

**EN**



EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR  
NEIGHBOURHOOD AND ENLARGEMENT  
NEGOTIATIONS

**Programming of the  
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 2014-2016**

**Strategy Paper/Multi-Annual Indicative Programme  
Libya (2014-2016)**

# Country Strategy Paper/Multi-Annual Indicative Programme

## Libya 2014 - 2016

### Country Strategy Paper

#### **Executive Summary**

The **EU's long-term objective in Libya** remains to assist Libya in its efforts to establish a democratic, stable and prosperous State. This comprises promotion of "deep and sustainable democracy" based on an inclusive constitution as well as fostering strong, transparent and accountable institutions, an active civil society and a vibrant private sector.

The **country is in serious crisis**. This has a negative impact on the civilian population and represents a threat to regional security. The Libyan crisis also has a direct impact on EU interests, such as the promotion of peace and security, the respect for human rights, humanitarian concerns and economic interests. Non-regulated migration towards the EU from Libyan shores has significantly increased since last year and is unlikely to diminish. Extremist elements are spreading throughout the country, and uncontrolled weapons proliferation continues to fuel insecurity in Libya and the wider region.

The **current crisis is to a large extent the culmination of the underlying struggle over power** (political, military, institutional and economic) and competing visions of the future of post-revolution Libya. The two main opposing camps, generally referred to as the "Islamist" camp and the "Nationalist" camp, broadly correspond to "Libya Dawn" and "Libya Dignity", respectively. Libya Dawn argues that they are protecting the 2011 Revolution from a pro-Gaddafi loyalists' counter-revolution and firmly opposes foreign intervention. Libya Dignity states that they are the safeguard of a modern democratic State against an extremist Islamist take-over, arguing that Europe and the International Community should support them; hence they favour some form of foreign intervention.

This said, **the situation in Libya is multi-dimensional and multi-layered** with a large number of players involved in continuously changing alliances. In addition to the more ideological bi-polar antagonism, there is a multi-polar power struggle underway that simultaneously involves players with static, predictable objectives and interests (Ansar Al Sharia, Daesh, Federalists) along with others of a more opportunistic and transactional type (tribes, cities, minority components). Regional players try and often manage to influence developments in the country in order to enhance their regional geopolitical objectives.

**Throughout the last year the International Community has supported the efforts of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to achieve a political settlement** via the UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue, now at its crucial phase. In addition to its political support to these UN-led efforts - expressed on numerous occasions by EU Member States the EU has hosted meetings of the Libyan Political Dialogue and has covered part of its costs. In May 2015 EU assistance to UNSMIL was stepped-up with the establishment of the EU Planning Cell in Tunis to support the UNSMIL in the planning of the post-agreement interim security arrangements. The EU also undertakes regular diplomatic reach out to neighbours and regional players to ensure their support to the UN-led process.

**Eventually, the Libyan Political Dialogue should yield a Government of National Accord** and the relaunch of the transitional process. However, such a political settlement would not necessarily commit all groups (e.g. radical actors driven by ideological agendas such as Daesh or salafi groups will likely continue to fight). Therefore it will be a priority to manage the risk of renewed escalation of violence and help enforce a peace agreement, allowing a number of longer term processes to start.

Substantial uncertainties persist, both as to the duration of the conflict and its outcome. This complicates an assessment of needs, priorities, institutional resilience and absorption capacity. Other key international actors struggle with similar limitations. Moreover, **the vast majority of the international community evacuated the country during the summer of 2014** when heavy fighting erupted in the capital. Therefore, information on the impact of the crisis inside Libya is scattered and donors cannot obtain a solid overview of the existing needs.

When the EU relocated to Tunis (summer 2014) approximately half of EU-funded programmes were suspended (mainly due to security reasons but also because they often entailed support to line ministries which had to be suspended because these ministries had been taken over by the self-declared government in Tripoli). Those **EU programs which were not suspended were reoriented to address emerging needs and provide a response to the crisis situation**. Throughout the last year implementation of on-going programs has been done relaying mainly on Libyan local staff (as most Europeans have left the country) or through activities in locations outside the country (e.g. training Libyan journalists in Tunisia).

The lack of recent assessment missions inside the country prevents the EU from making a comprehensive needs assessment. However, the information that is available indicates that **the three sectors of the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2014 – 2015 remain of utmost relevance**. These three sectors are: 1) Democratic Governance, 2) Youth, Active Citizenship and Socioeconomic Integration and 3) Health. One more year of conflict has only increased the need to support Libya in all these sectors.

As regards **Democratic Governance**, its consolidation will depend to a great extent on the capacity of the Libyan institutions to retake ownership over the transition process following a future political agreement. Continued and even enhanced support to the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) and to the High National Electoral Commission will therefore be essential. Other institutions will be covered as well, including those concerned with various levels of sub-national governance - particularly local councils. Priority areas of intervention will, in coordination with other international actors, be identified in consultation with national authorities, local councils and civil-society organisations.

Emphasis on the gradual development of a strong and vibrant civil society will be maintained as its importance will grow even further in the context of a protracted political transition.

Human-rights violations, notably abuses against vulnerable groups (e.g. migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons), torture and other forms of ill-treatment, condition of detainees and freedom of expression will remain part of the Democratic Governance sector.

As regards **Youth, Active Citizenship and Socioeconomic Integration**, lack of employment opportunities is a key factor contributing to difficulties with the reintegration of fighters and armed groups. The unfavourable social and economic context fosters criminality and

radicalisation. The poor quality of the education and qualifications systems does not allow young people adequately to prepare themselves for the labour market.

Areas to be addressed include support for an active citizenship, initiatives aimed at preventing youth involvement in drugs use and criminality, education and skills development and employment policy, as well as SME development. In the short term Libya needs to implement a credible set of measures to facilitate the reintegration of fighters, predominantly young men. In the longer term sectoral development strategies in support of economic diversification should be designed and implemented.

As regards **Health**, according to different reports months of fighting have had a devastating effect on Libya's already very poor health service delivery. The damage to the infrastructure and the departure of skilled foreign personnel has allegedly brought the health system on the verge of collapse. According to some reports, 60% of medical facilities is either inaccessible or otherwise non-functional.


Health was the entry point for EU cooperation in Libya almost a decade ago. Before the evacuation in summer 2014 the EU had established a comprehensive strategy for support to the health sector (Libya Health Systems Strengthening Programme) providing technical assistance to targeted reforms in health service delivery, management, strategic planning, health financing, human resources and physical rehabilitation for people with disabilities.

Throughout the last 12 months, EU support to health care has been reoriented to address the impact of fighting on the civilian population (e.g provision of primary health care training and psycho-social counselling). The scope of activities in the Health sector should be reassessed and possibly expanded upon conclusion of a future political agreement and expected consequent improvement of the security situation.

# Libya situation map



Crisis Response and Operational Coordination (MD CROC)



# **1. Country analysis**

## **1.1 Political situation**

Four years after the ousting of Muammar el Ghaddafi, Libya is in a deep political and security crisis, with an institutional vacuum and widespread violence since the summer of 2014.

The essence of the conflict is control over power (political, institutional, economical as well as military supremacy), with ideological differences regarding the future development of the Libyan state. At the national and institutional level, the conflict can be largely characterised as a conflict between the Tobruk/House of Representatives (HoR)/Libya Dignity on the one side and Tripoli/General National Congress (GNC)/Libya Dawn on the other. Below this level, there are numerous local conflicts, rivalries and tribal feuds. None of the camps is monolithic, even if one side appears to be more cohesive than the other. Local rivalries, competing interests and personal animosities are rife within each camp, and alliances shift accordingly. The disconnect between the political stakeholders and the military actors is an additional problem.

Notwithstanding the many obstacles, the UN SRSG has put a political process in place, which has made significant progress in recent weeks. The process is organised around 5 tracks: political (HoR, GNC, Misratans and independents), security, municipal, tribal and political parties. The objective of these talks is to agree on a political settlement that includes: names of PM and two Deputies for a Government of National Accord; security and ceasefire arrangements; and a roadmap for the transition process until the adoption of a new constitution followed by general elections.

After several rounds of talks, the UN presented to parties a draft political settlement that lays out a new institutional framework, and security arrangements. The proposed solution aims to satisfy the demands of both sides, through: the recognition of the House of Representatives as the only legitimate Parliament; the complete separation of legislative and executive powers; and the creation of a State Council composed mainly of GNC members.

The draft political settlement was initialled in July by 3 of the 4 main parties in the political dialogue. This dialogue is ongoing, with the aim to bring the GNC on board, and finalise the drafting of the Annexes and names of PM and two Deputy PMs by 10 September. The agreement would come into force one month later, and the Government of National Accord would be established shortly after, thereby putting an end to the institutional vacuum that has paralysed the country for over one year.

This government will have to address the underlying shortcomings of Libya's political system, which are the structural factors behind the current crisis:

- Lack of state institutions and political authority. The weak civil administration after the Revolution prevented consistent policy-making and implementation in almost all sectors, and severely limited the absorption of foreign support.
- Lack of democratic culture and practices due to 42 years of dictatorship, coupled with the erosion of traditional conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms (tribal leaders and elders) and dramatic changes in the social fabric, as well as little acceptance/recognition of any authority with which there is no direction connection or identification.
- Failure to deal with the past (no reconciliation process) and lack of a national vision for Libya.

The work of the **Constitutional Drafting Assembly** to produce a new Constitution is ongoing. The 18-month time frame to produce the Constitution will be reached on 20 October 2015, though the draft political agreement states that the work of the CDA shall continue until 24 December 2015. Once the CDA adopts the draft Constitution by a 2/3 plus one majority of its members, a referendum should be organised by HNEC within 30 days. If approved by a 2/3 majority of the voter turnout, the CDA shall ratify the text as the Country Constitution and refer it to the HoR for issuance. The main challenges for the work of the CDA are: the participation of minority components; increased political polarisation; and the controversial issues (political system, structure of the State, distribution of resources, sharia as a source of legislation and rights of minorities).

The constitutional process could become the instrument through which the Libyans can debate and decide on a wide range of issues where their opinion was never asked before (e.g. role of the State, role of Libya as a Nation or the role of religion). For this process to be effective, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly will need to properly guide the overall process, to actively communicate to the Libyan public and to ensure the inclusiveness of the process.

The **security situation** in Libya deteriorated significantly since the launching of Operation Dignity and Operation Dawn in 2014. An important development in recent months has been the end of military operations in the West. There are around 15 local cease-fires in place, all of which continue to hold, despite occasional skirmishes. The ceasefire in the Oil Crescent also continues to hold. Currently, Benghazi is the only area where sustained military operations persist. The Libyan National Army controls most of the city's centre and is in full control of the airport and seaport. Ansar Al Sharia and its supporters control the Al Sabri district (where Daesh and Boko Haram elements are known to be present), and the East/South Eastern areas. Despite recent losses in Derna, Daesh continues to consolidate its position in Libya and retains full control of Sirte and the Coastal Road between Abu Qurayn and Naoufiliya. Daesh elements are also known to be in Sabratha, Tripoli and Benghazi.

As for the **South** of Libya, the trend since the fall of the former regime has been one of cyclical violence interrupted by precarious cease-fires in three main conflict spots: Sabha, Obari and Kufra. Albeit the local nature and specificities of each separate conflict, these have become increasingly complex over the past year, as the wider political and military conflict has translated into and exploited the competing loyalties between the various communities in the South. For the moment, the situation in Sabha and Obari remains relatively stable. The main hot spot remains Kufra, where clashes between the Tebu and the Arab Azwai tribe have not yet subsided.

The **human rights situation** has steadily deteriorated since the outbreak of the crisis. Continued fighting and breakdown of law and order have led to serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law.

**Main human rights concerns** are: arbitrary detention, kidnapping, summary executions, torture and acts of violence against civilians, journalists, officials, political figures and human rights defenders. Many human rights defenders have fled the country or fallen silent in the face of assault, arbitrary detention, closure of NGO offices and death threats. Journalists and media professionals continued to face attacks, abductions, threats and intimidations. Different media outlets continue a systematic campaign of media incitement. Main violations against

international humanitarian law are indiscriminate attacks in areas with high population density, use of unconventional weapons with total impunity.

**Refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants** are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual abuse and extortion. Foreign nationals detained by the Ministry of Interior or by armed groups face deplorable conditions, with substandard access to basic necessities and medical care. Foreign nationals have also been victims of attacks, abductions and unlawful killings because of their religion. On 19 April, ISIL/Daesh released videos showing the beheadings and shootings of some 28 Ehtioptions and Eritrean nationals.

In May, the **Tripoli Court of Assize concluded public hearings in the trial of 37 former regime officials**, including Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi. On 28 July, the Court of Assize issued its verdict, sentencing Saif al-Islam, Abdullah al Senussi, and seven other officials to death; eight others to life imprisonment; 15 to prison sentences between 5 and 12 years; and four were acquitted of all charges. The Court also announced that seven of the defendants – including Saif al-Islam Gaddafi – were tried in absentia. The prosecution presented no witnesses or other evidence during the hearings, and the court allowed each defence to present no more than three witnesses. Mr. Gaddafi has not appeared at any hearings since June 2014, and Libya has not complied with the International Criminal Court's order to surrender him.

The **Universal Periodic Review of Libya** took place on 13 May 2015 and was adopted ad referendum on 15 May 2015. Libya announced that it would examine the 202 recommendations received and provide responses as to which recommendations would be accepted before the 30<sup>th</sup> session of the Human Rights Council in September 2015. Delegations expressed deep concern over the deteriorating human rights situation and the lack of accountability for human rights violations. It was recommended that Libya fully cooperates with the ICC, establishes a moratorium on the death penalty as an important step towards full abolishment, ensures access to humanitarian assistance, and protects civilians, including humanitarian workers

Due to the current situation the 2014 Human Rights Strategy is not being updated, but a detailed **Human Rights Action Plan is being prepared**.

## 1.2 Economic situation, vulnerability and potential

**Libya's economy is completely dependent on exports of hydrocarbons**, mostly oil, as well as its access to accumulated oil wealth, which now lies in the reserves of its Central Bank and its sovereign funds, such as the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA).

As a result of the crisis, oil exports have been very erratic and have reduced sharply. Unlike during the revolution when oil facilities were left unharmed, oil infrastructure has now become an integral part of the conflict. Oil exports are down to 400.00 barrels per day (bpd), about one fourth of normal production capacity of 1.6 million b/d. The sharp decline in international oil prices further reduces Libya's revenue generating capacity. GDP is estimated to have contracted by 24 percent in 2014, following a 13.6 percent drop recorded in 2013.

On the expenditure side, payments of salaries and subsidies have increased dramatically over the last few years, as various governments attempted to buy off popular dissent with lower prices for essential goods and higher wages. As the strongly reduced revenues were not



matched with commensurate budget cuts, the treasury is accumulating a large budget deficit. Since there are very limited opportunities to issue treasury bills, this deficit is funded by drawing down on the Central Bank's international reserves. According to the World Bank, these reserves declined by 40% from mid-2013 to end 2014 and would amount to \$ 85 billion (end 2014). If Libya continues drawing down on its international reserves at this pace, these risk being depleted in the short term.

The political and military conflict has also extended to the oil sector, with competition over key financial institutions. **So far the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation have preserved their neutrality.**

Regarding the potential of Libya's economy, a significant increase in oil output would be feasible in the coming months, if the security improves at oilfields and terminals where companies have suspended operations because of insecurity. However, once there is a national unity government, one of the challenges of the Libyan government will be the current economic model. Libyans will have to decide what economic model they wish to see: an oil based dependency state with high subsidies and stipends, or a more diversified market economy based on competition among more autonomously operating economic actors. The current system failed to create meaningful employment and alternative occupations for armed militias. At the same time, the early dismantling of the subsidy and hand-out system could trigger unrest if not properly planned and communicated. The issue of finding job formulas that would allow former fighters to make a living while maintaining a social status once having left the militia constitutes another major challenge.

At the same time, Libya faces formidable challenges to establish a transparent and efficient public financial management (PFM) system. Budget preparation and budget execution control need to be improved, international accounting and reporting standards introduced, and a modern procurement system created. PFM reform is a prerequisite to ensure a sustainable use of hydrocarbon resources and to fight corruption.

### 1.3 Social situation and vulnerability

The **humanitarian situation** continues to deteriorate with 2 million people being affected by the conflict, representing an increase of 125% since September 2014. Key humanitarian concerns are the continuing large-scale displacement of people, the deteriorating protection crisis, the collapsing health system, food insecurity and worsening access to safe drinking water and sanitation as well as the access to education for 150.000 children.

According to the draft Humanitarian Needs Overview presented to the international community on 17 August 2015, IDP figures have increased almost 7 fold since April 2014: from 63,985 to 435,800. Following the numbers of people in need of humanitarian assistance: protection: 2.44m; health: 1.9m; food security: 1.28m; shelter and NFIs: 204,160; wash: 682,000; early recovery: 1.5m. Libyan health system is collapsing with over 60% of medical facilities either being inaccessible or non-functional. In Benghazi 70 per cent of hospitals are either destroyed or not functional. Of the 435,000 IDPs, 290,000 are women and children. Some 1.2 million migrants from neighbouring and third countries are currently estimated to be in Libya. Approximately 47,449 migrants and refugees reached the Italian coast by sea during the first five months of 2015; approximately 90 per cent had departed from Libya. Conditions of migrant detention centres do not meet minimum international standards.

The UN Humanitarian country team has launched a multi-sector assessment for a new Humanitarian Needs Overview and a Humanitarian Response Plan. Priorities are on data management, displacement tracking mechanism and remote management. Lack of resources, accessibility and capacity constraints pose the main challenges.

The **Human Development Index** (HDI) for 2012 ranked Libya at place 64 out of 187 countries, similar to Malaysia and Serbia. In 2012, GDP per capita averaged USD 12,059. However, considering a population growth of 2.1% per year and close to 50 % of the population below 25 years of age, a large influx of entrants to the labour market can be expected in the next decade. Strong GDP growth will be required, as well as a determined policy to diversify the economy and to create jobs.

Given the current instability, as well as the previous regime's standard practice of under reporting **unemployment**, it is impossible to provide accurate figures on youth employment. Unemployment is officially measured at 26% in 2010, but is believed to be much higher.

Well-educated Libyans have a tendency to pursue careers abroad. This '**brain drain**' decreases the ability to develop 'high knowledge' and productive industries. The social stigma associated to labour intensive employment, as well as high salary demands, is the result of a general expectation that the public sector will be able to provide young graduates with employment opportunities.

In 2012, **higher education** comprised 12 universities with a total of 160 faculties, in addition to 16 technical faculties, 81 higher technical and vocational institutes and five private universities. In 2011, some 340.000 students were enrolled in higher education institutions (41% male and 59% female)<sup>1</sup>. Universities have some way to go to adapt their curricula to the needs of the labour market, both in terms of the nature of the training provided and of the level of skills required.

**Technical vocational education and training** (TVET) traditionally worked as a second chance for educational failures, rather than as a key service for enterprises and an effective instrument for inclusion in the labour market. Likewise, a true system for monitoring the labour market to collect and manage figures on flows on the labour market and TVET is missing.

In 2011, gross enrolment rates stood at 110% for **primary education** and 94% for **secondary education**, which is high by international standards. Enrolment has also increased rapidly in higher education and stood at 55.8% in 2011. During the Gaddafi regime there was a massive increase in teachers and administrative staff at schools. As a result, Libya had the lowest student-teacher ratio in the world — 1 to 5. The quality of education is presumably affected by other factors such as, the shortage of qualified teachers in key subjects; the use of reserve teachers; and teachers' status, motivation or qualification<sup>2</sup>.

With regards to **health services**, these may nominally be available and free of charge for most, but they are often of poor quality, which effectively serves to disenfranchise vulnerable groups which are unable to purchase services in the private sector or travel abroad. On the other hand, preventive services, mental health and primary health care are under-provided relative to need. Health services are also inappropriately configured to suit the needs of

---

<sup>1</sup> EACEA/NTD Report 2012

<sup>2</sup> UNICEF Report, 2012

specific groups, such as those infected with HIV/AIDS. The situation deteriorated since the crisis of mid-2014 with regular outbreak of violent clashes increasing the need for medical care and at the same time limiting access to health care and disturbing the supply chain of medication and supplies.

Before the 2014 crisis, 86 hospitals: 33 teaching tertiary hospitals, 20 secondary hospitals and 31 rural hospitals were operational although major capacity constraints in terms of governance, organisation and management existed. Overall scores of general service availability and readiness were also low. They stood at 54% for general service availability and 64% for readiness.<sup>3</sup> Since 2012 the Health sector received special attention mainly through EU and WHO engagement. The state of public health provision deteriorated further during the recent conflict which led to the suspension of the initiatives started. Moreover, due to the steady decline of revenues (oil exports and world oil price decreased) budgetary cuts are severely affecting the health sector. Shortages of drugs and medical supplies are increasingly reported and the health information system and supply systems are severely affected by the situation.

Libya ranks poorly on **women empowerment**. In 2012, female participation in the labour market was only 30.1 % compared to 76.8 % for men. On a positive note, 55.6 % of adult women had reached a secondary or higher level of education compared to 44% of their male counterparts. On the other hand, maternal mortality rates are seemingly high. For every 100,000 live births, 58 women die from pregnancy related causes; and the adolescent fertility rate is 2.6 births per 1,000 live births (HDR 2013).

#### 1.4 Sustainable agricultural and food security situation

Climatic conditions and poor soils severely limit agricultural output, which is further expected to aggravate due to the changing climate. Libya currently imports about 80% of its food. Libya's primary agricultural water source is the Great Manmade River Project which has capacity to transport around 1.7 million cubic metres of water per day from the South of the country to the coastal provinces.

**As a consequence of the current crisis an estimated 1.28m people are food insecure.**

#### 1.5 Environmental situation and climate change

The nine months of armed conflict in 2011 took place mainly in urban areas with cities like Misrata or Sirte being exposed to long periods of fighting. As a result **mines and other 'explosive remnants of war' have littered the country**. Some progress was achieved by local authorities and by international nongovernmental organisations to identify and to clean areas that remain contaminated by unexploded ordinance. In 2012, considerable efforts were made to provide comprehensive Mine Risk Education (MRE) to at risk children and communities. In the course of 2013, national capacities to effectively provide and manage MRE were further strengthened.—The pollution impact resulting from the renewed fighting remains to be assessed.

Libya's coastal zone hosts 85% of the country's population and most of its industrial and agricultural activity. There are no natural rivers in the area, only wadis (temporary dry rivers), which transport sediment, litter and pollutants from inland to the sea during storms. The major

---

<sup>3</sup> The Post Conflict Hospital Libya Survey (2013) is available at <http://www.seha.ly/site/>

environmental concerns in Libya before the conflict in 2011 were **water availability and the depletion of underground water** as a result of overuse in agricultural developments, causing salinity and sea-water penetration into the coastal aquifers. Water resources are also likely to be affected by climate change.

**Pollution resulting from human activities** is mainly found in the vicinity of large coastal cities, and is concentrated in a limited number of urban/industrial centres along the coast. The main sources of pollution are urban and industrial sewage, in addition to improper solid waste management. Oil pollution is observed near terminal facilities. As a result of the fighting oil terminals and reservoirs have been damaged, and sometimes set ablaze, provoking environmental damage.

Libya has built its economic development on access to very cheap oil (1 litre of petrol costs less than EUR 0.10). As a result, it has **very high energy consumption** relative to other countries in the region. In 2006, it consumed per capita 3.1 tonnes of oil equivalent, compared to 1 tonne in Algeria, 0.9 tonnes in Tunisia and 0.4 tonnes in Morocco. Libya's per capita consumption is close to the levels observed in European Mediterranean countries. Its CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are also comparatively large, with 8.96 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> per capita in 2003 (2.2 tonnes in Tunisia and 1.1 tonnes in Morocco).

The **use of renewable energies remains very limited** in Libya: in 2006, its consumption amounted to only 0.17 million tonnes of oil equivalent (1 million tonnes in Tunisia and 0.47 million tonnes in Morocco). However, the potential for the development of renewable energy sources seems spectacularly high, in particular solar but also wind energy. It is estimated that this potential amounts to 157 000 TWh per year.

## 1.6 Country capacities

The challenges to any future Libyan government are manifold and complex. There are urgent **needs to reform and strengthen capacity for effective and efficient service delivery**; to ensure effective strategic planning, financing and management to improve the efficiencies of the workforce.

Already before the current crisis there was significant popular pressure on the different interim governments to improve service delivery outcomes for the citizens. Throughout the first years of the transition (2012-mid 2014) the extremely weak capacity of the administration manifested itself almost permanently. Incapacity to design, articulate and implement government strategies was a recurrent obstacle for the successive interim governments when trying to meet the citizens' expectations. More than a year of fighting and political divide is unlikely to have improved the situation. Ministries and officials will be confronted with the challenge of regaining the momentum of reform based on their ability to define and implement national development objectives.

The Revolution triggered an avalanche of independent civil society organisations. Most new NGO's compensated their lack of experience with their enthusiasm and willingness to play a role in the political debate. Youth and women groups were of particular relevance. However, the above-mentioned enthusiasm rapidly decreased as a result of the political stalemate which preceded the current crisis. Already before, but notably since the fighting escalated in mid-2014, several Human rights defenders, political activists and journalists have been killed, threatened and intimidated. Women activists are particularly vulnerable and increasingly

pressured to abandon public roles. As a consequence numerous civil society activists have left the country or returned to anonymity fearing for their safety.

Under Gaddafi Libya was pre-revolution primarily a socialist economy with the private sector to a large extent in the hands of a few players, often with close ties to the former regime. The revolution unleashed previously restrained entrepreneurial activity and increased the potential for the evolution of a more market-based economy. However, a conducive framework for investment and private sector development still needed to be put in place.

## 1.7 Regional integration and cooperation

The international stance held by the different interim Libyan governments which ruled the country from 2012 until 2014 constituted a remarkable improvement compared to the erratic and sometimes aggressive foreign policy of the Gaddafi regime. Libya reached out to Arab and African neighbours seeking to conclude agreements which could add stability to the volatile Sahel and Maghreb regions. Agreements for cooperation on border management and security were concluded with Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.

In March 2012, **Libya hosted a Ministerial Regional Conference on Border Security**, during which the Tripoli Action Plan was adopted. A follow-up meeting took place in Rabat in November 2013 where ministers from the Maghreb and the Sahel agreed on a number of operational measures such as the establishment of a secretariat in Tripoli in charge of steering the implementation of the Action Plan.

Regional integration and cooperation is deemed essential to address security concerns, (e.g. Sahel/Mali crisis) and to foster economic growth and the ability to attract FDI in non-oil sector. If and when a political settlement would be reached and when security becomes less of an immediate concern, **Libya's integration with the region should be further energised**, especially regarding trade, energy, environment, climate change and transport cooperation but also in areas such as ICT.

In February 2013, Libya participated for the first time in a meeting of the Union for the Mediterranean (as observer). Following the establishment of a Government of National Accord and a stabilisation of the country **full participation from Libya in the ENP and in EU-led regional programmes** should be sought.

**Before the current crisis Libya was taking part in some EU regional programmes** such as the Mediterranean Intervention Epidemiology Training Programme (MediPIET), which aims to expand EU public health training to the Mediterranean region, so as to prevent and control national and cross-border public health threats.<sup>4</sup>

Libya had also appointed a National Contact Point (NCP) for the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme for Research, which covers activities in the field of research, technological development and demonstration (RTD) for the period 2007 to 2013.

---

<sup>4</sup> In 24 months, MediPIET aims to: i) establish a network of training sites and trained national MediPIET supervisors within the Mediterranean region; and ii) set up a training programme in field/intervention epidemiology, with trained supervisors, appraised training sites, accessible training material and agreed selection processes for future MediPIET fellows to be trained in national accredited training sites.

In the education sector, Libya is part of three regional mobility projects in the field of higher education, which operate under the framework of the Erasmus Mundus programme and aim to enhance the quality of higher education in Europe and promote the EU as a centre of excellence for learning and teaching. Libya is also part of three regional Tempus projects, which aim to promote institutional cooperation primarily on the reform and modernisation of higher education systems. Under the Erasmus Plus 2015 call for proposal 1 capacity building project including Libyan Universities has been selected (€0.7M).

**Libya's participation in most of the above-mentioned initiatives was suspended in summer 2014** as most of these programs entailed support to line-ministries in Tripoli which were taken over by the self-declared government in the capital non recognised by the EU and by the rest of the international community.

## 1.8 Conclusion

The **UN-facilitated talks should bring the Libyan parties to agree on a Government of National Accord** that would end the political power struggle driving Libya's conflict. The International Community must be ready to assist that government in succeeding there where its predecessors failed despite being confronted to a substantially less favorable situation. The government's early ability to address citizens' expectations, including resumption of service delivery and prevalence of rule of law, will condition the fate of Libya's second transition.

**An inclusive constitutional process leading to a wide consensus** will be essential for the overall trajectory of the transition process. Without a satisfactory settlement of key elements of the political process, such as disarmament, the role of religion, the relation between central and local government, it is hard to imagine that a sustainable solution to the foundations of a new, democratic Libya can be found. This requires an inclusive dialogue.

As part of the constitutional process, an **agreement on the division of resources and power between local and central authorities** will have to be reached. Given the strong wish for some level of autonomy at the local level and delicate questions in relation to the distribution of revenues from natural resources among the regions, this could be a potential deal breaker; if handled well, this could facilitate the transition process. Capacity building at all levels to support the required policy dialogue will be needed as well as a strong public outreach campaign.

The Libyan population is aware of the wealth emanating from natural resources lying under their soil. However, they fail to see the income from energy exports transformed into better public services. This was one of the main factors which triggered the 2011 unrest against the previous regime and one of the main sources of criticism against the different interim governments in power from late 2011 until mid-2014. Public perception needs therefore to feel an **improvement on the delivery of crucial public services** like health or education.

For a peaceful constitutional process to take shape and to reduce the risk of conflict, a **disarmament and reintegration process** is essential. Sufficient institutional capacity of the government to organise and implement such a complex process is required. This process should be accompanied by a community-based public outreach campaign.

Libyan youth, including militia members, need meaningful alternatives. Financial hand-outs will not satisfy their need to reacquire an acceptable social status. The SME sector could offer

many **job opportunities for Libyan youth**. For a more balanced economic growth, a well-considered **economic diversification** strategy is required.

**A functioning police and justice sector, contributing to public security and trusted by the people, as well as a broadly accepted transitional process** are essential to avoid armed groups taking justice in their own hands and to start the reconciliation process that would allow Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to return home.

Without some form of **reconciliation process**, the DDR process will be seriously hampered and revenge killings will continue to take place thereby exacerbating the risk of violence and conflict. Recurrence of human rights violations against migrants, detainees and other vulnerable persons (e.g. IDPs) can lead to radicalism within these groups which could pose additional pressure to the already fragile political process.

**Enhanced border security** will contribute to external and internal security. Libya's 6000 km of borders also pose a threat to the stability in the region and increase the migratory pressure on the EU if they are not better controlled. The civilian CSDP mission (EUBAM Libya) had to stop its support to the authorities on integrated border management when it had to evacuate in summer 2014. The mission has now been scaled-down to three people and relocated to Tunis. A political settlement could provide new entry points for a re-shaped CSDP mission. A regional approach will be important, including agreements with neighbouring countries on joint border control.

For the above and other key reforms, **improved effectiveness of the civil service** is essential. A full civil service reform programme will require many years. However, the government should be able already at short term to strengthen the effectiveness of the civil service in selected priority areas (e.g. security, health). Structural policy reforms without a minimum level of functioning of the civil service seem inconceivable. For any civil service reform initiative to be successful, inter-ministerial coordination under the leadership of the PM Office is required, as well as a shared vision of how a competent civil service should look like.

The same logic applies to **improved Public Finance Management, especially budget preparation and execution**, both at the central as at the local government levels. Most of the priorities mentioned here will not be addressed if Libya persists in its inability to turn oil dollars into expenditures for the common good and to manage this expenditure efficiently. The drive for change in this area will have to come from civil society and parliament.

The success and sustainability of PFM and other reforms will also depend on the **ability of civil society and the private sector to hold government to account** and to prompt reforms. This requires that government accepts empowered and organized civil society as a dialogue partner with whom the government will share information. Civil society and the private sector should assume this new role in a responsible manner and engage constructively with government on policy issues.

## **2. Overview of past and present donor cooperation, complementarity and consistency**

### **2.1. EU development cooperation and lessons learned**

EU cooperation with Libya was only embryonic under the previous regime (mainly focused on health and migration) but increased rapidly after the Revolution. There was no National Indicative Programme (NIP) for the period 2007-2010.

The NIP 2011-2013 with an **overall budget of EUR 60 million** was signed with the Libyan government in June 2010. It included two focal areas: (i) Improving the quality of human capital; (ii) Sustainability of economic and social development.

With the outbreak of the Libyan crisis in February 2011 all on-going cooperation contracts were technically suspended and re-oriented towards the most urgent needs caused by the armed conflict mainly to support in the area of Education, Public Administration and Civil Society. A revised NIP was signed with the new authorities on 30 August 2012 resulting in a **Special Measure (EUR 25 million)** with activities in the area of Technical Vocational Education and Training, Health and Security and Justice and **additional support (EUR 25 million)** was approved under the 2013 Annual Action Programme, for support in the area of Economic development, Protection and Migration.

Following the resumption of hostilities in the summer of 2014, the **EU cooperation portfolio was thoroughly reviewed** in order to assess the consequences of the conflict on EU-funded projects and to identify those projects which could be reoriented to contribute more efficiently to the Libyan people's relief.

**The 2014 Annual Action Programme (€8 million)** approved additional support in the sector of **Governance**.

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) has adopted several Exceptional Assistance Measures committing €12.5 million aiming at local risk detection and criminal investigation, security mapping, mediation of conflicts and dialogue, clearance of mines and unexploded ordnances as well as the protection of vulnerable people. In addition, a €7 million programme adopted in August 2015 supports the UN-led dialogue process and the implementation of any agreement to be reached. Furthermore, the measure will support community level efforts towards violence reduction.

Regarding support to **civil society**, for the period 2014-2017, Libya received a total allocation of €4 million:

**EIDHR:** 8 projects (€4.9 million) have been implemented in Libya from 2011 to 2014 in areas such as support to elections, fight against torture, human rights, media, freedom of information, women empowerment and transitional justice. For 2014-2017 a total allocation of €2million is granted.

**DCI Migration thematic budget line:** 5 projects for a total budget of €22.8 million have targeted Libya as a beneficiary during the period 2009-2014.

**Education:** Under the Erasmus Plus 2015 call for proposal 1 capacity building project including Libyan Universities has been selected (€0.7M). Erasmus Mundus has 4 regional projects ongoing (€17.4 million), offering 57 scholarships to Libyan nationals. Tempus: 3



national projects worth approximately €2.3 million are ongoing. The projects aim to foster quality assurance, modernise university governance and build capacity for university management.

**ECHO** mobilised a total amount of €2.7 million in three successive decisions in 2014. 7 projects have been financed in areas such as: emergency relief, assistance to vulnerable migrants and IDPs, protection and medical assistance to refugees and asylum seekers. In 2015 it increased its funding by €6 million to improve the response of humanitarian organisations to the most pressing needs.

The **lessons learned** from the on-going portfolio are that there is a need for a realistic and flexible approach. The legacy of over four decades of dysfunctional administration had an overarching impact on the different government bodies which can only be addressed gradually. Moreover, the unstable political and security situation and the co-existence of two rival governments competing for power has further complicated the capacity of the public administration to operate. Although the focal sectors proposed remain extremely relevant, the use of special measures might have to be considered to enable an efficient approach to the rapidly changing environment and to enable a more efficient response to the most pressing needs of the population.

## **2.2. Information on programmes of other donors and donor coordination**

Since the renewed outbreak of violence mid-2014 and the evacuation of all Embassies, donor co-ordination continues from Tunis where most of the Member States active in Libya have re-located. Member States were involved in a wide range of sectors, with predominance for governance and the security sector.

The EU Delegation co-ordinates with the UN Special Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) whose mandate bears the responsibility of the overall co-ordination of the international assistance to Libya (mandate extended till 15 September 2015).

The US provided assistance for reform in a number of areas including reform of security sector institutions and strengthening democratic governance. Other international donors include Canada and Japan. The World Bank developed a range of support programmes with the Libyan authorities, with a particular focus on public finance management and private sector development. Most activities have been suspended although some low profile support to key institutions continues.

Policy formulation remained at an early stage in most core government functions. All activities with the government are on hold due to the political and security situation till an agreement on a Government of National Accord has been reached. Policy coordination and dialogue among donors continues, albeit at a reduced level, under the overall mandate of UNSMIL.

## **2.3. Political and policy dialogue between donors and partner country**

In the absence of a bilateral agreement framing EU – Libya relations political dialogue takes place mainly via the regular exchanges in Tunis between the EU Delegation and Libyan key stakeholders and via ad-hoc meetings in Brussel. Unlike with other countries in the region there are no annual planned EU - Libya high-level meetings (e.g. Association Councils).

Throughout the last twelve months the EU has been supporting the UN-led political dialogue with the objective of having a Libyan Government of National Accord resulting from this process. Subsequently, political dialogue with the internationally recognised government based in Bayda and Tobruk has been focused on getting the government's support to the UN-led dialogue and also to address urgent priorities like the flow of irregular migration towards Europe departing from Libyan shores. The EU does not have any form of political dialogue with the self-declared government in Tripoli.

There have been several Council conclusions in recent years calling upon the EU to start a Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security under the framework of the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). Since Libya is a priority country in the Neighbourhood, as soon as conditions allow for a Dialogue with Libya to take place, it will be launched immediately. Asylum, Migration and Border Management would be the most burning issues to tackle in view of the lack of adequate frameworks in each of the three areas as well as Libyan accession to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its Protocol, the 1984 UN Convention against Torture, and the 2011 ILO Convention on decent work for domestic workers. Prospects for increased legal mobility for students, business persons, professionals etc. could be considered and provide an incentive for engagement.

The EU will also support Libya to re-join the Rabat Process (which promotes cooperation between the EU and countries in West Africa on migration along the West Africa migratory route) and/or to join the Khartoum Process (which focuses on cooperation between the EU and countries in the Horn of Africa along the East Africa route).

In the health sector, policy dialogue and dialogue on reform took place with the Ministry of Health prior to the current crisis. Competent managers within the Ministry of Health and articulate interlocutors within the Libyan health workforce had been identified. Libyan stakeholders also have considerable exposure to diverse models of health care delivery. In September 2012, the EU established a forum for regular policy dialogue with the Ministry of Health and Libyan healthcare leaders with a view to encourage the definition of national health objectives and reform priorities. Dialogue leverages the EU LHSS programme and is articulated around the EU LHSS Steering Committee and four Technical Working Groups.

In the field of primary education, policy dialogue took place under the framework of a UNICEF-implemented project worth EUR 2.4 million and aiming to improve access to quality education for vulnerable children.

#### **2.4. State of partnership with partner country, aid effectiveness agenda and progress towards harmonisation and alignment**

Earlier negotiations of an EU – Libya Framework Agreement were suspended at the early days of the Revolution. Libyan counterparts reiterated their interest to explore the possibility of launching negotiations of an Association Agreement during the first transition period (2011-2014). These discussions are not expected to restart soon and certainly not before a sustainable peace agreement has been reached and a new Government of National Accord will take up duty.

The Aid Effectiveness agenda is not implemented yet in Libya. Member States are generally not engaged in Libya with traditional development cooperation funds programmed on a multiannual basis. Support instruments are allocated on an ad-hoc or annual basis. With the possibility of a new Government of National Accord coming closer, UNSMIL has stepped up coordination of International support to Libya.

In July 2015 HRVP Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn launched the initiative for Joint Programming to reinforce coherence and visibility of EU support to Libya and to facilitate the coordination role of UNSMIL. Representatives of Member States were invited to meet in Brussels on 15 July to discuss the EU proposal to use the process of Joint Programming for our future support to Libya's transition process. The initiative was welcomed by all participants and should prepare the ground for discussions on the way forward for a more comprehensive strategy for our cooperation with Libya, to avoid overlap and to discuss possible "division of labour" for future programming. Follow-up meetings will be organised at Head of Cooperation level in Tunis later this year. This exercise has the objective to facilitate and feed into the overarching coordinating role of UNSMIL.

## **2.5. ENP**

EU financial cooperation with Libya will be closely aligned with EU political objectives, notably the EU Council conclusions on Libya, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

## **2.6. Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)**

The Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) work programme aims at enhancing the coherence of EU policies with development objectives. Building on the PCD Council conclusions of November 2009, this work programme outlines how the EU will address, through relevant policies, processes and financial means, five global challenges in a development-friendly manner:

- trade and finance,
- climate change,
- global food security,
- migration,
- security.

Different instruments have been in use in Libya: ENI, the thematic lines, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace" (IcSP), and a CSDP mission.

Security is a key sector for Libya. The EU Delegation was reinforced with security experts. In 2015 a EU Planning Cell was established in Tunis to support UNSMIL on planning for interim security arrangements which will have to be implemented following an agreement.

The conflict sensitive programming methodology was used to prepare the 2014-2015 programme involving all relevant EU departments in Brussels during an ad hoc seminar. It was also carried out in Tripoli with the Member States.

Considering EU commitment to dedicate 20% of its budget to climate related issues, climate change is to be considered as a cross-cutting issue.

## Libya Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014-2016

### Introduction

Since the Revolution in 2011, Libya made some progress on the path of democratic transition with the first ever free elections in July 2012 (election of the General National Congress), and the subsequent formation of a democratic government. However, the transition process remained fragile, with the government's authority compromised by the weakness and vulnerability of state institutions. Security structures were unable to deal effectively with challenges from diverse armed factions and radical groups. Insecurity spread from Benghazi (where targeted killings of security officers started to occur with growing frequency), to the rest of the country. The political divide grew steadily led by competing visions of the future of post-revolution Libya. This struggle paralyzed the General National Congress (GNC) and government, and steadily intensified following the adoption of the Political Isolation Law in May 2013, which basically denied everyone who worked under the Gaddafi regime at a senior level further public and political engagement.

Two more elections (February 2014 elections of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly and June 2014 election of the House of Representatives) took place. However, elections did not serve to bring positive momentum the transition process; on the contrary they accelerated the political polarisation and the struggle over power (political, military, institutional, and economic). The outbreak of violence in Tripoli in July/August 2014 finally derailed the transition process and triggered the current partition of the country in two areas under the control of two opposing camps, generally, referred to as the "Islamist" camp and the "Nationalist", broadly correspond to "Libya Dawn" and "Libya Dignity".

Libya Dawn argues that they are protecting the 2011 Revolution from a pro-Gaddafi loyalists' counter-revolution and firmly opposes foreign intervention. Libya Dignity states that they are the safeguard of a modern democratic State against an extremist Islamist take-over, arguing that Europe and the International Community should support them; hence they favour some form of foreign intervention.

This said, **the situation in Libya is multi-dimensional and multi-layered** with a large number of players involved in continuously changing alliances. In addition to the more ideological bi-polar antagonism, there is a multi-polar power struggle underway that simultaneously involves players with static, predictable objectives and interests (Ansar Al Sharia, Daesh, Federalists) along with others of a more opportunistic and transactional type (tribes, cities, minority components). Regional players try and often manage to influence developments in the country in order to enhance their regional geopolitical objectives.

**Throughout the last year the International Community has supported the efforts of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to achieve a political settlement** via the UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue, now at its crucial phase. In addition to its political support to these UN-led efforts - expressed on numerous occasions by EU Member States the EU has hosted meetings of the Libyan Political Dialogue and has covered part of its costs. The EU also undertakes regular diplomatic reach out to neighbours and regional players to ensure their support to the UN-led process.

**Eventually, the Libyan Political Dialogue should yield a Government of National Accord** and the relaunch of the transitional process. However, such a political settlement would not necessarily commit all groups (e.g. radical actors driven by ideological agendas such as Daesh or Salafi groups will likely continue to fight). Therefore it will be a priority to manage the risk of renewed escalation of violence and help enforce a peace agreement, allowing a number of longer term processes to start.

An agreement in the framework of the UN-led process and the formation of a Government of National Accord are crucial in order to achieve a greater objective which is the relaunch of the transition process. When this occurs the process will focus on the work of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly supported by the High National Electoral Commission (CDA) in view on an eventual referendum to adopt the Constitution. The CDA will allegedly release the first in October 2015. Building national consensus about future governance arrangements through the planned constitutional process is likely to be a prolonged process, while at the same time the population is impatient for concrete results from the transition process in terms of security, justice, improved public services and increased economic opportunities.

If the transition process is relaunched the management of the constitutional process is expected to dominate the political agenda in 2016, with issues related to the future division of power between central authorities, municipalities and regions remaining contentious. The role of civil society in voicing Libyan aspirations for the future constitution can be a positive factor to keep the process on track. If successful, the process will highlight long-term needs for far-reaching institutional strengthening across the whole range of democratic governance institutions whose roles and responsibilities will be defined in the Constitution.

In parallel with the constitutional process the security situation and the disarmament and reintegration of the armed groups of ex-fighters must urgently be addressed. Progress with national reconciliation and transitional justice appear essential for stabilisation of the country. The spread of radicalisation and violent extremism must also be addressed as well as the management of its long land and coastal borders through which very strong migratory pressure in the EU is being felt.

Another urgent issue to be addressed is the impunity for gross international human rights and humanitarian law violations, and put in place guarantees for non-reoccurrence. For this to happen the weak State monopoly of force, the enforcement of rule of law, continuing gaps in relevant legislation and lack of institutional capacities must also be addressed.

As regards the economic context, the role of the oil and gas sector is dominant. In recent years it has generated about 80% of GDP and given Libya one of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa. Employment is dependent on the public sector, with the private sector outside of oil and gas mostly limited to imports, retail and some services. Oil and gas exports have been seriously affected by the deteriorating security, creating doubts over future state revenues and the ability to maintain public spending at current levels. It is widely agreed that Libya needs to begin diversifying its economy both to reduce the state's dependence on the oil and gas sector, to boost the development of less rich areas of the country and to create wider employment opportunities for young Libyans. Coherent measures are needed to improve the business environment and encourage SME development, and to realign the education and professional training systems to respond better to the future skills requirements of the economy.

In Libya, health services may nominally be available and free of charge for most, but they are of very poor quality, which effectively serves to disenfranchise vulnerable groups that are economically and socially disadvantaged and are unable to purchase services in the private sector or to travel abroad to access health care. Assisting transformations in the organisation and delivery of health care services would help address social inequality entrenched in health policies, services and systems and ensure social justice. More broadly, ensuring equal access to health services is accepted as being part of the social contract binding citizens together. It is a precondition for civic and political participation and for inclusiveness of economic growth, and plays a critical role in democratic consolidation and in stabilisation efforts.

Libya's environmental challenges include limited water resources, droughts and land degradation, depletion of natural resources, fragmented mechanisms for environmental management and monitoring, inadequate solid and hazardous waste management, and oil spills. There is an urgent need to establish sound environmental management systems, supported by legislative and policy instruments. Climate change is expected to increase problems of water shortages which if not addressed could contribute to further instability.

During the period of implementation of this MIP, the EU and Libya will continue to support the most pressing needs of the Libyan population while standing ready to support a Government of National Accord and the institutions which will bear the responsibility for the relaunch of the transitional process.

## **1. EU Response**

### *1.1. Strategic objectives of the EU's relationship with the partner country*

The objectives of the EU's relationship with Libya over the period of this MIP have been defined in the light of the stabilisation context and conflict sensitivity analysis and the new deal endorsed at the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid effectiveness in Bussan in 2011. The overall objective is supporting a transition from a "peace-making" phase, to a longer-term "peace-building" phase. Taking into account the uncertainty and volatility of the current context, some flexibility will be needed in the definition of specific actions.

The objectives here defined are complementary and in line with the conclusions established in the 2015 Political Framework for a Crisis Approach (PFCA) for Libya, presenting a wide set of policy options in case a government of national unity is formed, including proposals on CSDP activities.

The conclusion of a political agreement and the establishment of a Government of National Accord is seen as central to Libya's stabilisation. Subsequently, throughout the last 12 months the EU has been supporting politically, finically and logistically the UN-led Libyan dialogue process which is currently in its crucial phase.

In addition to its political support to these UN-led efforts - expressed on numerous occasions by EU Member States the EU has hosted meetings of the Libyan Political Dialogue and has covered part of its costs. Support to UNSMIL was stepped-up in 2015 with the EU Planning Cell in Tunis becoming instrumental in assisting UNSMIL security team planning for the interim security arrangements which should follow a deal. The EU also undertakes regular diplomatic reach out to neighbours and regional players to ensure their support to the UN-led process.

Moreover, EU support should aim at supporting the transition process, with a focus on developing the institutions of democratic governance whose roles will be defined under the political agreement and possibly in the new Constitution. Depending on the speed of progress in the coming period support will focus on reconciliation, the constitutional drafting process; institutional support to core government functions; elections; building capacities for sub-national governance (municipalities); reinforcing the health sector, empowering youth and civil organisations, promotion and protection of human rights.

The participation of women in the transition process is deemed essential in order to pave the way for a democratic society where all Libyan citizens share rights and obligations. To help achieve this objective the EU intends to mainstream Gender Equality in all policies, strategies and cooperation actions in Libya and to finance measures which directly support women's empowerment.

Social and economic integration of Libyan youth will remain a key priority for the Libyan authorities in the coming period. Reinforced efforts in this area are needed to contribute to peace building by facilitating the reintegration of former fighters in the shorter term. In the medium term, EU support should be consistent with realisation of broader social and economic development objectives, in areas including education, vocational training, social integration, private business development and improvement of the investment climate, employment policy, subsidies and pension policies. Although environmental concerns are not seen as a focus of cooperation in the current situation, the new constitution, the institutional reforms and the related capacity building represent opportunities to prepare the foundations to respond to environmental challenges which will deliver benefits in the longer term.

Strengthening the health systems can play a major contribution to social stability and, more widely, to the state and peace building agenda. Since the outbreak of violent clashes in 2014, the already weak health system in Libya is now on the verge of collapse. There is an urgent need to restore the health system to minimum standards: increase accessibility, ensure supplies, update regulations and procedures, etc. It has long been recognised that public service provision enhances government performance, legitimacy and perceptions of responsiveness thereby reducing societal propensity towards conflict. Governance reforms have wider consequences for the consolidation of the state that extend beyond the institutions necessary for the direct delivery of health services. They impact upon perceptions of the legitimacy of the state; they encourage governments into greater levels of responsiveness and contribute to enhanced legitimacy; they bridge the divide between belligerent communities; and, most crucially, they contribute to the protection of core institutions and people, thus consolidating stability. Besides, health issues can be a vanguard of reintegration and demobilisation processes, a major priority in the Libyan context.

Due to the prevailing instability, Libya has evolved from a destination country into a transit country for a large number of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. The current crisis and the institutional weakness poses challenges for the development of adequate responses to the multi-faceted migration phenomenon. Between 2011 and 2014 the EU committed EUR 42.7 million in migration projects in Libya. Support to migration management is focussing on three sub-sectors: i) human rights based migration management; ii) countering irregular migration; iii) assistance to people in need of international protection/stranded migrants. Since the summer 2014 the ongoing portfolio has been refocused to guaranty emergency care and support to stranded migrants, IDPs and refugee and asylum seekers. To avoid a fragmented

approach which could lead to possible duplication of efforts or gaps in the assistance provided in Libya, Commission services have jointly strengthened their programming and addressed the issue of migration in a comprehensive manner cutting across different policies and instruments in line with the EU Agenda for Migration. In this regard, Commission/EEAS have agreed on a detailed delineation of roles and articulation of our various instruments.

## **1.2. Choice of sectors of intervention**

### **Sector 1 - Democratic governance**

Activities in this area intended to support the transition process beginning with the election of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) early 2014. Due to the crisis mid-2014, the work of the CDA has been delayed and it is now expected to be completed by the end of 2015.

The EU is undertaking a number of activities to support the electoral process, as well as the long-term institutional development of the High National Electoral Commission. High-level technical and legal advice on the drafting process has been made available to respond to the needs of the CDA. At the same time, EU support to Libyan civil society contributed to develop awareness of the CDA election, including a project focusing specifically on issues of particular relevance to women. The EU continues to support an important project focused on improving capacities of Libyan media to cover issues related to the constitution and the democratic transition. EU support to civil society organisations (CSOs) will continue to enhance their participation in the Democratic and constitutional process.

The EU's current involvement in the UN-led political dialogue is expected to lead to identification of opportunities to engage in technical support to the emerging institutions of democratic governance and to contribute to the effective implementation of the constitutional provision.

The subsectors/institutions that could be covered include: the legislature (Parliament); core government functions and administrative systems (in particular public policy management, statistics, human resource management, internal accountability,...) aspects of the public finance management system (including management of the social protection system); the electoral commission; institutions concerned with various levels of sub-national governance (particularly local councils/municipalities); initiatives dealing with national dialogue, transitional justice, reconciliation and human rights; the public audit body; etc.

Institution-building support will be defined for key institutions in the context of the UN-led coordination of International Cooperation in support of the political dialogue in close cooperation with national and local authorities. Priority areas of intervention will be identified, in consultation with national authorities, local councils as well as CSOs and in coordination with other international actors, in view of improving the management and organisational capacity of the state and CSOs and to support a constructive and balanced dialogue. EU support will be an inclusive process aiming to reinforce CSOs and the state's response in meeting citizens' needs and expectations in terms of effective democratic participation, respect of justice and human rights and promotion of good governance and accountability. In the context of good governance and accountability good quality and comparable statistics are vital and need to be supported in view of making trustworthy data available for measurement.



Human rights violations, namely abuses against vulnerable groups (e.g. migrants), torture and other forms of ill-treatment, condition of detainees and freedom of expression will be included as part of the governance component. Supporting institutional capacity of state bodies with a mandate to monitor human rights will be addressed.

Resources will be managed with a degree of flexibility to respond to the crisis situation in Libya and evolving needs.

In line with the Communication “The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations”<sup>5</sup>, the EU programme under this sector of the MIP will engage with Libyan CSOs to develop their capacities to actively play a role towards democratic governance (i.e. monitoring the implementation of the constitution, participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of the national strategies and reforms, reconciliation initiatives, electoral process, etc.)

## **Sector 2 - Youth: active citizenship and socioeconomic integration**

Complex issues having an impact on youth economic and social integration need to be addressed in a consistent manner.

Lack of employment opportunities is a key factor contributing to difficulties with the reintegration of former fighters and armed groups, while the persistence of such groups is a major challenge to the planned democratic transition and constitutional process. At the same time the unfavourable social and economic context is seen as contributing to increasing criminality and potential for radicalisation. The poor quality of the education and qualifications systems is not preparing young people to enter the labour market.

Areas to be addressed include support for an active citizenship, initiatives aiming at preventing youth involvement in drugs use, criminality or militias, resilience to radicalisation and violent extremism, education and skills development and employment policy, as well as SME development. In the short term Libya needs to implement a credible set of measures to facilitate the reintegration of fighters, predominantly young (some will be reabsorbed into the security sector, but the majority should return to civilian life). In the longer term relevant sector development strategies in support of economic diversification including low carbon development should be designed and implemented.

EU-supported programmes initiated in 2012 and 2013 addressed the development of national capacities and systems in the fields of vocational education and SME support services. In addition the EU supported efforts to achieve access to quality education for all children, with a special focus on the most vulnerable, including children affected by the conflict. In complementarity with these programmes, the present MIP planned to support the development and implementation of a comprehensive approach to Youth issues involving all institutional stakeholders (e.g. Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Higher Education, TVET Board, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Youth and Sport, Warriors Affairs Commission, etc.) through a suitable high level national structure such as the Ministry of Planning. Due to the 2014 crisis, this project had to be suspended until the situation stabilises and a Government of National Accord will have been installed. In the meantime, alternative actions

---

<sup>5</sup> COM(2012) 492 final

will be considered at municipal level to ensure youth actors are empowered to take up a more active and participative role in the Libyan society.

In addition, EU programmes will engage with civil society organisations to ensure Youth ownership, to develop policy dialogue at national and regional level and promote innovative programmes for developing youth participation and citizenship, ensure economic and social integration with a special focus on young women. Areas of intervention could include social entrepreneurship, the use of micro-credit to support local income-generating activities, community social and economic initiatives including awareness raising of sustainability, specific education and training schemes for drop-outs, youth networks and promotion of youth centres, promotion of sports including national and local leagues, prevention of addiction, promotion of the culture and the arts, and education for democratic participation including in the national dialogue. Civil society projects should be implemented in partnership with government programmes where possible, and could contribute to monitoring government policies and programmes in these areas. Projects would seek to engage private sector sponsorship in promotion of social integration initiatives.

### **Sector 3 - Health**

The rationale for investing in health service delivery in Libya is two-pronged.

In Libya, health services are citizens' direct line to government. They make the state tangible through an almost daily interaction. In the prevailing context, characterised by high expectations of "change", efficient and effective health care delivery will play a pivotal role as a tool for peace building.

A strengthened health system is also conducive to economic growth and employment. Good health has a positive, sizable and statistically significant effect on aggregate output. Conversely, poor health generates an economic burden to individuals, companies and countries. In particular, an unhealthy population generates higher healthcare costs. This hinders economic growth and inflates public expenditures. Environmental factors have a significant impact on health.

The strategy for EU engagement in this sector is built on a platform that helps overcome four elemental gaps: reducing exclusion and social disparities in access to health care through expanded access to health care services and essential medicines; promoting sustained change in patient safety through focused interventions that will provide tangible results at the point of care; availing reliable data vital for public health decision making, health sector reviews, planning, monitoring and evaluation; and addressing needs for fundamental change in health professionals' education so as to promote learners' ability to work more effectively and collaboratively and ultimately provide better patient care. Non-communicable diseases place poor and marginalised individuals and households at high risk of not having access to appropriate services and incurring payments for health care that push them deeper into poverty. The health situation deteriorated dramatically since the crisis of mid-2014. Regular outbreak of violent clashes increased the need for medical care and at the same time the security situation limited access to health care and disturbed the supply chain of medication and supplies. Supporting the health sector under the current circumstances could play an important role in the stabilisations of the crisis situation.

Despite these challenges there are also considerable opportunities for reform at present. The European Union was already engaged in the health sector providing technical assistance to support targeted reforms in health service delivery, management, strategic planning, health financing, human resources and physical rehabilitation for people with disabilities.

The EU-funded Libya Health Systems Strengthening Programme (LHSS) contributed towards capacity building of the Directorate of Health Financing to guide decisions on health financing, preparing National Health Accounts to use finances more equitably and efficiently, defining a Basic Health Care Package to be delivered in nine primary health care sites, reviewing contractual arrangements including part-time options and dual practice arrangements, launching a workforce analysis to review staffing policies, qualifications and geographic distribution, and defining the functions of a General Health Care Council and the Libyan College of Physicians and Surgeons.

Technical experts mobilized through this programme were embedded in the Ministry of Health and built strong relationships with Libyan counterparts at all levels. Although the programme has currently been suspended at institutional level, the previous work with relevant technical counterparts will be beneficial to re-start the programme as soon as conditions allow. Indeed, according to an independent review conducted in September 2013, the early outcomes of this programme have made ‘a lasting impact’.

Civil society participation will be mainstreamed throughout project implementation.

### **1.3.- Cross-cutting issues**

The mainstreaming of gender issues as well as environment and climate change issues will be taken into account in the three areas of intervention.

## 2. Financial overview (indicative amounts)

The indicative allocation for 2014-2020 is EUR 126,000,000 – EUR 154,000,000. The indicative allocation for the first programming period (2014-2016) is EUR 53,000,000 – EUR 65,000,000.

The indicative breakdown by sector is as follows:

<b>Sector of intervention</b>	<b>% total financial allocation</b>
Democratic governance	45
Youth	28
Health	16
Technical assistance and civil society support	11

In addition to programmed bilateral allocations, Neighbourhood countries may benefit from supplementary allocations provided under the multi-country umbrella programmes referred to in the Neighbourhood-wide programming documents. Such supplementary allocations will be granted on the basis of progress towards deep and sustainable democracy and implementation of agreed reform objectives contributing to the attainment of that goal.

Libya is also eligible for support under a number of other EU instruments, such as the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, humanitarian aid, the Partnership Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation, macro-financial assistance, Development Co-operation Instrument, thematic programmes and external actions under EU internal programmes for e. g. research and innovation, energy, transport, education, youth, culture and media (in particular Erasmus+ and Creative Europe).

To the extent possible, Member States' bilateral political action and assistance will be co-ordinated with EU action, in view of enhancing political leverage and coherence in the foreign policy across the EU. The EU launched a Joint-Programming initiative with Member States to avoid overlap and discuss possible “division of labour” in future programming. This exercise should also prepare the ground for a more comprehensive strategy in our medium-term support to Libya. Libya may also form the object of further action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy, following possible future decisions by the Council.

## 3. EU support per sector

### **3.1 Democratic governance (indicative 45%)**

#### 3.1.1 Overall and specific objectives

The EU's overall objective in this area is to support Libya's democratic transitional processes based on a political agreement, the formation of a Government of National Accord and the democratic adoption and implementation of a new constitution.

Specific objectives are as follows:

- Strengthening institutions of democratic governance: strengthening the ability of national institutions at both central and local levels to respond to citizens' needs, ensure respect of the rule of law, justice and protection of human rights and run effective and scalable social protection programmes. Encourage inclusive, nationally owned and participatory political decision-making processes related to the democratic transition.
- Strengthening Civil Society Organisations' (CSOs') capacities in order to enable them to participate in and exercise oversight of democratic governance and the constitutional process. Promote dialogue and interaction between the state institutions and the civil society on key governance and accountability issues.

Intervention priorities will be defined through identification of institution-building needs in key democratic institutions, providing the basis for preparation and implementation of tailored technical assistance packages. Structured and inclusive consultations will be carried out with the civil society, with special attention to women and minorities.

Support will be provided to key democratic institutions and entities such as Parliament; core government ministries or agencies and administrative systems including aspects of the public finance management system; bodies concerned with rule of law; electoral commission; the supreme public audit body; sub-national/local authorities/municipalities; bodies established to deal with national dialogue, transitional justice and reconciliation; public bodies dealing with human rights; including environmental rights etc. The support aims also to reinforce the capacities of Libyan civil society organisations to actively play a role in democratic governance (i.e. monitoring the implementation of the constitution, reconciliation initiatives, electoral process, etc.).

The gender dimension and relevant environmental issues will be taken into account in the definition of policies as well as in the implementation of activities.

3.1.2. Results under this sector will be defined specifically through agreement on Terms of Reference for each democratic governance institution and for the targeted civil society organisations. However, in general EU support aims to achieve the following results:

For objective 1:

- Libyan institutions' capacity are reinforced in line with the principles of good governance and rule of law;
- Government-led donor coordination is established and made operational.

Activities will relate among others to: preparation and implementation of organisational development plans for targeted institutions; capacity building and training activities, exchanges of experience with institutions from EU countries.

For objective 2:

- Increased CSOs capacity to perform their role as independent actor in supporting and monitoring the transition process (reconciliation, elections,...);
- civil society's awareness of key democratic governance issues is enhanced and its capacity for provisions of services is reinforced;
- Inclusive and structured CSOs' participation to democratic governance is increased including policy dialogue, human rights mechanisms and domestic accountability both at local and national levels.

3.1.3. The main indicators for measuring the aforementioned results are contained in the sector intervention framework attached in Annex 1.

3.1.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:

In the light of the UN Security Council Resolution 2040 of 12 March 2012, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is charged with managing and coordinating technical advice and assistance to the Libyan electoral process and the process of preparing and establishing a new Libyan constitution.

The EU fully participates in UNSMIL's coordination mechanisms. Moreover, the EU Delegation (in Tunis since mid-2014, together with UNSMIL and the vast majority of the diplomatic community) has been instrumental in assisting UNSMIL to overcome its capacity constraints while managing coordination meetings. An EU Joint Programming exercise has been launched to better coordinate EU and Member States' programming for Libya.

3.1.5. Government's financial and policy commitments: as soon as a political agreement will have been reached and a Government of National Accord installed, discussions on financial and policy commitment at national level can restart.

3.1.6. Environmental assessment: Whenever relevant, the appropriate type of environmental assessment will be carried out according to EU standards, and appropriate measures will be taken in response to the assessments,

3.1.7. The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention: EU support for democratic governance in Libya faces a number of risks inherent to the political, social and security context, and uncertainties in the ongoing transition process. Further deterioration in the security situation in Libya will cause an additional impact on the pace of the democratization process.

## **3.2 Youth: active citizenship and socioeconomic integration (indicative 28%)**

3.2.1 Overall and specific objectives

The overall objective in this area is to help a future Government and civil-society organisations in promoting youth's democratic participation and socioeconomic integration in view of a more inclusive sustainable and stable society.

Specific objectives of the intervention are as follows:

- To promote active citizenship, political participation and civic engagement and to prevent radicalisation of Libyan youth;
- To support and enhance Libyan youth's long-term social integration with a particular attention to those in vulnerable positions;
- To promote economic opportunities in support of economic diversification of young Libyans, particularly the former revolutionaries, through quality education and entrepreneurship.

3.2.2. EU support aims to achieve the following expected results:

For specific objective 1:

- increased level of awareness and understanding of democratic processes and rejection of radicalization among young Libyans;
- strengthened youth's participation in decision-making processes at all levels (central and local) as well as in the national dialogue;
- increased number of community-level initiatives for social purposes led by the young.

For specific objective 2:

- strengthened services targeting youth for the prevention and treatment of drugs use as well as psycho-social services;

established social reintegration programs for young revolutionaries willing to phase out from the security sector; increased offer of cultural and/or sports initiatives seeking to enhance youth's development.

For specific objective 3:

- improved public services in support of young job seekers;
- improved employability of youth by offering training opportunities in Libya and encouraging exchanges abroad;
- enhanced youth's entrepreneurship and self-employment through start-up and micro-finance/financial inclusion initiatives.

In order to achieve a more inclusive society, all programmes will put emphasis on the participation of women and minorities.

Areas of intervention could include social entrepreneurship, the use of micro-credit to support local income-generating activities, green and low carbon economy initiatives, community social and economic initiatives, youth networks and promotion of youth centres, promotion of sports including national and local leagues, prevention of addiction, promotion of the culture and the arts, and education for active youth's participation (including exchange programmes) and youth participation at all decision-making levels as actors of the stabilisation process. Civil-society projects should be implemented in partnership with government programmes where possible, and could contribute to monitoring government policies and programmes in these areas.

The actions will take into account the complementarity and synergy with Erasmus+ projects namely youth exchanges, the European Voluntary Service, mobility and training of youth workers as well as the participation of youth in the Structured Dialogue meetings with decision makers.

3.2.3. The main indicators for measuring the aforementioned results are contained in the sector intervention framework attached in Annex 1.

Whenever relevant the indicators will be broken down by age and gender.

3.2.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:

A number of donors and international partners including EU Member States are involved in the field of youth's social and economic integration, employment policy, education and vocational training, and local development initiatives with civil society and local authorities. Donor coordination will be sought at EU level through the initiative of Joint Programming and through the UNSMIL coordination groups with the wider donor community.

Once an international recognised Government is in place, the EU will continue to support government-led donor coordination within the Ministry of Planning (or any other appointed

institution) and it will seek to provide technical assistance to Libyan public bodies, especially regarding policy measures and public-sector programmes relevant to youth's social integration (e.g. Ministry of Youth and Sports, Ministry of Culture and Civil Society, Ministry of Labour, Ministries of Education and Higher Education, Ministry of Social Protection, TVET Board, Ministry of Economy, ICT Ministry, Warriors Affairs Commission, etc.). All institutional support will be prepared, coordinated and delivered through a suitable high-level national structure such as the Ministry of Planning. Structured civil society consultations will be set up in the framework of an inclusive policy dialogue.

### 3.2.5. Government's financial and policy commitments:

As soon as a political agreement will have been reached and a Government of National Accord installed, discussions on financial and policy commitment for social integration and employment of the youth can restart at national level.

EU support will adopt a phased approach relying on the civil society and local initiatives during the current crisis. This will serve to enhance a national dialogue on such policies when appropriate. Support for youth initiatives was also one of the requests emerging from the municipal track meetings of the UNSMIL-led peace dialogue and consequently several municipalities already signed an agreement for support to youth with UNICEF.

3.2.6. Environmental assessment: Whenever relevant, the appropriate type of environmental assessment will be carried out according to EU standards, and appropriate measures will be taken in response to the assessments,

### 3.2.7. The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention:

EU support for youth employment and social integration in Libya faces a number of risks that are inherent to the current political, social and security context. Further deterioration in the security situation in Libya could create major problems for the practical implementation of local-level initiatives.

A high level of frustration among Libyan youth persists regarding their limited participation in the country's economic, social and political life. Should this not be addressed, there is a risk of an increased disengagement of Libyan youth that could result in further instability.

## **3.3 Health (indicative 16%)**

### 3.3.1. Overall and specific objectives

The overall objective is to promote improved health status through increased access to quality health care services.

The specific objectives are:

- To reduce disparities and expand access to quality health care services, including for women and minorities;
- To increase access to essential medicines, medical products and technologies through pro-poor cost-efficient planning, better procurement, supply and distribution, quality assurance, strengthened monitoring and evaluation and rational use;



- To strengthen public health surveillance and health information systems including by improved monitoring, collection and analysis of environmental information so as to facilitate the generation of vital information for public-health decision making, planning, monitoring and review.

3.3.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

For objective 1: increased accessibility and readiness of quality health care services; improved patient safety; and upgraded curricula, teaching methods and materials.

For objective 2: updated national list of essential medicines; strengthened public procurement and supply management systems; upgraded norms and standards and effective enforcement of policies and regulations to ensure quality, safety and efficacy; and improved prescribing and dispensing.

For objective 3: A reliable health information system based on improved collection, compilation and analysis of health and relevant environmental data.

3.3.3. The main indicators for measuring the aforementioned results are contained in the sector intervention framework attached in Annex 1.

Whenever relevant the indicators will be broken down by gender.

3.3.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue

In September 2012, the EU established a platform for regular policy dialogue with the Ministry of Health and Libyan healthcare leaders and other relevant stakeholders with a view to encourage the definition of national health objectives and reform priorities. This dialogue leveraged the EU-funded Libyan Health Systems Strengthening (LHSS) programme. The LHSS Programme was articulated around the LHSS Steering Committee and four Technical Working Groups, which met on a weekly or biweekly basis at the Ministry of Health. The programme was suspended due to the security and political crisis in 2014 with only one ad-hoc activity remaining, namely for the training of assistant nurses and psycho-social support in the first 3 months of 2015.

3.3.5 The Government's financial and policy commitments are:

It is difficult to ascertain the government's financial commitment as the transition is not completed and care-taker governments are succeeding one another. However, there is strong political support for health-sector reform. The EU has established a close dialogue with the Ministry of Health..

3.3.6 Environmental assessment: When needed the appropriate type of environmental assessment will be carried out according to EU standards; policy development and activities will be assessed against climate change compatibility and environmental principles and appropriate measures will be taken in response to the assessments.

3.3.7 The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention:

As soon as a political agreement will have been reached and a Government of National Accord installed, the discussions on financial and policy commitment on support for the Health sector can resume.

However, there has always been a strong political support for health sector reform. The EU established a close dialogue with the Ministry of Health during the implementation of the first phase of the LHSS project and will be able to resume the dialogue as soon as the Libyan situation allows.

#### **4. Measures in favour of civil society**

Two years after the end of 42 years of dictatorship in Libya, the context in which Libyan civil society organizations (CSOs) operate is characterized by its volatility and uncertainty about the evolution of the political context. Libyan civil society organizations still have a long way to go towards building a relationship with the government and the public, setting visions and strategies, and increasing their technical and institutional organizational knowledge and managerial capacity.

Within this context, EU support included helping civil society actors develop the (basic) skills to run their organisations, develop projects and bid for funds. Specific education and training has been provided in areas such as human rights, women's rights and knowledge of elections and the constitution. Additional objectives of the support have been to improve governance (institutional development of the ministries and related bodies) as it might affect the sector and support the development of any legislation for the sector. Progress to achieve the latter has been difficult due to the absence of basic decision-making structures and strategies within the institutions. In conclusion, there is still a long way to go towards a strong and cohesive Libyan civil society community.

As foreseen, in the guiding principles of the programming exercise, the involvement of the CSO's will be integrated into sector programmes in order to promote a participatory approach at political level and to fully involve the CSO's in the design and implementation of the above three focal sectors' programmes. Even during the crisis situation since mid-2014, CSOs continued to be involved in the political process and actively participated in the UNSMIL-led discussions on a political agreement.

In addition to the support related to the three focal sectors, a more structural approach is needed to promote a conducive environment for CSOs and to enable them to participate in domestic policies, as well as in the EU programming cycle and in international processes, in order for them to play their role as independent development actors more effectively. The EU is developing a vision and priorities for its engagement with civil society in the Roadmap exercise that will not only involve the Member States but also local civil society. Local CS will be extensively consulted to ensure ownership, quality and relevance of the Roadmap process. The result of this process will inform the design of future activities for civil society organisations, including women and minorities' associations.

#### **5. Provision for technical assistance**

Technical Assistance measures are foreseen to cover strengthening of general capacity building for key democratic and legitimate institutions of democratic governance: improving the ability of national institutions to respond to citizens' needs, ensure respect of the rule of

law, and implement government programmes in line with national priorities. together with technical support on specific issues within the expected scope of the future EU Libya cooperation programmes.

Furthermore, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will also support the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements that are not already covered under the three sectors of intervention chosen.

**Annex 1. Template for Sector of Intervention Framework**

The results, indicators and means of verification specified in the present annex may need to evolve to take into account changes intervening during the programming period.

Where possible, baselines should be included in Action documents.

<b>Sector 1 - Democratic governance</b> <b>Overall objective:</b> to support Libya's democratic transitional processes based on the adoption and implementation of a new constitution responding to the aspirations and values of all Libyans.		
<b>Specific objective 1: Strengthening institutions of democratic governance</b>		
Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R1- Libyan institutions' capacity are reinforced in line with good governance and rule of law principles	I.1 Degree of implementation of the provisions of the new constitution within the deadlines set by the Libyan Government  I.2 Number of organisational development plans approved and implemented by the Libyan Government yearly	Project reports of EU implementing partner/s and EU political assessments.
R2 - Government led donor coordination is set up and operational	I.3 A government led donor coordination mechanism/platform is established before end of 2016  I.4 Number of meetings of the above mechanism/platform held on a yearly basis following set-up	Projects reports and monitoring
<b>Specific objective 2: Strengthening Civil Society Organisations participation and oversight of democratic governance and constitutional process</b>		
Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R3 – Increased CSOs capacity to perform their role as independent actors	I.5. Number of CSOs and CSOs members participating to capacity building activities	Project reports of EU implementing partner/s
R4 - Civil society awareness of key democratic governance issues is enhanced and its capacity for provisions of services is reinforced	I.6 Number of people working for CSOs trained in issues such as reconciliation, human rights, good internal governance and accountability per year	Projects reports and monitoring Ex ante/ex-post surveys
R5 Inclusive and structured CSOs' participation to democratic governance is increased	I.7 Number of CSO dialogue platforms/ networks set up in key areas such as: reconciliation, human rights and accountability covering the three regions	Projects reports and monitoring

## Sector 2 - Youth: active citizenship and socioeconomic integration

**Overall objective:** to support the Government and civil society organisations to promote youth's democratic participation and socioeconomic integration in view of a more inclusive and stable society.

**Specific objective 1: To promote active citizenship, political participation and civic engagement and to prevent radicalisation of Libyan youth**

Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R6 Increased level of awareness and understanding of democratic processes and rejection of radicalization among young Libyans.	I.8 Percentage of youth from targeted areas displaying increased knowledge and resilience to extremist ideologies after democracy educational programmes supported by the EU.	Survey (ex ante/ex post) on youth political culture as part of the programme activity Project reports and monitoring
R7 Strengthened youth's participation in decision-making processes at all levels (central and local) as well as in the national dialogue	I.9 Rate of youth participation and representation in local or national level governments  I.10 Number of meetings and/or MoU signed between youth associations and Government at local/national levels	Project reports Media surveys Members' lists of local/national mechanisms (survey)
R8 Increased number of community level initiatives for social purposes led by youth.	I.11 Number of social youth initiatives developed with EU support per year  I.12 Number of participants in the above initiatives (per year)	Project reports Community based surveys

**Specific objective 2: To support and enhance Libyan youth's long term social integration with a particular attention to those facing vulnerable situations**

Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R9 Strengthened services targeting youth for the prevention and treatment of drugs use as well as psycho-social services	I.13 Rate of youth surveyed displaying increased knowledge about risks of drugs abuse  I.14 Number of youth drug users treated following WHO standards.	Secondary schools based surveys as part of the programme activity Ministry of Health and targeted services provider reports
R10 Established social reintegration programmes for young revolutionaries willing to phase out of the security sector	I.15 Rate of youth effectively reinserted to civilian life after benefiting from social reintegration programmes supported by the EU	Tracer studies as part of the programme activity Project reports Government and WAC statistics

R11 Increased offer of cultural and/or sports initiatives seeking to enhance youth's human development	<p>I.16 Number of cultural and sport initiatives developed in local communities targeting youth with EU support per year</p> <p>I.17 Number of youth participants in the above initiatives (per year)</p>	Project reports
<b>Specific objective 3: To promote economic opportunities of young Libyans, particularly the former revolutionaries, through quality education and entrepreneurship</b>		
<b>Expected Results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>
R12 Improved public services in support of young job seekers	I.18 Number of staff participating in EU supported capacity building activities	Project reports Beneficiaries and public services surveys Government reports
R13 Improved employability of youth by offering training opportunities in Libya and encouraging exchanges abroad.	I.19 Number of youth who entered the labour market after having benefited from a specific vocational training supported by EU	Tracer studies as part of the programme activity Project reports Beneficiaries survey Government and WAC statistics
R14 Enhanced youth's entrepreneurship and self-employment through start-up and micro-finance/financial inclusion initiatives.	I.20 Number of new of micro/small/medium enterprises created by young Libyans with EU support per year	Project reports Beneficiaries survey Government and WAC statistics

<b>Sector 3 - Health</b>		
<b>Overall objective:</b> to promote improved health status through increased access to quality health care services.		
<b>Specific objective 1: To reduce disparities and expand access to quality health care services</b>		
<b>Expected Results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>
R15 Increased accessibility and readiness of quality health care services	I.21 Percentage of the population with access to Essential Package of Health Services as defined by the Ministry of Health	Project progress reports WHO Service Availability and Readiness Assessment Survey. MoH reports, facility-level records and official documents.
R 16 Improved patient safety	I.22 Number of health centres supported by EU complying with minimum standards of patient safety as per WHO definition	Project progress reports HIS data Independent surveys
R17 Upgraded curricula, teaching methods and materials	I.23 Number of graduates who participated to EU funded	Project progress reports Key informant interviews

	upgraded training	Students' statistics
<b>Specific objective 2: To increase access to essential medicines, medical products and technologies through pro-poor and cost-efficient planning and budgeting, better procurement, supply and distribution, quality assurance, strengthened monitoring and evaluation and rational use</b>		
<b>Expected Results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>
R18 Updated national list of essential medicines.	I.24 Proportion of population with access to affordable essential medicines as per WHO definition	WHO reports and statistics HIS data MoH reports, records and official documents. Independent surveys Project progress reports
R19 Strengthened public procurement and supply management systems.	I.25 Stock out days of tracer medicines	WHO reports and statistics HIS data MoH reports, records and official documents Independent surveys Project progress reports
R20 Upgraded norms and standards and effective enforcement of policies and regulations to ensure quality, safety and efficacy of essential medicines and health products.	I.26 Number of staff trained in norms and standards for quality, safety and efficacy.	Project progress reports.
R21 Improved prescribing and dispensing	I.27 Rate of medicines use against practice guidelines as per WHO definition	WHO reports and statistics HIS data MoH reports, records and official documents Independent surveys Project progress reports
<b>Specific objective 3: To strengthen public health surveillance and health information systems including by improved monitoring, collection and analysis of environmental information so as to avail vital information for public health decision making, planning, monitoring and review</b>		
<b>Expected Results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>
R22 Reliable health information system based on improved collection, compilation and analysis of health and relevant environmental data	I.28 Percentage of districts that submit timely, complete and accurate reports to national level to inform the health information system.  I.29 Number of citations in policies/laws/regulations of data collected through the above indicators by the Ministry of Health and other relevant stakeholders per year  I.30 Number of environmental	MoH reports, records and official documents

	indicators measured	
--	---------------------	--

## **Annex 2. Indicative timetable for commitments**

The MIP **2014-2016 for Libya** establishes the priorities of our cooperation. It has an indicative allocation range of €3,000,000 to €5,000,000 with the following breakdown by sector:

The amounts mentioned in this table are indicative:

<b>Priority areas</b>	<b>% total financial allocation</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Democratic governance	45			
Support to the democratic transition at national and local level		X		
Youth	28			
Towards resilience and social inclusion of adolescents and young people in Libya			X	X
Health	16			
Improving Health Information System and Supply Chain management in Libya			X	X
Technical assistance and civil society support	11			

Due to the ongoing crisis in Libya only €8million has been committed in 2014 a €4.4million are foreseen to be committed in 2015.