

# IMPETUS



MAGAZINE OF THE EU MILITARY STAFF, EEAS, BRUSSELS AUTUMN/WINTER 2016 ISSUE #22



THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY - CHALLENGE OR OPPORTUNITY FOR EU CSDP

EU MILITARY STAFF CONTRIBUTING TO EU FOREIGN POLICY

**THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY  
AND DEFENCE: THE CHALLENGE  
OF THINKING STRATEGICALLY  
ABOUT MEANS - P.2**

**THE EU MILITARY COMMITTEE  
ONE YEAR AFTER - P.6**

**NEW EU CSDP MISSION  
EUTM RCA - P.14**



Dear Readers,

We hope that you find IMPETUS 22 useful in increasing your situational awareness of what the EU Military Staff are doing, including EU Operations and Missions. If you have any comments on any of the articles, or indeed any suggestions in how IMPETUS could be improved, we would be very happy to receive both at the below email address.

Thanks,  
the Editor.

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# Overview of the Operations and Missions of the European Union 2016



**6** on-going military missions


**10** on-going civilian missions

More than **5,000** people currently deployed.

**17** completed missions since 2003.

**100,000** people deployed since 2003: soldiers, policemen and rule of law experts.

**Objectives:** keeping the peace, preventing conflicts strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, prevention of human trafficking and piracy.



All information correct as of Oct 2016



# The EU Global Strategy and Defence: The **Challenge** of Thinking Strategically about Means

BY PROFESSOR DR. SVEN BISCOP, EGMONT INSTITUTE

*Professor Dr. Sven  
Biscop, Egmont  
Institute at EDA  
Conference*



### **Sven Biscop**

Since strategy is about connecting ends, ways and means, the means constrain the ends. It would be unrealistic to set objectives for which the means are unavailable or cannot be acquired in time. But it would be equally unrealistic to underestimate the available means. To wilfully ignore one's potential is to handicap one's strategy from the outset.

Yet this is exactly what is threatening to happen in the debate about the defence implications of the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS). The High Representative, Federica Mogherini, aims to detail these in an Implementation Plan to be submitted to Member States by the end of November 2016.

### **Don't Mention the Battlegroups**

Once again, the Battlegroups, the EU scheme to have two battalion-size forces on stand-by, are absorbing a lot of attention. That is comfortable for everybody, for as the Battlegroups have been discussed time and again, the arguments are well rehearsed and no profound reflection is required. This debate by now can be run on autopilot. The problem is that even if the absence of any automatic availability of the Battlegroups could be solved (and it cannot, unless troops were hired on the EU payroll and put under EU command), two Battlegroups could implement but the slightest part of the extensive tasks that the EUGS sets to the military.

In what seems at first sight to be a positive development though, the brigade has made its entry into the EU debate. Proposals are on the table to increase the EU's military level of ambition from the ability to deploy two Battlegroups to one brigade. Four battalions instead of two, in other words: a doubling, yes, but still woefully inadequate to implement the EUGS.

In actual fact, a brigade does not constitute an increased level of ambition at all. For the point of comparison, the current level of ambition, is not the two Battlegroups. It is the Headline Goal that the EU set in 1999: the ability to deploy, and to sustain for at least one year, up to an army corps (i.e. 60,000 troops) and concomitant air and naval forces. The corps level is indeed the only appropriate scale when discussing the implementation of the ambitious EUGS.

Many are in the habit of ridiculing what they consider an unachievable level of ambition. But they ignore the fact that for more than a decade now, EU Member States have continuously fielded troop numbers, for CSDP, NATO, UN and coalition operations, which when taken together easily add up to the Headline Goal and more. Furthermore, even a quick look at all ongoing operations in which forces from EU Member States are engaged and the theatres in which the need for additional deployments is very likely, immediately reveals that the equivalent of – at least – a corps is definitely required simply to deal with today's challenges.

### **Don't Prepare for the Past War**

To this day, however, EU Member States cannot deploy such numbers alone. They can only do so if the US provides the bulk of the strategic enablers. And in practice they count on the availability of US forces and US political will to act as a strategic reserve as well. For contrary to good military practice, EU Member States have insufficient capabilities to simultaneously deploy troops up to the equivalent of a corps and have as many again in reserve in case an operation goes awry. In the military field therefore, EU Member States do not possess strategic autonomy.





*The delivery of the vehicles and IT equipment such as computers and GPS devices will help to enhance the Somali Coast Guard on-land capability and IT connectivity.*

Yet that is the objective that the EUGS has set: not only does the Strategy increase the tasks for the military, it also commits Member States to undertake these tasks alone if and when necessary. The need for strategic autonomy is obvious: regardless of who wins the presidential elections in the US, if one candidate considers statements about dissolving NATO to be a vote-winner, it means that for more than just a marginal segment of US opinion commitment to European security is less evident than it once was. If Europeans do not demonstrate the will and ability to do more, they are at great risk of losing their allies across the Atlantic.

But, the argument will be raised, once Brexit happens and the British contribution is deducted from the EU force catalogue, the corps level will definitely be out of sight, let alone strategic autonomy. For sure, British capabilities cannot be easily compensated for by the remaining Member States' existing capabilities. For one, however, British forces will not disappear, and Britain will still be in Europe, so when a crisis threatens the security of Europe, it threatens the security of the UK as well. If military action is called for, Britain is more likely to participate than not. So, while after Brexit the UK will most probably no longer be formally engaged in the Headline Goal process, a close partnership will be inevitable, to the mutual benefit of the UK and the EU.

Furthermore, together the EU27 still spend more than €175 billion per year on defence, for a total of more than 1.35 million troops. Even without the UK therefore, achieving the current corps-level Headline Goal – which, lest we forget, in 1999 was set for a Union of just fifteen – should be eminently feasible. This should be the case in the future, to achieve a new objective of strategic autonomy at this level.

Over time, for it would be a major mistake indeed to limit the EU level of ambition to existing capabilities today. An ambition is a project to be realised in the future. It is to guide the acquisition of new capabilities, in the long term. Now is the time to decide which capabilities Europe needs in twenty years' time and beyond. That similarly implies looking at the potential threats and challenges in 2035 and beyond as well, and not just at today's security environment.

### **Conclusion: Aim High**

The Implementation Plan stands or falls with defining the level of ambition: which military means are the EU Member States willing to devote to the implementation of the EUGS? Regardless of whether in an actual future contingency EU Member States choose to deploy through CSDP, NATO the UN or an ad hoc coalition, autonomously or with the US: if capability development is not set on track now, there will

be no European contribution in any scenario.

The first step is to think through the implications of the three military tasks in the EUGS – protecting Europe, building capacity in our partners, and responding to crisis – and to indicate the type and the scale of forces that they might require, now and in the future.

Protecting Europe, for example, can imply operations on Europe's borders, but as well a naval task force or even a carrier group to safeguard the sea lines of communication. Capacity-building can entail long-term efforts in several neighbouring countries, but also military cooperation activities with partners such as ASEAN, especially in the maritime area. Responding to (or preventing) crisis may require more than one long-term stabilisation operation, of at least brigade-size, in the neighbourhood, without forgetting that the EUGS also mentions contributing to worldwide UN peacekeeping. But it can also mean a high-intensity crisis management operation of several brigades and/or squadrons in the neighbourhood. These scenarios may occur simultaneously, so a high degree of concurrency is inevitable.

On this basis, the Implementation Plan cannot but conclude that the current Headline Goal, i.e. the corps level and equivalent air and naval forces, is the point of departure. This in turn allows quantifying the requirement for strategic enablers, which the EUGS itself strongly emphasises, in line with the objective of strategic autonomy. That objective also implies that EU Member States gradually provide their own strategic reserves. In combination with a gradual increase in the degree of concurrency that EU Member States have to be able to deal with, this can allow the Implementation Plan to give an indication of how the Headline Goal can develop over time.

Then comes the implementation of the Implementation Plan: Commission-funded defence research into future platforms, actual EDA-run projects to develop enablers, and ever closer cooperation among Member States' forces, which in time could be solidified by activating the mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation.

First things first though: setting a realistic but real level of ambition.

**Professor Doctor Sven Biscop, an Honorary Fellow of the European Security and Defence College, is the Director of the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels and a Professor at Ghent University. ■**



# The Changing Security Environment and the EU Military Staff

BY LT GENERAL ESA PULKKINEN, DIRECTOR GENERAL EU MILITARY STAFF

Lt General ESA  
Pulkkinen, Director  
General EU  
Military Staff visits  
EUNAVFOR MED OP  
SOPHIA



The security environment we live in is constantly changing. This naturally has implications to the EU and the work we do as part of the External Action Service (EEAS). It can be predicted that this demanding and fast-changing security environment will provide us with new tasks and demands. This will have to be balanced with possible changes in the European Union as a whole, but also here in Brussels.

It's not difficult to see that all three of these areas are closely connected to each other and it would probably be helpful to add a little more detail on each of them:

## Implementation of the Global Strategy

I see the implementation of the Global Strategy as the biggest single area that will affect our work in the near future. During the end of the summer and now into the autumn we have seen steady development of these ideas; indeed we have participated on many levels in its development and in the associated decision making and planning processes.

The EUMS will continue to actively contribute to the development of the HR's Strategic Implementation Plan to transfer the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy from vision into action. We will provide military expertise to the EEAS as well as to the member States through the Military Committee. We are all well aware of the complexity of this process. And it is crucial that the HR's expectations and the political will of our nations are properly synchronised. That is our responsibility.

The Global Strategy identifies three strategic priorities; responding to external crisis, building the capacities of partner nations, and protecting European citizens and territory. These priorities define the EU Political Level of Ambition. As you can imagine, this will require a full spectrum of defence capabilities to be realised. One important part of the implementation process is to characterise the required military capabilities to meet this level of ambition. The role of the EUMS in this process is already central.


We also have to make sure that we offer relevant and realistic military options to our decision makers, by thinking innovatively and without limiting ourselves to current solutions, and even more importantly, anticipating the possible limitations in the political decision making process. This political reality means that we will need to remain flexible.

What will be the end result of this implementation process? No one knows. But I am sure there will be changes that will involve the EUMS. They could be structural and/or procedural. Whatever the changes will be, I am

When I started my job as the Director General of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) in late May this year we didn't have BREXIT and we didn't have the EU Global Strategy. Things have moved very quickly since, and there is no sign of a slowdown in the near future. Even in this constantly changing environment the EUMS has continued to deliver and improve the high quality and professional military advice demanded by Member States (MS) and the EEAS structures. However, at the same time we have to make sure we are ready to meet the future.


We have just started what seems to be a very busy autumn within the military structures of the European Union and EEAS, and I can see three main focus areas for the work of the EUMS in the coming months, namely:

1. **Implementation of the Global Strategy**
2. **Ensuring the role of the military within the EEAS structures**
3. **Support to ongoing and possible new operations and missions**



EUMS Priorities  
September 2016 –  
January 2017





convinced that we will have an EUMS that will be even more prepared to meet future security challenges.

### Ensuring the role of the military within the EEAS.

In our daily work, we have seen that there is a growing appetite for military expertise within the European structures here in Brussels. This of course is, generally speaking, a positive development and something that we have to address.

However, as the DG EUMS I firmly believe that also in the future it is important that the EUMS remains the sole source of military expertise within the EEAS. This does not mean that there couldn't be military personnel working outside the EUMS. The objective however would be that the military personnel are attached to the EUMS and that the guidance on the substance and administrative issues would come from within EUMS. This I feel, would ensure a coordinated military expertise within the EU structures. I also believe that this is an important quality guarantee. Possible development and changes in this area are closely connected with the implementation of the Global Strategy.

### The EUMS support to ongoing and possible new operations and missions

Support to the operations and missions is, and will be, one of the most important standing tasks of the EUMS. Our soldiers, currently deployed to six military operations / missions are the key players when EU transforms our Common Security and Defence Policy into action. We are constantly following the development of the security situation in crisis areas and hot spots across the world to ensure we maintain readiness to provide the planning and support for the execution of any new missions and operations, should the requirement arise.

However, I feel there is one specific area we should closely explore in order to ensure that we can even better support our commanders in the field. I feel that the time is right to look at whether the EUMS could play a more active role when it comes to the direct support of the non-ex-

ecutive EU missions. This way we could better and more effectively support our commanders and their staff in their routines and allow them to use more of their time on their actual tasks in their area of operations.

If realised, this could also be seen as a first phase of the development of the command and control structure. In the future, as the implementation of the global strategy proceeds, we could look deeper for even more cohesion and synergy. A permanent civilian-military planning and conduct capability could have further impact on the role of the EUMS in command and control. We should prepare ourselves for this and I know we are doing it as we speak. It is called prudent planning. But we have to remember; all this is dependent on how the implementation of the Global Strategy actually proceeds.

### "We all deserve a stronger Europe"

Change is constant but somehow I feel that right now the speed of change is very high. All in all we should see this as an opportunity. Everything we do should aim at a stronger EU in the field of security in the future. We owe this to the citizens of our Member States. ■



*Visit of DG EUMS  
to the German  
Role 2 EUTM Mali  
in Koulikoro*



# "The **EU Military Committee** one year after"

BY GENERAL MIKHAIL KOSTARAKOS, CHAIRMAN OF THE EU MILITARY COMMITTEE

Chief Head of  
Defence  
(CHOD) meeting



*I am glad I have been offered the opportunity to contribute to the present edition of Impetus magazine as I strongly believe that audience scrutiny generates credibility. But beside that, we want the general public to sense how progress is real, rather than believing that little beyond the superficial has changed.*

*Broadly speaking, presenting tangible results to the average European citizen regarding his security feeling will boost support to the decisions taken; strengthen the support towards the EU and its institutions and double down on realizing the objectives set.*

Today, concern for Europe's security is at the top of our political agenda as instability in our neighbourhood is challenging freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights and has called basic principles of the European security architecture into question.

The open-ended conflict in Syria, political developments in Turkey, a fragmented Libya, the jihadist threat, the migration crisis, and the more assertive role of Russia - among other issues - have placed the region at the centre of European security concerns.

In the same light, terror attacks have spotlighted the dangers of violent radicalisation and highlighted that internal and external security are ever more intertwined, clearly showing that our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders.

Further, the nature of conflicts has changed dramatically. Hybrid warfare and non-state actors are playing an ever greater role. New technologies - offensive cyber capabili-

ties, armed drones, electronic, laser and stand-off weapons - carry new dangers. New combat scenarios - smaller units, higher fighting power, faster deployment - are to be included in our policies.

Since the EU Council on Defence held in 2013, a systematic consideration and inclusion of the defence dimension as part of the comprehensive array to conduct external action is being experienced.

In terms of the EU Military Committee (EUMC), I have witnessed good progress in a number of areas, which is encouraging. However, further progress needs to be made. Basing my analysis on the documents produced in my first year as

Chairman of the EUMC, I should highlight our contributions to EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in three different areas: the conceptual output, the support to CSDP Missions and Operations and the contribution to EU capabilities and partnerships.

First, a successful CHODs meeting in May allowed us to update Capitals on a number of ongoing work streams and seek guidance and approval for the further development of certain concepts.

Increased harmonisation of ongoing conceptual work with other projects across the EU is being pursued. In this regard, consultation and collaboration with other EU entities such as Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and European Defence Agency (EDA) has increased to ensure that relevant civilian-military developments in the EEAS and EU-wide conceptual framework are addressed in a timely manner.

In this respect and taking into consideration the increased operational output of CSDP Missions and Operations, we had specific demands to address identified lessons. In this respect, we made advances in key areas such as refining our procedures on Targeting, avoiding and minimizing collateral damages, the Security Sector reform (SSR) framework and for counter improvised explosive device (IED) for our missions and operations.

Further analysing the conceptual output of EUMC, I should mention the contribution to the initial drafting of the European Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy



(EUGS) both in terms of military advice and military expertise.

The EUGS has been welcomed by the European Council 29 June 2016 and a specific follow-up has been announced by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HRVP) by the end of the year. There will be further opportunities to discuss the topic namely at the Foreign Affairs Council/FAC Defence which will take place 15 November 2016 and at the EU council of December 2016.

Furthermore, the Strategy has delivered the starting points of a clearer definition of the EU's comprehensive Level of Ambition (LoA) to reach an appropriate level of strategic autonomy, to increase efforts with regard to security and defence, as well as to contribute to an integrated approach to conflicts and crisis, all this in concert with the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP).

The resulting capability requirements and identified shortfalls, inter alia, will constitute a key input to the Capability Development Plan (CDP). HRVP will allow mobilisation of EEAS, the Commission and EDA working with Member States from the very start.

At stake are the reinforcement of existing operational planning and conduct capabilities to meet the requirements of an integrated approach to conflict and crisis management and the improvement of synergies and a more efficient delivery of the Comprehensive Approach (CA).

Second, in the same light but on a different note, our Operations and Missions have remained our primary focus. The EUMC has supported this operational endeavour through military advice and the CEUMC being the main point of contact of their commanders.

Operations SOPHIA and ATALANTA continue to perform strongly in the maritime domain. ATALANTA decisively contributes to reducing piracy in the Horn of Africa and SOPHIA has extended its mandate in accordance with the recently agreed UNSCR and revised OPLAN.

Operation ALTHEA remains an essential guarantor of stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The two Training Missions in Mali and Somalia continue their task in a non-conductive operational environment and our RCA Mission has transformed from an advisory function to an EU Training Mission, swiftly settling in a very delicate mission area.

On the whole we can say that they have had a decisive impact in contributing to the broader effort of the EU Institutions in promoting democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights. More broadly, these missions are a successful showcase of the Comprehensive Approach highlighting that policy strategies such



*Chinese liaison officers aboard ESPS Tornado. EUNAVFOR ATALANTA*

as those for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel This confirms that efforts to update the EU's model of engagement are bearing fruit, ultimately allowing the definition of a single conceptual framework for external action and the consolidation of a shared vision among different Institutions.

However, to increase the impact of military training and capacity building missions, the provision of equipment, either through Capacity Building in support of Security and Development or other programmes must be assured. Mechanisms for the management of projects should be established, encompassing all relevant EU actors, including EU Delegations. The regional approach to crisis management activities should be systematically applied through the Comprehensive Approach.

On this issue the HRVP recently commented "our action will be coordinated and joined-up, in the spirit of our Global Strategy for foreign and security policy and the reviewed European Neighbourhood Policy. We are not only a donor but most importantly we are a political partner."

Third, EU-NATO relationship and the commitment to further strengthen it needs more work. The areas of cooperation, as mentioned in the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of NATO need to be also mentioned therein. The EUMC also encouraged the exploitation of every opportunity to strengthen cooperation in the practical / tactical level, also stressing the compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of the respective organisations.

The transatlantic link, its importance to the EU and the commitment to preserve and further galvanise it, needs to be mentioned in the strongest way to make clear that the EU recognises the USA as a strategic partner and ally.

Concurrently, the role of the United Nations as the lynchpin of our global engagement is broadly understood. The same applies to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), acknowledging its role in conflict resolution and in preserving the European Security Order.

**The importance of cooperation with regional security organisations, namely the African Union (AU) needs to be recognised in the paper. Advancing interoperability and compatibility should also be sought.■**



# Operation SOPHIA: the EU mission against human traffickers and smugglers commencing the supporting tasks

BY LIEUTENANT (NAVY) GIUSEPPE BISCEGLIA, PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER

*EUNAVFOR MED - SOPHIA operation, launched on 22 June 2015, directly involves 25 EU Member States and aims to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. EUNAVFOR MED is a four phased structured operation which, as outlined by the High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini, is but one element of a broader EU comprehensive approach to the issue of migration. "It is probably the first time the European Union takes the issue of migration so seriously", stated the HR Mogherini on 22 of June 2015, when operation SOPHIA was launched.*

The mission is divided in four phases, from intelligence gathering, to tackling human smuggling at sea and ashore and, finally, the withdrawal after the completion of the mission. On 20 June 2016, the mission was extended and rein-

forced with two new supporting tasks: the capacity building and training of, and information sharing with, the Libyan Coastguard and Navy, and the contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo in the high seas off the coast of Libya. Only two months later, the Operation Commander, Rear Admiral (UH) Enrico Credendino, signed a technical agreement on the training with the Commander of the Libyan Coast Guard and Port Security: the "Memorandum of Understanding between EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA and the Libyan Navy/Coast Guard regarding training of the Libyan Navy and Coastguard personnel by EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA".

On 30 August and on 6 September 2016, the PSC authorised the commencement of the capacity building and training, and the commencement of the contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo.

Contextually, the Member States have made many efforts to provide the proper assets to fully achieve the success of the above mentioned new tasks. Regarding the UN arms embargo, for example, there are some assets dedicated to the contribution to the UN arms embargo, in accordance with the UNSCR 2292 (2016), whilst regarding the training, Italy and the Netherlands will provide for the operation the amphibious ships San Giorgio and Rotterdam. Thanks to the spaces inside the amphibious ships and the accommodating requirements usually used to transfer the Marines, ITS San Giorgio and HNMLS Rotterdam are the appropriate assets to start the training packages agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

*The training activities will involve at first eighty Libyan Navy Coast Guard and Libyan Navy sailors, providing non combat training modules, typical of any Coast Guard.* ■

EUNAVFOR MED  
Mission Flagship  
ITS Garibaldi







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*EUNAVFOR MED - RAS Mission Flagship ITS Garibaldi*

*EUNAVFOR MED - Sunset from OP SOPHIA Flagship ITS Garibaldi*



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




Note: Missions/Operations in **bold** are ongoing. Dates refer to agreed mandates and do not mean that missions/operations will necessarily close on dates indicated. Information correct at time of printing in Oct 2016.

# EU Missions and Operations

Since 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 33 missions and operations under CSDP. 12 are military operations/missions. The remainder are civilian missions. Currently, the EU is undertaking 16 missions and operations under CSDP (6 military missions and operations and 10 civilian missions).

Operations	MILITARY MISSIONS	CIVILIAN MISSIONS
MIDDLE EAST	-	EUJUST LEX-Iraq (Iraq), Mar 05 - Dec 13 <b>EUPOL - COPPS</b> (occupied Palestinian territories), Jan 06 - 30 Jun 17 <b>EUBAM Rafah</b> (occupied Palestinian territories), 25 Nov 05 - 30 Jun 17
EUROPE	CONCORDIA (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Mar - Dec 03 <b>EUFOR ALTHEA</b> (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Dec 04 - Nov 16 <b>EUNAVFOR MED – Operation SOPHIA</b> . Contribute to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean, Jun 2015 - Jul 2017	EUPOL Proxima (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Dec 03 - Dec 05 EUPAT (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) followed EUPOL Proxima, Dec 05 – Jun 06 EUPM BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jan 03 - Jun 12 EUJUST Themis (Georgia), Jul 04 - Jul 05 EUPM Kosovo, Apr 06 - Feb 08 <b>EULEX Kosovo</b> , 04 Feb 08 - 14 Jun 18 <b>EUMM Georgia</b> , 15 Sep 08 - 14 Dec 18 <b>EUMM Ukraine</b> , 22 Jul 14 - 30 Nov 17
ASIA	-	AMM (Aceh Province, Indonesia), Sep 05 - Dec 06 <b>EUPOL AFGHANISTAN</b> (Afghanistan), 12 Jun 07 - 31 Dec 16
AFRICA	ARTEMIS (Ituri province, Congo RDC), Jun – Sep 03 EUFOR RD Congo (Congo RDC), Jun – Nov 06 EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad-Central African Republic), Jan 08 – Mar 09 <b>Operation ATALANTA</b> (EUNAVFOR Somalia Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia) Dec 08 – Dec 18 <b>EUTM Somalia</b> (Training Mission, Somalia), Apr 10 - Dec 18 <b>EUTM Mali</b> (Training Mission, Mali), Feb 13 - May 18 <b>EUTM RCA</b> (Central African Republic, Africa) July 16 - Sep 18	EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo RDC), Apr 05 - Jun 07 EU SSR (Guinea-Bissau), Jun 08 - Sep 10 AMIS 11 Support, Darfur Province (Sudan), Jul 05 - Dec 07 EUVASEC South Sudan, Sep 12 - Jan 14 <b>EUCAP NESTOR</b> , Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, 01 Jul 12 – 12 Dec 16 EUPOL RD Congo (Congo RDC), 01 Jul 07 - 30 Sep 14 <b>EUCAP Sahel Niger</b> 15 Jul 12 - 15 Jul 18 <b>EUCAP Sahel Mali</b> 14 Apr 14 – 14 Jan 17 <b>EUBAM LIBYA</b> 22 May 13 – 21 Jan 17

 <b>OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES</b> <b>EUBAM RAFAH</b> 	
TYPE	EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point.
OBJECTIVES	To provide a "Third Party" presence at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) on the Gaza-Egypt border, mandated to monitor, verify and evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) border police and customs services at the RCP and to contribute to confidence building between Israel and the PA.
MANDATE	Operational phase began on 25 November 2005. However, operations at the RCP have been suspended since June 2007 due to Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip. The Mission has maintained its readiness and capacity to redeploy to the RCP once political and security conditions allow. It supports capacity building of the PA's border agency to enhance their preparedness to return to the RCP. The Mission mandate runs until 30 June 2017.
COMMITMENT	The authorised strength of the Mission is 13, as well as 3 visiting experts. The budget for the period from July 2016 to June 2017 is € 1.5 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Natalina Cea</b> (IT).

 <b>OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES</b> <b>EUPOL COPPS</b> 	
TYPE	EU Police and rule of law mission.
OBJECTIVES	To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing and wider criminal justice arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the EU's institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector and Criminal Justice Reform.
MANDATE	Launched on 1 January 2006, the current Mission mandate runs until 30 June 2017.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Ramallah, the Mission has an authorised strength of 114 staff. Mission members include police experts, judges, and prosecutors. The budget for the period from July 2016 to June 2017 is €10.3 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Rodolphe MAUGET</b> (FR).



## Middle East





	<b>BOSNIA AND HERZGOVINA</b> <b>EUROPEAN UNION</b> <b>FORCE ALTHEA</b> (EUFOR ALTHEA) 
TYPE	Military EU-led operation.
OBJECTIVES	Under the authority of the Council and in line with the mandate, EUFOR ALTHEA supports Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) efforts to maintain a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), and in parallel, conducts capacity building and training of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) in order to contribute to the stability of the state.
MANDATE	In December 2004, EUFOR took over responsibility of maintaining a SASE in BiH from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The EU-led military Operation EUFOR ALTHEA is a United Nations (UN) Chapter VII mission.
COMMITMENT	In October 2011 the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) decided to keep the executive role to support BiH's authorities' efforts to maintain the SASE. By September 2012, the operation had been reconfigured with forces which, in addition, will focus on capacity building and training. There are currently 631 troops from 17 EU Member States and 5 Third Contributing States ready to carry out these tasks. EUFOR is backed up by the Intermediate Reserve Forces and stands ready to respond to any security challenge.
HEAD OF MISSION	The operation is conducted under Berlin+ arrangements, where EU Staff Group in NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) acts as an EU Operational HQ. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), <b>General Sir Adrian Bradshaw</b> (UK) is the EU Operation Commander. <b>Major General Schroetter</b> (AT) is the Force Commander (COM EUFOR) of EUFOR ALTHEA.

	<b>AFGHANISTAN</b> <b>EUPOL</b> <b>AFGHANISTAN</b> 
TYPE	EU Police mission with linkages into wider rule of law.
OBJECTIVES	EUPOL Afghanistan supports the building of a civilian police force operating under an improved rule of law framework and in respect of human rights. The Mission engages in two main areas focusing in particular on the strategic level: 1) Institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), 2) professionalisation of the Afghan National Police (ANP).
MANDATE	Launched on 12 June 2007, the mandate expires on 31 December 2016.
COMMITMENT	EUPOL Afghanistan's support is delivered by its police and rule of law experts from EU Member States in Kabul. Sustainable transition to Afghan ownership underpins all Mission's activities together with an emphasis on mainstreaming anti-corruption, human rights and gender equity. The Mission has an authorised strength of 289 staff. The budget for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2016 is € 43.6 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Pia Stjernvall</b> (FI). EUSR: <b>Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin</b> (DK).

	<b>UKRAINE</b> <b>EUAM</b> <b>UKRAINE</b> 
TYPE	EU Advisory Mission for civilian security sector reform
OBJECTIVES	To contribute to the development of effective, sustainable and accountable civilian security services that contributes to strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine, for the benefit of all Ukrainian citizens throughout the country.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 22 July 2014 and its current mandate is until 30 November 2017.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Kyiv with regional presences in Lviv and Kharkiv as well as mobile outreach to other regions. The Mission has an authorised strength of 255 staff. A budget of €17.6 million was allocated for the period from December 2015 to December 2016.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Kestutis Lancinskis</b> (LT).



	<b>GEORGIA</b> <b>EUMM</b> <b>GEORGIA</b> 
TYPE	EU Civilian Monitoring Mission
OBJECTIVES	Following the August 2008 armed conflict in Georgia, EUMM provides civilian monitoring of parties' actions, including full compliance with the Six Point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures on a countrywide basis throughout Georgia, including South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, working in close coordination with partners particularly the UN/OSCE and coherent with other EU activity, in order to contribute to stabilisation, normalization and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia.
MANDATE	Launched 15 September 2008, the Mission's mandate runs to 14 December 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquarters in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices in Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi. Currently 23 EU Member States are contributing to the Mission. The Mission has an authorised strength of 412. The budget for the period from December 2015 to December 2016 is € 17.6 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Kestutis Jankauskas</b> (LT).



	<b>KOSOVO</b> <b>EULEX</b> <b>KOSOVO</b> 
TYPE	EU Rule of law mission.
OBJECTIVES	As the largest civilian Mission launched under the CSDP, EULEX Kosovo's task is to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities with regard to police, justice and customs, while retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence.
MANDATE	Launched on 4 February 2008, the Mission's current mandate runs until 14 June 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Pristina, the Mission has an authorised strength of 800 staff. EU Member States and five Third State contributors Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA and Canada also support the Mission. A budget of €34.5 million is allocated for the budget period from June to December 2016.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Alexandra Papadopoulou</b> (EL)

	<b>CENTRAL SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN</b> <b>EUNAVFOR MED</b> 
TYPE	Operation SOPHIA – EUNAVFOR MED. Operation to contribute to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean.
OBJECTIVES	The aim of this military operation is to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers. Countering the smuggling and trafficking of migrants is one dimension of ending the human tragedy that we see in the Mediterranean sea. Currently 24 Member States are participating to the operation. On June 2016, the mandate was extended until July 2017 and reinforced with two supporting tasks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy;</li> <li>• contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, following the UNSCR 2292 (2016).</li> </ul>
MANDATE	EUNAVFOR Med is operating in accordance with the political, strategic and politico-military objectives set out in order to contribute disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. Jun 2015 - Jul 2017.
COMMITMENT	The flagship is the Italian light aircraft carrier GARIBALDI, 7 surface units and 7 Air Assets are at the moment deployed. In addition, the expected common budget from Jul 16 to Jul 17 is EURO 6.7 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Rome (Italy), Rear Admiral (UH) <b>Enrico Credendino</b> (IT Navy) is the Operation Commander and a Rear Admiral (LH) <b>acts as</b> Force Commander at sea.



 <div> <b>LIBYA</b>  <b>EUBAM LIBYA</b>  </div>	
TYPE	EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya
OBJECTIVES	The objective of EUBAM Libya is to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity to enhance the security of their land, sea and air borders in the short term and to develop a broader Integrated Border Management strategy in the long term.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 22 May 2013 and has a mandate until 21 February 2017. The Mission was temporarily relocated to Tunis on 31st July 2014. Current authorised staff is 23.
COMMITMENT	The Mission operates from its Headquarters in Tripoli (national staff only) and Tunis. The budget for the period from August 2016 to August 2017 is €17 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Vincenzo Tagliaferri (IT)</b> .



 <div> <b>HORN OF AFRICA AND THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN</b>  <b>EUCAP NESTOR</b>  </div>	
TYPE	Capacity building Mission.
OBJECTIVES	The Mission aims to strengthen the maritime security capacity of host countries to effectively govern their territorial waters and to reinforce their ability to fight piracy better. The Mission's efforts in Somalia concentrate on mentoring and advising Somali partners. This strategic level advice and mentoring is supported by the coordination and facilitation of specialised training to support capacity building efforts. The Mission is complementary to Operation ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia.
MANDATE	Launched in July 2012, current mandate runs until 12 December 2016.
COMMITMENT	The mission has its headquarters in Mogadishu with an administrative back office in Nairobi and a field office in Somaliland (Hargeisa). Authorised strength is 176, though currently deployed 48. The budget allocated for the period from December 2015 to December 2016 is €12 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Maria-Cristina Stepanescu (RO)</b> .



 <div> <b>MALI</b>  <b>EUCAP SAHEL</b>  </div>	
TYPE	EU Capacity building Mission
OBJECTIVES	The Mission supports the restructuring of the Malian internal security forces (the Police nationale, Gendarmerie Nationale and Garde Nationale) with a view to help Malian authorities implement their Security Sector Reform through a combination of training activities and the provision of strategic advice. In this, it complements the work of the EU Military Training Mission.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 15 April 2014 and its current mandate runs until 14 January 2017.
COMMITMENT	The headquarters of the Mission is in Bamako. The authorised strength is 140 staff. The annual budget for the period from January 2016 to January 2017 is €19.7 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Albrecht Conze (DE)</b> .



 <div> <b>NIGER</b>  <b>EUCAP SAHEL</b>  </div>	
TYPE	EU Capacity building Mission.
OBJECTIVES	Through training and advising, the Mission aims to improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces (Gendarmerie, National Police, National Guard) to fight terrorism and organised crime as well as better control irregular migration flows in an effective and coordinated manner, with a view to contribute to enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in Niger and in the Sahel region.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 15 July 2012 and the current mandate runs until 15 July 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquarters in Niamey and Field Office in Agadez. Authorised 127 staff. An annual budget of € 26.3 million was allocated for the period from July 2016 to July 2017.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Kirsi Henriksson (FI)</b> .

 <div> <b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</b>  <b>EUTM RCA</b>  <b>(MILITARY TRAINING MISSION)</b>  </div>	
TYPE	EU CSDP Military Training Mission
OBJECTIVES	EUTM RCA is part of the EU's comprehensive approach in the Central African Republic. This approach aims to contribute to the African and wider international efforts to restore stability and support the political transition process in the country. EUTM RCA follows the EU Military Advisory Mission in CAR (EUMAM RCA).
MANDATE	Launched on 16 Jul 16, its mandate expires two years after Full Operational Capability (FOC), on 20 Sep 18
COMMITMENT	In order to contribute to the Defence Sector Reform in CAR within the Central African Security Sector Reform process coordinated by MINUSCA, and working towards the goal of modernised, effective and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA), EUTM RCA provides strategic advice to CAR's Ministry of Defence and Military Staff, education to the FACA's commissioned and non-commissioned officers and specialists, and operational training to the FACA. It also coordinates closely with the EU Delegation in Bangui
HEAD OF MISSION	The Mission Headquarters is located in Bangui. It performs the functions of both Operational and Force Headquarters. The EU Mission Commander is <b>Major General Eric HAUTECLOQUE-RAYSZ (FR)</b> . He exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.



 <div> <b>SOMALIA</b>  <b>Operation ATALANTA – EUNAVFOR</b>  <b>Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia</b> </div> 	
TYPE	Counter-piracy maritime operation. First EU maritime operation.
OBJECTIVES	In support of UN Security Council Resolutions calling for active participation in the fight against piracy. The areas of intervention are the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean off the Somali Coast. The operation includes: Protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast; protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis; in addition, Operation ATALANTA also supports, as a Secondary Task, upon request and within means and capabilities, other EU missions, institutions and instruments within Somalia. Of note, Operation ATALANTA is not a Fishery Protection mission; however, its role does allow it to contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia and report this activity to DG MARE. Currently 876 staff members, 20 EU contributing states and 2 non-EU states.
MANDATE	Launched on 8 Dec 2008 - Dec 2018
COMMITMENT	Subject to Military Force Flow and the Force Generation process, Operation ATALANTA typically consists of between 1 to 3 surface combat vessels and up to 2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Common costs for the Operation in 2016 are € 6.3 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Northwood (UK). <b>Major General Rob Magowan CBE</b> (UK) is the EU Operation Commander. <b>Commodore Rene Lucykx</b> (NDL) is the Force Commander..

 <div> <b>SOMALIA</b>  <b>EU TRAINING Mission,</b>  <b>Somalia (EUTM Somalia)</b> </div> 	
TYPE	Military mission to contribute to the training, mentoring and advice of the Somali National Army Forces (SNAF)
OBJECTIVES	On 16 March 2015, the Council adopted the decision on a new mandate with the objective to provide political and strategic level military advice and mentoring to Somali authorities within the Defence Institutions, mainly specialized training as well as specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain, in order to contribute to the development of Somali National Security Forces.
MANDATE	The current mandate until December 2016. On 20 September 2016, a new mandate has been presented and will launch on 01 January 2017 and initially planned for two years, until December 2018, according to Strategic Review of CSPD engagement in Somalia and HoA. EUTM-Somalia shall not be involved in combat operations.
COMMITMENT	The mission comprises currently 186 personnel from 11 Member States and 1 participating third state (Serbia) + 17 local staff. The approved budget for the 2016 is 11,1M€. Since January 2014 all EUTM-Somalia activities including advisory, mentoring and training are now carried out in Mogadishu with the support of a Liaison Office in Nairobi and a Support Cell in Brussels. 5600 SNA trained so far.
HEAD OF MISSION	The Mission Headquarters is situated in Mogadishu. <b>Brigadier General MORENA</b> (IT) is the EU Mission Commander from 21st March 2016. The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.

 <div> <b>MALI</b>  <b>EU TRAINING MISSION,</b>  <b>MALI (EUTM MALI)</b> </div> 	
TYPE	Military mission to contribute to the training and advice of the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF).
OBJECTIVES	In line with the "EU Strategy for Development and Security in the SAHEL", EUTM's aims to support the training and reorganisation of the Malian Armed Forces and to help improve its military capacity, in order to allow, under civilian authority, the restoration of the country's territorial integrity. Until now, eight Battlegroups, each consisting of 650 to 700 personnel, have been trained by EUTM Mali. The mission also supported the preparation of the Malian Defence Programming Law ("Loi de programmation militaire - LOPM)..
MANDATE	Launched on 18 February 2013 and initially planned for 15 months, EUTM Mali has been extended until May 2016. On 23 March 2016, the Council of the EU decided to further extend the Mandate of EUTM for a period of two years, until May 2018. EUTM Mali shall not be involved in combat operations and mentoring. Its actions shall extend up to the river Niger Loop, including Gao and Timbuktu.
COMMITMENT	The mission comprises 550 personnel including 200 instructors, mission support staff, Force Protection and Air MEDEVAC (in total 23 EU contributing states + 4 non EU). The Mission Headquarters is located in Bamako and the Training area is in Koulikoro, 60 km north-east of the capital. Common costs for the current mandate are estimated at €27.7 million. For the third Mandate the common costs are estimated at €33.4 million
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Brigadier General Eric HARVENT</b> (BE). The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.



# European training mission in the **Central African Republic**

BY LT COLONEL ANGEL BRUFAU, PRESS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION EUTM RCA

*EUTM RCA  
mandate has been  
broadly presented  
to the authorities  
and key actors  
in Bangui.*



*In a letter dated 8 October 2015, the Chef d'Etat de la Transition of the Central African Republic (CAR), Mrs Catherine Samba-Panza, invited the European Union to further support the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) through a reinforced operational training structure in full collaboration with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).*

On 17 November 2015, the Council applauded the EUMAM RCA's work to support the restructuring of the FACA and invited the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) to begin preparations for a mission to provide strategic advice and operational training, to be launched after the inauguration of the democratically elected authorities and in good time before the end of EUMAM RCA's (European Union Monitoring and Advisory Mission in Central African Republic) mandate.

On 14 March 2016, the Council approved the Crisis Management Concept on a possible EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA), to contribute to the country's defence sector reform. In a letter dated 30 March 2016, the President of the CAR, Faustin-Archange Touadera invited the Union to deploy an EU CSDP military training mission in the CAR (EUTM RCA). Subsequently, on 19 April 2016 the Council formally decided to establish EUTM RCA with a view to launching it in July 2016.

On 16 July 2016 the launching of the EUTM RCA took place in Bangui "la coquette", the capital of CAR. At the same time the EUMAM RCA was closed. It was when the EUTM RCA Mission Commander Major General Eric Hautecloque-Raysz declared Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with the presence of General Mikhail Kostarakos, Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, and the CAR Minister of Defence Mr Joseph Yakete.

### The mandate

The mandate of EUTM RCA is for a period of two years after having achieved Full Operational Capability (FOC). It has a project cell for identifying and implementing projects, to be financed by the European Union member states or third states, which are consistent with its objectives and contribute to the delivery of the mandate.

With its Mission Headquarters located in Bangui, CAR, EUTM RCA, with its non-executive mission, performs the functions of both Operational Headquarters and Force Headquarters and also has a support cell in Brussels.

### The mission

In order to contribute to the defence sector reform (DSR) in the CAR within the Central African security sector reform (SSR) process coordinated by MINUSCA, and working towards the goal of modernised, effective and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces, EUTM RCA is providing strategic advice to CAR's Ministry of Defence and Military Staff, education to the FACA's commissioned and non-commissioned officers and specialists, and operational training to the FACA.

The coordination with MINUSCA with a view to ensuring the coherence between the security sector reform process and the deployment of trained FACA elements is also part of the EUTM RCA mission.

EUTM RCA also coordinates closely with the European Union Delegation (EUDEL) to the Central African Republic.



### The advice pillar

Liaison and advice at the level of the Ministry of Defense and Joint Army Staff (EMA - Etat-Major des Armées) is done through eight joint working groups, manned by both Central African Republic Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces and EUTM RCA members. The thematic working groups cover the following areas: defense policy, education and training, human resources, communications and information systems, logistics, intelligence, public information, budget and finances. Having agreed a road map for each of the working groups, they meet regularly in order to reestablish the capacities in each domain at the Ministry of Defense or EMA and its mutual interaction. In addition, direct advice is provided to some department chiefs, as well as to the Ministry of Defense coordination projects cell.


“EUTM adds its expertise and strategic advice to the teams of the Presidency which, supported by MINUS-CA, are in charge of the national security policy and the security sector reform (SSR) strategy. EUTM also ensures the secretariat of the DDRR (disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation) process and for the technical coordination committee for security. EUTM, in close collaboration with the Central African Republic soldiers appointed to the “Ministry of Defense and the EMA, supports the work of organisation of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces and will contribute to the elaboration of the laws on the military program and the concept of employment of the Armed Forces,” stated EUTM RCA Mission Commander, Major General Eric Hautecloque-Raysz, during the launching ceremony in Camp Kassai, Bangui, led by the Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera last 26 August 2016.

### The operational training pillar

Towards the aim to train three battalions during the two-year mandate, and beginning with the already established BIT 3 (Territorial Infantry Battalion #3), the EUTM RCA training pillar firstly checks the soldiers’ capacities through a two-week pre-training period. This course addresses subjects as individual and collective tactical movements, shooting, physical training, international law basics, body combat and first aid skills. It will be followed by the training itself, with team, section, platoon and then company training, completing 14 weeks of training per company.

At the same time the battalion commander and his staff are trained on the battalion tasks management, both in the daily organisational aspects and combat patterns.

“Taking into account that we can train two companies simultaneously, the training of the companies’ staff, and the



time needed for the battalion as a whole, we may be talking about 6 or 7 months to have the complete battalion trained,” stresses General Hautecloque-Raysz. “Everything depends on the units’ progress.”

Empowering the chain of command has an important role in this pillar. “Leadership and behavior are essential in the education of a soldier. He must be an example and respect the human rights and international law,” assures General Hautecloque-Raysz.

### The education pillar

Camp Kassai, eastern Bangui, is the location of the Kassai Formation Center (CFK), where the EUTM RCA instructors provide the only education the FACA’s commissioned and non-commissioned officers are currently receiving.

The military education system must be redrafted since it has disappeared during the conflict. Specialisation courses and the ongoing “train the trainers” program will provide the Central African Republic Armed Forces with their own military education capacity and will also serve as a reference for promotion throughout the military career.



*Strategic advice, operational training and education, the three pillars of EUTM RCA.*

“Leading a unit is not only about command but also about control. Even if there are some problems regarding the chain of command since the battalion, company and platoon commanders do not have experience and they miss the appropriate means, the soldiers are very motivated and willing to take over their legitimate functions. A global approach is needed to re-establish the Central African Republic Armed Forces, in support of the Army Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Defence”, concludes General Hautecloque-Raysz.

With almost 170 soldiers from 12 countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Georgia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain and Sweden), the EUTM RCA soldiers have been pushing hard in advising, training and educating the Central African Republic Armed Forces, as part of the European Union’s comprehensive approach in contribution to the African and wider international efforts to restore stability and support the political transition process in the country. ■



# RESEARCH IN DEFENCE IS ESSENTIAL AND THE MILITARY MUST HAVE ITS SAY. THE LOGISTICS' CASE.

BY EU MILITARY STAFF LOGISTIC DIRECTORATE.

European defence research and development (R&D) suffers from severe underinvestment. “US R&D effort is six times the EU’s”<sup>1</sup>. Strategic autonomy is at stake. It is paramount that the military voice be heard and understood, in order to define the best R&D targets. As one of the main drivers of strategic success and building dual use opportunities, military logistics brings substantial leverage to investments.

*Research & Development for war surgery is needed.*



The moment is critical. In the midst of enduring economic and security crisis, Europe has neglected one of the pillars of its own future. “If nothing is done, European defence research will simply disappear”<sup>2</sup>. “European defence research as a whole has declined sharply since 2006. (...) Between 2006 and 2013, EDA countries’ R&D has been reduced by a staggering 29.2%”<sup>3</sup>. The EU is planning responsive measures but the pre-conditions for success are challenging and include the ability to analyse long term needs and hence a planning effort with relevant players.

### 1. Why research in defence is so essential for the future of Europe?

Economy and strategy are inextricably intertwined. As demonstrated by Professor Paul Kennedy, “wealth is needed to underpin military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth”<sup>4</sup>. His economic analysis proves it: “The history of the rise and later fall of the leading countries in the great powers system (...) shows

a very significant correlation over the long term between productive and revenue-raising capacities on the one hand and military strength on the other”<sup>5</sup>. Countries that do not invest in their economy today cannot build their security for tomorrow.

A simplistic and short term approach to fulfil operational needs might be to rely on simple procurement on the world market, without distinguishing European industries from the rest of the world, and hence financing economic competitors.

A comprehensive and longer term alternative would be to conduct R&D on systems and materials that will be used tomorrow, in order to invest equally on Europe’s security and economy.

Along with some national initiatives to boost defence research, the EU might contribute to the financial support of the European defence research: a European Defence Research Action Plan, including a European Defence Research Programme might be initiated for the 2021-2027 period<sup>6</sup>.

### 2. Why the military needs should be clearly articulated and heard?

In order to obtain the best possible return on investments of public funds, research decisions should be underpinned by sound analysis of the military needs. Without it, the risk would be to produce a situation where “the tail is wagging the dog”. In his famous farewell speech of January 17, 1961, US President Eisenhower, former army general, publicly expressed his concerns about the rising influence of the arms industry, which he qualified as a threat: “In the council of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex”<sup>7</sup>. The door to European funds opened, there is a risk that projects do not meet future security challenges and thus fail to respond to the market needs.

European governments cannot predict what will be European global needs after 2026 and the simple sum of national needs may not be consistent as Member States do not



always share sensitive military needs, which they consider to be a national responsibility. Economic and security intelligence adds further complication. The combination of military experts from European countries widens the scope of experiences, lessons learnt and possibilities for future needs and other opportunities, beyond national thinking and budget capacities.

In order to avoid giving “too much clout to industrial concerns and drive away the whole process from capabilities needs”<sup>8</sup>, the military should be involved in the identification of the requirements and choice of the most appropriate solutions.

### 3. Why is it paramount to associate logistics in all R&D projects?

Out of the six core military capabilities, two are within the remit of logistics (deploy and sustain, along with command, inform, protect and engage) but all have a logistic dimension. Strategic autonomy requires notably comprehensive logistics, which is, with intelligence and CIS, the “hidden part of the iceberg”. With the compelling survival of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base at stake, is paramount the ability to deploy, supply, fix and treat military forces in all kinds of environmental conditions. Experience shows that developing combat systems without the inputs from logisticians leads to the design of more expensive and sophisticated capacities that are often more a burden than an advantage for operations and budget. Only a comprehensive military analysis with the support of all functions can mitigate potential strategic mistakes. From logistic principles, the key driver of system designs ought to be simplicity, in order to make them supportable. Over the last decades, it has always been increasingly difficult to support modern operations worldwide, from the wide Sahara to the devastated suburbs of Aleppo and the remote valleys of Kivu. The level of support required to deploy and sustain armed forces spread out in an austere environment has reached a cost that is disproportionate to the effects expected. These are some operational needs that require R&D:

- Strategic deployment: Design strategic transport assets that require a less demanding air and sea infrastructure, in order to minimise infrastructure building process, to allow transport of oversized cargo, and to spare tactical assets. Innovations such as airships are promising.
- In-theatre general support: For coastal areas, R&D is needed for systems improving over-the-shore logistics. For urban and remote areas, independent logistic systems need to be developed to allow self-sustainability of enduring small bases (intelligence and forward tactical points) without a global and heavy supply chain.
- Movements and transport: radio navigation should be fully cyber-proof with an independent European system, possibly a new version of Galileo. Transport drones and robots should be used to supply troops or conduct recovery operations in challenging areas such as large cities (e.g. Grozny, 1995: Russian logistics were hampered by snipers and artillery).
- Patient evacuation: drones would be useful for their ability to intervene in remote and multiple areas when CASEVAC assets are not available.
- Medical support: R&D on advanced telemedicine and

treatment could have decisive impact; injured soldiers should be treated from their home hospital with robotic assistance. Smart clothes could analyse the vital signs of a person, monitor his/her heartbeat, blood pressure, core temperature, water balance and should warn the person and tell what actions to take or even help with first countermeasures like controlling haemorrhage. A 3D printer chemical lab would produce pre-programmed medication in a military role <sup>2</sup>. Using the genome knowledge, more development is needed on vaccination, antidotes of chemicals and radiation, and more research on antibiotic resistance, new medication against bacteria and use of transplants in war surgery.

- Energy: R&D should aim at reducing further fuel consumption and quality needs; a 67 MW solar farm was developed by the Italian MoD.
- New materials: In case of need, dependence on non-EU key supplies should be reduced thanks to R&D for alternative new materials, for example the synthetic rubber developed before and during world war II. (Rubber shortage delayed allied operations in Europe because of Japanese expansion in South-eastern Asia). To alleviate the support in demanding environment for equipment, such as deserts, maintenance should be lightened thanks to the creation and development of more flexible materials and the use of 3D printers for spare parts.
- Logistic information systems should be secured by design, and allow independence from civilian networks.



*Airships could be a solution for outsized cargo transport.*

**In conclusion, every euro spent on R&D is a valuable investment for Europe's economy and security, if the consolidated military dimension is properly considered at each stage of the process. Logistics notably allows civilian applications, which brings a higher return on investment for the economy. Answering to the most critical needs is a prerequisite to set standards. ■**

1. EU's R&D is around EUR 8.8 billion per year. The future of defence research, Study requested by the European Parliament's Sub-Committee on Security and Defence, Me Frédéric Mauro and Professor Klaus Thoma, March 2016, p.45

2. Ibid., p. 8.

3. Ibid., p. 7.

4. The rise and fall of the great powers, Paul Kennedy, Vintage books, Jan. 1989, p. xvi;

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid. ref 1, p.8.

7. US presidential library, [https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online\\_documents/farewell\\_address.html](https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/farewell_address.html)

8. Ibid. ref. 1, p. 58



## MARITIME DOMAIN – EU PERSPECTIVE ON THREATS AND CHALLENGES

KEYNOTE SPEECH OF REAR ADMIRAL WALDEMAR GŁUSZKO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE EUMS, AT THE 3RD EU-ASEAN HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE IN BANGKOK

Rear Admiral Waldemar Głuszko, Deputy Director General of the EUMS contributes at conference



The political framework of the EU's response to global maritime threats is included in all policy documents starting with all 28 Member States approved ESS and lately announced by High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). In particular, for the maritime domain, the EU has established a Maritime Security Strategy. That shows the exceptional attention of the EU to more secure and safer seas and oceans. There is the belief that our coasts and seas hold the key to our future. Those documents are supported by Regional Strategies prepared for particular regions e.g. Strategy for HoA (Horn of Africa), GoG (Gulf of Guinea) or in the EU response to the Mediterranean migration crisis. There are some common threads in these strategies. Starting with emergency assistance funds, development assistance, through humanitarian relief actions and ending with CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) operations. In the maritime domain it is expressed by: building a common understanding of the scale of the threats emanating from the sea including a correct response to threats with the state's own tools; building robust and accountable political structures; helping governments of the region build robust institutions, maritime administrations and multiagency capabilities and stronger cooperation structures. This also includes development of prosperous economies, promoting economic growth, and supporting regional economic co-operation.

As of now, while an EU Regional Strategy for East and South East Asia might be developed in the near future, the cooperation between ASEAN and EU is growing. The EU is currently represented in some ASEAN-led security and defence related fora and organises CSDP orientation

courses and seminars for ASEAN countries. Moreover, the ASEAN chair has been and will be invited to observe our MILEX type exercises.

All of that is in response to threats to the interests of both European and global society. From the EU perspective, they are mainly set in the Mediterranean Sea, the GoG, the GoA (Gulf of Aden), the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. These threats are related to piracy and armed robbery at sea, arms, drugs and people trafficking, terrorism, maritime boundary disputes and illegal fishing.

In the Gulf of Guinea, piracy and armed robbery are particularly high, especially off the coast of Nigeria. In 2015 it was registered a total of 48 attacks on ships but in 2016 in the first semester there were already 62 attacks. Furthermore, this area is also the target for illegal fishing, estimated at about 40% of all catches. Also dumping of toxic waste and trafficking of arms, drugs and people. In these days, in the Indian Ocean Gulf of Aden illegal fishing and arms trafficking are the major problem. This region was highly affected by piracy until the end of 2011. Today the threat had decreased, but there is still a potential for piracy and an armed robbery surge if control of the region is decreased. The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean also present a low but persistent number of piracy cases. In the Malacca Straits and South China Sea, piracy and armed robbery has been a major concern for a long time. The latest figures show a great decrease of attacks in the Malacca Straits from 134 in 2015 to as a few as 8 in the 1st semester of 2016. The region is also the stage for some maritime boundary disputes that can ignite regional instability.

Within the comprehensive approach, the EU runs CSDP maritime operations and missions. In the case of HoA it is ATALANTA, EUCAP Nestor and EUTM-Somalia. As a combined result of different EU activities in the area, but also with a robust presence and actions by other States and International Organisations, there has been no successful act of piracy since 2011.

Programs which apply to GoG are: Critical Maritime routes in the GoG (CRIMGO) program whose aim is to support selected countries in the Gulf to develop the



capacity for regional cooperation in coast guard and maritime law enforcement functions. This also includes Information Sharing and Networking (GOGIN). The aim of that program is to support the creation of a network which will provide connectivity and information sharing capacity for all GoG partners. There is also the Cocaine Route Programme (SEACOP) which aims to support the fight against illicit maritime trafficking and associated criminal networks in an effective and coordinated manner. All those activities have not brought yet substantial improvement in the security situation in that region but that must be seen as a process which brings fruits in the long term.

Notwithstanding, in general with good results, there are many challenges we are facing in CSDP Operations. First of all it is necessary to approve a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). This is a long process with MS participation very often conditioned or delayed. The different interpretation of the UNSCR can produce some MS caveats that restrict the range of their activity. The port of safety for migrants has also been a matter of concern. This is very natural, bearing in mind that it brings many obligations on the receiving country. Another is the risk of terrorism infiltration among the migrants. The most striking case to highlight is the one of the terrorists involved in the attacks in France. Another aspect to underline is the prosecution of the criminals, and this is referred mainly to the pirates in the HoA. Once apprehended, coastal states have sometimes released the pirates applying their specific procedural laws. In this way it was frustrating the work of the coalition. The last challenge to mention is that the EU must face all these threats with the use of limited and scarce resources that sometimes prevent the EU in achieving best results.

Before the concluding, it is important to highlight the crucial importance of partnership and cooperation while dealing with a broad range of threats we are facing in the maritime environment. This cooperation could be conducted with organisations e.g. UN, NATO, AU, OSCE, ASEAN and at state level.

In practical terms, the EU approach aims at synchronising its objectives and commitments with international Partners as well as with multilateral programs led by the UN, the AU, GO (ASEAN) and NGOs. CSDP missions and operations are of course the tactical arm through which this cooperation is developed. That is exactly where ideas of partnership are shaped into real proposals and activities as e.g. the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the GoA or Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). This is an international cooperation mechanism that acts as a common point of contact between and among States, regional and international Organisations, and the Shared Awareness and De-confliction, which applies to both HoA and the Med (SHADE and SHADEMED). In South East Asia, there are two EU cooperation tools that need to be mentioned, namely the “Critical Maritime Routes” (CMR) Programme and the “Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean” (CRIMARIO). Recognising the importance of Maritime Security, a growing number of maritime threats, a need for comprehensive and coordinated approach combined with scarcity of resources in the global security arena.

Co-operation is no longer a question of choice or willingness, but more and more a pressing and urgent requirement. ■



EU – ASEAN  
High Level Dialogue  
Bangkok!



## EUFOR ALTHEA

# EUFOR Operation ALTHEA host combined brigade Exercise QUICK RESPONSE 16 in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARL 'HARRY' HARWOOD ROYAL NAVY MSC.

Antonov Strategic lift delivering UK vehicles to Ex "Quick Response" 2016 - Sarajevo Airport



*From the 25 September until 6 October 2016, EUFOR Operation ALTHEA conducted Exercise "QUICK RESPONSE 16". This is an annual exercise that this year consisted of EUFOR Multi National Battalion (MNB) (Austria and the United Kingdom Intermediate Reserve Company), Armed Forces Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH), KFOR Tactical Manoeuvre Battalion (KTM) (Portugal and Hungary) and the opposition force provided by EUFOR Turkish Company.*

### STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Troops supporting EUFOR and the exercise started to enter Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) from the 20 September. The UK dispatched a Voyager Transport Plane and C130 and on the 25 September, 124 troops arrived in the Royal Air Force A330-200. The following day, the first of three Antonov heavy lift cargo planes delivered the logistics required to support British Army Royal Anglian Regiment B Company. This aircraft type is the second heaviest in the world and was to transport the 24 British vehicles and equipment to support them during the exercise. EUFOR Spokesperson Lt Cdr Carl Harwood gave a joint video interview alongside the Company Commander Major Graham Goodey. This was an opportunity to assure the people of BiH that the arrival of British Troops was to support a large Exercise with EUFOR and announce their arrival. Concurrently KFOR discretely deployed 6 packets of vehicle convoys from Camp Slim Lines in Pristina, Kosovo.

### COMBINED TRAINING

Exercise QUICK RESPONSE 16 was the culmination of two years planning and brought together the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) alongside EUFOR MNB and the KFOR Tactical Manoeuvre Battalion. The purpose of this exercise

was to demonstrate the ability of EUFOR to call forward its Intermediate Reserve troops from across Europe into BiH to support AFBiH authorities if called to do so. This was also an opportunity for the AFBiH to train alongside EUFOR and share tactics and experience. The training was built around a fictional scenario which required the International Force to conduct Peace Support Operations in the host nation. This was to expand on previous Exercises and draw in support from both EUFOR and KFOR Headquarters. The exercise has expanded over previous years and this year, was to involve a Brigade sized force of over 750 troops working and exercising together providing a Safe and Secure environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the EUFOR Althea Mission.

An outline of the training accomplished during the exercise:

### ESTABLISHING OF FIELD CAMPS

Prior the tactical deployment, logistic assets had been deployed from 21 September in order to initiate the construction of field camps to support a brigade sized force. Austrian engineers as well as British and Hungarian soldier's evaluated appropriate areas and set up facilities for soldiers' needs, e.g. accommodation, ablutions, dining facilities and command posts.

### TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT

From 29 to 30 of September the tactical move to Manjača was conducted throughout the night. MNB and KTM convoys – consisting of 4 companies - featured over 70 vehicles of 7 nations. Driving tactically from Pristina and Sarajevo to Manjača respectively, in hours of darkness, the reserve forces quickly and discretely reached, secured and occupied their Forward Operating Bases, ready for the next phases of the exercise operations.

### DISTINGUISHED VISITORS DAY

Distinguished Visitors Day was attended by the head of the EU Delegation in BiH Ambassador Wigemark, Chief of the Joint Staff of AFBiH Lieutenant General Anto Jeleč, Commander EUFOR Major General Friedrich Schrötter and distinguished guests. All elements of the following training was exercised by all contributing forces during the exercise training phase 30 Sep to 4 Oct and then showcased by a dynamic display :-



- Full scale PSO Scenarios:
  - CONVOY
  - CHECKPOINT
  - CRC
  - IED/MEDEVAC
  - EVACUATION/EXTRACTION

### CONVOY

Under “exercise protection” of KTM, EUFOR had the distinguished visitors convoyed to the visitors’ area while the MNBN had started to establish the outer security cordon, which was tasked to a fictitious company illustrated with green smoke. Guests therefore had the chance to experience military action right on the spot. A highlight for AFBiH forces was securing the key terrain by helicopter.

### CHECKPOINT

Due to the layout of the training area, distinguished visitors were able to witness each detail of the operation. A platoon of AFBiH approached the area in their M113 APCs in order to establish a checkpoint to close the outer security cordon. On arrival, two squads were tasked to seize the terrain while the third quickly established the checkpoint. Visitors complimented the performance of AFBiH in synchronizing forces and their tactics, drills and procedures.

### CROWD AND RIOT CONTROL (CRC)

Approximately 30 people gathered and started to set up a road block to demonstrate in the vicinity of the checkpoint. Once the Commanding Officer MNBN had assessed the situation he ordered the Austrian Company to prepare for CRC measures. As the demonstration proceeded into the direction of the summit, the Austrian company was tasked to conduct CRC to support forces in the checkpoint from preventing unauthorised access to the summit area. Following firm and decisive action by the unit commander, the rioters withdrew and the unit started to reopen the road in order to re-establish freedom of movement.

### IED/MEDEVAC

Throughout this scenario, the brigade also had to deal with two other simultaneous exercise challenges:

#### Improvised Explosive Device

During the demolition of the road block, an improvised explosive device was discovered. The Commander Austrian Company immediately withdrew his troops to a safe distance and requested for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support. After assessing the situation, the Brigade Commander tasked KTM professionals to deactivate and remove the unexploded device safely.

#### Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC)

A soldier was injured during the CRC so a medical evacuation was called. An Alouette helicopter was tasked to expedite a winch rescue to recover the casualty to hospital.

### EVACUATION AND EXTRACTION of Civilians and VIPs

Austrian platoon conducted an evacuation of diplomatic personnel that had been trapped in the conflict. After securing and confirming the identities of the rescued personnel, the platoon evacuated the diplomats to a secure place, for medical treatment as required.

Summing up his experience of the exercise, Commanding Officer of the Multinational Battalion Lieutenant Colonel Christoph Blasch said, “The training area in Manjača was excellent, providing plenty of space for the exercise. This allowed the soldiers to train at a company and brigade level with few restrictions. The training itself was a good experience, and provided a good opportunity to work alongside the AFBiH. I was impressed with their efforts; they were well prepared for the Peace Support Operations scenario. At times the exercise required patience from everyone involved, but the Multinational Battalion displayed a high grade of professionalism and motivation throughout.”

After the dynamic display Ambassador Lars-Gunnar Wigemark gave a press statement and said: “This exercise shows how EUFOR continues to play a critical role in BiH. I am particularly pleased to see the excellent co-operation and co-ordination between EUFOR and Armed Forces BiH and I welcome participation of professional soldiers from a wide range of EU Nations working together for a secure and stable Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

This was followed by Lt Gen Anto Jeleč, Chief of Joint Staff of the Armed Forces BiH, who stated: “The relationship between EUFOR and Armed Forces BiH is important for overlapping of different synergies.”

COMEUFOR Major General Schrötter concluded by saying: “While this exercise is primarily designed to practice our contingency plans, the participation of units from Armed Forces BiH serves to showcase their forces’ significant progression in Capability Development and Capacity Building and their growing potential for increased participation in international peace support operations.” He added: “Large scale Brigade-Level exercises such as Exercise Quick Response 2016 prove decisively that EUFOR Forces along with our comrades from AF BiH and our Reserves are at all times ready and able to respond quickly and effectively to any potential threat to our Safe and Secure Environment.”

EUFOR Operation Althea is currently made up of soldiers from 15 EU member states and 5 partner nations. Its primary roles are to provide capacity building and training support to the Armed Forces of BiH and to support BiH efforts to maintain a safe and secure environment, whilst providing support to the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH.

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Exercise Quick Response 2016 Story Board



## PARTNERSHIPS

# CSDP Partnerships in Action And an Overview of The Strategic Guidance

BY LT COL DANIEL CALIN EXTERNAL EUMS

EUNAVFOR  
ATALANTA -  
Horn of Africa  
Coastguard  
Partners



### Abstract

*“In a more connected world, the EU will engage with others.”* Thus reads the June 2016 Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), listing both **engagement** and **partnerships** among the guiding principles of EU’s external action. Against this background, this article aims at providing the reader with the main pillars of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) partnerships in action; and also, the main objectives and principles of EU’s partnerships in the field of CSDP - as reflected in the guidance issued by the European Council and Council of the EU throughout the last three years [i.e. from December 2013 onwards]- as well as relevant facts and figures of EU’s CSDP partnerships which are summarised through a number of self-explanatory highlights.

### CSDP Cooperative Frameworks

CSDP cooperation with international and regional organisations (IRO) as well as with partner countries (PC) has been part and parcel of EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises. Over time, several cooperative CSDP frameworks have developed, mainly along the following lines:

1. *Cooperation with IROs* with responsibilities and competencies in the field of international and regional security, such as UN, NATO, the African Union (AU) and the OSCE;
2. Development and implementation of a *structured framework for cooperation aimed at facilitating the participation of PCs in CSDP military and civilian missions and operations*<sup>1</sup>;
3. Establishment and enhancement of *security and defence dialogues with PCs* as well as dialogues in the field of CSDP with IROs.

### Strategic Guidance on CSDP Partnerships: from TEU to EC in December 2013

#### Treaty on European Union (TEU)

Art. 21: *“The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the [same] principles. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.”*

#### Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), November 2013

The Council *“stresses the importance of working with its partners, in particular the UN, NATO, OSCE, and African Union, as well as strategic partners and partner countries in its neighbourhood, with due respect to the institutional framework and decision-making autonomy of the EU.”*

#### European Council (EC), December 2013

*“The Union remains fully committed to working in close collaboration with its global, transatlantic and regional partners. Such collaboration should be further developed in a spirit of mutual reinforcement and complementarity.”*

### CSDP Partnerships in Action

The CSDP partnerships related actions are and will most likely continue to be twofold:

- *‘partners in cooperation’*, i.e. like-minded PCs as well as IROs with an interest and role to play in strengthening international and regional security;
- *‘partners in need’*, i.e. PCs in a quest for support in developing their defence and security sectors as well as their resilience, especially to our East and South.

*Of note:* both categories are also qualifying (to different degrees) to provide valuable contributions or complementary actions to CSDP military and civilian missions and operations.

*In the first group, fall inter alia* UN, NATO and the US.



EU - UN cooperation has become a “way of life” as put by the UN Under-Secretary General [for Peacekeeping Operations] Hervé Ladsous, and it encompasses several aspects ranging from operational cooperation in crisis areas, to regular high level dialogues, to visits of the Ambassadors from the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) to New York, to participation of UN officials to high level meetings of EU MS.

NATO-EU cooperation is the most tangible and visible expression of the transatlantic link and the strengthening of the European defence cannot be seen otherwise than developing in full complementarity with the Alliance.

The 2015 agreed ‘Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management: Priorities 2015-2018’ and the recently signed ‘Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’<sup>2</sup> constitute milestones in EU-UN and EU-NATO cooperation respectively; these documents chart their future interactions aimed at promoting EU’s values and interests in peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based order.

Likewise, as clearly stated in the EUGS, “on the vast majority of global governance issues, the EU will work with the UN as the framework of the multilateral system and a core partner for the Union, with other partners such as the US, with regional organisations and like-minded and strategic partners in Asia, Africa and the Americas.”

For the second group, while the list might be too long to go into details here, one could easily mention the broad categories of states and societies to the East [of the EU] stretching into Central Asia, and South down to Central Africa in need of resilience related investments, including security sector reform and capacity building in countering emerging threats and challenges (e.g. cyber, hybrid, energy).

In any case, the EU will continue to promote a flexible approach in developing and implementing CSDP partnership policy to support PCs in their efforts to participate in CSDP military and civilian missions and operations, while also addressing their security concerns. At the same time, the EU will continue its dual approach towards IROs, aimed at ensuring complementarity of their actions as well as at supporting those organisations in need, to achieve full operational capability allowing them to assume in due time ownership of their actions.

On the participation of PCs in CSDP military and civilian missions and operations, this ranges from troop contributions proper, through specialised / niche capabilities and expertise (e.g. training teams, medical units / teams, engineering support, air transport – personnel and especially equipment aiming at filling the identified [EU] gaps in the run up to and during the force generation process), to complementary contributions in the framework of EU’s Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) initiative (aimed at empowering and enabling our partners to prevent and respond to crises), to financial support (if putting boots on the ground is too demanding or politically difficult to achieve by a partner country).

*“Third-country partners continue actively supporting CSDP operational activities, in parallel to regular consultations on CSDP and training. As of January 2016, 11 partner countries were deploying a total of 350 personnel and troops in eight CSDP Missions and operations, and a number of new Framework Participation Agreements have been finalised.”*

CFSP Report - Our priorities in 2016 (Doc no 13026/16 dated 17 October 2016)



EUNAVFOR  
ATALANTA -  
Serbian Armed  
Vessel Protection  
Detachment

## Conclusion

CSDP partnerships are no longer a matter of choice. Strategic guidance stemming from the European Council, the Council of the EU and the EU/EEAS leadership, combined with an increasing willingness and ability of PCs as well as IROs to team up with the EU in the pursuit of peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based order, made CSDP partnerships a reality nobody can deny and the Union has a responsibility to further it throughout all its external action<sup>3</sup>. ■

### Strategic Guidance on CSDP Partnerships: EUGS in June 2016

A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), June 2016

*“The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships. Co-responsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order. In pursuing our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings.”*

1. This took mainly the form of Framework Participation Agreements (FPA), complemented by Security of Information Agreements (SOIA).

2. EU-NATO Warsaw Declaration.

3. While the military-to-military (mil-mil) cooperation will remain the responsibility of the EUMC and the EUMS, this process will continue to be [both politically and strategically] driven by the HRVP in close cooperation with the EEAS leadership, in line with the guidance issued by and commensurate to the support received from EU Member States (EU MS). Consequently, mil-mil engagements will continue to follow and will evolve along the lines of effort above-mentioned.



## EU MILITARY STAFF

# Picture Parade



*EU Military Staff Sports Day 2016 at Duisburg sports centre*



*EU Military Staff and NATO annual sailing regatta at Veere, Holland*



*Handover ceremony of Director General EU Military Staff at EEAS HQ*



*EU Military Staff member Dan on his magnificent flying machine at the IEPER triathlon*



*Director General EUMS Lt Gen Esa Pulkkinen during a visit to EUTM MALI*



*EU Military Staff with DGEUMS before the start of the Brussels 20km*





*Director General EUMS Lt Gen Esa Pulkkinen welcomes the Chinese EU military representative to Cortenbergh*



*Director General EUMS Lt Gen Esa Pulkkinen and his wife visit EU Open Day 2016 and meets the staff from EUFOR ALTHEA*



*Brigadier General Dionigi LORIA, EU Military Staff, officially handed over the Minimum Technical Requirements for Contracted in-theatre Aeromedical Evacuation Services for EU Operations and Missions (MEDEVAC) to the ATHENA Administrator, Mr. Hans-Werner GRENZHOFER*



*International Womens' Day 2016 is marked in the EUMS with a presentation of roses to all EUMS ladies by DDG EUMS Rear Admiral Waldemar Gluszko*




*HRVP Federica Mogherini during a Hail & Farewell reception to mark the departure of Lt Gen Wosolsobe and arrival of Lt Gen Pulkkinen as the new Director General EUMS*



*EU Military Staff Sports & Social Club Autumn Dinner 2016 at HOTEL AMIGO*



## EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF - EUMS STRUCTURE



\* AS OF OCT 2016

## EU Military Operations and Missions

