



**European Union Election Observation Mission
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan**

Elections to the House of Representatives - 10 September 2024

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Well-run, inclusive elections in the context of an ambitious reform process

Amman, 12 September 2024

This preliminary statement of the EU election observation mission (EU EOM) is delivered before the completion of the entire electoral process. Critical stages remain, including tabulation of results and adjudication of petitions. The EU EOM is now only in a position to comment on observation undertaken to date, and will later publish a final report, including full analysis and recommendations. The EU EOM may also make additional statements on election-related matters as and when it considers it appropriate.

Summary

- On 10 September 2024, more than 1.6 million Jordanian voters elected the 20th House of Representatives in a well-run election. Jordan showed commitment to holding elections on schedule despite the uncertainty generated by the enduring conflict in Gaza and its wider regional repercussions. Voter and candidate registration were inclusive and efficiently administered. The 138 members of the House were elected among 1,623 candidates, offering a genuine choice to the electorate.
- Positively, Jordan's electoral legal framework is substantially aligned with the state's commitments under key regional and international treaties related to the conduct of democratic elections. The Constitution provides for secret ballot and general direct elections based on principles of integrity, independent administration, and non-interference with the will of voters. It also articulates key fundamental rights, despite some gaps, while provisions of several laws, including aspects of the Cybercrime Law and the Penal Code, entail uncertainty for the full exercise of such rights. The new laws implement, fully or in part, a number of past EU election mission recommendations.
- The 2022 Election Law to the House of Representatives (EL) and the Political Parties Law (PPL) are important milestones, aiming to increase political parties' role in the House of Representatives over three consecutive elections. The new laws and parallel constitutional amendments enhance in particular inclusion of women, youth and persons with disabilities. They also entail some new transparency measures in line with previous EU recommendations such as publishing results at polling stations level, though gaps remain, notably in relation to campaign finance. The five-week campaign was characterised by a plurality of parties. Nevertheless, candidates promoted their personal image, at the expense of political party programmes.
- The Independent Election Commission (IEC) implemented the elections efficiently and in line with legal deadlines. The vast majority of candidates expressed satisfaction with the professionalism and impartiality of the District Election Committees (DEC).
- EU EOM interlocutors expressed overall confidence in the accuracy and inclusiveness of voter lists. The candidate registration process was also assessed as inclusive and smooth by contestants. Overall, 686 candidates ran on 25 lists in the General Electoral District (GED) and 937 candidates on 172 lists in the 18 Local Electoral Districts (LED). However, the

This preliminary statement is available in English and Arabic but only the English version is official.

transparency of tabulation procedures was diminished by the exclusion of candidates and list representatives from observing the tabulation.

- Voters' lack of interest was consistently reported by EU observers and political parties throughout the campaign. Freedom of assembly was generally respected. Campaign activities, largely personality-driven, remained relatively low-key until the last two weeks. They focused on posters, door-to-door canvassing, social gatherings in tents, and social media. Paid advertising in traditional media was limited due to its high costs.
- Campaign finance rules were widely disregarded, as candidates tended to consider their personal expenses as not subject to regulation. The lack of robust enforcement mechanisms leaves the effectiveness of campaign finance regulations in question.
- Despite a comprehensive voter education programme conducted by the IEC, EU EOM interlocutors expressed concern about the low level of knowledge about how to vote for the new GED as opposed to the LED. According to EU observers, information for voters was hardly visible on the ground.
- Broadcast and news websites mostly failed to provide voters with comprehensive information on the electoral contestants. During the campaign, journalists operated under multiple legal restrictions to freedom of expression. Positively, state-owned Al Mamlaka TV channel and community radio Al Balad, organised debates with multiple political parties. The online environment remained largely respectful, mostly focused on candidates' self-promotion.
- For the first time, there is a reserved woman's seat in each LED, a positive development. The cultural, social, and economic barriers significantly outweigh the legal framework in determining the participation of women, youth, and persons with disabilities in political life. Women, in particular, face challenges such as limited economic opportunities, high campaign costs, and pressure from their families that affect their political engagement.
- Election day was assessed by the EU EOM as calm, with the elections being run orderly, professionally and smoothly. Observing the opening, 40 out of the 51 Polling Stations (PS) visited were on time. List representatives were present in over 90 per cent of observed PS. In 47 per cent of PS visited during voting, observers noted campaign activities outside the PS and in 43 per cent of them, campaign material were being distributed despite the legal prohibition on campaigning on election day. In addition, EU observers saw minors being used for campaigning activities in all local electoral districts, a violation of Labour Law and IEC instructions. At the closing of the polling, the IEC announced final turnout at 32.25 per cent of voters.

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) has been present in Jordan since 29 July 2024 following an invitation from the Independent Election Commission. The Mission is led by Chief Observer, Željana Zovko, Member of the European Parliament (Croatia). In total, the EU EOM deployed 120 observers from 27 EU Member States, Canada, Norway and Switzerland across the country to assess the whole electoral process against Jordan's constitution, laws and Jordan's international obligations and commitments for democratic elections. A delegation of the European Parliament, headed by MEP Andreas Schieder, also joined the mission and fully endorses this Statement. On Election day, observers visited 622 polling stations in all electoral districts of Jordan.

This preliminary statement is delivered prior to the completion of the election process. The final assessment of the elections will depend, in part, on the conduct of the remaining stages of the election process, in particular, the tabulation of results, and the handling of possible post-election day complaints and appeals. The EU EOM remains in country to observe post-election developments and will publish a final report, containing detailed recommendations, within two months of the conclusion of the electoral process.

The EU EOM is independent in its findings and conclusions and adheres to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation endorsed at the United Nations in October 2005.

Preliminary Findings

I. Background

Jordan embarked on a political modernisation process in June 2021 with the nomination by the King of the Royal Committee to Modernise the Political System (RCMPS), resulting in the 2022 adoption of the Election Law for the House of Representatives (EL) and the Political Parties Law (PPL). The EL establishes that the political parties' share of seats in the House of Representatives (HoR) will gradually expand over the next two election cycles from 30 per cent in 2024, to 50 per cent in 2028 and 65 per cent in 2032. Importantly, the PPL transferred the oversight and registration of political parties from the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs (MoPPA) to the IEC. The 2024 elections were seen as a test to these reforms, aimed at making the HoR more inclusive and less politically fragmented.

The elections were held against the backdrop of the enduring conflict in Gaza which overshadowed the political debate and the momentum of the elections. Despite the uncertainty generated by such a context, Jordan showed commitment to holding periodic elections.

Previous elections in 2013, 2016 and 2020 were observed by the EU with respectively two EOMs and an Electoral Expert Mission (EEM), and a number of recommendations were reflected in the new 2022 laws.

II. Legal Framework and Electoral System

Jordan's legal framework for democratic elections is substantially aligned with the state's regional and international commitments, despite some gaps for fundamental rights protections.

Jordan's electoral legal framework is substantially aligned with the state's commitments under key regional and international treaties related to the conduct of democratic elections. Positively, the Constitution guarantees the secret ballot and general direct elections based on principles of integrity, independent administration, and non-interference with the will of voters. It also articulates fundamental rights of association, assembly, non-discrimination, and freedom of expression including of press and media, but leaves broad scope for subordinate legislation to unduly curtail these rights. Provisions of several laws such as the Cybercrime Law, as well as administrative practices entail undue scope for arbitrary detention, excessive sanctioning, and curtailment of freedoms of expression.

Positively, the EL, the PPL, and parallel constitutional amendments enhanced inclusion of women, youth and persons with disabilities (PwD), and entail new accountability and transparency measures, also for political parties. Positive steps enabled candidates to contest from the age of 25 years (previously 30),¹ added restrictions to conflicts of interest, enhanced electoral legal stability, and added new transparency measures related to publishing results.

¹ The reduction in the age of eligibility to stand was a recommendation of the EU EOM 2016.

The electoral legal framework offers clear timelines and well-articulated steps for processing disputes and rights of appeal to courts.² There were few pre-election disputes and prosecutions of electoral offences. The IEC took steps to dissuade offenders through public statements, investigative actions, and referring matters to public prosecutors.

Some provisions of the law lack precision, including on aspects of list and candidate campaign funding, obligations to include reserved seats candidates on national party lists, and participation of candidates or their representatives at tabulation. Though these aspects of law did not materially impact the elections, they warrant revision to avoid potential for uncertainty.

EU observers reported concerns about wide variations in the ratio of voters to seats between LEDs, notably impacting key urban centres of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa.³ The new electoral system somewhat mitigates the disparities, with scope for further improvement in future elections as the number of seats reserved for political parties grows.

For the first time, political parties contested in a new 41-seat nationwide electoral district - the General Electoral District (GED) - under a closed list proportional system. In another 18 Local Electoral Districts (LED), candidates contested for the additional 97 seats through an open list proportional system. Only lists who passed the respective electoral district thresholds, as defined by law, qualify for seat allocation. Of the total 138 seats, an increase of eight on 2020, 30 were reserved for women, Christians and Chechen/Circassians. LED reserved seats go to the best performing candidate among the winning LED lists. Among GED winning lists, reserved seats are allotted in order of the highest-ranking candidates.

III. Electoral Administration

The IEC implemented the elections efficiently and in line with legal deadlines.

The elections were administered by a three-tiered election administration, headed by the Independent Election Commission (IEC), a District Election Committee (DEC) in every electoral district, and Polling and Counting Committees (PCC) for each of the 5,843 polling stations. The IEC, created in 2012 as a permanent body with financial and administrative independence, is governed by a Board of Commissioners appointed by the King in April 2022, at the same time as the adoption of the new electoral laws. The IEC's broad mandate included the registration of voters and candidates, the monitoring of the campaign, and voter education. With the 2022 legal reform, the IEC took over the responsibility of political party registration from MoPPA. Within the IEC, new units were created to foster the political participation of women and youth, as well as three temporary committees for campaign oversight, campaign finance, and electoral violence against women.

The IEC implemented the elections efficiently and in line with legal deadlines. The election administration was sufficiently resourced, with experienced permanent staff and some 45,000

² There is no prescribed time limit for declaring final results but they must be published in the Official Gazette before the end of the mandate of the previous parliament.

³ Ma'an. Voters per reserved seat figures also show wide variations. Generally, there is over-representation of rural voters compared to the urban centres.

temporary workers, whose training was assessed as high quality by EU observers. The EU EOM experienced excellent cooperation and access to information with the IEC and DECAs across the country. In the run-up to the elections, the IEC published relevant information in a timely manner on its website. The vast majority of candidates met by the EU EOM expressed satisfaction with access to DECAs and confidence in their professionalism and impartiality.

In this electoral process, the IEC further developed its use of election technologies. Besides digital voter identification at polling stations, in use since 2016, the IEC introduced a system to transmit preliminary results from each polling station directly to the IEC data centre. Several nationwide connectivity tests were conducted, and some 8,000 IT clerks and technical officers were trained to operate the results software. Quality control officers were trained to audit election results at polling stations before transmission. For the first time, a dedicated website enabled immediate publication of results per polling station, polling centre, and electoral district, allowing faster and more transparent access to detailed results, as suggested by previous EU recommendations. However, the transparency of tabulation procedures was diminished by the exclusion of candidates and list representatives from tabulation centres.

IV. Registration of Candidates and Political Parties

The candidate registration process was overall inclusive and smooth.

The right to stand is constitutionally granted to registered voters who have been Jordanian nationals for at least ten years and are at least 25 years old. Civil servants who wanted to run had to request unpaid leave 90 days before election day, a loosening of previous restrictions in line with a 2016 EU EOM recommendation.

From the entry into force of the PPL in 2022, political parties had one year to comply with the law. In total, 38 political parties registered, 24 of them newly established, reflecting an overall inclusive environment. For the GED, candidates had to be affiliated to their party for at least 6 months. For LEDs, party affiliation was not a requirement for candidates; still, according to the IEC, 38 per cent of the of the candidates on local lists were affiliated to a political party.

The candidate registration process was overall inclusive and assessed as smooth by EU EOM interlocutors. The election administration received list registration applications from 30 July to 1 August. By law, the IEC had up to seven days to verify submitted documents. The IEC already presented preliminary lists on 5 August, allowing an earlier campaign start. All the submitted LED and GED lists were accepted; only 11 GED candidates were rejected as they did not fulfil the legal provisions for candidacy. Three of these rejections were appealed; the courts confirmed all the IEC decisions. LED candidates could withdraw until 26 August; in all, 17 candidates (half the number of 2020) withdrew, including five women.

The IEC published final lists on 28 August, in line with the electoral calendar. In total, 686 candidates ran on 25 lists in the GED, including five alliances, and 937 candidates on 172 local lists in the 18 LEDs. The high number of candidates and lists in every district allowed for a genuinely competitive election.

Parties generally lacked transparent and clear mechanisms to select their candidates. Rumours of seat buying – asking or offering money for a prominent seat on a party list – were widely reported to EU observers in every electoral district. Tribes adapted to the new party structures, many by strategically placing their members on various party and local lists.

V. Campaign Environment and Campaign Finance

Freedom of assembly was largely respected in a campaign concentrated in the two weeks prior to election day.

The rules for campaigning were set out in an IEC Executive Instruction, prohibiting certain activities including use of state property and of official emblems, defaming opponents, and undue influence. The rules mandated poster placement in designated locations only.

The 2024 campaign was overall low-key and only started gaining momentum in the final two weeks before election day. EU observers reported that freedom of assembly was largely respected. Parties and candidates campaigned freely, focusing their efforts mostly on door-to-door canvassing and social gatherings in campaign tents. Contestants' posters and banners covered public spaces, despite regulations aimed to control their proliferation in unauthorised locations. The main campaign topics included the war in Gaza and support for Palestine, unemployment, health care, and education, along with some other locally relevant issues. Campaign messages were largely generic, lacking clear or detailed programs to address constituents' needs.

Intra-list competition was evident among LED candidates, who primarily joined forces to meet legal requirements rather than to form alliances based on shared ideas. EU observers reported little to no coordination among candidates on most local lists. Still, these candidates overwhelmingly avoided critical engagement with each other.

Several candidates reported threats or pressure by family members, political rivals, or state security operators to withdraw before or during the candidacy period. This was reported by EU observers⁴ and echoed by civil society and journalists. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) alleged a systematic campaign of discrimination and intimidation by state security, although only one registered IAF candidate withdrew from the race.

The EU EOM observed 121 campaign events from 21 August to 8 September, 84 per cent of which were for LED candidates. LED campaign events had an 80 per cent higher attendance than those for the GED, demonstrating the predominant interest of voters towards local candidacies. GED campaigns were generally coordinated and financed by political parties, while LED campaigns were largely candidate-driven and self-financed. Campaigning was mostly linked to personalities rather than party platforms. On some occasions, GED candidates used their local personal profile to support LEDs campaigns. The 24-hour campaign silence period was widely disrespected including on traditional and social media.

None of the parties received public funding in 2024, in line with new EL. Some newly established parties, backed by wealthy individuals, ran lavish campaigns perceived by EU observers as having

⁴ E.g. in Amman 1, Amman 3, Zarqa, Irbid 2, Karak, Aqaba, Ajloun and Balqa

exceeded the spending limit. Campaign finance rules were widely disregarded, as candidates tended to consider their personal expenses as exempt from the rules. EU observers reported that money and in-kind donations from family and tribes were not considered as having to be declared and that dedicated bank accounts were not always used. Widespread claims of vote-buying persisted throughout the process. The IEC investigated several cases, but the few resulting prosecutions demonstrated the difficulty of proving the offense.

The JOD 100,000 (EUR130,000) spending cap set for LED campaigns applied regardless of the number of candidates on the list or the number of voters in the district, which gave a considerable advantage to candidates on smaller lists and in smaller districts. The lack of robust enforcement mechanisms leaves the effectiveness of campaign finance regulations in question.

VI. Voter Registration

EU EOM interlocutors expressed confidence in the accuracy and inclusiveness of voter lists.

By law, Jordanians have the right to vote if 18 years of age at least 90 days before an election day. The right to vote is suspended for armed forces and security personnel on active service. Undischarged bankrupts, and citizens lacking legal capacity cannot vote. Citizens convicted with a prison term over one year were also excluded. Pretrial and administrative detainees were not expressly excluded, however there were no practical measures to enable them to exercise their voting rights.

Preliminary voter lists (PVL) based on the civil register were prepared by the Civil Status and Passport Department (CSPD) of the Ministry of Interior, under IEC supervision. Voters were included in the voter lists based on their permanent residence as recorded in the civil register, except for the Badia districts, where Bedouin voters were included according to their belonging to certain tribes. EU EOM interlocutors expressed overall confidence in the accuracy and inclusiveness of voter lists. PVL were displayed in public spaces and online as per the electoral calendar. Voters could file objections against the PVL; 18,726 objections were received by the CSPD and via the IEC website, against some 30,000 objections in 2020. Voters could request to change their polling centre within their electoral district, 9,288 voters used this possibility. Voters could also object the PVL entries of others; the IEC accepted 480 of 542 such objections. After the objections period, and per legal deadlines, the IEC published the final voter lists comprising 5,080,858 eligible voters (a nine per cent increase on 2020); 589,820 were first time voters.

VII. Voter Education

Despite a comprehensive voter education programme conducted by the IEC, EU EOM interlocutors expressed concern about the low level of information among voters.

The IEC's voter education programme was launched shortly after the adoption of the 2022 laws. In the weeks before election day, a series of videos was disseminated on the IEC social networks as well as state-owned and private media outlets to encourage participation and explaining how to vote. The IEC's centralised approach to voter education and information meant that DEC's were barely involved. According to EU observers, information for voters was hardly visible on the ground. EU observers in 12 out of 18 LEDs reported that local CSOs were conducting scattered

voter education activities, mostly focusing on their respective target population, as for example women, youth, or PwD. In four LEDs, observers reported that local radio outlets undertook voter education efforts, mostly using information provided by the election administration.

VIII. Media

Broadcast and news websites mostly failed to provide voters with comprehensive information on the electoral contestants.

The Constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and expression. However, during the campaign, journalists operated under multiple legal restrictions to freedom of expression. Defamation is a criminal offence. The Penal Code and Cybercrime Law contain restrictive provisions resulting in self-censorship across the media community. Recent detentions and arrests of several journalists, in particular Ahmad Al-Zoubi, clouded the discourse on freedom of expression in the campaign.

Media are legally obliged to treat all electoral contestants fairly and maintain neutrality and objectivity. The EU EOM media monitoring showed that most of the monitored media outlets focused their election-related content on electoral violations and IEC announcements, rather than analysing and debating parties' programmes or candidates' profiles, fearing to be labelled as biased. News coverage devoted to the electoral contestants on state Jordan TV and Jordan Radio was practically non-existent. Both state-owned Al Mamlaka TV and private Roya TV devoted most of its prime time to only a few parties.

Positively, state-owned Al Mamlaka TV channel and community radio Al Balad, organised programme-related debates with multiple political parties. Among radios, Al Balad dedicated its news and editorial to the largest number of parties.

Political advertising on broadcast media was unaffordable for most of the contestants. Many broadcasters offered paid interviews to the lists and candidates. Regrettably, no regulations on political advertising and free airtime were issued for this campaign.

IX. Social Media

The EU EOM monitoring found that the online environment remained largely respectful, mostly focused on candidates' self-promotion.

With some 5.3 million users, Facebook was the preferred platform for candidates and political parties to reach voters, while X, with 1 million users, was less utilised. The EU EOM monitoring team tracked 4,634 posts, with the IAF being the most active, accounting for 28 per cent of online political activity on Facebook. Independent candidates also had a strong presence with 29 per cent of the monitored sample.

Overall, the online campaign of candidates and parties was marked by a strong focus on personal branding, accounting for 50 per cent of the monitored posts, reflecting a broader trend towards personal image-based politics rather than party programmes. Women candidates were more active than male candidates in using Facebook to engage with voters. Limited funding and societal pressures led women to rely on social media as a more accessible platform to reach voters.

The relevant legal framework includes the recently amended Cybercrime Law and the Data Protection Law. The Cybercrime Law was substantially revised in August 2023, introducing harsh penalties for vaguely defined offences, which sometimes led to self-censorship. Crimes such as ‘spreading fake news’ and ‘provoking strife’, recently underpinned several prosecutions of individuals criticising the government. According to many interlocutors, candidates are self-censoring from fully expressing critical political views. The Data Protection Law recently added another layer of legal oversight in the digital space, particularly concerning the handling and protection of personal data. According to several interlocutors, these legal changes have heightened concerns about increasing online restrictions.

X. Participation of Women, Youth, Persons with Disabilities and religious and ethnic communities

Social practice overshadows the inclusion dimension of the legal framework when it comes to the participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities in political life.

While the modernisation process and the quota system were praised by stakeholders for aiming toward inclusiveness, deep-rooted cultural, social, and economic barriers continue to shape women's political involvement. Lack of funding poses a significant challenge, especially registration fees and campaign costs were considered high. Youth and PwD face similar obstacles. Women often experience coercion from their families and tribes regarding voting and contesting. Positively, some women candidates emphasised that the new provision for publicly employed candidates to be able to take unpaid leave, instead of resigning from their job, was essential to their opportunity to stand.

The PPL strengthened the inclusion of women, youth, and PwD in party structures and as candidates. In addition, public funding is granted for each elected woman, youth, or PwD. The EL increased the number of quota seats for women from 15 to 18, with one in each LED. Out of the 190 LED women candidates, 166 chose to contest the reserved seats, while 24 contested non-reserved seats. In the GED, there are no reserved seats but an obligation to place women candidates within the first three and the next three positions on each list. Among the 25 GED lists only one was headed by a woman. Women made up 20.3 per cent of LED and 27.5 per cent of GED candidates. The EU EOM observed that women's participation in campaign events was relatively low, about one fifth of both speakers and participants, while youth participation was more notable.

Christians, Chechens, and Circassians have reserved seats in the HoR. Representatives of and candidates from these groups expressed satisfaction with the modernisation process to the EU EOM. Candidates met by the EU EOM found running for reserved seats less challenging than open contests, feeling supported by fellow list candidates rather than competing with them.

The political participation of PwD is very limited, with obstacles ranging from lack of transport to social stigma. Although an estimated 12 per cent of Jordan's population has a disability, the IEC is aware of only 7,900 disabled voters, acknowledging that the actual number is higher. Among the 1,623 candidates, just six are known to have a disability. Of the 1,649 polling centres established for these elections, the IEC prepared 95 qualified centres, offering enhanced accessibility for voters with diverse disabilities. PwD could request assignment to one of these qualified centres, but only six voters did so, indicating low awareness of this option.

XI. Citizen and International Observers

The accreditation process was inclusive; citizen observers reported no obstacles to their work.

The IEC accredited 20 domestic observer organisations with some 3,500 individual observers. The main citizen observer organisation, RASED, deployed 54 long-term observers to monitor the campaign and conduct voter information activities across the country. As for international observers, the IEC accredited nine organisations and ten delegations of international guests.

The activities of domestic and international observers are not regulated in the EL but in two IEC Executive Instructions, potentially compromising the legal certainty of observer's rights. The regulations indicate unequal treatment of international and domestic observers, as the right of domestic observers to observe all phases of the electoral process is not explicitly stated, as it is for international observers.

XII. Polling, Counting and Tabulation

The EU EOM observed the opening in 51 polling stations (PS), voting in 527 PS, and counting in 44 PS. Overall, election day was assessed as calm, with the elections being run orderly, professionally and smoothly. All Polling and Counting Committee members were present in all observed PS. 40 out of 51 PS observed opened on time and the remaining with a slight delay. In 47 per cent of PS visited during voting, observers noted campaign activities outside the PS and in 43 per cent campaign material being distributed despite the legal prohibition on campaigning on election day. In addition, the EU observed minors being used for campaigning activities in all electoral districts, a violation of Labour Law and IEC instructions. List representatives were present in over 90 per cent of PS visited during the day and citizen observers in 25 per cent. Overall, 60 per cent of PS visited during voting were independently accessible for voters with reduced mobility, and in 79 per cent, the PS layout was suitable for such voters.

Throughout the day, voting procedures were mostly followed; however, in 27 per cent of the cases, polling staff did not always check whether voters' fingers were inked before voting, and in 10 per cent, polling staff did not always explain voters how to mark the ballot. At the time of closing, voters were still waiting in line outside 14 out of 44 PS observed, and in line with the procedures, were still allowed to vote. However, in five PS, voters arriving after 19h were still allowed to vote. Overall, polling stations closed on time and counting procedures were mostly followed. EU observers were able to observe without restrictions in all PS but one, and so were citizen observers and list representatives. No formal complaints were filed at the PS observed by the EU EOM during opening, voting, and counting. According to the IEC, 44 violations were referred to the public prosecutor. At the closing of the polling, the IEC announced final turnout at 32.25 per cent of voters. The EU EOM observed the tabulation process at LED and GED levels and will continue to follow the post-election process.

*An electronic version of this Preliminary Statement is available on the Mission website (jordan2024.eueom.eu).
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