EU Statement – UN Third Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): General Statement

28 April 2025, New York – European Union General Statement at the Third Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 28 April – 09 May 2025

 

 

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of the chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Rest assured of the EU’s full support in ensuring that this PrepCom paves the way for a successful outcome, including ways to strengthen the review process, next year.

The EU remains united in its unequivocal support to uphold and strengthen the Treaty, which remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article VI, and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. The NPT has enduring value and its universalisation and full implementation is needed now more than ever, particularly in view of the ongoing destructive and destabilising actions by Russia, and continuing proliferation crisesWe call upon the remaining States to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms.

We are committed to constructively and meaningfully engage in a comprehensive manner on all thematic priorities under the Treaty. In particular, we are convinced that improving transparency and accountability in the implementation of NPT obligations and all commitments of the 2010 Action Plan is a collective responsibility shared by all States Parties to the NPT.

Risk reduction measures are not a replacement for concrete measures on nuclear disarmament. We support work on risk reduction, call for the entry into force of the CTBT, and the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Any return to nuclear testing would constitute a grave threat to international peace and security and to the global efforts towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The norm against testing must be upheld. Pending a future FMCT in force, the EU calls on all States concerned to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU recognizes that negative security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and emphasises the importance of existing nuclear weapons free zones.

Mr. Chair,

The EU reiterates its resolute condemnation of Russia’s brutal and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, with Belarus’ complicity, and support by other third countries, actors and entities therein

including arms transfers, and ballistic missiles and deepening military cooperation with the DPRK and Iran. The EU reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence. We reaffirm our support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, in line with Ukraine’s Peace Formula. It is essential that no initiative regarding Ukraine be taken without Ukraine.

We urge Russia, a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council with the responsibility to uphold the UN Charter, to reverse its destabilizing actions that undermine international law, including its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Russia must immediately return to compliance with the New START Treaty and fulfil all its obligations. We call on Russia to revert its decision to withdraw its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and, in the meantime, respect the object and purpose of the CTBT. In order to reconstitute trust in negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, we call on Russia to cease violating its commitments under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, particularly its commitment to refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine. By not respecting its agreed obligations and commitments, Russia undermines the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as well as international peace and security.

Mr. Chair,

The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.


 

EU Member States remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. We stress the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals.

 

We remain deeply concerned by the rapid and opaque expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, which raises serious questions about its strategic objectives and is inconsistent with its disarmament commitments under the NPT. China’s lack of transparency over its nuclear doctrine, policies, and expanding arsenal casts doubt on the credibility of its declared ‘No First Use’ policy, fuelling mistrust. Doctrinal statements alone are insufficient; concrete actions and meaningful engagement are needed to build confidence. We therefore urge for clarity and meaningful engagement from China regarding its nuclear capabilities, and the role and significance of nuclear weapons in its doctrines and policies, including in relation to its stated No-First Use policy and nuclear posture. As the holder of the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal and a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, China must enhance transparency, establish necessary communication lines to prevent misperceptions and clarify its strategic objectives. We urge China to engage in arms control dialogue as a first step, improve information-sharing, and halt further expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

The EU remains seriously concerned in the face of persistent proliferation crises and challenges, which represent a threat to international peace and security, and underlines its resolve to increase non-proliferation efforts and to strengthen, universalise and render more effective the nuclear non- proliferation architecture.

It is a key security priority for the EU to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. To this end, the EU remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We call on all countries to support the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). The EU is gravely concerned by the continued alarming expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme and that, due to Iran’s lack of cooperation, the IAEA has lost the continuity of knowledge and is still not in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. The EU urges Iran to work with the Agency swiftly and substantially towards full compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement obligations. It remains essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran delivers on the actions specified in the resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors since 2020.

The EU reiterates that the DPRK must immediately fulfil its obligations under all relevant UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, while ceasing all related activities. The DPRK cannot and will


 

never have the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT or any other special status in that regard. The EU urges the DPRK to immediately return to full compliance with the NPT. The EU is ready to work with all relevant partners and promote any meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. We strongly condemn the arms transfers, including of ballistic missiles, deployment of combatant troops and military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, which violate UN Security Council Resolutions, and call on the DPRK and Russia to immediately cease these activities.

Mr. Chair,

We recognise the important work and central role of the IAEA and are resolved to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. The EU urges all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the international nuclear safety and security conventions without delay. The EU emphasises that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, constitute the current verification standard under the NPT and calls for their universalisation without delay. We also appreciate the IAEA’s support to make the most of nuclear science and technologies, mindful of the contributions to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Agreement.

The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls are top cross- cutting priorities and believes it is essential to integrate a gender perspective into discussions across the three pillars of the NPT. Improving gender equality in participation in the NPT review process is highly desirable and necessary to enhance the effectiveness of Treaty processes and their outcomes. To this end, we welcome initiatives such as the “Young Women Next Generation Initiative” established by the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. The EU is also the largest donor to the IAEA’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme and supports the meaningful and inclusive participation of young people.

In conclusion, we reiterate our commitment to further contribute to the work of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee, as well as throughout the whole NPT review cycle, with with the aim of making concrete progress towards the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

 

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.