FINAL EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT
“Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Eastern and Southern Africa Region”
(“CPMR”)

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FINAL REPORT

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The evaluators remain solely responsible for any errors and omissions in this report. The views expressed therein are those of the evaluators and in no way should be taken to represent the official views of the EU or of any of the organisations referred to in the text.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European Commission (EC) has commissioned a team of three consultants managed by IBF International Consulting to carry out the final evaluation of the project entitled “Conflict prevention, management and resolution in Eastern and Southern Africa region” (CPMR). The CPMR project was implemented from October 2007 to December 2012, as part of a broader set of activities funded under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) and based on a set of strategy and planning papers. The CPMR project had a budget of just over €10m, almost entirely funded by the EU. In essence, the programme’s purpose was to enhance the capacity of three of Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) to help prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict. The three RECs were:

- The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD);
- The East Africa Community (EAC); and
- The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The objectives of the CPMR programme, as summarized by the evaluation terms of reference (TOR), were:

- “To contribute to the prevention of the outbreak and escalation of violent conflicts with regional dimensions” in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) region; and
- “To mitigate the effects thereof in the ESA region so as to contribute to an enabling environment for economic development and poverty reduction”.

To achieve its purpose and objectives, the programme was structured into three components, each centred around one of the three target RECs:

- IGAD component: strengthening the capacity of the IGAD Secretariat and its Member States to implement CPMR;
- EAC component: strengthening the capacity of EAC Member States to fight arms trafficking and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW);
- COMESA component: strengthening the capacity of the region to address war economies.

IGAD was responsible for overall project coordination, which it implemented with a project coordinator and technical assistance supplied through a consortium led by the consultancy firm Transtec. The EAC and COMESA components were managed by the respective RECs in coordination with IGAD. The EU Delegations (EUDs) in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania) and Lusaka (Zambia) were respectively in charge of monitoring the IGAD, EAC and COMESA components of the programme, with the EUD in Addis being also in charge of coordinating the three EUDs’ monitoring. Since 2011, the monitoring tasks of the Addis EUD have been taken over by the Djibouti EUD. A Project Steering Committee made up of representatives of the three RECs and of relevant EUD staff, with the project coordinator acting as secretary, was designed to maintain general oversight of the project’s implementation.

Background of the evaluation

The CPMR project was implemented in the context of a broader set of peace and security initiatives, broadly falling under the overall umbrella of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA, pursuant to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, has at
its apex the African Union Peace and Security Council. One of the APSA’s key elements is the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), based on the regional early warning structures established by RECs across Africa, including IGAD. The EU has been supporting the operationalisation of APSA, including through the EU African Peace Facility Capacity Building component.

The CPMR project was developed on the basis of a number of EU strategy documents and inputs by the three RECs concerned. The 2005 joint EU development policy reinforced the availability of EDF support to “a strengthened role for the regional and sub-regional organisations in the process of enhancing international peace and security, including (…) conflict prevention”. The 2005 EU Africa Strategy similarly stressed the need for strengthening regional CPMR capacity. In addition, the RECs themselves had developed strategic documents that included a CPMR dimension. IGAD, for example, had developed in 2003 a Strategy and Implementation Plan for 2004-2008, which included a focus, *inter alia*, on “enhanced capacity for peace building”. The IGAD component of the CPMR project was developed in line with this strategy.

By focusing on trafficking in small arms, the EAC component of the project addressed a specific contributing factor to the outbreak and escalation of conflicts on the African continent. In policy responses SALW measures sit between CPMR, law enforcement measures and post-conflict response. At the time of the project design the EAC had no specific peace and security mandate but described the absence of conflict as a prerequisite for economic development. A protocol on peace and security was developed during the years of project implementation, which also contained a dedicated article on action on small arms (Art. 11) and a separate one on CPMR (Art. 4). Throughout the time of project implementation the EAC based its specific activities on the commitments under the UN Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Nairobi Protocol on SALW.

The COMESA component of the programme focused on war economies – that is, in essence, the analysis and action related to the economic aspects of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. As in the case of IGAD, the inclusion of peace and security matters in COMESA’s mandate has been relatively recent, dating back to a 1999 COMESA summit meeting. Importantly, COMESA’s mandate on peace and security was explicitly designed to be consistent with APSA, including in terms of early warning of conflict under processes supported across Africa by the African Union (AU).

**Evaluation methodology**

The evaluators followed the questions set out in Annex II of the evaluation TOR, adapting them to the specific context of each component. The evaluation addressed three activity and policy levels:

1. **Component level**: the evaluation covered the activities under each of the components.
2. **Project level**: assessment at that general level identified common patterns across the three components.
3. **Future action**: the first two elements of the evaluation provided an evidence base to recommend future approaches for project management and monitoring.

The evaluation was based on the analysis of this documentation and other materials provided by the RECs and the EUDs concerned, and on information gathered through semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders. These included REC representatives and
staff members, consultants employed on project activities, beneficiaries of programme activities, representatives of relevant civil society organizations, government and EU officials. The CPMR project coordinator and technical assistance consultancy company were also interviewed. A list of people met is annexed to this report.

**Future programming**
The evaluation is taking place in the context of planning by the EU and the CPMR stakeholders for a successor programme. To support this process, the evaluation will identified elements that should be taken into account in the implementation of the new programme. This include matters of substance and strategy – issues to be addressed by each REC involved in the future programmes – as well as lessons learned from the past CPMR programme in relation to programme management and monitoring processes. The preliminary results of the evaluation were shared in May 2014 with the team of consultants commissioned to support the planning process for a CPMR successor programme starting in 2015.

**Constraints and limitations**
The evaluation did not pose any particular methodological problem, but the evaluators faced three practical challenges:

- Many of the individuals involved with the initial design and early implementation of the project had moved on by the time the evaluation took place;
- The project involved stakeholders in more than a dozen countries, which required the evaluators to prioritise some countries for visits;
- The project did not collect objectively verifiable indicators on its activities or impact.

Despite the above constraints, the evaluators were able to form a well-rounded view of the project. There was a sufficient evidence base, outlined in the body of this report, to draw out general patterns and lessons learned that underpin the conclusions and recommendations.

**Findings of the evaluation**

**Relevance**
The programme was designed at a time when the peace and security structures in Africa were undergoing significant change – a process that has yet to be completed. The three RECs were themselves faced with the challenge of implementing peace and security mandates that were partly new to their institutional development or evolved during the project period. Capacities were often low, thus justifying the CPMR capacity building approach.

The project was highly relevant to regional needs as well as to global EU foreign policy objectives.

The IGAD component correctly identified the need to reinforce the organisation’s capacity to address conflict. That need had been identified by IGAD itself in its 2004-2008 strategy, and was clearly consistent with the broader African Union strategy on the operationalization of APSA. The project was also coherent with the stated EU policies consisting in supporting African peace and security processes, as set out in a number of EU policy and position papers.
The project correctly identified the various areas of IGAD’s work where support was appropriate, including in relation to conflict early warning and early response (CEWARN Unit), conflict mitigation, gender and conflict, as well as security sector programming. The need for flexibility and responsiveness to short-term capacity building needs was also correctly anticipated in the project design. The project was clearly designed to address, among others, the long-standing conflict in Somalia – where highly complex conflict dynamics involved a wide range of domestic and international actors, and had far-ranging implications at the regional level and beyond.

By focusing on trafficking in small arms, the EAC component area addressed a specific contributing factor to the outbreak and escalation of conflicts on the African continent. Widespread misuse of firearms followed the proliferation of these easy to use weapons after the Cold War power blocks rid themselves of surplus military stocks. This set development back for decades in many parts of the world. Within the EAC region, pastoralists armed themselves at the Kenya-Uganda border and engaged in increasingly bloody raids on each other’s livestock; the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) terrorised civilians in Northern Uganda; and bloody conflicts tore Rwanda and Burundi apart sending armed refugees from Burundi and the DRC flooding into Tanzania. More recently, it has been acknowledged that poor security sector management practices have contributed to the illicit proliferation of small arms in the region and clearer legal and procedural structures are needed to prevent further leakages.

Addressing the issue of illicit small arms proliferation was also a key global UN priority and a stated EU foreign policy objective. The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA, 2001) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI 2005) as well as the more recent Arms Trade Treaty (ATT, 2013 adopted not yet in force) set out measures for implementation. The EU has supported these initiatives as a block within the UN.

With regards to the COMESA component, the element of peace and security was embedded in Art.163 of the COMESA treaty which states that regional peace and security are pre-requisites to social and economic development and key to the achievement of the regional economic integration objectives of the Common Market. Member States therefore agreed to work towards preventing, better managing and resolving inter-State or intra-State conflicts.

The programme was highly relevant to the priorities and on-going activities of the RECs concerned.

The IGAD component was fully consistent with IGAD’s strategic outlook, expressed in its 2004-2008 strategy document, to build the capacity of its Peace and Security Department in the context of the continent-wide operationalisation of APSA. The existing teams of experts on conflict early warning and early response (CEWARN), mediation, security sector and gender, each were given a strong priority in the design of the project, in keeping with that strategy.

The EAC component of the programme was jointly implemented by the Secretariat for the East African Community (EAC) and the Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA). The EAC secretariat has had a policy on SALW since 2006 as part of its peace and security agenda,
defining it as a “pre-requisite for social and economic development” (EAC Treaty, Art. 124). During the years of project implementation, the EAC’s intention to work on SALW has been strengthened through the creation of dedicated peace and security mechanisms. As the executive organ, the EAC Secretariat is tasked with *inter alia* the co-ordination and harmonization of the policies and strategies related to the development of the Community, and with the mobilisation of donor funds for the implementation of Community projects. This project thus fitted perfectly within these priorities.

The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) based in Nairobi, is the regional institutional framework coordinating the efforts of the National Focal Points (NFPs) within the signatory region of the Nairobi Protocol. RECSA carries out training and documents developments. RECSA’s contributed important technical expertise, in particular related to the marking process. RECSA is the leading SALW centre in the region and the project was thus highly relevant to its mandate. However, RECSA was not part of the original project design and was brought in through a subcontract and a special log-frame in 2009. RECSA also used the project to fund areas that have difficulties attracting other funding (such as weapons destruction in Eritrea). RECSA therefore believes that the availability of funds through this project was highly relevant to its mandate as it help the organisation to support countries struggling to find the resources for implementation.

With regards to the **COMESA component**, there were a number of policies and processes in place that were relevant to the project and whose work could be reinforced by the project. The implication of COMESA in regional peace and security with programmes targeting specific aspects of conflict indicated that the war economy component of the CPMR project complemented existing actions and was relevant to the context of reducing conflicts in the region. The objectives and activities of the CPMR component were in line with other COMESA activities, including, *inter alia*, COMWARN and Trading for Peace.

**A convincing problem analysis contrasted with weak project logic.**

The problem analysis clearly and correctly identified contributing factors to violent conflicts in the region. However, the original project design was weakened by some incorrect assumptions and unrealistic objectives, including:

- In relation to the **IGAD component**, the key concern was a somewhat optimistic view of the absorptive capacity of the organisation, and of its ability to move quickly into new areas of conflict mitigation. In particular, the complexity of the CEWARN process, involving a wide range of actors at regional, national and local levels, was not fully captured in the project design, leading to the implicit but unrealistic expectation that rapid results could be achieved in conflict early warning with a relatively small outlay of technical assistance.

Another concern specific to the IGAD component was that the project design assumed the pro-active involvement of a number of stakeholders, without providing them with the means to provide constructive engagement and to follow up decisions. For example, the programme called for the IGAD Peace and Security Technical Committee (PSTC) to support the implementation of the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy. However, the PSTC was not actually operational, and there were insufficient provisions in the CPMR project to support it beyond occasional meetings.
• With regards to the **EAC component**, the assumption, quite commonly held at the time the project was conceived, was that a reduction in illicit small arms would solve peace and security issues. While there is no question that proliferation of small arms tends to aggravate violence and lethality of a conflict often leading to escalation, the absence of tools that make killing easier does not solve the underlying conflict issues. As studies in recent years have shown, SALW measures can reduce lethality when violence erupts and thereby make an important deescalating contribution to a cycle of violence without necessarily ending it.

Secondly, the project design was not based on a technical problem analysis and therefore tasked a REC with law enforcement measures to address ‘illicit transfers’. This was problematic for two reasons. Addressing ‘illicit transfers’ was in fact one step too advanced for a region without a common legally binding framework defining ‘illicit’ and ‘licit’ ownership and use of weapons, which is prerequisite to law enforcement measures. Moreover, the problem analysis had not sufficiently considered institutional mandates and made the mistake of tasking the Secretariat of the EAC with activities that remain the responsibility of national governments. However, these flaws in the project design were largely overcome in 2009 through the monitoring process that identified priorities from the UNPoA as key project activities. The project abandoned its original objectives of implementing common law enforcement measures to address illicit transfers and concentrated in stead of creating the framework necessary for such structures based on the objectives identified by the UN process.

• The key concern related to the **COMESA component** was the project’s ability to capture the complexity of the economics of war across a wide and extremely diverse region, without focusing on specific areas. As a result, studies and seminars tended to be overly scattered in thematic terms, hampering their relevance to individual post-conflict situations and reconstruction strategies.

In conclusion, the project was relevant in that it identified correctly a number of needs related to CPMR, and was explicitly designed to be in line with EU and AU regional and sub-regional strategies on peace and security. However, the project design failed to fully take account of the systemic weaknesses of the three RECs’ mandates on conflict issues, and of their weak capacity to implement peace and security strategies. The project design also failed to mandate a clear accountability mechanism for project management, and did not explicitly provide for a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) process to be established at the outset.

**Effectiveness**

The project had some elements of effectiveness in the sense that a number of activities and planned results were achieved, particularly in relation to the EAC component. However effectiveness was very weak in relation to the IGAD component, and weak in relation to the COMESA component.

The **IGAD component** achieved some results in relation to supporting the organisation's peace and security strategy design, discussion and dissemination, and other strategies relevant to the work of IGAD expert teams. However, few of the research and analysis results were achieved and the anticipated dialogue between
IGAD and its Member States on peace and security issues fell short of expectations set out in the project document.

The IGAD component of the project had five result areas under the Programme Estimate 1 (PE1) period (till 2010), revised and reduced to four under PE2 (till 2012). These differed in formulation from the project’s original and revised logical framework, where they were described as activities under result area 1 (strengthening of regional CPMR capacity). Notwithstanding the slight wording differences in various documents, the expected results could be synthesised as follows:

- Supporting the formulation, dissemination and subsequent implementation of the IGAD peace and security strategy;
- Strengthening linkages between IGAD Secretariat, Member States and other national and regional actors in the field of CPMR;
- Supporting linkages within IGAD between CPMR activities and cross-cutting areas such as environmental protection, refugees, gender.
- Strengthening coordination between IGAD and AU and between IGAD and its CPMR project partners, EAC and COMESA.

Results were, in essence, as follows:

- Work was done to develop strategies on CPMR, mostly in the form of support to planning and strategies at the level of PSD thematic teams. For example, the project helped the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP) team to develop its strategy and work plan during the CPMR project period. Similarly, the project helped fund research and seminars that contributed to CEWARN planning, as well as meetings of IGAD Member States representatives to consider IGAD strategy on peace and security, as well as the broader IGAD strategic outlook.

However, it cannot be said that the project resulted in the development and dissemination of a fully-fledged IGAD peace and security strategy. Documents of a strategic nature were indeed produced. However, IGAD’s strategy document made public in 2011, which referred to peace and security in the broader context of IGAD’s work, did not refer specifically to a peace and security strategy. This was due in part to the fact that IGAD’s main governing body, the Council of Ministers, did not formally approve a peace and security strategy till 2012. Project management of the IGAD component played a major role in this regard, as reviewed in the section on efficiency. As a result of the failure of the project to obtain timely approval of a peace and security strategy, follow-up measures protocols and related research planned under the two PEs were also largely unimplemented.

- The linkages between IGAD and other actors at Member State and regional levels were, in effect, reduced to some civil society-related activities, including training on call for proposals procedures. This fell far short of the anticipated result and in particular did not lead to a significant enhancement of civil society involvement in IGAD CPMR activities.

- The project supported research activities and contributed with training and financial resources to the establishment of a mediation unit at IGAD. These activities, though they also fell far short of original expected results, were probably the most effective in
the IGAD component. However, despite the relevance of the support given to mediation, most other cross-cutting areas of work were left untouched by the project. In particular, gender issues did not get systematic coverage, and research proposals submitted to the project coordinator were not followed up.

- The coordination issues with the AU, EAC and COMESA are addressed in the section on efficiency, as they were related to CPMR project management.

**Progress has been made in strengthening the regional capacity to fight against arms trafficking and proliferation at national (Partner State) and regional (EAC) level.** At national level, the capacity to fight arms trafficking and arms proliferation has been strengthened in a regionally coherent way but in many countries, the existing mechanisms are not yet adequate to effectively curb illicit firearm proliferation.

Partner States of the EAC have implemented a series of measures called for under the UNPoA, creating a framework in which to address illicit possession and use through laws, marking of illicit weapons stocks and improved management procedures for state owned weapons (including the use of a specially developed software). A table annexed to this report summarises specific SALW measures implemented in EAC Partner States between 2003 and 2012. However, there is less information on the extent to which these measures have yet led to any specific law enforcement measures against those possessing or transferring illicit weapons. For example, Rwanda has reported just 35 cases of illegal firearms possession. In other countries, there has been a disappointing lack of progress in genuine enforcement probably due to a number of conflicting political priorities and possibly vested interests. Some observers are concerned that in many countries of the region SALW measures remain an “add-on” project rather than having been fully mainstreamed within the management of the security sector, which has largely been done in Rwanda. Much of this success is probably due to the fact that the project could refer to the priorities and activities already defined under the UnPoA and thus already existing national commitments. The ongoing UN monitoring process and its associated regular reporting on national activities helped to ensure that states advanced in working on the national agenda.

**The EAC Secretariat helped to bring regional civil society organisations into the process thereby strengthening the regional responses**

During the second half of the project, the EAC secretariat used project activities and funding to bring representatives from regional civil society organisations to attend the NFPs meetings. This helped to bring a gender perspective to the project, widened the stakeholder pool and increased the regional pressure on national governments to stay on the path of implementation.

**The EAC has made progress in elaborating the procedures around SALW control cooperation, with indirect contributions from the project**

During the time of project implementation, the EAC decided upon several of its structures addressing SALW control matters. Within the EAC, SALW control is located within the pillar on Inter State Security along side topics such as drugs and general police cooperation. While SALW are clearly recognised as a contributing factor to insecurity, it is not dealt with at the same institutional level as CPMR.
The COMESA component included a number of activities under each of the expected results. However these activities largely fell short of achieving the planned results.

The component provided for the following results:

- Strengthening COMESA capacity in the area of war economy. Despite initial delays, CPMR workshops were initiated by COMESA with civil society organisations, parliamentarians and other COMESA CPMR stakeholders. Although these events were platforms for information exchange, no formal training was carried out. Observations have been made by most of the CSOs interviewed that formal training related to War Economy problems should have been developed in addition to these workshops and conferences. Some CSOs knowledgeable about war economy and conflict issues would have benefited from further training. COMESA's management claims that these activities provided them with a comprehensive understanding of war economies. A database of 46 experts on war economies was compiled. Experts were identified without a formal process after participating in research, production of papers, discussions and in making recommendations on the programme’s various topics. It is unclear whether these experts have been used to address issues on war economies.

- Strengthening the legal framework against illegal economic activities. Research on the illegal exploitation of natural resources identified a number of factors conducive to such activities, some well known as a result of previous studies. The research noted the lack of harmonisation among national mining policies and codes and the lack of comprehensive and effective policies to regulate international business practices in the mining sector. The research led to the compilation of information, disseminated during a validation workshop in 2010, and policy recommendations were put forward. Although these recommendations were adopted by COMESA, they could not be implemented in the timeframe of the project.

- Enhance the ability to reduce the adverse effects of war. This was probably the most effective part of the programme, in the sense that studies were carried out on issues such as the nature and extent of illegal economic activities and their linkages to the emergence and propagation of conflict systems and zones in the region. The main highlight was the linkages between informal economic activities and war economies with piracy, SALW trading, cattle rustling and their role in propagating conflicts. The role of shadow economies and their impact on the formal economy was pointed out.

- Strengthen regional collaboration and capacity in investigating tracking and prosecuting war economy crimes. This result was less effective in the sense that, out of five planned activities, only three were achieved. These were development of tools, incentives and strategies for tracking, investigating and prosecuting war economy related crimes at national and regional levels, consultations with stakeholders to disseminate strategies and proposed policy options and strengthening of NSA for greater involvement.

- Strengthening cooperation between international organisations and non-state actors in combatting war economy. The activities in this result area were mostly related to
analysis of national, regional and international networks involved in war economies in the COMESA region, seminars on social protection, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and codes of conduct for stakeholders. The key achievement was a draft regional model code for corporate governance and CSR. However there was no information as to whether progress was being made by Member States on its implementation.

In conclusion, the project was relatively effective in its EAC component, in the sense that useful activities in line with the overall objective were carried out following a substantial rewrite of the original, unrealistic plans (including for example a focus on UNPoA priorities and enhanced involvement of RECSA). The COMESA component was also effective, in that a range of studies and activities were implemented and some results achieved, which also built on previous COMESA experience. However follow-up was insufficient, in particular with civil society and private sector actors. The IGAD component’s effectiveness was weak, largely because its work programme was not appropriately integrated into IGAD’s overall strategy and because project management was extremely weak, as described in the next section. As a result, it was difficult to identify achievements at project result level, despite some important support to strategy development, particularly in the early period of the project.

**Efficiency**

The EAC and COMESA components were appropriately efficient, in the sense that the activities implemented represented reasonable value for money and were, in the main, implemented in accordance with plans, including after revisions resulting from the 2009 monitoring process and the mid-term review. The IGAD component, as well as the overall CPMR project management, were not efficiently implemented due to incorrect resource allocation, which eventually led to spending curtailment. The root cause of the lack of efficiency of the IGAD component and of the overall CPMR programme management was inadequate project management. The weakness of project management was compounded by ineffective oversight mechanisms and the lack of CPMR project-level M&E mechanisms.

IGAD was in charge of the management of its own component of the CPMR, and was also entrusted with the overall coordination of the CPMR project – that is, general management of the project in consultation with the two other RECs, EAC and COMESA. A steering committee made up of representatives of the three RECs and of the relevant EUDs was established, with tasks that included general oversight of the project’s implementation. However, the project coordinator, Dr Atnafu Tola, was in effect the sole decision-maker on project activities at IGAD component level, and the steering committee did not operate as an effective accountability mechanism. The concerns about project management at the IGAD component level were the following:

- Unclear lines of responsibility. The project coordinator had an office at IGAD headquarters and was nominally placed under the management of the Head of IGAD’s Peace and Security Department – and appeared to be therefore ultimately answerable to IGAD’s Executive Secretary. However this nominal line of accountability did not actually operate because IGAD’s Executive Secretary and the
Head of the PSD had no authority on the CPMR project budget, which was managed by the project coordinator with support from Transtec.

One consequence of this lack of accountability was that the CPMR project coordination with the other two RECs, carried out by the project coordinator, was always insufficient in comparison to original assumptions, and was in effect a parallel process not involving the authority of IGAD’s Executive Secretary, leading to misunderstandings.

The main consequence, however, was that IGAD had no powers to keep the project coordinator accountable to IGAD because the project coordinator’s decisions – for example on which missions to undertake – were not subject to an approval process involving IGAD senior management.

- Ineffective accountability mechanisms. If IGAD senior management was not empowered to supervise the project coordinator, who was? The CPMR Steering Committee (SC), which met five times between 2008 and 2010, and didn’t meet afterwards, was not formally tasked with supervising the project coordinator. Minutes of its meetings show that the SC was indeed concerned about the lack of quality of the CPMR project management, referring on one occasion to “the lack of good faith” of the coordinator (5th SC meeting minutes, December 2010). However this did not lead to improvements in the quality of the project’s management, and it was in any case too late to remedy past mistakes, including improving the effectiveness of the IGAD component as highlighted in the previous section.

- The EU itself was not in a position to exercise day-to-day supervision of the project coordinator because the PE contractual modalities only provided for ex-post approval by the EU of activity reports and accounts. As a result, the EU could only act after it became clear that project management was inadequate – which it did in 2011 when it froze the PE II and initiated an audit to identify ineligible expenses and ultimately seek their return.

In this context, it is clear that the IGAD component of the project suffered from a lack of integration with IGAD’s overall plans and strategies and from a lack of accountability on the part of the project coordinator:

- Lack of integration with IGAD’s plans and strategies, because programming decisions were taken outside the normal IGAD management processes, and because decisions whether to fund proposed activities were taken primarily by the project coordinator, not IGAD’s management.
- Lack of accountability, because the project coordinator was not subjected to close supervision. Neither IGAD’s senior management, nor the SC, nor the EU were in a position to supervise the activities and decisions of the project coordinator.

With regards to M&E, the project as a whole lacked systematic monitoring and evaluation processes. Recommendations from external monitoring mechanisms (2009 and 2010) concerning the EAC and COMESA components were largely taken on board but the project management did not carry out any internal monitoring. The IGAD component did not have any effective M&E mechanism, largely because of lack of proactive management on the part of the project coordinator.
The SC was kept informed from time to time by the project coordinator about the establishment of M&E processes in the IGAD component. The establishment of and M&E procedure was necessary because M&E processes were expected to be the source of objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) on the achievement of expected results, as set out in the project logframe. A study was mandated in 2009 by the project to set out the modalities of such an M&E system. However, the recommendations of the study were not implemented: as a result, the SC could only recommend in December 2010 that the M&E procedure be implemented – but this was not done. A Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) report was commissioned by the EU in 2012, focusing on the IGAD component: that report highlighted the low level of project effectiveness and did not refer to any M&E system being implemented since 2010.

Regarding the EAC component, the mission by a consultant (2009) and the 2010 mid-term review (MTR) led to some changes in the programme. The component was also monitored by the EUD in Dar Es Salaam in 2011. However, neither the EAC secretariat or RECSA carried out any formal monitoring of project activities or impact and the documentation of the learning process has been weak. The EUD supported the move to bring RECSA into the project (Addendum to TOR), which had been proposed by the EAC representative on the project steering committee. This was a good move as RECSA brought much needed technical skill to the project, which advanced marking of state owned stockpile during the second part of the project.

The COMESA component benefited from the pre-existing COMESA M&E mechanism. Feedback from COMESA in the Final Narrative Financial report (May 2013) indicated that the programme had been managed according to COMESA procedures, including the submission of annual work plans, quarterly activity reports and budgets.

In conclusion, the project as a whole lacked efficiency, although the EAC and COMESA components were much more efficient than the IGAD component. The reason for the discrepancy in performance in this respect was that the CPMR project coordinator, who was also managing the IGAD component, was unaccountable and acted in isolation from IGAD’s standard management and supervision structures. By contrast, the EAC and COMESA components were implemented in accordance with these RECs’ ordinary management mechanisms, thus ensuring adequate levels of accountability.

Beyond the individual responsibility of the project coordinator, it is essential to highlight the fact that the lack of accountability of the project coordinator was systemic: a more pro-active coordinator could certainly have ensured that the project performed much better, but the lack of real-time, day-to-day management oversight of the coordinator was a major reason for the poor effectiveness and general performance of the IGAD component. As a consequence, the coordination among the three RECs also suffered, thus hampering the overall performance of the project, irrespective of the work done at EAC and COMESA level.

This points to two criteria that any future project must meet to avoid the problems highlighted above:

- Project implementation must be integrated into the RECs’ work plans and strategies, and not be decided upon by “parallel processes”;
Project proposals need to be based on sufficient technical input about the subject area, to avoid designing unrealistic objectives;

Project managers must be under day-to-day supervision by senior managers with authority to refuse activities or expenditures not consistent with project activities. This supervision must come in addition to the reporting obligation to the EU, a Steering Committee or board, etc.

**Impact**

It was possible to identify some elements of impact of the CPMR project. However the impact of the project was weaker than could have been anticipated in view of the resources devoted to it, despite some positive changes – which (as is common in conflict prevention projects) cannot all be attributed solely to the project. The project did, however, help foster some institutional changes among the RECs, including with regards to relationships with civil society.

The IGAD component had some impact in the sense that it contributed to the development of strategies for CEWARN and ISSP, and therefore contributed to IGAD’s capacity to implement its broader peace and security strategy. Research projects conducted in the early period of the project, and the support to the design of ISSP’s strategic plan, helped IGAD address conflict situations in the Karamoja Cluster and in relation to piracy off the coast of Somalia. Indirectly, it might be argued that the project also helped reinforce the capacity of CEWARN to analyse the situation in Somalia. The project’s support to the establishment of a mediation unit within IGAD may also in future help IGAD achieve a greater impact on conflicts in the region.

All three components of the project have helped enhance the involvement of regional civil society organisations in CPMR activities. There are many examples of this:

- IGAD now frequently (though not systematically) invites civil society representatives to planning meetings; CEWARN’s methodology is built around work with a range of stakeholders that includes local, national and regional civil society; the mediation unit established with support from CPMR also considers contacts with civil society to be part of its core methodology, as does the IGAD gender unit.

- As reviewed below, civil society representation was also central to the EAC and COMESA components, and this approach is likely to be further developed in the future. RECSA, for example, systematically involves civil society representatives in its activities or refers to civil society activities, for example when training civil servants. Similarly, COMESA’s work on war economy addressed a range of private sector representatives (chambers of commerce, professional associations, etc.): while many of these stakeholders had previous exposure to COMESA, the discussion of war economies with them was to some extent an innovation.

One important caveat remains, however, with regards to the selection of civil society organisations involved in CPMR-related activities. RECs often rely on Member States to draw up the list of NGOs invited to take part in activities - these are often umbrella groups that do not necessarily have strong expertise in CPMR issues.
There is some evidence that the three RECs have enhanced their capacity for conflict resolution during the project period, thus moving towards the fulfilment of the project’s objective.

The question of whether there was more or less conflict and progress towards peaceful conflict resolution is difficult methodologically. It is extremely difficult to measure the number of conflicts, or the extent of escalation accurately and any chosen method has inherent weaknesses. It is even harder to measure the prevention of conflict. If something did not happen, there is no evidence of it having happened. How to measure something that did not happen is very complicated and will always produce controversial results. It goes beyond the possibility of this evaluation to carry-out a complex conflict assessment to determine to what extent conflicts or their escalation was prevented in the region. Only the simple method is feasible within the allocated resources of this evaluation.

At the time of the project design, conflicts among pastoralists was one of the main areas justifying the focus on curbing small arms proliferation as a means towards peace and security. Several programmes and measures outside of this project have been undertaken to address the issue. The EAC component did not target the pastoralist areas explicitly, but hoped to help reduce firearms availability through the general tightening of rules related to arms trading. The available data from IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) on the Karamoja Cluster suggests that these attacks have become less lethal, which can be taken as an indicator of reduced firearm availability. While the total number of incidents somewhat rose during the project period the total number of reported deaths has slightly fallen. The result has been a reduction in the average number of deaths per incident from 1.8 over the first for years to 0.8 over the last four years. The reduction in lethality in pastoralist conflicts can be an indicator of reduced firearms use as guns require less effort to kill than traditional weapons.

The available information suggests that the EAC is currently on a broadly positive way forward. There was a clear downward trend in conflict related issues within EAC countries from the start of the project to mid-term (2009) and towards the end (2011). While conflicts continue to emerge, such as the violence surrounding the Kenyan elections, Somalia driven terrorism and deteriorating political consensus in Burundi, the overall direction appears encouraging thanks to the number of initiatives that are taken to reduce tensions. This is underlined by the fact that deteriorating contexts have not escalated into larger conflicts since 2007. It also should be noted that the 2013 elections in Kenya were much less violent than those in 2007, probably as a result of a multiplicity of initiatives taken in the run-up to these elections.

Discussion with COMESA indicated that this project was after the fact rightly considered a diagnostic and preparation phase for a subsequent, longer-term project. The issue of war economies was so vast that the project management and most of the stakeholders needed to start with finding their own bearings on the issue before moving forward. It is clear that stakeholders and participants have been exposed to information through workshops seminars presentation and debates. However, the degree of absorption and the stakeholders’ capacity to be able to use the acquired knowledge in structured ways to deal with conflict resolution are not clear. COMESA Secretariat staff have acquired a much better understanding of war economy issues and are equipped to design better programmes in future. COMESA nevertheless is aware that more formal training is required to deal with conflict resolution and war economy
issues. The development of a database of experts on war economy in COMESA countries is a
direct result of this project. The challenge remains to ensure that this expert network be used to
help in the fight against war economies.

On the trade-related policy side, the project helped COMESA to develop recommendations for
implementation by Member States. These have adopted by the COMESA Policy Organ
Meetings, while parliamentarians have also committed to address war economy issues.
However implementation as yet is lagging. Nevertheless, one of the important impacts of the
COMESA component was the identification of piracy as a war economic issue and the
subsequent adoption of a regional strategy and action plan against piracy. The development of
a draft regional model code for corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are
also significant elements of impact – though it is too early to assess their implementation.

One unintended impact of the project is that SALW control activities made indirect
contributions to the evolving EAC peace and security structure.

The project design did not take into account specific institutional developments within the
EAC and how they could contribute to the overall CPMR agenda. The project activities,
however, helped the emergence of EAC working structures and thus made important, yet
unplanned for, contributions to the regional capacity to tackle peace and security concerns.
The project used meeting formats of the Sectoral Council for Inter State Security to bring
National Focal Points (NFPs) together for work meetings that centred primarily on
information exchange on implementation of the UNPoA agenda. These meetings were inter
alia utilised to agree on three common positions that allowed for block representation of EAC
views in multilateral small arms processes. The meeting process contributed to the
prominence SALW issues assumed in all EAC documents on peace and security. In a
number of areas, information exchange between NFPs has served as a testing mechanism
for other areas of information exchange thus making an important learning process to the
development of institutional structures of the EAC of how to implement policies covering
identified principles in parallel. Being provided with the resources to call these meetings
provided dynamic individuals within the institution with a vehicle to further both SALW and
institutional aims.

Sustainability

In general terms, the relevance of the CPMR issue to Africa in the foreseeable future
helps ensure that the advances made by the project will be built upon by the RECs,
thus ensuring a degree of sustainability. In particular, some strategic steps supported
or encouraged by the project (IGAD/ISSP strategy; coordination between EAC and
RECSA and emphasis on the UNPoA on SALW; research and acquired knowledge on
war economies) are likely to continue to be used in the future. Nevertheless, the
project could have achieved a higher degree of sustainability if the foreseen
coordination among the three RECs had been appropriately implemented by the
project coordinator.

There are some elements of sustainability in the IGAD component in the sense that the
project helped support strategic thinking within IGAD, and that planned developed with
CPMR inputs are still being implemented. However, IGAD continues to need donor funding
for its further development, thus weakening the sustainability of the strategic results achieved. The results achieved in relation to

In relation to the **EAC component**: because the SALW agenda continues to be a highly relevant topic likely to stay high on the global and regional priorities due to the on-going UN process, the prospects for sustainability are relatively good. However it remains to be seen whether the project output – a framework defining “illicit” weapons – will be used for transformative changes in law enforcement practices. This will depend, inter alia, on the political will within national governments. Development partners can further contribute to sustainability of future programmes by deepening their analysis of the political context in which the RECs are operating, with a view to identifying potential entry points for policy and practice changes.

Sustainability at **COMESA component** level is weak, in the sense that, although beneficiaries realise the importance of continuity of the actions undertaken under the project, no provision seems to have been made for follow up actions. Lack of funds is certainly one of the main reasons for this situation. The issue of “ownership” at CSO level should also be raised, because the network of CSOs dealing with war economies is not fully operational and is dependent on COMESA for funding is key enable to operate using other alternatives even at the end of a programme.

**Coherence, visibility, coordination and complementarity**

Generally, the CPMR project did not raise concerns related to these EU evaluation criteria.

- **With regards to the mutual reinforcement of the various EU actions (coherence)** the project was satisfactory in the sense that it was fully in line with EU stated policies and strategic outlook. Its key limitation in this respect was the multiplicity of actors involved in CPMR activities in the vast region covered by the three RECs, including the very complex maritime domain off the coast of East Africa.
- **Coordination** (with other development partners) and **complementarity** (with actions by EU Member States) did not pause particular problems here in general, because the project design included an adequate mapping of other actors’ policies and plans. However, complementarity could have been improved during the implementation of the programme on some issues related to institutional capacity development of some RECs. For example, IGAD received support from Denmark in 2011 to develop its project management capacity, including capacity development on M&E. This support could have benefited the CPMR project (though it came too late to remedy the project’s weaknesses, highlighted above).
- **Visibility** did not give rise to concerns, as all three RECs duly acknowledged EU support received through CPMR and maintained regular liaison with EUDs.

**Conclusions**

The following general conclusions stem from the evaluation:
The project was highly relevant, in the sense that conflict prevention in all its forms, including mediation, management and resolution, and SALW control is key to the development of Africa.

The project correctly identified needs and RECs that could address them, hence further ensuring its relevance.

While project design was generally correct, the project underestimated the complexity of appropriate responses, specific institutional mandates and necessary research and analysis, and the political and social obstacles to the implementation of recommendations.

The project's achieved some of its expected results, though the various components' performance differed. The key reason for the weak effectiveness of the IGAD component was related to inadequate management by the project coordinator.

The project was significantly hampered by the lack of management supervision of its coordinator, which had adverse consequences in particular on the implementation of the IGAD component and on the level of coordination among the three RECs.

The supervisory mechanisms implemented in the project did not amount to effective M&E; the SC procedure was not sufficient to ensure effective and timely coordination among the RECs.

The project achieved some impact, in particular as a result of research and strategic planning advice, and through dialogue with some sectors of civil society. However the project's impact could have been enhanced with more effective implementation of planned activities and monitoring of intended impacts.

The project helped develop analyses and mechanisms within the RECs that should remain in use beyond the project period, thus achieving a degree of sustainability. Nevertheless, the project should be seen as the start of a longer-term set of programmes, because the development of CPMR capability calls for gradual, wide-ranging research and attitude change.

**Recommendations**

**The EU should support a further CPMR programme**, taking into account the lessons learned from this evaluation and building on the acquired experience. The programme design should ensure that activities are explicitly integrated with the RECs' work plans and strategies, and are fully compatible with their mandates.

**The design of the future programme should take into account the complexity of the CPMR issues and technical responses required, and take an appropriately incremental approach.** In particular, the programme should anticipate delays related to approval of policies by RECs' governing bodies, for example by including a wide range of activities that do not require such approval. **It should further ensure appropriate investment in planning that identifies the right areas where RECs can bring a value added to the specific topic.**
- **Any future programme should have appropriate provisions to ensure effectiveness.** These might include the establishment of a Steering Committee and systematic monitoring of activities, outputs and impacts. If this is the case, the SC should be supported by its own independent secretariat, with authority to obtain information on project progress from all relevant stakeholders, independently of the project’s managers.

- **Any future programme should widen the involvement of NGOs and ensure that NGOs participating in activities possess the requisite CPMR expertise and meet standards of independence.** In particular, the future programme should devolve to RECs’ experts the authority to select the NGOs involved in activities.

- **All RECs involved in the programme should benefit from capacity building in the field of project management.** This should include support on M&E, activity and financial reporting, and on coordination among different programme strands. RECs should be encourage to locate M&E and other programme management units under the direct senior management authority.

The management modalities of any future CPMR programme should ensure full, timely accountability of the project manager. Particular care should be taken to ensure that management supervision be specified in any funding contract. Similarly, a M&E process should be contractually mandated.
2 INTRODUCTION

The European Commission (EC) has commissioned a team of three consultants managed by IBF International Consulting to carry out the final evaluation of the project entitled “Conflict prevention, management and resolution in Eastern and Southern Africa region” (CPMR). The CPMR project was implemented from October 2007 to December 2012, as part of a broader set of activities funded under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) and based on a set of strategy and planning papers. The CPMR project had a budget of just over €10m, almost entirely funded by the EU. In essence, the programme’s purpose was to enhance the capacity of three of Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) to help prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict. The three RECs were:

- The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD);
- The East Africa Community (EAC); and
- The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The objectives of the CPMR programme, as summarized by the evaluation terms of reference (TOR), were:

- “To contribute to the prevention of the outbreak and escalation of violent conflicts with regional dimensions” in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) region; and
- “To mitigate the effects thereof in the ESA region so as to contribute to an enabling environment for economic development and poverty reduction”.

To achieve its purpose and objectives, the programme was structured into three components, each centred around one of the three target RECs:

- IGAD component: strengthening the capacity of the IGAD Secretariat and its Member States to implement CPMR;
- EAC component: strengthening the capacity of EAC Member States to fight arms trafficking and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW);
- COMESA component: strengthening the capacity of the region to address “war economies”.

IGAD was responsible for overall project coordination, which it implemented with a project manager and technical assistance supplied through a consortium led by the consultancy firm Transtec. The EAC and COMESA components were managed by the respective RECs in coordination with IGAD. The EU Delegations (EUDs) in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania) and Lusaka (Zambia) were respectively in charge of monitoring the IGAD, EAC and COMESA components of the programme, with the EUD in Addis being also in charge of coordinating the three EUDs’ monitoring. Since 2011, the monitoring tasks of the Addis EUD have been taken over by the Djibouti EUD. A Project Steering Committee made up of representatives of the three RECs and of relevant EUD staff, with the project manager acting as secretary, was designed to maintain general oversight of the project’s implementation.

Background of the evaluation

1 The switch of monitoring responsibility from Addis Ababa to Djibouti followed the establishment of the EU representation in Djibouti as a fully-fledged EU Delegation.
The CPMR project was developed on the basis of a number of EU strategy documents and inputs by the three RECs concerned. The 2005 joint EU development policy reinforced the availability of EDF support to “a strengthened role for the regional and sub-regional organisations in the process of enhancing international peace and security, including (...) conflict prevention”. The 2005 EU Africa Strategy similarly stressed the need for strengthening regional CPMR capacity. In addition, the RECs themselves had developed strategic documents that included a CPMR dimension. IGAD, for example, had developed in 2003 a Strategy and Implementation Plan for 2004-2008, which included a focus, inter alia, on “enhanced capacity for peace building”. The IGAD component of the CPMR project was developed in line with this strategy.

The 2003 IGAD strategy document helped enshrined IGAD’s mission in relation to conflict prevention, which originally grew from the pre-1996 IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development) mandate focusing on food security, drought response and development cooperation. It was as a result of the 1996 refocusing of IGAD’s mandate that peace and security (understood in the IGAD mission statement as including “intra-state” as well as “inter-state” conflict) had been included in the organisation's scope.

The IGAD component of the CPMR project targeted mostly the organisation’s Peace and Security Division (PSD), one of three IGAD divisions alongside those for Agriculture and Environment and for Economic Cooperation and Social Development. The divisions are supervised by IGAD’s Executive Secretary, who reports to the IGAD Council of Ministers, represented by the Committee of Ambassadors.

By focusing on trafficking in small arms, the EAC component of the project addressed a specific contributing factor to the outbreak and escalation of conflicts on the African continent. In policy responses SALW measures sit between CPMR, law enforcement measures and post-conflict response. At the time of the project design the EAC had no specific peace and security mandate but described the absence of conflict as a prerequisite for economic development. A protocol on peace and security was developed during the years of project implementation, which also contained a dedicated article on action on small arms (Art. 11) and a separate one on CPMR (Art. 4). Throughout the time of project implementation the EAC based its specific activities on the commitments under the UN Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Nairobi Protocol on SALW.

Small arms control measures within the EAC region are part of the global implementation of the 2001 adopted United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA). At present, this document provides the framework for activities to counter the illicit trade in such arms. The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa sets out the East African agenda for UNPoA implementation. It calls for specific national legislative measures, strengthening of operational SALW management capacities by states and adequate procedures to control.

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2 UN Document A/CONF.192/15. Since its adoption the document has been expanded with a series of additional protocols such as International Tracing Instrument (ITI) December 2005, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Brokering, the outcome documents of the Third and Fourth Biannual Meetings of States (BMS3 and BMS4), and the Chair's Summary of the Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) in 2011 and in 2013 the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

3 It was adopted by eleven countries of the East African region in Nairobi, Kenya on 21 April 2004 and entered into force as a legally binding document on 5 May 2006. Somalia joined as a 12th signatory state in 2005.
both state-owned small arms and light weapons and firearms in civilian possession. Signatory states agree to general cooperation, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transparency, information exchange and harmonization.

The CPMR SALW component was implemented jointly by the EAC Secretariat, working with representatives from the EAC Partner States, and the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA). The EAC approaches the issue from a regional integration angle as part of its emerging peace and security policy and with links to the development of a common market where trafficking of arms is an element requiring regulation within the free movement of goods. RECSA, the regional body specialized in SALW control measures, provides important technical know-how for practical action. It was brought into the project in 2010 requiring an addendum to the original contract. As RECSA membership goes beyond the EAC Partner States, RECSA involvement leads to a scaling up of key measures to neighbouring states, an approach that can be seen as essential for tackling a cross-border concern of trafficking. However, arms control in general, and management of state owned stocks in particular, are clearly a policy area for national governments. Thus, the technical measures required to address the root problem depend on the willingness and ability by national governments to implement arms management reform. These key stakeholders, however, are not direct beneficiaries of the EU - CPRM support and are reached only through the coordinating and awareness raising activities of the regional bodies, who are the core recipients of this project.

The international SALW control agenda has advanced since the start of the project, with implications for future action in the area. The adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) last year (2 April 2013) has created a landmark regulatory framework that the states of the region will have to implement over the coming years. The ATT is an important objective of the external policies of the European Union and Members States repeated publicly pledged to support partner states in the implementation of the objectives.

The COMESA component of the programme focused on “war economies” – that is, in essence, the analysis and action related to the economic aspects of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. As in the case of IGAD, the inclusion of peace and security matters in COMESA’s mandate has been relatively recent, dating back to a 1999 COMESA summit meeting. Importantly, COMESA’s mandate on peace and security was explicitly designed to be consistent with APSA, including in terms of early warning of conflict under processes supported across Africa by the African Union (AU).

One specificity of COMESA compared with the other two RECs involved in the project was that, as an economic development and trade facilitation institution, it arguably had the closest on-going relationships with a wide range of civil society groups including business

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4 An extra dimension might reinforce the strategic link if the EAC-SADC-COMESA Tripartite leads to harmonization of the economic integration processes.

5 As of 8 April 2014, a total of 118 states have signed the treaty and 31 have already ratified. The treaty will enter into force once 50 states have ratified it.

6 A group of EU member states jointly deposited their signatures of the treaty on the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty in New York because as stated in a Press release from the French Foreign Ministry ‘We strongly advocate universal adherence to and full implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. We stand ready to assist others in setting up or improving their respective transfer control systems, for example through the dedicated EU-ATT Outreach.’ http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy-1/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/events-2129/article/deposit-of-instruments-of. For more on the EC statements on the ATT and support for third countries: http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm
associations and chambers of commerce at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. It also maintained links with parliamentarians in its Member States, and with financial institutions – national central banks as well as the African Development Bank (AfDB).

Methodology
The CPMR project was clearly wide-ranging and fairly complex, with three components of a different nature managed by three different institutions. The three components had different objectives and methods, yet they were designed in response to the 9th EDF focal areas, which provided them with a degree of unity of purpose. The evaluation, while mindful of the key differences between the three components, sought to identify common patterns across the three components, so as to draw common lessons to the extent possible.

Each component operated in a different range of countries, despite some overlaps. Each component had to adapt to specific political, social and economic challenges as well as global or regional agendas as in the case of the SALW programme. Conflict and post-conflict situations, broader peace building challenges and capacities for regional cooperation or integration, were also widely different in each sub-region covered by the programme, and also varied over time within the sub-regions.

The evaluators followed the questions set out in Annex II of the evaluation TOR, adapting them to the specific context of each component. The evaluation addressed three activity and policy levels:

4. Component level: the evaluation covered the activities under each of the components.

5. Project level: assessment at that general level identified common patterns across the three components.

6. Future action: the first two elements of the evaluation provided an evidence base to recommend future approaches for project management and monitoring.

The evaluation focused on the following internationally recognised criteria, in addition to coherence and visibility:

- **Relevance** (adequateness of problem identification and project design). A key point was to assess the extent to which differences in country situations, regional priorities and REC capacity, were explicitly taken into account.

- **Effectiveness** (extent to which activities and expected results were achieved). It was important to assess implementers’ focus on the delivery of results, not just activities, and their ability to learn from experience and feed this learning back into project implementation.

- **Efficiency** (adequateness of resources used to results achieved; quality of project management). That aspect of the evaluation took into account the programme’s original plans, but also considered the extent to which risk factors were identified and mitigated.

- **Impact** (change achieved by the project beyond the planned results). The evaluators sought to identify whether mechanisms or processes were developed by the programme implementers and other stakeholders as a result of the project and were having an effect beyond the programme period.
• **Sustainability** (capacity of ensuring that project results endure beyond the project’s end). The evaluators considered steps taken to build the capacity of the implementing organization and their partners, as well as procedures or mechanism initiated or designed to address programme issues, which might last beyond the programme period. They also considered any “exit strategy” that might have been developed and any linkages, cooperation or coordination arrangements planned or put in place in areas relevant to the programme.

In addition to the documents listed in the TOR, the evaluators have received extensive information from the EUDs and the RECs. These covered the design of each component, activities and products resulting from the EU’s support, as well as some information on the management and reporting systems used by the RECs and the technical assistance organisation. In addition, the team has been provided with a range of publications, online materials and other relevant information concerning projects under each component.

The evaluation was based on the analysis of this documentation and other materials provided by the RECs and the EUDs concerned, and on information gathered through semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders. These included REC representatives and staff members, consultants employed on project activities, beneficiaries of programme activities, representatives of relevant civil society organizations, government and EU officials. The CPMR project manager and technical assistance consultancy company were also interviewed. A list of people met is annexed to this report.

**Future programming**
The evaluation is taking place in the context of planning by the EU and the CPMR stakeholders for a successor programme. To support this process, the evaluation will identified elements that should be taken into account in the implementation of the new programme. This include matters of substance and strategy – issues to be addressed by each REC involved in the future programmes – as well as lessons learned from the past CPMR programme in relation to programme management and monitoring processes. The preliminary results of the evaluation were shared in May 2014 with the team of consultants commissioned to support the planning process for a CPMR successor programme starting in 2015.

**Constraints and limitations**
The evaluation did not pose any particular methodological problem, but the evaluators faced three practical challenges:

- Many of the individuals involved with the initial design and early implementation of the project had moved on by the time the evaluation took place. This is an unavoidable pitfall for any project spread out over several years. The evaluators were, however, able to form a reasonable picture of the project’s early years through various activity and other reports. The mid-term review conducted by independent consultants in 2010 was also relevant in this respect.

- The project involved stakeholders in more than a dozen countries, which required the evaluators to prioritise some countries for visits. This was done by focusing primarily, though not exclusively, on countries in the Horn of Africa and East Africa more generally. Meetings held in Nairobi and Addis Ababa were also opportunities to meet stakeholders from other countries.
• The project did not collect any objectively verifiable indicators on its activities or impact.

Despite the above constraints, the evaluators were able to form a well rounded view of the project. There was a sufficient evidence base, outlined in the body of this report, to draw out general patterns and lessons learned that underpin the conclusions and recommendations.

Programme implementation context
The CPMR project was implemented in the context of a broader set of peace and security initiatives, broadly falling under the overall umbrella of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA, pursuant to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, has at its apex the African Union Peace and Security Council. One of the APSA’s key elements is the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), based on the regional early warning structures established by RECs across Africa, including IGAD. The EU has been supporting the operationalisation of APSA, including through the EU African Peace Facility Capacity Building component.

The CPMR project was therefore part of the broader efforts of the international community – with the EU being one major contributor – to support regional conflict prevention capacity in a way coherent with the broader APSA vision of Africans ensuring peace and security across Africa. IGAD has been operating in a highly conflict-affected region, with security threats affecting both its Member States and surrounding countries – not to mention international trade and security challenges related to the situation in Somalia for example. Similarly, the work of ECA on SALW also affected conflict situations in other countries, and the “war economies” component potentially had implications beyond COMESA Member States, including at civil society and private sector organisations’ levels.
3 FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION

In this chapter, the evaluators present their findings in relation to the evaluation criteria set out in the TOR. The narrative takes into account the evaluation questions that are set out in the TOR (Annex II), from the perspective of each of the three components of the CPMR project. The key findings are summarised in bold type. To avoid repetitions and redundant text, the findings should be understood as applying to the entire project when no specific component (IGAD, EAC or COMESA) is indicated.

3.1 Response to problems and needs (relevance)

The project was designed at a time when the peace and security structures in Africa were undergoing significant change – a process that has yet to be completed. The three RECs were themselves faced with the challenge of implementing peace and security mandates that were partly new to their institutional development or evolved during the project period. Capacities were often low, thus justifying the CPMR capacity building approach.

The RECs have – or have acquired during the project period – genuine expertise in the areas covered by the CPMR project. However they generally suffered from low staffing numbers, which mean that a small number of experts (sometimes one single person) is in charge of implementing a broad agenda of research and analysis, sometimes coming on top of other obligations such as attendance at international meetings. Expertise was therefore thinly spread.

The objectives of the three components of CPMR remained unchanged throughout the programme period. However, specific activities foreseen in the logframe were modified considerably between the original design and the revised log-frame developed during the monitoring and evaluation exercise conducted in 2009. In relation to the IGAD component, activities were modified further, particularly during the Programme Estimate 2 (PE2) period (2011-2012), to take account of delays in implementing activities. However the logframe was not revised to reflect the successive changes in work plans. In relation to the EAC component, the original logframe prescribed rather general activities of “establishing cooperation mechanism for police and security agencies to investigate and prosecute illicit arms dealers and to monitor the movement of SALW with GIS”. The revised log-frame, by contrast, listed as the activities a nearly exhaustive list of all the measures called for in the UNPoA and regional SALW documents. However, the log-frame does not appear to have been updated to reflect the important change of bringing the technical centre RECSA into the project. There also does not appear to be a comprehensive document that provides the list of actual activities compared against the long list of proposed activities included in the 2009 log-frame.

The logframe lists a number of general impact indicators on conflict reduction, which were not collected, partly because the CPMR project did not have a dedicated monitoring and evaluation unit or component tasked with the gathering of conflict indicators. The second
(post 2009) log-frame included a long list of activities suggested as indicators on implementation, the implementation of which was not systematically recorded by the project, due in large part to the weakness of project coordination – this point is reviewed below, in the section on efficiency.

**The project was highly relevant to regional needs as well as to global EU foreign policy objectives.**

The IGAD component correctly identified the need to reinforce the organisation’s capacity to address conflict. That need had been identified by IGAD itself in its 2004-2008 strategy, and was clearly consistent with the broader African Union strategy on the operationalization of APSA. The project was also coherent with the stated EU policies consisting in supporting African peace and security processes, as set out in a number of EU policy and position papers.

The project correctly identified the various areas of IGAD’s work where support was appropriate, including in relation to conflict early warning and early response (CEWARN Unit), conflict mitigation, gender and conflict, as well as security sector programming. The need for flexibility and responsiveness to short-term capacity building needs was also correctly anticipated in the project design. The project was clearly designed to address, among others, the long-standing conflict in Somalia – where highly complex conflict dynamics involved a wide range of domestic and international actors, and had far-ranging implications at the regional level and beyond.

By focusing on trafficking in small arms, the EAC component area addressed a specific contributing factor to the outbreak and escalation of conflicts on the African continent. Widespread misuse of firearms followed the proliferation of these easy to use weapons after the Cold War power blocks rid themselves of surplus military stocks. This set development back for decades in many parts of the world. Within the EAC region, pastoralists armed themselves at the Kenya-Uganda border and engaged in increasingly bloody raids on each other’s livestock; the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) terrorised civilians in Northern Uganda; and bloody conflicts tore Rwanda and Burundi apart sending armed refugees from Burundi and the DRC flooding into Tanzania. More recently, it has been acknowledged that poor security sector management practices have contributed to the illicit proliferation of small arms in the region. Varying levels of corruption in certain parts of the public sector are believed to have played their part. Over the past years, political violence surrounding elections in Kenya, spill-over terrorist activity from Somalia, and a deteriorating political consensus within Burundi keep issues of armed violence high on the East African security agenda.

Addressing the issue of illicit small arms proliferation was also a key global UN priority and a stated EU foreign policy objective. The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA, 2001)\(^7\) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI 2005)\(^8\) as well as the more

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\(^7\) UN Document A/CONF.192/15. Since its adoption the document has been expanded with a series of additional protocols such as International Tracing Instrument (ITI) December 2005, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Brokering, the outcome documents of the Third and Fourth Biannual Meetings of States (BMS3 and BMS4), and the Chair’s Summary of the Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) in 2011 and in 2013 the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

\(^8\) International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Firearms/ITI.pdf)
recent Arms Trade Treaty (ATT, 2013 adopted not yet in force) set out measures for implementation.910 The EU has supported these initiatives as a block within the UN.

The East Africa region has been a vocal supporter of the UnPoA agenda. The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004) 11 defined the regional priorities for PoA implementation, which in a number of areas, notably civilian firearm possession, goes beyond the common UN objectives. Signatory states agreed to general cooperation, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transparency, information exchange and harmonization, all central elements of this project. The East African Community (EAC)12 and African Union (AU) made common statements in favour of the ATT13 and several civil society organisations in East Africa have been key players in the global campaign to elaborate the restrictions, included in the ATT to govern the transfer and management of SALW.

The approach was also in line with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AU’s Strategy on Small Arms (2013) specifically acknowledged that important role of the RECs in its strategy (Point 2.0).14

With regards to the COMESA component: the element of peace and security was embedded in Art.163 of the COMESA treaty, which states that regional peace and security are pre-requisites to social and economic development and key to the achievement of the regional economic integration objectives of the Common Market. Member States therefore agreed to work towards preventing, better managing and resolving inter-State or intra-State conflicts.

The issues of conflict prevention within COMESA member states began as far back as 1999, in response to the impact of regional conflicts on the regional integration process. As a consequence the 4th Summit of the COMESA Authority in 1999 decided to set up structures within the COMESA Secretariat to deal with issues of peace and security. COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs were mandated to meet annually to discuss modalities for addressing peace and security. Their role was also to monitor and advise the Authority on the promotion of peace, security and stability and to work within the framework of the African Union, hence also contributing to the APSA. The use of a collaborative approach was encouraged by involving and working closely with a wide range of stakeholders including civil society, business community and parliamentarians.

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9 As of 8 April 2014, a total of 118 states have signed the treaty and 31 have already ratified. The treaty will enter into force once 50 states have ratified it.
10 A group of EU member states jointly deposited their signatures of the treaty on the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty in New York because as stated in a Press release from the French Foreign Ministry: “We strongly advocate universal adherence to and full implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. We stand ready to assist others in setting up or improving their respective transfer control systems, for example through the dedicated EU-ATT Outreach.” http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy-1/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/events-2129/article/deposit-of-instruments-of.
11 It was adopted by eleven countries of the East African region in Nairobi, Kenya on 21 April 2004 and entered into force as a legally binding document on 5 May 2006. Somalia joined as a 12th signatory state in 2005.
13 http://www.cacda.org.cn/a/ATT/
COMESA responded by setting up structures for the engagement of non-state actors including the formation of a network of civil society and private sector organizations through a process of accreditation to the COMESA programme on peace and security. In 2006, the COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs also established a Committee of Elders drawn from the COMESA Region for preventive peace-building assignments. The role of this committee was to carry out fact-finding missions, shuttle diplomacy efforts and leading election observer missions to member states. The idea was to make elders engage in preventive Diplomacy through their good offices and target all stages of the conflict life cycle.

During the same meeting it was decided that the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security should develop niche areas on economic dimensions of conflicts and thus directed the Programme to develop its strength on such thematic issues as war economies.

In 2006 COMESA decided to involve Parliamentarians in the process by establishing an Inter-Parliamentarian Forum for COMESA. The Forum’s main roles were to provide an interaction platform for COMESA Parliamentarians with governments and serve as an early warning mechanism in the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security, ensure implementation of international instruments and peace agreements, provide linkages with existing structures at national assemblies and with other regional initiatives, and carry out Research and advocacy on issues of peace and security. The COMESA programme on Peace and Security included components on conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and on post-conflict reconstruction and development.

In this context, the CPMR project was building on a body of activities and strategies that demonstrated the commitment of the three RECs to address CPMR issues. In that sense, the project also addressed a clear demand for support on the part of the RECs in the operationalization of their chosen strategies.

**The programme was highly relevant to the priorities and on-going activities of the RECs concerned.**

The IGAD component was fully consistent with IGAD’s strategic outlook, expressed in its 2004-2008 strategy document, to build the capacity of its Peace and Security Department in the context of the continent-wide operationalisation of APSA. The existing teams of experts on conflict early warning and early response (CEWARN), mediation, security sector and gender, each were given a strong priority in the design of the project, in keeping with that strategy.

The EAC component of the programme was jointly implemented by the Secretariat for the East African Community (EAC) and the Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA). The EAC secretariat has had a policy on SALW since 2006 as part of its peace and security agenda, defining it as a "pre-requisite for social and economic development" (EAC Treaty, Art. 124). During the years of project implementation, the EAC’s intention to work on SALW has been strengthened through the creation of dedicated peace and security mechanisms. As the executive organ, the EAC Secretariat is tasked with *inter alia* the co-ordination and harmonization of the policies and strategies related to the development of the Community, and with the mobilisation of donor funds for the implementation of Community projects. This project thus fitted perfectly within these priorities.
The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) based in Nairobi, is the regional institutional framework coordinating the efforts of the National Focal Points (NFPs) within the signatory region of the Nairobi Protocol. RECSA carries out training and documents developments. RECSA’s contributed important technical expertise, in particular related to the marking process. RECSA is the leading SALW centre in the region and the project was thus highly relevant to its mandate. However, RECSA was not part of the original project design and was brought in through a subcontract and a special log-frame in 2009. RECSA also used the project to fund areas that have difficulties attracting other funding (such as weapons destruction in Eritrea). RECSA therefore believes that the availability of funds through this project was highly relevant to its mandate as it help the organisation to support countries struggling to find the resources for implementation.

With regards to the COMESA component, there were a number of policies and processes in place that were relevant to the project and whose work could be reinforced by the project. The implication of COMESA in regional peace and security with programmes targeting specific aspects of conflict indicated that the war economy component of the CPMR project complemented existing actions and was relevant to the context of reducing conflicts in the region. The objectives and activities of the CPMR component were in line with other COMESA activities, including:

- **COMWARN**, an early warning system developed in 2000 with the objective of consolidating COMESA economic integration programme. COMWARN sought to address conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy by focussing on structural factors of conflicts. COMESA is developing indicators to be used in structural vulnerability assessment, in close collaboration with civil society actors.
- **Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programmes**. COMESA, EAC and IGAD are jointly developing a programme intended to enhance political integration, good governance and human security, which are seen as cross cutting issues to regional integration and closely support conflict prevention.
- **COMESA’s post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) agenda** ensures that transition from conflict to peace is undertaken in a manner that is coordinated, multidimensional, integrated and that uses conflict sensitive approaches. The process of PCRD, from emergency to recovery and development is complex and multifaceted and cannot be undertaken without partnerships among the various actors including governments, the civil society, the private sector, the donor community, and the population.
- **Trading for Peace**. This project, supported by DFID and USAID, has the overall objectives of strengthening peace and security through fair and equitable trade has commenced in two phases in the early 2000s and is preparing for a third phase. The first phase of the project was a research phase that investigated trade flows along three main corridors at the Great Lake Region. The second phase, which started in October 2007, proceeded with the implementation of recommendations stemming from research.

**A convincing problem analysis contrasted with a weak project logic.**

The problem analysis clearly and correctly identified contributing factors to violent conflicts in the region. However, the original project design was weakened by some incorrect assumptions, including:
• In relation to the **IGAD** component, the key concern was a somewhat optimistic view of the absorptive capacity of the organisation, and of its ability to move quickly into new areas of conflict mitigation. In particular, the complexity of the CEWARN process, involving a wide range of actors at regional, national and local levels, was not fully captured in the project design, leading to the implicit but unrealistic expectation that rapid results could be achieved in conflict early warning with a relatively small outlay of technical assistance.

Another concern specific to the IGAD component was that the project design assumed the pro-active involvement of a number of stakeholders, without providing them with the means to provide constructive engagement and to follow up decisions. For example, the programme called for the IGAD Peace and Security Technical Committee (PSTC) to support the implementation of the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy. However, the PSTC was not actually operational, and there were insufficient provisions in the CPMR project to support it beyond occasional meetings.

• With regards to the **EAC component**, the assumption, quite commonly held at the time the project was conceived, was that a reduction in illicit small arms would solve peace and security issues. While there is no question that proliferation of small arms tends to aggravate violence and lethality of a conflict often leading to escalation, the absence of tools that make killing easier does not solve the underlying conflict issues. As studies in recent years have shown, SALW measures can reduce lethality when violence erupts and thereby make an important deescalating contribution to a cycle of violence without necessarily ending it.

Secondly, the project design was not based on a technical problem analysis and therefore tasked a REC with law enforcement measures to address ‘illicit transfers’. This was problematic for two reasons. Addressing ‘illicit transfers’ was in fact one step too advanced for a region without a common legally binding framework defining ‘illicit’ and ‘licit’ ownership and use of weapons, which is prerequisite to law enforcement measures. Moreover, the problem analysis had not sufficiently considered institutional mandates and made the mistake of tasking the Secretariat of the EAC with activities that remain the responsibility of national governments. However, these flaws in the project design were largely overcome in 2009 through the monitoring process that identified priorities from the UNPoA as key project activities. The project abandoned its original objectives of implementing common law enforcement measures to address illicit transfers and concentrated instead on creating the framework necessary for such structures based on the objectives identified by the UN process.

• The key concern related to the **COMESA component** was the project’s ability to capture the complexity of the economics of war across a wide and extremely diverse region, without focusing on specific areas. As a result, studies and seminars tended to be overly scattered in thematic terms, hampering their relevance to individual post-conflict situations and reconstruction strategies.

**The EAC component suffered from a degree of mismatch between the activities proposed by the original project design and mandates of the stakeholders closely involved in the project.**
The project design proposed that “illicit” SALW flows should be address through increased law enforcement co-operation and monitoring of illicit weapons in the area. This was an unrealistic objective in a region that in 2006 was without a framework that defined “licit” and “illicit” weapons stocks. Effective law enforcement requires legally binding clarification of ownership and management responsibilities. Without such defined parameters for permissible and illicit behaviour, it is not possible to take measures against ‘illicit’ transfers. This essential prerequisite to project implementation had been overlooked by the project designers in 2005.

**The project design included no gender analysis.**

While project design made the mistake of not matching the planned activities and intended objectives with the mandate of the stakeholders, it also failed to identify the specific value added a project implemented by a regional organisation can bring to a project. RECs are able to fulfil both “push” and “restraining” functions on actors inclined to use force if they have developed appropriate institutional mechanisms that make unilateral action more costly than the potential benefit that could be gained from the use violence as an extension of politics. In the field of control of illicit small arms, such structures would probably have to centre on binding mechanisms for information exchange that would lead to mutual scrutiny of practices. The project design missed the opportunity to define objectives that would tap into the real value added of a regional organisation.

The project also lacked a gender approach to conflict. While the IGAD component made reference to gender, and indeed included in its scope support to IGAD’s gender unit, the design did not specifically refer to activities or strategies concerning gender in conflict, beyond inclusion of gender in some research.

**Technical expertise from RECSA helped to identify marking and stockpile management as activities central to the end task**

At the outset of the project, the EAC secretariat had no specific SALW expertise and at suggestion of the EAC, RECSA was brought into the project, bringing with it much needed technical know-how. Overtime, the project changed the focus from “cooperation on combating illicit weapons” to marking of state owned stockpiles and providing support for the establishment of clear legal frameworks clarifying civilian and state ownership and applicable stockpile management procedures. Thus, while being slow to start, the project successfully redefined its objectives half way through the implementation process.

The shift towards a creation of the framework conditions within which to address the illicit trafficking of arms by defining ‘illicit’ as a region was an essential response to lessons learned. During the second part of the project phase, regional civil society organisations widened the stakeholder base and brought gender consideration to the table.

In 2010 the MTR concluded that “an unintended result that negatively affects the programme, is the failure to adequately address civil society involvement in order to reach the grassroots level where the complexity of socio-economic factors fuel arms proliferation” (p. 17-18). During the last two years of implementation, the project was able to address this weakness by bringing the East African Action Network on Small Arms (EAANSA) and the East African Sub-regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI) into the project. These regional civil society organisations participated in regular information exchange on implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, widened the stakeholder base and brought gender consideration to the table.

There is no information that would suggest that the way in which small arms aggravate conflicts would have changed during the project period. However, the key security concerns that motivated the project, changed from a preoccupation with pastoralist conflicts and crime to the election violence in Kenya, increase in the terrorism threat from Somalia or the deteriorating internal situation in Burundi. However, the project did not target these areas directly.
In conclusion, the project was relevant in that it identified correctly a number of needs related to CPMR, and was explicitly designed to be in line with EU and AU regional and sub-regional strategies on peace and security. However, the project design failed to fully take account of the systemic weaknesses of the three RECs’ mandates on conflict issues, and of their weak capacity to implement peace and security strategies. The project design also failed to mandate a clear accountability mechanism for project management, and did not explicitly provide for a monitoring and evaluation process to be established at the outset.
3.2 Achievement of purpose (effectiveness)

The project had some elements of effectiveness in the sense that a number of activities and planned results were achieved, particularly in relation to the EAC component. However, effectiveness was very weak in relation to the IGAD component, and weak in relation to the COMESA component.

The IGAD component achieved some results in relation to supporting the organisation’s peace and security strategy design, discussion and dissemination, and other strategies relevant to the work of IGAD expert teams. However, few of the research and analysis results were achieved and the anticipated dialogue between IGAD and its Member States on peace and security issues fell short of expectations set out in the project document.

The IGAD component of the project had five result areas under PE1 (till 2010), revised and reduced to four under PE2 (till 2012). These differed in formulation from the project’s original and revised logical framework, where they were described as activities under result area 1 (strengthening of regional CPMR capacity). Notwithstanding the slight wording differences in various documents, the expected results could be synthesised as follows:

- Supporting the formulation, dissemination and subsequent implementation of the IGAD peace and security strategy;
- Strengthening linkages between IGAD Secretariat, Member States and other national and regional actors in the field of CPMR;
- Supporting linkages within IGAD between CPMR activities and cross-cutting areas such as environmental protection, refugees, gender.
- Strengthening coordination between IGAD and AU and between IGAD and its CPMR project partners, EAC and COMESA.

Results were, in essence, as follows:

- Work was done to develop strategies on CPMR, mostly in the form of support to planning and strategies at the level of PSD thematic teams. For example, the project helped the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP) team to develop its strategy and work plan during the CPMR project period. Similarly, the project helped fund research and seminars that contributed to CEWARN planning, as well as meetings of IGAD Member States representatives to consider IGAD strategy on peace and security, as well as the broader IGAD strategic outlook.

However, it cannot be said that the project resulted in the development and dissemination of a fully-fledged IGAD peace and security strategy. Documents of a strategic nature were indeed produced. However, IGAD’s strategy document made public in 2011, which referred to peace and security in the broader context of IGAD’s work, did not refer specifically to a peace and security strategy. This was due in part to the fact that IGAD’s main governing body, the Council of Ministers, did not formally approve a peace and security strategy till 2012. Project management of the IGAD component played a major role in this regard, as reviewed in the section on efficiency. As a result of the failure of the project to obtain timely approval of a peace
and security strategy, follow-up measures protocols and related research planned under the two PEs were also largely unimplemented.

- The linkages between IGAD and other actors at Member State and regional levels were, in effect, reduced to some civil society-related activities, including training on call for proposals procedures. This fell far short of the anticipated result and in particular did not lead to a significant enhancement of civil society involvement in IGAD CPMR activities.

- The project supported research activities and contributed with training and financial resources to the establishment of a mediation unit at IGAD. These activities, though they also fell far short of original expected results, were probably the most effective in the IGAD component. However, despite the relevance of the support given to mediation, most other cross-cutting areas of work were left untouched by the project. In particular, gender issues did not get systematic coverage, and research proposals submitted to the project coordinator were not followed up.

- The coordination issues with the AU, EAC and COMESA are addressed in the section on efficiency, as they were related to CPMR project management.

**Progress has been made in strengthening the regional capacity to fight against arms trafficking and proliferation at national (Partner State) and regional (EAC) level.** At national level, the capacity to fight arms trafficking and arms proliferation has been strengthened in a regionally coherent way but in many countries, the existing mechanisms are not yet adequate to effectively curb illicit firearm proliferation.

Partner States of the EAC have implemented a series of measures called for in the UnPoA creating a framework in which to address illicit possession and use through laws, marking of licit weapons stocks and improved management procedures for state owned weapons (including the use of a specially developed software). A table annexed to this report summarises specific SALW measures implemented in EAC Partner States between 2003 and 2012. However, there is less information on the extent to which these measures have yet let to any specific law enforcement measures against those possessing or transferring illicit weapons. For example, Rwanda has reported just 35 cases of illegal firearms possession. In other countries, there as been a disappointing lack of progress in genuine enforcement probably due to a number of conflicting political priorities and possibly vested interests. Some observers are concerned that in many countries of the region SALW measures remain an “add-on” project rather than having been fully mainstreamed within the management of the security sector, which has largely been done in Rwanda. Much of this success is probably due to the fact that the project could refer to the priorities and activities already defined under the UnPoA and thus already existing national commitments. The ongoing UN monitoring process and its associated regular reporting on national activities helped to ensure that states advanced in working on the national agenda.
**Table 1: SALW Measures Implemented by EAC Member States, 2003-12** *(source: national focal points – data could not be independently verified)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burundi</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction of three armouries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destruction of collected arms (workshop supported by USA; explosive destruction by UNDP).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender mainstreaming</strong>. Workshop on gender in SALW control in three locations held in 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(initiated by GIZ; in 2012 UNDP funded follow-up workshops for other parts of the country).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian disarmament</strong>. Carried out in 2009. Points that could be exchanged for civilian items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Awareness raising</strong> about new law and arms collection process in 2009 (supported by UNDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computerisation of stockpile management and registration (supported by Switzerland).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking of police weapons (supported by USA through RECSA).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitoring of armed violence (UNDP).</td>
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<th>Kenya</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender mainstreaming</strong> Training by NFP staff for DTF on gender issues 2011 (EASSI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary arms surrender programme, 2005-2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapons destruction</strong> since 2003 annually (UNDP, other donors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of existing Firearms Act. On-going since 2010 (Saferworld).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking of military weapons (on-going 2011 EU, RECSA, others).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marking of police weapons</strong>, administrative police, KWS and KFS in 2009 (RECSA, EU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SALW assessment</strong> conducted with SAS in 2011/12 (Small Arms Survey, Denmark).</td>
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<th>Rwanda</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Awareness raising</strong>. Information campaigns and public destruction of weapons since 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central arms registration established in 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking of police weapons started in 2008, completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking of privately owned weapons started in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking of private security company weapons started in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armory for police weapons built 2011/12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reintegration of former rebels</strong> who returned from the DRC to Rwanda, on-going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voluntary disarmament campaign</strong> in target regions in the West (Lubavu, Rusizi) in 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New firearms law adopted in 2009.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Survey on attitudes to SALW conducted in 2008.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Tanzania</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working towards a revised law on SALW</strong> since 2006, draft now with Cabinet Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender mainstreaming 2007</strong>. Training of police officers on how to interview women victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record keeping of civilian firearms, Work started in 2003, data capture started in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking of civilian owned firearms, 2011 (EU support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking of state owned weapons, 2011 (EU support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disarmament among refugees</strong> in Kigoma, Kagera Provinces, 2001-06 (UNDP).</td>
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<tr>
<th>Uganda</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training for armoury management personnel</strong> (UPDF; Police, prison, UWA, ISO), 2009-2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development of new law</strong>, zero draft of law under consultation, since 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NFP structure</strong> from national (2003) to regional (2007) and district level (2008) along police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative regions to run firearm policies (e.g. firearm registration).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Marking of UPF firearms. All police districts completed in 2012 (UNDP, Netherlands).

Awareness raising, 2006-12.

Gender mainstreaming on SALW issues (RECSA).

Construction of armory boxes for policy posts 2012 (EU).

Marking of UPDF arms for Amisom deployment, 2010 (Netherlands).

Marking of UPDF arms in North Eastern and Central Uganda on-going (UNDP).

Central Arms Registry, Hardware (computers) 2010, populating, on-going (RECSA).

Marking of PSC arms, planned but not yet started (USA, RECSA).

Marking of Prison Official arms, planned, not yet started.

Marking of civilian owned firearms, planned, not yet started.

Marking of UWA firearms, completed 2011 (government).

It is clear from this table that the EAC component of the project took place in a context of sustained activity by a range of other actors over a long period of time. This sets the component apart from the two others: there are fewer activities undertaken with donor support in the fields covered by CPMR in relation to IGAD and COMESA.

The EAC Secretariat helped bring regional civil society organisations into the process thereby strengthening the regional responses

During the second half of the project, the EAC secretariat used project activities and funding to bring representatives from regional civil society organisations to attend the National Focal Points (NFPs) meetings. This helped to bring a gender perspective to the project, widened the stakeholder pool and increased the regional pressure on national governments to stay on the path of implementation.

Table 2: Regional Civil Society Activities on the EAC Component (source: EAC, NGOs).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>East African Action Network on Small Arms (EAANSA)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Input to National Action Plans (NAPs), government policies on disarmament and voluntary surrender, and community policing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input to Arms Trade Treaty and the UNPoA implementation and review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information campaigns on the process (support from Pax Christi and IANSA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online database/SALW information depository for the region (support from Pax Christi and IANSA).</td>
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<tr>
<th>East African Sub-regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion of a gender analysis framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender audit of the National Action Plans (NAPs) and designing a Gender Policy on SALW in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa 2008 (Norway, RECSA support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlighting gender issues for the UN Process, including working on linking the small arms arms process with work on UN Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security (2000, OSF support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating networking among women affected by conflict and a mentoring programme for women and men working on security issues (OSF, DANIDA support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of 250 members of the security sector in the EAC Partner States.</td>
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<th>Peacenet (Kenya)</th>
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<tr>
<td>SALW trafficking advocacy activities along the Kenya/Uganda Border.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tanzania Action Network on Small Arms (TANANZA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work towards the establishment of a Zanzibar Action Network on Small Arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on illicit proliferation of SALW in Tarime and Rorsya Districts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EAC has made progress in elaborating the procedures around SALW control cooperation, with indirect contributions from the project.
During the time of project implementation, the EAC decided upon several of its structures addressing SALW control matters. Within the EAC, SALW control is located within the pillar on Inter State Security along side topics such as drugs and general police cooperation. While SALW are clearly recognised as a contributing factor to insecurity, it is not dealt with at the same institutional level as CPMR.

The COMESA component included a number of activities under each of the expected results. However these activities largely fell short of achieving the planned results.

The component provided for the following results:

- Strengthening COMESA capacity in the area of war economy. Despite initial delays, CPMR workshops were initiated by COMESA with civil society organisations, parliamentarians and other COMESA CPMR stakeholders. Although these events were platforms for information exchange, no formal training was carried out. Observations have been made by most of the CSOs interviewed that formal training related to War Economy problems should have been developed in addition to these workshops and conferences. Some CSOs knowledgeable about war economy and conflict issues would have benefited from further training. COMESA’s management claims that these activities provided them with a comprehensive understanding of war economies. A database of 46 experts on war economies was compiled. Experts were identified without a formal process after participating in research, production of papers, discussions and in making recommendations on the programme’s various topics. It is unclear whether these experts have been used to address issues on war economies.

- Strengthening the legal framework against illegal economic activities. Research on the illegal exploitation of natural resources identified a number of factors conducive to such activities, some well known as a result of previous studies. The research noted the lack of harmonisation among national mining policies and codes and the lack of comprehensive and effective policies to regulate international business practices in the mining sector. The research led to the compilation of information, disseminated during a validation workshop in 2010, and policy recommendations were put forward. Although these recommendations were adopted by COMESA, they could not be implemented in the timeframe of the project.

- Enhance the ability to reduce the adverse effects of war. This was probably the most effective part of the programme, in the sense that studies were carried out on issues such as the nature and extent of illegal economic activities and their linkages to the emergence and propagation of conflict systems and zones in the region. The main highlight was the linkages between informal economic activities and war economies with piracy, SALW trading, cattle rustling and their role in propagating conflicts. The role of shadow economies and their impact on the formal economy was pointed out.

- Strengthen regional collaboration and capacity in investigating tracking and prosecuting war economy crimes. This result was less effective in the sense that, out of five planned activities, only three were achieved. These were development of tools,
incentives and strategies for tracking, investigating and prosecuting war economy related crimes at national and regional levels, consultations with stakeholders to disseminate strategies and proposed policy options and strengthening of NSA for greater involvement.

- Strengthening cooperation between international organisations and non-state actors in combatting war economy. The activities in this result area were mostly related to analysis of national, regional and international networks involved in war economies in the COMESA region, seminars on social protection, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and codes of conduct for stakeholders. The key achievement was a draft regional model code for corporate governance and CSR. However there was no information as to whether progress was being made by Member States on its implementation.

In conclusion, the project was relatively effective in its EAC component, in the sense that useful activities in line with the overall objective were carried out following a substantial rewrite of the original, unrealistic plans. (including for example a focus on UNPoA priorities and enhanced involvement of RECSA). The COMESA component was also effective, in that a range of studies and activities were implemented and some results achieved, which also built on previous COMESA experience. However, follow-up was insufficient, in particular with civil society and private sector actors. The IGAD component’s effectiveness was weak, largely because its work programme was not appropriately integrated into IGAD’s overall strategy and because project management was extremely weak, as described in the next section. As a result, it was difficult to identify achievements at project result level, despite some important support to strategy development, particularly in the early period of the project.
3.3 Management and value for money (efficiency)

The EAC and COMESA components were appropriately efficient, in the sense that the activities implemented represented reasonable value for money and were, in the main, implemented in accordance with plans, including after revisions resulting from the 2009 monitoring process and the mid-term review. The IGAD component, as well as the overall CPMR project management, were not efficiently implemented due to incorrect resource allocation, which eventually led to spending curtailment. The root cause of the lack of efficiency of the IGAD component and of the overall CPMR programme management was inadequate project management. The weakness of project management was compounded by ineffective oversight mechanisms and the lack of CPMR project-level M&E mechanisms.

IGAD was in charge of the management of its own component of the CPMR, and was also entrusted with the overall coordination of the CPMR project – that is, general management of the project in consultation with the two other RECs, EAC and COMESA. A steering committee made up of representatives of the three RECs and of the relevant EUDs was established, with tasks that included general oversight of the project’s implementation. However, the project coordinator, Dr Atnafu Tola, was in effect the sole decision-maker on project activities at IGAD component level, and the steering committee did not operate as an effective accountability mechanism. The concerns about project management at the IGAD component level were the following:

- Unclear lines of responsibility. The project coordinator had an office at IGAD headquarters and was nominally placed under the management of the Head of IGAD’s Peace and Security Department – and appeared to be therefore ultimately answerable to IGAD’s Executive Secretary. However this nominal line of accountability did not actually operate because IGAD’s Executive Secretary and the Head of the PSD had no authority on the CPMR project budget, which was managed by the project coordinator with support from Transtec.

One consequence of this lack of accountability was that the CPMR project coordination with the other two RECs, carried out by the project coordinator, was always insufficient in comparison to original assumptions, and was in effect a parallel process not involving the authority of IGAD’s Executive Secretary, leading to misunderstandings.

The main consequence, however, was that IGAD had no powers to keep the project coordinator accountable to IGAD because the project coordinator’s decisions – for example on which missions to undertake – were not subject to an approval process involving IGAD senior management.

- Ineffective accountability mechanisms. If IGAD senior management was not empowered to supervise the project coordinator, who was? The CPMR Steering Committee (SC), which met five times between 2008 and 2010, and didn’t meet afterwards, was not formally tasked with supervising the project coordinator. Minutes
of its meetings show that the SC was indeed concerned about the lack of quality of the CPMR project management, referring on one occasion to “the lack of good faith” of the coordinator (5th SC meeting minutes, December 2010). However this did not lead to improvements in the quality of the project’s management, and it was in any case too late to remedy past mistakes, including improving the effectiveness of the IGAD component as highlighted in the previous section.

- The EU itself was not in a position to exercise day-to-day supervision of the project coordinator because the PE contractual modalities only provided for ex-post approval by the EU of activity reports and accounts. As a result, the EU could only act after it became clear that project management was inadequate – which it did in 2011 when it froze the PE II and initiated an audit to identify ineligible expenses and ultimately seek their return.

In this context, it is clear that the IGAD component of the project suffered from a lack of integration with IGAD’s overall plans and strategies and from a lack of accountability on the part of the project coordinator:

- Lack of integration with IGAD’s plans and strategies, because programming decisions were taken outside the normal IGAD management processes, and because decisions whether to fund proposed activities were taken primarily by the project coordinator, not IGAD’s management.
- Lack of accountability, because the project coordinator was not subjected to close supervision. Neither IGAD’s senior management, nor the SC, nor the EU were in a position to supervise the activities and decisions of the project coordinator.

With regards to M&E, the project as a whole lacked systematic monitoring and evaluation processes. Recommendations from external monitoring mechanisms (2009 and 2010) concerning the EAC and COMESA components were largely taken on board but the project management did not carry out any internal monitoring. The IGAD component did not have any effective M&E mechanism, largely because of lack of pro-active management on the part of the project coordinator.

The SC was kept informed from time to time by the project coordinator about the establishment of M&E processes in the IGAD component. The establishment of and M&E procedure was necessary because M&E processes were expected to be the source of objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) on the achievement of expected results, as set out in the project logframe. A study was mandated in 2009 by the project to set out the modalities of such an M&E system. However, the recommendations of the study were not implemented: as a result, the SC could only recommend in December 2010 that the M&E procedure be implemented – but this was not done. A Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) report was commissioned by the EU in 2012, focusing on the IGAD component: that report highlighted the low level of project effectiveness and did not refer to any M&E system being implemented since 2010.

Regarding the EAC component, the mission by a consultant (2009) and the 2010 mid-term review (MTR) led to some changes in the programme. The component was also monitored by the EUD in Dar Es Salaam in 2011. However, neither the EAC secretariat or RECSA carried out any formal monitoring of project activities or impact and the documentation of the learning process has been weak. The EUD supported the move to bring RECSA into the
project (Addendum to TOR), which had been proposed by the EAC representative on the project steering committee. This was a good move as RECSA brought much needed technical skill to the project, which advanced marking of state owned stockpile during the second part of the project.

The COMESA component benefited from the pre-existing COMESA M&E mechanism. Feedback from COMESA in the Final Narrative Financial report (May 2013) indicated that the programme had been managed according to COMESA procedures, including the submission of annual work plans, quarterly activity reports and budgets.

In conclusion, the project as a whole lacked efficiency, although the EAC and COMESA components were much more efficient than the IGAD component. The reason for the discrepancy in performance in this respect was that the CPMR project coordinator, who was also managing the IGAD component, was unaccountable and acted in isolation from IGAD’s standard management and supervision structures. By contrast, the EAC and COMESA components were implemented in accordance with these RECs’ ordinary management mechanisms, thus ensuring adequate levels of accountability.

Beyond the individual responsibility of the project coordinator, it is essential to highlight the fact that the lack of accountability of the project coordinator was systemic: a more pro-active coordinator could certainly have ensured that the project performed much better, but the lack of real-time, day-to-day management oversight of the coordinator was a major reason for the poor effectiveness and general performance of the IGAD component. As a consequence, the coordination among the three RECs also suffered, thus hampering the overall performance of the project, irrespective of the work done at EAC and COMESA level.

This points to two criteria that any future project must meet to avoid the problems highlighted above:

- Project implementation must be integrated into the RECs’ work plans and strategies, and not be decided upon by “parallel processes”;
- Project proposals need to be based on sufficient technical input about the subject area to avoid designing unrealistic objectives;
- Project managers must be under day-to-day supervision by senior managers with authority to refuse activities or expenditures not consistent with project activities. This supervision must come in addition to the reporting obligation to the EU, a Steering Committee or board, etc.
3.4 Achievement of wider effects (impact)

It was possible to identify some elements of impact of the CPMR project. However the impact of the project was weaker than could have been anticipated in view of the resources devoted to it, despite some positive changes – which (as is common in conflict prevention projects) cannot all be attributed solely to the project. The project did, however, help foster some institutional changes among the RECs, including with regards to relationships with civil society.

The IGAD component had some impact in the sense that it contributed to the development of strategies for CEWARN and ISSP, and therefore contributed to IGAD’s capacity to implement its broader peace and security strategy. Research projects conducted in the early period of the project, and the support to the design of ISSP’s strategic plan, helped IGAD address conflict situations in the Karamoja Cluster and in relation to piracy off the coast of Somalia. Indirectly, it might be argued that the project also helped reinforce the capacity of CEWARN to analyse the situation in Somalia. The project’s support to the establishment of a mediation unit within IGAD may also in future help IGAD achieve a greater impact on conflicts in the region.

All three components of the project have helped enhance the involvement of regional civil society organisations in CPMR activities. There are many examples of this:

- IGAD now frequently (though not systematically) invites civil society representatives to planning meetings; CEWARN’s methodology is built around work with a range of stakeholders that includes local, national and regional civil society; the mediation unit established with support from CPMR also considers contacts with civil society to be part of its core methodology, as does the IGAD gender unit.
- As reviewed below, civil society representation was also central to the EAC and COMESA components, and this approach is likely to be further developed in the future. RECSA, for example, systematically involves civil society representatives in its activities or refers to civil society activities, for example when training civil servants. Similarly, COMESA’s work on war economy addressed a range of private sector representatives (chambers of commerce, professional associations, etc.): while many of these stakeholders had previous exposure to COMESA, the discussion of war economies with them was to some extent an innovation.

One important caveat remains, however, with regards to the selection of civil society organisations involved in CPMR-related activities. RECs often rely on Member States to draw up the list of NGOs invited to take part in activities - these are often umbrella groups that do not necessarily have strong expertise in CPMR issues.

There is some evidence that the three RECs have enhanced their capacity for conflict resolution during the project period, thus moving towards the fulfilment of the project’s objective.

The question of whether there was more or less conflict and progress towards peaceful conflict resolution is difficult methodologically. It is extremely difficult to measure the number
of conflicts, or the extent of escalation accurately and any chosen method has inherent weaknesses. It is even harder to measure the prevention of conflict. If something did not happen, there is no evidence of it having happened. How to measure something that did not happen is very complicated and will always produce controversial results. It goes beyond the possibility of this evaluation to carry-out a complex conflict assessment to determine to what extent conflicts or their escalation was prevented in the region. Only the simple method is feasible within the allocated resources of this evaluation.

At the time of the project design, conflicts among pastoralists was one of the main areas justifying the focus on curbing small arms proliferation as a means towards peace and security. Several programmes and measures outside of this project have been undertaken to address the issue. This component did not target the pastoralist areas explicitly, but hoped to help reduce firearms availability through the general tightening of rules related to arms trading. The available data from IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) on the Karamoja Cluster suggests that these attacks have become less lethal, a phenomenon that can be taken as an indicator of reduced firearm availability. While the total number of incidents somewhat rose during the project period the total number of reported deaths has slightly fallen. The result has been a reduction in the average number of deaths per incident from 1.8 over the first for years to 0.8 over the last four years. The reduction in lethality in pastoralist conflicts can be an indicator of reduced firearms use as guns require less effort to kill than traditional weapons.

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<td><img src="image" alt="Graph of reported violent incidents" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Graph of reported conflict-related human deaths" /></td>
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<td>Source: CEWARN data, Karamoja cluster</td>
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The available information suggests that the EAC is currently overall on a positive way forward. There was a clear downward trend in conflict related issues within EAC countries from the start of the project to mid-term (2009) and towards the end (2011). While conflicts continue to emerge, such as the violence surrounding the Kenyan elections, Somalia driven terrorism and deteriorating political consensus in Burundi, the overall direction appears encouraging thanks to the number of initiatives that are taken to reduce tensions. This is underlined by the fact that deteriorating contexts have not escalated into larger conflicts.
since 2007. It also should be noted that the 2013 elections in Kenya were much less violent than those in 2007 probably thanks to multiple initiatives taken in the run-up to these elections.

There was a clear downward trend in conflict related issues within EAC countries from the start of the project to mid-term (2009) and towards the end (2011). In 2012 concerns rose as the number of reports increased mainly related to violence surrounding the Kenyan elections and more recently regarding Burundi. However, the 2013 elections in Kenya were overall much more peaceful than the 2007 elections. While this overall development cannot be attributed directly to the EAC component, it is possible that it contributed to the overall direction of the EAC Partner States towards resolving conflicts without use of direct force.

Stakeholders in the EAC region perceived a modest improvement in security, thanks to a reduction in availability of firearms, according to an online questionnaire administered by GIZ as part of the impact assessment of the GIZ component of the EAC project (see graph below).

![Graph showing the improvement in security in EAC countries](image)

In order to display some measure of the direction the EAC is going in terms of conflict outbreak, escalation or prevention, the number of published International Crisis Group (ICG) reports and briefings have been used as a proxy indicator. The ICG is widely regarded as the best available analysis of emerging and resolving conflicts. The ICG only publishes reports when there is an issue of concern. Thus the publication of an ICG report on a given country in a given year can be taken as one indicator of conflict volatility.

In as far as the issuing of a ICG report or briefing is an indication of a conflict concern, there was a clear downward trend in conflict related issues within EAC countries from the start of the project to mid-term (2009) and towards the end (2011). In 2012 concerns rose as the number of reports increased mainly related to violence surrounding the Kenyan elections and more recently regarding Burundi. However, the 2013 elections in Kenya were overall much more peaceful than the 2007 elections. As Kenya remains ethnically and politically divided, the absence of violence can be interpreted as an indication of a prevention of violence and de-escalating policies. It remains to be seen whether the, at present, deteriorating situation in Burundi can also be defused through preventative measures.
While no direct attribution from the SALW project can be made to this overall development, it is possible that it contributed to the overall direction of the EAC Partner States towards resolving conflicts without use of direct force.

Discussion with COMESA indicated that this project was after the fact rightly considered a diagnostic and preparation phase for a subsequent, longer-term project. The issue of war economies was so vast that the project management and most of the stakeholders needed to start with finding their own bearings on the issue before moving forward. It is clear that stakeholders and participants have been exposed to information through workshops seminars presentation and debates. However, the degree of absorption and the stakeholders’ capacity to be able to use the acquired knowledge in structured ways to deal with conflict resolution are not clear. COMESA Secretariat staff have acquired a much better understanding of war economy issues and are equipped to design better programmes in future. COMESA nevertheless is aware that more formal training is required to deal with conflict resolution and war economy issues. The development of a database of experts on war economy in COMESA countries is a direct result of this project. The challenge remains to ensure that this expert network be used to help in the fight against war economies.

On the trade-related policy side, the project helped COMESA to develop recommendations for implementation by Member States. These have adopted by the COMESA Policy Organ Meetings, while parliamentarians have also committed to address war economy issues. However implementation as yet is lagging. Nevertheless, one of the important impacts of the COMESA component was the identification of piracy as a war economic issue and the subsequent adoption of a regional strategy and action plan against piracy. The development of a draft regional model code for corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are also significant elements of impact – though it is too early to assess their implementation.

One unintended impact of the project is that the SALW control activities focused on SALW control made indirect contributions to the evolving EAC peace and security structure.

The project design did not take into account specific institutional developments within the EAC and how they could contribute to the overall CPMR agenda. The project activities,
however, helped the emergence of EAC working structures and thus made important, yet unplanned for, contributions to the regional capacity to tackle peace and security concerns. The project used meeting formats of the Sectoral Council for Inter State Security to bring National Focal Points (NFPs) together for work meetings that centred primarily on information exchange on implementation of the UNPoA agenda. These meetings were *inter alia* utilised to agree on three common positions that allowed for block representation of EAC views in multilateral small arms processes. The meeting process contributed to the prominence SALW issues assumed in all EAC documents on peace and security. In a number of areas, information exchange between NFPs has served as a testing mechanism for other areas of information exchange thus making an important learning process to the development of institutional structures of the EAC of how to implement policies covering identified principles in parallel. Being provided with the resources to call these meetings provided dynamic individuals within the institution with a vehicle to further both SALW and institutional aims.
In general terms, the relevance of the CPMR issue to Africa in the foreseeable future helps ensure that the advances made by the project will be built upon by the RECs, thus ensuring a degree of sustainability. In particular, some strategic steps supported or encouraged by the project (IGAD/ISSP strategy; coordination between EAC and RECSA and emphasis on the UNPoA on SALW; research and acquired knowledge on war economies) are likely to continue to be used in the future. Nevertheless, the project could have achieved a higher degree of sustainability if the foreseen coordination among the three RECs had been appropriately implemented by the project coordinator.

There are some elements of sustainability in the IGAD component in the sense that the project helped support strategic thinking within IGAD, and that planned developed with CPMR inputs are still being implemented. However, IGAD continues to need donor funding for its further development, thus weakening the sustainability of the strategic results achieved. The results achieved in relation to

In relation to the EAC component: because the SALW agenda continues to be a highly relevant topic likely to stay high on the global and regional priorities due to the on-going UN process, the prospects for sustainability are relatively good. However it remains to be seen whether the project output – a framework defining “illicit” weapons – will be used for transformative changes in law enforcement practices. This will depend, inter alia, on the political will within national governments. Development partners can further contribute to sustainability of future programmes by deepening their analysis of the political context in which the RECs are operating, with a view to identifying potential entry points for policy and practice changes.

Sustainability at COMESA component level is weak, in the sense that, although beneficiaries realise the importance of continuity of the actions undertaken under the project, no provision seems to have been made for follow up actions. Lack of funds is certainly one of the main reasons for this situation. The issue of “ownership” at CSO level should also be raised, because the network of CSOs dealing with war economies is not fully operational and is dependent on COMESA for funding is key enable to operate using other alternatives even at the end of a programme.

Example of impact: a pilot case in the Artisanal Small Scale Mining sector

The COMESA component conducted a pilot case on the Artisanal Small Scale Miners (ASSM), which was considered one of the highlights of the component. Research, recommendations and publications were developed to better understand and improve the frameworks and the environment under which artisanal miners operate.

The issue of artisanal mining is important in the war economy context because artisanal miners often operate in zones of conflict where ordinary government regulation is not operative. In zones of conflict, armed groups frequently subject artisanal miners to arbitrary
operational rules and extortion. Artisanal mining is therefore one of the sectors that may contribute to the financing of conflict, for example in the Great Lakes region.

One of the first actions of the programme was to carry out in May 2009 research on legal and policy frameworks relating to the exploitation of natural resources in the COMESA region. This research built on analyses of the legal, policy and institutional frameworks conducted earlier, for example through the Trading for Peace programme implemented by COMESA since the early 2000s. Research focussed on two geographical clusters (Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa) and on the issue of governance.

From August to September 2009, the needs for analysis and research were identified during a validation workshop. A report identified the following concerns:

- Lack of harmonisation of mining policies and codes across member states;
- Lack of regional and institutional framework to protect natural resources and manage mining regimes and certification of lucrative minerals;
- Lack of comprehensive and effective policy to regulate international business practices in the mining sector.

The research also highlighted the way national and international companies contributed to supporting trade in conflict minerals, while offshore banking facilities encouraged war economies. The development of artisanal small-scale mining is therefore constrained because informal mining sites are linked to the trade in illicit weapons and to human and drugs trafficking, and to the exploitation of vulnerable groups such as children and women.

In October 2010, following a validation workshop with the participation of government experts, short- medium- and long-term recommendations were developed for COMESA Member States, followed by suggestions for immediate action. These recommendations were subsequently followed up by COMESA and continue to form one basis for its strategy on addressing war economies.
3.6 Mutual reinforcement (coherence) and EU added value

In general terms, the relevance of the CPMR issue to Africa in the foreseeable future helps ensure that the advances made by the project will be built upon by the RECs, thus ensuring a degree of sustainability. In particular, some strategic steps supported or encouraged by the project (IGAD/ISSP strategy; coordination between EAS and RECSA and emphasis on the UNPoA on SALW; research and acquired knowledge on war economies) are likely to continue to be used in the future. Nevertheless, the project could have achieved a higher degree of sustainability if the foreseen coordination among the three RECs had been appropriately implemented by the project coordinator.

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In relation to the ESA component: because the project addresses a highly relevant topic likely to stay high on the global and regional agendas due to the on-going UN process, the prospects for sustainability are relatively good. However it remains to be seen whether the project output – a framework defining “illicit” weapons – will be used for transformative changes in law enforcement practices. This will depend, inter alia, on the political will within national governments. Development partners can further contribute to sustainability of future programmes by deepening their analysis of the political context in which the RECs are operating, with a view to identifying potential entry points for policy and practice changes.

Sustainability at COMESA component level is weak, in the sense that, although beneficiaries realise the importance of continuity of the actions undertaken under the project, no provision seems to have been made for follow up actions. Lack of funds is certainly one of the main reasons for this situation. The issue of “ownership” at CSO level should also be raised, because the network of CSOs dealing with war economies is not fully operational and is dependent on COMESA for funding is key enable to operate using other alternatives even at the end of a programme.

3.7 Coherence, visibility, co-ordination & complementarity

Coordination has been defined as “activities of two or more development partners that are intended to mobilise aid resources or to harmonise their policies, programmes, procedures and practices so as to maximise the development effectiveness of aid resources”\textsuperscript{15}. Coordination is essential, particularly in transitional environments, since its absence – or ineffectiveness – can result in donor-driven agendas, duplication of efforts, inefficiency and the waste of restricted resources, and inconsistencies of approach.

\textsuperscript{15} Review of aid coordination and the role of the World Bank, World Bank, November 1999
Complementarity is intended to ensure that EU development policy “shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States”\(^{16}\), the aim of which is to achieve greater collective effectiveness of EU and Member States’ development cooperation, taking account of, among other things, the comparative advantages of their respective actions, particularly on the ground. However in the current evaluation, the concept also encompasses complementarity with other donor or national initiatives.

Generally, the CPMR project did not raise concerns related to these EU evaluation criteria.

- With regards to the mutual reinforcement of the various EU actions (coherence) the project was satisfactory in the sense that it was fully in line with EU stated policies and strategic outlook. Its key limitation in this respect was the multiplicity of actors involved in CPMR activities in the vast region covered by the three RECs, including the very complex maritime domain off the coast of East Africa.

- Coordination (with other development partners) and complementarity (with actions by EU Member States) did not pause particular problems here in general, because the project design included an adequate mapping of other actors’ policies and plans. However, complementarity could have been improved during the implementation of the programme on some issues related to institutional capacity development of some RECs. For example, IGAD received support from Denmark in 2011 to develop its project management capacity, including capacity development on M&E. This support could have benefited the CPMR project (though it came too late to remedy the project’s weaknesses, highlighted above).

- Visibility did not give rise to concerns, as all three RECs duly acknowledged EU support received through CPMR and maintained regular liaison with EUDs.

\(^{16}\) Article 130u, European Union Treaty
CONCLUSIONS

The following general conclusions stem from the evaluation:

- The project was highly relevant, in the sense that conflict prevention in all its forms, including mediation, management and resolution, and SALW control, is key to the development of Africa.

- The project correctly identified needs and RECs that could address them, hence further ensuring its relevance.

- While project design was generally correct, the project appears to have underestimated the complexity of appropriate responses, specific institutional mandates and necessary research and analysis, and the political and social obstacles to the implementation of recommendations.

- The project’s achieved some of its expected results, though the various components’ performance differed. The key reason for the weak effectiveness of the IGAD component was related to inadequate management by the project coordinator.

- The project was significantly hampered by the lack of management supervision of its coordinator, which had adverse consequences in particular on the implementation of the IGAD component and on the level of coordination among the three RECs.

- The supervisory mechanisms implemented in the project did not amount to effective M&E; the SC procedure was not sufficient to ensure effective and timely coordination among the RECs.

- The project achieved some impact, in particular as a result of research and strategic planning advice, and through dialogue with some sectors of civil society. However the project’s impact could have been enhanced with more effective implementation of planned activities and monitoring of intended impacts.

- The project helped develop analyses and mechanisms within the RECs that should remain in use beyond the project period, thus achieving a degree of sustainability. Nevertheless, the project should be seen as the start of a longer-term set of programmes, because the development of CPMR capability calls for gradual, wide-ranging research and attitude change.
5 **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- **The EU should support a further CPMR programme**, taking into account the lessons learned from this evaluation and building on the acquired experience. The programme design should ensure that activities are explicitly integrated with the RECs’ work plans and strategies and are fully compatible with their mandates.

- **The design of the future programme should take into account the complexity of the CPMR issues and technical responses required, and take an appropriately incremental approach.** In particular, the programme should anticipate delays related to approval of policies by RECs’ governing bodies, for example by including a wide range of activities that do not require such approval. **It should further ensure appropriate investment in planning that identifies the right areas where RECs can bring a value added to the specific topic.**

- **Any future programme should have appropriate provisions to ensure effectiveness.** These might include the establishment of a Steering Committee and systematic monitoring of activities, outputs and impacts. If this is the case, the SC should be supported by its own independent secretariat, with authority to obtain information on project progress from all relevant stakeholders, independently of the project’s managers.

- **Any future programme should widen the involvement of NGOs and ensure that NGOs participating in activities possess the requisite CPMR expertise and meet standards of independence.** In particular, the future programme should devolve to RECs’ experts the authority to select the NGOs involved in activities.

- **All RECs involved in the programme should benefit from capacity building in the field of project management.** This should include support on M&E, activity and financial reporting, and on coordination among different programme strands. RECs should be encourage to locate M&E and other programme management units under the direct senior management authority.

- **The management modalities of any future CPMR programme should ensure full, timely accountability of the project manager.** Particular care should be taken to ensure that management supervision be specified in any funding contract. Similarly, a M&E process should be contractually mandated.
1. BACKGROUND

Under the provisions of the Cotonou agreement, the regional program of EDF 9 for the Eastern and Southern Africa Region has been undertaken as a joint effort for Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), East Africa Community (EAC) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The 9th EDF Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) / Regional Indicative Paper (RIP) has three focal areas: (1) Support to regional integration and trade, (2) Management of natural resources, and (3) Transport and communications, as well as non-focal sector with projects in areas of capacity building, education and research, peace and security.

The European Commission has also initiated a Regional Political Strategy (RPS) for the Horn of Africa with the aim of promoting peace, security and development. The Inter Regional Coordination Committee (IRCC) initiated preparation of a series of projects in line with the objective and priorities of the RSP/RIP, one among these being the creation of a common regional framework for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) for Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) Region under focal Area 3.

Interventions to prevent/manage or resolve violent conflicts in the ESA region had primarily targeted the local, national and pan-Africa levels. The CPMR programme pursued to complement these measures by strengthening the capacity of RECs in the ESA region to implement CPMR related activities within the respective mandates of the regional organizations (IGAD, EAC & COMESA). Moreover, the CPMR program supported the efforts of IGAD, EAC and COMESA to establish a regional, integrated approach to take the major peace and security challenges. Furthermore, the regional CPMR activities assisted the Regional Integration Organizations (RIO) in their endeavours to support their respective member states, within the peace and security architecture of the African Union.

The overall objectives of the CPMR program are:

• To contribute to the prevention of the outbreak and escalation of violent conflicts with regional dimensions, and

• To mitigate the effects thereof in the Eastern and Southern Africa Region so as to contribute to an enabling environment for economic development and poverty reduction.

The purpose of the project is to enhance the capacities of the RIOs of the ESA Region in exercising their CPMR mandates and activities, within a consistent and coordinated continental and regional framework focussing on the key regional factors responsible for proliferation of conflict.

In order to achieve its purpose, the programme implements a set of activities through three separate components that lead to the following results:

Result 1 – Regional capacity to implement the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) mandate strengthened with IGAD Secretariat and its member states. It is implemented by IGAD Secretariat located in Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti. It was monitored by EU Delegation to Ethiopia, Addis Ababa until June 2011, then by EU Delegation to Djibouti.

Result 2 – Regional capacity to fight arms trafficking and arms proliferation (Small arms and light weapons) strengthened within EAC and its member states. It is implemented by EAC Secretariat
located in Arusha, Tanzania. The program was monitored by EU Delegation to Tanzania, Dar Es Salaam.

Result 3 – Regional capacity to address War Economies strengthened within COMESA Secretariat and its member states. It is implemented by COMESA Secretariat based in Lusaka, Zambia, through a Contribution Agreement. EU Delegation to Zambia, Lusaka followed the implementation of the programme.

The total cost of the project is € 10 037 867 allocated as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>COMESA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Result 1 – CPMR – IGAD</td>
<td>4,071,600</td>
<td>4,071,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 2 – SALW - EAC</td>
<td>2,806,600</td>
<td>2,806,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 3 – War economy - COMESA</td>
<td>2,225,600</td>
<td>37,867</td>
<td>2,263,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and technical assistance</td>
<td>224,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>224,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations and audit</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>272,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>272,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>37,867</td>
<td>10,037,867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The implementation period started on October 23, 2007 and ended on December 31, 2012.

As Regional Authorizing Officer, IGAD was responsible for overall programme coordination as well as implementation of the planned activities related to result 1. IGAD sub-delegated the responsibilities for implementation of the activities leading to result 2 and 3 to EAC and COMESA respectively. COMESA implemented the activities related to result 3 through a Contribution Agreement, while IGAD and EAC followed the EDF procedures in the implementations of the programme (9th EDF).

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

2.1 objectives

The final evaluation, which had been planned in the Technical and Administrative Provisions of the project’s Financing Agreement, will provide the decision-makers of IGAD, EAC, COMESA and the European Union and the wider public with sufficient information to:

1. make an overall independent assessment about the past performance of the project, paying particular attention to the impact of the project activities with respect to its objectives;

2. identify key lessons and propose practical recommendations to be used in the framework of future activities in conflict prevention management and resolution in the ESA region.

Requested services

The evaluation study responds to the requirements of the last phase of the project cycle. The consultants shall verify, analyse and assess in detail the issues outlined in Annexe 2 "Layout, structure of the Final Report". The list of issues is not intended to be exhaustive. The questions refer to the five evaluation criteria endorsed by the OECD-DAC (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact), and to the EU-specific evaluation criteria (EU added value and coherence).

The consultants are requested to verify, analyse and assess the integration and impact of cross cutting issues in the project. The consultants are required to use their professional judgement and
experience to review all relevant factors and to bring these to the attention of the Government and European Union.


Methodological guidance for the evaluation of integration of cross-cutting issues (environmental sustainability, gender, good governance and human rights) may be found in the same above web link.

2.3 Management of the final evaluation

The evaluation is managed by the EU Delegation in Djibouti in collaboration with the EU Delegations in Dar Es Salaam and Lusaka. The reference group member's main functions are:

- To aggregate and summarise the views of the European Union services, Regional Organizations (ROs) and other stakeholders;
- To facilitate coordination of the mission;
- To ensure that the evaluation team has access to and has consulted all relevant information sources and documents related to the project/programme;
- To validate the Evaluation Questions;
- To discuss and comment on notes and reports delivered by the evaluation team. Comments by individual group members are compiled into a single document by the evaluation manager and subsequently transmitted to the evaluation team;
- To assist in feedback of the findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations from the evaluation.

3. EXPERTS PROFILE

3.1 Number of requested experts per category and number of working days per expert

The mission will be composed of one (1) senior expert – Team Leader, CPMR expert, and two (2) junior experts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of working days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CPMR / Team leader (IGAD Component)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SALW (EAC component)</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Regional Integration (COMESA component)</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Profile per expert:

Common Minimum requirement to all experts:
- University degree or equivalent;
• Solid and diversified experience in the specific field of expertise needed;

• Experience in evaluation/monitoring of similar projects/programmes;

• Relevant experience of at least 3 years in Developing countries;

• At least one of the experts is fully conversant with the principles and working methods of project cycle management and EU aid delivery methods;

• At least one of the experts proposed should have knowledge of gender, environment and governance mainstreaming;

• At least one of the experts proposed should have direct experience with civil society in conflict prevention and resolution;

• At least one of the experts proposed should have direct experience with institution capacity building;

• Full working knowledge in English;

• Excellent computer skills with at least Microsoft offices usual software (Word, Excel, MS-Project, Power Point) or equivalent. Additional requirements: Expert 1 - Team leader, Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution expert

  - Master degree in law, conflict and peace studies, development studies, social sciences or relevant field;

  - Experience as a team leader in the last 5 years; (Minimum required skills)

  - At least two experiences in programme evaluation in the last five years in conflict prevention, management and resolution; (Minimum required skills)

  - Recent experience (last five years) in conflict prevention, management and resolution in EAC/COMESA/IGAD region;

  - Relevant working experience in East and Southern Africa;

  - Relevant experience in Monitoring and Evaluation (Minimum required skills); Expert 2 - Small Arms and Light Weapons Expert for the EAC component

  - Master degree in law, development studies, social sciences or relevant field;

  - Recent experience (last three years) in the causes associated with the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and best practise for control and management of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa;

  - Demonstrated recent experience (last 3 years) in procurement processes and EDF procedures at national or regional level;

  - Good knowledge of EAC is an advantage.

  - Experience in the region is an advantage

  - Demonstrated experience in EDF procurement Expert 3 - Expert for the COMESA
component

- Master degree in Governance, Economy, Development studies, Law or relevant field;

- Recent experience (last 3 years) in regional integration in COMESA region;

- Experience in war economies in the region would be an asset;

- Good knowledge of COMESA is an advantage.

3.3 Working language

The working language of the assignment is English.

4. LOCATION AND DURATION

It is expected that the assignment shall commence as soon as possible after the signature of the specific contract but no later than 01/04/2014. The overall duration for the assignment will last 65 calendar days for the total performance period. This amounts to 40 working days for expert 1, 25 working days for expert 2 and 21 working days for expert 3. This overall duration shall cover desk study during preparatory stage, consultation with relevant stakeholders as well as time dedicated to preparing Draft and Final Evaluation reports. Detailed timelines and table of activities required from the experts, as well as their contribution in working days over duration of the assignment are shown in section 5.2. The date on which the Contracting authority formally approves or rejects the Final Evaluation report will be considered the end date for the purpose of this contract. This approval/rejection shall be communicated to the Consultant in writing and shall occur within 21 calendar days from the receipt of the consolidated final report.
ANNEX 2: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

- Ambassador (rtd) Ochieng Adala, Deputy Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum (APFO) and Member of Africa-China EU Expert Group on Conventional Arms
- Association of Artisanal Miners, Burundi
- Dr S Arinaitwe, Uganda Joint Christian Council of Churches
- Godfrey Bagonza, Grant Manager, RECSA
- Andrew Bahemuka, HURNET Human Rights Network Uganda
- Angela Baiya-Wadeyaa, RECSA
- Richard Bamuturaki, War Economy Specialist, COMESA.
- Richard Barno, Head of CEWARN, IGAD
- Chiara Bellini, EU Delegation, Zambia
- Elisabeth Brian, COMESA
- Hilda Champanga, One World Africa
- Kelvin Chibonda, One World Africa
- Corinne Deleu, EU Delegation, Djibouti
- Emmanuel Deisser, Director, Sahan Research, consulting IGAD CEWARN
- Saffia Diop, Delegation Dar Es Salaam
- Roisin Drury Tully, EU Delegation Djibouti
- Alexa Du Plessis, Delegation Dar Es Saalam
- Brigitte Fahrenhost Consultant
- Federation of Artisanal Miners, Zambia
- Antonio Fernandes De Velasco, Delegation Dar Es Saalam
- Venelina Gancheva, Peace and Security project, GIZ office Arusha
- Dr Aleu Garang, Programme Coordinator, Mediation Support Unit, IGAD
- Col. Gebre, Somalia Facilitation Unit, IGAD
- Miriam Heidtmann, Programme Manager, GIZ office Arusha
- Theophilus Kamali, Planning and Coordination Officer, RECSA
- Pauline Kamau, Representative, Green Belt Movement, Kenya
- Azare Karim, IGAD Infrastructure expert
- Alessandro Liame, Regional Adviser for Crisis Response and Peace Building East, Southern, Central Africa and Indian Ocean, Delegation of the European Union in Kenya
- Godefroid Manirankunda, ADIR Development and Regional Integration, Burundi
- James McNulty, M&E Officer, EU Delegation, Zambia
- Mohammad, IGAD M&E Officer
- Florence Mpaayei, Nairobi Peace Initiative
- Esaka Mugasa, Political Liaison Officer, RECSA
- Nadège Muhimpundu, Support to the East African Community Integration Process
- Cmdr Abebe Muluneh, Head of ISSP, IGAD
- Odette Mutanguha, COMESA
- Richard Nabudere, former SALW focal point in the Government of Uganda.
- James Ndung’u, Saferworld, Kenya Project Manager, Arms Control and Policing
• Charles JK Njoroge, Deputy Secretary General, Political Federation, East African Community
• Walter Odhiambo, Nairobi Peace Initiative
• Victor Ogalo, Kenya Private Sector Alliance
• Leonard Onyonyi, EAC Programme Manager
• Peter Omurangi Otim, Peace and Security Department African Union Commission
• Rose Othieno, Executive Director, CECORE Centre for Conflict Resolution, Uganda
• Wyciffe Oweda, Kenya Private Sector Alliance
• Abdi Roble, Coordinator, Development Partners, IGAD
• Ian Ruddock, Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives Disposal Specialist
• Marjaana Sall, Deputy Head of the European Union Delegation in Kenya
• Ambassador Joseph Silva, EU Delegation, Djibouti
• Andrew Simon, EU Delegation
• Hadera Tesfay, Gender Unit, IGAD
• Dr Atnafu Tola, former CPMR project coordinator
• Uwe Weissenbach, First Counsellor Political Delegation of the European Union in Kenya
• Daniel Yifru, Senior Advisor, IGAD
### ANNEX 3: LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Early Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for East and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMWARN</td>
<td>COMESA Conflict Early Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Mitigation and Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASSI</td>
<td>East African Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEANSA</td>
<td>East African Action Network on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>European Union Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSP</td>
<td>IGAD Security Sector Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>International Tracing Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord's Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>National Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVI</td>
<td>Objectively Verifiable Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Programme Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSTC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Technical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Centre on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROM</td>
<td>Results-Oriented Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Term of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPoA</td>
<td>United Nations Plan of Action on SALW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>