Madam Coordinator,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia[*], Montenegro^* and Albania^*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Georgia align themselves with this statement.

We continue our discussion at a deeply worrying moment of Russia’s unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which threw the world into even more uncertain times. Russia bears full responsibility for the loss of life, the human suffering and all the destruction it causes in Ukraine. The international community will hold Russia accountable for its actions. The EU expresses full solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people and remains strongly committed to the fight against impunity for atrocities. We actively support the work of the International Criminal Court and measures to ensure accountability for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. There can be no impunity for war crimes.

Madam Coordinator,

The EU and its Member States regard outer space as a global commons, to be used for the benefit of all. Ensuring space security and preventing an arms race in outer space are essential conditions for the further exploration and use of outer space in a safe, sustainable and secure manner and for strengthening international peace and security in the common interest of humankind.

We recognise the critical importance of international law for outer space security and consider that international law, including customary international law, that applies to the use of force, also applies in outer space.

In this regard, we promote the application, implementation, and strengthening of international humanitarian law and human rights law in the context of outer space. The EU and its Member States underline that, without excluding the possibility of a legally binding instrument in the future, the most pragmatic, realistic and concrete way to strengthen space security and to prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations at this point in time, is to agree upon norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours and to increase transparency and predictability of space activities.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty and other applicable international law instruments, in particular the UN Charter, as well as the guiding principles developed in the UN framework, constitute the cornerstone of the global governance of outer space. We stress the importance of conducting space activities in accordance therewith.

The OST, emphasizing that space is to be used for peaceful purposes, in its key provisions provides the basic framework for international space law. These include the prohibition of the placement of nuclear weapons in space or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in orbit around the Earth or of installing such weapons on celestial bodies; limitation of the use of the moon and other celestial bodies to exclusively peaceful purposes; the principle that space shall be freely explored and used by all nations, the applicability of International Law, including the UN Charter, in outer space; and precluding any country from national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means of outer space, including the moon and any celestial body. States Parties to the OST have also committed not to establish military bases or installations, test any type of weapons, or conduct military exercises on the moon and other celestial bodies.

We also recall the importance of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation of 2002 (HCoC). This instrument, although non-legally binding not designed for outer space specifically, provides for transparency and confidence building measures, such as pre-launch notifications, on space launch activities as well as activities using ballistic missile technologies. The link between the HCoC and outer space is further enhanced as it requires subscribing states to ratify, accede to or otherwise comply with three major international space conventions: the OST, the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention.

In addition, the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU Constitution, 1992) has a role in controlling and regulating the use of radio communication and orbits for satellites around the Earth, specifically civil and commercial satellites.

Madam Coordinator,

We appreciate that experts in the Group of Governmental Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (GGE PAROS) in 2018 took a comprehensive approach in an effort to build bridges between various positions. Even though the GGE PAROS could unfortunately not reach consensus on a final report, its efforts should contribute to current and future discussions to enhance security in outer space.

The EU and its Member States reiterate that the current draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) does not constitute a sufficient basis for an effective, comprehensible and verifiable instrument. In addition, the proponents of the draft treaty have demonstrated that they already possess and that they are developing capabilities, which represent a real threat to outer space security, such as ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities.

The European Union strongly condemns the Russian Federation’s conduct of a kinetic direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test against its own satellite in November 2021, as a clear act of irresponsible behaviour in outer space. It generated a large amount of space debris that constitute a long-lasting risk for crewed and un-crewed space activities, including for the safety of astronauts and cosmonauts at the International Space Station. This action goes also against the principles reflected in the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and will jeopardize the free access to and use of space for all States for many years. It also contradicts the position expressed by the Russian Federation in multilateral fora. This puts the credibility of its stance into question. The conduct of such tests are dangerous and highly destabilising, as potentially leading to deteriorating the confidence between space actors, increasing the perception of threats. This could lead to potential catastrophic consequences. The European Union continues to urge all States to refrain from the irresponsible behaviour of destructing space objects that generate space debris in order to preserve the safe, secure and sustainable use of outer space for present and future generations.

Furthermore, one of the proponents of this treaty, Russia, just has demonstrated its willingness to blatantly violate international law in its war against Ukraine. Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression grossly violates international law and the UN Charter, and undermines international peace and security.

We also believe that the initiative "No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space" (NFP), currently does not meet the criteria for the transparency and confidence-building measures, as agreed in the consensus report by the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities of 2013. Again, this initiative does not address ground-based weapons targeting outer space assets.

A particular challenge for space security is a dual use nature of many space objects and systems giving rise to ambiguities of their intended uses: Certain systems and objects that are indispensable for the free and sustainable use of outer space might be misused to destroy or impair space assets of others. Both the PPWT as well as NFP initiative do not address dual-use or dual-purpose concerns. Furthermore, the NFP initiative contains no mechanism that would make it possible to effectively verify a State’s political commitment “not to be the first to place weapons in outer space”.

We recognize that, while the existing international framework related to outer space, and the legal regime provided for therein, play a positive role in regulating outer space activities, the above proposals are unable to guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, or to contribute to the enhancement of space security in order to preserve outer space for peaceful purposes for present and future generations.

In this regard, as legally binding instruments in outer space were often based on previous non-legally binding commitments, we emphasise that, without excluding the possibility of a legally binding instrument in the future, agreeing on norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours represent a first important step to maintain space security. It is the most pragmatic, realistic and concrete way to strengthen space security and to prevent misconceptions and miscalculations at this point in time.

We acknowledge that existing relevant international legal or other normative instruments should be strengthened to cope with current security challenges and rapid technological development. Therefore, we will elaborate on possible normative proposals for norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours in our future contributions to the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing Space Threats. We welcome the commitment of the United States not to conduct destructive, direct-ascent ASAT missile testing. At the same time, we call on all States to refrain from any ASAT tests. We will continue exploring ways and means to uphold and strengthen a rules-based international order for outer space.

The EU and its Member States remain firmly convinced that the most important immediate step forward is to continue the discussions on responsible behaviour in space. This approach will allow all States to enhance communication and dialogue, strengthen transparency and confidence with a view to narrowing differences and reaching consensus in order to create favourable conditions for possible future negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In this regard, we continue to support the process launched with UNGA Resolution 75/36 and welcome the adoption of UNGA Resolution 76/231, which is a timely step to contribute to the reduction of threats and risks related to outer space. The establishment of this Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), which we fully support, has paved the way for a detailed and inclusive discussion on reducing threats through responsible behaviour in space with a view to concretely improving space security and to contribute to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The EU has contributed to the work of the OEWG with two working papers on scoping as well as legal and normative aspects related to outer space.

I thank you, Madam Coordinator.

[*] The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process