THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

HANDBOOK

CSDP

Volume I
3rd edition

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HANDBOOK ON CSDP
THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Third edition

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### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<p>| A | CMC | Crisis Management Concept |
| AF | Armed Forces | CMPD | Crisis Management and Planning Directorate |
| AFET | Committee on Foreign Affairs (EP) | CoE | Council of Europe |
| AKU | Autonomous Knowledge Unit | COM | Commander |
| AMIS | African Union Mission in Sudan | CONOPS | Concept of Operations |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia | COPPS | Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL) |
| APF | African Peace Facility | COREPER | Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States |
| ARF | ASEAN Regional Forum | COSI | Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security |
| ARGUS | Secure Rapid General Alert System | CPCC | Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations | CPFB | Conflict Prevention and Peace Building |
| ASEM | Asia-Europe Meeting | CRM | Crisis Response Mechanism (EEAS) |
| AU | African Union | CS | Cyber Security |
| BENELUX | Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg | CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy |
| BG | Battle Group | CT | Counter-terrorism |
| BIS | Budgetary Impact Statement | CT/P-CVE | Counter-terrorism/Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism |
| C | CVE | Countering Violent Extremism |
| CA | Comprehensive Approach | CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy |
| CAR | Central African Republic | CT | Counter-terrorism |
| CBM | Confidence-Building Measure | CT/P-CVE | Counter-terrorism/Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism |
| CBSD | Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development | CRM | Crisis Response Mechanism (EEAS) |
| CCDP | Civilian Capability Development Plan | CS | Cyber Security |
| CD | Creative Destruction | CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy |
| CD | Cyber Defence | CT | Counter-terrorism |
| CDP | Capability Development Plan | CT/P-CVE | Counter-terrorism/Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism |
| CDPF | Cyber Defence Policy Framework | CVE | Countering Violent Extremism |
| CEDC | Central European Defence Cooperation | DCI | Development Cooperation Instrument |
| CERT | Computer Emergency Response Team | DDoS | Distributed Denial-of-Service (cyber attack) |
| CHG | Civilian Headline Goal | DDR | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration |
| C-IED | Counter Improvised Explosive Device | DG DEVCO | Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development |
| CIP | Critical Infrastructure Protection | DG NEAR | Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations |
| CivCom | Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management | DIF | Defence Industry Factories |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-I</td>
<td>Doctrine, organisational, training/exercise, material, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSG</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAB</td>
<td>Executive Academic Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>EATs</td>
<td>Embedded Advisory Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBCG</td>
<td>European Border and Coast Guard Agency (former FRONTEX)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>ECOMIB</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECTS</td>
<td>European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>European Defence Action Plan</td>
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<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>European Defence Technological and Industrial Base</td>
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<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>eLearning, Cyber Security and Internet Performance</td>
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<td>EU Police Mission</td>
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<td>EUR</td>
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<td>EUROPOL</td>
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<td>Fragile and Conflict-Affected States</td>
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<td>Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (see EBCG)</td>
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<td>Freedom, Security and Justice</td>
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<td>IoT</td>
<td>Internet of Things</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
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<td>LoA</td>
<td>Level of Ambition</td>
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<td>LU</td>
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<td>Mine Action</td>
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<td>Major General</td>
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<td>MD</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur</td>
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<td>African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>Initiating Military Directive</td>
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<td>Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising</td>
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<td>PARSEC</td>
<td>Programme of support for</td>
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<td>Mopti-Gao</td>
<td>enhanced security in the Mopti and Gao regions and for the management of border areas</td>
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<td>PDT</td>
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<td>PESCO</td>
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<td>PFCA</td>
<td>Political Framework for Crisis Approach</td>
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<td>PIP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace (NATO)</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>PMG</td>
<td>Politico-Military Group</td>
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<td>pMS</td>
<td>Participating Member States</td>
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<tr>
<td>PolAd</td>
<td>Political Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRISM</td>
<td>Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/security sector reform, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<td>RELEX</td>
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<td>REV</td>
<td>Revision</td>
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<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPAS</td>
<td>Remotely Piloted Aircraft System</td>
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<td>RTDI</td>
<td>Research, Technology Development and Innovation</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>Situational Awareness</td>
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<td>SIAC</td>
<td>Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity</td>
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<td>SMEs</td>
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<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>SST</td>
<td>Space Surveillance and Tracking</td>
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<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Strategic Communication</td>
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<td>TCN</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Nation</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>TWP</td>
<td>Working Party on Terrorism</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNSC(R)</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council (Resolution)</td>
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<td>US(A)</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<td>V4</td>
<td>Visegrad Group</td>
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<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice-President (of the European Commission)</td>
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<td>VUCA</td>
<td>Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity</td>
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<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yearbook of European Security (EUISS)</td>
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The need for a strong European Union has never been perceived so acutely as it is today. None of our Member States – alone – has the resources to stabilise fragile countries around our borders, prevent the next refugee crisis, or create a safe environment for our economies to thrive. But as a Union of almost half a billion citizens, we are the first economic and trade power in the world, the largest investor in development cooperation and humanitarian aid, and a global security provider.

More and more, our partners around the world see us as an ‘indispensable power’ to build a more cooperative world order. The citizens and the governments of Europe, on their side, increasingly realise that European security, too, can only be guaranteed through a collective effort.

It is in this context that I presented a Global Strategy for our foreign and security policy, and a package of concrete measures to move towards a true Union of security and defence – a package that has now been endorsed by the European Council. We are finally building the conditions to make full use of the tools at our disposal. The Global Strategy and its implementation process aims precisely at that goal.

Of course, we do not start from scratch. Our missions and operations around the world are a well-established reality. I could not imagine our external action without Operation Sophia, fighting against human traffickers and saving lives in the Mediterranean; or without Operation Atalanta, which has successfully contained piracy off the Horn of Africa; or the EUCAP Sahel missions, supporting local security forces in one of the most strategically important regions in our wider neighbourhood.

To preserve these successes and expand our Common Security and Defence Policy, we must provide our personnel with the best training and education. The European Security and Defence College, supported by Member States’ commitments, provides first-class training to the EU civilian and military staff, by addressing real-time training needs and requirements. This handbook gives an excellent overview of our CSDP. Recognised experts from Europe provided their expertise to contribute to this new edition, which was again published by the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports.

Only if we understand our strength – what we do best and what we could do better – will we be able to reform our Union. In a moment when the very essence of the European project is being questioned, we need to demonstrate that our Union can truly deliver on our citizens’ needs. Heading towards a real European Union of security and defence has never been so important.

Federica Mogherini
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
The Common Security and Defence Policy is the ‘business card’ of the European Union in crisis and conflict areas. When this policy field became operational in 2003, its main goal was to strengthen the crisis management toolbox using military and civilian means. Fourteen years later, CSDP plays a leading role within the comprehensive approach of the European Union, complementing other tools such as development cooperation, financial support and diplomatic and conflict prevention measures.

With over 30 missions and operations around the world, the European Union has proven to be a global and reliable actor. The Union and its Member States did not reinvent the wheel, but rather implemented good practices, learned lessons and followed a value-based crisis management approach. Most of the missions and operations can be seen as part of the broader picture of security sector reform, which bring only a few ‘quick wins’. However, the focus is on long-term objectives.

Security is a field that is constantly developing: challenges emerge, new tasks are allotted, priorities shift. Taking this assessment as a starting point, the strategic guidance offered by the recent EU Global Strategy, which aims to be a ‘Global Strategy to promote our citizens’ interests’, is of utmost importance. According to the latest Eurobarometer survey, citizens are mainly interested in two topics at the European level: tackling the migration challenge and countering the threat of terrorism. In order to maintain our credibility within the EU territory as well as outside of it, the EU must find ways to convince citizens of the added value of working together at the European level, of pooling our resources and of standing together when our way of life is threatened. The challenges faced by European countries today cannot be solved on a national, stand-alone basis. The European Union is tasked with presenting solutions. In the current implementation phase of the Global Strategy, we have to ‘think global, and act European’.

The European Union, its Member States and its citizens must regain their common vision. This common vision can be found by reinforcing our common European security culture, allowing us to benefit from the joint situational awareness that will lead to common action and a unified Europe in a better world.

The European Security and Defence College (ESDC) has a leading role in establishing such a security culture. With more than 12,000 alumni, the ESDC has demonstrated its tremendous value to the European project in the past. Training and education is the foundation of a successful Common Security and Defence Policy, hence the basis for a reliable European ‘business card’.

I am happy that Austria is the main supporter of the ESDC. This handbook series is an exemplary means of transferring knowledge, sharing best practices and stimulating discussions on CSDP-related subjects. I wish the readers of this publication all the best in their professional work, good luck in future deployments in CSDP missions and a pleasant experience reading the articles by various European experts on security issues.

Hans Peter Doskozil
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports
of the Republic of Austria
Today, more than ever before in its history, the European Union is faced with unprecedented security threats that challenge the very essence of European civilisation and our open democratic societies. It is therefore high time for decisions that respond to these challenges efficiently and comprehensively, coming up to the expectations of our citizens.

In this context, the EU Global Strategy sets out a new level of ambition for a stronger and safer Europe. Furthermore, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, as well as the European Defence Action Plan, constitute decisive steps towards an enhanced European defence and security architecture.

Located in a geostrategic region of great instability, Cyprus is firmly committed to promoting the collective security of Europe in these demanding times that call for common action.

This new level of ambition for CSDP necessitates the promotion of a common security and defence culture based upon our shared values, ideals and security interests. Investing in systematic education and training is a prerequisite for achieving this goal. In this regard, the role of the European Security and Defence College is crucial.

Cyprus actively supports the prominent work and the educational initiatives of the ESDC, including the publication of the present Handbook.

I am convinced that it will be an invaluable tool for decision-makers and all those who want to deepen their understanding and knowledge of the Common Security and Defence Policy, and will thus contribute to advancing the wider goal of a common defence culture.

Christoforos Fokaides,
Minister of Defence
of the Republic of Cyprus
In 2017, seven years after the first edition of the ‘Handbook on CSDP’, it is time for a completely revised version of the most popular ESDC publication in the handbook series.

Federica Mogherini is the third High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the second woman to hold this position. She has brought new momentum to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which has been driven by numerous challenges both inside and outside the European Union. Migration, terrorism and cyber security can be included within the most demanding issues that require ‘united action’ and a ‘stronger Europe’.

Only six months after its publication, the EU Global Strategy is already the reference document for all foreign and security-related work within the EU institutions and the EU Member States. Security and defence form the cornerstones for new developments which should help address the challenges ahead. Strategies and action plans have been drafted which will help ensure that that there is an even more effective and efficient Common Security and Defence Policy for the future.

However, changes were not only evident on the European stage. The editorship of this handbook is also new. In the past, I co-edited this handbook with Mr. Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, who retired in spring 2015 after several years of successful service for the European Union as the first Head of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).

Fortunately, the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports as well as the new Head of the ESDC, Mr. Dirk Dubois, remained committed to the publication of this handbook. With Cyprus, the handbook series welcomed a new partner on board.

In this preface, I would like to repeat what I have already stated in previous editions of the handbook, namely that such a publication can only be possible with the help of a team of able and willing experts, who are prepared to share their experience and expertise. Saying ‘Thank You’ is only a small sign of appreciation for their tremendous contribution, not only in the transfer of knowledge but also in facilitating the establishment of a Common European Security Culture.

I would, in particular, like to thank:
* LtGen Günter Höfler, Head of the Austrian Military Representation in Brussels and his team;
* MajGen Johann Frank, Defence Policy Director of the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports and his Directorate for Security Policy;
* Mr Oliver Rentschler, Deputy Head of the Cabinet of Ms Federica Mogherini;
Lastly, I am more than grateful for the support of my family, my wife Bernadeta and my children Julia and Maximilian. I would like to thank them for their patience and understanding, in particular during the Christmas season.

I hope that the third edition of the ‘Handbook on CSDP’ will meet your expectations and will again serve as a reference document for the present and future experts on the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Jochen Rehrl

The Handbook on CSDP: Missions and Operations targets the personnel deployed in the field. It describes the structures and procedures with a focus on the implementation of the mission mandate. It summarises the principles and guidelines of CSDP engagements.


The Handbook for Decision Makers targets the strategic and operational leadership level for CSDP engagements abroad. It provides an overview of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The handbook provides some skills for decision makers, such as negotiation techniques, mediation and conflict analysis.


The latest handbook on Migration – How CSDP can support was published in the aftermath of a high-level conference on 13 September 2016 in Brussels. It includes articles from recognised European academics and practitioners as well as a compendium of various factsheets on migration from the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European External Action Service.

COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
1.1. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CSDP

by Gustav Lindstrom

The origins of Europe’s security and defence architecture can be traced back to the years following World War II. Beginning in the late 1940s, several initiatives facilitated increased cooperation across Europe. Examples include the signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948) – sowing the seeds for a Western European Union – and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, placing strategic resources under a supranational authority.

In the late 1960s, the European Community (EC) began to explore ways to harmonise members’ foreign policies. At The Hague Summit, held in December 1969, European leaders instructed their foreign ministers to examine the feasibility of closer integration in the political domain.

In response, the concept of European Political Cooperation (EPC) was presented in the October 1970 Davignon Report. The report defined EPC’s objectives, including the harmonisation of positions, consultation and, when appropriate, common actions. It also listed specific processes, such as six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, as well quarterly meetings for the Political Directors forming the Political Committee. Overall, EPC aimed to facilitate the consultation process among EC Member States.

EPC served as the foundation for the Common Foreign and Security Policy introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. With its entry into force on 1 November 1993, it created a single institutional framework, the European Union, based on three...
pillars – the second of which was the Common Foreign and Security Policy. CFSP went beyond EPC. For example, it broke new ground through its Article J(4), which states that CFSP includes ‘all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’.

While the European Union identified ambitious objectives in the area of external security and defence via the Maastricht Treaty, it would not be until the late 1990s, in the aftermath of the wars of secession in the Balkans – and a policy change in the United Kingdom – that concrete provisions were introduced for an independent ‘Common European Security and Defence Policy’ endowed with tangible crisis management capabilities. The UK’s evolving position was presented during the informal European Council held in Pörtschach (24-25 October 1998) under the auspices of the Austrian EU Presidency. A week later, the defence ministers of the European Union convened an informal meeting in Vienna, reinforcing the call for a more proactive Europe. These events paved the way for the bilateral meeting between France and the UK held in Saint-Malo, considered by many as the catalyst for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Following the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998, numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks, consisting of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Examples include the Cologne European Council Meeting (1999), the Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999), which introduced the Headline Goal 2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting (2000) which identified four civilian priority areas.

In 2003, ESDP became operational through the first ESDP missions and operations. Since 2003, the EU has initiated over thirty crisis-management missions and operations. In addition, the EU presented its first ever European Security Strategy in December 2003, outlining key threats and challenges facing Europe. The strategy remained in place until the presentation of a follow-on EU Global Strategy in the summer of 2016.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, ESDP was renamed Com-
The Lisbon Treaty also established the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, merging the two positions of High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations – symbolising the disappearance of the EU pillar structure.

The Lisbon Treaty formally endorsed the extension of the 'Petersberg tasks', which now include ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation’ (Article 43(1) TEU). In addition, these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by ‘supporting third states in combating terrorism in their territories’.

The extended Petersberg tasks and related matters are currently enshrined in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Among them is the aim of political and military solidarity among EU Member States through the inclusion of a mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) and a solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU).

With the implementation of the EU Global Strategy of 2016, new momentum was given to the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Security and defence has become one of the priority areas for work on the implementation of the EU global strategy, which also includes resilience-building and an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, strengthening the nexus between internal and external policies, updating existing or preparing new regional and thematic strategies, and stepping up public diplomacy efforts.

Work on security and defence is carried out synergistically through implementation of the Commission European Defence Action Plan and implementation of the joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of NATO of July 2016.
### BASIC TIME-LINE OF ESDP/CSDP EVENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>End of World War II</td>
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<td>1946</td>
<td>Churchill’s speech at the University of Zurich calling for a United States of Europe</td>
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<td>1947</td>
<td>Launching of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan)</td>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>Signing of the Brussels Treaty</td>
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<td>1949</td>
<td>Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>Unveiling of the Schuman Plan Outbreak of the Korean War</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>Establishment of the Warsaw Pact</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>Suez Canal Crisis</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaties of Rome</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>Construction of the Berlin Wall</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>The Davignon Report introduces the idea of European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Adoption of the Helsinki Final Act</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>Stuttgart Declaration (‘Solemn Declaration’)</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>Signing of the Single European Act</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>Fall of the Berlin Wall</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Official creation of the EUROCORPS</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Reinforcement of ESDI within NATO at the Berlin Summit</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999)</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>European Council held in Pörtschach, Austria Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence (Saint-Malo)</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings lay the foundations for ESDP</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Santa Maria da Feira European Council</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>First CSDP missions and operations Adoption of the European Security Strategy Adoption of the Berlin Plus Arrangements</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Headline Goal 2010 / Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (updated in 2007 to CHG 2010); Establishment of the EDA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union. New institutions, scope of activities, and decision-making in CFSP/CSDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Presentation of the EU Global Strategy</td>
</tr>
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</table>
1.2. THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

compiled from the EEAS website

We need a stronger Europe.
This is what our citizens deserve,
this is what the wider world expects.

We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption. Yet these are also times of extraordinary opportunity. Global growth, mobility, and technological progress – alongside our deepening partnerships – enable us to thrive, and allow ever more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives. We will navigate this difficult, more connected, contested and complex world guided by our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world.

OUR SHARED INTERESTS AND PRINCIPLES

The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders.

The EU will advance the prosperity of its people. Prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, including in Europe. A prosperous Union also hinges on an open and fair international economic system and sustainable access to the global commons. The EU will foster the resilience of its democracies. Consistently living up to our values will determine our external credibility and influence.
The EU will promote a rules-based global order. We have an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.

We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.

In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world.

In a more connected world, the EU will engage with others. The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. To promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies, we will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider world.

In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. We will engage responsibly across Europe and the surrounding regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights.

The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility goes hand in hand with revamping our external partnerships. In the pursuit of our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings. We will deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key players in a networked world.

**THE PRIORITIES OF OUR EXTERNAL ACTION**

To promote our shared interests, adhering to clear principles, the EU will pursue five priorities.

**The Security of our Union**

The EU Global Strategy starts at home. Our Union has enabled citizens to enjoy unprecedented security, democracy and prosperity. Yet today terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity endanger our people and territory.

An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders.

We will therefore enhance our efforts on defence, cyber, counterterrorism, energy and strategic communications.

Member States must translate their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties into action. The EU will step up its contribution to Europe’s collective security, working closely with its partners, beginning with NATO.
State and Societal Resilience to our East and South

It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa.

Under the current EU enlargement policy, a credible accession process grounded in strict and fair conditionality is vital to enhance the resilience of countries in the Western Balkans and of Turkey.

Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), many people wish to build closer relations with the Union: our enduring power of attraction can spur transformation in these countries.

But resilience is also a priority in other countries within and beyond the ENP. The EU will support different paths to resilience, targeting the most acute cases of governmental, economic, societal and climate/energy fragility, as well as develop more effective migration policies for Europe and its partners.

An Integrated Approach to Conflicts

When violent conflicts erupt, our shared vital interests are threatened. The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, and foster human security through an integrated approach. Implementing the ‘comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises’ through a coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal is essential. But the meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’ will be expanded. The EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts. The EU will act at different levels of governance: conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya have local, national, regional and global dimensions which must be addressed. Finally, none of these conflicts can be solved by us alone. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships, which the EU will foster and support.

Cooperative Regional Orders

In a world caught between global pressures and local pushback, regional dynamics come to the fore.

Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs. This is a fundamental rationale for the EU’s own peace and development in the 21st century, and this is why we will support cooperative regional orders worldwide. In different regions – in Europe; in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa; across the Atlantic, both north and south; in Asia; and in the Arctic – the EU will be driven by specific goals.
Global Governance for the 21st Century

The EU is committed to a global order based on international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons. This commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than to simply preserve the existing system. The EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors.

A Responsive Union

Our diplomatic action must be fully grounded in the Lisbon Treaty. The Common Security and Defence Policy must become more responsive. Enhanced cooperation between Member States should be explored, and might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty’s potential. Development policy also needs to become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities.

A Joined-Up Union

We must become more joined up across our external policies, between Member States and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of our policies. This is particularly relevant to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, migration, and security, notably counter-terrorism. We must also systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions.

THE EUROPEAN UNION WILL BE GUIDED BY CLEAR PRINCIPLES

In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world.

In a more connected world, the EU will engage with others. The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. To promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies, we will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider world.

In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. We will engage responsibly across Europe and the surrounding
regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY

To implement the EU Global Strategy, decisive steps have been taken on security and defence. The package consists of three major pillars: new political goals and ambitions for Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security and defence; new financial tools to help Member States and the European defence industry to develop defence capabilities ('European Defence Action Plan') and a set of concrete actions as follow up to the EU-NATO Joint Declaration which identified areas of cooperation. Together the three elements constitute a comprehensive package to boost security of the Union and its citizens.

Terrorism, trafficking and smuggling, hybrid threats by state and non-state actors and other threats and challenges are directly affecting our internal security and often feed off the crises and instability in the regions surrounding Europe. ‘For most Europeans security is a top priority today’ says High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini. The EU has taken action to respond. It will become a stronger actor on the international scene to promote peace and security in its neighbourhood and beyond. HR/VP Mogherini has set out how to achieve this in a strategy (‘A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’) adopted in June 2016. The three interlinked decisions on security and defence are turning this vision into concrete actions.

Ministers on 14 November 2016 agreed on a new level of ambition in security and defence. It focuses on three priorities: enabling the European Union to respond more comprehensively, rapidly and effectively to crises, in particular in our neighbourhood; helping to make our partners stronger when it comes to their security and defence; and strengthening the European Union’s capacity to protect European citizens, by working more closely together on security. To fulfil these goals, Ministers also agreed to a range of actions to strengthen civilian and military capabilities, as well as EU security and defence structures and tools.

The European Defence Action Plan was adopted by the European Commission on 30 November 2016. It comprises a European Defence Fund and other actions to help Member States boost research and spend more efficiently on joint defence capabilities, thus fostering a competitive and innovative defence industrial base and contributing to enhance European citizens’ security.

The Council of the European Union and Foreign Ministers of NATO adopted in parallel on 6 December 2016 a common set of proposals for EU-NATO cooperation. This followed the Joint Declaration signed by EU leaders and the NATO Secretary General in July 2016. The set of actions comprises 42 concrete proposals for implementation in seven areas of cooperation. EU-NATO cooperation is thus taken to a new level, at a moment when facing common challenges together is more important than ever.

CONCLUSION

The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility goes hand in hand with revamping our external partnerships. In the pursuit of our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. The European Union will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings. We will deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key players in a networked world.

This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of and ambition for a stronger Union, willing and able to make a positive difference in the world. Our citizens deserve a true Union, which promotes our shared interests by engaging responsibly and in partnership with others. It is now up to us to translate this into action.
The lack of cooperation between Member States in the field of defence and security is estimated to cost annually between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion. This is because of inefficiencies, lack of competition and lack of economies of scale for industry and production.

In 2015, the US invested more than twice as much as the total spending of EU Member States on defence. China has increased its defence budget by 150% over the past decade.

Around 80% of defence procurement is run on a purely national basis, leading to a costly duplication of military capabilities.

More Europe in defence will have a positive spill-over effect on the European economy. The European defence industry generates a total turnover of EUR 100 billion per year and 1.4 million highly skilled people directly or indirectly employed in Europe. Each euro invested in defence generates a return of 1.6, in particular in skilled employment, research and technology and exports.

Europe can no longer afford relying on the military might of others. We have to take responsibility for protecting our interests and the European way of life. It is only by working together that Europe will be able to defend itself at home and abroad.

Jean-Claude Juncker
The European Union as we know it came into being in 1993, when the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force and the preceding European Economic Community (EEC) was absorbed into a more overtly political Union which aspired to pursue a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 1999 a politico-military arm was added to the CFSP; originally the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), it is now known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

**ABSENCE OF STRATEGY**

However, the EU’s first strategy, the European Security Strategy (ESS), was only adopted a full ten years later, in 2003. Member States purposely avoided any strategic debate, because of their widely differing views on the degree of autonomy of EU policy vis-à-vis the capitals themselves and vis-à-vis the US. That did not halt progress on other dimensions of foreign and security policy, however: Member States often pragmatically agree to disagree on one aspect, which allows them to move forward on the issues on which they do agree. Thus they were able to create the institutions of the CFSP and the CSDP.

**STRATEGIC ROOTS**

The absence of a formal strategy does not necessarily mean that all action is un-strategic. During the first decade of the CFSP, an implicit ‘European way’ of doing things emerged from the practice of EU foreign policy-making, characterised by cooperation with partner countries, an emphasis on conflict prevention, and a broad approach through aid, trade and diplomacy. This approach has its roots in the external relations of the EEC. Although it had no formal competence in foreign policy, the EEC developed dense worldwide trade relations and built up a network of delegations more encompassing than the embassy network of any Member State.

This implicit concept of strategy steered the development of EU partnerships and long-term policies such as development. But it proved entirely insufficient when the EU was confronted with crisis. It was the EU’s failure to address the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s and again in Kosovo in 1999 that drove the institutional development of the CFSP and the CSDP. Even perfect institutions will not deliver, though, if there is no strategy for them to operate on.

**TOWARDS THE ESS**

That insight finally came to the Member States in 2003. That year the US invasion of Iraq created a deep divide within Europe, between those who wanted to stand by their most important ally no matter what, and those who felt that even an ally cannot be followed when it so clearly violates one’s own principles and, as would be revealed all too soon, acts against one’s interests. But whatever Europeans thought, it did not matter. This was the great lesson of the Iraq crisis: when Europe is divided, it has no influence.

This was the catalyst for the unexpected drive to finally organise a formal strategic debate in the EU and produce a strategic document. EU Member States needed to heal the wounds inflicted by the highly emotional debate over Iraq and pro-
ject an image of unity to the outside world once again. It also sent a message to the US. Those who had supported the invasion of Iraq wanted to signal that Europe was still an ally and that it cared about the same threats and challenges as the US. Those who had opposed it wanted to make it clear that caring about the same threats and challenges does not imply addressing them in the same way.

DRAFTING THE ESS

This window of opportunity was not wasted. Javier Solana, then the High Representative, was tasked with producing a first draft, which was drawn up by a small team around him and put to the European Council in June 2003. Then, instead of discussing points and commas and working his way up through the hierarchy of CFSP bodies, which is the normal procedure when drafting official EU foreign policy texts, Solana had three seminars organised, where the same officials could give their input on the draft, but alongside representatives from national parliaments, from key allies and partners, and from academia and civil society. This approach created a much greater sense of ownership and produced a very readable text, short and free of jargon.

The final document was formally adopted by the European Council as the European Security Strategy in December 2003. A strategy was born. The adoption of the ESS was a turning point, but after several years calls for a strategic review began to sound louder and louder.

THE IMPACT OF THE ESS

The ESS certainly worked as a narrative. In 2003, many expected that the ESS would be quickly forgotten – locked in some drawer, with the key given to NATO. In fact, the opposite happened: EU foreign policy decisions continued to refer to the ESS as the overall framework, and EU
and national officials continued to refer to it when explaining Europe’s role in the world, because it expressed it so neatly and concisely. That is important, because in a disparate organisation such as the EU, comprising twenty-eight Member States each with their own strategic culture, commonality must be stressed time and again.

But did the ESS drive a proactive EU foreign policy, and did it help the EU make the right decisions in moments of crisis? Here the picture is more mixed, for the simple reason that the ESS was not a complete strategy at all. In the ESS, the EU was very clear about its values, which it translates into very specific methods: Europe wants to tackle things in a preventive, comprehensive and multilateral way. The ESS had little to say, however, about either the means, apart from a general acknowledgement that in the military field especially more resources were required, or, even more importantly, the objectives. The decision to prioritise assuming leadership in stabilising Europe’s own neighbourhood was an important one; opting for a more indirect approach at the global level was the logical corollary, for one cannot prioritise everything at once. In the ESS itself, however, neither broad objective was detailed into more specific priorities that could drive day-to-day decision-making. The ESS codified how to do things – but it did not really tell Europe what to do first.

CALLS FOR REVISION

In the autumn of 2007 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt put the revision of the ESS on the agenda as an objective for their upcoming Presidencies. This idea did not meet with universal enthusiasm. Not everybody was convinced that the ESS was already in need of updating, and some also feared that it would provoke excessively divisive debates, particularly on Russia, and that the EU would end up with a worse rather than a better document. Hence the somewhat cautiously expressed mandate given to High Representative Javier Solana by the December 2007 European Council: ‘to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it’.

The debate was concluded by the adoption of a Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – providing security in a changing world by the December 2008 European Council, which decided to leave the text of the ESS itself untouched. The Report ‘does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it’, and the ESS remained in force.

TOWARDS A GLOBAL STRATEGY?

After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a number of Member States, with Sweden once more in the lead, again attempted to put a revision of the ESS on the agenda. However, no agreement was reached. To continue the debate, Sweden, Poland, Italy and Spain launched a think-tank process, which in May 2013 produced a report on a ‘European Global Strategy’ (EGS). Member States remained strongly divided on the need for a new strategy, however.

Eventually, the December 2013 European Council, in the context of a debate about defence, could only agree on a veiled mandate for the High Representative to assess the impact of the changes in the geopolitical environment. In layman’s terms: write a strategy?

When the new High Representative, Federica Mogherini, assumed office, she gave renewed impetus to the strategic debate. When she submitted her assessment of the EU’s environment to the European Council in June 2015, she finally received a mandate to produce an entirely new strategy.

Albeit grudgingly in many cases, Member States could no longer deny that the various crises in and around Europe, the US ‘pivot’ and the rise of China called for a new strategy. This EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) was presented to the European Council on 28 June 2016 by High Representative Fed-
erica Mogherini. Many pundits portrayed it as an example of Brussels’ disconnectedness from reality – tabling an external strategy just a few days after the UK had created a huge internal challenge by voting to leave the EU. But would it have demonstrated a better sense of reality to pretend that because of the British decision to put a stop to its EU membership the world around Europe would come to a stop as well? The EU needs the EUGS and that ‘is even more true after the British referendum,’ as Mogherini rightly says in her foreword.

REALPOLITIK WITH EUROPEAN CHARACTERISTICS

The EUGS introduces a new overall approach to foreign and security policy, which can be read as a corrigendum to the ESS. ‘The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states,’ the EU said in 2003.

Unfortunately, spreading good governance and democracy proved more difficult than expected, and when their absence provoked crises, we did not always muster the will and the resources to respond.

Where the ESS proved to be overoptimistic (and optimism is a moral duty, as Karl Popper said), the EUGS is more conscious of the limits imposed by our own capabilities and by others’ intractability, and therefore more modest.

It charts a course between isolationism and interventionism, under the new heading of what the EUGS now calls ‘principled pragmatism’.

This represents a return to realpolitik. Not realpolitik as it has come to be understood, as ends justifying means, but realpolitik in the original sense of the term. Coined by the German liberal Ludwig von Rochau in 1853, it meant a rejection of liberal utopianism, but not of liberal ideals themselves. Rather, it was about how to achieve those ideals in a realistic way. As the EUGS has it, ‘responsible engagement can bring about positive change’.

EU INTERESTS

The fact that for the first time ever we have an EU document listing our vital interests (which is a breakthrough in its own right) is a reflection of this new approach. Policy is about interests; if it isn't, no one will invest in it. That applies to the EU as much as to a state, and ‘there is no clash between national and European interests’. The vital interests defined by the EUGS are vital to all Member States: the security of EU citizens and territory; prosperity (which, the EUGS states, implies equality – otherwise we would not be talking about the prosperity of all citizens); democracy; and a rules-based global order to contain power politics.

Setting these interests off against the analysis of the global environment that Mogherini presented to the European Council in June 2015, the EUGS identifies five priorities: (1) the security of the EU itself; (2) the neighbourhood; (3) how to deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional orders across the globe; and (5) effective global governance. The pursuit of the first three priorities especially clearly reflects the modesty or realism imposed by ‘principled pragmatism’, by emphasising our own security, the neighbourhood, and hard power, and by no longer emphasising democratisation.

THE SECURITY OF THE EU

The EUGS focuses on Europe’s own security (which was much less present in the ESS) and on the neighbourhood: ‘We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield’. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, and the refugee crisis that is visible across Europe, addressing our internal and border security was indispensable for the EUGS to be credible with citizens and Member States alike.

The focus on the neighbourhood is justified by the range of our capabilities. It is defined very
broadly, though, going beyond what Brussels now often calls our ‘neighbours’ neighbours’: ‘to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa’.

Stabilising this part of the world is no mean task, yet the EUGS achieves the right balance, since it does not ignore the challenges in Asia (‘there is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian security’) and at the global level (such as the freedom of the global commons).

THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

The EUGS puts much less emphasis on democracy. The EU will support democracies where they emerge, for ‘their success […] would reverberate across their respective regions’ – but in our broad neighbourhood the EUGS mentions only Tunisia and Georgia as positive examples. As many others do not wish to pursue closer relations with the EU, the EUGS puts the emphasis on reducing the fragility of these states rather than on changing their regimes, for which we have but limited leverage.

However, since many of our neighbours are ‘repressive states [that] are inherently fragile in the long term’, that requires targeting civil society instead. The aim is to increase the resilience of people and societies, notably by fighting poverty and inequality, so that over time home-grown positive change can emerge. This will require considerable funds, however.

Lowering the level of ambition in terms of democratisation is simply acceptance of reality. This is all about being honest with ourselves. The EU cannot democratise Egypt, so it should not pretend to. At the same time, it should then also not feel obliged to pretend that the Al-Sisi regime is a great friend – it is not. But we maintain diplomatic relations with (nearly) everybody, not just with our friends, and we work with (nearly) everybody where interests coincide.

As long as they are there, we may indeed be obliged to work with authoritarian regimes in order to address urgent problems; the anti-IS coalition is a case in point. The EUGS doesn’t say much about this dimension: how to work with such regimes, in line with ‘principled pragmatism’, without further strengthening their hold on power?

This question demonstrates that resilience is a tricky concept. Increasing the resilience of a state against external threats can easily lead to increasing the resilience of a repressive regime. While we must be modest about our ability to change regimes, we should not be propping them up either. It makes sense, therefore, for the EUGS to simultaneously advocate capacity-building and the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors, as well as human rights protection. The strong emphasis on human rights (which is indeed to be distinguished from democratisation) is indispensable, for it is often against their own governments that people have to be resilient. But can we deliver on that promise? Perhaps ‘fighting inequality’ would have been a better heading for the new strategy towards our eastern and southern neighbours than ‘resilience’.

On a side note, if the EU wants to be even more honest with itself, then (the Balkans excepted) ‘a credible enlargement policy’ does not really have a place in the section on the neighbourhood, for enlargement is no longer a credible project, least of all for Turkey.

WAR AND CRISIS

The EUGS shows a much stronger awareness of the indispensability of a credible military instrument. ‘Soft and hard power go hand in hand,’ Mogherini rightly says in the foreword. The EUGS has not rediscovered geopolitics per se – the ESS already stated that ‘even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important’ – but it recognises to a greater extent than the ESS that some powers will not hesitate to use blackmail and force in what they consider to be a geopolitical competition. Hence the ambition ‘to pro-
tect Europe, respond to external crises, and assist in developing our partners’ security and defence capacities’. Furthermore, our efforts ‘should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO’.

This can be read as the EU constituting the European pillar that allows its Member States to act with the US where possible and without US assets when necessary.

The ends to which the EU should apply this ‘strategic autonomy’ (as Mogherini calls it in the foreword) are spread throughout the text.

Firstly, ‘this means living up to our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity’, i.e. Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU.

Secondly, where conflict is ongoing, the EU should ‘protect human lives, notably civilians’ and ‘be ready to support and help consolidate local cease-fires’, presumably in the broad neighbourhood as a matter of priority. This is an ambitious undertaking, for it entails deploying troops on the ground, with serious firepower, who are backed up by significant air support and ready reserves, and who are not necessarily there to seek out and destroy an opponent but who will fight when the civilians for whom they are responsible are threatened.

Thirdly, the EU ‘is seeking to make greater practical contributions to Asian security’, including in the maritime area. Finally, the EU ‘could assist further and complement UN peacekeeping’ as a demonstration of its belief in the UN as ‘the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order’.

These are more than sufficient elements to translate the EUGS into a revised military level of ambition in ‘a sectoral strategy, to be agreed by the Council’ – into a white paper, in other words, that should kick-start more cooperation and even integration in defence.

The EUGS also offers guidelines on how to do so: ‘an annual coordinated review process at EU level to discuss Member States’ military spending plans’. Or, as an earlier draft had it, a European semester on defence.

REGIONAL ORDERS

The focus on ‘cooperative regional orders’ also reflects the awareness of ongoing geopolitical competition between different global and regional powers. The intention of ensuring a coherent response to China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, not just through the EU-China Connectivity Platform (to create a link with the EU’s own investment plans) but also through ASEM and the EU-ASEAN partnership, could signal the start of a sophisticated diplomatic initiative. In the same vein, the aim of deepening dialogue with Iran and the GCC countries ought to be the beginning of a new vision on the future regional order in the Middle East. After all, there are not one but several wars ongoing in an area that clearly falls within the neighbourhood in which the EU ought to assume responsibility. This will also be one of the issues (though it is not among the examples explicitly listed in the EUGS) on which the EU will have to cooperate with Russia, while making ‘substantial changes in relations’ dependent on Russia’s respect for international law. On Russia, the EUGS essentially advocates strategic patience.

EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM

The fifth priority puts global governance firmly back on the EU agenda, after ‘effective multilateralism’ (as the ESS phrased it) had more or less disappeared from radar screens. Now the EUGS ambitiously sets out ‘to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system’, which will indeed be necessary to prevent ‘the emerging of alternative groupings to the detriment of all’. Under this heading as well, an ambitious programme on free trade (envisaging FTAs with the US, Japan, Mercosur, India, ASEAN and others) and on the freedom of the global commons could herald a creative diplomatic initiative – and a more strategic use of EU trade policy, which ought to be as embedded in overall strategy as it is in the US.
The EU Global Strategy was presented at the European Council in June 2016, but was overshadowed by the Brexit referendum (in the picture HR Mogherini and PM Cameron).

The EUGS is a strategy, and strategies have to be translated into sub-strategies, policies and action to achieve their objectives. Unlike in 2003, the EUGS itself already provides the links to what should become a systematic process of implementation and review.

CREATING A PROCESS

The EUGS calls for a prompt decision on ‘clear procedures and timeframes’ for revising existing sectoral strategies and designing new ones. It then announces an annual reflection on the state of play, ‘pointing out where further implementation must be sought’, though not a systematic overall review. ‘A new process of strategic reflection will be launched whenever the EU and its Member States deem it necessary’ (so not automatically every five years, for every legislature).

For this scheme to succeed, it is crucial that it be firmly anchored institutionally, not just within the EEAS but in the Commission as well. Of course, the High Representative has the main ownership of the EUGS and will take charge of overall coordination and initiative. But which body, including Commission and EEAS officials, will monitor implementation and prepare the annual state of play? (In the same way as the National Security Council in the US, which not only coordinates the drafting of the National Security Strategy but also monitors whether all relevant subsequent documents comply with its approach).

And, most crucially, will the Member States feel ownership of the EUGS?

Mogherini will obviously drive implementation, but if she is the only one, it cannot work. And implementing this ambitious strategy will demand serious drive.

BREXIT

It is on the implementation of the EUGS that Brexit will have the most impact. Not on substance: the analysis of the environment, the definition of our vital interests, and the identification of our priorities will not change because we have one fewer Member State.

But, unfortunately, it will have a negative impact on the capacity for delivery. For one, the EU has quite simply lost face – and face is important in diplomacy. The credibility and persuasiveness of any EU initiative will be undermined by the fact that one of the three biggest Member States has just decided to leave. Furthermore, the UK can no longer directly contribute its impressive diplomatic and military clout to EU foreign and security policy.

What options there are to bring it to bear indirectly will have to be explored.

Nevertheless, Federica Mogherini is absolutely right when she says that ‘a fragile world calls for a more confident and responsible European Union’ – even though the EU itself is somewhat more fragile now than in 2003.

Hiding inside for fear of the world around us will not solve anything, whereas ‘responsible engagement can bring about positive change’.
The new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy triggered a fruitful discussion in the area of security and defence that led to a comprehensive security package involving Member States and EU institutions alike. The continuity and speed with which security and defence issues were drawn up in recent months has been remarkable, especially given that any step taken towards a more European defence policy cannot be taken for granted. As a result of migration, terrorism, political unrest and armed conflicts in neighbouring regions, perceptions have changed in the last couple of years. Europeans clearly expect governments to collectively take more responsibility for their safety and security.

These expectations are also reflected in the new EU Global Strategy, which states: ‘The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders.’

MOMENTUM GROWING FOR MORE DEFENCE

There is no doubt that momentum is growing for more defence cooperation and closer coordination among Member States and the EU institutions, and there has been a clear spike in political will to deliver on defence. At the same time the UK’s decision to leave the EU displayed the Europe-wide sense of disappointment with its institutions. In this context, it will be crucial to maintain momentum and make all EU Member States willing to act on it. This puts both the Commission and the High Representative in particular under enormous pressure to prove that the EU is more efficient and capable of providing joint solutions in the field of security and defence than the Member States on their own. Quick wins must be achieved, e.g. through strengthening existing activities, reviving projects (such as permanent structured co-operation) or exploiting the full potential of the Treaty. At the same time, the defence package proposes new ideas and possibilities, and the Commission and the High Representative are only just beginning to establish concrete medium- and long-term actions.

IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY

Less than four months after the Heads of State and Government welcomed the presentation of the EU Global Strategy, High Representative Federica Mogherini proposed an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence1.

During a joint session of Foreign and Defence Ministers on 14 November 2016, conclusions were adopted on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence based on the Implementation Plan2. Subsequently, the Heads of State and Government discussed the proposal during the European Council in December 2016.

The implementation process of the EU Global Strategy consists of three strands of work in the field of security and defence, forming a so-called defence package. It includes:

- Increased levels of military ambition to allow Member States to take more responsibility for their own security and defence (Implementation Plan on Security and Defence as well as FAC conclusions based on the Implementation Plan of 14 November 2016).
- New financial tools proposed by the Commission, such as the establishment of a European Defence Fund to support the Member States as well as the European defence industry in developing efficient joint defence capabilities (European Defence Action Plan).
- Concrete measures, as a follow-up to the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. The declaration aims to achieve new levels of reciprocal cooperation between the two organisations, focusing on concrete areas such as fighting hybrid and cyber threats, supporting partners in defence capacity-building, and increasing maritime security.

### A COMMON LEVEL OF AMBITION

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) refers to ‘an appropriate level of ambition’ as a requirement for Europe’s ability to safeguard security within and beyond its borders. The Implementation Plan identifies a comprehensive level of ambition for the EU in the field of security and defence for the first time. The focus is on achieving three priorities set out in the EU Global Strategy:

- **Responding to external conflicts and crises.** Responding to today’s crises involves the full range of CDSP tasks as set out in Article 43 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The EU’s ambition is to have the ability to increase awareness and responsiveness during all phases of a conflict cycle, such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.
- **Building the capacities of partners.** The objective of CSDP missions/operations with training-related tasks is to build/foster local capacities (e.g. the EU Training Mission in Mali). The EU

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3 Signed during the Warsaw Summit on 8 July 2016 by President of the European Council Donald Tusk, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Jens Stoltenberg.
should strengthen CSDP’s ability to contribute more systematically to the resilience and stabilisation of partner countries. This can be achieved in synergy with other EU instruments and actors, notably along the nexus of security and development. CSDP can also be used to provide expertise and assistance to strengthen partners’ resilience and counter hybrid threats.

- **Protecting the union and its citizens.** CSDP is one instrument that is used to tackle challenges and threats that have an impact on the security of the Union and its citizens, along the nexus of internal and external security. While there are no legal grounds for deploying CSDP missions or operations inside the Union, there are various areas in which Member States can contribute to a safe and protected union from a security and defence perspective. This includes, *inter alia*: strengthening the protection and resilience of its networks and critical infrastructure; fostering the security of its external borders, building partners’ capacities to manage their borders, countering hybrid threats, cyber security, preventing and countering terrorism and radicalisation, combating people smuggling and trafficking, building their capacity to manage irregular migration flows, promoting compliance with non-proliferation regimes and countering arms trafficking and organised crime.

These three priorities mutually reinforce each other and constitute a coherent approach. The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) conclusions on the proposed level of ambition further highlight the importance of Mutual Assistance and/or Solidarity in line with Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU in this context.

Like the EU Global Strategy, in which the importance of EU and NATO relations are very clearly underlined, the FAC conclusions based on the Implementation Plan again stress that NATO remains the foundation for the collective defence of its members. At the same time, the document states that the specific character of the security and defence policy of all EU Member States will be fully respected.

Another element highlighted in the EU Global Strategy is the strategic autonomy of the Union, which is an important component when discussing the level of ambition. Even though the EU prefers to work with partners, it must also be able to tackle defence and security tasks alone, if needed. This requires the development of a strong, independent defence industry that can produce...
everything that this entails – notably the strategic enablers. The scope and extent of this strategic autonomy will reflect the readiness of Member States to contribute to their common defence.

**ACTIONABLE PROPOSALS**

The level of ambition outlines the goals that the EU and its Member States set out to achieve – as identified in the Global Strategy – in the form of three priorities. The Implementation Plan presented by the High Representative also includes concrete proposals on how this level of ambition should be reached.

A non-exhaustive list of actionable proposals to implement the level of ambition provides input for the follow-on work. The FAC conclusions based on the Implementation Plan from 14 November 2016⁴ also address the same actionable proposals and work strands; however, the language and details in the documents differ somewhat. In the following paragraph the Council conclusions, rather than the document presented by the High Representative, will serve as the reference. The actions proposed focus on five work strands:

- **Setting capability development priorities.** Pushing for civil and military capability development – in line with the establishment of a European Defence Fund as proposed by the Commission as well as existing tools within the European Defence Agency.
- **Deepening defence cooperation.** Deepening of defence cooperation, in particular by means of a non-binding coordinated Annual Review on Defence.
- **Adjusting structures, tools and financing.** Adaptation of structures and instruments, in particular financial instruments (e.g. review of planning and implementation structures). Preparation of proposals to improve crisis response – especially through the EU battlegroups – and reinforce their effective funding.
- **Drawing on the full potential of the Treaty: PESCO.** Making use of the possibility outlined in Article 42(6) TEU of establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
- **Taking CSDP Partnerships forward.**

**THE WAY AHEAD**

The Security and Defence Implementation Plan forms part of a wider package that includes the Commission’s European Defence Action Plan and the follow-up to the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. Concrete actions based on the Implementation Plan must be an unequivocal translation of the political level of ambition as expressed in the EU Global Strategy. This is a matter of credibility in the eyes of our partners and adversaries and, at the same time, a clear message to the Member States and their citizens. It is important to keep in mind that the process of acquiring the identified capabilities to reach the level of ambition is first

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and foremost in the hands of the Member States. The EU institutions can provide clear structures, financing mechanisms and ideas and guidelines, but in the end, the future development of the CSDP will very much depend on the political will of the Member States.

Besides pushing for the swift implementation of measures, the EU must be more effective in translating its ambitions into practice. The Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 14 November 2016 in that regard state: ‘A proactive and coordinated strategic communication, directed both inwards to the EU citizens and outwards to partners and other organisations, should be given a special focus.’ It will be crucial to the successful implementation of the defence package to get the message across and to stress the EU’s role as the main security provider in and around Europe.

While planning concrete actions to reach the required level of ambition, the EU should not lose sight of the long-term element of the new strategic documents. Since it takes years to build capabilities or gain usable results from defence research programmes, the EU is doing the right thing by using the current momentum to set the course.

5 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14149/16), paragraph 6.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The EU is facing a multitude of security challenges today – both externally and, no less importantly, internally. Looking at European political agendas, there are two issues that clearly stand out and dominate discussions: migration and security. Both are very complex in nature, and if we want to tackle them successfully, there must be close interaction between countries and between state and non-state actors. Clearly, no one, however powerful, can face these challenges alone.

These challenges are testing the EU’s ability to act decisively and provide support to its members. If we succeed, we will emerge stronger – but if we fail, trust in our institutions will be weakened and so will cohesion within our community. So, the stakes are high and our citizens want convincing and visible results, and they want them fast.

Today, the EU is undergoing a difficult phase in its development. It is precisely amidst such difficulties that it needs a good story to tell. A story that is compelling and can help citizens to understand that the EU is there to help them. The area of security and defence is particularly relevant from this perspective: the effects of the threat posed by terrorists and by actors who seek to undermine trust in our institutions and values concern societies in Europe directly. The heavy focus on security and defence seen at European political fora over the past months is therefore wholly justified.

The window will not be there forever, and the coming months will be decisive in terms of understanding whether or not Member States can turn the current momentum into concrete steps. There are three key initiatives being pursued in parallel that can help bring about concrete results. These are: (1) the implementation of the security and defence aspects of the EU Global Strategy (the ‘Implementation Plan’); (2) the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); and (3) the implementation of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. These three strands of work are complementary and mutually reinforcing. The first gives the main direction and charts the way ahead in security and defence, the second helps provide the instruments needed to promote defence-related cooperation, and the third places these efforts in the larger context of EU-NATO cooperation. Together, they will shape what CSDP looks like in the years to come as an instrument in the EU’s varied crisis prevention and management toolbox; they will generate the civilian and military capabilities that Europe needs, and create a sound defence industry base to underpin those capabilities. The more the line between external and internal security is blurred (think of cyber or foreign fighters, for instance), the more the link between the various instruments in the EU’s toolbox becomes stronger. CSDP is no exception. The use of Article 42(7) TEU following the terrorist attacks in Paris is a case in point.

In crisis management, the EU’s often-cited
unique strength lies in the ‘comprehensive approach’, i.e. in the capacity to choose from the very large array of instruments in its toolbox, ranging from diplomacy through development assistance to military means, and apply them as it feels appropriate. It also includes the option of moving between instruments as circumstances require. This is a great concept, but one which has yet to be implemented in full. There are theatres which are often presented as places where the concept is being tested. The Horn of Africa is an obvious example of a case where the EU has deployed a number of instruments simultaneously and is engaged not solely in containing piracy at sea (i.e. focusing on the symptoms) but also trying to address the root causes onshore through training, capacity-building and economic assistance.

CSDP was not designed to be a long-term instrument, but engagement in security and defence in a country almost always is. The moment a decision is taken to deploy a mission, a commitment is made to stay the course and help bring about results; we cannot turn around halfway down the road and leave. That is why it is so important to have the option to transition from one instrument to another. And let’s face it: the sort of security sector reforms that the EU is increasingly engaged in, on both the civilian and military front, take time. Such reforms cannot be completed in two or three years. Local ownership is key in the process, but it is not something that we can take as a given in most places. We have to work for it. Ukraine may be cited as an example.

**STRATEGIC GUIDANCE: EUGS**

The role of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the Implementation Plan is: (a) to provide strategic guidance on our security and defence priorities in terms of geography and in terms of the range of activities envisaged; (b) to provide clarity on our civilian and military Level of Ambition (LoA); (c) to match priorities with the capabilities needed to meet them; and (d) to facilitate the implementation in a resource-conscious fashion so as to properly back up ambitions. To deliver effectively, we need to look at our institutions and our decision-making, and we need to secure proper funding arrangements. Many concrete solutions that Member States may want to consider again as options have already been outlined in the Lisbon Treaty, such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO).

The three strategic priorities are spelled out in the EUGS very clearly. These are: crisis management, partners’ capacity-building and protecting Europe. At first glance, they resemble NATO’s three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

So, how should we read that? Are we on a collision course, set to compete? The answer is clearly no. The goal is clearly to build complementarity and ensure closer alignment, for instance in areas like planning. Of the three priorities, crisis management and capacity-building are traditional CSDP areas where cooperation with NATO has been growing stronger – take the example of the Mediterranean where strong, pragmatic links of interaction are being developed between Operation Sophia and NATO’s Sea Guardian, or take our complementary security sector reform (SSR) efforts in Ukraine.

The ‘protecting Europe’ component is perhaps less obvious. It is important to be absolutely clear: ‘hard-core’ military security and territorial defence is NATO’s business. The EU’s role in this regard is more that of a ‘facilitator’, in the sense that it can encourage and assist Member States, including through the EDAP and a much-awaited European Defence Fund, in helping to fill identified short-falls and acquire the required capabilities.

The EU’s role is different and is indeed complementary: think of the need to protect the EU’s borders, working through internal security actors. Think of the EU’s work on countering radicalisation in our societies, its ongoing efforts to counter hybrid threats, its investments in cybersecurity, or its work on strengthening our energy security. Or think of what will certainly become a key driver in the coming years: the need to enhance
the resilience of our societies and infrastructure, an area which is clearly an EU strength. We need to have the capacity to withstand the blow and then recover quickly. Greater resilience is therefore a key form of defence – and it also serves as a deterrent, as it helps deny the benefit of a possible attack. Or think of efforts to improve the protection of our land and maritime borders and build a European Border and Coast Guard capacity, the substantial beefing-up of Frontex. These are all areas where Europe is best placed to enhance the protection of its members and citizens.

Member States’ national defence capabilities are essential to underpinning the credibility of the EU’s action in the world and they are vital to ensuring Europe’s security – regardless of whether such capabilities are used nationally, as part of an EU effort or in the context of NATO actions.

Security does not come for free. The decline in defence spending that has characterised European defence budgets for over a decade must stop and be reversed. Europe’s security, the international context and the need for more equitable transatlantic burden-sharing all require that. The rhetoric that European citizens have been hearing practically since the end of the Cold War is neither true nor sustainable today. The EU needs to invest more in defence – and, given the challenges it faces, in security more broadly.

MULTINATIONAL COLLABORATIVE PROJECTS

The question of course is not only what we spend but also how we spend it. Here, we need to make sure that we build and keep capabilities that we truly need and that, once we have acquired them, we have the political will and resources to use them – otherwise, they are of limited value. There should therefore be a lot more focus on actual output. The EU’s aggregate defence spending is almost EUR 200 billion per year. This is still a large amount of money – but we could certainly get more bang for our buck. If we want to increase the output of national defence spending we need to come up with more multinational collaborative projects, and they need to have substance. Results to date, whether in the context of ‘pooling and sharing’ or ‘smart defence’, have been modest. Clearly, nationally oriented defence programmes cannot address capability shortfalls and provide the core capabilities the EU needs. The reasons for insufficient progress are predominantly political, arising from a narrow definition of sovereignty.

Over the past decade a number of initiatives have been introduced to address the above problems. The EU’s ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (PESCO) and NATO’s ‘framework nations’ concept are among them. Their goal is to promote defence cooperation by committing countries to spend more, collaborate more and deliver critical capabilities. PESCO will need to balance the requirements of efficiency and inclusiveness: in other words, it must enable those who are willing and prepared to move faster to do so, keeping their cooperation under the EU umbrella, and, on the other hand, ensure that PESCO does not become a divisive instrument, driving the EU further apart, especially not now. The fact that, despite repeated efforts, PESCO has yet to take off shows that it is not easy to reconcile those two requirements. Incentives, such as those that EDAP and, further down the road, the European Defence Fund could offer, for countries to enter into more binding mutual commitments could become important game changers.

Last but not least: we also need to modernise our definition of defence capabilities to include areas like intelligence, cyber, space and dual-use capabilities, and not just traditional military hardware. NATO has already embarked on that road with its Deterrence and Defence Posture Review – and the EU should certainly not lag behind. By way of illustration, let me refer to the increased emphasis on enhanced situational awareness. The recent establishment of an EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, linking together the various European institutions and the relevant services of Member States, and also NATO, to acquire and maintain
a shared situational awareness picture shows how critical it is to be aware of current or just-emerging threats for both prevention and coordinated response purposes.

**MULTI-STAKEHOLDER’ CHARACTER OF SECURITY**

All of the above requires a paradigm shift. If we want to be successful in our response to the challenges we face, including for instance hybrid threats (often described as the dark side of the comprehensive approach), we need to apply a sort of ‘whole of government’ approach at both national and European level. But not only that: there is a compelling need to work increasingly with non-state actors, too. Cybersecurity is a prime example of the ‘multi-stakeholder’ character of security.

Funding remains central to the EU’s further efforts to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP. Progress is also required in terms of raising national spending on security and defence in all key areas, including the financing of our own CSDP activities, funding equipment support to partners and providing financial support to European capability projects and the establishment of a sound defence industry base.

According to the current funding arrangement, only a small fraction (less than 10 %) of the overall costs of a CSDP military mission is regarded as common costs. The brunt of the expenses are paid by those who provide the troops and equipment, in accordance with the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle. This is what Defence Minister Le Drian called ‘10 % solidarity’.

**CAPACITY-BUILDING FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT**

One of the three priorities of the EUGS is to help build partners’ capacities – and indeed, as experience shows, the focus in CSDP has been clearly shifting towards training missions, on both the civilian and military front. However, until we can complement current training efforts, provide at least some equipment to support local militaries that we train and ensure proper sustainment, our capacity-building efforts will not deliver real effect. Today, we can train but not equip – and this simply does not work, whether we look at our CSDP efforts in Somalia, Mali or the Central African Republic. Keeping our security and development goals entirely non-aligned, as if they belonged to completely different universes, can hardly help us achieve our overall objectives. If we want to truly establish a nexus between security and development, and make real headway, a change is required in the approach – not merely at European level, but at national level in Member States, too.

There is much talk about EU Battlegroups (BGs). They are a great instrument, readily available – but never used. Lots of work has gone into the BGs to make them even more versatile. But, paradoxically, it only fuels frustration as it means that there is an even larger range of scenarios where we could use them, but don’t. The problem, similar to NATO’s Response Force (NRF), is political, not military technical. It has to do with decision-making and funding. Unless we can reconcile the national interests of those who have a particular interest in a region and those who provide the forces to deploy, BGs will likely continue to exist solely on paper. Here, too, PESCO may prove to be the vehicle to break the decade-long deadlock.

The window for taking the EU’s security and defence cooperation to the next level is now open. Turning Member States’ renewed high-level political commitments into concrete measures will be a task for the coming months. It is also important to ensure that the high-level ambitions regarding security and defence are underpinned by concrete CSDP actions and commitments on the ground, too.
2.2. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND CSDP

by Luis Amorim

2.2.1. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The European Council provides the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and defines the general political direction and priorities thereof, including in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

According to Article 22 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union relating to the CFSP and in other areas of the external action of the Union, on the basis of the following principles, as stated in Article 21 TEU: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and respect for the United Nations Charter and international law.

Moreover, Article 26 TEU states that the European Council shall identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for the CFSP, including matters with defence implications, and shall adopt the necessary decisions.

The European Council became one of the Union's seven institutions when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009.

It consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (i.e. presidents or prime ministers), together with its own President and the President of the European Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative) also takes part in its work.

The European Council elects its own President, by a qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. This ‘permanent’ nature of the post is one of the main innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. In addition to convening, chairing and preparing European Council meetings, as well as driving forward and ensuring the continuity of its work in cooperation with the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council also ensures, at his level and in

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1 The CSDP is an integral part of CFSP and is intended to provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets, which the Union may use on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks is undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States. The CSDP is also expected to include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, which will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides, in full accordance with the Member States’ respective constitutional requirements (Article 42 TEU).

2 The European Council was created in 1974 and formalised by the Single European Act in 1986. Between 1961 and 1974, seven summit meetings of Heads of State or Government had been convened to assess different turning points in the European Community’s history.

3 The expression ‘permanent’ should be read in contrast to the mandate of the Presidency of the Council of the EU, which is held by each Member State for a period of six months at a time on a rotating basis.
that capacity, the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its CFSP, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative. It is worth noting that the High Representative is appointed by the European Council and is expected to ensure, *inter alia*, the implementation of European Council decisions in the areas of CFSP and CSDP.

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council has had two ‘permanent’ Presidents: former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy, and former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.

The European Council does not exercise legislative functions and, unless otherwise stated by the Treaties, takes its decisions by consensus and unanimity. It is assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council.

The European Council is expected to meet at least twice every six months in the Europa Building in Brussels (inaugurated in December 2016). The President may decide to convene special meetings of the European Council if the situation so requires. Several such meetings were held during the mandate of President Van Rompuy with regard to the euro crisis, and more have since been convened during the mandate of President Tusk to address the migration crisis.

The European Council has always been particularly attentive to CFSP matters, including CSDP.
The following political milestones in the specific context of CSDP are worth highlighting:

**Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of 12-13 December 2003 (5381/04):** The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS), which provided the conceptual framework for the CFSP, including what would later become the CSDP.

**President conclusions of the European Council of 11-12 December 2008 (17271/1/08 REV 1, Annex 2):** Declaration by the European Council on the enhancement of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

**European Council conclusions of 19-20 December 2013 (EUCO 217/13):** For the first time since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council held a thematic debate on defence, which was preceded by a meeting with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The European Council identified at this meeting priority actions for stronger cooperation in three main areas: increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; enhancing the development of capabilities; and strengthening Europe’s defence industry.

**European Council conclusions of 25-26 June 2015 (EUCO 22/15):** The European Council tasked the High Representative with continuing the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016.

**European Council conclusions of 28 June 2016 (EUCO 26/16):** The European Council welcomed the presentation of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy by the High Representative and invited...
The European Council also discussed EU-NATO cooperation in the presence of the NATO Secretary General and called for further enhancement of the relationship, in light of their common aims and values and given unprecedented challenges from the South and East. At this meeting, it was also announced that the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission would issue a declaration together with the NATO Secretary General at the NATO summit in Warsaw on 8 July 2016.

European Council conclusions of 15 December 2016 (EUCO 34/16): The European Council stressed that Europeans must take greater responsibility for their security. In order to strengthen Europe’s security and defence in a challenging geopolitical environment and to better protect its citizens, confirming previous commitments in this respect, the European Council stressed the need to do more, including by committing sufficient additional resources, while taking into account national circumstances and legal commitments. It also urged swift action to follow up on the Council conclusions of 14 November 2016 on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence, and the Council conclusions of 6 December 2016 implementing the Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw by EU and NATO leaders.

For further information

To learn more about the work of the European Council and its President, go to:

2.2.2. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Council of Ministers of the European Union (Council of the EU) is the Union institution that, jointly with the European Parliament, exercises legislative and budgetary functions. It carries out policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties. It consists of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of the Member State in question and cast its vote. The Council acts by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide otherwise. In the CFSP/CSDP domains, the Council acts by consensus and unanimity. The adoption of legislative acts is excluded (Article 24 TEU).

Currently, the Council of the EU meets in the following 10 configurations:
* General Affairs
* Foreign Affairs
* Economic and Financial Affairs
* Justice and Home Affairs
* Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs
* Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry, Research and Space)
* Transport, Telecommunications and Energy
* Agriculture and Fisheries
* Environment
* Education, Youth, Culture and Sport

The General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) assists the work of the Council. It is led by its Secretary-General, who is appointed by the Council. The Secretary-General ensures the execution of services provided by the GSC to the rotating and ‘permanent’ presidencies of the Council and its preparatory bodies, and to the president of the European Council, including the administrative management of the GSC in terms of its human and financial resources.

The Secretary-General takes part in Council meetings as appropriate. The Secretary General of the Council is also the Secretary General of the European Council and attends European Council meetings and takes all measures necessary for the organisation of its proceedings. The current Secretary General is Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen. He was appointed on 21 April 2015 for the period 1 July 2015 – 30 June 2020.

Despite the fact that it meets in different configurations, the Council of the EU is a single legal entity. This has three important consequences for its work:
* Any legal act concerning any subject falling within the Union’s competence can be formally adopted by any Council configuration, whether or not it falls under its remit.
* There is no hierarchy among the different Council configurations, although the General Affairs Council has a coordinating role and is responsible for institutional, administrative and horizontal matters.
* The office of the Presidency of the Council is also a single office. This means, in practice, that the rules applicable to the Presidency apply to

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1 The Council may only act by qualified majority when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision or following a specific request of the European Council to the High Representative, when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position, and when appointing a EU special representative (Article 31(2) TEU). Finally, some decisions in relation to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the CSDP may be taken by qualified majority voting (Articles 46(2) and 46(3) TEU).

2 The exclusion of the adoption of legislative acts does not deprive CFSP Decisions of their binding nature, which is confirmed by Article 28(2) TEU. The exclusion of legislative acts is mostly linked to the exclusion of the legislative procedure from the CFSP domain, and hence with the inapplicability of the role of the Commission and the European Parliament in this procedure.
any person chairing any one of the Council configurations, including the Foreign Affairs Council ‘permanent’ chair, or, as appropriate, any person chairing one of the Council’s preparatory bodies.

It is not unusual for the members of the Council to continue their discussions at the meals that are organised on the occasion of Council meetings. However, such events do not form part of the official Council meetings and any decisions taken or conclusions reached must be adopted at the official meeting.

Ministers also meet to reflect and exchange views freely on topics of general scope. These informal meetings are outside the framework and procedural rules laid down by the Treaties and their discussions cannot give rise to the production of documents, before or after the meeting, or to the drafting of conclusions or formal decisions.

In the Foreign Affairs area, ministers meet informally usually once per semester, at ‘Gymnich meetings’, so called following the first meeting of this nature in the German town of Gymnich in 1974. Ministers of Defence also meet informally once per semester.

The General Affairs and the Foreign Affairs configurations are the only ones specifically mentioned in Article 16 TEU.

The General Affairs Council ensures consistency in the work of the different Council configurations. It prepares and ensures the follow-up to meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council and the European Commission.

The Foreign Affairs Council elaborates the Union’s external action on the basis of the strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensures that the Union’s action in this area

The Justus Lipsius building is the main seat of the General Secretariat of the Council.
is consistent. This includes foreign policy, defence and security, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The Council can launch EU crisis management missions and operations, both civilian and military, in pursuit of the EU’s objectives of peace and security. It can also adopt measures needed to implement the EU’s foreign and security policy, including possible sanctions.

The Foreign Affairs Council is composed of the foreign ministers of all EU Member States. Depending on the agenda, the Council also brings together defence ministers (CSDP), development ministers (development cooperation) and trade ministers (common commercial policy). Ministers from these policy areas usually meet twice a year under the Foreign Affairs Council configuration. In the case of defence ministers, they usually meet back-to-back with foreign ministers.

The **High Representative** chairs this Council configuration. The representatives of the Member State holding the six-monthly rotating Presidency chair all other Council configurations. The Foreign Affairs Council meets once a month, with the exceptions of August and September unless there is a situation warranting a meeting during any of these two months.

A **Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States** (Coreper) prepares the work of the Council and carries out the tasks assigned to it by the Council. Coreper also ensures consistency in the Union’s policies and actions. The chief role of Coreper is to coordinate and prepare the work of the different Council configurations, including Foreign Affairs, and to attempt to achieve, at its level, an agreement to be submitted subsequently to the Council for decision or adoption.

Coreper’s central role is illustrated by the fact that all the items included on the Council’s agenda must be examined beforehand by Coreper unless, for reasons of urgency, the Council decides otherwise. Coreper is divided in two parts, 1 (deputy permanent representatives) and 2 (permanent representatives). Coreper 2 prepares, *inter alia*, the work of the Foreign Affairs Council.

The **Political and Security Committee** (PSC), provided for in Article 38 TEU, plays a central role in the CFSP and CSDP domains. It performs two main functions:

1. it monitors the international situation in areas falling within the CFSP and contributes to the definition of policies, delivering opinions within the Council, without prejudice to the work of Coreper;
2. under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, it ensures the political...
tional control and strategic direction of civilian and military crisis management missions and operations and may, when appropriate and if so empowered by the Council, take decisions in this area. A representative of the High Representative chairs the PSC.7

Beyond Coreper and the PSC, more than 150 different preparatory bodies, also known as working parties, support the work of the Council.8 Some 35 Council thematic and geographic preparatory bodies support the work of the Foreign Affairs Council. Below is a selection of those that are more closely associated with the CSDP domain.

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council (Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP of 22 January 2001). It directs all military activities within the EU framework, in particular the planning and execution of military missions and operations under the CSDP and the development of military capabilities. It gives military advice to the PSC and makes recommendations on military matters.

The EUMC is composed of the chiefs of defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The Committee has a permanent chair, selected by the EUMC meeting at the level of chiefs of defence, and appointed by the Council. The EUMC chair is also the top military advisor of the High Representative.

The European Union Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG) supports and assists the EUMC in its work on military matters within the EU framework. It carries out tasks assigned to it by the EUMC, such as the drafting of military advice and military concepts, and reports to the EUMC.

The EUMCWG has a permanent chair, selected by the EUMC meeting at the level of military representatives and appointed by Coreper.

The European Union Military Committee Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force (EUMCWG/HTF) is a group of experts dealing with military capability development. It is the EUMC’s working body with regard to all aspects of capability development where it has a responsibility. Beyond that, it has been given tasks encompassing a wider range of capability-related issues in preparation of EUMC decisions. The EUMCWG/HTF has a permanent chair, selected and appointed by the EUMC meeting at the level of military representatives.

The Politico-Military Group (PMG) carries out preparatory work in the field of CSDP for the PSC. It covers the political aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, including concepts, capabilities and operations and missions. The PMG prepares Council conclusions and provides recommendations for the PSC, monitors their effective implementation, contributes to the development of horizontal policy and facilitates exchanges of information. It has a particular responsibility regarding partnerships with non-EU countries and other organisa-

The two chairs, Ms Jana Kalimonova (CivCom) and General Michail Kostarakos (EUMC) – in the centre – flanked by two Austrians, General Günter Höfler (Military Representative) and Alexander Kmentt (Ambassador to the PSC).
The Council of the European Union

The Council is the EU institution where the EU Member States’ government representatives sit, i.e. the ministers of each Member State with responsibility for a given area.

Chaired by a representative of the rotating Presidency

Qualified majority = A minimum of 260 of 352 votes and the majority of Member States (voting strength ranges from 29 (Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom) to 3 (Malta))

Tasks:
- It adopts legislative acts (Regulations, Directives, etc.), in many cases in "co-decision" with the European Parliament;
- It helps coordinate Member States’ policies, for example, in the economic field;
- It develops the common foreign and security policy, on the basis of strategic guidelines set by the European Council;
- It concludes international agreements on behalf of the Union; It adopts the Union’s budget, together with the European Parliament.

10 council configurations:
- General Affairs
- Foreign Affairs
- Economic and Financial Affairs
- Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
- Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs
- Competitiveness (internal market, industry, research and space)
- Transport and Telecommunications and Energy
- Agriculture and Fisheries
- Environment
- Education, youth, culture and sports
2.3. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN CSDP

by Diego de Ojeda

Although – contrary to most other EU policy areas – the role of the European Commission in CSDP is secondary to those of the HR and the Member States, the Commission remains an essential actor in fully attaining CSDP goals. Indeed, Article 21(3) of the Lisbon Treaty calls upon the Council and the Commission, assisted by the HR, to cooperate to ensure consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action, and between those areas and its other policies. This is without prejudice to the distinctive competences of each institution and both CFSP and non-CFSP decision-making procedures, as per Article 40.

The ‘consistency’ principle was developed in the December 2013 Joint Communication on the EU Comprehensive Approach, and the ensuing May 2014 Council conclusions. The idea is simple: CSDP is not to act in isolation from other EU external actions and instruments. On the contrary, it must act in sync with non-CFSP instruments for which Commission participation is required as a result of its responsibility to implement the EU budget as determined in Articles 317 and 318 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.

Non-CFSP EU external instruments include the geographic Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), as well as the extra-budgetary European Development Fund (EDF). The thematic Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the Partnership Instrument (PI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation (INSC) and the DCI thematic programmes also belong to this category.

In addition, under the authority of the HR acting in her capacity as Vice-President, the Commission also implements the CFSP budget, which finances CSDP civilian missions, EU Special Representatives and non-proliferation and disarmament projects.

Furthermore, the Commission manages other, somewhat related external action policies such as international trade and humanitarian assistance, as well as internal policies with substantial and growing external dimensions – security, migration, climate, energy, transport, space, defence internal market, etc. – which are relevant to the Union’s foreign, security and defence policy.

Thus, the Commission fully participates in the PSC and all Council bodies – including CivCom, PMG and the EUMC – discussing and preparing the decisions of the Foreign Affairs Council in its different configurations: FAC, FAC Defence, FAC Development and FAC Trade.

Through a number of mechanisms, Commission services are increasingly able to make their input available to the EEAS when preparing CSDP interventions. Examples include the Crisis Platform chaired by the EEAS, which brings together all the relevant services when necessary, and the Political Framework for a Crisis Approach (PFCA), which is now a mandatory step in the process that may
lead to deciding to establish a CSDP mission following the completion of all other planning steps, to which Commission services also contribute.

In short, the Commission is not only an important actor when it comes to implementing CSDP directly – managing the budget – and indirectly – ensuring coordination with non-CSDP instruments – but it is also a substantial contributor to the interdepartmental process leading to the preparation of CSDP interventions and their discussion in Council.

Of course, there is still much left to do to fully deliver a truly comprehensive EU approach. The double-hatting of the HR/VP and the establishment of the EEAS by the Lisbon Treaty were revolutionary steps that, with hindsight, inevitably required some time for the intended gains to emerge. In addition to the non-negligible human, logistic and organisational aspects, the full assimilation of and adjustment to the changes in roles and competences could not take place overnight. However, it can be argued that the transition period was completed in the autumn of 2014, when Jean-Claude Juncker took office as President of the European Commission and included the goal of making the EU a stronger global actor as one of the ten political priorities of his Commission. In parallel, he decided to set up the Commissioners’ Group on External Action, chaired by HR/VP Federica Mogherini, to discuss all EU external action issues with other relevant Commission Vice-Presidents and Commissioners as appropriate, without prejudice to the decision-making competences of the college of Commissioners.

Indeed, the greater consistency achieved at the political level trickles down to services and to regional, country and thematic common strategies that the HR/VP and the Commission discuss and prepare with a view to their submission for endorsement to the Council and the Parliament and which increasingly guide EU external action, including CSDP.

There should be no room for complacency, however, at least not at this stage, so soon after
the Lisbon Treaty (in historical terms). Substantial ground has been covered already: now, the left and right hands of EU external action are aware of what the other is doing. But the goal is for them to go forward hand in hand, not merely in parallel, and the plurality of intense international crises, particularly within the Union’s neighbourhood, suggests that the comprehensive approach should be deepened further to reap the synergies that can still be attained.

The military dimension is particularly important in this respect. On the one hand, the Commission is not well-equipped to contribute given it does not have competence in the area and lacks military resources. In addition, Article 41(2) TEU explicitly forbids the funding using the EU budget of any expenditure directly or indirectly arising in the context of military operations. The discussions in Council in recent years would appear to indicate that Member States may no longer want to keep the Commission at bay when it comes to CSDP military missions and operations but, at any rate, the Commission will remain bound by the Treaty, which will not be easy to change.

As a partial solution, building on the Joint Communication on Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD) and in the context of the Joint Communication proposing an EU-wide strategic framework bringing together the CFSP and non-CFSP concepts of Security Sector Reform in partner countries, in July 2016 the Commission proposed an amendment to the regulation of the IsSP so as to allow the funding of CBSD interventions as a last resort under very specific circumstances (e.g. ‘failed’ states), where military actors may be the only groups available to carry out developmental activities, in line with recent policy developments in the context of the OCDE development policy. It is to be hoped that both Council and Parliament will be able to agree to the proposal soon.

In parallel, the services of the Commission are actively contributing to bringing forward the EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defence and to the implementation of the July 2016 EU-NATO Declaration and the EU-NATO Set of Common Proposals that build and expand on ongoing work in the field of Countering Hybrid Threats. Finally, on 30 November 2016 the Commission put forward an ambitious European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) that aims to enhance cooperation between Member States and promote greater pooling of national defence resources, strengthening the defence European internal market through the establishment, inter alia, of a European Defence Fund that will lead to a Defence Research Programme and the joint development of defence capabilities by groups of Member States.

The direct relevance for CSDP of all of the above initiatives seems clear, as does the European Commission’s role in developing them or contributing to their implementation in its areas of competence. The security of the Union and of its citizens is obviously a top priority for the European Parliament, the Council, the High Representative and also for the European Commission, both externally, including through CSDP and non-CFSP instruments, and internally, by enhancing synergies with the external dimension of the Union’s internal policies. In this context and with full respect of the competences assigned to each institution, the Commission plays, and will continue to play, a fully active role in this area in the best interest of the EU and its citizens.
2.4. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN CSDP

by Jérôme Legrand

It is a commonly accepted view that the European Parliament has very little power (if any) as far as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is concerned, and even less with regard to its defence component, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, a detailed examination of the evolution of CSDP over the last decade reveals quite a different reality.

LEGAL BASIS AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Common Security and Defence Policy is an integral part of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),1 as framed by the Treaty on European Union (TEU). As a matter of fact, in its preamble, the TEU underlines the Member States’ resolve to ‘implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence (…)’. While Article 41 TEU outlines the funding of the CFSP and CSDP, the policy is further described in Articles 42 to 46, in Chapter 2, Section 2 of Title V (‘Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy’), and in Protocols 1, 10 and 11 and Declarations 13 and 14.

Decisions relating to the CSDP are taken by the European Council and the Council of the European Union (Article 42 TEU). They are taken by unanimity, with some notable exceptions relating to the European Defence Agency (EDA, Article 45 TEU) and the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO, Article 46 TEU), to which majority voting applies. Proposals for decisions are normally made by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also acts as Vice-President of the European Commission (the ‘HR/VP’).

The Lisbon Treaty introduced the notion of a European capabilities and armaments policy (Article 42(3) TEU), which will be at the core of the upcoming European Defence Action Plan (EDAP). The latter, to be presented on 30 November 2016, is based on four pillars:2 supporting defence research with the launch of the preparatory action on defence research in 2017; unlocking EU tools to invest in the whole European defence supply chain (especially SMEs); working towards a possible European Defence Fund; and improving the functioning of the single market for defence.

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1 See Title V (‘General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)’) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); see also → 6.1.1 on the EU’s foreign policy.

The Lisbon Treaty also establishes a link between the CSDP and other Union policies by requiring that the EDA and the Commission work in liaison when necessary (Article 45(2) TEU). This concerns in particular the Union’s research, industrial and space policies. This link has created opportunities for the European Parliament (EP) to seek and develop a much stronger bearing on the CSDP than it had in the past.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE CSDP

The specific role of the European Parliament in the CFSP and CSDP is described in Article 36 of the TEU. It has the right to scrutinise the policy and to take the initiative of addressing the HR/VP and the Council on it (Article 36 TEU). It also exercises authority over the policy’s budget (Article 41 TEU). Twice a year, the European Parliament holds debates on progress in implementing the CFSP and the CSDP, and adopts reports: one on the CFSP, drafted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and including elements relating to the CSDP where necessary; and one on the CSDP, drafted by the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE).

Since 2012, the European Parliament and the Member States’ national parliaments have organised two interparliamentary conferences every year in order to debate matters of common foreign and security policy. Interparliamentary cooperation in these areas is foreseen by Protocol 1 to the Lisbon Treaty, which describes the role of the national parliaments in the EU framework.

Innovations in the Lisbon Treaty have provided an opportunity to improve the political coherence of the CSDP. The HR/VP occupies the central institutional role, chairing the Foreign Affairs Council in its ‘Defence Ministers configuration’ (the EU’s CSDP decision-making body) and directing the EDA. The political framework for consultation and dialogue with the European Parliament is evolving in order to allow the Parliament to play a full role in developing the CSDP. Under the Lisbon Treaty,
the European Parliament is a partner shaping the Union’s external relations and is in charge of addressing the challenge of ensuring popular support to the CSDP, as described in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. In particular, the European Parliament examines developments under the CSDP in terms of institutions, capabilities and operations, and ensures that security and defence issues respond to concerns expressed by the EU’s citizens. Deliberations, hearings and workshops are held regularly, devoted to topics including:

- the current 16 civilian and military CSDP missions in the southern Caucasus region, Africa, the Middle East and Asia (November 2016);
- international crises with security and defence implications, and security sector reforms in the aftermath of crises;
- non-EU multilateral security and defence cooperation and structures, in particular regarding NATO;
- international developments with regard to arms control and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- combating international terrorism, piracy, organised crime and trafficking;
- strengthening the European Parliament’s role in the CSDP through EU policies with implications for security and defence (such as internal and border security, infrastructure development, research, and industrial and space policies);
- good practices to improve the effectiveness of security and defence investments and to strengthen the technological and industrial base, ‘smart defence’ and ‘pooling and sharing’;
- institutional developments with regard to: EU military structures; security and defence cooperation within the Union; the EDA; and other EU agencies and structures in the domain of security and defence;
- legislation and political resolutions relating to security and defence, particularly as they pertain to the above-mentioned topics.

The European Parliament holds regular Joint Consultation Meetings (JCMs) with the Council, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission. These meetings allow for the exchange of information on CSDP missions and operations, on implementing the CFSP budget, and on regions of interest and concern. They are part of the consultations between the Parliament and the other EU institutions involved in the CFSP and CSDP that have been taking place since the HR/VP’s declaration on political accountability in 2010. The European Parliament has concluded a series of inter-institutional agreements on CSDP: of note is the

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3 ‘Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home’.

4 *Inter alia*, the EU Satellite Centre (EU SatCen), the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR).
Inter-institutional Agreement of 20 November 2002, which allows the European Parliament to have access to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy, and the 2006 agreement on Budgetary Discipline and Sound Financial Management, which has led to regular political dialogue with the chair of the Political and Security Committee.

Given the key role that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) plays in underwriting European security, the European Parliament participates in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly with a view to developing EU-NATO relations while respecting the independent nature of both organisations. This is particularly important in theatres of operation in which both the EU and NATO are engaged, such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the fights against piracy off the Horn of Africa and against human trafficking in the Mediterranean.

**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSDP**

The principal achievements of the CSDP up to 2014 have been the consolidation of related EU structures under the aegis of the EEAS, and the Council’s definition of the EDA’s statute, seat and operational rules, as foreseen in Article 45(2) TEU.

Recognising the need to provide a strategic impetus for Heads of State or Government, the European Council set a number of initial targets in December 2013 to advance the CSDP. It also tasked the HR/VP and the European Commission with an assessment of the impact of changes in the global environment, with a view to reporting on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, in particular in terms of security developments.

Ahead of the European Council of 25-26 June 2015, HR/VP Federica Mogherini

presented a report on the implementation status of the targets of the December 2013 Council conclusions, as well as initial proposals for the way forward.

These formed the basis for the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 18 May 2015, which were endorsed and taken forward by the European Council of 25-26 June 2015.

On 28 June 2016, the presentation of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) by HR/VP Mogherini to the European Council was another important step towards a stronger CSDP. Welcomed by the EU Heads of State or Government, the EUGS puts a strong emphasis on the security of the European Union, with CSDP as one of the Union’s five broad priorities.

‘Principled pragmatism’, the idea that ‘soft and hard power go hand in hand’, reflects the increased importance the EUGS gives to CSDP. The EUGS also foresees the development of a sectorial strategy, described by many as a White Book that should further specify the civil-military level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities stemming from the strategy.

The importance of the CSDP is further reflected in the EUGS ‘Implementation Plan on Security and Defence’, which the HR/VP presented at the 14 November 2016 Foreign Affairs/Defence Council meeting, and which EU Member States welcomed. Building on the values and priorities of the EUGS, the actionable proposals refer to capability development and the need for a European approach in CSDP missions, which can contribute to three priorities: responding to external conflicts and crises; capacity building of partners; and protecting the Union and its citizens.

Moreover, to ensure a solid follow-up, the implementation of the Global Strategy will be reviewed annually in consultation with the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. With many of the priorities the European Parliament supported being highlighted
in the HR/VP document (e.g. more strategic autonomy for the EU, a high level of cooperation between Member States, a better use of existing CSDP tools and EU-NATO cooperation), the Parliament will no doubt have many opportunities to intervene in the follow-up phase.

Nevertheless, a number of opportunities to advance the CSDP have been missed: attempts to launch operations have either failed, as in Lebanon and Libya, or lagged, as in Mali. As a result, EU Battlegroups\(^5\) have not been deployed, and the permanent headquarters for EU operations has yet to be instituted.

From a wider perspective, and if one is to categorise the key issues at stake, the CSDP could be advanced, the related institutional framework developed, and cooperation among Member States and with the Union’s structures enhanced by a number of orientations, which the EP has advocated in several reports:

* developing a strategic approach with a view to unlocking the full potential of the policy, as provided by the Lisbon Treaty and on the basis of an understanding of where the Union would add value; in such an approach a security and defence white paper should describe the balance to be achieved between the Union and the Member States;\(^6\)

* incorporating defence into the EU’s research and innovation, space and industrial policies, as this would help harmonise civil and military requirements, and would help build CSDP capabilities;\(^7\)

* building on the Union’s institutional framework – in the first instance by upgrading the EDA to exploit the full range of its mission and tasks as defined by the EU Treaties, particularly for the deployment of capabilities and armaments policy under the CSDP (Article 42(3) TEU), and by defining the roles of other Union and European agencies operating in the area of security and defence;\(^8\)\(^9\)

* defining permanent structured cooperation, including EU support to Member States committing military capabilities (as provided for by Article 46 TEU);

* defining the relationship between the various elements of the CSDP: a capabilities and armaments policy (Article 42(3) TEU), permanent structured cooperation (Article 46 TEU), the ‘mutual assistance’ clause (Article 42(7) TEU, which reads like a mutual defence clause), the mutual solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU), the Union’s commitment to progressively framing a common EU defence policy (Article 42(2) TEU), and the EU-NATO relationship.\(^10\)

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5 The EU Battlegroup Concept provides a CSDP instrument for early and rapid military crisis responses. A Battlegroup is a force package – composed of about 1,500 (normally multinational) personnel (a minimum to ensure military effectiveness) – capable of standalone operations or of conducting the initial phase of larger operations. EU Battlegroups have been operational since January 2005.


7 See EP own initiative report 2015/2276(INI) on ‘space capabilities for European security and defence’. See also the first research pilot project agreed in the field of defence research (with activities contracted on 28 October 2016), and the preparatory action (PA) on defence research (both EP-supported endeavours of the European Commission, in cooperation with the EDA).

8 In particular, European intergovernmental agencies outside of EU structures, such as the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), the European Space Agency (ESA), the French-German Research Institute of Saint-Louis (ISL) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol), which either already have or could have roles in EU programmes of security and defence (or ‘dual use’) relevance, inter alia in areas pertaining to space, research and development, standardisation and certification.

9 See the EP yearly reports on CFSP and CSDP, as well as the own initiative report (2014/2258(INI)) on ‘financing the Common Security and Defence Policy’.

10 See own initiative report (2012/2223(INI)) on ‘the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and operational dimensions’.
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S DRIVING FORCE

While recent developments seem to be moving things in the direction supported by the EP, political will and coherent and sustained initiatives will be required to address this list of enhancements to the Common Security and Defence Policy. The European Parliament has, for its part, demonstrated its will to act and to pursue political initiatives in this field.

As a first practical outcome, the Parliament proposed funding a pilot project on CSDP research using the EU’s 2015 budget. This pilot project, approved by the Parliament and the Council in December 2014, means that, for the first time, EU funds will be transferred to the EDA to conduct research on military requirements. Some research projects have been selected (‘Unmanned Heterogeneous Swarm of Sensor Platforms’, ‘Inside Building Awareness and Navigation for Urban Warfare’ and ‘Standardisation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Detect and Avoid’) and are expected to start in November 2016.11 The importance of research on CSDP has been underlined on many occasions, for instance in the EP resolution ‘on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy’ approved in May 2015, where the Parliament called on Member States ‘to achieve the collective target of 2 % of our defence spending on research funding’.12

The European Parliament has taken the lead in scrutinising the advancement of the CSDP and analysing the policy’s setbacks. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it has solicited in over twenty resolutions the effective implementation of the CSDP. One of the latest examples of its proactive role is the own-initiative report ‘on the EU in a changing global environment – a more connected, contested and complex world’, adopted in April 2016. On that occasion, the Parliament advocated the pooling of multinational military units with the ultimate goal of creating a European Defence Union, and the adoption of a White Paper on EU defence, together with the strengthening of EU-NATO cooperation.

Awaiting the Parliament’s first reading, the own-initiative report ‘on the European Defence Union’ will be as important as the above-mentioned initiatives in setting the guidelines for a more coherent CSDP. In its draft form, the report encourages the European Council to lead the framing of the European Defence Union and calls for greater and more systematic European defence cooperation among Member States. Among the various recommendations, it also advocates the establishment of multinational forces under the PESCO framework, and an enhanced role for the EDA.

The Parliament has also acted as a motivating force by stimulating the debate and questioning Member States’ actions. In this sense, its informal role has been as important as the formal one foreseen by the treaties. It is undeniable that the mutually beneficial interchange between the Parliament and important international think tanks has produced ‘food for thought’ in current debates on CSDP.

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An example of timely debate was the workshop organised by SEDE on a study: ‘On the way towards a European Defence Union – A White Book as a first step’, coordinated by former NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, and released in April 2016. This report sets out a concrete proposal for an EU White Paper on defence and specifically recommends that the European Parliament upgrade the Subcommittee on Security and Defence to a fully-fledged Committee and strengthen cooperation with national parliaments. In that regard, the European Parliament could take advantage of the provisions for interparliamentary cooperation in Protocol 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon.13

The European Parliament also plays an important role in parliamentary diplomacy. Its President is invited to speak at or participate in major events, be they internal to the EU (such as European Council meetings) or international; at global or regional level; and in institutional or informal formats (UN General Assembly, G7 and G20, NATO meetings, Munich Security Conferences, etc.). Interparliamentary dialogue with strategic partners of the EU, such as the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue with the USA, or in the framework of EU-NATO relations,14 also allows the EP to engage in open discussions on fundamental developments in the western security and defence environment. This is yet another way for the EP to exercise its legislative scrutiny and budgetary role and contribute to shaping EU policies in the field of security and defence.

CONCLUSION

As illustrated above, in reality, the European Parliament exercises much more influence on CSDP than is commonly known. The follow-up to the recent EU-NATO joint declaration of July 2016 on cooperation, for instance, is an important development which the European Parliament will monitor closely. This is a key role at a time when the request for increased security by the populations of the Member States is also one of the few uncontested demands for more Europe.

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13 ‘Will CSDP enjoy ‘collateral gains’ from France’s invocation of the EU’s ‘mutual defence clause’?’, In-depth analysis by Jérôme Legrand, European Parliament, December 2015.
14 Members of AFET and SEDE participate in the EP permanent delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
2.5. THE EEAS AND ITS CRISIS MANAGEMENT COMPONENT

by Arnold Kammel

The idea of setting up a European diplomatic service dates back to the ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ which was not ratified, and provided for the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS) to assist the Union’s Foreign Minister. With the ‘Treaty on European Union’, the post of Foreign Minister became that of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and at the same time Vice-President of the Commission.

MANDATE

The competences of the EEAS had however remained unchanged, and Article 27(3) TEU stipulates:

‘In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.’

In March 2010, the High Representative proposed her draft Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS to the Council that - after some deliberation with the European Parliament - was finally adopted on 26 July 2010. The EEAS was established as a ‘functionally autonomous body’ of the EU, ‘separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission’ and ‘with the legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives’ (Article 1(2) EEAS Decision).

TASKS AND STRUCTURE

In general, the tasks of the EEAS include ensuring the consistency and coordination of the Union’s external action and preparing policy proposals and implementing them following approval by the Council. It should be noted that the tasks of the EEAS are quite complex. Firstly, the EEAS is to ‘support the High Representative in fulfilling his/her mandates’ (Article 2(1) EEAS Decision), the enumeration of which reflects Articles 18 and 27 TEU and includes conducting the CFSP and CSDP (Article 18(2) TEU), ensuring the consistency of the EU’s external action (Article 18(4) TEU), presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 18(3) TEU), and acting as Vice-President of the Commission. The latter capacity not only includes ‘responsibilities incumbent on [the Com-
mission] in external relations’ but also ‘coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action’ (Article 18(4) TEU). Secondly, the EEAS must ‘assist the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations’ (Article 2(2) EEAS Decision).

Thirdly, the EEAS is to ‘support, and work in cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the Member States as well as the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, in order to ensure consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas and its other policies’ (Article 3(1) EEAS Decision and Article 21(3), second subparagraph, TEU). Fourthly, it must ‘extend appropriate support and cooperation to the other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular to the European Parliament’ (Article 3(4) EEAS Decision).

The EEAS is composed of desks dealing with single geographical or thematic areas and also comprises the Union Delegations under the author-
EEAS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

Mr Pedro Serrano, Deputy Secretary General of the EEAS, is responsible for the Common Security and Defence Policy and its crisis management structures. These structures comprise, in particular:

- the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD),
- the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC),
- the EU Military Staff (EUMS),
- the Security and Conflict Prevention Directorate (SECPOL),
- the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN).

In December 2016, a new Division complemented the crisis management structures, which deals with Prevention of conflicts, Rules of Law/security sector reform, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation (PRISM).

The crisis management structures
**CMPD**

The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) has been tasked, strategically and politically, with: planning and following up civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (acting under the responsibility of the Council and the HR); providing assistance and advice to the High Representative and the relevant EU Council bodies; and initiating, developing and coordinating a number of activities to further develop civilian and military crisis management capabilities and partnerships with organisations such as the UN, NATO and OSCE and with third states, including in relation to horizontal aspects of EU crisis management as well as concepts, training, exercises and lessons.

The CMPD works in close cooperation with the EUMS, CPCC and other relevant (crisis management) bodies, including the European Commission.

CMPD is composed of four divisions:
1. Coordination
2. Capabilities, concepts, training and exercises
3. Integrated strategic planning
4. CSDP partnerships and agreements

**EUMS**

The EU Military Staff (EUMS) works under the direction of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and under the authority of the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP). It can best be described as the source of collective military expertise within the European External Action Service (EEAS).

As an integral component of the EEAS’s comprehensive Approach, the EUMS coordinates military action, with a particular focus on operations/missions (both military and those requiring military support) and the creation of military capability. Enabling activity in support of this output includes: early warning (via the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity, SIAC), situation assessment, strategic planning, communications and information systems, cyber capability, logistics, concept development, training and education, and support of partnerships through military-military relationships.

Concurrently, the EUMS is responsible for running the EU Operations Centre (OPSCEN) and providing the Centre’s core staff when it is brought into play. The Centre would be able to lead military operations and missions as an Operational Headquarters (OHQ). In addition, a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) will be established within the EUMS. The DG EUMS will become responsible for the planning and conduct of all military non-executive missions at the military-strategic level. Whilst he will retain responsibility for the missions, it is within his remit to delegate tasks as appropriate.

EUMS is composed of five directorates:
1. Concepts and Capability
2. Intelligence
3. Operations
4. Logistics
5. Communications and Information Systems

**EU INTCEN**

The EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) is the exclusive civilian intelligence service of the European Union, providing intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness to the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to the EEAS, to various EU decision-making bodies in the fields of CSFP and CSDP and counterterrorism, as well as to the EU Member States. EU INTCEN monitors and assesses international events 24 hours a day, seven days a week, focusing in particular on sensitive geographical regions, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats.

However, EU INTCEN has no formal mandate to collect intelligence as traditionally under-
stood. Its analytical products are based on intelligence from the EU Member States’ intelligence and security services and on open-source intelligence (OSINT). In cooperation with the EUMS Intelligence Directorate, EU INTCEN produces intelligence reports under the heading of Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), which combines civilian and military intelligence.

EU INTCEN has its roots in the Joint Situation Centre set up in 1999 as an open-source intelligence unit under the supervision of the then High Representative Javier Solana. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001, Solana decided to use the Joint Situation Centre to start producing intelligence-based classified assessments. In 2002 it was renamed the EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) and was made a directorate of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. When the European External Action Service (EEAS) was founded in 2010 it became one of its Directorates. In 2012, it was renamed the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN).

INTCEN is composed of four divisions:
1. Intelligence analysis
2. Open source intelligence
3. Situation room
4. Consular crisis management

The CPCC thus acts as the permanent operational headquarters for civilian CSDP missions. It is responsible for the operational planning and conduct of civilian CSDP crisis management missions and oversees the implementation of all mission-related tasks. The CPCC provides support for missions, is involved in developing doctrine and concepts, and provides missions with guidance on cross-cutting issues.

The CPCC is composed of three divisions:
1. Conduct of Operations
2. Chief of Staff/Horizontal coordination
3. Mission support

SECPOL

The Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention (SECPOL) supports the High Representative’s task of framing policies to fulfil the EU’s objective to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with Article 21(2)(c) of the Treaty on European Union.

The Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention provides the various crisis management bodies with conflict risk assessments. It uses conflict analysis to assess the impact on actual and potential conflicts of a planned CSDP mission, supports the development of conflict mitigation strategies and conflict prevention missions, and contributes to the overall expertise on conflict, peace and security inside the crisis management bodies.

In addition, SECPOL’s responsibilities cover disarmament, non-proliferation, arms export control, the sanctions regime, and the fight against terrorism and organised crime, as well as addressing external security threats, including those relating to outer space and the maritime and cyber domains.

SECPOL is composed of four divisions:
1. Disarmament – non-proliferation and arms export control
2. Counter-terrorism
3. Security policy and space policy
4. Sanctions policy
A new Division within the CSDP was created in December 2016 by merging the Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Division (SECPOL.2) with the Crisis Response and Coordination Division (CSDP.1).

Its name is PRISM, standing for Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/security sector reform, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation.

Located in the organisation chart immediately below Deputy Secretary General Pedro Serrano and linked with a dotted line to the Deputy Secretary General for Political affairs, Jean-Christophe Belliard, PRISM will be a focal point for the EEAS and Commission – complementing CSDP, and geographical and cross-departmental activities – for coordinating EU responses to the conflict cycle, including conflict analysis, early warning, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, mediation, security sector reform and the rule of law, crisis response and stabilisation.

PRISM aims to be an agile and specialised service provider, recognised across the EU institutions, and by Member States and external partners, as catalysing the delivery of an integrated EU response in fragile and conflict-affected areas. The Division will act as a centre of expertise on policy, programming, training, technical support and operational issues across the phases of the conflict cycle.

PRISM is composed of four thematic teams:
1. Early Warning System and Conflict Prevention
2. Team Mediation Support Team
3. Stabilisation and Crisis Response Team
4. Rule of Law, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Team

The Division will also be organised into geographical teams, with each team offering cross-sectional expertise.

**CONCLUSION**

The EEAS is at the crossroads between intra-EU institutional competition, Member States’ interests and a changing international order. Thus, the functioning of the EEAS depends not only on political factors related to the political will of the Member States or EU institutions, but also on the legal competences the EEAS enjoys on the basis of the EU Treaties and secondary legislation. Whereas the EEAS’ main purpose is to allow the EU to better organise its external relations and to pursue speaking with one voice, the current legal setup has taken account of the fact that the EU is not a federation of states and that Member States continue to play a (sometimes autonomous) role in international relations. By overcoming these internal issues, however, the EEAS will be a useful vehicle for extending influence in world politics.
2.6. EEAS CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISM

by Pedro Serrano

The EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM) is an internal EEAS procedure consisting of arrangements and structures for responding in a coordinated and synergic way to crises and emergencies – including hybrid threats – of an external nature or with an external dimension, potentially or actually impacting the interests of the EU or any Member State.

WHAT IS A CRISIS?

For the purposes of the CRM, a crisis or an emergency is a sudden, serious deterioration of the political, security and/or economic situation or an event or development in a given country or region that might have an impact on the security interests of the EU or the security of EU personnel or citizens.

Responses to crises and emergencies implemented through the CRM should envisage the use of all available resources in a coordinated and synergic way, in line with the EU’s comprehensive approach.

ACTIVATION

Upon the occurrence of a serious situation or emergency concerning or in any way involving the external dimension of the EU, the Deputy Secretary General (DSG) for Crisis Response consults with the High Representative/Vice President (HRVP) or the Secretary General (SG) and EEAS senior managers and, if the situation so warrants, activates the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism.

The Deputy Secretary General for Crisis Response can also be requested to initiate the Crisis Response Mechanism by the HRVP, the SG or another DSG or Managing Director (MD). In the DSG’s absence, responsibility is transferred to a designated representative; for practical purposes, the latter will be by default the Director of INT-CEN.

ELEMENTS OF THE CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISM

The fundamental elements of the Crisis Response Mechanism are: the Crisis Meeting; the catalogue of possible Immediate Action; the Crisis Cell; the Crisis Platform; and the Task Force.

The CRISIS MEETING gathers EEAS, Commission and Council senior managers directly affected by the crisis in question. It assesses the short-term effects of the crisis and may decide to implement one or more of the following courses of action: (A) taking immediate action; (B) activating the Crisis Cell; (C) convening a Crisis Platform. Those courses of action can be implemented in any time sequence.

The Crisis Meeting may agree on some immediate action to be taken, including providing guidance and support to the EU Delegation, providing guidance to CSDP missions and operations, intensifying international contacts and action, issuing public messages, initiating CSDP prudent planning and launching fact finding missions, among others.

The CRISIS CELL provides support to the EEAS Headquarters’ decision-makers and ensures
that decisions taken in the Crisis Meeting are implemented. It is co-directed by a representative of the DSG for Crisis Response and a representative of the services primarily involved in the crisis. It is composed of a number of workstations manned by representatives of EEAS, Commission and Council services involved in the response to the crisis.

The aim of the CRISIS PLATFORM is to gather together relevant EEAS, Commission and Council services to assess the medium and long-term effects of crises and agree on action to be taken. It is chaired by the HR/VP, the Secretary General or the DSG for Crisis Response. The Crisis Platform may agree on activating the Task Force, evaluates its implementation reports, decides on possible further measures and discusses proposals for Council action. The Crisis Platform is an ad-hoc meeting; therefore, it is not permanently activated.

The TASK FORCE is directed by the competent geographic MD and composed of representatives of the services involved in the response. Its aim is to follow and facilitate the implementation of the EU response. The Task Force evaluates the impact of EU action, prepares policy documents and options papers, contributes to the preparation of the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCAs), develops its own action plan, develops a roadmap and reviews it periodically, contributes to the communication strategy, and adopts any other arrangements that can facilitate the implementation of the EU response.

The Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements are activated by the EU Presidency or upon request from one or more Member States. They allow for rapid consultation of EU Member States at political level in the event of emergencies or crises of political significance and with a wide-ranging impact, taking place either inside or outside the EU.

The EEAS contributes to the IPCR process, including by providing input for Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA) reports. The Situation Room is the EEAS central IPCR 24/7 contact point.

A Crisis Platform meeting brings together experts from the EEAS, the European Commission and the Council.
Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements.

Trigger events
- Grave deterioration of law & order in third countries
- Serious deterioration of external situation (countries, regions)
- Serious international incident
- Risks for EUDEL
- Risks for CSDP Operations/Missions
- Risks for EU citizens abroad
- Notification of threat by Hybrid Fusion Cell
- Others

Other starters
- Request from HR/VP or SG
- Request from other DSGs or Mds
- European Council/Council request
- Member States or Commission

Enhanced Data Collection
- EU INTCEN
- Watchkeeping Capability
- Geo Desks/EU Delegations
- Early Warning System
- EUMS Intel Directorate
- Others

DSG-CSDP
- Instructs INTCEN to enhance data collection
- Consults with Senior Managers
- Makes initial assessment
- Proposes priority actions
- Requests establishment of POCs in relevant departments
- Reports to SG and/or

Crisis Meeting
- Situation on the ground
- Security risks for EU staff and EU citizens
- Risks for EU interests
- International reaction

Possible immediate action
- Follow-up Crisis Meetings
- Launch Fact Finding missions
- Activate other analytical tools
- Others

Action
- Activate Crisis Cell

Convene Crisis Platform
- Convene FAC
- Recommend European Council

Guidance/support to EUDEL
- Guidance to CSDP Missions/Operations
- Public Messages
- Intiate CSDP prudent planning
- Intensification of international contacts

Inform/get support from
- Member States
- PSC/COOREPER
- Convene FAC
- Recommend European Council

Continuous situation monitoring
- Reporting to EEAS and COM
- Advising hierarchy
- Assisting and supporting CSDP missions and operations through chains of command
- Contribute to Communication Strategy

1. Assessment — Medium term effects of crisis
   - Evaluate result of EU action
   - Prepare policy documents, option papers, PFCAs
   - Contribute to PFCA
   - Develop Action Plan
   - Develop roadmap and review it periodically
   - Evaluation of Task Force Implementation reports and decision on further measures
   - Proposals for Council action

2. Action
   - Activation of Task Force
3 CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
3.1. HOW TO LAUNCH A CSDP MISSION OR OPERATION

by Ana Isabel Xavier and Jochen Rehrl

Framed by the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) forms an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and is one of the main pillars of EU external action. Under the treaty, CSDP was drafted as a crisis management tool and envisages a progressive definition of a common EU defence policy, thus consolidating the development of operational (civil and military) capabilities for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and enhancing international security, in full accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

To this end, Member States may form multinational civilian and military forces that can be deployed for different missions and operations: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, military advice and assistance, and conflict prevention and peacekeeping, including post-conflict stabilisation. These all contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting non-EU countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

Since the first mission in 2003, the EU has already carried out around 30 civilian missions and military operations¹ in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia for the purposes of peace consolidation, observation and monitoring of elections or combating piracy and irregular migration.

THE PROCEDURE

To address the complex changing nature of today’s crises, in the last few years the European Union has been evolving in its commitment towards crisis management, both through civilian missions and military operations. In fact, as established by the Treaty on European Union, the EU has the ability to conduct a wide range of tasks which cover the full range of the crisis management cycle (prevention/intervention/peacebuilding).

Crisis response planning starts as soon as an emerging crisis is identified by the EU at the political level, but the range of bodies and structures involved spans both the political strategic level and the military strategic/operational level. For that purpose, the EU has developed a flexible, five-step decision-making process tailored to the CSDP:

Phase 1 – Monitoring and early warning

This phase represents the daily routine of crisis management, which consists of monitoring, planning and anticipating crises and serious threats. At the beginning of each presidency, the Council holds a discussion on the global environment, based on the geographic and thematic working groups, consultation activities and a ‘watch list’, regularly updated by the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

This phase in fact involves a fourfold responsibility: the Member States and the Commission monitor the situation on an early-warning basis; the PSC is informed both by the Member States and the Commission, as well as by the Council. Moreover, both the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) assess the risks of potential crises, provide advice and make recommendations (military in the case of the EUMC and civilian in the case of CIVCOM) to the PSC.

When a crisis occurs, a document called the ‘Political Framework for Crisis Approach’ (PFCA) is drafted by the EEAS geographic desk supported by all services and the respective EU delegation. The outcome of the PFCA will be a broad range of options available to the EU. This document mirrors the comprehensive integrated approach and the political leaders will decide on which tools should be used to tackle the crisis.

In this phase, and in accordance with the provisions of the standing arrangements for consultation, NATO, the UN and other international, regional and non-governmental organisations are regularly consulted or involved in the political dialogue, planning and coordination.

Phase 2 – Drawing up the Crisis Management Concept

If the PSC considers that CSDP action may be appropriate, if and once a crisis erupts (or in a preventive manner), a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is drafted, identifying the political interests of the EU, the strategic options and the final goal. The CMC is the conceptual backbone
of crisis management operations as it ensures the coherence and comprehensiveness of EU instruments and tools in the crisis management field.

It cannot be governed by a ‘one model fits all’ assumption, as it is triggered by different and complex variables, from the stage of a crisis to its nature and location. Those variables are assessed through periodic joint assessments by the Council Secretariat and the Commission, information gathering and consultation with international and regional organisations, as well as with the European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN), which collects, processes and reports information to the competent decision-making and crisis management bodies.

The CMC is drafted by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), which is the primary service for political strategic planning on CSDP, supported by the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The CMC analyses the situation and proposes options. The High Representative (HR) submits the CMC to the PSC, which gathers advice from EUMC and CIVCOM, depending on the engagement in question.

When the CMC has been agreed by the PSC, the document is forwarded to the Council for approval. A Council decision on the ‘establishment of a mission/operation’ is the result of this process. At the same time, a force-sensing mechanism is initiated, in which the Member States provide first indications of whether they will contribute and if so, with which forces.

On the basis of this Council decision, one or several Status of Mission/Forces Agreements (SOMA/SOFA) are negotiated and, pending the decision of the Member States, non-EU countries are invited to join the CSDP engagement. In addition and only for military operations, the operation headquarters (OHQ) are identified and the operation commander (OpCdr) is appointed. CPCC is the permanent operation headquarters for all civilian missions; hence, no decision on the civilian OHQ has to be taken. However, the Council decision for civilian missions needs an annexed budgetary impact statement (BIS), which is not necessary for military operations (Athena mechanism).
Phase 3 – Operation planning

In this phase, the concept of operations (CONOPS) and the operation plan (OPLAN) are drafted. Both documents are produced by the operation commander and his/her team. The operation commander presents the CONOPS to the PSC, which submits it to the Council for approval, if necessary.

For military operations, the Initiating Military Directive (IMD), developed by the EUMS, is a comprehensive ‘guideline’ that gathers all the directives that will allow the operation commander (OpCdr) to develop the concept of operations (CONOPS), the Statement of Forces Requirement (SOR) and the detailed script of the operation plan (OPLAN). It is then up to the PSC to note or approve the IMD and request the authorisation of the EUMC as the OpCdr needs to prepare a draft CONOPS and a SOR.

As soon as the Council approves the CONOPS, the OpCdr (responsible for conducting the military operation and reporting its progress to the EUMC) will start the force generation process. This process is particularly important, because its success depends on the political commitment of the Member States, through the force generation conferences, to gather the military assets and capabilities and constitute the troop-contributing nations (TCN).

The next step requires Member States to agree on their rights, obligations, immunities or facilities as defined in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). A draft proposal is submitted by the PSC to the Council as well as the draft military and civilian OPLANs. Both the Status of Forces Agreement and the operation plan process involve a complex advice and recommendation cycle before the Council approves the rules of engagement (military operations) or the rules for the use of force (civilian missions with an executive mandate). This phase is finalised with the Council decision on the ‘launch of an operation/mission’.

Phase 4 – Deployment and implementation

The chosen measures are thus implemented with the political control and strategic direction of the PSC, under the authority of the Council. In this phase, the EUMC monitors and reports on execution to the PSC. For civilian missions, the Head of Mission is responsible for command and
control in theatre whereas the civilian operation commander is the one who reports back and is accountable vis-à-vis the PSC.

**Phase 5 – Strategic review: maintain, refocus or terminate**

The conduct of missions and operations is regularly reviewed, in particular their respective mandates and structures. The result of these reviews can be that the mission/operation will remain with an unchanged mandate, will refocus its priorities or that EU action in theatre will finish.

This phase demands a (re-)evaluation of the situation and the revision of the CMC by the PSC, which forwards a recommendation to the Council in order to examine the action taken with the Member States. A CSDP action can also be terminated without any further ado if an end-date is mentioned in the Council decision. Another option to terminate a CSDP mission/operation is through a new Council decision, which will state that the mission is accomplished and that the CSDP mission will end at a given time.

**LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS**

The lessons learned process follows the various phases of decision-making. Each of the three CSDP structures at EU HQ (CMPD, CPCC and EUMS) has its own internal system for recording, analysing and implementing lessons learned. The CMPD collects lessons from political-strategic planning of CSDP missions and operations and from the related strategic reviews.

The CPCC collects lessons from operational planning, conduct and support of civilian CSDP missions. The EUMS collects lessons from advance planning and support given to military HQ and from reports from missions and operations. As far as possible, lessons are also collected through visits by officials from Brussels HQ to CSDP missions and operations and through interviews with mission and operation staff and other stakeholders.

**CONCLUSION**

This five-phase procedure was implemented as a guideline in order to coordinate the crisis management tools, ensure their complementarity and rapidly deploy the capabilities of the EU Member States, which constitute the backbone of the EU’s external action on the ground. Although these procedures have been quite successful until now, future efforts must be focused on fast-tracking the decision-making process in order to rapidly deploy missions and operations on behalf of the EU. Rapid and preventive deployment should be the goal.
Since 2003, the European Union has launched 13 military CSDP missions and operations. Deployed in two continents, on land and at sea, these missions and operations constitute the military contribution to the European Union’s comprehensive approach to crisis management. Their objective, regardless of the geographical area they are deployed in, is to support efforts to restore stability and build security in states and regions in the Union’s periphery. Today, six EU-led military missions and operations are active.

The mandates of these missions and operations, given through a resolution of the United Nations Security Council or via a request by the host nation, have been diverse. This underpins the inherently flexible and adaptable nature of the military approach which allowed and enabled the smooth development of the EU’s engagement, following developments in the country in question. The example of the gradual development of the executive EU military operation in Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR) to a non-executive Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM CAR) and later to a Training Mission (EUTM CAR) has educational value in this sense.

**STABILITY PROJECTION AND SECURITY BUILDING**

The lack of quick and spectacular results may create frustration. Nevertheless, ‘quick wins’ were never anticipated or expected, although they would definitely be welcome. The nature of the
military engagement in the current CSDP missions and operations is fundamentally different from the common military tasks, as undertaken under national control and within national borders. Although the military is linked to the ‘hard’ element of the power nations or organisations possess, and rightly so, in this unique EU approach, it is wrapped in a ‘velvet glove’.

Its presence in the host nation or in the seas adjacent to unstable regions is intended to project stability rather than power, and to increase security.

The European Union’s commitment to peace and security in Africa is growing, and the deterioration of the security environment in parts of that continent – which is very important for Europe – namely the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia, creates challenges and threats that need to be adequately and effectively addressed. From the European side it is acknowledged that the key to achieving a sustainable Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) is to encourage, enable and support the local security institutions in building up their own capacities. To this end, creating ownership of the endeavour and enjoying the extensive support of all concerned stakeholders in the nation in question are ‘sine qua non’.

In this context the tasks entrusted to the military include supporting indigenous security building, providing advice to the respective security institutions in areas such as operations, plans, logistics, administration and legal affairs, as well as providing specialised training to the Armed Forces of the respective host nation.

Great emphasis is placed on advancing constitutional and democratic order over the military apparatus and on strengthening the rule of law. The strengthening of the local armed forces’ effectiveness, reforming them into a modernised, ethnically balanced and democratically accountable institution and the restoration of their credibility and overall image among the population is fundamental for a security environment that will stand the test of time. Although the mandates of each of these three non-executive EU military missions differ, reflecting the different needs and priorities of the respective host nation, they are similar in that the focus is on operating in the background and doing an in-depth job, which requires patience, persistence and commitment: these qualities are encoded into the DNA of the military.

EXECUTIVE CHARACTER AND MANDATE

The same approach can be unmistakeably identified in the EU’s military operations. Their executive character and mandate prioritise the relevant tasks. The wording used here is stronger: ‘[… maintain a Safe and Secure Environment’ in the case of EUFOR ALTHEA, ‘[…] protection of shipping, deterrence projection, repression of acts of piracy’ in the case of EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, ‘[…] disrupt the business model of human smugglers and traffickers’ in the case of EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA. Here again, there are no quick fixes: EUFOR ALTHEA took over the responsibility of maintaining a Safe and Secure Environment from NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 2004; EUNAVFOR ATALANTA has been operating in the Indian Ocean since 2008. EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA is likely to be active for quite a long time as well. Here
again, the flexibility and adaptability of the military instrument has proven its importance. Over time, and following developments on the ground and the initial phased concept of the operation, the operations evolved to incorporate amended or additional tasks.

In certain instances, these tasks are of a rather non-executive character, such as an operation to ‘[…] support the capacity building and training of the coastguard’.

TRANSNATIONAL, MULTIDIMENSIONAL AND DYNAMIC THREATS

Over the last decade, the security environment in the regions adjacent to Europe has changed significantly. New challenges and threats have surfaced to join conventional, persistent ones. These include terrorism, cybersecurity [hybrid threat], the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, transnational organised crime, piracy or armed conflicts. The European Union’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy accurately identifies these challenges and threats and offers a vision for the European Union’s role as a credible security provider.

New threats call for new responses. Most if not all of them are transnational, multidimensional and dynamic threats that blur the boundaries of the traditional internal/external security division; a joined-up civilian-military response is thus required in order to successfully tackle them. The European Union has to be inventive, adaptable and strong-willed to become a recognised strategic actor.

Making better use of the instruments already in its extensive tool box, as well as fine-tuning and supplementing them with a number of additional features to bridge identified gaps or cover shortfalls will be sufficient to enable the Union to fulfil this role.
The military CSDP missions and operations are faced with challenges that are internal as well as external to the European Union, adding to the overall complexity. All of them are quite well known and have been thoroughly analysed. The European Union has been extensively criticised over an alleged slowness in its responses. Even more criticism was generated by the reluctance it has shown to use its rapid response forces, namely, the Battlegroups. It cannot be denied that the established decision-making procedures within the European Union are indeed time-consuming. It could be argued, however, that they are designed in this way precisely in order to facilitate this process, in an institution that currently brings together 28 sovereign nations with equal votes. At the same time, whenever time was critical, such as in the case of Operation Artemis or EUFOR CAR, adequate flexibility was demonstrated and decisions were made in a very timely fashion, a fact that has been widely acknowledged. This proves that the specific challenge can be addressed, provided that the political will to do so is present.

The same argument could be used in favour of the potential deployment of the Battlegroups, an instrument that this year celebrates its tenth anniversary but has never been used, despite the fact that on several occasions it could have constituted the proper response. Ten years after its birth, it is high time to revisit the Battlegroups concept and examine how relevant it still is to contemporary challenges. It is time to ask ourselves some hard questions, such as whether we still need (or want) to have this kind of rapid response capability and, depending on the answers, to take the respective decisions. If the outcome of this debate is that the challenges and threats the European Union is up against require that sort of capability, then it must not only be preserved, but developed into something meaningful and useful. And if it is useful, then it needs and deserves to be used. Like the issue of decision-making, this one is also a matter of political will.
Adequate financing is another challenge the EU military missions and operations face. Military operations are usually financed through national funding, although some can be financed through collective funding under the provisions of the ‘Athena’ mechanism. This arrangement does not make participation in the missions and operations attractive, and for the most part discourages the smaller Member States, or those affected by the financial crisis, from making a more active contribution. The upcoming review of the ‘Athena’ mechanism in 2017 provides a unique opportunity to address this issue, which increases and to a certain extent explains, reluctance to deploy the Battlegroups. In the case of the EU military missions, financing should also cover the provision of relevant material support to the recipients of their training programmes, if the latter are to be of any meaning operationally. It should be noted that the overall cost of the CSDP to the European Union budget is minimal, in stark contrast with the importance placed upon it. The revision of the ‘Athena’ mechanism in this way is likely to produce secondary effects that will improve the attractiveness of potential contributing nations, facilitating the creation of follow-on forces and improving the sustainability of the endeavour. The expectation is that this opportunity will be seized and a political decision will be made to facilitate the operation and maximise the effectiveness of CSDP military engagement.

PERMANENT EU HEADQUARTERS

The way the European Union will address the identified shortcomings and gaps in the way CSDP military missions and operations are currently planned and conducted constitute a different
kind of challenge. Amongst these shortcomings are the extended periods of absence commanders are obliged to take from their posts in order to be in Brussels. They also result in the loss of the valuable, hard-won experience, lessons learnt and valuable expertise gained after a mission or operation concludes. The procedures followed so far in the EU, and that are tested, proven and coherent, differ from those used by national defence institutions. The creation of an EU permanent planning and conducting structure and of an operational headquarters have been clearly identified as the corrective steps, streamlining EU practices with well-established and proven norms. The challenge is to strike a balance between those Member States that call for a more ambitious development of European Union military capabilities, and those that express scepticism on the grounds of avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO, a subject on which there is unanimous agreement.

Agreement also exists on deepening cooperation with NATO in a number of commonly identified areas of mutual interest. This is also a field that presents a challenge, taking into account the different nature of each institution and the prevailing political sensitivities of certain Member States. Practical cooperation is exercised at the tactical level, by solving problems on the ground and maximising the effectiveness of the respective missions and operations.

**INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY**

The blurring of the boundaries of the traditional internal/external security division and the acknowledgement of the need to address the internal/external security nexus demand, rather than require, the closer cooperation between the military and security forces. This has already been witnessed in a number of Member States, which mobilised their national Armed Forces in order to respond to situations such as the migrant crisis, whose intensity overwhelmed the capacities of the responsible civilian authorities. In the future, there may be a request for an EU military mission to provide this kind of support to a Member State, as some have already implied.

The invocation of Article 42.(7) (mutual assistance clause) of the TEU by France, following the deadly November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris raised the issue and fuelled the discussions about the ways in which the European Union might provide assistance to a Member State in a similar situation in the future. This discussion also included Article 222 (solidarity clause) of the TFEU.

The explicit reference of the latter to the use of the military resources available to the European Union (‘[…] mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States […]’), presents an additional opportunity to reflect on the ways this could be made possible, in particular because Article 222 TFEU is not part of the Common Security and Defence Policy and therefore does not fall under the responsibility of the EUMC.

**EU: GLOBAL ACTOR AND SECURITY PROVIDER**

The European Union is a global actor and a security provider. As such it enjoys great respect and is highly regarded. Nevertheless, these cannot be taken for granted: an actor's position in the international system and its relative power is constantly evaluated and recalculated, based upon its decisions and its positions. In the contemporary security environment, characterised by instability and revisionism, new actors – state and non-state alike – have emerged. If the European Union wants to be acclaimed as a respected security provider it needs to decisively and convincingly position itself as such. At the conceptual level, the presentation of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy and the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence was very timely. Now, it is time for action.
3.3. CHALLENGES FOR CIVILIAN CSDP MISSIONS

by Kate Fearon and Sophie Picavet

The civilian CSDP missions promote stability and build resilience in fragile environments through strengthening rule of law institutions and key leaders. They are just one tool in the EU’s toolbox for dealing with security and defence matters, and they work together with EU delegations in theatre, military CSDP missions and Operations and with Commission Directorates such as Development Cooperation. Thus they work to link up the three essential elements of the EU’s integrated approach as articulated in its Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) (hereinafter the ‘Global Strategy’) – diplomacy, security and defence, and development.

TEN CIVILIAN MISSIONS ON THREE CONTINENTS

In 2016 there were ten civilian missions on three continents (Kosovo, Ukraine, Georgia, Niger, Mali, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya), with around 2500 staff deployed in theatre and a budget of around EUR 200 million. The missions are supported by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which is the Brussels-based Operational Headquarters. The CPCC is a directorate of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

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1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
Mission mandates are set by the Council of the European Union and agreed with host states, who invite missions to assist them. Though the mandates vary from place to place, they usually involve supporting local institutions and key leaders in law enforcement. Specifically, the institutions concerned usually include the public prosecution services, the police, border management, the coastguard, customs, prisons and the judiciary. Thematically, they work on issues such as public order policing, community policing, organised and transnational crime, irregular migration, anti-corruption, human resources management, human rights and gender concerns in the criminal justice system.

The civilian missions are concerned with increasing the capacity of law enforcement institutions by monitoring, mentoring and advising on their organisation and on the legislative and policy framework in which they operate, and by training their personnel. One mission has an executive mandate, and so it also investigates, prosecutes and adjudicates criminal cases.

Several missions operate in high-threat security environments – in 2016 the Afghanistan, Niger, Mali and Libya missions operated in theatres with a HIGH security risk rating. The Civilian Operations Commander, acting on behalf of the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission, owes a ‘duty of care’ towards all staff.

Before getting into the challenges, we will first present a whistle-stop tour of mission achievements in 2016. Thus, for example, in Kosovo the EULEX mission implemented EU-facilitated dialogue agreements on integrated border management, vehicles and licence plates, civil protection, police and judicial integration, thus promoting normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as arresting high profile public figures, demonstrating that no one is above the law and that everyone must abide by it.

In Ukraine the mission (EUAM) facilitated the Minister of the Interior’s rolling out of a nationwide community policing programme, based on its successful pilot programme in one police station.

In Georgia the mission (EUMM) reduced tension and facilitated agreements between the conflicting parties through its hotline and its ability to quickly deploy staff to remote locations where incidents occurred.

In Niger, the mission (EUCAP Sahel Niger) completed a revision of the training manual for the police force, and facilitated the operationalisation of the ‘PC Mixte’ Command post concept – a mechanism that will enhance coordination between the various internal security forces.

In Mali the civilian mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali) supported the complete overhaul of the national training curriculum for police, thus ensuring sustainable, standardised and high quality training for all new recruits and seasoned officers alike, that will in the future include modules on human rights and gender as standard.

In Palestine the missions (EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah) supported increasing the capacity of the key institution on border management, and we saw progress on forensic skills and community policing with the Palestinian Civil Police.

2 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
In Afghanistan the mission (EUPOL) facilitated the signature of two key agreements on a Police Ombudsman which will protect citizens against human rights abuses by the police, and on Police-Prosecutor Cooperation, which will be key to efficient detection and investigation of crimes.

In Somalia the civilian mission (EUCAP Nestor) saw the production of a new National Security Policy, facilitated meetings of the Somali Maritime Security Coordination Committee, and, with partners, supported the opening of an Operations Room for the Somali Coast Guard.

In Libya, despite a challenging political and security situation, the mission (EUBAM Libya) was able to engage the Government of National Accord, and locate itself as a key player for future security sector reform, in part by facilitating the renewal of the National Team for Security and Border Management.

And, for the first time ever, we achieved a 50:50 gender balance of our civilian Heads of Mission, with five women and five men leading the ten civilian missions.

**SHORT-, MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM CHALLENGES**

While logistics, security, communications, transport, mandate delivery, changes in the personnel of local partners, the transfer of trained personnel to other roles, political interference, weak local institutions, absorption capacity and transition and exit strategies all present short-, medium- and long-term challenges for the civilian CSDP missions, four key challenges were identified: two on both the operational and strategic level, and two on a purely strategic level. These are (1) responsiveness, (2) visibility, (3) adapting to the wider, evolving security context and (4) output, impact and influence.
DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS

Force generation and deployment speed in terms of both personnel and technical and administrative support are the main requirements to ensure responsiveness. The Global Strategy holds the position that more ‘rapid and effective’ CSDP action is needed and that this can be achieved ‘by encouraging force generation [and] speeding up deployment’.

Missions are comprised of a blend of seconded and contracted international staff and contracted local staff. Of the international staff, the majority are seconded by Member States. This represents an important and welcome political commitment to the missions and the CSDP by Member States, however, the staff are at times vulnerable to demands made on domestic institutions (such as the police, the judiciary, the prosecution or corrections service), with the result that the right people are not always available for the right posts at the right time. So, managing this situation is a challenge.

In order to mitigate this, the CPCC invested in reviewing and revising its job descriptions, distilling multiple texts to around 80 job functions and sharing these with Member States. This is to enable early force sensing, improve recruitment procedures and increase transparency, and – on a very practical level – to assist Member States with their own forward planning.

Standing civilian CSDP capacity

Genuine rapid response raises the issue of a standing civilian CSDP capacity, that is to say, having a ‘first responder’ team that is comprised of in-house staff (from the Operational Headquarters) for fast interim deployment at very short notice to key posts – as is the case with the standing capacity of police and rule of law staff in the United Nations – and that, following deployment, take part in the early planning processes for any envisaged CSDP mission (which today frequently have complex mandates related to capacity building of police, migration and criminal justice authorities).
However, having a standing capacity will be of little benefit unless they are able to operate in the field.

So, personnel, technical and administrative support is necessary, and the development of standard protocols and procedures across all missions is a challenge for the coming year.

Amongst these, the secure use of information technology is important, as is the ability to deploy equipment such as vehicles and computers at short notice: a new concept for storage and management of strategic stock – the ‘Warehouse 2.0’ – has been developed for this reason.

Its implementation will be a challenge, particularly given current levels of resources. Thus, the creation of a standing civilian capacity and the concomitant mission support would allow for a qualitative leap forward in terms of the responsiveness of civilian CSDP, but the key challenge will be to gain access to the additional resources to reflect such an upscaling in action and responsiveness.

**VISIBILITY**

The Global Strategy sets out the EU’s vital interests as ‘peace and security, prosperity and democracy’. The Global Strategy identifies the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a core delivery instrument, alongside diplomacy and development, of its global engagement and influence. It exhorts the CSDP to become ‘more responsive and effective’, to be more joined up with the EU’s other external policies and instruments, and to be more visible.

**Strategic communication**

Specifically in relation to strategic communications, it clearly states that ‘The EU will enhance its strategic communications [...] in order to connect EU foreign policy with citizens and better communicate it to our partners’. In this, the Global Strategy echoes and affirms policy asserted in Council conclusions (2013, 2014, 2015), for example by underlining the importance of effective communications.
to raise public awareness, and working on a more effective, visible and results-oriented CSDP.

In-theatre, adequate provision is made. Each mission (with the exception of Libya) has a specific budget line for visibility and produces up to ten media and/or communication products and posts them on up to 15 platforms in 12 languages. The bigger missions have around ten people dedicated to this work, with smaller missions having between two and four people.

Public communication

However, the CPCC, the Brussels-based Operational Headquarters for the missions – and the key interface between the missions’ work and the EU institutions, Member States and the general public – has no budget or full-time personnel dedicated to strategic communications. The central public communication output is thus limited to updating posts on the CSDP and EEAS news pages with stories about the missions. Key audiences in Brussels (Member States’ Permanent Representatives, other EU institutions) and in Member States (Foreign Ministries and Ministries of Defence, Justice and the Interior) should also be kept up to date. The Operational Headquarters of the missions is well aware of this challenge and has already taken steps to address it.

ADAPTING TO THE EVOLVING SECURITY CONTEXT

How should we adapt to the evolving and challenging security context? The Global Strategy notes the following challenges: ‘energy security, migration, climate change, violent extremism, and hybrid warfare’. The priority areas for civilian engagement envisaged by the 2000 Feira European Council encompassed assistance to fragile or post-conflict countries in areas related to policing, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection; however, the last two tasks were never implemented. Since then, the external dimension of EU internal security instruments (Justice and Home Affairs) has been developed in the areas of anti-corruption, the fight against organised crime, illegal migration and terrorism. Closer links between the external dimension of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) and civilian CSDP crisis management were also developed.

In November 2016, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted conclusions for the implementation of the three strategic priorities identified by the EUGS: (a) responding to external conflicts and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens. The conclusions pointed out the need to revisit the Feira priority areas with a focus on irregular migration, hybrid threats, cyber security, terrorism, radicalisation, organised crime and border management. But whereas previous civilian CSDP missions focused mainly on capacity building activities, CSDP missions within the new framework of the EUGS would be even more intertwined with internal security activities. The review of Feira should address CSDP added value in the comprehensive approach model throughout the entire conflict cycle. This requirement has implications both for strengthening ties with FSJ actors and for enhancing cooperation with military instruments.

Responding to external conflicts and crises

With regard to the more classic strategic priorities set out for the CSDP (responding to external conflicts and crises and building the capacities of partners), the conclusions mainly focus on the EU’s awareness and responsiveness in the conflict prevention phase, its rapid and decisive capacity response tools as well as on an increased use of strategic communication.

Building the capacities of partners

The ability to contribute more systematically to the resilience and stabilisation of partner countries along the nexus of security and development, including through training, advice and/or mentoring within the security sector, is highlighted. The use of internal instruments to deal with external security with reciprocity is also recommended.
Protecting the Union and its citizens

The third strategic priority is quite new for the CSDP. It covers the contribution that the EU and its Member States can make from a security and defence perspective outside the EU to protect its domestic interests in various areas: protection and resilience of EU networks and critical infrastructure, security of EU external borders, building partners’ capacity to manage their borders, civil protection and disaster response, access to the global commons including the high seas and space, countering hybrid threats, cyber security, preventing and countering terrorism and radicalisation and combating people smuggling and trafficking. The nexus between internal and external security and cooperation with (FSJ) actors is underlined again in this area.

The EU is called on to continue its broad range of civilian crisis management activities, including in areas related to capacity building for the security sector, police reform, rule of law and border management. The EU then aims to be more Europe-centric (protection of Europe). This paradigm shift may imply new challenges for CSDP missions with regard to local buy-in and local ownership requirements. This constraint will need to be addressed through finely tailored CSDP activities.

The new Level of Ambition (LoA)\(^3\) will need to be evaluated against realistic criteria. In addition, the implementation of the EUGS for civilian CSDP missions also implies a review of the planning and conduct structures and capabilities, as well as the enhancement of civilian/military synergies. The need to rethink our mandates through a better combination of tools, including combined military and civilian tasks in the same mandate, could be explored using the model of existing military missions with a law enforcement component (for instance, the anti-smuggling mandate of Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden).

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\(^3\) The previous LoA was: The EU should be able to deploy a dozen CSDP civilian missions of varying formats, inter alia in a rapid reaction situation, including a major mission (possibly up to 3 000 experts), which could last several years. It was set out according to a methodology transposed from the military system.
OUTPUT, IMPACT AND INFLUENCE

The fourth, and main, challenge faced by civilian CSDP missions relates to the impact both on the ground and at the strategic level. Whilst pursuing political-strategic objectives in the framework of the EU’s CSDP, civilian missions aim to foster sustainable changes in countries and regions affected by conflict.

The lack of baseline data to make optimal use of indicators is a recurrent problem in post-conflict countries where the ability to collect information is often undermined by limited national capacities and data systems. The accountability of the CPCC in terms of reporting to Member States on mandate delivery represents a unique opportunity to increase its efforts to strengthen operational effectiveness. At the same time, it highlights the difficulties of measuring the impact of activities: these difficulties are generally greater than in the military area (where the operational objectives are more easily assessed). Advisory tasks are, by their nature, difficult to measure, and capacity-building activities can take time before yielding results. As a result, the CPCC keeps the methodology used for measuring outcomes of the missions under constant review.

Significant efforts have been made in recent years to strengthen impact assessment tools. However, the development of a common methodological approach across the missions requires finessing. During the summer of 2016, missions were provided with new Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) guidelines and a template aimed at reinvigorating a standardised and simplified approach during the entire mission lifecycle.

The conduct of an impact assessment anticipates a strong role for the CPCC. In particular, it is recommended that the CPCC promotes the consistent use of standard terminology and templates in order to rely on durable trend analysis without reconstructing post facto indicators. The delivery of training to missions for the implementation of impact assessments is done in the country concerned and in Brussels. The impact assessment can be conducted by desk officers and other CPCC staff deployed to the country. The communication on findings is important. Last but not least, harmonisation between the strategic reviews of the timing and the scope of the impact assessment would be beneficial.

The methodology should also help to strengthen EEAS/CPCC analysis of operational and implementation obstacles. The greater the local buy-in and local ownership, the greater the impact on the ground of the mandate delivery by the CSDP mission.

CSDP missions may indeed face reluctance from governments to implement agreed reform commitments without being able to use effective leverage to oblige these authorities to fulfil their commitments. Activities focusing too much on training and not enough on institutional reform can lead to this kind of outcome. Therefore, a blend of activities on both the strategic and operational levels is usually needed.

DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS

A more comprehensive approach to the formulation of the strategic framework of CSDP operations within the EU family (Missions, European Commission, EU Special Representative, Member States) should also be further explored, including through the development of indicators and measures of indicators. Based on the model of the indicators used by the EU Delegations when developing state-building contracts (budgetary support), CSDP missions could explore benchmarks drawing on conditionality and discontinuation of activities. Such a tool would allow the missions to establish the stage at which working with the government would allow them to promote the reform most effectively. Some emphasis could also be placed on the broader perspective by viewing the impact assessment within the overall conflict situation. Lastly, coordination at central level could help to develop a more strategic impact assessment.
Mandated by the UN Security Council, Operation ALTHEA was launched on 2 December 2004. EUFOR currently operates under the legal authority of UNSCR 2315 (2016) and an Operational Plan issued by the Operation Commander. Since 2004 EUFOR, on the basis of its executive mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is responsible for the implementation of the military annexes to the Dayton Peace Agreement, also known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). The Force has contributed to the maintenance and stability of a Safe and Secure Environment in BiH and helped to promote a climate in which the peace process can continue.

Furthermore, based on a decision by the EU Foreign Ministers, EUFOR has since 2010 additionally focused on ‘Capacity Building & Training’ for the AF BiH.

The Instructions to Parties (ITPs) set out the guidelines for achieving the goals of the GFAP and are a key tool for the Force Commander. Since the GFAP provisions are framed in general terms, there is a need for further interpretation and clarification. The ITP are a vital tool for defining the Parties’ responsibilities and obligations. Set out by the Force Commander, they ensure that the Parties are acquainted with the tasks contained in the GFAP and know how to accomplish them. They are signed off by both COM EUFOR and COM NHQ So as to cover their respective responsibilities; EUFOR for a safe and secure environment and NATO for defence reform.
### EUFOR ELEMENTS

- The Headquarters at Camp Butmir.
- The Multinational Battalion.
- A network of 17 Liaison and Observation Teams spread across the country, headed by the LOT Coordination Center (LCC).
- Embedded Advisory Teams (EATs) attached to the AFBiH.
- National Support Elements of Troop-Contributing Nations.

### EUFOR’S MAIN OBJECTIVES

- Supporting the overall EU strategy for BiH.
- Ensuring a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) in the country, especially supporting the BiH efforts in this regard.
- In parallel, providing the Armed Forces of BiH with ‘Capacity Building & Training’ so that they can attain international standards.

### POLITICAL CHALLENGES

Bosnia and Herzegovina is progressing on its path towards EU accession, working on a socio-economic Reform Agenda and dealing with the EU Commission Questionnaire as a prerequisite for achieving EU candidate status.

There are still, however, big challenges ahead:

- The leadership of the three ‘constituent peoples’ still disagrees on the foundations of BiH. Bosniaks would prefer a strong and unitary state, whereas Bosnian Serbs tend to push for further self-governance, and Bosnian Croats continue to strive for what they consider a ‘fairer share’ of the power arrangements (‘third entity’, ‘electoral district’, ‘federalisation’…).
- Public institutions are costly, fragmented and partly dysfunctional. The reconciliation process, which is crucial for progress, is slow.
- Political dialogue has in recent months been marked by a significant increase in inflammatory nationalistic rhetoric.
- Some figures in the political elite fear ‘rule-of-law’ standards.
- Short election cycles (general and local elections alternating in a 2-year cycle) are not contributing to political continuity.
SECURITY CHALLENGES

There are several threats to the Safe and Secure Environment, and obstacles to substantial progress, amongst others:

- Ethno-nationalist centered politics
- Polarisation and demagoguery
- Nationalistic and inflammatory rhetoric from political key figures
- Tendency towards ethnically motivated acts of intimidation, harassment, and in some cases even violence
- Weak economy
- Corruption
- Powerful organised crime networks
- Unemployment rate over 40%

SURVEYS – PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF EUFOR

EUFOR conducts two major surveys per year to gain information on public opinion regarding EUFOR, EU, NATO and security related issues. The survey results help measure the success of EUFOR’s media campaigns and to design future campaigns. Furthermore, the surveys contribute to EUFOR’s situational awareness. Surveys conducted in December 2016 involving 2500 individuals in face-to-face and 1000 individuals in telephone interviews suggested the following:

- Almost 92% of Bosniaks describe the political situation as critical or deteriorating, only 5% call it stable. For Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats the figure is 80% and 13% respectively.
**ARMs CONTROL**

- **EUFOR** conducts verifications and inspections of Defence Industry Factories (DIF) in close coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (MoFTER) and the Ministry of Security (MoS) for Situational Awareness (SA) and monitors imports and exports of Ordnance, Munitions and Military Equipment (OME).
- EUFOR trains, mentors and monitors AFBiH personnel by organising ammunition delabration courses and thus providing know-how on the demilitarisation of surplus ammunition. EUFOR fully supports the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Mine Action (MA) authorities in the aim of making them more effective and efficient. EUFOR also supports the European Union (EU) on technical issues concerning the new demining projects in BiH. These projects are aimed at reducing risk and supporting mine victims, and the EU will invest significant funds in them from the Instrument for Pre-Acces-sion Assistance 2013 (IPA 2013 Funds) for demining activities.

- 65% of Bosniaks but only 35% of Bosnian Serbs consider EUFOR to be an important factor of safety and stability in BiH.
- Opinions about EUFOR and NATO:
  Around 85% of Bosniaks have a (very) positive or neutral opinion of both EUFOR and NATO, while only 5% have a very negative opinion of these organisations. Among Bosnian Serbs, however, 24% have a very negative opinion of EUFOR while 38% have a negative opinion of NATO.
- Membership of EU and NATO:
  81% of BiH citizens still support EU membership and 68% are in favour of NATO membership. Bosnian Serb support for EU membership is still 66%, but that support has significantly weakened since 2008. Only 34% of Bosnian Serbs currently support BiH membership of NATO, while 53% strongly oppose it.
- Within a year, the number of citizens who think that a military presence will be needed for another 3-5 years or even 5-10 years has increased by 15 percentage points.
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

Visual Inspection and Inventory of Ammunition: EUFOR conducts verifications and inspections of Defense Industry Factories (DIF) in close coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (MoFTER) and the Ministry of Security (MoS) for Situational Awareness (SA) and monitors imports and exports of Ordnance, Munitions and Military Equipment (OME).

Disposal of unsafe and surplus ammunition is conducted by AFBiH, and by local, regional and international companies with the support of the International Community. Biggest financial donors: European Union and Sterling Company, which has been tasked by the US State Department. Funding ensured until end of 2018.

MINE ACTION

EUFOR fully supports the Demining Battalion of the Armed Forces of BiH by monitoring, advising and assisting their humanitarian demining operations in the aim of increasing their operational and logistical effectiveness.

EUFOR continues to provide Mine Risk Education (MRE) for vulnerable and at-risk groups such as farmers, forestry companies, hunting clubs and in particular children of all ages, in order to raise awareness and promote safe behaviour. In 2016, EUFOR provided MRE training to 20611 BiH residents.

CAPACITY-BUILDING AND TRAINING

Along with military skills and leadership training, EUFOR has enabled a significant range of capability-enhancing training events including dismantling and delaboration of surplus and outdated ammunition, deployability and mobility, disaster relief operations, road construction, flight operations, flight safety and communications security.

Furthermore, in 2016 the AFBiH were able to declare 11 units at operational readiness, 8 of which completed NATO Evaluation Level 1 in May. For 2017, AFBiH, supported by EUFOR will be preparing these units for their NATO Evaluation Level 2.
EUFOR LOT HOUSES FOR GREATER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

EUFOR has 17 Liaison and Observation Team (LOT) houses in Bosnia and Herzegovina which act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of EUFOR. They are in touch with local authorities and the population as well as other agencies in BIH, in order to gain awareness of the needs and concerns of the people.

The teams provide information to the EUFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo through the LOT Coordination Center (LCC).

CONCLUSION

It is now over 20 years since the conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forced the United Nations to intercede and oversee the newly-formed State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nonetheless the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and the role of EUFOR as the legal successor to SFOR remain relevant. Bosnia and Herzegovina has made significant steps towards European Union accession, but there are still a number of areas where improvements are expected. These relate primarily to the rule of law and to the ability of the law enforcement agencies to cooperate effectively. Additionally there is the urgent need to eradicate the terrible threat of landmines and other explosive remnants of war that still pollute the countryside. The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are developing well and making progress toward achieving standards that would make them a welcome contributor to multinational peace support operations around the world. EUFOR’s role is to support this effort and provide the International Community with a robust and reliable force that is able to act if necessary to enforce GFAP by maintaining a safe and secure environment.
4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES
4.1. MIGRATION AND CSDP

by Jochen Rehrl

CSDP is already being used and has proved to be a useful tool in assisting the EU and its Member States in the management of migration flows.

In his speech on the ‘State of Union 2016’,¹ the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, said that we should start our reflection with a sense of realism and with great honesty.

‘First of all, we should admit that we have many unresolved problems in Europe. There can be no doubt about this. …

‘Secondly, we should be aware that the world is watching us. …

‘Thirdly, we should recognise that we cannot solve all our problems with one more speech. Or with one more summit’.²

This is also a good starting point for the topic of migration, which highlights the inextricable link between internal and external security. In the past few years we have seen a massive influx of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and realised that no single country can face this challenge alone.

Migration is not necessarily the biggest challenge in Europe and for Europe, but the migration challenge is very present in our daily discussions, in the mass media and on the streets. Hence the public put it on the agenda of our politicians, who – since then – having been seeking common solutions.

Migration is not a seasonal phenomenon; the pressure will likely stay. Our systems were not built with this scenario in mind. Therefore we are seeing overstretches of capacity, loss of trust and credibility in our democratic governments and as a result the rise of populist political parties taking advantage of this situation. Moreover, the soli-

² Jean-Claude Juncker, p. 7.
darity between EU Member States, which is elo-
quently laid down in Article 2\(^3\) and Article 3(5)\(^4\)
of the Treaty on European Union, seems to have
been weakened. This results in a decrease in cohe-
sion inside the Union.

Our answers to the migration challenge must
be comprehensive, credible and strategic. We
should not forget our values or our interests. How
the Union will tackle the migration crisis will be
the stress test for the structures in Brussels and the
capitals.

**HOW CAN WE MANAGE MIGRATION?**

Migration is an issue combining humanitar-
ian aspects, employment, social welfare, security
and many other areas. The main responsibility
for managing it lies with the EU Member States.
The European Commission and its agencies are
performing well, but much more has to be done.

And the EU has not stood idle in the face of
this crisis. Making use of all the policy tools at
its disposal, a number of important actions have

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\(3\) Article 2 TEU: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to
the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail.’

\(4\) Article 3(5) TEU: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth,
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human
rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law,
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’

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been launched for a coordinated and coherent European response. A new approach to better manage migration through the establishment of partnership frameworks was set out at the European Council on 28-29 June 2016, fully embedding the issue of migration in the EU’s overall foreign policy.

The European Global Strategy, which was welcomed at the same Council meeting, states very clearly, that ‘Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. We will work with our international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity.’

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a Member State tool to manage external crises, is most probably not the main instrument to tackle this complex issue. But it should remain part of the comprehensive crisis management toolbox, and we should examine how CSDP instruments could complement current activities. In a number of theatres the EU has already deployed CSDP missions and operations with the objective of complementing other EU efforts to address irregular migration, in particular in the Central Mediterranean and the Sahel.

At the same time we should also be aware that CSDP is meant to be deployed outside EU territory; hence assistance and support to other EU

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6 Article 42(1) TEU: ‘The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.’

In a number of theatres the EU has already deployed CSDP missions and operations with the objective of complementing other EU efforts to address irregular migration.
Member States via CSDP is not currently possible in our legal framework.

Securing the external borders of EU and its Member States is one key policy area of the Commission under which numerous initiatives have been launched. The European Agenda on Migration, the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation, Smart Borders and EURO-SUR are amongst the significant measures taken to reinforce the management of European borders.

And when we come to the point where we are willing to deploy a CSDP mission and/or operation, we should pay attention to the existing structures, instruments and mechanisms outside the CSDP scope, ensuring they are not duplicated or hindered in their valuable work.

For example, since 6 October 2016 the European Border and Coast Guard has provided a missing link in strengthening Europe’s external borders, so that people can continue to live and move freely within the European Union – helping to meet Europe’s commitment to get back to the normal functioning of the Schengen area and the lifting of temporary internal border controls.

Nevertheless, some of the existing instruments and structures are currently being reinforced (e.g. the European Border and Coast Guard) and in the short- to mid-term, shortfalls could be identified. CSDP tools could be used to fill these gaps and thereby support the civilian entities.


Migration is not necessarily the biggest challenge in Europe and for Europe, but the migration challenge is very present in our daily discussions, in the mass media and on the streets.

**The Common European Asylum System (CEAS)**

Asylum is granted to people fleeing persecution or serious harm. Asylum is a fundamental right and granting it is an international obligation, stemming from the 1951 Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees.

Those who seek, or have been granted, protection do not have the right to choose in which Member State they want to settle. To this end, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) provides common minimum standards for the treatment of all asylum seekers and applications. The CEAS consists of a legal framework covering all aspects of the asylum process and a support agency - the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

However, in practice, the current system is still characterised by differing treatment of asylum seekers and varying recognition rates amongst EU Member States. This divergence is what encourages secondary movements and is partly due to the fact that the current rules grant Member States a lot of discretion in how they apply the common EU rules.

The large-scale, uncontrolled arrival of migrants and asylum seekers since early 2015 has put a strain on many Member States’ asylum systems and on the CEAS as a whole. The EU now needs to put in place the tools to better manage migration flows in the medium and long term. The overall objective is to move from a system which, by design or poor implementation, encourages uncontrolled or irregular migratory flows to one which provides orderly and safe pathways to the EU for third country nationals.

The European Commission has presented proposals in May and July 2016 to establish a sustainable system for the future, based on common rules, a fairer sharing of responsibility, and safe legal channels for those who need protection to get it in the EU.
CSDP HAS PROVED TO BE USEFUL

CSDP is already being used and has proved to be a useful tool in assisting the EU and its Member States in the management of migration flows. Needless to say, it is only one of the tools at the EU’s disposal to address the migration challenge. In many CSDP missions and operations, migration is implicitly or explicitly mentioned in the mandates. Tasks include supporting host countries by providing training and advice for military and security forces, building institutions for the sustainable rule of law, and thus building local capacity with the main objective of creating the conditions for economic growth and prosperity. EUFOR ALTHEA, EUCAP SAHEL NIGER, EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA, EUTM MALI and many more could be listed as examples.

Nevertheless, as CSDP mainly focuses on the security aspects of the EU’s support to our partner countries in managing migratory flows at their borders, there are several key areas in which CSDP support could have an added value. CSDP missions and operations could work alongside other specialised EU agencies to enhance border protection and maritime security with the objective of fighting cross-border crime and disrupting smuggling networks and thus saving more lives.

Possible areas of enhanced CSDP support as described above could be:

- **border surveillance** and prevention of uncontrolled border crossings, in particular for land and sea borders;
- **processing of irregular migrants**, in particular by providing training and technical assistance as well as capacity building for the so-called ‘hotspots’;
- **law enforcement activities** against smugglers’ networks by strengthening intelligence sharing;
- **security sector reform** in countries either of origin or transit.

A certain amount of time is needed between a fully-fledged CSDP mission or operation being launched and starting to fully deliver its support. This could be an issue in a rapidly changing situation where smugglers are fast to respond and adapt to any law enforcement action. It could therefore be worth considering whether existing crisis management procedures and mechanisms could
be used more rapidly and flexibly. Alternatively, should the members states decide that CSDP should play a more active role in providing support to our partners, an entirely new mechanism for more rapid CSDP deployment could be designed for cases where urgent assistance or flexibility would be needed – as some member states have already called for in the course of the current crisis.

**HOW CAN WE HELP EU MEMBER STATES IN NEED?**

One way could be to establish a **clearing-house function** at EU level in order to have a clear picture of the national, bilateral, multilateral and regional initiatives. Additionally, the clearing house could gather requests from member states and forward them to entities which could offer support. The question remains open as to where this clearing-house function should be located; at the European Commission (e.g. DG HOME), the External Action Service (e.g. CMPD or EUMS) or one of the relevant agencies.

Another possible solution could be to refer to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The so-called ‘solidarity clause’ has a solid legal basis and covers natural and man-made disasters as well as terrorism (both prevention and consequence management). The procedure and structures for its implementation are in place and could be used immediately. The Union must mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the member states.

**CONCLUSION**

The abovementioned proposals were developed by experts from EU member states and the EU institutions in the margins of the panel discussion on migration, held at the Egmont Palace. The driving factor for implementing one proposal or another is political will. Legal obligations are man-made and can be changed in the same way as they were created. Solutions must bear in mind the humanitarian dimension of the migration crisis, European values and the European population eager to see results.

The root causes of the migration challenge must also be addressed, and better today than tomorrow. In general, the security situations in the countries of origin are not at the top of the list. There we find economic and personal reasons for migration.

And one core element in addressing the root causes has to be education. Without giving young

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th>REFUGEE</th>
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<td>The term ‘migrant’ is understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of ‘personal convenience’ and without intervention of an external compelling factor. This definition indicates that the term ‘migrant’ does not refer to refugees, displaced or others forced or compelled to leave their homes. <strong>Source</strong>: <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/migrant/">http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/migrant/</a></td>
<td>Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention defines a <strong>refugee</strong> as an individual who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence who is unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on his or her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. <strong>BUT</strong>: Individuals who have received protection in a third country are not considered refugees. (Article 1(C)).</td>
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people in the countries of origin or transit a credible vision for their future, the migration flow will never end.

We have to act now and we have to be innovative in our thinking. The former Secretary General of the European External Action Service, Pierre Viemont, advocates the same, saying it is ‘time to be ambitious’.9

Jean-Claude Juncker said in his speech that the next twelve months are the crucial time in which to deliver a better Europe: ‘Therefore we are in need of

* a Europe that protects;
* a Europe that preserves the European way of life;
* a Europe that empowers our citizens;
* a Europe that defends at home and abroad; and
* a Europe that takes responsibility.’10

The main responsibility for tackling the migration challenge lies with the EU Member States.

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10 Jean-Claude Juncker, p. 9.

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**MIGRATION**

**Migration** is the crossing of the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period of time. It includes the movement of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people as well as economic migrants.


**ASYLUM SEEKER**

**Asylum seekers** are people who move across borders in search of protection, but who may not fulfil the strict criteria laid down by the 1951 Convention. The terms ‘asylum seeker’/‘asylee’ and ‘refugee’ differ only in regard to the place where an individual asks for protection.

The Schengen area without internal borders is only sustainable if the external borders are effectively secured and protected. The European Commission is proposing to establish a European Border and Coast Guard – designed to meet the new challenges and political realities faced by the EU, both as regards migration and internal security. The European Border and Coast Guard will be composed of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the national authorities and coastguards responsible for border management.

«A united refugee and asylum policy requires stronger joint efforts to secure our external borders. Fortunately, we have given up border controls between the Member States of the Schengen area, to guarantee free movement of people, a unique symbol of European integration. But the other side of the coin to free movement is that we must work together more closely to manage our external borders. This is what our citizens expect. The Commission said it back in May, and I said it during my election campaign. We need to strengthen Frontex significantly and develop it into a fully operational European border and coast guard system.»

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Address, 9 September 2015

Between January and November 2015 an estimated 1.5 million persons have crossed the EU external borders illegally – an all-time peak.

From July to September 2015, 413 800 persons applied for international protection in the Member States, twice as many as in the second quarter of 2015.
A NEW MANDATE

The limitations of the current EU border agency, Frontex, have hindered its ability to effectively address and remedy the situation created by the refugee crisis: it is not able to purchase its own resources, it does not have its own operational staff and relies on Member State contributions, it is unable to carry out its own return or border management operations without the prior request of a Member State and it does not have an explicit mandate to conduct search and rescue operations. The new Agency will be strengthened and reinforced to address all these issues.

UNION STANDARDS FOR BORDER MANAGEMENT

The new Agency will ensure Union standards for border management are implemented at all external borders. The external borders will be constantly monitored with periodic risk analyses and mandatory vulnerability assessments to identify and address weak spots. Liaison officers will be seconded to Member States where the borders are at risk. They will be fully integrated into the national information systems and able to relay the information back to the Agency.

A RESERVE OF EUROPEAN BORDER GUARDS AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

The Agency’s permanent staff will be more than doubled and for the first time, the Agency will be able to purchase its own equipment and deploy them in border operations at a moment’s notice. A rapid reserve pool of border guards and a technical equipment pool will be put at the disposal of the Agency – meaning there will no longer be shortages of staff of equipment for Agency operations.

THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE

When deficiencies are identified, the Agency will be empowered to require Member States take timely corrective action. In urgent situations that put the functioning of the Schengen area at risk and when deficiencies have not been remedied, the Agency will be able to step in to ensure that action is taken on the ground even where there is no request for assistance from the Member State concerned or where that Member State considers that there is no need for additional intervention.

WORKING WITH AND IN THIRD COUNTRIES

The Agency will have a new mandate to send liaison officers and launch joint operations with neighbouring third countries, including operating on their territory.

A STRONGER ROLE IN RETURNS

A European Return Office within the Agency will allow the deployment of European Return Intervention Teams composed of escorts, monitors and return specialists who will work to effectively return illegally staying third country nationals. A uniform European travel document for return will ensure a wider acceptance by third countries.

GUARANTEEING INTERNAL SECURITY

The Agency will include cross-border crime and terrorism in its risk analysis, process personal data of persons suspected to be involved in acts of terrorism and cooperate with other Union agencies and international organisations on the prevention of terrorism.
Since 2001 civilian CSDP missions have been developing as important tools of EU common foreign and security policy, operating with post-conflict and conflict-prevention mandates in a variety of countries and regions abroad. Whilst these missions are generally well documented and analysed, there is one angle few have considered to date, which is the link with the EU’s counter-terrorism (CT) efforts that have also been an important part of the EU’s external and security policy dimension. It appears that, even within the EU institutions, there has been little if any interaction between the relevant bodies, which is striking given the similarities in aims, objectives, and geographical priorities; nor has there been any coordination between respective approaches, despite the huge potential for synergies.

The present article seeks to analyse these similarities in greater detail, with a view to making the case for more interaction and coordination between the two EU external policy instruments, which would enhance the much sought-after ‘comprehensive’, or ‘integrated’, approach that the newly adopted EU Global Strategy advocates. The article also argues in favour of much stronger investment in CSDP, specifically with a view to addressing more systematically the CT requirements in third countries when there is a link to Europe’s security.

SIMILARITIES

The first similarity is the shared objective of enhancing the rule of law: civilian CSDP missions with a capacity-building mandate usually focus on mentoring, monitoring, advising and training for the host country’s police and judiciary.
They help countries with weak law-enforcement institutions to adapt their national legislation, they assist them with security sector reform, and they contribute to improving related inter-agency cooperation and coordination, and enhancing the performance of the state apparatus and relevant personnel. Typical of this is the civilian nature of the efforts: civilian CSDP uses civilian expertise from Member States’ active police and judiciary personnel to carry out tasks relating to enhancing the rule of law in third countries.

The EU approach to CT is based on the rule of law, in so far as terrorist acts are criminalised and thus investigated, prosecuted and the perpetrators sentenced in accordance with the rule of law and international standards. Ever since the first EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism in 2001, and following the adoption of the EU CT strategy in 2005, the EU’s external CT action has continuously advocated this civilian approach. The EU has been an active contributor to various landmark resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) that seek to criminalise terrorist acts and to strengthen the police and judiciary systems dealing with terror. The EU was a founding member of the Global Counter terrorism Forum (GCTF), which is a civilian platform for politicians and practitioners involved in CT. The EU continues to proactively shape its numerous policy initiatives, best practice documents, advocacy and coordination of capacity-building in countries in need. In 2016 the EU contributed around EUR 224 million to CT/P-CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) assistance programmes in partner countries and EUR 175 million to CT/P-CVE-related assistance programmes, making a total of...
around EUR 400 million of capacity-building in relation to the rule of law abroad.

Another similarity is the proactive bringing of international standards and best practice to partner countries: use of international standards is a recurrent feature in the planning documents for civilian CSDP missions. The fact that civilian CSDP missions use active service personnel means that they can draw on the state-of-the-art best practice and policy of their sending countries when helping to reform local services and local legislation.

Another important dimension of the EU’s external CT action is advocacy and diplomacy, for example through the numerous CT political dialogues held with a variety of countries and regional organisations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union (AU). The EU also takes and active part in the GCTF (which includes co-chairing one of its working groups) as well as sponsoring numerous workshops and seminars on CT- and CVE-related topics in priority countries and regions. The network of CT experts deployed in various EU delegations since 2015 also contributes to the mainstreaming and promotion of globally agreed standards and policies.

Looking at the geographical focus of civilian CSDP and EU external CT efforts, there seems to be far less overlap than might be expected considering that in many regions terrorism is the root cause of instability or, conversely, it is likely to arise where the state apparatus is weak and conflict endemic. Some more detailed examples are:

- **Western Balkans**: EULEX Kosovo, which is focusing on police reform and capacity-building: CT expert deployed since the end of 2016 to cover the entire region and help coordinate a major initiative in the Western Balkans to address CT and radicalisation;
- **Pakistan**: no CSDP mission but considerable CT engagement, including deployment of a CT expert and a major programme currently in the pipeline (CT STRIVE);
- **Afghanistan**: significant CSDP effort (EUP-OL Afghanistan, soon closing), but currently no CT expert;
- **Middle East**: Iraq CSDP mission now closed, but CT expert deployed since 2015 helping to
coordinate a number of key assistance projects including intelligence services capacity-building;

- **Palestine**: a CSDP mission focusing on police reform and capacity-building, but no CT expert deployed;
- **Lebanon and Jordan**: no CSDP mission, but considerable CT assistance efforts and CT experts deployed since 2015;
- **Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco**: no CSDP mission, but considerable CT assistance for Tunisia (Algeria and Morocco still pending), and CT experts deployed since 2015;
- **Sahel**: two civilian CSDP missions ongoing, all in the field of Security Sector Reform; two CT experts deployed (Chad and Nigeria) with a number of CT-related assistance programmes ongoing.

The overview shows that there is currently almost no coordination between the two instruments. To put this in more positive terms, the instruments avoid duplication and thus complement each other. However, this is to assume that the decision is deliberate. The reality is that there is no coordination when an instrument is decided on, or at least that this has not been happening enough.

Nevertheless, there are examples in the past where counter-terrorism considerations have played a role in the design and inception of a civilian CSDP mission:

The first was the **AMIS Support Mission** (2005-2006), which supported the command and control operations of the first ever AU-led peacekeeping mission to counter the effects of the militant groups laying waste to Darfur, which at the time were not categorised as ‘terrorists’.

Some years later (in 2012), the **EUVSEC** mission in South Sudan was clearly conceived in the context of the perceived threats posed by weak security at Juba airport, where the main risk was its potential use by terrorists to hijack planes. The newly established landlocked state of South Sudan was then heavily reliant on massive air transport to support state-building, and its only international airport was a lifeline.

**EUCAP Nestor**, which was planned and set up in parallel (in 2012), was to help counter the increasing threat posed by Al-Shabaab and its links to piracy groups operating in the Indian Ocean. Whilst this was clearly the context, the mandate of the mission ultimately focused on helping build effective coast guards for the countries in the region, without a specific reference to terrorism.

**EUCAP Niger**, planned and set up later in 2012, is so far the only mission that explicitly refers to counter-terrorism as part of its mandate, which includes mentoring, advice and training for local security services in legislative and other matters.

**EUBAM Libya**, planned in 2013, fell short of explicitly referring to terrorism, albeit terrorism was again part of the context at the time.

**CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER INTERACTION AND COORDINATION**

The above explanations of linkages (or non-linkages) between CSDP and CT so far clearly show two things. On the one hand, the link does not have to be explicit: aims and objectives where the emphasis is on (re-establishing) the rule of law serve the same purpose, be this through civilian CSDP or through the EU’s classical external CT efforts such as dialogues or European Commission-financed assistance programmes. On the other hand, there is clearly scope for civilian CSDP missions to be used more specifically to achieve external CT objectives.

The changing global environment in fact points to a need to redouble the EU’s efforts in this area, given the following main factors.

First, territorial gains in Iraq and Syria will sooner or later lead to a situation where remaining Da’esh fighters will move to ‘safe havens’, including in Yemen or Somalia, but also in Sudan, Libya and the wider Sahel.

CSDP is well established in the Sahel, mainly through the two EUCAP Sahel missions (Mali
and Niger), and possibly soon a new mission in Libya that is currently being planned. All three missions could easily see their mandates adapted to more explicitly help the respective host countries cope with the growing threat posed by terrorism. The same applies to EUCAP Nestor on the eastern coast of Africa. Tasks would for instance include adapting national legislation to international standards (e.g. UNSC resolutions and conventions), mentoring and training in relation to CT cases in the courts, enhancement of CT threat assessments, information exchange and evidence collection, etc.

Ongoing discussions about ‘regionalisation’ of the civilian CSDP missions in the Sahel through the deployment of CSDP experts in all Sahel EU delegations also create an ideal opportunity for synergies between CT experts already in the field and Commission-funded projects that either directly or indirectly pursue the same objectives as CSDP.

Current planning of a possible new civilian CSDP mission for Libya likewise provides an ideal opportunity to combine efforts, as the aim of this new mission would be not just to help law enforcement agencies address terrorism and radicalisation, but also to tackle the links to migration – in full recognition of the fact that terror and migration have the same root causes and require similar measures by state authorities.

This is achievable and warranted, perhaps even more so now in view of the possible diminution of US engagement in these regions, which is the second main factor to consider in this context.

In summary, it seems that some opportunities could certainly arise to establish more systematic links between CSDP and CT, with more targeted and specifically CT-related mandates for civilian CSDP missions. This would meld the work already done by other EU services on external CT measures/capacity-building with the CSDP-specific methodology of ‘hands-on’ mentoring and advice/training.

Despite these positive considerations, there is still one major challenge to the ideas outlined in this article, and that concerns the issue of resources: civilian CSDP relies on the secondment of active service personnel from EU Member States. Security and judiciary services are already under severe strain given the heightened threat to the European mainland.

Making additional resources available for enhanced civilian CSDP missions would be very difficult, if impossible, without a major policy shift making the links between internal and external security more explicit.

CONCLUSIONS

There can be no doubt that there is in principle scope for civilian CSDP to consider aspects of terrorism more specifically in the definition of mandates, since civilian CSDP is perfectly suited to helping countries’ authorities cope with growing threats that are ultimately linked to our own EU internal security, including migration issues (same root causes).

But it is not enough to ensure good policing or the rule of law. It is necessary to address more specific aspects of counter-terrorism in order to deal effectively with the phenomenon: this means CT-related information exchange, adapting national legislation to international standards, developing CT-specific best practices for law enforcement and the judiciary (see GCTF work), etc.

These are less familiar areas for current EU CSDP structures, but this can easily be addressed so as to ensure that future CSDP mandates include, subject to available resources, targeted objectives and tasks relevant to CT.

Clearly this would be in the interest of the EU and in line with the prerogatives of the recently adopted global security strategy for the European Union, which calls for a more integrated approach using EU external instruments to address both internal and external security needs.
Our modern information society is deeply dependent on the availability of free and secure access to cyberspace and to the internet. This is true in nearly all areas of our lives, including, of course, in foreign and defence policy. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) activities, including civilian and military missions and operations, are no exception. They benefit from the digital world and their success is directly linked to the availability of assured information and functioning communication and information systems.

THE NEW THREAT LANDSCAPE

Cyberspace and the internet are increasingly becoming a new battlefield. Cyber-attacks are part of daily business, and at the same time are becoming more sophisticated, ranging from massive denial-of-service attacks to advanced and complex intrusions aimed at gathering, stealing, encrypting or manipulating and compromising information. Adversaries vary from ‘script kiddies’ and hacktivists to criminals, terrorists and nation-states – or are supported by them. They have identified our dependencies and target our vulnerabilities, using the cyber domain to gain an asymmetric advantage and accomplish economic, political or military objectives anonymously and unattributed, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.

The EU institutions’ networks too are constantly being probed and tested, and although there is no evidence yet of their being targeted, CSDP operations and missions are already facing a growing cyber dimension. Today’s conflicts are increasingly supported by disinformation campaigns based on social media, or by destabilisation operations with cyber-attacks on enabling sectors. Cyber activities must therefore be considered as part of all future scenarios, comprehensively examined, and integrated into the broader crisis response and taken into account when countering hybrid threats. With this in mind, what can we do and what has been done so far, in particular in the area of CSDP?
POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS

In 2013, recognising the need for increased cyber security and for an ‘open, safe and secure cyberspace’, the EU institutions developed the EU Cyber Security Strategy. Based on this, the European External Action Service (EEAS), as the home of CSDP, developed an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (CDPF) in 2014. The aim of the policy framework was to improve cyber defence resilience and capabilities for the implementation of CSDP activities, by tracking, interconnecting and coordinating all the work carried out by the various stakeholders at the EEAS and beyond.

Recently, the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy designated cyber security and defence as a priority, focusing on both resilience and protection, and addressing in particular the need to cooperate and to share information among Member States (MS) and also with military and civilian partners.

These strategic documents form a valuable foundation and framework for cyber security and defence in CSDP. But what does this all mean in a practical sense?

CYBER SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN PRACTICE

Cyber security and defence have been taken into consideration in CSDP operations and missions for several years, but to varying degrees. Cyber capabilities primarily depend on what mission or operation commanders request, mainly based on the situation, their perception of the cyber threat and their decision on how much to ‘invest’ in various capabilities. Hence, cyber security and defence measures in ongoing operations and missions vary from rather basic security and information assurance measures to well-established, state-of-the-art protection and resilience to defend command and control and communication and information systems.

In future, all CSDP missions and operations will have to give appropriate consideration to cyber security and defence. For the three most recent of them (EUMAM RCA, EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA, EUTM RCA) this has already been done. However, for the moment the topic has been introduced only on a best practice
level. There are as yet no formal structures or procedures for assured and effective consideration of cyber threats in planning which could form a basis for defining appropriate requirements for the cyber defence capabilities to be made available for missions and operations.

THE CYBER DEFENCE CONCEPT

In view of this, in 2016 the EUMS, as the EU’s and the EEAS’s provider of military expertise, developed a new version of the EU Concept for Cyber Defence for military operations and missions, reflecting the specific organisational and procedural aspects of military planning and military force generation and addressing requirements for MS’ provision of cyber capabilities for CSDP activities. As civilian missions do not depend on MS’ capabilities, work has started on a complementary concept for the implementation of cyber security in purely civilian missions, addressing the specific aspects thereof and taking into account the military concept.

At this point, we have to understand that the EU and the EEAS use the term ‘cyber security’ mainly in the civilian context and link the term ‘cyber defence’ to military action, even though the two concepts are closely connected, covering the same threats, relying on the same basic principles and using similar measures. While the statements made in this article are, in principle, valid for the broader term ‘cyber security and defence’, it will focus on cyber defence and the principles and guidance reflected in the Cyber Defence Concept.

Planning cyber defence

The first principle for ensuring effective cyber security and defence, similar to a lesson identified during recent planning activities, is to consider cyber aspects as early as possible in the EU’s crisis management and planning processes. Cyber aspects must therefore be considered and included in the overall threat evaluation for the planned operation or mission. Information in the form of a cyber threat landscape should be provided by the EU’s strategic intelligence structures, based around EEAS INTCEN and the INTEL Directorate of EUMS, and should be supported by information sharing, for instance with the EU’s cyber information hub (CERT-EU), military partners such as NATO, and of course MS’ cyber information providers.

Together with INTEL experts, the EUMS cyber defence team will assess the information provided and support the operation/mission planning teams, inserting a cyber narrative into initial planning documents (notably the Crisis Management Concept and the Initiating Military Directive) and thereby providing a sound basis for further planning. On that basis, the designated operation or mission commander and his or her staff – supported by further intelligence and a more in-depth analysis of threats and risks from cyberspace in the area of operations – is able to take a decision on the importance of cyber defence and to define, in the concept of operations and the operation or mission plan, how an effective defence against potential threats from cyberspace can be achieved, requesting the necessary capabilities to ensure the resilience and protection of the IT systems and networks to be used for the mission or operation.

Since EUMS does not provide or deploy any...
operational cyber capabilities, these must generally be requested from the MS which are supporting the CSDP activity in question and are willing to provide forces. Therefore, in general, MS are responsible for providing capabilities. They are given guidance and advice on this in the Cyber Concept. But what is meant by this general term ‘cyber capabilities’?

Implementing cyber defence

The implementation of cyber security and defence in CSDP involves far more than simply providing some protection mechanisms in the networks. The term ‘capabilities’ has therefore been considered in the Cyber Defence Concept in a broader context, covering doctrinal, organisational, training/exercise, material, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability aspects (using the DOTMLPF-I scheme). Besides ‘simple’ material protection it is mainly concerned with the preparation of systems, structures, procedures and, especially, the people involved, to ensure their resilience against threats from cyberspace. This cyber resilience and the related capabilities must in fact be established and put into practice long before the planning processes start.

Information and communication technology (ICT), which is the basis for the systems and networks used in CSDP action, cannot be made cyber-resilient when being handed over to a commander. ICT providers, whether they are MS, EU institutions or contractors in general, have to develop their systems in compliance with standardised basic design requirements and necessary security and assurance rules (‘design-to-security’).

As during the planning phase, organisational elements and procedures to ensure effective cyber defence must also be put in place during the conduct phase of operations and missions. Therefore, structures known as ‘cyber cells’ should be established within every OHQ/FHQ, to provide a continuous assessment of the cyber threat information received from the supporting intelligence structures. A cyber cell should advise decision-makers in the HQ, providing agreed and appropriate actions or reactions. Therefore, the cells work closely with the security operation centres (SOCs), which are responsible for running the risk management for the mission’s networks, observing the networks and identifying, prioritising and mitigating risks. Standardised operations procedures (SOPs) are needed to complement these organisational elements, and will ensure that both the strategic and the operational level of missions and operations act and react appropriately and without delay and allow for ‘defence in depth’.

Mitigating the human risks

The most important aspect of resilience is to prepare the people involved. The most common ‘cyber-vulnerability’ remains the human element. Mitigating the human risks essentially requires a change in culture and behaviour in handling and working with ICT, to be achieved through constant education and training. This must be supplemented with up-to-date knowledge and awareness of the threat environment through regular cyber awareness training. In addition, between this basic education for all ICT users and the training for deep specialists (the ‘geeks’) at the other end, there are various specific training requirements, for instance for cyber advisers, for specialists in the definition of cyber capability requirements and in cyber intelligence, and in particular for decision-makers and their planners, including legal and political advisers. They have to be able to understand detailed cyber-related information and intelligence reports and to know about the impact of cyber operations when immediate decisions are required on how to react in the event of an incident. It is therefore essential to provide them with training and exercises on these issues, so as to bridge the typical ‘mind gap’ between the higher-level decision-makers and the real specialists, and to build up broader operational excellence for an effective posture against the threats from cyberspace.
While the Cyber Defence Concept addresses the various aspects of an effective cyber defence capability at a fairly high level, this has to be translated into actionable work packages.

One major aspect of this is the development of more concrete requirements and specific cyber capability packages which can be implemented by potential providers – mainly the MS, but also civilian contractors.

As a basis for building the new capability requirement catalogue in the framework of the implementation of the Global Strategy, cyber aspects and a threat landscape have to be injected into the existing scenarios, considering cyber as an operational domain.

Subsequently, concrete and detailed cyber capabilities have to be defined, supported and flanked by the studies carried out by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and its cyber defence project team.

Although the new Cyber Defence Concept already provides a basic understanding for appropriate action and reaction, SOPs have to be developed as a next step in cooperation between the EUMS and operational stakeholders from HQ level.

This also comprises the development of business continuity and recovery plans, to ensure that operations can continue even in a degraded and contested cyber environment.

A third aspect is of course education, training and exercises and the streamlining of the EU’s cyber defence education and training landscape.

Supported by the EUMS and the MS, the cyber discipline within the EU Military Training Working Group, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the EDA are working hand-in-hand on new initiatives for the design, development, conduct and evaluation of training activities and exercises, from awareness training up to courses for high-level decision-makers.
A key enabler for the implementation of these aspects is the cooperation with civilian and military partners. While cyber expertise from industry and academia is linked into the processes mainly by the EDA and the ESDC, the EUMS interacts closely with NATO on military aspects of cyber defence, although this remains rather informal as yet. The implementation plan of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration, which was adopted by Council conclusions in December 2016, gives huge impetus not only to the common use and development of training and exercises by the two organisations, but also on exchanges and involvement in cyber policy work and cyber information sharing, to increase synergies, avoid duplication and allow the organisations to understand each other’s mechanisms.

Besides this, some first steps have also been taken towards closer cooperation between cyber security and defence in CSDP and cyber security in civilian sectors (counter-terrorism and crime, energy and aviation) which are covered by the Commission and related agencies like the Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) or the European Cyber Crime Centre in Europol (EC3), for instance in pooling and sharing training and mutual attendance of and support for exercises (such as ‘Multi Layer’ and ‘Cyber Europe’).

The success of cyber security and defence in CSDP operations and missions remains dependent on a well-balanced combination of state-of-the-art technology, well-functioning structures and procedures, and of course educated, aware and competent staff. But more than ever this has to be enabled by cooperation and information-sharing agreements, both with external partners such as NATO and internally across MS and EU institutions. Facing the upcoming structural changes and the integration of civil and military elements in crisis management and response, there is a strong need for an integrated approach to counter cyber threats (including hybrid threats), and hence to merge the somewhat divided cyber security and cyber defence efforts and measures to allow for a stronger posture across all military and civilian CSDP activities.
4.4. HYBRID THREAT AND CSDP

by John Maas

Countering hybrid threats – a European Union response through Joint Communication

A year ago, the term ‘hybrid’ was just entering the European Union lexicon. Commentators, politicians, planners all had a sense of what ‘hybrid’ might mean but not necessarily a full understanding of the true nature of the threat. Indeed, in terms of reaction, one of the first steps was to internally digest the fact that hybrid threats really were a challenge to the European Union both at the level of Member States and also here in the Brussels’ institutions.

Just to reinforce what is meant by the terms ‘hybrid’ and ‘hybrid threat’; the concept of hybrid threat relates to the deliberate use and blending of coercive and subversive activities both conventionally and unconventionally across the diplomatic, information, military, economic spectra – with the hybridity coming from the coordination by a state and/or non-state actor to achieve specific objectives, while remaining hidden, and below the threshold of formally declared warfare.

It is important to understand that there is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of society and on generating ambiguity in order to hinder decision-making processes at a political level – and thereby gain leverage. These often insidious attacks are frequently masked by massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors who can in turn be used as vehicles for delivering a hybrid strategy.

To respond to these challenges, the European Union Member States, through the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council, have taken action and mandated the High Representative in close cooperation with Commission services and the European Defence Agency (EDA), to forge a credible European response.

The hybridity in ‘hybrid threat’ refers to coordination by a state and/or non-state actor to achieve specific objectives while remaining hidden and below the threshold of formally declared warfare.

A COMPREHENSIVE JOINT FRAMEWORK

The consequent extensive joint work has resulted in a comprehensive Joint Framework that sets out 22 actionable proposals across the full spectrum of European Union competences to counter hybrid threats. These proposals focus on four main elements: improving awareness, building resilience, prevention, responding to a crisis.

As such, the European Union goal was to develop a significant response with a real priority given to the political level in responding to the dramatic change in the European Union’s security environment, particularly in the eastern and southern neighbourhood. Furthermore, given that key challenges to peace and stability continue to underscore the need for the Union to adapt and increase its capacities as a security provider, a strong focus is placed on the close relationship between external and internal security, which requires close cooperation with partners. Here, as NATO is also working to counter hybrid threats, the Foreign Affairs Council proposed to enhance current EU–NATO cooperation.
Turning to the key tenets of the framework: as a direct result of the often very subtle and hard to detect methods of deploying a hybrid threat, **improving awareness** is essential in supporting the early identification of changes in the security environment related to hybrid activity enacted by either state or non-state actors. To support this goal, action has been undertaken in three main areas:

**First**, the creation of a European Union Hybrid Fusion Cell, established within the European Union’s Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN), offers a one-stop shop for information collation to support the analysis of potential hybrid threats. This Cell, once at full operating capacity, will be capable of analysing information specifically related to indicators and warnings concerning hybrid threats with the aim of then rapidly disseminating the products to inform the European Union’s strategic decision-makers. This work will also help bring an input to European Union Member States’ security risk assessments.

Moreover, the Cell is in direct contact with the Council’s Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) mechanism which, through regular meetings of Commission DGs, collects ‘signals’ of ongoing events from the different areas of expertise (energy, trade, competition, telecommunication, etc.) and is thus able to detect changes. If, for example, one country produces two or more signals, that will trigger the mechanism to a higher alert.

The **second** element concerns strategic communication. It is absolutely critical that the European Union has an ability to respond to misinformation campaigns that are deliberately targeted at both the European Union as an institution and individual Member States. A sound strategic communications strategy (which makes full use of social media tools, as well as the traditional visual, audio and web-based media and is delivered by professional communicators with the appropriate language and cul-
tural awareness) is essential. In direct response, two task forces - Stratcom East working in the Russian language and Task Force South running a counter Da’esh narrative – have been set up to counter active disinformation campaigns. Their products are disseminated through weekly publications that factually put the record straight and are complemented by the use of modern media methods such as Twitter.

EU Mythbusters (@EUvDisinfo) is one such outlet which has a growing number of followers.

Thirdly, building on the experience of some Member States and partner organisations, and in order to fill a gap at the strategic level, Finland has accepted the European Union challenge for a Member State to establish a European Centre of Excellence. This work should start in early 2017 and the Centre’s tasks will be specifically focused on research and training on how hybrid strategies have been applied and, thereafter, on encouraging the development of new doctrinal concepts to help Member States and allies improve the advice given to strategic decision makers. This will likely lead to a real-time capacity for exercising demanding scenarios designed to improve decision-making in situations blurred by ambiguity. The research should also help contribute to aligning European Union and national policies, doctrines and concepts, and help to ensure that decision-makers can respond better when faced with complex challenges posed by hybrid threats which by their nature are designed to create uncertainty.

CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND STRESS AND RECOVER

Turning to the longer-term action, the fourth domain is that of building resilience. Resilience in this context is the capacity to withstand stress and recover, ideally through actioning of lessons identified. To effectively counter hybrid threats, the potential vulnerabilities of key infrastructures, supply chains and society need to be analysed and vulnerabilities addressed. For success in this area to be achieved, it is imperative that a comprehensive approach is adopted to allow all European Union instruments and policies to be brought to bear, and for Member States to be offered the best guidance on critical infrastructure design in order to ensure an overall improvement in resilience across the Union and with partners. To offer a flavour of the scope of this work, actions have been outlined to build resilience in areas such as cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, financial systems safeguards against illicit exploitation, and the countering of violent extremism and radicalisation. In each of these areas, implementation of agreed strategies by the European Union institutions as well as by Member States themselves fully applying existing legislation are key factors for success.

The European Defence Agency has a paramount role in driving forward another form of resilience – that of building defence capabilities. Here it is absolutely essential to stay abreast of technological innovation to ensure that the European Union’s capacity to act as a defence and security provider remains relevant in a dynamically and rapidly changing world. Here the European Union is seen as being able to play a key role in helping Member States develop those capacities that will be needed in the future to counter the full spectrum of potential threats. The first step on this path has been to identify the relevant key capability areas of surveillance and reconnaissance as catalyst areas for future military capability development. Technological advances can also be complemented by shortening capability development cycles, focusing investment on technological prototypes, and encouraging both innovation and innovative commercial technologies. When it comes to building resilience to hybrid attacks, commercial operators have very often through years of experience developed best practices that the European Union could exploit rather than seeking bespoke military solutions. Cyber security is one such area.
While the European Union greatly benefits from its interconnected and digitised society – considered as a real strength and economic driver – there are serious considerations linked to over-reliance. As regards hybrid attacks, the very connectivity that drives European Union society is by definition a centre of gravity and may appear a rewarding target for a would-be aggressor. Strong cyber security is therefore absolutely critical in the context of countering hybrid threats. Specifically, improving the resilience of communication and information systems in Europe is vital in supporting the digital single market. The European Union Cybersecurity Strategy and the European Agenda on Security provide the overall strategic frameworks for European Union initiatives on cyber security and cybercrime. Moreover, the European Union has been very active in developing awareness in Member States and in building inter-mechanism cooperation.

However, the European Union cannot in today’s interconnected world operate alone. There is an inbuilt reliance on partners and neighbouring countries, be it from global economic ties, shared resources or simply the natural intertwining of cultures. Therefore, when we look to the European neighbourhood, building capacities in partner countries in the security sector is essential. Taking a holistic approach by building on the nexus between security and development, the European Union is actively developing the security dimension of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy.

In this respect the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) can offer tools for use on missions and operations that can be melded to complement other deployed European Union instruments or used independently. A couple of such examples might be advisory support for key ministries under stress from hybrid threats or additional support for border management agencies that are at risk of being overwhelmed by an engineered emergency.
The creation of a European Union Hybrid Fusion Cell offers a one-stop shop for information collation to support the analysis of potential hybrid threats.

charged with making policy recommendations.

In the European Union, coordination of crisis management occurs at three levels: political, operational and technical. It addresses the full crisis management cycle: prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Dedicated procedures govern the implementation of the Commission system (ARGUS), the Council arrangements (IPCR) and the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM). Within the CRM, identified points of entry allow coordination with EU actors and international partners. When there is a need for wider/emergency consultation on hybrid threats among Commission services, the EEAS and European Union agencies, appropriate use is made of these crisis management procedures.

Given the nature of hybrid threats, the purpose and design of which is often to stay below the threshold of activity that might trigger a recognisable crisis, the European Union may need to take appropriate action in the pre-crisis phase. The attached table gives an indication of the interaction required to better inform and speed up decision-making.

**COOPERATION AND COORDINATION**

Finally, the Council proposes to step up cooperation and coordination between the European Union and NATO in common efforts to counter hybrid threats, not least as the two organisations share common values and face similar challenges. European Union Member States and NATO allies alike expect their respective organisations to support them, by acting swiftly, decisively and in a coordinated manner in the event of a cri-
sis. Of course, in a perfect world they should ideally be able to prevent the crisis from happening.

Therefore, an effective response calls for there to be an active dialogue and close coordination both at the political and operational levels of both organisations. Closer interaction between the European Union and NATO would improve both organisations’ ability to prepare for and respond to hybrid threats effectively in a complementary and mutually supporting manner.

It is fundamental that this cooperation is based on the principle of inclusiveness, while respecting each organisation’s decision-making autonomy and data protection rules. Closer European Union–NATO cooperation in a number of areas has been endorsed at the highest level by both organisations.

These areas include situational awareness, strategic communications, cyber security, and crisis prevention and response.

There has also been political agreement that the two organisations should conduct parallel and coordinated exercises organised in this cooperative framework.

**CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, the European Union’s response to hybrid threats largely depends on Member States’ willingness to share detected signals and their vulnerabilities; The more general point, which is important for all to grasp is that countering hybrid threats requires everyone to take a different intellectual approach to security issues. The traditional internal and external, civil and military, public and private separations in the European Union approach to security and defence matters are no longer sustainable and a necessary step change in mindset was needed. The European Global Strategy has gone some way to updating security and defence thinking in Europe, and the Joint Communication on Countering Hybrid Threats represents a first step towards building a safer Europe. More needs to be done, including planting the seed in all those who work in the European Union institutions or serve in delegations or on missions and operations that hybrid threats are real, and that they themselves have a role to play in supporting efforts to create a safer society.

**Hybrid Threat**

combined, centrally designed and controlled use of covert/overt, military/non-military and conventional/unconventional means and tactics

- Regular security forces
- Special forces
- Irregular forces
- Economic pressure
- Diplomacy
- Cyber attacks
- Propaganda
- Disinformation campaign

*Graph: Jochen Rehrl*
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is a major topic because of an increasing number of incidents. The main focus of protection is prevention based on a sectoral approach. But how are we to cope with significant infrastructure interruptions if protection efforts fail and there are cascading effects? Public knowledge is limited and people do not have the necessary capabilities to deal with the incidents. Our belief that it will not happen does not actually prevent the event from happening. This can also be described as the ‘Turkey Illusion’.

A turkey’s trust in its owner, who feeds it daily, will increase based on its owner’s good care. What the turkey doesn’t know is that it is being fed for one purpose only. On the day before Thanksgiving, when turkeys are traditionally slaughtered, the turkey’s trust will undergo a significant interruption.

Humans often act similarly. We look back at how successful we or our systems have been up until now and assume that past performance will continue in the future. Although we are unlike turkeys, who cannot foresee future or changing developments, we tend to ignore significant changes.

Similarly, there are significant indications that we are undergoing a major transformation process which will comprehensively change our societies and there are also sufficient signs that this process could be accompanied by ‘creative destructions’, as described by Joseph Schumpeter many decades ago. However, our essential infrastructure interdependencies mean that the outlook is not very pleasant.
We are in a process of transformation to the Network Age or Society, which will change the way of life in our societies fundamentally.

**TRANSFORMATION TO A NETWORK SOCIETY**

During the Industrial Age, we had simple structures (‘machinery’) and clear hierarchies which worked very well most of the time. Now, however, we are in a process of transformation to the Network Age or Society, which began in the 1950s, and which will change the way of life in our societies fundamentally. In considering ongoing developments, it is dangerous to adhere currently to the knowledge and experience of former times, even if past solutions were successful in their day.

One major challenge will be that Industrial Age structures and thinking will not completely disappear, but they will increasingly lose influence and importance. This will increase complexity and requirements for those who must keep up with the developments and will have to cope with new challenges.

**WHAT DOES COMPLEXITY MEAN?**

Complexity is already a part of everyday language usage, even if there are often related different meanings like opacity, uncertainty, dynamism and so on. In short, complexity has the following typical characteristics:

- Changing system properties because of feedback-loops and therefore the possibility of emergent new system properties.
  
  Take, for example, oxygen and hydrogen which, are flammable gases; these two elements combined produce a liquid, aqua, that puts our fire. Even if we knew the character of the gases, we would not be able to foresee the character of the new element.

- This also causes non-linearity where our approved risk management systems inevitably fail and predictions are difficult or impossible. They may work normally for
a certain amount of time but system behaviour could change completely in a single moment.

* Interconnectivity leads to an increasing dynamic (faster and faster) because the opportunities of system behaviour are increasing.
* This also leads to irreversibility (no way back) and the impossibility of reconstructing the causes or restarting at a well-known point.

As an example of a complex system, take a creature: you cannot cut creatures into well-structured pieces, analyse them and put them back together again. It will not work. And this is valid for all complex (live) systems. Reconstruction only works with complicated ('dead') systems (i.e. machines).

* Another very well-known characteristic is that small causes could lead to large effects (known as the 'butterfly effect'). A small problem in a supply chain link could bring down the whole system/production, as we have recently seen.
* Delayed and long-term effects are another, often underestimated, characteristic, especially in our very short-range focused economy. Figures are given for quarters. We know that apparent short-term solutions often have a negative impact on a long-term view and that, for long-term success, acceptance of short-term disadvantages is often needed.

**VUCA-TIMES**

Experts are therefore also speaking from new VUCA-times or a new VUCA-normal, the acronym for volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity, which is directly connected to the increasing complexity caused by the ongoing man-made interconnectivity between everything. In particular, we are not used to dealing with ambiguity.

**SYSTEMIC RISKS**

Consequently, the rise of systemic risks is hardly observed. Systemic risks are characterised by a high degree of interconnectivity and interdependencies and missing outreach limitation. Cascading effects are possible. Because of complexity and feedback loops, there are no simple cause-and-effect chains and the triggers, as well as the impact, are systematically underestimated by organisations and the persons in charge.

**RISK AND UNCERTAINTY**

However, we still try to address new possible risks and developments with successful past methods which can hardly cope with increasing interconnectivity and complexity. In addition, risks are not the same as uncertainty. In a world with perfect hindsight, one knows what can/cannot happen and therefore assigns risk-weighted probabilities to such events, builds a model and takes calculated decisions. However, in a world where we cannot possibly know what can/cannot happen, assigning probabilities and building models might lead us to the same fate as that suffered by our turkey.
WHAT CHALLENGES ARE WE FACING?

First, we have to recognise that in nature there are only complex, open systems. These are new on a technical level, especially the increasing interdependencies (vulnerabilities). And we are still used to dealing with linear simple machines and not with complexity, which is caused mainly by a lack of education and training. Especially in the education system, we often still train and teach as was necessary for the Industrial Age, but that is hardly what is needed in the upcoming Network Age, where even a black and white description is too simple.

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND SYSTEMIC THINKING

There are of course improvements but, in general, they cannot keep up with the fast-moving technological developments and therefore we see more and more complexity gaps. Even though there are people who have the necessary knowledge to develop these emerging and converting technologies, most people, including people who should, do not have this knowledge, e.g. people working for public authorities or regulatory bodies to protect public interests. In particular, administrative bodies are often still organised under good old hierarchical structures which are hardly able to cope with fast changing VUCA-developments. Not to mention the fact that interconnected special knowledge and fast reactions are often needed. Today, nobody can know everything about everything and therefore we have to arrange more flexible ad-hoc networks and interaction among different experts to address complex dynamic challenges. This leads again to complexity gaps, which brings systemic risks and a danger of extreme events.

EXAMPLE ONE: CYBERSPACE AND CYBER SECURITY

Ten years ago, cyber security was hardly mentioned. We spoke about information and communication technology (ICT)security, but not about cyber security. With increasing networking of systems and infrastructures and with the spread of new technologies like smartphones, the focus grew broader. This was also necessary because of an increasing threat landscape, both qualitative...
and quantitative. Hardly any nation has a cyber security strategy to mitigate new challenges coming from the new virtual world. However, as we can see, everyday regulations and efforts do not seem to be able to follow up the developments on the dark side of interconnectivity.

One reason could be that we still focus on symptoms and not sources. We still try to fix vulnerabilities and wonder why it does not work. But more of the same will not work, to quote Albert Einstein: ‘Problems cannot be solved with the same mindset that created them.’

Of course, to conclude, some essential vulnerabilities will not be easy to fix because they are often based on significant design failures, which exist because the internet and also the connected hard- and software often were not designed for the purposes for which they are used nowadays. This problem is escalating, in particular, with legacy infrastructure systems like supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) or industrial control systems (ICS), which are used for automation and were designed for offline use. Nowadays, however, they are increasingly connected to office IT systems, so known office IT problems and threats could spread without the possibility of using known IT security solutions because of other system requirements or because of costs.

But developments do not stop: on the contrary, new technologies like the Internet of Things (IoT) emerge quickly and, with them, more future interconnectness and threats. A few months ago, only a few experts warned that major risks could spread from these technologies. Since some major distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, we know that a large number of unsecured internet-connected digital devices, such as home routers and surveillance cameras and so on, could constitute a powerful weapon and could also bring down parts of our infrastructure. Until now, we have been lucky and only services have been interrupted. But what we have already seen would also be enough to trigger a major cascading infrastructure collapse, even if most people still believe that this is not possible. The threat increases with every new unsecure and connected device and with every new interconnection within infrastructure systems.

It is still early days but interconnectness is likely to increase rapidly within the next few years because of smart grids, smart homes, smart cities and also with ‘Industry 4.0’. Digitalisation is on everybody’s lips, especially on politicians’ lips. But do we really know what we are doing? Why should rapidly increasing threats from ICT be solved when they become more connected? Why are we again seeing serious security vulnerabilities in the IoT which we previously solved in other domains years or decades ago? Back then, they were in offline systems, but nowadays they are in highly interconnected systems where failure and disruptions could spread very fast and very far. It is as if we have not learned the right lessons, but the risks of today are growing exponentially and it seems that it will only be a matter of time before serious infrastructural disturbances arise because of an increasing complexity gap and underestimated systemic risks.

**EXAMPLE TWO: EUROPEAN POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM**

Another sector where a large complexity gap emerges is within the European power supply system. We just started the largest infrastructure transformation ever, with the transformation from fossil fuel driven power plants to renewable energy, which means a major shift from centralised to decentralised structures and power ratios. Yet every Member State is carrying out its transformation at its own speed and in its own way, with hardly any common aim or plan; this leads to an increasingly fragile system. However, insufficient new developments driven by the ICT-sector or new market players will also increase vulnerabilities in this highly sensitive system. It is our most important lifeline even if we do not notice it normally because it works seamlessly almost every day. This means that we do not have fall-back plans in the event of a considerable disturbance in the power supply system.
Nevertheless, the warning signs have never been as tangible as in recent months. System instabilities have been increasing rapidly for years. And even the Association of European Transmission System Operators, ENTSO-E, stated in its investigation report on the 2015 Turkey blackout: ‘Although the electric supply should never be interrupted, there is, unfortunately, no collapse-free power system!’

While most regions in the world have some experience of dealing with major disturbances like this, Europe does not, owing to its excellent security of supply. It is therefore also difficult to predict how long it would take for power to be restored. The estimate ranges from several hours to several days. The knock-on effect for our strong inverse infrastructure and society would be devastating, because we do not expect it and are not prepared for it.

For this crisis situation, there are rarely contingency plans for working ‘offline’, and, because of the power outage, nor would it be long before the telecommunication systems collapsed. So we could say that we have very good systems and operators because they have coped with all the problems to date. But we could also be suffering from a major Turkey Illusion.
LEARNING FROM NATURE – ‘SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL’

We should learn more from nature, which has a very long history and development phase. Only survivable structures and organisms were successful and are still here. We often miss the so-called ‘silent witnesses’, those who did not survive and are not to be found in the history books. One major structure that did succeed is ‘small is beautiful’.

• Small structures are more flexible and robust against strikes (asymmetry).
• People are more resilient in small structures.
• You cannot prevent the development, but early warning is an important part of navigation and we have to prepare to cope with uncertainty and with major incidents/disruptions.
• It is all about communication and knowledge. If people and decision makers know the challenges, they can react and prepare before a crisis or a disruption or change the path leading up to it.
• Security Communication will be a main driver to increase people’s resilience and capacity to act in the event of uncertainty and after extreme events.
• ‘Understanding the problem is half the solution’, as Albert Einstein once said.

ARE WE PREPARING FOR THE RIGHT THING?

So we are moving along a very narrow path. Benefits and risks are very close together. One key question therefore is, are we mature enough? To prepare for an increasing number of possible and likely significant infrastructure interruptions, it is not enough to speak only at a high political or management level. We have to include people and mobilise them to prepare themselves, because such scenarios can be solved only by people themselves and not, as is usually the case, by emergency services.

• This calls for open security and risk communication, which addresses risks and uncertainties and assigns people their responsibilities in the event of significant infrastructure interruptions.
• We will also have to ask ourselves in politics and in the security sector if we have the right focus, or if we are preparing for ‘the last war’. For example, on the one hand, we are devoting a large amount of money and effort to terrorism prevention, but on the other, we have a fundamental problem with our deadly vulnerable infrastructures.

The problem is that there is no easy, quick technical solution, but we have to start thinking about it and developing new design approaches, to mitigate already existing catastrophic potential. To start with all these steps in the aftermath of a first incident, as we have done in the past, will be too late in the future.
5 CROSSCUTTING CSDP ISSUES
Women, men, girls and boys experience and are affected by armed conflicts differently. Violence, displacement, disruption of support services, economic insecurity and unravelling of social structures and judicial and security institutions are some of the long-term consequences that people in post-conflict settings have to endure, and each has a gender dimension.

International interventions, in the form of crisis management missions or post-conflict reconstruction programmes, need to be implemented in a gender-sensitive manner, so as to ensure that the measures in question are non-discriminatory and do not exacerbate existing inequalities but benefit both men and women.

**DEFINITION OF GENDER**

*Gender* refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialisation processes. They are context- and time-specific, and changeable.

*(European Institute for Gender Equality, EIGE).*
THE EU’S GENDER POLICY

The EU’s gender policy in the area of crisis management is based on mainstreaming, i.e. systematically integrating a gender perspective in all areas of the CSDP, from planning and implementation of missions and operations to reporting, evaluation, training and lessons. The ultimate objective of the CSDP gender mainstreaming policy is gender equality, one of the core values of the European Union that is enshrined in the Treaty on European Union. The EU’s external actions, including the CSDP, are guided by the Union’s core values and principles.

Promoting gender equality contributes to stability. Studies show that societies with a high level of gender equality tend to be more stable than those with a wide gender equality gap. Similarly, gender inequality is closely associated with armed conflict. For example, all but one of the ten lowest-ranking countries in the UN Development Programme’s gender inequality index (GII) were either experiencing or emerging from conflict (HDR 2015).

GENDER MAINSTREAMING

Gender mainstreaming is also applied for reasons of operational effectiveness. The underlying reasoning is that applying a gender perspective will increase the EU’s crisis management capacity by mobilizing additional resources and exploiting the full potential of the available human resources, and will make the missions more effective in terms of establishing peace and security and strengthening democratic values (11932/2/05). Other pragmatic reasons include improving situational awareness and reaching out to the host civilian population, in particular on issues such as conflict-related sexual violence or gender-based violence.

A new key document, which provides a comprehensive policy framework for gender equality and women’s empowerment in the EU’s external activities, is the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) for 2016-2020. It renews the EU’s commitment to gender equality, human rights, the empowerment of women and girls and the eradication of gender-based violence.
Gender balancing in CSDP missions
by Maline Meiske

In October 2015, the UN Security Council conducted a High-Level Review aiming at assessing progress in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. The Review provides an opportunity to take a closer look at the developments and progress made in the context of the CSDP. Ensuring women’s participation in CSDP crisis management operations is still a major challenge, particularly in military operations. Endeavours at the EU-level alone, however, are insufficient, and can only succeed in conjunction with member states’ efforts.

The European Union has increasingly recognised that conflict and crisis management are not gender-neutral affairs and has introduced numerous gender policies and initiatives to forward the aims of UNSCR 1325. The key phrase is ‘gender mainstreaming’ – the process of assessing the implications of any planned action for men and women, which includes the proportional representation of both genders in conflict resolution and crisis management operations (also referred to as ‘gender balancing’).

Boosting women’s participation began as an equal rights issue, but it has developed into a functionalist argument about improved operational effectiveness of crisis management and sustainability of conflict resolution. Adequate representation of female personnel is thought to help combat sexual violence, promote gender awareness among the host nations’ populations, and improve relationships between peacekeepers and local citizens.

With the gradual release of gender-disaggregated data on women’s participation in crisis management operations, research on gender balance and the impact on operational effectiveness is on the rise. EEAS data on 16 civilian CSDP missions between 2007 and 2013 reveal an increase in women’s participation, suggesting that gender policies and initiatives have had some success. Overall, the proportion of women participating in civilian CSDP missions rose from 20% to 26% and the absolute number of female civilian personnel increased from 240 to 869.

For CSDP military operations, no gender-disaggregated data is retained – a shortcoming that is in the process of being addressed. The EU Military Staff, however, estimates that only 3%-8% of the deployed personnel in CSDP military operations are female.

Mind the gap
To understand why women remain underrepresented in CSDP missions and operations, the methods of recruitment must be examined. Personnel are mainly supplied through national secondments, meaning that the decision-making authority in the allocation process lies with each member state. The underlying characteristics of each state thus determine women’s participation in

UNSCR 1325 WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

The United Nations Security Council’s adoption in 2000 of the landmark Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security highlighted women’s rights and gender equality for the first time as key factors in establishing international peace and stability. This was followed by Resolution 1820 (2008), which focused on sexual violence as a tactic of war and a possible war crime.

Since then the UN Security Council has adopted six more resolutions: 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122 and 2242. The women, peace and security agenda is based on these eight resolutions.

The European Union is a strong supporter of the women, peace and security agenda. The Union has consistently called for its full implementation, stressing the need to combat violence against women in conflict situations and to promote women’s equal and meaningful participation in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction.

IMPLEMENTING THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA

The key EU document for implementing the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda is the ‘Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implementation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security’ (15671/1/2008).

It offers a holistic approach, which recognises the close links between peace, security, development and gender equality and lists a range of EU external action instruments. The guiding document ‘Implementation of UNSCRs on women, peace and security into CSDP mission and operations’ (PSC document 7109/2012) focuses on the implementation of the WPS agenda in CSDP missions.

In 2010, the EU adopted 17 indicators to identify both progress and gaps in implementation based on the Comprehensive Approach; five of these indicators focused specifically on the CSDP.

The indicators were revised in 2016 (12525/16) and grouped under four thematic headings: prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery.
5.2. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CSDP

by Taina Järvinen

In the context of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law are considered essential for lasting peace and security.

Over the years the EU has mainly deployed missions focusing on capacity-building, training, advising and supporting security sector or other institutional reforms in post-conflict situations, where human rights are part of broader reconstruction efforts.

However, CSDP missions increasingly operate in complex and hostile conflict settings where national institutions are fragile or non-existent and civilians are often deliberately targeted by armed groups – a clear violation of international humanitarian law.

NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

The European Union is committed to promoting and protecting human rights worldwide and the development of EU human rights policies in its external action, including CSDP, has a strong normative basis. Human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of equality and solidarity are founding principles of the EU embedded in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with Article 21 TEU, the EU is guided by and seeks to advance these principles in its external action. Furthermore, Article 21 TEU places the EU’s external activities within a broader international normative framework by including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law among the guiding
principles. In other words, even when a CSDP mission mandate does not explicitly refer to human rights, the mission operates in the framework of international and EU human rights standards and indirectly aims to promote human rights.

HUMAN RIGHTS MAINSTREAMING

To ensure effective implementation of human rights commitments in CSDP, the EU early on adopted a policy of mainstreaming. In June 2006 the Political and Security Committee endorsed a paper entitled ‘Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP’ (11936/4/06). The document outlines the basic principles of human rights mainstreaming in CSDP and lists a number of implementation measures for the missions, Member States and the Commission, which include:

• ensuring the necessary human rights expertise at headquarters and in missions;
• providing human rights training to mission personnel;
• integrating human rights aspects as part of flanking measures or technical assistance provided in the context of missions and operations;
• ensuring appropriate mission-specific reporting procedures and integrating lessons learned on human rights aspects in missions and operations;
• cooperating with other international stakeholders.

In the context of CSDP operations and missions, human rights mainstreaming means that human rights aspects are systematically integrated into all phases of CSDP missions and operations, from the early planning phase to implementation and review. The mainstreaming policy should pay special attention to the needs and situation of children affected by armed conflict and other vulnerable groups.
ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS AND COHERENCE

The European Union reaffirmed its commitment to human rights in 2012 when the Council adopted the package entitled ‘Human Rights and Democracy: EU Strategic Framework and EU Action Plan’. The second action plan on human rights and democracy for the 2015 – 2020 period was adopted in 2015. The strategic framework and the consecutive action plans aim to further enhance the effectiveness and coherence of EU policies by setting out objectives, principles and priorities, and to ensure a comprehensive approach to preventing and addressing conflicts and crises.

INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO CSDP – TAKING STOCK

Considerable progress has been made and many of the measures identified in the 2006 document have been implemented over the past ten years. The EU and Member States have adopted new policies and developed a body of guidelines, checklists, handbooks and other toolkits for mainstreaming human rights and other human rights–related fields such as transitional justice and international humanitarian law into CSDP.

Human rights aspects have been integrated into the 2013 crisis management procedures, and there has been an increase in human rights expertise and resources. Human rights advisers or focal points are present in most CSDP missions and operations, and human rights components are included in CSDP training courses organised by various Member States under the framework of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). Specialised training on human rights, gender, children and armed conflict, protection of civilians and conflict prevention is also available through ESDC and other Member State initiatives.

However, after ten years it was necessary to take stock of the progress made and identify areas where more should be done. In April 2015, 20 Member States drafted a non-paper encouraging the EU to enhance its efforts to mainstream human rights, gender, women, peace and security into CSDP. In May 2015, the Council welcomed the initiative for a baseline study that would allow progress and delivery on human rights, gender and related fields to be measured over time. In response, the EEAS conducted a baseline study on the integration of human rights and gender into CSDP during 2016. The 21 baselines were developed based on existing policy commitments for integrating human rights, gender, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the protection of children affected by armed conflict into CSDP missions.

The study focused on both human rights and gender, as CSDP policies have consistently promoted human rights and gender together. However, efforts were made to separate human rights from gender so as to differentiate the complementary importance to CSDP of, on the one hand, human rights and, on the other, gender and UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security.

The final report of the baseline study was approved by the High Representative and submitted to the Council in December 2016. The findings and recommendations of the study will provide an informed basis for further integration of human rights in CSDP.
5.3. RULE OF LAW AND CSDP

by Daphne Lodder

Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Lisbon, 2009) states that:

‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights [...] These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’

Article 3(1) TEU stipulates that:

‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’, and adds to this in Article 3(5) ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values [...] It shall contribute to peace, security [...] (and) the protection of human rights [...]’

Article 21 TEU deals with the principles that inform EU foreign policy and extends Member States’ values on which the Union is based to its external action, where it aims equally to uphold and promote these values:

‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.’

The rule of law is a principle of governance whereby all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable under laws that are publicly promulgated, enforced and independently adjudicated.
Furthermore: ‘The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for [...] cooperation in all fields of international relations’, (Article 21(2) TEU) in order to ‘consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’. (Article. 21(3) (b) TEU).

Upholding the rule of law has a twofold effect on the EU: as a foundational and common value (internal dimension), and as a guiding principle for international action (external dimension). These dimensions – as also mentioned in the EU Global Strategy – are ever more intertwined: this is becoming most obvious in the nexus between internal and external security, stressing that our security at home ‘entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions’.

RULE OF LAW AS A PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNANCE

The rule of law is a principle of governance whereby all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable under laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It is closely linked to the principle of justice, involving an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs.

The initial emphasis within the rule of law area at international level was on justice, to address war crimes and corruption that threatened the stability of countries emerging from conflict. With an independent judiciary still central to the delivery of that justice, the modern – broader – concept of the rule of law, as defined above, also encompasses the executive (mainly the police) and the legislative branch of a state’s authority. However, against the backdrop of the link between the ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’ these terms have at times been used as synonyms: the rule of law is often applied in the sense of ‘justice system/judiciary’, or referring to the (criminal) ‘justice chain’ composed of police, courts, prosecution services and the penitentiary. In the next paragraph the meaning of the rule of law within the CSDP context will be outlined.

As to the relationship between human rights and the rule of law, while human rights have to do with the substance of rights and freedoms, the rule of law has to do with their just and effective protection and promotion. Or, as stated in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, ‘human rights should be protected by the rule of law.’ There is also an important relationship between Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the rule of law, as SSR is aimed at gradually providing individuals and the state with more effective and

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5 The concept and process of SSR as such will be elaborated upon in the next chapter of this handbook (5.4).
accountable security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good governance.⁶

**EU Principles and Concepts Relevant to the Rule of Law on CSDP Missions**

At the Feira European Council of 2000, the ‘Rule of Law’ was identified as one of four priority areas for civilian crisis management alongside police, civilian administration, and civil protection – effectively equalling ‘justice (reform)’ in recent terminology. However, with the adoption of the Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence⁷, it is proposed to review the priority areas of civilian CSDP missions in the light of evolving political priorities and in order to better respond to current and future security challenges. The review should address where CSDP can have added value in line with the EU’s comprehensive approach throughout the entire conflict cycle.⁸

A review of priorities could also provide a good opportunity in terms of further clarifying the concepts of ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’, and how those are applied in a CSDP context. In this context consideration could also be given to reviewing the existing EU concepts, primarily those relating to police strengthening missions and justice missions⁹ (as referred to in this article).

EU concepts for CSDP missions cover diverse state functions and policy fields in the broader rule of law area, such as police and justice, civilian administration, customs, border management, anti-corruption, human rights and gender. Those concepts should be read in conjunction with the ‘core concept’, the ‘EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law Framework)’ (18173/10).

Amongst the main imperatives for the design, planning and conduct of CSDP missions, as laid down in these concepts is that of ensuring sustainable, transparent, effective and accountable institutions in the host countries, set up in a democratic fashion, being free from corruption, upholding human rights, in particular the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups, operating within a coherent legal framework, developed via due legislative process, and in line with international norms and standards. These institutions should include an independent and impartial justice system, to which there is unhindered access, one that is capable of dealing – without fear or favour – with the legacies of the past and the needs of the present, in coexistence with informal or alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms. When promoting these standards and concepts it is of utmost importance that CSDP missions themselves operate in strict compliance with applicable rules and regulations as well as with professional and behavioural standards. A strong internal accountability measure is the Code of Conduct and Discipline which is applied by all civilian CSDP missions equally and holds mission members to account for their professional behaviour. Another example of an accountability mechanism but with an external/public dimension is the Human Rights Review Panel as established by EULEX Kosovo, to hold the mission accountable to the local population, given its executive tasks and direct impact of decisions.

Missions must pursue a tailored, systemic and comprehensive approach under local ownership, and with a shared vision, in coordination with EU institutions and actors, and with the wider international community. In the end, CSDP rule of law and justice missions take place as part of a wider, coherent EU action, and should be supported by or lay the ground work for the

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⁷ 14149/16, 14 November 2016.
⁸ 14149/16, p.7, para.11(a).
⁹ 15031/09 and 18173/10 respectively.
deployment of other, broader EU institutional support through other EU external assistance instruments, as well as those of Member States in capacity building and development tools. It will significantly enhance the successful conclusion of strengthening missions and/or substitution missions.\(^{10}\)

**TYPES OF MISSIONS WITHIN THE RoL FRAMEWORK**

There are two generic types of CSDP mission in the area of the rule of law: firstly, strengthening missions, whereby qualified justice personnel are deployed to monitor, mentor, advise (MMA) and to train if appropriate host country justice officials, including judges, prosecutors and lawyers, with the aim of ensuring that the host country’s legal system meets international standards. The second generic type of rule of law mission is at the level of executive/substitution functions for the local judiciary/legal system. This type of mission can be deployed in a crisis or post-conflict situation, where host country structures have failed, or do not exist, and where justice personnel are deployed to carry out executive functions, to rebuild the rule of law and thereby contribute to restoring public order and security.\(^{11}\) CSDP (justice) missions can take the following forms. This is further illustrated by the table on the next page:

- CSDP justice strengthening missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising justice officials, including in the context of justice system reforms);
- CSDP justice mission that carries out both the strengthening activities and executive/substitution ones;
- CSDP integrated rule of law missions comprising several components (e.g. a justice component, a police component);
- SSR missions, comprising initial reorganisation and reform of military, police, justice, governance structures and relevant civilian administration, could involve a multiplicity of actors and agencies, in a holistic approach.

Depending on their mandates, missions may take on a combination of these generic types, and may address a variety of the state functions and policy fields as outlined above. Even though not all missions have a clear RoL component or pillar, care is always taken to ensure that rule of law as a principle of governance is promoted across the various activities. Under the current concepts, executive/substitution missions would never stand alone, but would always be complemented by strengthening activities – see the example of EULEX Kosovo, the only current CSDP mission whose mandate includes executive functions.

**OTHER REFERENCE FRAMEWORKS & DOCUMENTS**

In addition to the documents already referred to in the text of the article and in the footnotes, the overarching EU rule of law framework conceptually includes:

- Council conclusions on Ensuring Respect for the Rule of Law, 16682/14: ‘(…) respecting the rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection of fundamental rights’.
- Council conclusions on fundamental rights and rule of law, 10168/13.
- Comprehensive Concept for ESDP Police Strengthening Missions (Interface with Broader Rule of Law), 15031/09.
- Comprehensive Concept for Police Substitution Missions – Revised Version, 8655/5/02.
- Comprehensive EU concept for missions in the field of Rule of Law in crisis management, including annexes, 14315/02 and 9792/03.
- EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), 12566/4/05.

\(^{10}\) 18173/10, p.15.
\(^{11}\) 18173/10, p.20.
### Rule of law in civilian CSDP missions: an overview of activities and some examples of achievements

#### MISSIONS WITH A RULE OF LAW COMPONENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Support for the Palestinian Criminal Justice System</th>
<th>Support for police-prosecution cooperation</th>
<th>Increase cooperation between police and prosecution</th>
<th>Use of executive judicial competencies in specific areas (organised crime, war crimes, corruption, property issues)</th>
<th>Strengthening the Rule of Law institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| EUPOL COPPS (Palestine) 2006 – ongoing | • Support for the local authorities in the delineation of competences of the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General and the High Judicial Council with the overall aim of adopting a new Law on Judicial Authority  
• Support for the Palestinian Judicial Institute  
• Support for legislative drafting initiatives, including amendments to the Law on anti-corruption, to the Code of Criminal Procedure or to the Law on the Protection of Families from Violence | • Development of an MoU between police and prosecutors  
• Support to the Working Group on the MoU implementation | • Support for the Palestinian Criminal Justice System  
• Support for legislative drafting initiatives, including amendments to the Law on anti-corruption, to the Code of Criminal Procedure or to the Law on the Protection of Families from Violence | • Mission judges delivered more than 43,600 judgements  
• Mission prosecutors have reviewed more than 2,300 case files on war crimes and serious and organised crime, resulting in 250 indictments or investigations | • Mission advice through MMA and peer-to-peer case management (mixed panels) has enabled the judicial authorities to develop and reinforce their capacity to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases  
• Support for legislative reform drafting |
| EUPOL Afghanistan 2007 – 2016 | | | • Support for the development and use of a Police and Prosecutors Coordination Training Manual | | |
| EULEX Kosovo 2008 – ongoing | | | | • Mission advice through MMA and peer-to-peer case management (mixed panels) has enabled the judicial authorities to develop and reinforce their capacity to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases  
• Support for legislative reform drafting | |

Missions must pursue a tailored, systemic and comprehensive approach under local ownership, and with a shared vision.
### MISSIONS WITH A RULE OF LAW COMPONENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Somalia (former EUCAP NESTOR) 2012 – ongoing</td>
<td>Support for the drafting and implementation of maritime security legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Support for the review and drafting of relevant maritime security legislation in compliance with international human rights standards (Law on the Organisation of the Police, Somali Maritime Security, Counter Piracy and Coast Guard legislation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Support for maritime security agencies and relevant judicial/legal institutions (establishment &amp; development, organisational capabilities and professional skills)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Advice to high-level officials in the Ministries of Justice, Supreme Courts (and other courts), Attorneys General’s Offices, Maritime Police Units and Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Organisation of a regional conference on maritime security as well as regular regional workshops and legal seminars for prosecutors, judges and other legal practitioners on piracy trial exercises in Nairobi, Djibouti, Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Provision of strategic advice, notably in relation to criminal investigations (including prosecution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine 2014 – ongoing</td>
<td>- Advice on clarifying investigative and prosecutorial responsibilities incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Advice on developing the framework for vetting in the General Prosecutor’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operational support to ensure implementation of strategic advice for reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Enhancement of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau’s/Specialised Anti-Corruption Office’s capacity for international legal cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Training of national police and prosecutors’ office in investigation techniques for money laundering and cross-border crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MISSIONS STREAMLINING RULE OF LAW ACROSS THE MISSION COMPONENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Advice to the Mission on Rule of Law matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger 2012 – ongoing</td>
<td>- Review of training curricula for the Nigerien security forces and the justice sector focusing on the reinforcement of the Rule of Law and Nigerien capacities to fight terrorism and organised crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inclusion of key EU standards in Security Sector Reform in national training curricula for sustainability of efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Advice to the Mission on Rule of Law matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali 2014 – ongoing</td>
<td>- Review of training curricula for the Malian internal security forces (ISF), notably for the modules on the fight against terrorism, organised crime, judiciary police, criminal investigation, custody and interviews procedures, complaint filing and victims support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Distribution of codes (penal and penal procedure) and manuals to ISF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.4. THE NEW EU-WIDE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT SSR

by Karin Gatt Rutter and Gianmarco Scuppa

Security Sector Reform (SSR) can be translated as:

‘transforming a country’s security system so that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more effective and accountable security and in a manner that is consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good governance’.

The EU has been supporting Security Sector Reform in numerous countries for many years by using external action instruments and crisis management tools. In 2015, foreign ministers asked the High Representative and the Commission to review the existing policy framework and to maximise the impact, efficiency and consistency of the EU’s support. This led to the development of the new EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform, which was issued in the form of a Joint Communication by the High Representative and the Commission in July 2016 and subsequently endorsed by the Foreign Affairs Council in November the same year.

This new SSR policy framework merges and updates previous policies from 2005 and 20061 that have been guiding EU action in the field of Security Sector Reform and includes new elements in line with international trends, such as the recognition of the increasingly stronger links between security and development as explained in the Agenda 2030 and more explicitly in sustainable development goal 16.2

OBJECTIVES FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

This SSR strategic framework sets clear objectives for EU engagement in the security sector:

* support partner states in concretely improving security for individuals and the state;

This means, in particular, addressing the security needs of different groups (including women, minors and minorities) as perceived and experienced by them.

* improve the legitimacy, good governance, integrity and sustainability of the security sector in partner states.

This means encouraging and supporting the security sector in partner states to respect internationally accepted human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles, apply the good governance principles of transparency, openness, participation, inclusivity and accountability, respect public finance management rules and procedures, fight corruption and be fiscally sustainable.


2 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015; UNGA A/RES/70/1); Goal 16: ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.
SCOPE OF SSR

The SSR strategic framework has a very wide scope as it applies to all EU actors and instruments, including political/diplomatic, external actions instruments, crisis response and CSDP civilian and military actors. It also applies in all contexts, not only in conflict or post-conflict situations or any specific geographical region. It is designed to be broad enough to guide a variety of situations encountered throughout the various phases of EU support from identification, planning and programming to implementation of activities.

The starting point for any EU action in the security sector of a partner country should be an understanding of the security sector and the context in which it is situated. EU delegations will therefore be requested to report more regularly on security sector developments as part of the regular political reporting to headquarters. Where there are CSDP missions and operations present in the field, such security sector analysis and reporting should be done jointly. If the situation calls for substantial security assistance, specific and in-depth security sector assessments could be undertaken to identify security needs as perceived and experienced by the different groups of the population (for instance woman and minority groups) and to what extent the security sector addresses them.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

EU assistance should therefore be based on a solid understanding of the features and actors of the security sector and be built on ongoing national debates and initiatives and, where existing and credible, on national strategies, policies and plans. This will enhance the national ownership, which is essential for achieving any sustainable changes in the partner country. National actors should steer the reform process and take overall

National ownership is essential for achieving any sustainable changes in the partner country.
responsibility for the results of interventions, which should result from an in-depth political and policy dialogue on the security sector with all national stakeholders, including oversight entities such as legislative bodies, and civil society. Issues of good governance, human rights, the rule of law and democracy are also part of such dialogues, as the respect for these principles is particularly critical in the security sector.

Transforming any security sector is a complex and lengthy process which requires long-term engagement and flexibility, because the political and/or operational environment may change rapidly and the EU must be able to adapt its political, technical and financial support.

Moreover, in many situations the population may have pressing security needs. It is therefore fundamental to contribute to immediate solutions to these needs while gradually progressing towards longer-term systemic changes in the security sector.

**COOPERATION AND COORDINATION**

One key aspect of the new strategic framework is the enhancement of the effectiveness and impact of EU action through better coordination of EU support, including with EU Member States. The new framework therefore proposes the mapping of all EU SSR activities and the development of coordination matrices that set common EU objectives and identify links and sequencing of diplomatic, development cooperation and possible CSDP actions to achieve them.

Involvement with other relevant international actors is also necessary to avoid duplication and to increase a shared understanding of needs and objectives.

An essential part of any form of support is monitoring and evaluation, as well as understanding the risks linked to assistance/intervention. The most important risks can be categorised under broad headings related to 1) insufficient national political commitment to change, 2) negative unintended consequences, 3) reputational risks, and 4) the risks of non-intervention.

Context analysis and conflict-sensitive analysis are important tools with which to generate an understanding of the context in which support is provided. Additionally, a solid risk management and risk mitigation framework will be developed to guide any future EU assistance in the security sectors of partner countries.

To maximise the EU’s effectiveness in providing SSR support, EU SSR expertise will have to be developed both at the level of headquarters and in the field. Following the endorsement of the strategic framework a permanent, informal, inter-service task force has been established with staff from relevant thematic EEAS and Commission services.

The function of this task force is to develop methodological tools, oversee EU SSR activities and provide support and advice to EU Delegations, EEAS and Commission services and CSDP missions.

In the field, CSDP missions should assist the EU Delegation on SSR-related issues and all EU actors – including Member State diplomatic missions – and should share information and analysis, participate in joint analysis and contribute to the formulation of SSR coordination matrices.
6 CFSP AGENCIES
The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is the Union’s agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues.

**MISSION AND STRUCTURE**

The Institute was set up in January 2002 as an autonomous agency under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) [Council Joint Action 2001/554, now regulated by Council Decision 2014/75/CFSP] to foster a common security culture for the EU, support the elaboration and projection of its foreign policy, and enrich the strategic debate inside and outside Europe. Based in Paris with a liaison office in Brussels, the EUISS is now an integral part of the new structures that underpin the further development of the CFSP/CSDP.

The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses and fora for discussion which are useful and relevant for the formulation of EU policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels.
The Institute is funded by the EU Member States according to a GNI-based formula. It is governed by a Board – chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), with the EEAS providing the secretariat – which lays down its budgetary and administrative rules and approves its work programme. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political supervision – without prejudice to the EUISS’s intellectual independence and operational autonomy.

PUBLICATIONS

As part of its mission to promote a common security culture for the EU, help develop and project the CFSP, and enrich Europe’s strategic debate, the Institute regularly releases publications on issues at the core of the Union’s work. The EUISS conducts its research both by theme and by region. In addition to the work produced on the CFSP and CSDP

The Institute’s flagship publication is its series of Chaillot Papers.
www.iss.europa.eu/publications/chaillot-papers/
proper, the EUISS addresses the various dimensions of the Union’s common external action – from energy to sanctions, from cyber issues to climate change, from space to strategic communications. Particular emphasis is placed on the Union’s neighbours to the east and the south, as well as on the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and territorial disputes in Asia.

The Institute’s flagship publication is its series of Chaillot Papers, which are based on focused, in-depth research. A special effort has been made in recent years to help keep the general public informed, by developing products such as the Yearbook of European Security (YES) and publishing leaflets (on CFSP and CSDP) and pocket books (on defence and strategy).

These products, together with the series of Briefs and Alerts, have become reliable sources of analysis and information for both diplomats and academics the world over.

**EVENTS**

EUISS events are intended to enhance the Union’s analytical capacities and facilitate the shaping of common approaches.

They bring together EU officials, national experts, academics, decision-makers, media and civil society representatives from the EU Member States as well as the rest of the world.

EUISS conferences are large public events attended by well-known figures which centre on broad political issues. EUISS seminars are medium-sized events focused on specific subjects, often with a regional or policy emphasis.

EUISS task forces are smaller groups which meet fairly regularly to monitor events in a particular region and/or specific policy developments, and often to deliver targeted advice.

In recent years, priority has also been given to dialogues with partner institutes in third coun-
tries, through the annual Transatlantic Forum in Washington and strategic dialogues with the Institute’s Chinese, Indian, Korean and Japanese counterparts.

**COOPERATION**

Over the course of 2015 and 2016, the EUISS – in close cooperation with the Strategic Planning Division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) – successfully coordinated the expert consultation and outreach process leading up to the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), which was launched by the HR/VP in June 2016.

The process brought together the broader expert community represented by think tankers and academics from across Europe (and beyond). This ‘strategic semester’, as it came to be known, included events in almost every EU Member State, organised in collaboration with a national centre or institute and often with the direct participation of the foreign ministry.

The EUISS, which was recently placed under the aegis of the EEAS Secretary-General, also liaises regularly with all EEAS departments dealing with security and defence, as well as with the geographical desks, and involves relevant officials in its various events whenever possible.

Collaboration with the EU institutions and the other agencies has also increased, leading to projects conducted for the Commission’s DG DEVCO, the European Defence Agency and the European Parliament.

Cooperation with the SATCEN has recently been formalised through a dedicated memorandum of understanding. The EUISS also enjoys excellent working relations with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC): the Institute offers its expertise and support for courses and events (including the alumni network), and, since September 2015, the EUISS Director has been Chair of the ESDC Executive Academic Board.

Finally, cooperation with the Member States – through the PSC and the Board, as well as the Permanent Representations, the rotating EU Presidencies and, occasionally, the Working Groups – is also a key part of the work of the EUISS.
6.2. THE EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE

by Pascal Legai

The EU SatCen provides products and services derived from the exploitation of space assets and collateral data to the European Union (to support its decision-making, missions and operations), EU Member States, third States¹ and international organisations. It was founded in 1992 as part of the Western European Union and was incorporated into the European Union as an agency on 1 January 2002.

ROLE

Under the supervision of the Political and Security Committee and the operational direction of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, SatCen is a decentralised EU agency which provides decision-makers with early warning of potential crises to allow timely diplomatic, economic and humanitarian measures to be taken, including generic planning and conduct for intervention.

SERVICES

GEOINT

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is a discipline that uses the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on Earth.

In response to task requests, SatCen produces analyses. These range from brief descriptions when a quick response is required to detailed studies on complex areas, installations and activities.

Depending on the requests received, SatCen analyses satellite and aerial images for activities related to EU crisis management operations, arms control, non-proliferation and treaty verification, counter-terrorism, counter-crime, migration, humanitarian aid, contingency planning and general surveillance.

Training

SatCen offers specialised training to image analysts and general information for users. For this purpose, it is constantly developing applied training techniques and products, such as multimedia tutorials, remote sensing imagery processing and data fusion.

¹ Third States are non-EU NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU.
**Capability development activities**

SatCen executes projects and participates in programmes aimed at developing new – or improving existing – capabilities:

- Activities under the Copernicus programme, supporting in particular EU external action, SatCen’s GEOINT activities, and cooperation in the areas of maritime and border surveillance.

- Space surveillance and tracking (SST) activities which contribute to the protection and enhancement of space assets. SatCen is in direct contact with SST users.

- Research, technology development and innovation (RTDI) activities to identify and assess technical and programmatic solutions to incoming and transversal issues.

**PARTNERS**

SatCen cooperates with national and international institutions in the space sector. It works closely with the European Commission, the European Defence Agency and the European Space Agency, as well as other institutions and international organisations.

**STAFF**

SatCen staff are drawn from EU Member States. In addition, experts seconded from Member States work at SatCen for periods ranging from six months to three years, and temporary staff are recruited locally as needed.

**SUPPORT TO CFSP**

As a unique operational asset in the field of space and security, SatCen serves a variety of institutional users, ranging from the EU’s high-level decision-makers, such as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP), and the crisis management and situational awareness structures of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to the personnel on the ground involved in EU missions and operations. Within the EEAS, the main users of SatCen products are the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the Intelligence Analysis Centre
EU SatCen products, handled at various levels of confidentiality, are delivered both to central operational entities (e.g. EU Military Staff) and to the Operations Headquarters (OHQs). Every single product is systematically distributed to all Member States to facilitate cooperative decision-making in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), particularly Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). SatCen provides support almost in real time and, when necessary, around the clock.

SatCen is a concrete example of the pooling and sharing of know-how and services in a sensitive field. Each Member State, paying only a fraction of the contributions to the SatCen budget but receiving 100% of the output, directly benefits from the operational work, shared information for common decision making, financial optimisation and savings. This pooling of analysis capabilities and sharing of the resulting services...
Our partners

The SatCen cooperates with national and international institutions in the field of space.

It works closely with the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and the European Space Agency, as well as other institutions and international organisations.

Our staff

SatCen staff are drawn from EU Member States. In addition, experts seconded from Member States work at the SatCen for periods ranging from six months to three years, and temporary staff are locally recruited as needed.

Details of vacancies are posted on our website.

strengthen the case for making further use of the concept upon which SatCen is built and for applying its working methods more widely.

This specific role requires the Centre’s geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) products and services to be tailored to support and enable SatCen users in their specific undertakings, from diplomatic, economic and humanitarian measures to mission planning or intervention, through a permanent exchange to support their core business.

The Treaty of Lisbon has increased and diversified the operational engagement of European entities. This is reflected in the demand for SatCen products and services and, consequently, capability development has become a central concern for SatCen.
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established under the Joint Action of the Council of 12 July 2004 ‘to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy – now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – as it stands now and develops in the future’.

To implement the Treaty of Lisbon, this Joint Action was replaced by a Council Decision on 12 July 2011, which was then revised by Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 on the statute, seat and operational rules of the EDA.

**STRUCTURE AND MANDATE**

The Head of the Agency, who chairs the EDA’s Steering Board, is also the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as Vice-President of the European Commission (currently Federica Mogherini). The EDA Chief Executive (currently Jorge Domecq) is appointed by the Steering Board. In addition to the Defence Ministers’ meetings, which are held at least twice a year, the Steering Board also meets at the level of national armaments directors, R&T directors and capabilities directors.

The EDA’s staff is composed of experts in capability development, research and technology, armament cooperation and industrial matters; it combines bottom-up expert-level initiatives (the EDA connects around 2 500 nationally based experts) and top-down political direction. The Agency is organised into three operational directorates: Cooperation Planning & Support; Capability, Armaments & Technology; and European Synergies & Innovation.

It also has a Corporate Services directorate which ensures the smooth and efficient functioning of the Agency.

The main tasks of the EDA are to:

* identify Member States’ operational military capability requirements and promote measures to satisfy those requirements;
* propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives for military capabilities;
* coordinate the programmes implemented by Member States and manage specific cooperation programmes;
* promote collaborative R&T projects that provide Member States and Europe with the military capabilities they will need now and in the future;
* help identify and implement any measures needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector;
* participate in establishing a European capabilities and armaments policy;
* work to ensure coherence with other EU policies which have implications for defence capabilities;
* promote and foster stronger defence cooperation between participating Member States;
* provide support to CSDP operations.
The EDA works ‘à la carte’, from a minimum of two EU Member States to all (except Denmark), and also works with partners such as Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Ukraine (the third countries which have concluded administrative arrangements with the EDA). Depending on their strategic priorities, their operational requirements or their interest in a specific project, Member States decide themselves when and to what extent they wish to participate in the Agency’s projects, programmes and activities.

The EDA is small in size (around 140 staff) but its specialised personnel work closely with expert counterparts in Member States, industry, EU institutions – notably the European Commission – and other multinational organisations and entities, such as the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR). The EDA functions with a relatively small annual budget (currently just over EUR 30 million) sourced directly from the Ministries of Defence, which nevertheless, combined with its in-house expertise, enables it to act as a powerful lever: projects and programmes launched and managed by the EDA generate several hundred million euros worth of ad hoc investments. Since the creation of the Agency in 2004, approximately EUR 1 billion has been invested in defence research and programmes through the EDA.

The EDA provides a platform where Member States keen to enhance and develop their defence capabilities through cooperation with other Member States can do so. The Agency thereby helps to develop European military capabilities, adopting a through-life approach: from harmonising requirements to delivery capabilities, from research and innovation to the development of technology demonstrators, and from training and exercises to maintenance and support for operations. In this respect, the capabilities developed through the EDA can be used in EU CSDP and NATO operations as well as in other multinational or national engagements.

The EDA also acts as a facilitator between Member States’ military stakeholders and wider
EU policies. The Agency represents and defends military views and interests in the process of shaping and implementing EU policies while at the same time offering a platform for the European Commission and other EU bodies to hold a dialogue with the Ministries of Defence. It can also facilitate the access of Ministries of Defence and the defence industry, notably SMEs, to EU instruments and tools, including EU funding.

**DEFENCE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT**

Cooperation among Member States with a view to pooling and sharing military assets is considered to be the most appropriate and cost-efficient solution to ensure that Europe is able to acquire, maintain and develop the critical defence capabilities it needs to face current and future threats.

Against this backdrop, the EDA has launched four main capability development programmes (air-to-air refuelling, remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), cyber defence, and governmental satellite communications) as well as many other cooperation projects and programmes in domains such as airlift training and exercises, countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED), military airworthiness, single European sky air traffic management research (SESAR), the impact of energy and the environment on defence, and support for defence-related SMEs (access to EU funding). The idea is to support the development of capabilities which attract a critical mass of Member States, and thereby also strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base.

The EDA also plays a key role in drawing up and reviewing the capability development plan (CDP), which serves as a reference for national capability planning by informing Member States about capability requirements over time and identifying areas for capability improvements. The EDA has been tasked by Defence Ministers with presenting a new set of EU priorities for military capability development by spring 2018.
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGIES (R&T)

Stimulating and facilitating collaborative European defence research is another major task of the EDA. It is beyond debate nowadays that investing in future-oriented defence research and technology programmes is absolutely crucial if Europe wants to maintain an appropriate level of strategic autonomy – as is mentioned in the EU Global Strategy – and develop the military capabilities it will need in the future to become a credible security provider for its citizens, its neighbours and its partners.

The EDA has been facilitating collaborative research since 2005 by providing technical expertise through its various ‘CapTechs’, facilitating the negotiation process with the Member States and enhancing the effectiveness of the process.

Since 2005, the EDA has facilitated and managed over 180 R&T projects, for which the total budget contributed by participating Member States exceeds EUR 800 million.

In addition to this, the EDA is involved in preparations for the launch of the European Commission’s ‘Preparatory Action’ (PA) on defence research in 2017. Whereas today’s multiannual EU research programme (Horizon 2020) is exclusively dedicated to civilian-focused research, the PA is meant to test defence research implementation and funding within an EU framework.

In the run-up to the PA, which is expected to start in 2017, the EDA is currently managing and implementing (on behalf of the European Commission) a pilot project for defence research which was launched in March 2016 (call for proposals) and for which grant agreements worth almost EUR 1.4 million were signed at the end of October 2016.

The pilot project marks the first time that defence research has been funded through the EU budget. The PA may become the nucleus for a fully fledged European defence research programme under the next multiannual financial framework for 2021 to 2027.
SUPPORT FOR CSDP OPERATIONS

The EDA also sees itself as an intermediary body which facilitates the establishment and running of EU operations in every way it can.

It therefore offers various types of support to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations and to EU Battlegroups without generating any additional costs for the Member States or the Agency itself.

The assistance ranges from expertise and existing projects to providing ready-to-use solutions for contracting and procurement, and also human resource management support and cyber awareness training.

In the Council Decision of 12 October 2015 on the statute, seat and operational rules of the EDA, support for EU-led operations was even promoted to one of the Agency’s key tasks.

The above is just an illustration of what the EDA does in accordance with its missions and tasks.

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) presented in June 2016 by Federica Mogherini makes several references to the EDA and in particular states that full use of the EDA’s potential, especially in capability development, is an essential prerequisite for European security and defence efforts.

In this respect, the Agency’s role in the implementation of the EUGS is crucial, especially as regards the development of defence capabilities.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

For more information on the EDA’s activities, see: www.eda.eu
7 COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION
7.1. CSDP AND PARTNERS

by Clara Ganslandt

Common challenges call for shared responsibility in addressing them.

The European Union Global Strategy states that ‘the EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships’.

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been an open project from the outset. A comprehensive approach means not only drawing on all EU strengths, but also working with international and regional organisations, such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the African Union, as well as with non-EU countries.

The EU and these partners can mutually benefit from each other’s knowledge, expertise and specific capabilities, thereby bringing them closer to one another.

The European Union is developing CSDP partnerships in four main areas:

- Cooperation with international organisations and in regional and international fora
- Participation in CSDP missions and operations
- Security and defence (CSDP) dialogues and seminars
- Capacity building

**EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY**

The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships. Co-responsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order. In the pursuit of our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings.
EU-UN cooperation in crisis management and peacekeeping is constantly developing. It adds value to both organisations and is focused on bringing operational benefits to efforts on the ground. Cooperation in Mali and the Central African Republic are good examples of the EU and the UN coordinating support for national security and defence sectors, with EU missions deployed alongside UN peacekeeping operations. EU bridging operations have also been conducted to support UN peacekeeping missions, such as the EUFOR RCA operation in the Central African Republic.

The EU and the UN work together on EU-led crisis management operations and missions in, for example, Mali, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Western Balkans. EU cooperation with the UN on peacekeeping places the EU’s CSDP missions within a broader political and operational framework, making them more effective and efficient and enabling the EU to play its role in supporting effective multilateralism. In addition to cooperation on the ground, there is also regular dialogue between the two organisations on planning, strategic reviews and the implementation of mandates.

Operational cooperation is accompanied by multiannual initiatives through which the UN and the EU continue to strengthen their partnership. The UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management, which is currently being implemented, outlines priorities for 2015-2018, including, inter alia, rapid response, security sector reform, information and analysis exchange, and support for the African Peace and Security Architecture. The focus is on putting modalities and procedures in place to allow for closer cooperation.

The partnership also features regular high-level dialogue, including the biannual EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management, regular meetings between ambassadors from the EU Political
and Security Committee (PSC) and the UN Security Council (UNSC), the participation of the UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations in high-level meetings of the EU Member States (e.g. informal defence ministers meetings, PSC meetings) and an annual visit of the High Representative to the UNSC.

Maintaining a strong transatlantic relationship remains of fundamental importance to Europe. In the current security environment, strengthening EU-NATO cooperation is more important and necessary than ever. Our bond has a solid foundation: our shared values, our common interests and the need to face current challenges together. The Joint Declaration signed by President Tusk, President Juncker and the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Warsaw in July 2016 gave new impetus and substance to EU-NATO cooperation. The Joint Declaration identified seven areas of cooperation: countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation, including at sea and on migration; cyber security and defence; defence capabilities; defence industry and research; exercises; and supporting Eastern and Southern partners’ capacity-building efforts. It also mandated EU and NATO staff to develop concrete proposals for implementation.

On 6 December 2016, the NATO and EU Councils respectively endorsed a common set of proposals consisting of 42 action-oriented deliverables covering all seven areas of cooperation identified in the Joint Declaration. In its conclusions of 15 December, the European Council urged swift action on implementation, avoiding duplication and ensuring complementarity between the EU and NATO. Implementation of the Joint Declaration is a key political priority for the EU. It will be carried out in accordance with the guiding principles of transparency, inclusiveness, reciprocity and with full respect of the decision-making autonomy of the two organisations and the specific character of the security and defence policy of all members.

Strengthening EU-NATO cooperation is linked to broader efforts by the EU to enhance its contribution to Europe’s security – notably through the implementation of the EU Global Strategy and the European Defence Action Plan. This will be done by assisting Member States in developing their security and defence capabilities, as well as strengthening the EU’s own structures and mechanisms in order to be able to deliver on missions and operations.

These efforts will also benefit NATO – both by boosting capabilities and by giving the organisation a stronger partner with whom to share responsibilities. Reinforcing EU-NATO cooperation plays a considerable role in strengthening the transatlantic bond as well.

Multilateral cooperation under the Eastern Partnership Panel on CSDP, launched in 2013, complements bilateral relations and allows all six Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) to be involved in numerous workshops, seminars, field visits and other training activities. Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine remain the most active partners – all three are clearly committed to closer cooperation in CSDP missions and operations.

All CSDP training activities are organised in cooperation with the national authorities of partner countries and financially supported by the EU (European Neighbourhood Instrument).
Since 2013, the EEAS’s Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), together with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and EU Member States, have conducted more than 30 different CSDP activities for Eastern partners, including outreach events in Kyiv, Tbilisi, Chisinau, Minsk, and Yerevan. In addition, all partner countries take advantage of the regular training and education events organised by the ESDC.

In the short and medium term, the EU and its partners are looking for opportunities to expand cooperation in the field of security. The EU’s Global Strategy, together with the revised European Neighbourhood Policy and the Joint Communication on countering hybrid threats, will offer new opportunities enabling the EU to deliver more security in the European neighbourhood and to engage in capacity building.

The EU partnership with the African Union (AU) and African actors in peace and security and crisis management was put on a strategic footing by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, signed in 2007, which made peace and security a priority across the eight thematic partnerships to be developed in a comprehensive manner between the EU and Africa.

EU support for capacity building for peace and security in Africa under various instruments and policy areas has gradually increased over the last few years.

EU support for peace and security includes both longer-term structural support and support of a more time-bound nature.

Activities may be financed under the general budget of the Union, by the European Development Fund, or bilaterally by EU Member States.

CSDP activities in Africa are the main EU defence and security tools for cooperation with African security and defence forces, be it within national forces or in close coordination with UN or AU contingents. Civilian and military missions in the Sahel, Central Africa and the Horn
of Africa are cooperating with African forces on a daily basis.

The EU’s willingness to step up cooperation with its Asian partners also translates into multilateral activities. From autumn 2013 until spring 2014, for example, the EU co-chaired with Myanmar the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy. The three editions of the EU-ASEAN High-Level Dialogue on Maritime Security have complemented and added value to the ongoing ASEAN mechanisms and processes in this area.

Between 2017 and 2020, the EU will co-chair – along with Vietnam and Australia – the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security for the first time.

The EU also regularly participates in ARF-driven exercises in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and in workshops on issues such as maritime security and mediation. In 2016, EU officials were invited to attend the Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo, organised by Indonesia, and the joint China-US Disaster Rescue Exercise – both first-time occurrences.

PARTICIPATION IN CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

CSDP partnerships with third countries have a number of different objectives, including fostering third-country participation in CSDP operations, building resilience in a particular country or region, contributing to efforts to prevent or manage a crisis and dialogue in view of the geo-strategic significance of the partner countries. The primary objective of CSDP cooperation with partners is to maximise the impact of CSDP operational activities.

The Union regularly invites third countries to participate in specific missions and operations. This cooperation is mutually beneficial in terms of capacities, interoperability and experience, as well as legitimacy and political leverage. All non-EU NATO allies and candidate countries have participated in various CSDP missions and operations and were the first to develop close cooperation with the EU in this respect.

Partners have contributed to EU-led missions and operations, sometimes providing key enabling assets and capabilities. Approximately 45 non-EU states have participated in CSDP operations since the first operation was launched in 2003.

Here are some examples:
- Since 2014, Georgia has been contributing to the EU-led CSDP operation, with 156 military at the peak of its deployment. The country also contributed to the follow-on mentoring and advisory mission EUMAM RCA, and is set to participate in the EU military training mission EUTM RCA.
- Serbia is providing medical support to the three EUTMs and Turkey is amongst the largest contributors to EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Albania, Chile, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Switzerland also provide long-term support to Althea.
- Albania, Georgia, Montenegro and the Republic of Moldova have participated in EUTM Mali and Switzerland has joined EUCAP Sahel Mali.
- Canada, Georgia, Norway and Switzerland have contributed to EUAM Ukraine.
- Numerous third countries regularly participate in EUNAVFOR Atalanta or cooperate with the maritime operation.

Altogether, 12 partner countries participated in nine EU-led missions and operations in 2016: EUNAVFOR Atalanta; EUMAM RCA; EUTM Somalia; EUTM Mali; EUCAP Sahel Mali; EUPOL COPPS; EUFOR Althea; EULEX Kosovo; and EUAM Ukraine. The number fluctuated throughout the year, but at times partners’ participation constituted almost 10% of the overall personnel deployed in CSDP missions. The current number (at the end of 2016) of participating personnel from partner countries is around 305 (around 5%). The EU concludes Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) with
selected partner countries to facilitate their participation in CSDP missions and operations and foster long-term cooperation. The network of CSDP Framework Participation Agreements has even expanded to Asia and Latin America. So far (at the end of 2016), 18 such legally binding international agreements have been signed with: Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Iceland, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine and the USA. These agreements will open new avenues for dialogue and concrete operational cooperation.

In the Southern Neighbourhood, the EU remains forthcoming in CSDP contact with, inter alia, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and the League of Arab States. Some of these entities have recently shown a renewed interest in engaging more comprehensively with the EU on security and defence. Moreover, the implementation of the EU-NATO Warsaw Declaration could provide a new impetus to improve the effectiveness of capacity-building activities in these countries by preventing duplications while exploring uncharted territories between the two organisations. Against this background, it is also worth recalling the priorities set out in the EU Global Strategy of building resilience in the neighbourhood and providing more protection for EU citizens. CSDP partnerships will thus continue to be instrumental in achieving this goal.

It is now regularly possible for new CSDP missions and operations to establish project cells in order to gather parallel support from potential donors from Member States and partner countries, following the positive example of Canada’s financial contribution to a project run by EUTM Mali. Beyond US participation in the CSDP mission in Kosovo, flexible informal cooperation with the US continues in the Horn of Africa/Somalia and at military-to-military level. Some partners are also joining the EU Battlegroups (FYROM, Norway, Turkey and Ukraine) or training with the EU (China and Japan held naval exercises with EUNAVFOR Atalanta).
SECURITY AND DEFENCE (CSDP) DIALOGUES AND SEMINARS

The EU has developed regular dialogues in the field of CSDP with several countries and organisations. Following the principle that ‘one size does not fit all’, the level, frequency, topics and formats of these dialogues are adapted to the EU’s and its partners’ respective expectations and interests.

Beyond dialogue and operational cooperation, the role of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) should also be highlighted. The highly appreciated training and education that the ESDC provides to and undertakes with partner countries strengthens connections and paves the way for enhanced future cooperation.

The EU has also increased the number of seminars on security and defence organised together with the ESDC. These seminars reach out to potential partners or important stakeholders (Eastern Partnership countries, the Western Balkans, ASEAN, China, South America and Mexico) and have a wide array of objectives, ranging from building confidence between the EU and other security actors, to explaining the CSDP in depth, sharing best practices and encouraging interest in partnerships for our missions and operations.

CAPACITY BUILDING

Security challenges have to be tackled by those and with those most affected. The EU is therefore increasingly engaged in building the capacities of partner countries and organisations in volatile situations.

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Article 21: The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the [same] principles. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.

Georgia has been contributing to the EU-led CSDP operation with 156 military at the peak of its deployment.
regions. The long-term objective is to enable them to take responsibility for their own security so that they can increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves. It is in this context that the flagship initiative ‘Capacity building in support of security and development’ (CBSD) was launched.

The overall objective is to support partner countries in enhancing their own capacity to prevent and manage crises on their own in a sustainable manner. This need was identified by our CSDP missions: the training provided by our military missions could not be sustained and could become a lost investment for the EU without further support in the provision of equipment (non-lethal items like boots, tents, blankets, etc.) and basic infrastructure.

Following the Joint Communication of April 2015 on CBSD, in July 2016 the EEAS and the Commission adopted a package aimed at enhancing the EU’s role as a global actor in the field of security. The package consisted of an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform and a legislative proposal amending the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) to enhance capacity building in support of security and development in third countries, particularly as regards non-lethal military equipment and infrastructure.

This priority is clearly reflected in the EU Global Strategy as well as in the European Council conclusions of December 2016.

**NEXT STEPS**

The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in November 2016 stressed the importance of taking cooperation with partner organisations and partner countries forward and invited the High Representative to present options for a more strategic approach to CSDP partnership cooperation with partner countries which share EU values and are able and willing to contribute to CSDP missions and operations, in full respect of the EU’s institutional framework and its decision-making autonomy.

This strategic approach should also include possibilities to strengthen the resilience of partners to our East and South, including in Africa, also taking into account the importance of security under the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Moreover, this strategic approach should also include possibilities to strengthen the resilience of partners to our East and South, including in Africa, also taking into account the importance of security under the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Work to prepare such options is now being taken forward.
7.2. INTERNAL-EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS – STRENGTHENING TIES BETWEEN CSDP AND FSJ ACTORS

by Michel Savary

CSDP was designed as a tool to prevent, manage or resolve crises of both a military and civilian nature, outside the EU and as an integral part of EU foreign policy. Many CSDP missions and operations may also directly or indirectly deal with reform of the security sector (SSR) and the provision of support to a host country to build sustainable rule of law institutions as part of their contribution to international peace and security.

Nowadays, EU missions and operations are increasingly embedded in a wider EU approach.

CSDP EMBEDDED IN A WIDER EU APPROACH

Today, EU missions and operations are increasingly embedded in a wider EU approach; it could not be otherwise. Strengthening the links between internal and external security, especially in areas such as irregular migration, trafficking of all sorts, terrorism and hybrid threats is increasingly important for the further development of CSDP when considering any possible new operation/mission. In this vein, the Council conclusions on CSDP1

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1 8971/15.
adopted by the Council on 18 May 2015 state: ‘The Council strongly underlines the need to further strengthen the links between external and internal security.’

The HR/VP/Head of the Agency report ahead of the European Council in June 2015 mentions that ‘… terrorist and other attacks in several Member States have impacted on the internal security situation and have further highlighted the linkages between external and internal security.’

This has been identified in various other high level discussions as well, such as the Riga Joint Statement\(^2\) and the statement by the European Council on the fight against terrorism of 12 February 2015.

**COHERENCE BETWEEN INTERNAL/EXTERNAL SECURITY**

The Commission’s communication on the European Agenda on Security adopted on 28 April 2015\(^3\) identifies the need to ensure coherence between the internal and external dimensions of security...
as one guiding principle. Stressing the inter-linkage between EU internal security and global security, and the fact that security threats are not constrained by the borders of the EU, the Commission underlines the need for a comprehensive approach, based on a coherent set of actions, to further reinforce links between Justice and Home Affairs and the Common Security and Defence Policy.

**INTEGRATIVE AND COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH**

The Council conclusions on the renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy (2015-2020) adopted by the Council on 16 June 2015 state inter alia: the council, ’[…] acknowledging the growing links between the European Union internal and external security as well as following an integrative and complementary approach aimed at reducing overlapping and avoiding duplication […] welcomes the call of the Foreign Affairs Council of 18 May 2015 to develop synergies between CSDP and relevant actors in the area of freedom, security and justice, and calls on all actors involved to increase further their efforts and support to the implementation of the principles contained in the roadmap ‘Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ’.

As a matter of fact, and as identified in the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (HLG), actions to strengthen ties between the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) actors were set up years ago, and linkages have been established between the external and internal security of the EU.

This initiative supports the idea that closer cooperation between civilian CSDP missions and JHA actors could yield tangible improvements in terms of European security. I would like to highlight one particular area where tangible actions took place in practice:

A Joint Staff Working Paper – ’Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ Actors – Proposals for a Way ahead’ presented jointly to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) in June 2011 clarifies where the interface of their policies affords scope for coordinated or possible concerted action, while respecting their respective competencies. The following specific areas where cooperation can be further strengthened have been identified as having potential for further action: Comprehensive Situational Awareness and Intelligence Support to the EU; Exchange of information and mutual support; Improving mechanisms in the decision-making process; Improving cooperation in planning EU external action; Capabilities: Human Resources and Training.

Along these lines a roadmap was established in December 2011 (12 priority lines of action out of 27 lines of action). Four progress reports on the overall implementation of the roadmap activities and, in parallel, completed actions were presented to Member States in Civcom and the COSI support group.

**STRUCTURED COOPERATION**

The priority has been to structure the approach to cooperation, in particular with EU agencies (Europol, Frontex, Eurojust and CEPOL), EUROGENDFOR and INTERPOL, and to agree on possible cooperation and coordination mechanisms (among others, the administrative arrangement on sharing classified information between the EEAS and Europol and Frontex, the working arrangement with Frontex, the exchange of letters on enhancing cooperation with Europol, Interpol…). The ‘General Administrative Arrangement between the European Gendarmerie Force’ (EUROGENDFOR or ‘EGF’) and the European External Action

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4 9878/11 of 6 May 2011.
5 Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ actors-roadmap, 18173/11, 5 December 2011.
Service (EEAS) on cooperation under the Common Security and Defence Policy entered into force on 6 October 2014 and consolidated the EGF’s support for crisis management structures and its involvement in missions and operations.

A permanent relationship/triangular connection with EU agencies and the Commission is being set up: trilateral meetings at Director level between the Commission, the EEAS/Europol and Frontex; the participation of the EEAS included crisis management structures in the establishment of EU agencies’ work programmes. Regular staff-level talks are giving rise to new initiatives for cooperation, and will potentially come up with new, innovative ways to move this agenda forward.

EEAS services have taken part in the consultation on the overview of analytical products undertaken by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies network, underlining that it is critical to share information, and not only on specific threats.

Concerning the decision-making process, terrorist threat assessments and other counter-terrorism-related products are provided by INTCEN to COSI and the Working Party on Terrorism (TWP), which then brief the PSC with intelligence based assessments on matters of foreign and security policy relevance. EU agencies are regularly invited to the PSC as well. Informal joint meetings of PSC/COSI take place once per Council Presidency, and all interlocutors have talks on the internal/external nexus.

**TRAINING AND EDUCATION**

In the area of training and education, the institutionalisation of CSDP/FSJ courses as well as the streamlining of the CSDP/FSJ nexus in various courses organised in the framework of the European Police College (CEPOL) and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) should also be noted. Links between the ESDC and relevant Union agencies, including CEPOL and Frontex, and with the European Union’s
law enforcement agency (Europol) have been strengthened and the development of joint training activities encouraged. Cooperation on training (with Europol) in the field of cyber-related issues is also scheduled.

**INFORMATION SHARING**

From a strategic and operational perspective, it should be noted that the EEAS, INTCEN and Frontex have started to systematically share their non-classified analytical products and situation reports, which are then distributed within the EEAS.

On the basis of the new Council Decision on the EU Satellite Centre6 (SATCEN), a service level agreement has provided solid ground for enhanced operational cooperation for the provision of satellite products between the SATCEN and Frontex.

As for civilian missions, the revision of the ‘visiting experts’ guidelines has enabled a sound legal and financial basis for the participation of FSJ experts from agencies in the conduct of CSDP missions. Cooperation frameworks with Eurojust and CEPOL are now being considered.

Additionally, the new legal frameworks of certain JHA agencies such as Europol that will enter into force next year and, more recently, that of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation (2016) will increase the external activities of these new external crisis management actors. There is also an enhanced role for EU Delegations.

EU actors abroad, in particular EU Delegations – where counter-terrorism/security & defence experts, European migration liaison officers (EMLO) or EU agencies liaison officers (such as Frontex) are deployed – and CSDP missions should further contribute to situational awareness and to the exchange of information among EU actors.

In order to contribute to this process, the principles contained in the ‘Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ’ Roadmap remain valid. If most of the actions identified have been carried out successfully, it has now become necessary to move beyond the measures identified in 2011 and to take into account the evolving international context and especially those aspects that challenge security in Europe.

**CONTRIBUTION OF CSDP**

As a follow up on this process, a CMPD Food for Thought Paper ‘From strengthening ties between CSDP/FSJ actors towards more security in EUROPE’7 was written in July 2016, focusing on the contribution of CSDP missions in ensuring more ‘return on investment’ for EU security. The paper’s aim is to draw the attention of Member States to concrete actions which, at a later stage, may contribute to the implementation of the newly adopted EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), particularly in three specific areas:

* **Operationalising the internal/external security nexus.**
We need to be able to work on an operational timescale. Cooperation frameworks are to be fully implemented with EU internal security actors at the strategic and operational levels, enabling permanent consultation.

* **Improving situational awareness and exchanging information within the EU.**
This new approach would mean maintaining the confidence and support of the authorities of the host countries where missions are deployed. While a challenge, introducing significant FSJ assets and internal security objectives into CSDP should not alter the credibility or undermine the effectiveness of future CSDP operations.

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7 10934/16.
* CivMil convergence and synergies.

In essence, it can be argued that the internal/external security nexus should also generate enhanced civilian-military interaction within the CSDP. Further consideration should also be given to the design, deployment and support of a well-coordinated and possibly even integrated civ-mil CSDP deployment with complementary mandates and objectives.

As stated in the Global Strategy, ‘Security of Our Union is a priority for our external action’. The strategy highlights the fact that ‘internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’. This should be the guiding principle on how we use our instruments, taking a holistic approach in the light of what any given situation may require.

In line with the comprehensive approach, CSDP should be seen as complementary to other approaches, whilst avoiding duplication through action being carried out either by EU Member States or the Commission.

In the words of the EU Global Strategy, ‘CSDP missions and operations can work alongside the European Border and Coast Guard and EU specialised agencies to enhance border protection and maritime security in order to save more lives, fight cross-border crime and disrupt smuggling networks’.

The Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in the area of Security and Defence of 14 November 2016 set out the main goals which the EU and its Member States will aim to achieve in order to implement the EUGS in the area of security and defence, including through CSDP, in support of three strategic priorities identified in the EUGS: (a) responding to external conflicts and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners, and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens.

The level of ambition and the guidance required in the future for this level of ambition are set out as follows:

* Protecting the Union and its citizens covers the contribution that the EU and its Member States can make from a security and defence perspective, notably through CSDP in line with the Treaty, to tackle challenges and threats that have an impact on the security of the Union and its citizens, along the nexus of internal and external security, in cooperation with Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) actors.

* Promoting civil-military cooperation in the field as well as strengthening ties with FSJ actors, where appropriate, should be pursued in this context [as an action to be implemented].

This should be streamlined as a mantra that is applicable to external activities and will require even closer cooperation between all EU actors in the future in order to achieve better synergies and avoid duplication of efforts.

FSJ AND CSDP ARE DIFFERENT, BUT...

It may be recalled that the area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are still distinct policy areas acting under different legal regimes, governed by different stakeholders (military, diplomatic or home affairs) and implemented by different EU entities. However, there may now be a need to blur the lines between internal and external security.
The security and development nexus – peace is also often added into the equation – has been defined and referred to in a large number of Commission communications, Council conclusions and other policy documents. The EU Security Strategy 2003 stressed that security is a precondition for development and that, in turn, development is a powerful tool to encourage reform in partner countries. In 2003, Europe had started to face new threats that were ‘more diverse, less visible and less predictable’, combining terrorism, regional conflicts, weak state governance and organised crime outside its borders, including in many countries supported by the EU’s development policy. The 2006 European Consensus on Development defined the security and development nexus as follows: ‘without peace and security, development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur’.1

ERADICATION OF POVERTY

As set out in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the main objective of development policy is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. Development policy also pursues other objectives, such as ensuring sustainable economic, social and environmental development and the promotion of democracy, rule of law, good governance and international respect for human rights.

To improve the effectiveness and the impact of EU development policy, the security and development nexus provides added value compared to traditional development approaches by taking into account the specificities of working in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS).

More than 50% of EU development assistance today is directed at countries affected by conflicts and fragility. The EU has a wide range of instruments in its toolbox to address conflicts and crises, such as conflict prevention, sanctions, humanitarian aid, mediation, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, stabilisation, political dialogue and development cooperation.

Development cooperation is a cornerstone of the external action of the European Union. It is managed by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), which defines the EU’s development policy and uses a set of instruments to implement programmes and projects on the ground.

It does so by following development effectiveness principles such as ownership of interventions by partners at the local, national or regional levels, alignment behind objectives and strategies defined by those partners and coordination and information-sharing among donors to avoid duplication. In 2015, the budget managed by DG DEVCO amounted to EUR 8.42 billion. The European Union and its Member States are the number one provider of official development assistance (ODA) in the world.

THE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

An early example of a development strategy implemented on the basis of this nexus is provided by Sierra Leone from 2001 onwards. The authorities, with the support of the international community, prioritised security as their first development objective after years of civil war in order to be able to build infrastructure and deliver social services across the country later.

As it became increasingly clear that FCAS were lagging behind other developing countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a consensus emerged among donors to prioritise support to those countries.

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2 To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; to achieve universal primary education; to promote gender equality and empower women; to reduce child mortality; to improve maternal health; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; to ensure environmental sustainability; to develop a global partnership for development.
DEVELOPMENT, HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY COOPERATION

Although fragility is a multidimensional concept spanning economic (e.g. youth unemployment), environmental (e.g. exposure to natural disasters and epidemics), political (e.g. corruption, lack of political inclusiveness), security (e.g. crime) and societal (e.g. inequalities) factors, violence and insecurity are often the main reasons why a country is considered fragile. FCAS usually have limited capacity, authority and/or legitimacy to achieve peace and sustainable development, and the authorities have to deal with multiple pressing priorities. As a result, the sequence of reforms has to be adapted to the specific context, although it should usually start with the building of institutions and specific action to improve trust between state and society. The New Deal for engagement in fragile states, adopted as part of the outcome of the Busan High Level Forum on aid effectiveness in 2011 with strong support from the EU, listed five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals to serve as a guide for the delivery of development assistance in FCAS: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services. Coordination between development, humanitarian and security actors, in full compliance with their respective mandates and principles, in order to prevent crises from recurring or to help countries recover in the longer term, is often an additional challenge. Despite recent impressive progress in countries such as Myanmar/Burma and Colombia, crises and conflicts are becoming more protracted and recurrent. In six countries out of ten, significant humanitarian needs related to disasters of human and natural origin last for eight years or more. Improving the implementation of the security and development nexus in FCAS will become all the more important in the future as it is estimated that the percentage of the world’s poor living in FCAS will rise from 43% in 2015 to 62% in 2030, compared to only 20% in 2005.3

The EU has been one of the earliest and most prominent players to translate the nexus between security and development into its policy framework and action given its history and experience in promoting peace within its own borders and its credibility in promoting values such as democracy and human rights. It is also due to the scale of its support, the continued partnership it has built over time with many FCAS and the diversity of the short-term and long-term instruments the EU can mobilise across the conflict cycle. The 2011 Agenda for Change,4 defining the EU’s development policy, underlines the efforts to be pursued to tackle the challenges related to security and fragility calling for a more integrated, coherent and coordinated response. The EU Global Strategy of 2016 also calls for ‘the dual – security and development – nature of the [EU] engagement’ to be developed to deal with specific challenges posed by conflicts. The proposal for a new European Consensus on Development, adopted by the European Commission in November 2016,5 also states that ‘the EU and its Member States will use development cooperation as part of the full range of policies and instruments to prevent, manage and help resolve conflicts and crises, meet humanitarian needs and build lasting peace and good governance’. The revised European Consensus on Development reflects the fact that the EU aims to play a leading role in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in 2015. The 2030 Agenda represents a new way of addressing global challenges based

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on common objectives and a shared responsibility for all countries. Peace and security is a building-block for the achievement of the agenda as a whole, and progress will be monitored through a dedicated goal – Sustainable Development Goal 16 – on peace, justice and strong institutions.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS

Two evaluations of the support provided by the European Commission, to justice and security sector reform (JSSR)⁸ and to conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB)⁹ respectively, were published in 2011. They help measure how the security and development nexus has gained importance not only in policy but also in the implementation of programmes and projects. Between 2001 and 2009, European Commission support for JSSR rose from EUR 14 million to EUR 174 million a year, and support for CPPB from EUR 120 million to EUR 854 million. For the 2014 – 2020 period, more than 10 % of EU development cooperation was programmed in support of conflict prevention, resolution, peace and security-related activities. EU interventions in these areas take place at all levels, from the local to the global level. This support covers a wide range of activities, from supporting conflict resolution mechanisms at community level in Nigeria’s north-east to contributing to the reconstruction trust fund in Afghanistan, preventing human rights abuses in Uganda, and supporting demining programmes and anti-piracy action. The African Peace Facility (APF) represents a large part of EU support provided to CPPB. The facility was

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established in 2004 to support the capacity of the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to manage conflicts and more than EUR 2 billion has been committed under the APF so far. It serves to support peace operations in Africa such as AMISOM in Somalia, MISCA in the Central African Republic, ECOMIB in Guinea-Bissau and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNTJF) for the fight against Boko Haram. It is also used to enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security and to support the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture for conflict prevention and management.

PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING

Evaluations of development cooperation programmes highlight a number of issues particularly relevant for peacebuilding and statebuilding: (a) the interdependency between good governance, security, justice, growth, employment and the delivery of basic services; (b) the need to base support on a thorough and shared analysis of conflict dynamics, fragility and factors of resilience in order to address the root causes of conflicts rather than their symptoms; (c) the necessity for national ownership and (d) the ability of partners to be flexible in order to adapt to changes on the ground and to work together. The 2013 joint communication on the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises’ is an attempt to address some of these issues.\textsuperscript{10}

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EXTERNAL CONFLICTS AND CRISES

The comprehensive approach outlined in the 2013 communication mentioned above attempts to improve the implementation of the security and development nexus while also encompassing other areas such as migration and gender. It provides practitioners with guiding principles to work in situations of conflict and crisis. It is not about ‘what to do’ but rather ‘how to do it’. It builds on a number of previous initiatives such as the Sahel and Horn of Africa strategies, which aim to make the EU’s external action more coherent, more visible and more effective by mobilising all EU tools towards a common objective. For example, the strategy for development and security in the Sahel, adopted in 2011, calls for the mobilisation of all the EU’s available tools to meet the long-term objective of ‘enhancing political stability, security, good governance, social cohesion and economic and education opportunities in the Sahel states, thus setting the conditions for local and national sustainable development’.

Eight elements underpin the EU’s comprehensive approach: (1) a shared analysis to build a common understanding of the challenges at hand in a given context; (2) the definition of a common strategic vision setting the direction for the EU’s engagement; (3) a focus on prevention to preserve lives, to save costs and to protect the EU’s interests; (4) mobilisation of the different strengths and capacities of the EU; (5) a long-term commitment taking into account that addressing fragility and building resilient societies takes time; (6) acknowledging the link between internal and external policies and action in areas such as migration, climate change and organised crime; (7) a better use of EU delegations as the central players to carry out EU dialogue and support in partner countries; and (8) the necessity to work in partnership, for instance with the United Nations or NATO.

IMPLEMENTATION IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

Implementation of the comprehensive approach, as pointed out in the Council conclusions of May 2014, is the shared responsibility of EU institutions and Member States. Action

\textsuperscript{10} JOIN(2013) 30 final of 11 December 2013
plans to take forward specific thematic and geographic priorities relating to the comprehensive approach have been prepared for 2015 and for 2016-2017. These two action plans include for instance transition from CSDP missions to other EU instruments, the global roll-out of the early warning system and the reinforcement of staff in EU delegations specialised in migration, security issues and security sector reform. They also include geographic priorities such as Ukraine, Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali. As part of its focus on prevention and shared analysis, the comprehensive approach has led the EU to reinforce its capacity to understand fragility and anticipate crises and conflicts by developing a number of tools. The early warning system aims to identify risks of emergence or escalation of violence and conflicts across a variety of indicators, notably in countries and regions and on thematic priorities where the EU has particular interests and leverage. The exercise triggers increased attention, intensified monitoring and appropriate preventive action for the selected countries, regions and thematic areas across the EU system. Guidance on conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity has also been issued in order to maximise the impact of the EU’s action and to manage the risks of intervening in situations that are volatile by nature. Developing a shared analysis by using such tools is crucial because the link between security and development is always context-specific and will determine the choice and coordination of the most appropriate interventions (see graph below).

**TRANSITION FROM CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO PEACEBUILDING**

The EU Global Strategy emphasises that the EU’s ‘peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition from short-term crisis management to long-term peacebuilding to avoid gaps along the conflict cycle’. Linking crisis responses, such as humanitarian aid and CSDP, with long-term actions on peacebuilding, statebuilding, resilience and governance is indeed a recurrent challenge for the implementation of the comprehensive approach, although the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) can be used to prepare the ground for more sustained and longer-term assistance delivered by EU development...
CAPACITY BUILDING IN SUPPORT OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

In parallel to the joint communication on security sector reform, a legislative proposal to amend the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) was presented\(^1\) in July 2016. The proposal extends the EU’s assistance to the military of partner countries, under exceptional and clearly defined circumstances, to achieve sustainable development and help partner countries prevent and manage crises by themselves. The proposal highlights that the military can play an important role in preventing violence and can contribute to setting the conditions for peace. It follows up on the gaps identified in EU support for the capacities of partners in the security sector outlined in the joint communication on Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD) of April 2015\(^2\). The assistance provided under this legislative proposal may cover training, mentoring and advice, as well as the provision of equipment or infrastructure improvements with a development and human security related objective. However, it excludes recurrent military expenditure and the procurement of arms and ammunitions.

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interventions. The communication on the comprehensive approach emphasised that programming of development assistance should be flexible to adapt to the volatile environment of fragile countries. Although the seven-year programming period for development instruments is very helpful for partner countries to define areas where the EU can support them and to have reliable and predictable development flows, it is usually difficult to adapt programming to an evolving conflict situation. The establishment of EU trust funds is the most fully developed response to this challenge, and works by delivering development assistance more flexibly with faster procedures in crises and post-conflict situations. The objective of the EU emergency trust fund for Africa, established at the Valletta Summit in November 2015, is to support partner countries in the North of Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa with development projects and programmes focusing on addressing the root causes of instability, insecurity, forced displacements and conflicts.

For example, the Sahel Window includes as priorities (a) reinforcing the resilience of local communities to deal with environmental, socio-economic and security challenges; (b) improving border management, fighting transnational trafficking and criminal networks; and (c) preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. Several projects have been designed thanks to the combined analysis and knowledge of DG DEVCO at its headquarters and in EU delegations and of CSDP missions operating in the same area. A programme to strengthen security in the Mopti and Gao regions of Mali and to improve the management of border areas (PARSEC Mopti-Gao) was drawn up in close cooperation with the EUCAP and EUTM missions.

These provide a concrete illustration of some of the elements of the comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises, as does the new EU policy framework for security sector reform.

THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM POLICY FRAMEWORK

Over the current programming period (2014-2020), 15 countries have a specific security component as part of their cooperation with the European Commission. Activities financed with EU instruments in security sector reform (SSR) include, but are not limited to, law enforcement, border management, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and civilian oversight of the security forces by parliaments and
civil society organisations. The communication on security sector reform adopted in July 2016 brings all EU actors and instruments under a single policy framework, taking into account that CSDP missions and operations, development cooperation and the IcSP can be used to implement SSR interventions. EU actors therefore need to share information on the various interventions they run in this field either in post-conflict situations or to prevent crises, noting that ‘insecurity and instability are frequently generated or aggravated by a lack of effective and accountable security systems’.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND THE EU’S APPROACH TO FRAGILITY

A conference on the Central African Republic took place in Brussels in November 2016. Its objective was to gather support from the international community to help the country recover from a long period of instability after its government was overthrown in 2013. Throughout the crisis, the EU has used all means available to support the country, including via three CSDP missions and a large amount of humanitarian aid. It has engaged in political dialogue with the authorities. It has set-up a multi-donor trust fund ‘Bêkou’ to link relief, rehabilitation and development, and has channelled development funds to support civil society, food security, education and health. It has also supported a free and fair electoral process for a return to constitutional order and to round off what it considers a successful political transition. While 2 million people are still at risk of food insecurity and one-fifth of the population remains displaced, the EU, the United Nations and the World Bank have supported the CAR authorities in drawing up their National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan for 2017 – 2021. The plan prioritises specific development activities while taking into account the humanitarian and life-saving needs of the population as well as security, peace and reconciliation. The case of the Central African Republic illustrates that sustainable development is only possible when and where there is peace and security. As part of the assessment several consultations and surveys have been carried out in the country to gain more insight into the population’s expectations and priorities. Security was considered the main concern and forms, together with peace and reconciliation, the first pillar of the strategy.

A HUMAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

The first objective of EU support for SSR is to improve the security of states and above all the security of individuals. From a human security perspective, trust between populations and security actors and the state’s ability to deliver on security are key for state legitimacy. The perception of the state largely depends on the way populations and security actors interact in everyday life. The second objective is therefore to support the security sector and to ensure security actors are accountable and act in full compliance with
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Support is to be provided for SSR in line with a number of key principles, including those related to development effectiveness. National ownership and the ability of all EU instruments to adapt to changing circumstances in the field as well as the importance of conducting regular political and policy dialogues on security are key. Managing risks, including the risk of doing harm and reputational risk, is crucial when engaging in SSR and requires a thorough analysis not only of the sector itself but also of the wider governance system.

**CONCLUSION**

Development approaches focusing on poverty reduction through growth and the provision of basic social services have had mixed to disappointing results in FCAS. As a consequence, the development community has been forced to take into consideration the specificities of working in such countries to a much greater extent. This explains why the security and development nexus, as part of a broader strategy towards peacebuilding and statebuilding, has acquired a growing importance in the EU policy framework. Policy-making is the result of a continuous process of learning, based on experiences from the field and on new approaches being tested. Past experiences show that long-term development and peace need to be at the core of the EU’s response from the outset of a conflict or crisis. The implementation of the EU Global Strategy and of the revised European Consensus on Development, in a challenging global context, will surely keep the security and development nexus in the limelight in the near future.

CSDP can fill the gap in the short-run, but in the long-run other EU instruments should take the lead.

**TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION**

Article 21: The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the [same] principles. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.
8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
The cornerstone of the European Union’s reaction to external conflicts and crises is the comprehensive approach; and one element is the Common Security and Defence Policy. In order to be able to plan and conduct the full spectrum of missions and operations envisaged in the Treaty on European Union, a toolbox of different capabilities, military as well as civilian, is required. In accordance with Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, all EU Member States are responsible for providing the necessary resources: ‘The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. (...) The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.’1

Bearing in mind that the different national capacities and development programmes should also serve supranational interests, a common European capability development process is necessary. Capability development itself, in general a military domain by nature, seems to be an important process for addressing specific shortfalls within the European Union and for closing persisting gaps with regard to upcoming future challenges. The different national positions may lead to miscellaneous views on these ‘gaps’. The EU’s commonly known ‘capability-expectations gap’ has narrowed considerably due to improve-

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ments in terms of its resource availability, as well as the instruments at its disposal. But there still exists a gap between what the EU Member States are expected to do globally and what they are actually able to agree upon (‘consensus-expectation gap’).²

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CAPABILITIES

What are ‘capabilities’? According to the Oxford Dictionary, a capability is the power or ability to do something, either by force or using resources that provide a country with the capacity to undertake a particular kind of (military) action.³

The military follows the paradigm of perceiving capabilities in the form of doctrines, organisations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and interoperability.⁴ These modules are also called ‘lines of development’. According to that paradigm, a desired capability can only be achieved if progress is made in a balanced way and within the scope of the above-mentioned eight lines.

Looking at other definitions, the European Union also has to accept that European military capability is context-dependent, for instance with respect to existing threats, the physical environment, or contributions made by partners,⁵ or provisions by Member States based on their level of ambition. Therefore, a capability itself is a very complex system relying on different and interdependent influences.

A closer look at history and at processes, both military and civilian, as well as at the institutions involved might create a better understanding and highlight similarities as well as differences.

MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

The basis of the European Union’s ambition for capability development resides in the idea of a Common European Defence Policy that dates back to 1948 (the Western Union, which in 1954 was transformed into the Western European Union, WEU).

After the end of the Cold War, the Balkan conflicts demonstrated the EU’s shortcomings (most of them political, with the lack of a common foreign and security policy) in this regard. During the Cologne European Council of 1999, EU Member States reaffirmed the Union’s willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces.⁶ The definition of the so-called Military Headline Goals (HLGs) constituted the starting point for the military capability development process: ‘[…] To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks […] up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50 000 – 60 000 persons). […] Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days […]. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year […].’⁷

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In the years that followed, the HLG was amended by different ‘add-ons’ like the 2010 HLG, created in 2004 and based on specific scenarios to be addressed by the European Union by means of increased rapid response capabilities. Later on, this HLG led to the creation of European Union Battlegroups (triggered by the first autonomous CSDP operation 2003’s Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), to ‘pooling and sharing’, and finally to the idea of civil-military capability development. The qualitative focus of the 2003 HLG has evolved in a more quantitative direction.

In terms of methodology, the political objective of the HLG is translated thus ‘[…] into a Requirements Catalogue (precise set of objectives and planning elements), a Force Catalogue (assets identified by Member States for use within the EU framework), and a Progress Catalogue (identifying the shortfalls to be remedied)’.  

These three elements (establishing military requirements, monitoring and evaluation as well as addressing shortfalls) are defined in the Capability Development Mechanism.

Mention should also be made of an EU/NATO capability group to provide the principal forum, from the strategic point of view, for addressing the overall coherence and complementarity as well as for mutually reinforcing the development of capabilities common to the requirements of the two organisations.  

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body within the EU Council. It is responsible for ‘[…] the elaboration, the assessment and the review of capability objectives according to agreed procedures’.  

The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, represented by their permanent military representatives. In the area of capability development, the EUMC is supported by the EU Military Committee Working Group/Headline Goal Taskforce (EUMCWG/HTF), a group of Member States experts dealing with capability development.

These Council bodies are responsible for providing the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with military advice and recommendations on all military matters, based on the consensus of all Member States.

As far as the content of such advice or recommendation is concerned, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) provides relevant military expertise under the direction of the EUMC and under the authority of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. The EUMS is part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and it ‘[…]is the source of collective (multi-disciplinary) military expertise within the European External Action Service (EEAS). As an integral component of the EEAS’s comprehensive approach, the EUMS

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coordinates the military instrument, with particular focus on operations/missions (both military and those requiring military support) and the creation of military capability. Enabling activity in support of this output includes: early warning (via the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity – SIAC), situation assessment, strategic planning, Communications and Information Systems, concept development, training and education, and support of partnerships through military-military relationships. Concurrently, the EUMS is charged with sustaining the EU OPSCEN and providing its core staff when activated.13

Within the EUMS the capability-related issues are concentrated in the ‘Concepts and Capabilities Directorate’ which is responsible, inter alia, for capability planning and capability development, including crisis management exercises, training, analysis and lessons learned as well as for cooperation with the European Defence Agency.14

Military Capability Development is a responsibility of the Member States based on voluntariness, i.e. their willingness to contribute. It is based on soft law mechanisms, which means that no official sanctions will be taken in the case of non-contribution. In general, this methodology can be called the ‘Open Method of Coordination’.15

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004 ‘to support the Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the EU’s defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy’.16

In line with the above-mentioned Capability Development Mechanism, the Capability Devel-

opment Plan (CDP) provides the reference framework for the EDA’s activities. It consists of four modules, the so called ‘strands’, which are:

- analysis of current capability shortfalls and operational risks (HLG process),
- identification of potential trends in future military capability characteristics (2025 and beyond),
- understanding of current plans/programme led by Member States to mitigate risks and identification of possible cooperation opportunities,
- lessons learned from current operations.\(^\text{17}\) For military capability development this CDP is the clear focus. It is owned by the Member States and administered by the EDA, which therefore plays a crucial role in capability development. But in order to know which capabilities should be developed, we first need to know which capabilities are or will be required. The EUMC is responsible for two work strands of the CDP: A (HLG Process, ambition) and D (Lessons Learned). The first is very complex itself (Scrutinising, Assessing, Evaluating (operational risk) and Prioritising of Member States’ contributions)\(^\text{18}\) and leads to a list of prioritised military capabilities shortfalls. The second one uses lessons learned from operations. The EUMC has the EUMCWG/HTF as a working body, which is supported by the EUMS. The other two strands, B (future trends) and C (Member States’ plans and programmes), are owned by the EDA.

Since assets are provided by the EU Member States on a voluntary basis, it cannot be taken for granted that all assets identified during this process (as for example shown in the force catalogue) will be committed to joint EU operations.

Besides that, the time-consuming nature of procurement procedures and the complexity of a specific capability in itself, especially in the case of new developments such as weapon systems, require the anticipation of possible capability gaps. In fact, the military capability development process focuses on military organisations, which can be described as the totality of personnel, equipment, training, and specific criteria like performance, operational readiness, interoperability, sustainability and deployability.

Due to the above-mentioned considerations and the fact that technology is a specific driver for the remaining, interconnected lines of development, military capability development focuses on equipment.

### CIVILIAN CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Driven by decisions regarding military capability development and considering the European Union’s lessons identified during the Balkans conflict, especially regarding ‘[…] the difficulty in the aftermath of NATO-led intervention in deploying a sufficient number of police personnel within UNMIK led the European states to also include the enhancement and better coordination of the Union’s and the Member States’ non-military crisis response tools […]’,\(^\text{19}\) an official civilian capability discussion started in December 1999. In 2000, the first four priority areas for civilian crisis management were identified at the European Council of Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal (‘Civilian Headline Goals’, CHG): policing, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. In detail, this means that the EU Member States, cooperating voluntarily, should be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international operations, ranging from conflict prevention to crisis

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management, of whom 1 000 should be deployable within 30 days. The European Council also welcomes the willingness of the Commission to make, within its spheres of action, contributions to civilian crisis management efforts.\(^\text{20}\)

The 2008 CHG added two new priorities: monitoring missions and support for EU Special Representatives. Besides that, it highlighted two further focus areas for the European Union: security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). It also emphasised the need for the Union to conduct simultaneous missions.\(^\text{21}\) The 2008 CHG focused on the human resources needed for CSDP civilian crisis management.

The 2010 CHG was drafted in 2007, focusing on non-human resources, i.e. equipment, and civilian-military synergies in capability development.\(^\text{22}\)

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) is the organisation within the Council of the European Union dealing also with civilian capability development. \(^\text{23}\)

The CPCC has contributed significantly to the professionalisation and standardisation of civilian crisis management and to civilian capability development.

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Following the Nice European Council (2000), the EU established permanent political and military structures, thus enabling itself to fully assume its responsibilities in terms of crisis management.

Speaking of civilian capability development, we must not forget to mention, along with EUMCWG, EUMC, EUMS, and CIVCOM, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). It is an element of the EEAS and is responsible for the political-strategic planning of CSDP civilian missions and military operations as well as the coherence and effectiveness of such operations, which are part of the EU’s comprehensive approach. It is also responsible for CSDP capabilities.24 Within the structure of the EEAS the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) must also be mentioned. It was created in 2007 in order to offer a permanent OHQ to civilian CSDP missions. With a staff of over 60, it provides command and control of the missions under the authority of the Civilian Operation Commander and fulfils a duty of care for approximately 2,500 staff deployed in the field. It must be mentioned that there is no military equivalent due to the fact that a separate Chain of Command has to be established for each military operation.25

The main tasks of the CPCC are:

- to support missions in relation to their respective mandates and ensure that the political objectives of the High Representative and the Member States are followed;
- to provide guidance on cross-cutting issues to ensure greater consistency and coherence in operational mandate delivery;
- to support the operational planning and establishment of civilian CSDP missions;
- to set up human resources policies and provide support to the missions in the management of their budget and in legal, logistics and security areas.26

As the operational Headquarters the CPCC is responsible for the planning, conduct and support missions and, most often in liaison with the CMPD, for providing guidance on cross-cutting issues and the conceptual development of civilian operational capabilities.27 Over the years, in coordination with CMPD, the CPCC has contributed significantly to the professionalisation and standardisation of civilian crisis management and to the civilian capability process.

The civilian capability development process also deals with voluntary contributions made by Member States.

In the meantime, civilian capability development follows a plan, known as the Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP), established in 2012. Its methodology is similar to that of the military development process: EU ambitions, capability trends, national strategies and lessons learned are the driving elements of CCDP.28 In December 2011, the Council also called for a multi-annual CCDP work programme, finally leading to the adoption of the CCDP in July 2012 by integrating the four above-mentioned drivers.

Whereas the military capability development process focuses on equipment, the civilian capability development process deals mainly with bringing the right person to the mission theatre. It therefore concentrates on training and personnel.

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The reason for that can be found in the recruitment process for civilian CSDP missions itself. This process is more complex than similar exercises on the military side, due to the fact that the respective ‘[…] experts are normally requested from various governmental or non-governmental entities, such as the Ministry of Justice for judges, the Ministry of the Interior for police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for diplomats. Some experts from the private sector are also targeted in order to recruit the best composition of personnel to accomplish a mission’.  

Moreover, these experts are normally employed at home, hence they are not earmarked for missions abroad. It must be recognized that ‘civilian personnel’ are also shared among different actors at supranational level. There are also other actors, even within the European Union, targeting the same expertise, such as Justice and Home Affairs agencies (e.g. Europol, Eurojust and Frontex).

**DIFFERENCES AND CHALLENGES**

Since Member States’ contribution are made on a voluntary basis, the supranational (EU) level depends on the Member States and their commitment to develop capabilities that might later on be used under the EU flag. For the military, the capacity for multinational cooperation and a sufficient degree of interoperability and standardisation have always played an important role.

Interaction between the supranational and national level is another aspect to be considered during the process. While military operations are covered by the respective Ministries of Defence, civilian-dominated operations, depending on the need (e.g. police or rule of law), might be taken charge of by more than one ministry. This makes force generation more complex at the supranational and even at the national level. Complex-

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30 ibid.
ity might also affect lines of communication and, thus, coordination at national and European levels. Member States are tasked with providing the right civilian personnel – to develop capabilities to be trained and deployed to civilian CSDP missions balanced with the needs and requirements of all the other national and supranational actors.

Regarding financial regulations, the common costs for civilian operations are to be covered by the EU budget (Common Foreign Security Policy). The CFSP budget is administered by the Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (European Commission) under the responsibility of the HR/VP. CSDP military operations cannot be funded by the EU budget. Therefore, the costs for military operations are normally borne by the states participating in the operations. In March 2004, the Athena financing mechanism was established. It is a system that coordinates the covering of certain common expenses arising from EU-led military operations. The EU Member States (except Denmark, which has opted out of military CSDP activities) contribute to this mechanism with an annual share based on their gross national income. With the Athena Mechanism all Member States, except Denmark, are covering the common costs arising out of EU military operations.

EUROPEAN INITIATIVES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Looking at the developments within the European Union, a loss of momentum following the financial crisis of 2008 could be observed. As a reaction, the defence ministers of the EU Member States affected by the financial crisis agreed in 2010 on the so-called ‘Ghent Framework’, also known as ‘Pooling and Sharing’. Through this agreement, Member States were encouraged to ‘systematically analyse their national military capabilities’, aiming at measures to increase their military interoperability for capabilities to be maintained on a national level, to explore their input for international pooling, to intensify international cooperation, and to support structures and tasks that could be addressed on the basis of role and task sharing’. In fact, this pragmatic approach has since then been focusing on ‘pooling and sharing’.

Directly linked to this approach is the question of whether pooling and sharing could restrict the sovereignty of EU Member States. Therefore, the successful implementation of this system depends on a depoliticisation of the debate and a link with, for example the NATO agenda (‘complementarity’ as a key word).

The whole discussion on capabilities regained momentum in 2013 and 2015 when the topic was listed on the agenda of the European Council. Moreover, recent terrorist attacks have reminded Europe of its vulnerability. Therefore, the decline in European collective defence spending seems to have come to a temporary halt. The enhancement of capability development and greater commitment in this regard (e.g. a sufficient amount of defence spending) as well as new ways to meet well-known challenges have been addressed: ‘[…] fostering greater and more systematic European defence cooperation to deliver key capabilities, including through EU funds […]’.

This process is reflected in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security

Policy, published in 2016 and stating that Member States will remain sovereign in their defence decisions, but that nevertheless defence cooperation must become the norm in order to achieve and maintain many of these capabilities.\(^{36}\) Along with all these recent developments, the joint declaration published by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation constitutes another step towards possible increased defence cooperation, a form of cooperation where the keyword ‘complementarity’ shines in new splendour: ‘Develop coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and NATO Allies, as well as multilateral projects’.\(^{37}\)

November 14, 2016: ‘High Representative Federica Mogherini has proposed […] an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, to turn into action the vision set out in the EU Global Strategy. The Plan has been welcomed by the European Union’s Foreign and Defence Ministers […].’\(^{38}\) Concerning capability development the plan highlights the need to identify priorities related to the level of ambition and the EU Global Strategy. Moreover, it is mentioned that proposals should be developed for revisiting the above-mentioned Santa Maria da Feira priority areas for civilian missions as well as for enhancing the responsiveness of civilian crisis management. In this regard further work on the generic civilian CSDP tasks list is mentioned; this list

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will contribute to a common understanding and help to identify capability requirements. For military capability development a review is envisaged too. The EDA for instance should take forward the work to specify and complement capability priorities, as part of the revision process of the Capability Development Plan, and Member States should agree to review the military requirements based on the level of ambition and the EU Global Strategy. The plan suggests drawing on the full potential of the Treaty: ‘The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), as defined in Articles 42(6) and 46 of the TEU and Protocol 10, has the potential to generate a more binding commitment as regards capability development, improving output and strengthening CSDP [...].’

Based on the decision of the Member States, the work should commence in 2017.

Analysing the recent developments in the area of civil and military capability development, the operational key drivers for further progress can be reduced to increased interoperability, lessons learned, rapid deployment and financing of missions and operations, and fair burden sharing. On the military side, discussions are still ongoing on how to make the Battlegroups operational. Currently, the political ambition of forming two standing Battlegroups seems to be difficult in terms of its implementation. Besides that, we can also identify important gaps in the future EU Battlegroup Roster.

EU Battlegroups should become ‘[…] an instrument that can be tailored to respond to a specific crisis, and combined with additional land, naval and air elements based on advance planning and commitments by Member States.’

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40 ibid.
41 European Commission: In Defence of Europe – Defence Integration as a Response to Europe’s Strategic Moment, 2015, European Political Strategy Centre No. 4.
Hand in hand with the discussion on the use of EU Battlegroups, we also have to consider the idea of fair burden sharing. When Member States are willing to provide capabilities, they also have to take over the costs arising from such a commitment. Beyond a limited coverage of common costs through the Athena mechanism – roughly 10% – costs of EU operations essentially lie where they fall. [...] This is even more true for Battlegroup deployment, for which there is no established framework for burden-sharing beyond an uncertain declaration on strategic transport costs [...].

The potential dual use of equipment is also discussed as part of the European Union’s agenda, as are civilian-military synergies.

The dual-use idea may apply not only for surveillance operations and border control, but also for any kind of defence operations, including the third dimension and space. The fact that equipment is intended to be designed for both military and civilian use is one of the key findings when we talk about civilian-military synergies.

Interoperability, which, in military language, means the ability to work together smoothly in a multinational environment and with different equipment has become very important on the civilian side too.

Throughout the years different aspects of civilian capability development have been identified: these include training, expert pools and warehousing (to improve rapid reaction) as well as development of IT tools (such as Goalkeeper, [...] a web-based platform that serves Member States, Headquarters and CSDP civilian missions by supporting training, recruitment, capability development and institutional memory for EU/international crisis management) or CSDP – Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) cooperation. The latter should also be pursued, where appropriate, beside other work strands in future.

All the aforementioned developments are also a consequence of lessons learned from previous operations and the fact that equipment must be interoperable. Besides that, purchase on demand might be too expensive to set up a mission, especially in a time-constrained environment.

From the strategic point of view the recent developments starting with the EU Global Strategy, the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence lay the emphasis on the security and defence of the European Union.

In line with these developments, the recent proposal from the European Commission to create a European Defence Fund to support investment in joint research and joint development of defence equipment and technologies and other actions to support Member States’ more efficient spending on joint defence capabilities must be mentioned.

All the above-mentioned actions are closely linked and complement the European Union Global Strategy. The ‘preconditions’ are set and the proposed actions might lead to a stronger European Union in defence and new momentum in the area of capability development.

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42 European Commission: In Defence of Europe – Defence Integration as a Response to Europe’s Strategic Moment, 2015, European Political Strategy Centre No. 4.
45 Council of the European Union: Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence, 2016, 14149/16.
8.2. STRENGTHENING EU DEFENCE WITH MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION

by Sabine Mengelberg

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The last decade saw an increase in new forms of differentiated cooperation between EU Member States, varying from cooperation based on ad-hoc agreements, to political agreements, to permanent forms of cooperation. Some of these agreements have a historical background originating in the Cold War, while others were founded more recently. Either way, European governments have responded to the combined challenges of hybrid threats, the need to maintain and modernise capabilities, and declining defence budgets by establishing or reinforcing these ‘clusters’ of defence cooperation.

Consequently, for reasons of national interest, efficiency or cultural links, EU Member States are engaged in bi- and multinational cooperation in various policy areas, including defence cooperation. Alongside the possibilities that the EU provides for enhanced multinational defence cooperation, EU Member States have set up bi- and multilateral regional clusters to deepen their defence cooperation, which enriches the network of EU cooperation and integration. Examples of these bi- and multinational regional clusters are the Visegrad Group Defence Cooperation (V4)\(^1\), the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC)\(^2\), NORDEFCO\(^3\), the Baltic cooperation\(^4\), Benelux\(^5\), the Weimar Triangle\(^6\) and the ‘Lancaster House Treaty’ between the United Kingdom and France.

PURPOSE

In general, the purpose of these regional initiatives is to enhance defence cooperation in compliance with the provisions of EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Inspired by the EU ‘Pooling and Sharing’ Initiative, multinational cooperation is driven by the desire to foster interoperability, enable the sharing of experiences, identify and respond to future common threats and execute joint exercises or even joint operations.

Regional joint initiatives that originate from Member States can be submitted to the CSDP. Conversely, these initiatives can also originate from the EU and be submitted to the Member States. This leads to a two-way approach – both bottom-up and top-down – to strengthen the EU’s defence cooperation. Furthermore, there have been instances of partnering between multinational cooperation initiatives\(^7\), partnering with non-EU states and cooperation with organisations like the UN and NATO.

For the sake of efficiency, the EU states participating in regional clusters do not need to seek the approval of the other EU Member States; informing the Council and the High Representative is sufficient. In other words, the consensus rule that applies to CSDP cannot hinder the bottom-up process of building multinational defence cooperation. Consequently, regional defence

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1 Comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. See: http://www.visegradgroup.eu.
2 Comprising Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.
3 Comprising Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. See: http://www.norddefco.org
4 Comprising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. See: http://www.baltasam.org
5 Comprising Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. See: http://www.benelux.int
6 Comprising Poland, Germany and France.
7 For example: Enhanced Visegrad activities in the Eastern Partnership, Bratislava, 16 June 2011; Nordic-Baltic Declaration, Stockholm, 10 November 2015
cooperation in whatever field, whether it involves capacity building, exercises or operations, remains nationally determined and democratically controlled. Likewise, multinational cooperation can be implemented or operationalised by existing national chains of command or the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) in which interoperability between Member States increases.

**DIFFERENT FORMS OF COOPERATION**

Bi- and multinational defence cooperation comes in various forms, which differ in their goals and achievements. There have been advances in the operational area, such as joint training and exercises, or even the combining of units from different nations. For instance, the merger of the German/Netherlands Corps, who are integrating their tank division, allows the Dutch military to maintain operational knowledge and practical experience. Similarly, the V4 is deepening defence cooperation and aligns its members’ defence planning in order to maximise the scope for joint procurement. The focus of the V4 cooperation lies in the areas of common interest such as joint capability development, defence industry (joint procurement and acquisition), establishment of multinational units (the V4 EU Battlegroup) and permanent modular force modalities. The cooperation also covers joint education, training and exercises, and the group runs cross border activities. Under ‘V4 Plus’ cooperation formats, the V4 works with partners inside and outside the EU. Furthermore, The Nordic countries (NORDEFCO) cooperate to coordinate the strengthening of their defence capabilities. This strengthening links strategic development, capabilities, human resources and education (peace support operation courses), training and exercises and common operations, such as in Afghanistan.

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8 V4-CDEC Ministerial Meeting, Prague, 8 June 2016.
The EU encourages and provides enhanced multinational clusters based on the EU Battle-group concept and flexible cooperation clauses in the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU, 2009). Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO, Article 46 TEU) provides a potential framework for working in smaller groups and deepening defence cooperation in core groups, with the option of involving the European Defence Agency (EDA) as a supporter and facilitator for assessment, accountability and procurement. Furthermore, the Council is allowed to ‘entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task’ (Article 44 TEU). This article specifically aims to foster CSDP military operations and civilian missions. Finally, ‘enhanced cooperation’ (Title IV, TEU) allows a minimum of nine EU Member States to establish advanced cooperation within EU structures.

Multinational defence cooperation has become a reality within the CSDP. To be successful and strengthen EU defence cooperation in the future, these various initiatives should be coordinated carefully with one another to avoid replication of effort between (overlapping) regions and within the EU. Therefore, the EU could facilitate and support these different forms of cooperation, serve as a mediator where agendas overlap and provide expertise whenever required. Furthermore, the flexible cooperation clauses of the EU could be strengthened, for instance by deepening PESCO from material cooperation to the execution of operations for Member States who are willing and able. In short, multinational cooperation can bring benefits to the EU integration process and strengthen the capacities of the Member States, including capability development and interoperability for exercises and operations, if linked to the EU’s security and defence policy – a win-win situation.
8.3. EUROPEAN DEFENCE DEPLOYABLE CAPABILITIES

by Christos Malikkides

A SCALABLE AND SUSTAINABLE IMPACT ON OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Emerging hybrid and asymmetrical threats penetrate the Union’s internal and external security borders more and more frequently. Such threats call for a collective reaction that should be proportionate, scalable and adaptive to new threats. To that extent, it is imperative that CSDP be re-adapted to become more comprehensive, responsive and robust in order to counteract such threats.

In particular, the volatile security situation in the Middle East and North Africa, the massive immigration flow, the recent terrorist attacks on European territory and the ongoing crisis close to the EU’s eastern borders illustrate three fundamental points:

- we can no longer claim that we live in secure and stable conditions
- we need to unify our efforts to cope with current and future challenges
- we need to readjust our defence structures to ensure our security in the long term.
IDENTIFICATION AND EXPLOITATION OF SYNERGIES

The Global Strategy on the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy clearly indicates that the EU has a comprehensive understanding of the nature of current and future security challenges. Critically, it acknowledges the vital role that defence can play in managing such challenges. Despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty was adopted seven years ago and provides the institutional framework for strengthening the military dimension of CSDP, progress has been relatively limited. It is now up to the Member States to demonstrate leadership regarding CSDP. A positive first step could be the identification and exploitation of synergies in resources and capabilities. EU institutions such as the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission are well placed to serve as the key strategic enablers for that first step.

DEEPENING MILITARY COOPERATION

To enable the EU to address those diverse challenges across the full security and defence spectrum, we need to further deepen our military cooperation inside the Union. The establishment of permanent structured cooperation (Article 42(6) TEU) provides the opportunity to pool and share our resources and capabilities in an integrated and cost-efficient manner. Although, as indicated, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, that provision has not been activated yet. However, it provides the framework for interested Member States to address collectively their operational and capability requirements through the EU structures. Acknowledging the fact that several EU Member States possess critical defence capabilities, it is strategically imperative to streamline work in this area and to enhance in this respect the European defence output.

The vital interconnected and interrelated domains of military deployability and sustainability could form the bedrock for establishing permanent structured cooperation. Although both areas are considered national responsibilities, their multinational dimension cannot be ignored when it comes to the field of CSDP. Notably, the lack of an overarching EU entity to facilitate the coordination of movement and transportation of assets poses a critical challenge to the EU’s capacity to conduct CSDP crisis management operations. Furthermore, uncoordinated military transportation generates unnecessary duplication, associated inefficiencies and additional costs. Therefore, for more efficient results, it is crucial to ensure the fast and smooth movement of national military forces across EU territory, especially in the event of an emergency.

These shortfalls, as mentioned earlier, could be addressed through a permanent cooperative framework leading to the establishment of an overarching European Movement Coordination Entity. This entity should act as a CSDP enabler to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as the mobilisation of military assets in the event of armed conflicts, peace support operations, terrorist attacks, or natural or man-made disasters. Additionally, daily requirements for military movement and transportation of EU forces and equipment across our territories could be adequately addressed by adopting an agreed set of EU border-crossing legal, customs-related and other administrative arrangements and procedures.
CONNECTING AND COMPLEMENTING SCARCE RESOURCES

In light of the evolving and complex international security environment and decreasing defence budgets, it is crucial to connect and complement our scarce resources, niche capabilities, technologies and expertise. The EU would then be able to act as a credible global security provider, and to deploy and sustain CSDP missions and operations efficiently and safely. For this to be achieved, Member States, whether acting as providers, users, or both, need to unify their efforts and complement their assets and requirements so as to safeguard the strategic autonomy of the EU. However, our efforts should not be solely restricted to complementing our capabilities. We need to ensure that our capabilities can be functional at multinational level through their compatibility and interoperability. Undoubtedly, this would entail optimising levels of pooling and sharing.

Cyprus is one example of how existing national capabilities can be used for common security purposes and peace support operations. Due to its unique geostrategic position, it represents a bridge between the EU and the Middle East, constituting in this regard a ‘permanent aircraft carrier in the Eastern Mediterranean’. Moreover, the country has the infrastructure needed to host international forces, as well as the services and expertise required to provide logistical support for their deployment. The value of those capabilities is reflected in their use over the last thirty years for missions in countries in the region. A considerable number of partners also frequently use Cyprus as a transit hub or for the recovery of their personnel (decompression). Additionally, Cyprus provides valuable lessons learned through the years clearly demonstrate that for capabilities to be functional and effective at multinational level, it is essential that they be standardised, interoperable and compatible.
facilities to United Nations missions as well as to other international organisations. It also offers a permanent non-combatant evacuation operation headquarters for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, while its aim is to become a search and rescue hub.

STANDARDISED, INTEROPERABLE AND COMPATIBLE

Lessons learned through the years clearly demonstrate that for capabilities to be functional and effective at multinational level, it is essential that they be standardised, interoperable and compatible. Building on those principles and exploiting its geographic position as well as its national infrastructure and versatile capabilities (aerial, seaports, warehouses, logistics, human expertise and advanced technologies), Cyprus has managed to act as a regional multimodal transport hub in a volatile area of high strategic interest to the EU and its partners.

Similar to the Cyprus case, there are examples of other EU Member States which possess critical capabilities that could be used to the benefit of either individual partners or the EU. Given the increased challenges and threats as well as our decreased defence budgets, it is essential to map these capabilities and identify how to enhance their efficiency further. The EU Global Strategy and the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) provide the impetus and the tools needed to combine our military capability development processes with research, innovation and diffusion in order to produce tangible and relevant results. While change is required in terms of defence innovation and remains a top priority if we are to have a robust European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), enhancing existing critical military capabilities also remains vital.

RENEWED, ROBUST AND INNOVATIVE

The March 2017 celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties provide a suitable occasion to remind ourselves that the European vision to establish a United Europe for a more stable and secure world could be revitalised through a renewed, robust and innovative common security and defence policy.
9 TRAINING AND EDUCATION
9.1. THE CSDP TRAINING POLICY

by Horst Koukhol

Training and the professional performance of staff are interlinked. Enhanced training will improve capabilities. Better trained experts will provide better impact on the ground and will make civilian missions and military operations more effective and the EU as a security provider more credible. Training is essential to making CSDP effective: the EU external policy could not work without the efforts of well-prepared diplomats, uniformed civilians, rule of law and military personnel. The ‘EU Policy on Training for CSDP’ aims to contribute to the development of a European security and defence culture. The document creates conditions for a broader development of CSDP training within the CFSP context and also with regard to the comprehensive approach. In this regard, it has a civil-military dimension as there is a recognised need to strengthen synergies between military and civilian training personnel. The document creates conditions for a broader development of CSDP training, within the CFSP context and also with regard to the comprehensive approach.

MEMBER STATES REMAIN THE KEY ACTORS

The recently presented ‘EU Policy on Training for CSDP’ and its ‘Implementing Guidelines’ take into account new drivers for training arising from considerable developments in the field of CSDP in both civilian and military crisis management. The aim of this policy paper is also to set out the guiding principles and responsibilities of CSDP. CSDP training is a responsibility of the Member States and CSDP training activities do complement from the EU level the CSDP-relevant training provided by Member States. Member States remain the key actors in civilian and military CSDP, as they provide the absolute majority of assets and capabilities. Any policy on CSDP training therefore has to set a clear framework for maximising the performance of all personnel connected with missions and operations, including contract staff and officials working in EU Delegations. The EEAS has recognised this, and has been supporting the Member States with their training programmes in support of CSDP missions across the spectra of military, police and civilians. Ensuring the appropriate training for civilian and military staff deployed in EU missions and operations is therefore both the responsibility and the guarded prerogative of the Member States. In the area of civilian CSDP this translates mainly into civilian experts who are deployed as seconded national experts from Member States’ police, judiciary, penitentiary, or other parts of the civil service.

TRAINING NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS

The document on the new CSDP training policy creates conditions for a broader development of CSDP- and CSDP-related training. It comprises aspects of civilian and military training needs gathered from various sources such as lessons learned
reports, feedback from missions/operations and stakeholders involved in providing (CSDP and CSDP-related training at strategic and operational level.

CSDP training activities have to contribute to the comprehensive approach by taking stock of training needs, including feedback received from stakeholders and reflecting needs identified. There are also certain developments in the civilian-military field which create new CSDP training requirements, such as the EU Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, EU Security Sector Reform (SSR), the comprehensive approach, the mainstreaming of human rights and gender issues and mandatory pre-deployment training for seconded and international contract staff working in EU missions and on EU operations.

Additionally, there is an emerging need for training courses enhancing the capabilities of staff as regards ‘Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising’, ‘Leadership and Management, ‘External and Internal Security of the EU’, ‘Cyber Security’ and ‘Hybrid Warfare’.

### A HOLISTIC AND COORDINATED APPROACH

CSDP and training for CSDP must also be seen in context as just one EU external action tool which needs to fit in with the rest, reflecting the development of EU crisis management capabilities, integrating training requirements from operational activities and lessons from exercises into training, and identifying and sharing best practices among training providers. CSDP training must be cost-effective and make the best possible use of the available resources/infrastructures – including through bilateral/multilateral cooperation – inside and outside the EU – in delivering training activities and seeking synergies with international organisations. CSDP training will also need to meet requirements in the area of EU relations with third states and international organisations, with a view not only to enhancing cooperation, but also to sharing common training standards and recognition of training.

This calls for the adoption of a holistic and coordinated approach to training matters aimed at establishing links and strengthening synergies between the different training initiatives at EU level within CSDP, with a particular focus on the interface between military and civilian areas.
THE CSDP TRAINING CYCLE

The CSDP training cycle is an iterative sequence of activities aimed at supporting the achievement of CSDP training requirements. The CSDP training cycle is a continuous process and is informed by regular analysis of CSDP training requirements. It consists of four phases: planning, conduct, evaluation and assessment.

It will apply to personnel from EU institutions when they are involved in the programming and implementation of EU training activities and also to personnel of institutions and organisations working on behalf of the European Union and where proper integration with EU actors would be vital to the success of the operation involved. It will also apply to personnel of Member States dealing with CSDP matters.

CONCLUSION

Given the complexity and shared responsibilities in CSDP training, extensive consultations have taken place within the EEAS, with Member States and with external actors involved in CSDP and CSDP-related training. As a result of all these consultations, the drafting exercise of the ‘EU Policy on Training for CSDP’ and the ‘Implementing Guidelines’ followed a thorough procedure based on joint effort.
9.2. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE

by Dirk Dubois

Established in 2005, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is a network of training institutes, think tanks and other actors identified by Member States that has become the main provider of training on the Common Security and Defence Policy in the larger framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. It is the only training provider on this topic that acts at the European level and that addresses civilians, diplomats, police officers, military personnel and other civil servants. The ESDC owes its success to its rather unique structure, relying on the expertise of both the Member States and the institutions and relevant agencies of the European Union. The ‘pooling and sharing’ of the different training activities makes the ESDC extremely cost-efficient as an organisation, training almost 2 000 participants in residential courses in 2016 with an operational budget of only EUR 630 000.

Of course, the College’s operational budget does not give a good idea of the real costs of the courses. Most of the costs are still borne by the
Member States through their training institutes and by other entities in the ESDC network. Currently, the ESDC network consists of over 100 training providers, including diplomatic academies, police academies, military academies, universities, think tanks and research institutions. The main thing that they have in common is that they are certified by their Member States to provide high-quality training and education in the field of security studies.

A particular role in the network is played by the EUISS. This EU agency makes its expertise available to the ESDC in the form of its publications and contributions to the e-learning system of the ESDC and, most importantly, by making available on a very regular basis the skills and knowledge of its researchers for lectures at ESDC training activities. The organisational setup of the ESDC also contributes to its cost-efficiency. Currently, the ESDC is managed by the Head of the ESDC, who is an official seconded by the EEAS. Political guidance is provided the ESDC Steering Committee, in which the Member States take decisions by qualified majority. Academic expertise is provided by an Executive Academic Board, on which the training institutes are represented by senior staff members.

The Board has an advisory role and as such does not take decisions. Although there is only one Board, it actually convenes in different project-fo-
cused configurations, depending on the topic. Finally, the small, permanent secretariat supports the Head, the Committee and the Board to fulfil their mandates. In particular, they help ensure that all steps in the delivery of a training activity – from curriculum development to content to methodological approach – reflects the highest possible standards.

In 2008, the College established its own training concept, addressing all levels of personnel from working level up to the level of decision-makers working in the field of CSDP. At the time of writing this article, the EEAS is finalising its new training policy on training for CSDP and the accompanying implementing guidelines.

At the same time, the College is developing its new legal basis, which will also reflect this policy in terms of the training activities the College offers through its network.

Currently, the ESDC addresses target audiences ranging from high-level decision makers to people at the beginning of their career with more than 40 different types of courses. On top of that, the College has also developed some 20 common modules.

These common modules have been successfully combined to create a European semester at bachelor level and will also be combined to create the basis for a joint master’s degree on European security studies, starting in 2017.

The ESDC promotes the use of blended learning in all its training activities. All participants in ESDC courses are introduced to this approach in advance of the residential courses.

Before they attend a residential training activity, they are asked to go through an e-learning phase. Currently, the learning management system contains almost thirty different ‘autonomous knowledge units’ (AKUs) or lessons, developed either by existing network members or by external partners like the Geneva Centre for Security Studies, the Institute for European Studies and many others. Once the basic theoretical concepts are in place, the residential module takes place. The College promotes blended learning during the residential module too: depending on the size of the audience, and on the topics concerned, lectures, panel discussions, practical exercises and other pedagogic approaches are combined to make the courses as interactive as possible.

Since 2005, the ESDC has trained over 10 000 people from the EU Member States, the EU institutions and agencies, as well as from partner countries and organisations.
In November 2008 the European Union Ministers of Defence decided in their Council Conclusions on the ESDP – during the 2903rd External Relations Council Meeting – to establish an Implementation Group for the ‘European Initiative for the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus’, tasked with harmonising the European Union basic officer education, increasing interoperability and promoting a European security and defence culture among future military leaders. The Implementation Group is a project-focused configuration of the Executive Academic Board supported by the Secretariat of the European Security and Defence College.

Consisting of experts from basic officer education institutions, the Implementation Group develops possibilities and creates the conditions for exchanges of young officers during their initial
education and training. It uses existing exchange programmes – including civilian ones such as ERASMUS+ – as well as creating new avenues of approach for the purpose of strengthening the interoperability of the EU Armed Forces and – as a consequence – increasing EU security within the framework of CSDP.

The Implementation Group defines problem areas which are to be solved to facilitate exchanges. These ‘lines of development’ focus on specific fields, such as the development of necessary competences for officers, regulations concerning administrative matters, how to pass information to the people who need it, and defining common modules which are considered essential by all EU Member States to the education of young officers. If these common modules are implemented into national curricula, then step by step the European Union basic officer education will be harmonised.

By the end of 2016, some 24 common modules worth 72 credits (ECTS) have been developed which may cover more than two academic semesters.

Each year some 1,000 officer cadets participate in common modules which are developed by the Implementation Group – and the trend is increasing.

A huge step forward is the cooperation between five European Union basic officer education institutions to hold annual conferences dedicated to future developments in favour of the Implementation Group’s tasks. Challenges – such as developing common modules, establishing an international semester, financing exchanges and implementing educational elements developed by the by 28 EU Member States into national academic curricula – are solved during these conferences, which are open for participation to all EU Member States.
Following a proposal by EU officials concerning the Common Security and Defence Policy – ‘Member States should introduce a European Semester on Defence’ – the five institutions mentioned above also developed a detailed international semester within the framework of the civilian Erasmus+ Strategic Partnership programme. It consists of a combination of existing and new common modules, and all the developments will be available for all EU Member States by the end of 2017.

The Implementation Group is driven by the key idea that exchanges of officer cadets between European basic officer education institutions will in itself create a European security and defence culture, and thus increase Europe’s security and defence capabilities.

SOURCES FOR MORE AND UPDATED INFORMATION

- Website: http://www.emilyo.eu
- Website: http://www.maf-reichenau.at/
- iMAF 2014 (Harald Gell & Sylvain Paile-Calvo) available on http://www.emilyo.eu
- European Education and Training for Young Officers – The European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus (Sylvain Paile-Calvo) available on http://83.64.124.70/campus/iep/pdf/2014/Basic_Documents/2014-03-Paile-erasmus_booklet_fin.pdf
- From European Mobility to military Interoperability – exchanging Young Officers, knowledge and know-how (Sylvain Paile-Calvo) available on http://www.emilyo.eu

The common module ‘Cadet leadership development under harsh conditions’ was organised by the Republic of Cyprus.
9.4. THE POSITIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF TRAINING – THE SECURITY POLICY DIMENSION

Prologue: The European Security and Defence College is a ‘network college’ which is comprised of 120 national entities including diplomatic academies, national defence universities, police colleges and NGOs. The article below is based on that specific training environment, in which the training audience is mainly recruited from the EU institutions and the country’s administration, i.e. from various ministries and agencies. The training environment is international and includes both military and civilian participants, with a focus on ensuring gender and regional balance among trainees. In general, the ESDC provides training and education for the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the wider context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at European level.

INTRODUCTION

When ‘training’ is mentioned, the general assumption is that this word refers to acquiring and applying the knowledge, skills and competencies which are needed for a specific job. But besides the classic training goals, there are some other relevant dimensions which play a crucial role, in particular when it comes to training at strategic level.

These positive side effects can be described as the ‘security policy dimension’ of training. These side effects can include institution and human capacity building, strengthening participants’ intellectual diversity and confidence building – to name but a few. It is of utmost importance that the training designer be aware of these positive side effects, in order to make the best use of them.

THE POSITIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF TRAINING

The positive side effects of training, from the trainer’s and trainee’s perspective, include

a) Institution building
b) Human capacity building
c) Democratisation
d) Intellectual diversity
e) Regional focus
f) Agenda setting
g) Confidence building
h) Networking

This list does not claim to be exhaustive, but it gives a good overview of the potential of each training activity. It is up to the training designer to think about that potential and to the course director to ensure that it is fulfilled.
a) Institution building

When a training course is provided in a third country (‘local host’), the responsible organisation is generally working together with one of the regular ESDC network partners from one of the EU Member States. A representative from the ESDC Secretariat also assists the course organisers in planning and conducting the training event. The local host is requested to identify a point of contact which has connections to other key ministries in order to simplify the nomination process.

In some cases, working relations between the various ministries leave some room for improvement. The training activity can be used as a facilitator in order to establish or improve these relations. The preparation of such an event can also be used to introduce permanent working bodies, e.g. in order to deal with EU Common Foreign and Security Policy issues.

During training events conducted under the umbrella of the ESDC, the local host should ensure that a number of high-ranking officials are present and visible. This process, which includes the cabinet of various ministries, can again be used to stimulate working relations between various actors, and to create a network, which will then hopefully last beyond the end of the training event.

b) Human capacity building

Of course, the training courses themselves contribute to the creation of knowledgeable personnel within the countries involved (both participating and organising). But coming back to what was said under point a), the local personnel responsible for the courses must be not only good organisers, but also good facilitators, mediators and networkers. They should be able to make middle-management decisions, while always bearing the bigger picture in mind. The training field should not be used for national turf battles.

The personnel nominated to give a lecture or contribute to a training event face a very specific challenge. Similarly to the personnel involved in
organising the event, local lecturers asked to provide a contribution will mostly be doing so for the first time in an international environment, in a foreign language and on a topic which could be controversial and therefore challenging to discuss.

Besides these elements, the presentation style can differ depending on the audience. Let’s use some stereotypes in order to make the point clear: whereas military audiences love to follow a PowerPoint presentation, academics prefer to listen and receive a well-structured speech; civilians, on the other hand, tend to appreciate a mixture of slides, role plays and other interactive elements. In general, military participants wait until they are asked, keeping their questions until the Q&A session is opened, whereas civilians try to clarify questions as soon as they come into their minds. The lecturer is tasked with both making everyone happy … and delivering the message.

The challenges above put pressure on the lecturer, both because they represent a brand new experience and because there may be many different ways of handling them. Within the ESDC, the Chatham House rule is commonly used, which means that ‘information disclosed during a meeting may be reported by those present, but the source of that information may not be explicitly or implicitly identified’. In some countries it could be the case that all information disclosed has to be approved by a higher authority, which puts additional pressure on the lecturer, in particular during the Q&A session.

The ESDC has established a well-functioning evaluation system, which can be used to give the lecturer feedback on his or her personal presentation style and how it was perceived. In addition, the College provides ‘Train the Trainer’ seminars in order to improve lecturers’ performance.

Freedom of speech and academic freedom are the cornerstones of any valuable training and education event.
c) Democratisation

Democracy and its values are one of the key priorities of the European Union in its neighbourhood policy: free and fair elections; accountability of the political elite; active contribution of society to political debates; an administration based on the rule of law; and the protection of human rights in all aspects.

Training and education promotes these ideas in two ways: on the one side, by making the organisers/lecturers (training providers) aware of these principles; and on the other side, by providing training for an audience (training receivers) which will be confronted with critical assessments and discussions.

Education (more so than training) should focus on facts and figures – that is to say, on the transfer of knowledge. Nevertheless, for more advanced courses and seminars, the trainees should be provoked into making (self-)critical assessments. This allows them to experience a healthy debate and discussion environment – the basis for democratic discourse.

Lecturers, who – in general – have to have their seminars approved by a superior, will get immediate feedback on their arguments in the Q&A period, in which they will have to defend their points of view. Trainees are invited to question everything, challenge the arguments of the lecturer and even to play devil’s advocate in order to stimulate a thought-provoking exchange of views.

Responsibility for this endeavour lies with the moderator/facilitator of a specific training and education event. This person is tasked with keeping the questions rolling, intervening when the discussion is not remaining within the given parameters (in terms of both content and politeness) and finding ways to link contributions with the overall learning outcomes of the whole event.

d) Intellectual diversity

Freedom of speech and academic freedom are the cornerstones of any valuable training and education event: listen to each other; try to understand your opponent and make your point clear and understandable; don’t take statements personally, and try to remain on factual grounds.

Intellectual diversity can be challenging and is even sometimes not appreciated in less developed democratic cultures. There are also differences between various cultures, e.g. in some Asian countries, public disagreement is a no-go; hence, cultural awareness should also be taken into account when discussing this issue.

Promoting intellectual diversity and academic freedom does not necessarily mean that everything must be accepted. There are certainly red lines which should not be crossed, such as xenophobic remarks or other statements that violate human rights. The former President of the European Parliament, Mr Martin Schulz, gave a good example of a response to such a transgression in March 2016, when a right-wing member of the Parliament provoked the plenum with racism and therefore Mr Schulz had him excluded from the meeting. This kind of measure should not be excessively used in training and education events, but it should not be excluded either.

Bearing in mind that training and education events should first of all be informative, intellectual diversity comes into play when climbing up the ‘knowledge pyramid’. When trainees are asked to apply, understand and explain why and how procedures and structures are as they are, they should be confronted with various approaches and methods. Intellectual diversity will help them...
to find their own way. Being critical, questioning what they have been taught and developing their own problem-solving approach to challenges is the best kind of learning, and one which could even lead to a change in attitude.

e) Regional focus
The regional focus – in other words, the local ownership – of training can be seen as the key to success. A training and education event should never be a one-way street: a trainee from a specific region can enrich the event by sharing his or her experience, contributing to discussion and highlighting links which are hard to identify from an outside perspective; while a trainer from a specific region is also beneficial for the event, because he or she can bring in a regional perspective on certain issues. These perspectives are particularly important for EU bureaucrats who can easily become trapped in the Brussels bubble; external experts can therefore help to keep things simple and understandable.

The regional focus ensures that both sides take into account each other’s positions, encouraging them to think about one another and thereby opening their horizons. At the end of this kind of training event, the EU officials should know more about the region and the regional representatives should know more about the EU; a classic win-win situation.

f) Agenda setting
By training and educating specific audiences, organisers have an important tool at their disposal: agenda setting. Although most EU/ESDC training is already standardised and harmonised, the
course director has the power to focus on specific topics and distribute the available time according to his or her priorities.

Agenda setting is a skill which was very well known to the former High Representative, Javier Solana. In 2008, he wrote a publication entitled ‘Security and Climate Change’. In the following months, he included this topic in each and every meeting. By doing so, he gently forced the other side to read his publication and find its own position on this subject. This is a textbook example of how agenda setting can be used.

For training and education events, the major themes are already stipulated. But there is usually a certain amount of room for manoeuvre, and this should be used to add topics which are important for the organisation or the audience. Having said that, agenda setters should be aware of their power and use it wisely.

**g) Confidence building**

One of the main aspects of training and education events within the European Security and Defence College is confidence building. Some training events involve conflicting parties sitting in the same room. If the organiser succeeds in bringing them together, discussing issues and maybe even finding common ground, then the event can be deemed a success. Training and education – the transfer of knowledge and the strengthening of skills – are vectors for social engineering and networking.

Confidence-building measures can be facilitated through role plays or other interactive exercises. It is important to give the floor to the audience; they should lead any interactions, discussions or debates. Topical facilitators could be exercises focused on conflict analysis, mediation or negotiation. All these facilitators stimulate interaction between the participants and force them to think in the mindset of others.

**h) Networking**

Last but not least, networking between the participants – but also between the lecturers – is crucial if the event is to have a lasting impact. Exchanging business cards, phone numbers and email addresses can facilitate work after the event is over. Having a contact person in another country, who is reliable and can be called any time, can make life easier, in particular when an individual is under stress or is lacking situational awareness.

Networking should bring together the alumni of a specific training course, creating relationships between various ministries but also across borders. A sign of good networking during training is when participants know their counterparts in the other ministries and even in the ministries of partner countries.

If training and education events are provided on a regular basis, the network between the students and alumni will grow from year to year. This network can form the basis for trust and further cooperation, but above all for an extended period of peace in Europe, which we all wish for.

**CONCLUSION**

Training and education has, in addition to the learning perspective, a lot of other positive side effects which should be taken into account and used whenever possible. In order to use the security policy dimension of training, responsible and well-educated trainers are of utmost importance. When training is mingled with a political mandate, the positive side effects of training can take the lead in order to accomplish the mission. And when training has the potential to make the world a better place, why shouldn't it be used to do so?