Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, and Ukraine.

The European Union thanks the Director General for his update on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran and commends the DG and the Secretariat for their professional, independent and impartial work in verifying Iran's safeguards obligations. 

The EU remains gravely concerned that the Agency is at an impasse with regards to resolving outstanding safeguards issues due to Iran’s protracted lack of cooperation. This means that the Agency is not in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. It is deeply regrettable that, despite five Board resolutions and numerous opportunities over more than five years, Iran has so far not clarified these issues by providing full and technically credible explanations. This would enable the Agency to confirm the correctness and completeness of its declarations. The situation is all the more worrying in light of statements made by Iranian officials about Iran’s capacity to assemble a nuclear weapon. 

The Board decided in its November 2022 resolution that it was essential and urgent that Iran clarifies all outstanding safeguards issues. These issues relate to unexplained nuclear-related activities at multiple undeclared locations involving undeclared nuclear material, which may still exist in Iran today, outside Agency safeguards. Iran’s continued failure to cooperate remains deeply concerning. As reaffirmed by the Board in its last resolution in November 2024, Iran must act to fulfil its legal obligations by providing all necessary information and access without delay. This is essential for the Agency to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material. 

We urge Iran to resume the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and to bring it into force, to enable the Agency to provide credible assurances on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. We stress that Iran’s unilateral decision to stop the implementation of modified Code 3.1 is in contravention of its legal obligations set out in the Safeguards Agreement and in the Subsidiary Arrangements. This significantly obstructs the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. 

We are concerned by the Agency’s findings of nuclear material unaccounted for in the material balance of Iran’s undeclared uranium metal production activities at JHL, and that there has been no progress towards resolving the discrepancy. We call on Iran to urgently clarify this issue instead of rejecting the Agency’s evaluation results. We underscore the value of the Agency’s technical expertise and independent authority to investigate these issues.

We echo the DG’s deep regret that Iran, despite having initially accepted to consider it, it has finally refused the designation of four additional experienced inspectors recently proposed by the Agency. It is deeply regretful that Iran has not reversed its previous decision to withdraw the designations of several experienced Agency inspectors, as requested by the Board and the DG. This measure directly and seriously affects the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran effectively, in particular at the enrichment facilities.

It is highly concerning that Iran’s implementation of the March 2023 Joint Statement lacked any significant progress in the past two years. We echo the DG’s call upon Iran to urgently implement the Joint Statement through serious engagement.

To conclude, we are grateful for and fully support the Agency’s long-standing efforts to remain open to constructive engagement with Iran and to seek progress, in particular to address Iran’s persistent failure to cooperate with the Agency towards the clarification of all outstanding safeguards issues. We look forward to the publication, as soon as possible, of the Director General’s comprehensive and updated assessment for the Board’s consideration of next steps on these issues. The EU urges Iran to use this opportunity and to cooperate with the Agency swiftly and substantially, towards full compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) obligations. It remains essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran delivers on the actions specified in the resolutions adopted by the Board since 2020. 

With this, the EU looks forward to additional reporting from the Director General and requests that this report be made public. 

Thank you, Chair.