Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, Monaco, North Macedonia, San Marino, Norway and Ukraine.

The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report and DDG Aparo for the technical briefing. We commend the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, independent and impartial work. 

It is a key security priority for the EU to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. To that end, the IAEA’s verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear programme and its reporting on it is imperative. We remain committed to and stress our support for a diplomatic solution leading to an agreement that addresses and resolves all international concerns related to Iran’s nuclear activities. The EU encourages all parties to constructively engage in diplomacy. We call on all countries to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). The report shows that Iran regrettably has not made the necessary decisions to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA despite all diplomatic efforts up to 2022 to fully restore the JCPOA. Iran’s unabated nuclear advances over the last five years are of utmost concern. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region is increasing as a result of Iran’s escalating nuclear trajectory. 

The EU remains deeply concerned by the continued alarming expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has gravely departed from its JCPOA commitments and has gained irreversible knowledge. The EU notes with particular concern Iran’s significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium and the expansion of its nuclear enrichment capability and operations. The DG’s report again documents a significant increase of material enriched at 60%. Iran has accumulated more than 9 Significant Quantities of material enriched at 60%, which the Agency defines as the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. Iran is currently producing over one Significant Quantity of highly enriched uranium every month. These actions have no credible civilian justification and carry very significant proliferation-related risks. They add to the complexity of the serious findings outlined in the Agency´s comprehensive report on Iran´s NPT safeguards agreement. In this context, the statements made by former high-level Iranian officials about Iran having all capabilities to assemble a nuclear weapon raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions.

Chair,

Iran has stopped the implementation of its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA. As a consequence of this, for more than four years, the Agency has been unable to carry out several key JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities. Due to Iran’s decision whereby all of the Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment has been removed, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium concentrate, which it will not be possible to restore. This has detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We reiterate our grave concerns in this regard. 

Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon State to produce and accumulate highly enriched uranium in significantly increased amounts. This is of serious concern to the Director General, and also to us. In light of these multiple and grave concerns, we strongly urge Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory and return to its nuclear-related commitments. We also urge Iran to return to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, to ratify it, and to resume implementation of all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures. This, together with full implementation of the legally binding CSA and modified Code 3.1, of the General Part of its Subsidiary Arrangements, is essential in order to address serious doubts about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. 

Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. The EU wholly supports the IAEA's efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We reiterate our support for the Director General’s efforts in the pursuit of a constructive engagement with Iran to achieve the necessary cooperation and address issues that need to be urgently resolved. We unequivocally call on Iran to engage effectively with the IAEA without any further delay. 

With this, we take note of the Director General's report and request that it be made public. 

Thank you, Chair.