Mr. Chair, 

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries North Macedonia*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina^*, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

The EU strongly supports all three pillars of the NPT and will continue to promote a comprehensive, balanced, and substantive full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. We stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT and commitments from previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security.

The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use, and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

The EU condemns in the strongest possible way Russia’s actions, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear force in its illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which are provocative, dangerous and escalatory. This further demonstrates how Russia’s actionsrepeatedly undermine international peace and security and erode arms control mechanisms, security assurances, and underscores the urgent need to strengthen our defence in order to protect our societies. We urge Russia to abide by the principles enshrined in the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races that it co-authored in January 2022.

We are deeply concerned by Russia’s announced deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarussian territory. We recall the commitment Belarus made in the Budapest Memorandum ‘to eliminate all nuclear weapons from [its] territory’. We call on Russia and Belarus to reverse this decision and to abide by all their commitments. We also call on Belarus, DPRK, and Iran to put an immediate stop to their direct military assistance, and on China and other countries to refrain from providing material support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to reverse any decision that would contribute to heightening existing tensions in the region. 

Mr. Chair,

EU Member States remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. We stress the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals.

Less than a year from now, the New START Treaty will expire. The world could be for the first time in decades without an agreed framework for nuclear arms control between the US and Russia. Recalling the obligations for all nuclear weapon States arising from Article VI of the NPT, we underline that the two nuclear weapon States with the largest arsenals hold a special responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The EU strongly encourages seeking further reductions to their arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, and to pursue further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction, and verification activities, laying the ground for even more robust and ambitious future arms control agreements and reporting. We underscore the importance of a successor agreement to New START in the interest of international peace and security and for the prevention of a new nuclear arms race. We welcome the repeated offers for dialogue by the US. We call on China to actively contribute to these processes.

Indeed, we remain deeply concerned about the rapid and opaque expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, which casts serious doubt about its strategic objectives and is inconsistent with its disarmament commitments under the NPT. China’s lack of transparency over its nuclear doctrine, policies, and expanding arsenal raises questions about the credibility of its declared ‘No First Use’ policy and fuels mistrust. Concrete actions and meaningful engagement need to underpin doctrinal statements to build confidence. We therefore urge for clarity and meaningful engagement from China regarding its nuclear capabilities, as well as the role and significance of nuclear weapons in its doctrines and policies, including in relation to its stated No-First Use policy and nuclear posture. As the holder of the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal and a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, China must enhance transparency and establish necessary communication lines to prevent misperceptions and clarify its strategic objectives. We urge China to engage in arms control dialogue, improve information-sharing, and halt further expansion of its nuclear arsenal. 

The EU recalls Action 5 of the NPT 2010 Action Plan, which inter alia calls upon nuclear-weapons States to further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence. The EU acknowledges the efforts by some nuclear-weapon States, including France, to demonstrate increased transparency on their doctrines and the nuclear weapons they possess, and calls on others to do likewise, noting the proposals in the EU’s working paper on the subject (NPT.CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.1).

Mr. Chair,

Moreover, we call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. Pending a future FMCT in force, the EU calls on China – as the only nuclear-weapon State that has not yet done so - and all other States concerned to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices, as elaborated in the Working Paper entitled ‘Towards an FMCT: Advancing the objective of stopping fissile material production for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in this NPT Review Cycle’ (NPT.CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.6) submitted on behalf of the EU and a number of NPT States Parties.

As we highlight in the Working Paper on The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (NPT/CONF.2026/PCIII/WP.3) submitted jointly with a number of NPT States Parties, the EU stresses the need to promote universal adherence to and the entry into force of the CTBT, and that to this end all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex 2, need to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay. In the meantime, we call on all States to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion and to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, we deeply deplore Russia’s unprecedented decision to revoke its ratification of the CTBT and expect Russia to respect the object and purpose of the Treaty and maintain its contribution to the International Monitoring System (IMS).

We would like to highlight the benefits of concrete work on risk reduction and therefore the urgent need for all States concerned to discuss, agree and implement practical measures to that end, as inter alia outlined in Action 5 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

Multilateral cooperation is of great value in advancing nuclear disarmament verification. We will continue to support the actions taken by a number of States, including EU Member States, to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and support further efforts in all relevant fora, including the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the Quad nuclear verification partnership and the NuDiVe exercise. While verification is not an end in itself, further development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities would facilitate progress on nuclear disarmament. The EU looks forward to constructive engagement in the discussions on the establishment of a UN Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

The EU recognises the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal security assurances from nuclear-weapon States as part of binding and agreed security arrangements. We stress the importance of continued reaffirmation by nuclear-weapon States of their existing security assurances noted by relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Finally, the EU supports disarmament and non-proliferation education, to which the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium is contributing with various activities.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

* North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.