Sound environmental management is strongly dependent on institutional and social factors, such as legislation, rule of law, good governance, conflicts and gender equity. In the medium and long-term, interventions in this sector are expected to impact positively on the environment.

When relevant, particular attention will be given to the linkages between poor natural resources management and conflicts as well as the role good environmental governance can play in the wider process of peacebuilding.

#### **3.3.7. The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention:**

This sector is subject to the highest risks among the proposed sectors. Commitment to the development of a civilian police force is, at best, uneven with a large part of the police force being engaged in different counter-insurgency functions. A further deterioration in the overall security will delay and undermine the transformation into a more civilian and fiscally sustainable police force. The justice sector is intrinsically weak and risks becoming the subject of political negotiations with insurgent groups. Increasing the numbers and responsibilities of female personnel in police and justice functions will require the international community's continued attention to achieve sustainable results.

### **3.4 DEMOCRATISATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY: APPR. 14% OF MIP**

#### **3.4.1 The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:**

**Overall Objective:** Enhance democratic governance and domestic accountability to improve service delivery to the Afghan citizens through legitimate and effective institutions and processes.

**Specific Objective 1 (SO1):** to promote resilient, effective and legitimate democratic institutions capable of credibly representing Afghan people and holding the executive accountable.

**Specific Objective 2 (SO2):** to support the development and rationalisation of clear, efficient and effective structures of sub-national governance, with appropriate responsibilities and a role in service delivery.

**Specific Objective 3 (SO3):** to strengthen formal and informal bodies responsible for increasing the accountability of the country's leaders and institutions to the Afghan people, including through the media sector and increased monitoring by civil society.

**Cross-cutting issues** to be mainstreamed in this sector are: human rights (in particular gender equality and women's empowerment), anti-corruption, and counter-narcotics.

#### **3.4.2-3.4.3. Main expected results:**

(SO1) R1: Legitimate democratic institutions on central and sub-national level established through a credible electoral system managed by independent electoral bodies with effective complaint mechanisms;

(SO1) R2: Overall governmental capacity, fiscal sustainability and service delivery improved by accountable, transparent and effective public administration with a merit-based civil service.

(SO2) R1: Effective structures of sub-national governance, with appropriate mandates and clearly defined roles in planning, implementation, oversight and budgetary process are in place;

(SO3) R1: Formal bodies responsible for increasing the accountability and oversight of the Government and institutions to the Afghan people are strengthened especially in the area of public finance management, anti-corruption and transparency;

(SO3) R2: Human rights and informal domestic accountability structures as provided through civil society and media are providing a non-governmental civilian control and oversight;

The main indicators for measuring the aforementioned results are contained in the sector intervention framework attached in annex 3.

#### **3.4.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:**

The key policy issues are being covered within the TMAF. More specific donor coordination and policy dialogue are either effectively organized around institutions (IEC, parliament) or programs (World Bank's CBR and NSP, UNDP's ELECT II). For the sub-national governance sector, the EU has taken a leading role, while for PFM and anti-corruption issues informal small donor groups or meetings prevail. Support to civil society could increasingly be coordinated with other donors – especially EU MS who have expressed an increasing interest in enhancing coordination in addition to the EU hosted Human Rights and Gender Working Group.

#### **3.4.5. The Government's financial and policy commitments :**

The overall objective, specific objective and expected results of the democracy and accountability sector are aligned with the Afghan governance-related NPPs and the TMAF, which defines a number of commitments by the Afghan government. The government's financial commitments in the sector are rather stretched, with donors increasingly asking for more ownership and financial contribution to ensure the sustainability of independent institutions such as the IEC, IECC, AIHRC and the HoO.

#### **3.4.6. Environmental assessment:**

No significant negative environmental impact is expected for activities under this sector.

#### **3.4.7. The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention:**

Progress in this sector will significantly depend on the political will of the government and parliament to make political and economic governance measures more transparent and accountable to the Afghan people. The implementation of effective sub-national governance structures and deconcentration of

budgetary functions may also meet with reluctance of line institutions or be limited by the ability of the center to oversee and control transparent spending. The low support of the general public and the political leadership for substantive advancement of human rights, specifically the rights of women, could further wane or become subject of negotiations in national reconciliation efforts. A protracted and intensified situation of fragility could also pose a danger in exacerbating underlying ethnic divisions within Afghanistan.

#### **4. Supporting and accompanying measures**

An indicative amount of EUR 7.0 million will be set aside for measures aimed at supporting the preparation and implementation of actions under the MIP including through feasibility studies, consultation and planning workshops, outreach, audits, evaluations and other activities, such as statistical capacity building, as necessary to ensure a high quality design and implementation of actions.

## COUNTRY PROFILE - AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is a landlocked and mountainous country, with a size slightly larger than France (652,100 sq km). The climate is arid to semiarid with hot summers and cold winters.

The Central Statistical Office estimates the population at around 26.5 million which 51.2% male and 48.8% female. The most striking feature of the Afghan population is its very young age structure. Some 48.4 percent (13 million) is under 15 years of age, whereas elderly of 65 and over represent only 2.5 percent of the total population. The proportion under 15 would figure the second highest in the world in the 2010 UN population estimates (UN Population Division 2011). The annual population growth is 2.63 %, with a fertility rate of 6.27 children per women. The increase of population is more than the absorption capacity of the education system and labour market. Three quarter of the population (74%) is settled in rural areas, 6% consists of semi-nomadic Kuchi and remaining 20% lives in towns. The main ethnic groups are Pashtun (42%), Tajik (27%), Hazara (9%) and Uzbek (9%) (ASY, 2011; NRVA 2011/12).

### Socio-economic indicators

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
GNI per capita current, PPP (Current USD)	1030	1220	1310	1400	1560

Total labour force:	8,000,000
<i>Agriculture and livestock</i>	59%
<i>Const., mining and quarrying</i>	8%
<i>Manufacturing</i>	5%
<i>Trade</i>	11%
<i>Trans. and comm..</i>	3%
<i>Education</i>	2%
<i>Other services</i>	9%
<i>Public administration</i>	4%
Unemployment rate	7%
Female unemployment rate	43%
Absolute poverty rate	32%
Average household size	7.3

### Health and education indicators

Life expectancy at birth:		
<i>Males</i>	61.35	
<i>Females</i>	58.84	
Infant mortality rate	77 deaths / 1,000 live births	
Under-5 mortality rate	97 deaths / 1,000 live births	
Maternal mortality	460 maternal deaths / 100,000 live births	
Adult literacy	39%	
<i>Males</i>	42%	
<i>Females</i>	18%	
School enrolment rate	97%	
<i>Males</i>	60%	
<i>Females</i>	42%	
	<b>Males</b>	<b>Females</b>
Population by educ. attainment	72%	93%
<i>No education</i>	10%	3%
<i>Primary school</i>	5%	1%
<i>High school</i>	9%	2%
<i>Teacher college</i>	1%	1%
<i>University / Post graduate</i>	3%	0%

## Macro-economic indicators

	2006/2007	2007/2008	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011	2011/2012
GDP (PPP) USD billions	17,555	20,209	21,340	25,224	31.12	33.79
GDP USD billions	7,723	9,658	12,061	14,022	19,910	20.5
GDP growth	8.2%	12.1%	3.4%	9.0%	7%	9.5
C/A (including grants) USD millions	-379	85	-181	-591	n/a	n/a
C/A (excluding grants) USD millions	-5,407	-6,425	-7,087	-7,083	n/a	n/a
Official Exports	416	482	603	658	720	414
Official Imports	6,049	7,246	8,273	8,093	6,390	8.932
Inflation rate	5.1%	13.0%	27.2%	5.2%	10.2%	8.4%
GDP composition by sector						
Agriculture	20%					
Industry	25.6%					
Services	54.4%					
Main export partners						
India	21.1%					
Pakistan	20.1%					
US	18.8%					
The Netherlands	7.9%					
Tajikistan	6.7%					
Main import partners						
Pakistan	35.8%					
US	9.2%					
Germany	7.5%					
India	4.8%					
Currency	Afghani (AFN)					
Exchange rate regime	Pegged to USD Average rate since 2002 is 48.55 AFN to 1 USD					
Exchange rate EUR/AFG	72.75					

## Public-sector performance indicators

	2006/2007	2007/2008	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011	2011/2012
Public expenditure (% GDP)	11.3%	10.5%	12.2%	12.1%	13%	12%
Gvt gen. income (%GDP)	5.7%	5.2%	5.0%	5.7%	11.4%	10.3%
Externally financed recurrent budget (%GDP)	44.2%	45.6%	36.2%	39.7%	52%	

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Annex 2: Donor Matrix showing indicative allocations per sector

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ODA Breakdown by ANDS Sector (2002-2011)																					
in US\$ Million																					
S#	Development Partner	Infrastructure		Governance		Education		Health		Agri/Rural Dev.		Social Protect.		Private sector		Security		Unclassified		Total Commit	Total Disburs
		Comit.	Disb.	Comit.	Disb.	Comit.	Disb.	Comit.	Disb.	Comit.	Disb.	Comit.	Disb.	Comit.	Disb.	Comit.	Disb.	Comit.	Disb.		
1	ADB	1,916	666	353	339	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,269.08	1,005.14
2	AKDN	25	25	-	-	16	16	20	20	33	33	17	17	30	30	-	-	-	-	140.30	140.30
3	Australia	4	4	162	93	24	20	10	10	15	14	416	411	1	1	18	18	92	84	743.49	656.04
4	Austria	-	-	1	1	-	-	0	0	2	2	2	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	6.40	6.40
5	Belgium	1	-	15	12	1	1	6	6	13	8	21	20	-	-	5	4	1	6	63.35	58.04
6	Brunei	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.64	0.44
7	Canada	5	5	136	136	92	92	96	96	185	185	162	162	217	217	117	117	246	246	1,255.57	1,255.57
8	China	-	-	23	2	-	-	6	1	39	14	-	-	-	-	21	2	42	40	130.25	58.53
9	Czech Republic	4	4	1	1	4	4	1	1	2	2	8	8	-	-	5	5	78	78	102.14	102.14
10	Denmark	-	-	61	61	92	74	10	10	70	20	20	20	9	5	15	13	161	185	437.71	437.71
11	EC/EU*	149	141	518	493	13	12	201	169	513	417	826	721	66	55	486	482	111	104	2,882.46	2,594.42
12	Estonia	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	1.04	0.73
13	Finland	-	-	49	49	-	-	8	8	5	5	31	31	-	-	18	18	49	49	160.35	160.35
14	France	17	11	36	29	55	42	50	34	94	44	41	13	10	1	20	16	-	-	322.87	174.49
15	Germany	494	224	378	38	224	55	45	21	205	85	40	16	426	63	318	247	-	14	2,129.63	761.59
16	Greece	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1.55	0.50
17	Hungary	-	-	1	0	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	-	-	1	1	-	-	5.66	4.51
18	IDB	66	12	0	0	5	5	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71.75	16.57
19	India	734	503	4	4	173	91	39	29	7	3	551	124	3	3	-	-	4	3	1,515.99	759.01
20	Iran	202	180	10	10	33	33	6	6	11	10	16	16	3	3	8	8	111	111	399.36	376.86
21	Ireland	-	-	18	16	0	0	0	0	1	1	6	5	-	-	2	2	-	-	27.57	24.64
22	Italy	146	86	225	223	7	7	29	14	63	43	132	133	9	9	29	21	5	3	645.11	539.59
23	Japan	371	371	303	303	134	134	225	225	202	202	559	559	-	-	954	954	404	404	3,151.64	3,151.64
24	Kuwait	0	0	15	15	-	-	4	4	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.19	19.19
25	Lithuania	0	0	1	1	1	1	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.40	5.40
26	Luxembourg	-	-	9	8	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	0	0	-	-	12.57	11.08
27	Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	76	50	6.00	5.00
28	Netherlands	37	37	420	420	30	30	9	9	72	72	204	204	13	13	205	205	26	26	1,014.90	1,014.90
29	New Zealand	7	7	6	6	5	5	2	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	3	3	7	7	33.55	33.55
30	Norway	34	-	96	18	51	1	36	13	119	59	86	22	2	18	1	334	521	775.60	635.53	
31	Pakistan	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.00	0.00
32	Poland	12	11	1	0	4	4	1	0	1	0	2	2	0	-	-	-	2	2	21.87	19.04
33	Portugal	1	0	1	1	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.80	1.20
34	Russia	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	40	37	-	-	109	109	-	-	151.00	146.60
35	Saudi Arabia	30	-	45	45	17	0	2	2	-	-	51	51	-	-	0	0	-	-	145.09	98.08
36	Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.50	1.50
37	South Korea	4	4	14	11	18	17	54	29	5	5	2	-	-	-	5	5	14	14	116.00	84.75
38	Spain	36	36	26	26	8	8	11	11	54	54	9	9	-	-	1	1	76	50	220.00	194.12
39	Sweden	27	27	256	256	137	137	34	34	2	2	149	149	9	9	21	21	-	-	635.00	635.00
40	Switzerland	1	1	27	23	15	11	12	12	33	24	25	25	-	-	4	4	3	2	118.16	102.42
41	Turkey	39	30	1	1	54	43	54	52	2	2	4	4	1	1	53	43	5	5	212.86	180.69
42	UAE	7	5	2	2	3	3	6	-	0	0	1	1	104	104	10	10	-	-	133.93	126.13
43	UK	479	479	476	476	186	186	183	183	275	275	228	228	35	35	358	358	-	-	2,220.71	2,220.71
44	United Nations	37	9	36	23	106	51	171	58	29	6	43	15	3	0	16	16	4	1	445.56	178.79
45	USA	3,615	2,558	2,345	1,172	734	522	675	538	4,452	3,377	418	390	820	512	28,850	26,050	2,447	2,000	44,356.50	37,118.20
46	WB	742	584	382	355	160	114	207	151	489	423	8	2	149	71	-	-	-	-	2,137.05	1,699.64
<b>Total</b>		<b>9,241</b>	<b>6,020</b>	<b>6,452</b>	<b>4,669</b>	<b>2,415</b>	<b>1,724</b>	<b>2,220</b>	<b>1,750</b>	<b>6,998</b>	<b>5,442</b>	<b>4,122</b>	<b>3,399</b>	<b>1,911</b>	<b>1,133</b>	<b>31,671</b>	<b>28,735</b>	<b>4,297</b>	<b>4,005</b>	<b>69,256.15</b>	<b>56,816.72</b>

1) \* Social protection includes humanitarian assistance.  
2) Reason for discrepancy between total commitment and disbursement by year, and total commitment and disbursement by sector:



**Sector 1: Agriculture and Rural Development**

<b>Specific objective 1:</b>			
<b>Expected Results:</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Means of Verification:</b>	<b>Baseline</b>
R1: Progress is made towards a sector wide approach in ARD, in alignment with the national policies, aiming at continued provision of services in rural areas	1. Approval status of government-led ARD Policy and common expenditure programme	ARD-NPPs implementation reports	in 2013 no common expenditure approved
R2: Institutional and organizational capacity of the sector relevant public and private institutions at national and sub national level is strengthened	1. Execution rate of operational and development budgets of ARD Ministries	Statistics Ministry of Finance	MAIL and MCN 53%; MRRD 59% (2012) Source: Statistics MoF
<b>Specific objective 2:</b>			
<b>Expected Results:</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Means of Verification:</b>	<b>Baseline</b>
R3: Following a tailored Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), water and land resources are better managed and sustainably protected; precipitation run-off reduced, while irrigated and rain-fed cultivated land is extended and improved in the Panj-Amu River Basin and later on country-wide	1. % of sustainably managed farming, range and forestry land towards total national area 1(a). % of irrigated and rain fed farming towards sustainably managed farming	MAIL/FAO land cover mapping and MEW River Basin Atlas	total agricultural/ range/ forest land: 395,186 km <sup>2</sup> (2012) <sup>1</sup>  Source:MAIL/FAO land cover mapping and MEW River Basin Atlas.
R4: The traditional subsistence production system is gradually transformed into a dynamic, modern, environmental friendly market-driven agricultural sector through the creation of an enabling environment conducive of private sector investments and relying on strong public/private sectors partnership	1. % change of agricultural production nation-wide measured in USD	CSO	5.043 billion USD – excluding opium production – 2012 Source: CSO

<sup>1</sup> Calculated as sum of irrigated land: 35.616 km<sup>2</sup>, rain-fed land: 37657 km<sup>2</sup>, orchards: 1.279 km<sup>2</sup>, vineyards: 932 km<sup>2</sup>, forest and shrubs: 16.937 km<sup>2</sup>, rangeland: 302.765 km<sup>2</sup>.

<b>Specific objective 3:</b>			
<b>Expected Results:</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Means of Verification:</b>	<b>Baseline</b>
R5: : Food and nutrition security and household resilience to shocks and stresses are increased in rural areas	1. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption  2. acute malnutrition rates	- NRVA	1. 30% of the Afghan population are very severely to moderately food insecure - 2011/12. Source: NRVA 2. 17.8% acute malnutrition rate- 2010. Source MICS
R6: Contribution of licit agriculture and other rural activities to the household and national economy increased	1. % contribution of licit agriculture to GDP	- CSO	24,6% of GDP – 2012, Source: WB

**Sector 2: Health**

<b>Specific objective:</b>			
<b>Expected Results:</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Means of Verification:</b>	<b>Baseline</b>
R1: Health and nutritional status of the population improved	1. Maternal mortality ratio - MDG 5.1 2. Under-five mortality rate -MDG 4.1	- MICS and MoPH Household surveys	1. 327 / 100.000 live births (2011) 2. 102 / 1.000 live births (2011) Source: MICS and MoPH Households surveys
R2: Inequality in access to quality health services through BPHS and EPHS is reduced	1. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel 2. Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised with DPT3 (Third dose of diphtheria toxoid, tetanus toxoid and pertussis) vaccine		1. 39% (2010) 2. 35%. Source: MICS and MOPH household surveys)
R3: Health system strengthened in key areas	1. Government health expenditure as percentage of Total Government Expenditure 2. Private out of pocket health expenditure	- National Health Account, MoF - MICS - MoPH Household surveys	1. 4% (2008/9). Source: National Health Account, MoF) 2. 75% (2008/9). Source: MICS and MOPH household survey

(\* ) Baselines will be included in the Action documents at the latest.

R4: Health human resources management and development are strengthened	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. % of Health workers that are male/ female</li> <li>2. Regional distribution (Rural / Urban (i.e. Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar, Herat, Kandahar and Kunduz)) of health workers.</li> </ol>	- HMIS reports	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Male 75% vs Female 25% (2009).</li> <li>2. Doctors 73% / 27%; Nurses 61% / 39 %; Midwives 60% / 40% (2009). Source: HMIS reports</li> </ol>
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**Sector 3: Policing and Rule of Law**

**Specific objective 1:**

<b>Expected Results:</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Means of Verification:</b>	<b>Baseline</b>
R1: Capacity of the ANP to sustain and maintain security throughout Afghanistan in the decade of transformation reinforced	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of deaths in armed conflict: civilian casualties</li> </ol>	- UNAMA	8,615 civilian casualties (2,959 civilian deaths and 5,656 injured) - 2013; Source: UNAMA
R2: Performance and capacity of the Afghan National Police as a civilian police force under civilian control improved in line with the 10-year vision of the Ministry of Interior	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of procedures initiated for harassment of female police officer per year</li> <li>2. % of security sector costs as of total budget</li> </ol>	- MoI HR statistics / database  - National Budget, MoF (including salary data)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 23 - 2013 Source: MoI statistics (gender, Human Rights and Child Rights)</li> <li>2. 42.3% -Y1393/2013-2014) – Source: National Budget</li> </ol>

**Specific objective 2:**

<b>Expected Results:</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Means of Verification:</b>	<b>Baseline (*)</b>
R1: Reach of the formal judicial system extended throughout Afghanistan with quality of legal services improved through, inter alia, better coordination between the justice institutions and the police for more effective case management	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of VAW cases recorded with AGO, police and civil society per annum</li> </ol>	- ERAW Law implementation reports	4505 (registered by AGO, MoI, MoWA, 2013). Source: ERAW Law Implementation Report
R2: Prosecutorial autonomy and judicial integrity and independence are strengthened through oversight mechanisms and improved protection for all institutions in the criminal justice chain, increasing transparency, effectiveness and credibility of the formal justice system	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of investigations of alleged misconduct by a prosecutor or a judge;</li> <li>1.a Number and Percentage of cases processed compared to total number of cases per year.</li> </ol>	- HOOAC, MEC - AGO	TBD 2014

(\*) Baselines will be included in the Action documents at the latest.

**Sector 4: Democratisation and Accountability**

**Specific objective 1:**

<b>Expected Results:</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Means of Verification:</b>	<b>Baseline (*)</b>
R1: Legitimate democratic institutions on central and sub-national level established through a credible electoral system managed by independent electoral bodies with effective complaint mechanisms	1. Voter turnout at elections	- IEC reports	1. 38.8% (2009 Presidential elections), 45,8% (2010 Parliamentary elections) Source: IEC
R2: Overall governmental capacity, fiscal sustainability and service delivery improved by accountable, transparent and effective public administration with a merit-based civil service	1. Line ministries' development budget execution rates	- MoF reports	TBD (Y1392/2013)

**Specific objective 2:**

<b>Expected Results:</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Means of Verification:</b>	<b>Baseline</b>
R1: Effective structures of sub-national governance, with appropriate mandates and clearly defined roles in planning, implementation, oversight and the budgetary process are in place. Successful service delivery on local level allows for ownership over development, increasing the legitimacy of the state also in rural areas	1. Extend to which decision making process on the national budget includes input from the provincial level 2. Proportion of budget directly allocated to each province	- National Budget - Budget circular, MoF	1. 2014 provincial planning still not linked with the planning and budgeting at central level 2. USD 1-3 million allocated to each province, National Budget 1393/2013-2014, Source: National Budget

**Specific objective 3:**

<b>Expected Results:</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Means of Verification:</b>	<b>Baseline</b>
R1: Formal bodies responsible for increasing the accountability and oversight of the Government and institutions to the Afghan people are strengthened especially in the area of public finance management, anti-corruption and transparency	1. Implementation status of IMF program/ Extended Credit Facility	- IMF Programme reports - Joint TMAF Assessments and monitoring reports	Disbursement by IMF (last in June 2012). Source: IMF)

(\*) Baselines will be included in the Action documents at the latest.

<p>R2: Human rights and informal domestic accountability structures as conveyed through civil society and media provide a non-governmental civilian control and oversight</p>	<p>1. International rating for Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)</p>	<p>- AIHRC Reports - International Coordinating Committee of the National Human Rights Institutions (ICC)</p>	<p>'A' score (2013). Source: ICC</p>
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The results, indicators and means of verification specified in the present annex may need to evolve to take into account changes intervening during the programming period.

**MEUR**

Sectors:	Indicative Allocation	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
<b>1) Agriculture &amp; Rural Development</b>	337	102.5		80		70		84.5	<b>337</b>
<b>2) Health</b>	274	37	43		100		94		<b>274.0</b>
<b>3) Policing and Rule of Law</b>	319		91	30		60	60	78	<b>319.0</b>
<b>4) Democratisation &amp; Accountability</b>	163	40		20	30		45	28	<b>163.0</b>
<b>5) Incentive based</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>300.0</b>
<b>Support measures</b>	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
<b>Total Commitments</b>	<b>1400</b>	<b>203.5</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>191.5</b>	<b>1400</b>