Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia*, Albania*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Iceland*, Liechtenstein*, Norway*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and San Marino.

The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2021/51, and Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 18 November 2021.

The EU reiterates its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and is determined to continue working with the international community to preserve this agreement of strategic importance for the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. The EU calls on all countries to support its implementation in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners. The EU welcomes the prospect of a meeting of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA on 29 November in Vienna, and the perspective of participants continuing the discussions on the modalities to ensure the return to full and effective implementation of the JCPOA. We welcome that Iran is finally ready to resume the Vienna talks after a delay of five months. We expect Iran to return to the negotiation table in good faith and with realistic positions, to allow for a timely conclusion of the negotiations.

The EU acknowledges the issues connected to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions by it. Alongside the verified full implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments, the

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* Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania as well as potential Candidate Country Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

* Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.
lifting of nuclear-related sanctions is an essential part of the agreement. The EU has fully upheld its commitments, including sanctions lifting under the JCPOA.

The EU remains gravely concerned that, for the past two and half years, Iran has been steadily undertaking a series of actions inconsistent with the JCPOA, and with severe and, in certain cases, irreversible proliferation implications. Some of these actions do not have any plausible civilian justification:

- the continued accumulation of enriched uranium, with increased quantities of material at 20% and 60% level of enrichment, far beyond the JCPOA thresholds; the pace of production at 60% remains particularly alarming

- the continued installation, testing and accumulation of uranium with additional IR-1 and advanced centrifuges, including progress related to two IR-6 cascades at Fordow and modification of their sub-headers that will enable Iran to change the operating configuration of the cascade more easily and to enrich to higher levels efficiently

- significant work on uranium metal, including uranium enriched up to 20%.

We strongly urge Iran to reverse all activities inconsistent with the JCPOA and return, without any further delay, to its full implementation, including of all transparency measures. We support the efforts of the JCPOA participants in addressing all relevant issues within the JCPOA framework. This, together with full implementation of the CSA, including modified Code 3.1 to its subsidiary arrangements, and immediate provisional application pending earliest ratification of the Additional Protocol is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial.

Transparency is a key element of the JCPOA. Accordingly, the EU recalls its deep concern at Iran’s decision to suspend, as of 23 February 2021, the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, as well as the provisional application of the Additional Protocol. This has significantly reduced the Agency’s access and oversight regarding sites, activities and relevant information and the Agency’s monitoring and verification activities have been seriously undermined. Additionally, Iran has not provided updated declarations and the IAEA was not able to conduct any complementary access under the Additional Protocol. For about nine months, the IAEA has been deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran’s activities on the entirety of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle. Iran’s decision seriously restricted IAEA’s ability to verify that nuclear material and activities in Iran remain for exclusively peaceful purposes. We urge Iran to implement all transparency measures, so that the Agency is in a position to resume the necessary verification and monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA, which is indispensable to maintain continuity of knowledge.
Preserving the Agency’s technical capability to restore and maintain continuity of knowledge for its verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments in the future remains essential. It is concerning that this is becoming a challenge due to the long duration of the temporary agreement reached in February 2021. In addition, we note with serious concern that the lack of access to the Karaj workshop continues to prevent the IAEA from ensuring continued surveillance and monitoring, which is indispensable for the Agency to be in a position to resume the necessary verification and monitoring activities in Iran in relation to the JCPOA while retaining continuity of knowledge, including with regard to the production of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows. We note that the DG reiterates that Iran’s unilateral interpretation is contrary to the 12 September Joint Statement reached between the Director General and the Vice-President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. We urge Iran to ensure full implementation of the monitoring arrangements agreed with the IAEA and provide immediate access to the workshop, so that the Agency can install replacement cameras. Retaining continuity of knowledge regarding the production of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows is of great importance.

The EU commends the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, objective and impartial work and wholly supports the IAEA’s efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We welcome Member States’ extra budgetary support to IAEA’s mission in Iran. Our concerns related to the treatment of inspectors will be addressed in the EU statement on Agenda item “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

The EU expresses its strong support to DG Grossi’s tireless efforts in the pursuit of a constructive engagement with Iran to enhance cooperation and address issues that need to be urgently resolved. We take note of the DG’s visit to Iran on 22-23 November 2021 and of his meetings with the Vice-President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The EU is deeply concerned at the inconclusive outcome of the discussions and at the lack of progress in ensuring IAEA access to Karaj which is urgently needed and in identifying a way forward to address outstanding issues. We reiterate our support to the Director General and unequivocally call on Iran to engage constructively with the IAEA without any further delay.

Chair,

The EU takes note of the Director General’s report and requests that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.