

Submission For The 2022 Schuman Challenge

Essay Question:

Paradigm Shift? What does the EU's response to the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine mean for the future of its foreign policy?

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## Introduction

This analysis will argue that the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has caused paradigm shifts in the EU's relations with Russia and Ukraine. These paradigm shifts led the EU to respond with a comprehensive sanctions regime against Russia. This in turn has implications for the future of EU foreign policy, especially as the EU starts to make investments in industrial policy to prevent future reliance on trade with hostile foreign powers.

### Paradigm Shifts From the War in Ukraine

The first paradigm shift caused by the war in Ukraine is the change in the trade relationship between Russia and the EU. The past 30 years have seen an increase in trade between Europe and Russia that began with the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994.<sup>1</sup> The EU-Russia relationship then proceeded to become increasingly indispensable over the past three decades due to a heightened economic interdependence.<sup>2</sup> However, as economic interdependence grew, it also became increasingly difficult to manage the relationship due to the inherent differences between the two sides.<sup>3</sup> In some sense, the relationship between the EU and Russia was always paradoxical. Through the 2000s the EU became increasingly economically entangled with its reliance on Russian gas while the two sides simultaneously moved apart in terms of values and national interests.<sup>4</sup> This is most clearly reflected in the dropping of democratic values in Russia, and the Russian gas stoppages in 2003 and 2009. Then in the 2010s Russia grew increasingly assertive and belligerent on the world stage in an attempt to regain its "great power" status.<sup>5</sup> This was reflected in its 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine was the next escalation in aggressive foreign policy by Russia. The resultant falling out after the invasion has ended decades of economic interdependence and reliance between the EU and Russia. The war in Ukraine has thus caused a paradigm shift in how Europe views its economic entanglements with Russia and other hostile foreign powers. From this point onward, the EU will make attempts to end its offshoring of key economic factors of production to hostile and unreliable trading partners.

The second shift caused by the war is the EU policy towards Ukraine. Prior to the start of the war, EU policy towards Ukraine was often dithering. The EU had made diplomatic overtures to Ukraine but also kept Ukrainians at a distance by denying them EU membership. The EU developed a formalized approach for Ukraine in 2003 with its "European Neighbourhood Policy."<sup>6</sup> This policy began with the EU promoting democratization, the rule of law, human rights, and modernization in its Eastern neighbours of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova.<sup>7</sup> However, Ukraine was never admitted as a member to the EU. In fact, the European Neighbourhood Policy was widely seen as a solution to the fact that the EU did not want to admit its Eastern neighbours into the EU.<sup>8</sup> Some statements made by EU officials over the decades hinted that EU membership remained a possibility, but this never materialized. The

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1 Serena Giusti and Tomislava Penkova, "The European Union and Russia: Engaged in Building a Strategic Partnership," In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), Edited by Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 120.

2 Laure Delcour, *Shaping the Post-Soviet Space? EU Policies and Approaches to Region Building* (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 53.

3 Delcour, *Shaping the Post-Soviet Space*, 53.

4 Delcour, *Shaping the Post-Soviet Space*, 58.

5 Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 281.

6 Fabrizio Tassinari, *Why Europe Fears its Neighbors* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 23.

7 Tassinari, *Why Europe Fears its Neighbors*, 23.

8 Keukeleire and Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, 250-251.

EU rationalized its policy towards Ukraine with concerns about potential destabilization in the East if it expanded further Eastward.<sup>9</sup> This left Ukraine in an unstable position between Brussels and Moscow with both sides making advances toward them.<sup>10</sup> In 2007 the Europeans decided to hold the 2012 Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) soccer cup in Ukraine in 2012. Meanwhile, Russia made overtures to Ukraine by offering membership in its economic partnership, the Commonwealth of Independent States.<sup>11</sup> This led the Ukrainian government to oscillate between each side with little hope for security or economic development.

EU policy towards Ukraine has seen a massive shift since the beginning of the war, and has been nothing short of overwhelming. The EU has provided €2.5 billion dollars in military aid to Ukraine,<sup>12</sup> over €500 million dollars in humanitarian aid,<sup>13</sup> and has taken on 7.6 million Ukrainian refugees.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the EU has undertaken a sanctions regime against Russia that has had dramatic impacts on the economies of its member states. All of this was done in support of the Ukrainian people. The war in Ukraine has clearly led to a massive sea change in the EU's policy towards Ukraine. Gone are the days of keeping Ukraine at a distance.

The third and final paradigm shift is the lack of fragmentation within the EU. Previous to the war in Ukraine, many scholars of foreign policy noted that the EU policy towards Russia has been highly fragmented. This is a result of the highly diverse group of countries that build up the EU's 28 member states.<sup>15</sup> Many scholars have noted that Central and Eastern EU members have often argued for a more assertive foreign policy against Russia.<sup>16,17</sup> This is due to the history of Soviet occupation in 10 of the 28 EU member states during the cold war.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, Western European powers have been more deferential to Russia and willing to do business with it.<sup>19</sup> This led to a divided chorus of voices that was interpreted by Russia to believe that the EU was inherently fragmented.<sup>20</sup> European fragmentation had been the case in past crises. The most obvious example being the Eurozone Crisis that began after the financial crash in 2008, which saw major disputes arise between EU member states over financial bailouts.

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9 Delcour, *Shaping the Post-Soviet Space*, 46.

10 Serena Giusti and Tomislava Penkova, "Ukraine and Belarus: Floating between the European Union and Russia," In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), Edited by Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 135.

11 Giusti and Penkova, "Ukraine and Belarus," 141.

12 Calin Trenkov-Wermuth and Jacob Zack, "Ukraine: The EU's Unprecedented Provision of Lethal Aid is a Good First Step," United States Institute for Peace, October 27, 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/ukraine-eus-unprecedented-provision-lethal-aid-good-first-step#:~:text=Over%20the%20past%20six%20months,provision%20of%20direct%20military%20assistance.>

13 United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Ukraine: EU launches winter shelter programme and boosts humanitarian aid by €175 million," Reliefweb, October 19, 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, [https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-eu-launches-winter-shelter-programme-and-boosts-humanitarian-aid-eu175-million.](https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-eu-launches-winter-shelter-programme-and-boosts-humanitarian-aid-eu175-million)

14 Omer Karasapan, "Ukrainian refugees: Challenges in a welcoming Europe," Brookings, October 14, 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2022/10/14/ukrainian-refugees-challenges-in-a-welcoming-europe/.](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2022/10/14/ukrainian-refugees-challenges-in-a-welcoming-europe/)

15 Keukeleire and Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, 283.

16 Keukeleire and Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, 283.

17 Tassinari, *Why Europe Fears its Neighbors*, 71.

18 Keukeleire and Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, 279.

19 Tassinari, *Why Europe Fears its Neighbors*, 71.

20 Giusti and Penkova, "The European Union," 122.

However, the EU response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has ended this history of fragmentation. The invasion has shown that European member nations, despite their overwhelming differences and diversity of views, are entirely capable of providing a unified response to Russia. The embrace of the new sanctions regime against Russia has been widespread throughout the EU despite the harm it has inflicted in European economies. Furthermore, the unconditional support for the Ukrainian people has also sparked a wide solidarity across Europe. Support for the war remains high among the European public.<sup>21</sup> This shift between a divided EU towards one of European solidarity against Russian aggression has massive implications for the future of EU foreign policy.

### The EU Response

These paradigm shifts have led to a unified and comprehensive sanctions regime against Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine. There are three types of sanctions: financial, trade, and the freezing of assets.<sup>22</sup> Financial sanctions include the removal of Russia from the SWIFT banking system.<sup>23</sup> Trade sanctions include export bans, which are usually targeted at firms but in this case target the entire country of Russia.<sup>24</sup> Lastly, the freezing of Russian assets was an attempt to prevent the Russian government from financing its war with assets it held in non-Russian banks abroad.<sup>25</sup> These sanctions have had a massive impact on the Russian economy. There has been a 4% contraction in the Russian economy in its second quarter,<sup>26</sup> but there will also be a level of unemployment, underemployment, wage cuts, and a drop in imports.<sup>27</sup> There has also been a widespread cost to Europe in imposing these sanctions because of the harm it poses to many European economies.

The goals of the EU sanctions regime are worth some consideration. Sanctions are economic tools of international influence aimed to achieve political ends.<sup>28</sup> The main goal is to inflict economic suffering to influence and change the targets behaviour.<sup>29</sup> Sanctions aim to achieve this goal by dealing maximum damage to the recipients economy to produce higher chances of succeeding in producing a result.<sup>30</sup> Connolly (2018) argues that there were five goals for the sanctions levied on Russia in 2014 in response to its annexation of Crimea and subsequent seeding of an insurgency in the Donbas. While the 2014 sanctions were far less comprehensive than the current regime, this analysis finds that the goals of the sanctions have not changed substantially. Connolly's work thus provides a solid basis to understand the goals of current EU sanctions on Russia. According to

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21 Martin Banks, "Majority of EU citizens still support Ukraine in its war with Russia – poll," BrusselsMorning, October 6, 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, <https://brusselsmorning.com/majority-of-eu-citizens-still-support-ukraine-in-its-war-with-russia-poll/26738/>.

22 Soumaya Keynes, Mike Bird and Alice Fulwood, hosts, "Money Talks: Who is winning the sanctions war?," Money Talks (podcast), August 24, 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, <https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/money-talks-who-is-winning-the-sanctions-war/id420929545?i=1000577232885>.

23 Keynes, Bird and Fulwood, hosts, "Money Talks: Who is winning the sanctions war?," Money Talks (podcast).

24 Keynes, Bird and Fulwood, hosts, "Money Talks: Who is winning the sanctions war?," Money Talks (podcast).

25 Keynes, Bird and Fulwood, hosts, "Money Talks: Who is winning the sanctions war?," Money Talks (podcast).

26 Dimitri Simes Jr., "Did sanctions really hurt the Russian economy?," Al Jazeera, August 29, 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/8/29/did-sanctions-really-hurt-the-russian-economy>.

27 Keynes, Bird and Fulwood, hosts, "Money Talks: Who is winning the sanctions war?," Money Talks (podcast).

28 Clara Portela, *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and why do the work?* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 1.

29 Portela, *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy*, 3.

30 Portela, *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy*, 36.

Connolly, the goals of the sanctions against Russia were to express disapproval of Russia's actions in Crimea and in the Donbas,<sup>31</sup> to recommit to the geopolitical status quo (i.e. to promote democracy, peace, human rights, and international law,)<sup>32</sup> to demonstrate Western Unity in the face of Russia's aggression,<sup>33</sup> to inflict economic pain on Russia,<sup>34</sup> and to deter Russia from continuing to meddle in Ukraine.<sup>35</sup> All of these goals still apply to the new regime of sanctions that have been enacted since the start of the war. The only addendum is that the fifth goal should be modified to include a Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory and an end to the war.

### Implications For the Future of EU Foreign Policy: Global Trade

The intensity of the EU response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in its comprehensive sanctions regime and the harm it has inflicted on European economies is notable. It is clear that the EU will take steps to end its reliance on hostile foreign powers for energy or other key economic components to prevent Europe from having to deal with economic entanglements with hostile foreign powers. Because of this, the EU will be reluctant to trade with aggressive foreign powers with different sets of national interests and values from this point onward. The EU will be especially cautious to prevent offshoring of industry and energy. This will cause a pull back from globalization as key energy and industry initiatives get re-established in a regional sphere on the European continent.

The realization that hostile foreign powers like Russia and China do not share values with the EU has led many powers around the world to try and ease reliance on Taiwanese semiconductor production. This is based on the fear that the PRC will invade Taiwan sometime over the next few decades. In the United States, the Biden Administration passed the CHIPS Act in late July of 2022 to invest in semiconductor production in America.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, the United States has also imposed trade restrictions to prevent semiconductor technology from being exported to China.<sup>37</sup> In response to this new global focus on semiconductors, the EU recently announced its own semiconductor initiative. The EU announced on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November 2022 that they will implement a €43 billion plan to foster the development of semiconductors in EU member countries.<sup>38</sup> The goal of this initiative is to produce 20% of the world's semiconductors by 2030. This plan marks a major shift towards regionalized industrial policy.<sup>39</sup> The EU and other global actors are now acting under the realization that having trade ties with hostile foreign powers that do not share their own national security goals or democratic

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31 Richard Connolly, *Russia's Response to Sanctions: How Western Economic Statecraft is Reshaping Political Economy in Russia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 57.

32 Connolly, *Russia's Response to Sanctions*, 57.

33 Connolly, *Russia's Response to Sanctions*, 58.

34 Connolly, *Russia's Response to Sanctions*, 58.

35 Connolly, *Russia's Response to Sanctions*, 60.

36 Justin Badlam, Stephen Clark, Suhrid Gajendragadkar, Adi Kumar, Sara O'Rourke, and Dale Swartz, "The CHIPS and Science Act: Here's What's in it," McKinsey & Company, October 4<sup>th</sup> 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/the-chips-and-science-act-heres-whats-in-it>.

37 Karen Freifeld and Alexandra Alper, "Exclusive: Biden to hit China with broader curbs on U.S. chip and tool exports – sources," Reuters, September 15, 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/business/exclusive-biden-hit-china-with-broader-curbs-us-chip-tool-exports-sources-2022-09-11/>.

38 Jillian Deutsch, "EU Nations Advance €43 Billion Plan to Become Semiconductor Hub," Bloomberg, November 23, 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-23/eu-nations-advance-43-billion-plan-to-become-semiconductor-hub#:~:text=The%20EU%20has%20an%20ambitious,continent%2C%20including%20research%20and%20production>.

39 Deutsch, "EU Nations Advance €43 Billion Plan."

values is a potential path to ruin. This is a harsh lesson being learned from the war in Ukraine, and the energy entanglement that Europe found itself in with Russia.

This feeds into the next point, that the EU will attempt to diversify its energy imports. After the January 2009 gas stoppage over the dispute between Russia and Ukraine, there were calls to end the reliance on Russian energy exports. The President of the European Commission at the time, José Manuel Barroso, released a statement calling for “the rapid development of infrastructure, diversification of energy sources and supply routes.”<sup>40</sup> This did not materialize at the time, but it is happening now. Today, Russia has stopped exports of oil and gas to Europe for several months while it continues its ongoing invasion. The resulting spike in demand for energy in Europe means that the EU will have no choice but to diversify its energy suppliers. Recent reporting shows a move towards this, as a Polish pipeline operator recently announced that gas began to flow through the Baltic Pipeline from Norway to Poland at the beginning of October 2022.<sup>41</sup> The Baltic Pipeline will allow gas to flow into Europe at a moment of astronomical demand for energy from Norway, a reliable member of the EU security community. The Baltic Pipeline marks the beginning of a shift some 13 years after Barroso’s initial call for action in 2009. This example, taken with the semiconductor investment, shows that the EU has taken major steps to pullback from globalization and invest in industrial policy as a way of preventing further entanglements with unreliable trading partners.

### Conclusion

This analysis has conclusively argued that the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has had broad impacts on the future of the EU. The sanctions regime imposed by the EU has led Europe to pursue a path of industrial policy on the European continent as an alternative to globalized trade with hostile foreign powers. This strive for economic self sufficiency will have long term implications for the future of EU foreign policy.

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40 Sijbren De Jong, Jen Wouters, and Steven Sterkx, “The EU in Multilateral Security Governance: The Case of the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian Gas Dispute,” In *The EU and Multilateral Security Governance*, Edited by Sonia Lucarelli, Luk Van Langenhove, and Jan Wouters (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 149.

41 Anna Włodarczak-Semczuk, “Gas starts flowing to Poland through new Baltic Pipe pipeline,” Reuters, October 1, 2022, Last accessed November 30, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/gas-starts-flowing-poland-through-new-baltic-pipe-pipeline-2022-10-01/>.

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