Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia^*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina^*, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

The current complex security environment, which is marked by the Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, by increased tensions and continued proliferation of crises, underscores the need to preserve and further strengthen general arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation processes.

A key priority for the EU is to uphold and preserve the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes, promote its universalisation and strengthen its implementation. We reiterate the EU’s strong, resolute and continuous support for all three pillars of the NPT and will continue to promote comprehensive, balanced and substantive full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan, which is a collective responsibility shared by all States Parties to the NPT without exception. We stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, and commitments from previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security.

The EU deeply regrets that no consensual report was adopted at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee, due to an unconstructive attitude of some States-Parties. We however appreciate the reflections by the Chair to structure discussion at the second session of the Preparatory Committee. Although disappointed by no outcome at the recent Working Group on further strengthening the NPT review process, we were encouraged by the constructive and meaningful engagement of an overwhelming majority of States Parties, including some nuclear weapons states. Both processes resulted in broad cross-regional, nearly unanimous support for the objective of further developing recommendations and reviewing the implementation of previous NPT obligations and commitments, including on transparency and accountability. We need to move forward within the framework of the next Preparatory Committee sessions, in order to achieve tangible results. The Chair´s Factual Summary from the Working Group is a useful, strong and balanced basis in this respect.

The EU condemns in the strongest possible way Russia’s illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia´s actions and threats to use nuclear force are provocative, dangerous, escalatory and entirely unacceptable. We also wish to recall that last year, on 3 January 2022, Russia signed up to the joint statement by the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon states – reaffirming, inter alia, that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. Furthermore, it reiterated this commitment in a Joint Statement with China on 22 March 2023. We call upon Russia to respect the commitments contained therein along with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter.

In the same vein, the EU condemns the announced deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus, inconsistent with the commitment Belarus made in the Budapest Memorandum “to eliminate all nuclear weapons from [its] territory”. These steps further demonstrate how Russia’s reckless, unlawful and deliberate actions undermine international peace and security. Belarus can still make the choice to reverse its decision to host Russian nuclear weapons. We therefore call on the Belarus authorities to put an immediate stop to their support of Russia's unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and reverse any decision that would contribute to heightening tensions in the region.

Mr. Chair,

The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

EU Member States remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. We stress the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals. The EU recalls Action 5 of the NPT 2010 Action Plan, which inter alia calls upon nuclear weapons states to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence. In this regard, the EU acknowledges the efforts thus far by some nuclear-weapon states, including France, to demonstrate increased transparency on their doctrines and the nuclear weapons they possess and calls on others to do likewise.

The reduction of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals under the New START Treaty, enhanced notably by its robust verification mechanism, contributes to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of deployed nuclear weapons. The EU is deeply concerned about Russia’s suspension of the New START Treaty. We call on Russia to immediately return to compliance with the New START Treaty and fulfil all its obligations.

Given the rapid and extensive build-up of China’s nuclear arsenal, we call on China to join future arms control agreements and to respond positively to calls for an arms control dialogue as a first step. We urge China to immediately take measures to improve transparency on its nuclear weapons and doctrine, to refrain from further build-up, which is not in line with its commitments under the NPT, and to pursue risk reduction measures.

The EU recognizes that negative security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and calls on all nuclear weapon States that have not done so yet to reaffirm existing security assurances noted by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The EU acknowledges the critical importance of existing nuclear weapons free zones for peace and security and remains committed to the implementation of the Resolution on Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

The EU reiterates its resolute commitment to and continued support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture, endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council through its resolution 2231 (2015). As a key security priority, the EU will continue to invest diplomatically and politically to ensure that Iran does not develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. In this regard, we are deeply concerned by the successive and recent IAEA reports documenting the alarming level of Iran’s nuclear programme, including the most recent worrisome information about the regression in implementation of provisions of the IAEA’s NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region has further increased as a result of Iran’s nuclear trajectory. We strongly urge Iran to reverse its nuclear trajectory and to return to its legal obligations and political commitments. The EU calls on all countries to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). The EU also condemns the recent de-designation of several IAEA inspectors by Iran, which is another step in the wrong direction as it undermines Agency’s ability to carry out its safeguards mandate effectively.

The EU deeply regrets that the Syrian Arab Republic still needs to remedy its longstanding non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement under the NPT. We once again urge the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues. Moreover, in order to rebuild confidence in its nuclear programme, we call on the Syrian Arab Republic to bring into force an Additional Protocol to its NPT Safeguards Agreement without further delay, in line with the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of June 2011.

The DPRK can never have the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons, any other weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We call on the DPRK to return to compliance with the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and to sign and ratify an Additional Protocol thereto. We urge the DPRK to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay. The EU urges the DPRK to resume meaningful dialogue with all the main parties. The EU is ready to work with all relevant partners and promote any meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Chair,

Promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a key priority for the EU. We call on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex 2, to sign and ratify the CTBT without preconditions or further delay. We therefore urge all States to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We welcome the latest ratifications by the Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka and Somalia. We reiterate our full confidence in the CTBT's verification regime, which the EU supports financially. The EU is deeply concerned with the recent announcements of the Russian Federation regarding a possible reconsideration of its ratification of the
CTBT. As mentioned by the Executive Secretary in his recent statements on this matter, “it would be concerning and deeply unfortunate if any State Signatory were to reconsider its ratification of the CTBT. The CTBT has established a powerful norm against nuclear testing and is making an invaluable contribution to international peace and security, for the good of humanity”.

In addition, the EU calls for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. We support the start of the negotiations in accordance with document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. Pending a future FMCT in force, the EU calls on China and all other States concerned to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices.

Furthermore, we will continue to support the actions taken by the number of states, including the EU Member States, to consider the role of nuclear verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and support further efforts in all relevant fora, including the Group of Governmental Experts, the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) format and the NuDiVe initiative.

Lastly, the IAEA safeguards system is an indispensable component of the International nuclear non-proliferation regime and the EU strongly supports its strengthening. The EU stresses that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol constitute the current verification standard under the NPT and calls for their universalisation without delay.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.

* North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.