Video conference of Defence Ministers: Remarks by the High Representative Josep Borrell at the press conference

20.11.2020
Brussels

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Good afternoon,

We meet for the second time this week. Again, it was an informal meeting, but we have discussed important topics with Defence Ministers: how the European Union can become a stronger security provider and [how can we] be better prepared for tomorrow’s challenges.

My portfolio as High Representative is, most of the times, devoted to foreign policy, but it is also about building a Common Security and Defence Policy. We do not talk too much about it, maybe we talk less [about it] because there are less pressing events, but I think that we have to focus more on this side of the role of the High Representative, because we really need to become a stronger security provider. We have to be better prepared for tomorrow’s challenges. For me it is clearer every day that we have to strengthen and to give more importance to this part of the role of the High Representative. That is why I have launched some initiatives.

Today, firstly, I chaired the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, an organisation created by the Treaty itself, it is in the Treaty. The main topic was the so-called CARD, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence. There are a lot of acronyms on the defence side of the European policy and we have to make an effort to clarify what this jungle of acronyms means. Today, the acronym CARD has been very much on our agenda, because it is the first ever defence review conducted at the European Union level that looks at the European defence landscape today and for the years to come.

We clearly see in this CARD report that European defence suffers from fragmentation, duplication and insufficient operational engagement. Just to give you an example of the many other data and comments that you can find in the CARD report: the United States has just one type of main battle tank (MBT), just one. Here, in Europe, the European armies altogether operate with 16 different types of MBT. In the maritime domain, we are operating with more than 30 different types of surface warships: corvettes, frigates and destroyers. The United States – that has quite a considerable navy - only has four. I could say the same thing about the air forces. You can see how much different it is from the point of view of cost, economies of scale, maintenance and interoperability. If the biggest army in the world, the United States, only has four types of warships and only one type of main battle tank, it does not make a lot of sense that here in Europe we have 30 different types of warships and 16 different types of Main Battle Tanks.

On the other side, when we talk about Member States’ engagement on the Common Security and Defence Policy in terms of personnel and expenditure, it barely represents 7% of Member States’ total operational commitments in all frameworks. This figure is a good example of the size of the engagement at the level of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

This is what we are trying to solve with our initiatives on defence, which I am very much ready to push, because we have a responsibility to protect and defend our citizens. And it is clearly [stated] in the Treaty that European Member States have the commitment to participate in an integrated and common approach to defence efforts.

This is why the review is so important and timely: it points out those areas where Member States can work and develop capabilities together and contribute to a more prepared, modern and united European defence efforts for the future ahead.

To go from words to facts and acts, the review identifies over 100 concrete collaborative opportunities in the areas of capability development, research and technology. Many of these opportunities will benefit our CSDP missions and operations.

We had the [meeting of the] Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, a young body that has to be in the public knowledge. We also approved the budget for the European Defence Agency for the next year, which is about €36 million contribution from the Member States directly.

Then, we went to the two specific work strands: the Strategic Compass and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO is more familiar to you than the Strategic Compass.

On the Strategic Compass, a lot information will be provided to you afterwards. Press material, we have even produced a video, factsheets and written information, because we would like to make an effort in order to help you understand and disseminate information about the Strategic Compass.

I think this is the first time that all the European Union’s intelligence services have been working and compiling a threat analysis. And our intelligence service has been putting together the information coming from the intelligence services of the Member States, both civilian and military intelligence services. This is a first of its kind and points us to those threats and challenges to the European Union’s security and its interests.

This is a classified document. It has been circulating among Member States, but it is a classified document. So, I hope, first, that it is not going to have leaks and, second, you will understand that I will not be able to comment on specific questions related to its content. But what I can say now is that it is with this kind of document that we can move forward in developing our response thanks to a better understanding of our security environment. It is a first step, but it is an important one.

The discussion of today was important in the sense that we could focus on what this analysis means for our work on security and defence. It is going to take a couple of years to finish this exercise. It is going to be something done with the foot on the ground and with information from all Member States’ intelligence services. I think it is going to be – if I can say it - more important than a strategic outlook or a document about a theoretical strategy. I would like it to be one of the most important deliveries during my mandate.

We need to go into concrete objectives. We need to have a clear understanding on how to respond to the growing threats and challenges that the European Union will be facing in the coming decade.

We will do this through the Strategic Compass, focusing on four lines of work: crisis management, resilience, capability development and partnerships.

This is only the beginning. This process will keep us very busy in the coming months until the end of 2022. As I said, you will have material in order to explain in more detail what it is about.

On the Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO is a name that is also in the Treaty and you are more familiar with that, because PESCO has been implemented during the last couple of years.

We approved today the Council Conclusions finalising the 2020 PESCO Strategic Review. This will be approved by written procedure, but this Strategic Review has been endorsed by the Defence Ministers today.

Now we start a new phase until 2025. Ministers have set concrete political goals and agreed to develop incentives for participating Member States to fulfil their commitments.

Ministers also supported my call to focus more on operational projects that facilitate joint deployment of forces on the ground.

We have 26 projects that have to deliver concrete results up until 2025. In the field of defence you do not have results in one year. It requires more time and these 26 projects, which are already in the pipeline, will deliver concrete results on 2025 horizon. Let me give you some examples:

The Cyber Rapid Response Teams, consisting of several deployable teams on alert and able to respond to cyber incidents in any Member State, including our CSDP missions and operations.

The European Medical Command, a multinational medical structure coordinating medical resources within the European Union and NATO.

The European Union Beyond line of sight (BLOS) is a land battlefield missile, a medium-range missile capable of delivering precision strikes beyond direct sight. Drones will deliver pictures and coordinate in real time to the operator and to guide missile strikes.

These are only three examples, but let me also remind you about the important Council Decision on the participation of third States in PESCO projects that was adopted earlier this month. I do not know for how long has this been on the table of the Council, but now we have a Decision that will allow the participation of third states in PESCO projects.

This allows us to invite third States to join those projects provided they meet certain conditions and provided that they can contribute to the success of those projects.

On current affairs, I updated Ministers on a number of important political developments in the operational domain.

On Libya, there is a positive momentum created by the ceasefire agreement, which has been in place for almost one month and the relaunch of a Libyan-led political process. We need to continue coordinating closely with the United Nations to define the best way to support this momentum, an unexpected but very much welcome momentum and a possibly a United Nations-led ceasefire monitoring mechanism when it will be established. We will work with the United Nations and support them as much as needed.

Second, on Mali, our CSDP civilian and military missions will resume their activities. They started that on 13 October following the launch of an 18-month civilian-led transition in Mali and having met all the conditions demanded by ECOWAS and the wider international community. The sanctions by ECOWAS have been lifted and we can say that the transition in Mali is on rails.

We also talked about the European Peace Facility. We are still negotiating the terms of the implementation of this instrument, which will provide us with the capacity to not only train, but also to equip the armies of our partners in places like the Sahel. [We also talked] about the status of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability. Both are crucial for our operational engagement.

We also talked about the situation in Ethiopia, which is becoming tougher every day. There are almost 30,000 people displaced from the Tigray region to the neighbour Sudan. My colleague Commissioner for Crisis Management, [Janez] Lenarčič, will visit Sudan soon in order to take stock of the needs and see how we can help Sudan to take care of this flow of people. There are strong military activities in Tigray with some collateral consequences in Eritrea. As you can imagine, we are following closely the situation there.

I think it is the content of a very intense meeting. For me, one of the most positive meetings that we have had, even thought it had to be via video conference. We have had to limit our deep analysis, but it was a good starting point that will continue in the following meetings - let us hope that they will be in-person in order to facilitate our discussions and interactivity among Ministers and the services of the European External Action Service.

Thank you.

Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-199287

Q&A

Q. On your assessment on the CARD report, how far are we from strategic autonomy based on the current report in terms of time and in terms of capability and political will?

My answer would depend on what is the content of the words ‘strategic autonomy’. These words have been used for many years, they were already in the conclusions of the Council in 2013 – seven years ago the Council endorsed this. They were also part of the strategy that my predecessor [High Representative/Vice-President Federica] Mogherini approved and the Council endorsed in 2016. It was clearly stated that Europe should try to work to build a strategic autonomy. So there is nothing new about it, nobody should be surprised. It has been there for seven years.

The problem is that different people understand different things about the substance of the concept. When you ask me how long it is going to take to be strategically autonomous, well it depends what you mean by that. Once again, it is not an issue of being independent, it is not an issue of leaving NATO or forgetting about our strategic partnership with the US that some people sometimes seem to be afraid of. No, it is a matter of building our own capacities to act in different fields, from pharmaceuticals to the military.

The strategic autonomy was born in the military field and that is why there is a big debate about how it is related to NATO. But now it is affecting a lot of aspects of our Foreign and Security Policy. It is related with our [autonomous] capacity to react in front of the threats, and with our capacity to give an answer to all the challenges we face, from cyber threats to the capacity of keeping technological independency and being able to face shortages on critical supplies. This is the wide aspects of Commission competences, Member States competences, it is something that has to be built on a comprehensive approach, avoiding sterile debates and going to the substance, adding substance to this expression.

Forget about ‘strategic’, I do not know what frightens more people, autonomy or strategic. The contrary of autonomy is dependency. Do you prefer to be dependent or autonomous? I prefer to be autonomous and that is what the Europeans have to understand: it is better to be autonomous than to be dependent. We do not want to be dependent, especially in some fields. We were dependent on [masks]. We were dependent on a single, easy to produce thing like a mask. And we were depending and we still depend on pharmaceuticals. We can’t be depending on rare materials and we should not be dependent on technology, and we have to be capable of defending our values and interests with a broad toolbox. This are the ideas that have to be taken in consideration, not only thinking ‘Ah, strategic autonomy means that you want to be working independently of NATO or without having strong links with the US’. This is the Manichaean approach to strategic autonomy.

Q. J’ai deux questions pour vous. La première concernant la PESCO et votre référence aux drones. On a vu que dans le conflit du Nagorno-Karabakh, la victoire est venue aux forces qui avaient des drones, qui les ont utilisés pour bombarder, qui n’avaient aucune opposition en face. En fait, le Nagorno-Karabakh est le premier conflit de drones. Ces drones étaient israéliens, fournis par les turcs. Alors, est-ce que l’Union Européenne va enfin avoir des drones ? Et pas seulement des drones d’observation, mais des drones qui soient défensifs, voir offensifs ? Je sais que, sur ce point, il y a des querelles entre États membres. Ma seconde question est sur le Mali, et quand vous faites référence à la facilité de paix. Si j’ai bien compris, l’idée de l’Union Européenne est d’équiper les forces armées des pays partenaires, notamment dans le Sahel. Il y a un problème, et nous l’avons vécu au Mali, c’est que les forces armées bien équipées font de coups d’État. Est-ce que l’Union Européenne peux prendre le risque de bien former des forces armées et de risquer d’avoir forces putschistes pratiquement tous les trois mois lorsqu’il y a un mécontentement ?

Par rapport à la deuxième, c’est un peu contradictoire d’entrainer des soldats pour faire face à des forces qui sont bien équipées, et puis les envoyer au combat sans avoir la même capacité du point de vue de l’armement. C’est contradictoire, nous ne pouvons pas entrainer les soldats sans avoir la capacité de leur fournir le matériel qui leur permet de faire ce pour quoi ils sont entrainés.

Une autre chose c’est la possibilité que, dans certains pays, les armées soient engagées dans des activités politiques. Ce risque existe toujours, mais il existera toujours avec ou sans la capacité qu’on doit fournir. On l’a bien vu au Mali. Ce n’est pas parce que nous ne sommes pas capables de fournir de l’armement que ça n’arrive pas. C’est arrivé dans le passé et personne nous assure que ça ne vas pas arriver dans le futur. Mais pour empêcher que ça arrive, il faut travailler dans un autre domaine, c’est le domaine de la bonne gouvernance.

Notre action dans les pays du Sahel et en particulier au Mali – ou j’ai eu l’occasion de m’entretenir au téléphone avec le nouveau président -, ne doit pas seulement entrainer et équiper les forces armées, mais demander des résultats concrets dans le domaine de la bonne gouvernance. Dans le Sahel, nous ne gagnerons pas la guerre si nous ne gagnons pas la paix. C’est-à-dire, si les gouvernements ne sont pas capables de fournir à la population des biens publics, comme la santé, l’éducation et la bonne gouvernance. Tout ça fait partie de la stratégie que nous voulons développer au Sahel, en étant plus exigeants du point de vue du résultat dans le domaine de comment les gouvernements remplissent ses fonctions régaliennes. Mais cela n’empêche pas l’autre.

Par rapport aux drones, vous demandez quand est-ce que l‘Union européenne aura des drones. L‘Union européenne n’a pas d’armée, donc elle n’a pas de drones. Vous voulez dires les États membres. Je ne peux pas vous expliquer en ce moment quels sont les équipements en matière de drones des différentes armées européennes, mais ce que je sais c’est que quand nous lançons des projets PESCO – et il va y avoir aussi dans le domaine des drones - nous parlons de projets qui sont développés dans le long terme. Quand nous parlons de drones, de missiles, de technologies de communication très sophistiquées, ça prend beaucoup de temps. C’est pour ça qu’il faut commencer vite, pour que PESCO fournisse un bon cadre, pour tirer des économies d’échelle et pousser à un moindre coup le développement de projets que, comme vous dites, ont montré leur efficacité dans le Nagorno-Karabakh.

Q. On defence capability, given that the rule of law question will guide the next MFF one must reasonably assume that Poland and Hungary will not benefit from the European Development Fund if their governments do not change their laws and political stance. My question to you, given that both Poland and Hungary are minor players in Europe Defence Security sector, do you think the EU will easily develop its defence capabilities without them?

For sure the European Union will be able to develop its capacities. There are many minor players in between the 27 Member States. If we want to build a common defence, we cannot start saying ‘this is a minor player, this is a bigger player’. Common defence is something that benefits all members of the European Union. If we develop defence capabilities in one country we are benefitting the defence capacities of the whole Union, that is the secret of a common defence policy.

I would not anticipate facts on this debate about the rule of law that was taken into consideration yesterday at the European Council. I am sure that there will be an agreement. I am completely sure that we are not going to block such an important thing as the Next Generation EU or the financial perspective. The European economy and society and also defence policy need the resources of these financial instruments and I am sure that the German presidency will have the capacity to find a compromise.

Q. J’avais deux questions. Sur la Libye, vous avez dit que l’Union européenne est prête à soutenir le processus de l’ONU sur l’observation du cessez-le-feu. Est-ce qu’on pourrait savoir à quel horizon vous pensez qu’on pourrait avoir une réponse et quelles sont concrètement les possibilités en matière de cessez-le-feu ? Sur Irini, est-ce que vous êtes content de l’engament des États européens ou est-ce qu’il reste encore un peu faible dans les premiers mois ? Est-ce que vous espérez que pour 2021 il y aura un engagement plus important des pays européens ? Sur la PESCO, apparemment, ça ne fonctionne pas très bien. Si j’ai bien lu quelques résumés du rapport, ce n’est pas les résultats espérés qui avaient étés engages il y a trois ans. Comment vous pensez que la PESCO va permettre de produire des résultats un peu plus efficaces ?

Par rapport à PESCO, il ne faut pas toujours voir la bouteille à moitié vide. La bouteille n’est pas tout à fait pleine, mais je voudrais la regarder de façon un peu plus optimiste et un peu plus objective. PESCO est une initiative très jeune, d’il y a à peine trois ans. Trois ans, quand nous essayons de mettre d’accord différents pays pour qu’ils travaillent ensemble dans un domaine aussi sensible comme la défense, ce n’est pas trop pour développer des projets qui prennent beaucoup plus de temps de ce que nous pouvons imaginer. Quand on parle d’un projet en matière de défense, nous parlons au moins de moins de cinq ans. C’est pour ça que nous disons que ces 26 projets que nous avons sélectionnés vont délivrer des résultats en 2025.

La révision stratégique c’est une révision qui touche le fondamental de l’affaire. Nous ne voulons rien cacher, et moi personnellement je dis à mes collègues les ministres, qu’il faut, à mon avis, se pencher plus sur les projets plus opérationnels, des projets plus directement en rapport avec la capacité de déploiement de force. Il faut s’engager plus dans des projets opérationnels, plus durs. Mais c’est normal qu’au début, on ne commence pas tout de suite par le projet le plus difficile, le plus long terme, le plus couteux et qui touche à la capacité même des États membres de choisir son arsenal militaire. Mais je vous ai fait référence à trois parmi eux, qui sont des projets opérationnels qui s’engagent dans le noyau dur de la capacité militaire.

Oui, il nous a manqué peut-être un premier temps de rodage. Il y a eu des délais, mais je pense que la révision stratégique a mis le doigt dans le problème, nous l’avons signalé, nous sommes bien conscients, et nous voulons relancer PESCO. PESCO doit être un peu la continuation, le CARD nous dit là où nous sommes et là où nous devons aller. PESCO aide à chercher le chemin et puis il y a le Fonds européen de défense (EDF), qui doivent permettre le financement de certains de ces projets. Ça ne veut pas dire que les projets financés par le Fonds européen de défense doivent être des projets PESCO, mais jusqu’à maintenant, 80% des projets financés par la Commission sont des projets PESCO. Donc il y a toute une constellation d’instruments, le CARD, la PESCO, le EDF qui demandent un peu plus de pédagogie de notre part, pour expliquer qu’est-ce que c’est, qu’est-ce que nous voulons faire et comment est-ce que nous le faisons. J’accepte la critique, mais je continue à penser que la bouteille continue à se remplir.

Par rapport à la Libye, le cessez-le-feu est une grande nouveauté. Au début, nous étions sceptique, mais ça fait presque un mois que ça fonctionne. La situation en Libye était stagnée pendant trop longtemps et maintenant il y a eu une véritable percée. Tout ça s’est passé sous l’égide des Nations unies, il faut le reconnaitre. Ce sont les Nations unies qui ont débloqué la situation, ce n’est pas nous. Ce sont les Nations Unies qui, tout d’un coup, d’une façon assez inattendue, ont été capables de casser l’impasse et d’aller au-devant d’un cessez-le-feu qui demande un mécanisme de surveillance, sinon ça ne vas pas tenir. C’est aux Nations unies de dire comment elles veulent le faire et quels sont ses besoins. Nous sommes à l’écoute des Nations unies. Nous serons prêts à aider les Nations unies. D’ailleurs, nous l’aidons déjà beaucoup. Toute l’imagerie [satellitaire] que les Nations unies utilisent, c’est nous qui lui fournissons. Dans l’Opération Irini aussi, dont beaucoup de renseignements aux corps techniques des Nations unies, c’est nous qui payons pour toute la logistique des discussions à l’intérieur de la Libye, c’est nous qui finançons le processus. Mais [le cessez-le-feu] c’est sous l’égide des Nations unies, d’ailleurs nous espérons qu’il y aura bientôt un envoyé spécial. Je ne peux pas vous donner les détails mais le jour où les Nations unies vont nous dire « j’ai besoin de ça », je demanderai à mes collègues ministres [des Affaires étrangères] s’ils sont prêts à fournier de l’aide, quelle aide et dans quelles conditions.

Sur Irini, là aussi je vois la bouteille qui se remplie. Parce qu’il y a quelques semaines, je me plaignais que j’avais seulement un bateau et un avion à temps partiel, et [début Novembre] heureusement nous avons quatre bateaux de guerre et quatre avions à temps complet. En plus, aujourd’hui la France nous a donné la bonne nouvelle qu’elle met à disposition de l’Opération Irini le port civil de Marseille, dans le cas où il faudrait accueillir un bateau comme celui qui a été intercepté il y a quelques semaines. Donc, ça va beaucoup mieux. D’un à quatre [bateaux et avions] c’est quand même une augmentation significative. J’espère pouvoir donner plus d’importance à l’Opération Irini, qui a reçue beaucoup de critiques, mais finalement, c’est la seule chose qui marche.

We will meet as soon as possible on the same topic and you will have a lot of information. I took care of trying to help you on having a good understanding on what is CARD, what is the review of PESCO, because with your help, we have to launch a more intense activity on trying to inform the European public opinion about the European defense efforts.

Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-199288

Nabila Massrali
Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
+32 (0) 2 29 88093
+32 (0) 460 79 52 44
Xavier Cifre Quatresols
Press Officer for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
+32 (0)2 29 73582
+32 (0)460 75 51 56