

JCPOA

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action



Delegation of the European Union to the
International Organisations in Vienna

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International Organisations in Vienna**



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Contents

Introduction	5
<i>Iran nuclear deal: support to nuclear non-proliferation & security</i>	7
<i>The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its implementation</i>	9
Abbreviations	11
UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015)	13
Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, 14 July 2015	21
<i>JCPOA Annex I - Nuclear-related measures</i>	35
<i>JCPOA Annex II - Sanctions-related commitments</i>	53
<i>JCPOA Annex III - Civil nuclear cooperation</i>	97
<i>JCPOA Annex IV - Joint Commission</i>	107
<i>JCPOA Annex V - Implementation Plan</i>	115
Annex B: Statement by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union, 14 July 2015	123
Note by the President of the Security Council, 16 January 2016	133
Joint Commission documents	139
<i>Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)</i>	141
<i>Waste</i>	142
<i>Hot Cells</i>	143
<i>Procurement Channel</i>	144
<i>Information on the Procurement Channel</i>	145
<i>Statement of Confidentiality</i>	154
<i>Practical arrangements for the Procurement Working Group and the Joint Commission for matters relating to the Procurement Channel</i>	155
<i>Optional Application Form</i>	159
<i>Explanatory Note: Optional Application Form</i>	166
<i>Optional End-use Certification</i>	171
<i>Explanatory Note: Optional End-Use Certification</i>	173
<i>Heavy Water</i>	177
<i>SWU Attribution</i>	178
<i>Template for Describing Centrifuge Types</i>	181
<i>Sanctions Lifting</i>	185
<i>Irradiation</i>	186
<i>Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP)</i>	187
Resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors, 15 December 2015	189
Reports	195

Introduction

Iran nuclear deal: support to nuclear non-proliferation & security

GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR THE EU's FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY:

The Global Strategy proposes that *"the EU will strongly support the expanding membership, universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes."*

WHAT THE EU HAS DONE:

As coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the EU has played a key role in achieving and preserving the nuclear deal with Iran. The deal is crucial for the security of Europe, the Middle East and beyond: It ensures that Iran does not produce or acquire material to develop a nuclear weapon. The deal is delivering on its goals and has prevented a nuclear arms race. It is a key pillar of the global non-proliferation regime.

WHAT THE EU IS DOING:

The EU continues to be committed to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA by all participants and to uphold and strengthen joint efforts to preserve this agreement of strategic importance for the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. To that end, the EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners.



Joint Commission meeting, June 2021, Vienna

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its implementation

Since 2006, the High Representative has led diplomatic efforts between the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Iran, which led to the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran's nuclear programme in Vienna on 14 July 2015. The JCPOA ensures that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful and provides for the comprehensive lifting of UN, EU and US nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions. *(Note: following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018, the US re-imposed its sanctions on Iran).*

On 20 July 2015, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 (2015) regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, agreed by Iran and the E3/EU+3. This resolution endorses the JCPOA, allows for certain exemptions to existing restrictive measures and defines the schedule and commitments to be undertaken by all parties to lead to the termination of restrictive measures against Iran.

Following legislative reviews of the JCPOA in the US and Iran, **Adoption Day** was declared on 18 October 2015 which set in motion the implementation of the provisions of the JCPOA. On Adoption Day the EU adopted the legislative framework to lift all of its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions.

The next milestone, **Implementation Day** was reached on 16 January 2016 after the IAEA verified that Iran had fulfilled its commitments. On Implementation Day the EU legislative framework providing for the lifting of economic and financial nuclear-related sanctions entered into effect. UN financial nuclear-related sanctions and US secondary nuclear-related sanctions were also lifted. On the same day, a comprehensive Information Note on the lifting of sanctions was issued in order to provide clarity to EU business operators on the new regulatory environment.

The next stage of the JCPOA is **Transition Day**, which will take place 8 years after Adoption Day (i.e. in 2023) or when the IAEA has reached the broader conclusion that all remaining nuclear material in Iran is for peaceful activities – whichever is earlier. This will trigger the lifting of the remaining nuclear-related sanctions, ballistic missile restrictions, and related designations.

Finally, on **Termination Day**, which will occur 10 years after Adoption Day (i.e. in 2025), remaining EU measures will be terminated, the UN Security Council will conclude consideration of the Iran nuclear issue and UNSC resolution 2231 (2015) will be terminated.

Under the JCPOA, a **Joint Commission** was established consisting of all members of the E3/EU+3 and Iran. The EU High Representative coordinates the work of the Joint Commission, which oversees JCPOA implementation and addresses potential problems and disputes. Under the Joint Commission, a Procurement Working Group, a Technical Working Group, an Arak

Working Group, and a Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting have been established. All groups except for the Arak Working Group are coordinated by a representative of the High Representative. On 8 May 2018, the President of the United States announced the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA. Therefore, the United States does not participate in any JCPOA-related activities or meetings.

Since 6 July 2018, the Arak Working Group is co-chaired by the United Kingdom and China.

Sanctions imposed by the EU in view of the human rights situation in Iran, support for terrorism and other grounds are not part of the JCPOA and remain in place.

Abbreviations

A	
AEOI	<i>Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran</i>
C	
CBI	<i>Central Bank of Iran</i>
CFSP	<i>Common Foreign Security Policy</i>
CISADA	<i>Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010</i>
D	
DIQ	<i>Design Information Questionnaire</i>
E	
EO	<i>Executive Order</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
EUC	<i>End-Use Certification</i>
EUPP	<i>Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant</i>
F	
FEP	<i>(Natanz) Fuel Enrichment Plant</i>
FFEP	<i>Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant</i>
FSE List	<i>Foreign Sanctions Evaders List</i>
H	
HWPP	<i>Heavy Water Production Plant</i>
I	
IAEA	<i>International Atomic Energy Agency</i>
IIC	<i>In-core Irradiation Channels</i>
IFCA	<i>Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012</i>
INFCIRC	<i>International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular</i>
IRISL	<i>Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines</i>
ISA	<i>Iranian Sanctions Act</i>
ITER	<i>International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor</i>
J	
JCOA	<i>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</i>
JPOA	<i>Joint Plan of Action</i>
K	
Kg/sec	<i>Kilogram/second (refers to flow rate for coolant)</i>
L	
LEU	<i>Low-enriched uranium</i>
LIC	<i>Lateral irradiation channels</i>
M	
MPa	<i>Megapascal Pressure Unit</i>
MWth	<i>Megawatt thermal</i>
N	
NIOC	<i>National Iranian Oil Company</i>
NICO	<i>Naftiran Intertrade Company</i>
NITC	<i>National Iranian Tanker Company</i>
NDAA	<i>National Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012</i>
NPT	<i>Non-Proliferation Treaty</i>
O	
OFAC	<i>Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control</i>
P	
PIE	<i>Post Irradiation Examination</i>
PFEP	<i>Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant</i>
PWG	<i>Procurement Working Group</i>

R	
R&D	<i>Research and Development</i>

S	
SDN List	<i>Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List</i>
SWIFT	<i>Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication</i>
SWU	<i>Separative work unit</i>

T	
TRA	<i>Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012</i>
TRR	<i>Tehran Research Reactor</i>

U	
UCF	<i>Uranium conversion facility</i>
UCO	<i>Uranium Ore Concentrate</i>
UF ₆	<i>Uranium hexafluoride</i>
UO ₂	<i>Uranium dioxide</i>
U ₃ O ₈	<i>Uranium oxide</i>
UNH	<i>Uranyl nitrate</i>
UNSC	<i>United Nations Security Council</i>
UN	<i>United Nations</i>
UNSCR	<i>United Nations Security Council resolution</i>

UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015)

S/RES/2231 (2015)

Resolution 2231 (2015)**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7488th meeting, on 20 July 2015**

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010),

Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with their obligations, and *recalling* the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation,

Welcoming diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Iran to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded on 14 July 2015, (S/2015/544, as attached as Annex A to this resolution) and the establishment of the Joint Commission,

Welcoming Iran's reaffirmation in the JCPOA that it will under no circumstances ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons,

Noting the statement of 14 July 2015, from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union aimed at promoting transparency and creating an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the JCPOA (S/2015/545, as attached as Annex B to this resolution),

Affirming that conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue, and *expressing* its desire to build a new relationship with Iran strengthened by the implementation of the JCPOA and to bring to a satisfactory conclusion its consideration of this matter,

Affirming that full implementation of the JCPOA will contribute to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme,

Strongly supporting the essential and independent role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of declared nuclear material to undeclared purposes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared nuclear activities, and, in this context, in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, including through the implementation of the "Framework for Cooperation" agreed between Iran and the IAEA on 11 November 2013 and the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past

and Present Outstanding Issues”, and *recognizing* the IAEA’s important role in supporting full implementation of the JCPOA,

Affirming that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of nuclear non-proliferation, promote greater confidence among States, inter alia, by providing assurance that States are complying with their obligations under relevant safeguards agreements, contribute to strengthening their collective security and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation, and further *recognizing* that effective and efficient safeguards implementation requires a cooperative effort between the IAEA and States, that the IAEA Secretariat will continue to engage in open dialogue on safeguards matters with States to increase transparency and build confidence and to interact with them on the implementation of safeguards, and in this case, avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Iran or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge,

Encouraging Member States to cooperate, including through IAEA involvement, with Iran in the framework of the JCPOA in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects, in accordance with Annex III of the JCPOA,

Noting the termination of provisions of previous resolutions and other measures foreseen in this resolution, and *inviting* Member States to give due regard to these changes,

Emphasizing that the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran, and *having* regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,

Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council’s decisions,

1. *Endorses* the JCPOA, and *urges* its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA;
2. *Calls upon* all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA;
3. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA, and *reaffirms* that Iran shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports;
4. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to

the Security Council at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments;

Terminations

5. *Requests* that, as soon as the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1 -15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this fact to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

6. *Requests* further that, as soon as the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this conclusion to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

7. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, upon receipt by the Security Council of the report from the IAEA described in paragraph 5:

(a) The provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) shall be terminated;

(b) All States shall comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 and the provisions in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 of Annex B for the duration specified in each paragraph or subparagraph, and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annex B;

8. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that on the date ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, all the provisions of this resolution shall be terminated, and none of the previous resolutions described in paragraph 7 (a) shall be applied, the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the item “Non-proliferation” will be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized;

9. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the terminations described in Annex B and paragraph 8 of this resolution shall not occur if the provisions of previous resolutions have been applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

Application of Provisions of Previous Resolutions

10. *Encourages* China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union (EU), and Iran (the “JCPOA participants”) to resolve any issues arising with respect to implementation of JCPOA commitments through the procedures specified in the JCPOA, and *expresses* its intention to address possible complaints by JCPOA participants about significant non-performance by another JCPOA participant;

11. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, within 30 days of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an issue that the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a) of this resolution, *decides* further that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member of the Security Council has submitted such a draft resolution for a vote, then the President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and put it to a vote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and

expresses its intention to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue by the Advisory Board established in the JCPOA;

12. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph 11 to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), then effective midnight Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of this resolution, and the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

13. *Underscores* that, in the event of a notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, Iran and the other JCPOA participants should strive to resolve the issue giving rise to the notification, *expresses* its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved, *decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that if the notifying JCPOA participant State informs the Security Council that such an issue has been resolved before the end of the 30-day period specified in paragraph 12 above, then the provisions of this resolution, including the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), shall remain in effect notwithstanding paragraph 12 above, and *notes* Iran's statement that if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 in whole or in part, Iran will treat this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA;

14. *Affirms* that the application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 do not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions;

15. *Affirms* that any application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 is not intended to harm individuals and entities that, prior to that application of those provisions, engaged in business with Iran or Iranian individuals and entities that is consistent with the JCPOA and this resolution, *encourages* Member States to consult with each other with regard to such harm, and to take action to mitigate such unintended harm for these individuals and entities, and *decides* if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 not to impose measures with retroactive effect on individuals and entities for business activities with Iran that were consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions prior to the application of these provisions;

JCPOA Implementation

16. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to review recommendations of the Joint Commission regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B, and that such recommendations shall be deemed to be approved unless the Security Council adopts a resolution to reject a Joint Commission recommendation within five working days of receiving it;

17. *Requests* Member States seeking to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B to submit proposals to the Security Council, *expresses* its intention to share such proposals with the Joint Commission established in the JCPOA for its review, *invites* any Member of the Security Council to provide relevant information and opinions about these proposals, *encourages* the Joint Commission to give due consideration to any such information and opinions, and *requests* the Joint Commission to provide its recommendations on these proposals to the Security Council within twenty working days (or, if extended, within thirty working days);

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in order to support JCPOA implementation, to take the necessary administrative measures to facilitate communications with Member States and between the Security Council and the Joint Commission through agreed practical arrangements;

19. *Requests* the IAEA and the Joint Commission to consult and exchange information, where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOA, and *requests* further that the exporting states cooperate with the Joint Commission in accordance with Annex IV of the JCPOA;

20. *Requests* the Joint Commission to review proposals for transfers and activities described in paragraph 2 of Annex B with a view to recommending approval where consistent with this resolution and the provisions and objectives of the JCPOA so as to provide for the transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for Iran's nuclear activities under the JCPOA, and *encourages* the Joint Commission to establish procedures to ensure detailed and thorough review of all such proposals;

Exemptions

21. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall not apply to the supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and the provision of any related technical assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, by JCPOA participant States or Member States acting in coordination with them, that is directly related to: (a) the modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production; (b) the export of Iran's enriched uranium in excess of 300 kilograms in return for natural uranium; and (c) the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design and, subsequently, on the agreed final design of such reactor;

22. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that Member States engaging in the activities permitted in paragraph 21 shall ensure that: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; (b) they notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and, when constituted, the Joint Commission ten days in advance of such activities; (c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the relevant INFCIRC referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, have been met; (d) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and (e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the INFCIRCS referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfers;

23. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, also that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall not apply to the extent necessary to carry out transfers and activities, as approved on a case-by-case basis in advance by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), that are:

(a) directly related to implementation of the nuclear-related actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA;

(b) required for preparation for the implementation of the JCPOA; or,

(c) determined by the Committee to be consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

24. *Notes* that the provisions of paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 27 continue in effect if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

Other Matters

25. *Decides* to make the necessary practical arrangements to undertake directly tasks related to the implementation of this resolution, including those tasks specified in Annex B and the release of guidance;

26. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Security Council in its exercise of the tasks related to this resolution, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures in this resolution;

27. *Decides* that all provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices;

28. *Recalls* that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the conditions specified in paragraph 15 of that resolution are met, and *underscores*, that if the provisions of previous resolutions are reapplied pursuant to paragraph 12 of this resolution, then this provision will apply;

29. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the application of the provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) and this resolution;

30. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until the termination of the provisions of this resolution in accordance with paragraph 8.

Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, 14 July 2015

S/RES/2231 (2015)***PREFACE***

The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran's nuclear programme, including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3's concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.

PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

- i. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
- ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.
- iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
- iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.
- v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.
- vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.
- vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013.
- ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.
- x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be fully observed by all parties involved.
- xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and practices.

- xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the annexes to this document.
- xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in Annex III, including through IAEA involvement.
- xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after the Adoption Day.
- xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.
- xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus.

Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes

NUCLEAR

A. ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES

1. Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran's Safeguards Agreement.
2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.
3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.
4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA. From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
5. Based on its own long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.

7. During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted against the above stated 300 kg UF₆ stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at international market prices.

B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING

8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67%, in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.
9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.
10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market.
11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.
12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from irradiated enriched uranium targets.

C. TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
14. Iran will fully implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues" agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.
15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.
16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.
17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.

SANCTIONS

18. The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue - 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) - simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish specific restrictions, as specified in Annex V.¹
19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following areas, as described in Annex II:
 - i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;
 - ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States;
 - iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance;
 - iv. Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
 - v. Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance);
 - vi. Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran;
 - vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;
 - viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical products;
 - ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
 - x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
 - xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology;
 - xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
 - xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services;
 - xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;
 - xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
 - xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;
 - xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and export or software for integrating industrial processes;
 - xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II; and
 - xix. Associated services for each of the categories above.
20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA

¹ The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.

has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.

21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the following areas as described in Annex II:

- i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and letters of credit);
- ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial;
- iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;
- iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on their transfer;
- v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds;
- vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
- vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
- viii. Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales;
- ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
- x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;
- xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran;
- xii. Transactions with Iran's energy sector;
- xiii. Transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;
- xiv. Trade in gold and other precious metals;
- xv. Trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
- xvi. Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector;
- xvii. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above;
- xviii. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List; and
- xix. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections 5 - 7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.

22. The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V, allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran; license non-U.S.

persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA; and license the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.

23. Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.
24. The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete list of all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures and will lift them in accordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting of sanctions beginning on "Implementation Day". If at any time following the Implementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur that lifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOA participant in question will take appropriate action. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the Joint Commission.
25. If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United States will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities, with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will actively encourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.
26. The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
27. The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult with Iran

regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis and whenever appropriate.

28. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements². The E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.
29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.
30. The E3/EU+3 will not apply sanctions or restrictive measures to persons or entities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions provided for in this JCPOA, provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with E3/EU+3 laws and regulations in effect. Following the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA as specified in Annex II, ongoing investigations on possible infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance with applicable national laws.
31. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States will terminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated entities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks and financial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the United States will remove designation of certain entities and individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals listed on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto.
32. EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion, establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the implementation of these projects.
33. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to ensure Iran's access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible areas for cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Iran, and in this context consider the use of available instruments such as export credits to facilitate trade, project financing and investment in Iran.

² 'Government officials' for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:
- i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
 - ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.
 - iii. Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.
 - iv. Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.
 - v. UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.
35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration - in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level - either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory

Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.

37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

JCPOA Annex I - Nuclear-related measures

A. GENERAL

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.

B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR

2. Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotopes production for medical and industrial purposes. Iran will redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, including testing of fuel pins and assembly prototypes and structural materials. The design will be such as to minimise the production of plutonium and not to produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation. The power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that the parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary adjustments in developing the final design while fully preserving the above-mentioned purposes and principles of modernisation.
3. Iran will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in Iran. The calandria will be made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application. In redesigning and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research reactor.
4. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities regarding the modernisation of the Arak reactor as described in this Annex. A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak modernisation project. The Working Group could be enlarged to include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, and subsequently contracts would be concluded. The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.
5. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and operation. The final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories will be submitted to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will aim to complete its review and endorsement within

three months after the submission of the final design. If the Joint Commission does not complete its review and endorsement within three months, Iran could raise the issue through the dispute resolution mechanism envisaged by this JCPOA.

6. The IAEA will monitor the construction and report to the Working Group for confirmation that the construction of the modernised reactor is consistent with the approved final design.
7. As the project manager, Iran will take responsibility for the construction efforts. E3/EU+3 parties will, consistent with their national laws, take appropriate administrative, legal, technical, and regulatory measures to support co-operation.
E3/EU+3 parties will support the purchase by Iran, the transfer and supply of necessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems and technologies required for the construction of the redesigned reactor, through the mechanism established by this JCPOA, as well as through exploration of relevant funding contributions.
8. E3/EU+3 parties will also support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the modernized Arak reactor and its subsidiary laboratories, upon request by Iran, through IAEA technical cooperation if appropriate, including but not limited to technical and financial assistance, supply of required materials and equipment, state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems and equipment and support for licensing and authorization.
9. The redesigned reactor will use up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium in the form of UO₂ with a mass of approximately 350 kg of UO₂ in a full core load, with a fuel design to be reviewed and approved by the Joint Commission. The international partnership with the participation of Iran will fabricate the initial fuel core load for the reactor outside Iran. The international partnership will cooperate with Iran, including through technical assistance, to fabricate, test and license fuel fabrication capabilities in Iran for subsequent fuel core reloads for future use with this reactor. Destructive and non-destructive testing of this fuel including Post-Irradiation Examination (PIE) will take place in one of the participating countries outside of Iran and that country will work with Iran to license the subsequent fuel fabricated in Iran for the use in the redesigned reactor under IAEA monitoring.
10. Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies, which are specifically designed for the support of the originally designed Arak reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40. Iran will store under IAEA continuous monitoring all existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies until the modernised Arak reactor becomes operational, at which point these natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies will be converted to UNH, or exchanged with an equivalent quantity of natural uranium. Iran will make the necessary technical modifications to the natural uranium fuel production process line that was intended to supply fuel for the IR-40 reactor design, such that it can be used for the fabrication of the fuel reloads for the modernised Arak reactor.
11. All spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of the reactor, will be shipped out of Iran to a mutually determined location in E3/EU+3 countries or third countries, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded, consistent with national laws, with the recipient party, within one year from the unloading from the reactor or whenever deemed to be safe for transfer by the recipient country.

12. Iran will submit the DIQ of the redesigned reactor to the IAEA which will include information on the planned radio-isotope production and reactor operation programme. The reactor will be operated under IAEA monitoring.
13. Iran will operate the Fuel Manufacturing Plant only to produce fuel assemblies for light water reactors and reloads for the modernized Arak reactor.

C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT

14. All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the modernised Arak research reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quantities needed for medical research and production of deuterate solutions and chemical compounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer for 15 years. Iran's needs, consistent with the parameters above, are estimated to be 130 metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water or its equivalent in different enrichments prior to commissioning of the modernised Arak research reactor, and 90 metric tonnes after the commissioning, including the amount contained in the reactor.
15. Iran will inform the IAEA about the inventory and the production of the HWPP and will allow the IAEA to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced, including through IAEA visits, as requested, to the HWPP.

D. OTHER REACTORS

16. Consistent with its plan, Iran will keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying only on light water for its future nuclear power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation including assurances of supply of necessary fuel.
17. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power and research reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded consistent with national laws with the recipient party.

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

18. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or spent fuel reprocessing R&D activities. For the purpose of this annex, spent fuel includes all types of irradiated fuel.
19. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, reprocess spent fuel except for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.
20. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, develop, acquire or build facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptunium from spent fuel or from fertile targets, other than for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.
21. For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran

Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.

22. The E3/EU+3 are ready to facilitate all of the destructive and non-destructive examinations on fuel elements and/or fuel assembly prototypes including PIE for all fuel fabricated in or outside Iran and irradiated in Iran, using their existing facilities outside Iran. Except for the Arak research reactor complex, Iran will not develop, build, acquire or operate hot cells capable of performing PIE or seek to acquire equipment to build/develop such a capability, for 15 years.
23. For 15 years, in addition to continuing current fuel testing activities at the TRR, Iran will undertake non-destructive post irradiation examination (PIE) of fuel pins, fuel assembly prototypes and structural materials. These examinations will be exclusively at the Arak research reactor complex. However, the E3/EU+3 will make available their facilities to conduct destructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed. The hot cells at the Arak research reactor in which non-destructive PIE are performed will not be physically interconnected to cells that process or handle materials for the production of medical or industrial radioisotopes.
24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.
25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years.
26. If Iran seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed quantities after 10 years and before 15 years, Iran will present its plan to, and seek approval by, the Joint Commission.

F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY

27. Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in no more than 30 cascades in their current configurations in currently operating units at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) for 10 years.
28. Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67 percent for 15 years.
29. Iran will remove the following excess centrifuges and infrastructure not associated with 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in FEP, which will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring:
 - 29.1. All excess centrifuge machines, including IR-2m centrifuges. Excess IR-1 centrifuges will be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges of the same type on a one-for-one basis.
 - 29.2. UF6 pipework including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters, and UF6 withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal stations, which is currently not in service, including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps.
30. For the purpose of this Annex, the IAEA will confirm through the established practice the failed or damaged status of centrifuge machines before removal.
31. For 15 years, Iran will install gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-related infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium enrichment, research and development, or stable isotope enrichment, exclusively at the locations and for the activities specified under this JCPOA.

G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

32. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. For 10 years and consistent with its enrichment R&D plan, Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges. Mechanical testing on up to two single centrifuges for each type will be carried out only on the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7 and IR-8. Iran will build or test, with or without uranium, only those gas centrifuges specified in this JCPOA.
33. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-2m cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.
34. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-4 cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.
35. Iran will continue the testing of a single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10 centrifuge machines for 10 years.
36. Iran will test a single IR-5 centrifuge machine for 10 years.
37. Iran will continue testing of the IR-6 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuge machines and small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.

38. Iran will commence, upon start of implementation of the JCPOA, testing of the IR-8 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence the testing of up to 30 centrifuges machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuges to small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.
39. For 10 years, Iran, consistent with the established practice, will recombine the enriched and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the use of welded pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of enriched and depleted uranium materials and verified by the IAEA.
40. For 15 years, Iran will conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only at the PFEP. Iran will conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only at the PFEP and the Tehran Research Centre.
41. For the purpose of adapting PFEP to the R&D activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will remove all centrifuges except those needed for testing as described in the relevant paragraphs above, except for the IR-1 cascade (No. 1) as described below. For the full IR-1 cascade (No. 6), Iran will modify associated infrastructure by removing UF₆ pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters. The IR-1 cascade (No. 1) centrifuges will be kept but made inoperable, as verified by the IAEA, through the removal of centrifuge rotors and the injection of epoxy resin into the sub headers, feeding, product, and tails pipework, and the removal of controls and electrical systems for vacuum, power and cooling. Excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. The R&D space in line No. 6 will be left empty until Iran needs to use it for its R&D programme.
42. Consistent with the activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will maintain the cascade infrastructure for testing of single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascades in two R&D lines (No. 2 and No. 3) and will adapt two other lines (No. 4 and No. 5) with infrastructure similar to that for lines No. 2 and No. 3 in order to enable future R&D activities as specified in this JCPOA. Adaptation will include modification of all UF₆ pipework (including removal of all sub-headers except as agreed as needed for the R&D programme) and associated instrumentation to be compatible with single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascade testing instead of full scale testing.
43. Consistent with its plan and internationally established practices, Iran intends to continue R&D on new types of centrifuges through computer modelling and simulations, including at universities. For any such project to proceed to a prototype stage for mechanical testing within 10 years, a full presentation to, and approval by, the Joint Commission is needed.

H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT

44. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology centre and international collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. The Joint Commission will be informed in advance of the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow.
45. Iran will not conduct any uranium enrichment or any uranium enrichment related R&D and will have no nuclear material at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) for 15 years.
46. For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines at one wing of the FFEP of which:

- 46.1. Two cascades that have not experienced UF₆ before will be modified for the production of stable isotopes. The transition to stable isotope production of these cascades at FFEP will be conducted in joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. To prepare these two cascades for installation of a new cascade architecture appropriate for stable isotope production by the joint partnership, Iran will remove the connection to the UF₆ feed main header, and move cascade UF₆ pipework (except for the dump line in order to maintain vacuum) to storage in Fordow under IAEA continuous monitoring. The Joint Commission will be informed about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at FFEP.
- 46.2. For four cascades with all associated infrastructure remaining except for pipework that enables crossover tandem connections, two will be placed in an idle state, not spinning. The other two cascades will continue to spin until the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous subparagraph has been completed. Upon completion of the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous subparagraph, these two spinning cascades will be placed in an idle state, not spinning.
47. Iran will:
 - 47.1. remove the other 2 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges from this wing, by removing all centrifuges and cascade UF₆ pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters.
 - 47.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets and vacuum pumps. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.
48. Iran will:
 - 48.1. remove all excess centrifuges and uranium enrichment related infrastructure from the other wing of the FFEP. This will include removal of all centrifuges and UF₆ pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure gauges and transducers, and frequency inverters and converters, and UF₆ feed and withdrawal stations.
 - 48.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets, vacuum pumps and centrifuge mounting blocks. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.
49. Centrifuges from the four idle cascades may be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges in stable isotope production at Fordow.
50. Iran will limit its stable isotope production activities with gas centrifuges to the FFEP for 15 years and will use no more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for these activities at the FFEP. The associated R&D activities in Iran will occur at the FFEP and at Iran's declared and monitored centrifuge manufacturing facilities for testing, modification and balancing these IR-1 centrifuges.
51. The IAEA will establish a baseline for the amount of uranium legacy from past enrichment operations that will remain in Fordow. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily as requested by the IAEA, access to the FFEP in order to monitor Iran's production of stable isotopes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the FFEP for 15 years.

I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT

52. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration described in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol¹. The IAEA will confirm on an annual basis, for the duration of the plan that the nature and scope and scale of Iran's enrichment and enrichment R&D activities are in line with this plan.
53. Iran will start to install necessary infrastructure for the IR-8 at Natanz in Hall B of FEP after year 10.
54. An agreed template for describing different centrifuge types (IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, IR-8) and the associated definitions need to be accomplished by implementation day.
55. An agreed procedure for measuring IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge performance data needs to be accomplished by implementation day.

¹ Iran will permit the IAEA to share the content of the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, as submitted as part of the initial declaration, with the Joint Commission participants.

J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS

56. Iran will maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) for 15 years.
57. All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF₆ (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. Iran will enter into a commercial contract with an entity outside Iran for the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kg UF₆ in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, where applicable, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. Iran may choose to seek to sell excess enriched uranium to the IAEA fuel bank in Kazakhstan when the fuel bank becomes operational.
58. All uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. Scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. In case of future supply of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U₃O₈) for TRR fuel plates fabrication, all scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates, containing uranium enriched to between 5% and 20%, will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less within 6 months of its production. Scrap plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside Iran. The commercial transactions should be structured to return an equivalent amount of natural uranium to Iran. For 15 years, Iran will not build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back to UF₆.
59. Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran do not count against the 300 kg UF₆ stockpile limit. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from other sources outside of Iran for use in Iran's nuclear research and power reactors, including those which will be fabricated outside of Iran for the initial fuel load of the modernised Arak research reactor, which are certified by the fuel supplier and the appropriate Iranian authority to meet international standards, will not count against the 300 kg UF₆ stockpile limit. The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF₆ or the equivalent in different chemical forms). This Technical Working Group will also, within one year, work to develop objective technical criteria for assessing whether fabricated fuel and its intermediate products can be readily converted to UF₆. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF₆ stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF₆. This could for instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF₆ would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical

criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group. The Joint Commission will also support assistance to Iran including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran.

60. Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities outside Iran for the purchase of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, as needed, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. In the case of lack of conclusion of a contract with a fuel supplier, E3/EU+3 will supply a quantity of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) and deliver to Iran, exclusively for the purpose of fabrication in Iran of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets for the lifetime of the reactor. This 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) will be supplied in increments no greater than approximately 5 kg and each new increment will be provided only when the previous increment of this material has been verified by the IAEA to have been mixed with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or fabricated into enriched uranium targets. Iran will notify the E3/EU+3 within 2 year before the contingency of TRR fuel will be exhausted in order to have the uranium oxide available 6 months before the end of the 2 year period.

K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING

61. Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will only engage in production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope separation or any other centrifuge components, to meet the enrichment and enrichment R&D requirements of this Annex.
62. Consistent with its plan, Iran will use the stock of IR-1 centrifuge machines in storage, which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in Natanz and the IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow, for the replacement of failed or damaged machines. Whenever during the 10 year period from the start of the implementation of the JCPOA, the level of stock of IR-1 machines falls to 500 or below, Iran may maintain this level of stock by resuming production of IR-1 machines at a rate up to the average monthly crash rate without exceeding the stock of 500.
63. Consistent with its plan, at the end of year 8, Iran will commence manufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year 10 at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type. After year 10, Iran will produce complete centrifuges with the same rate to meet its enrichment and enrichment R&D needs. Iran will store them at Natanz in an above ground location, under IAEA continuous monitoring, until they are needed for final assembly according to the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.

L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1

64. Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament).

65. Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force.

M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN

66. Iran will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues", as verified by the IAEA in its regular updates by the Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this Roadmap.

N. MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA

67. For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, for 15 years or longer, for the specified verification measures:
- 67.1. Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working space in individual nuclear sites.
 - 67.2. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence, including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear sites and, with best efforts, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment.
 - 67.3. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran, consistent with its laws and regulations.

O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)

68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period.
69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.

P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT

70. For 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges, as specified in this Annex.
71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the FEP and PFEP, for 15 years.
72. For 15 years, the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D.
73. Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology. For 15 years, Iran will only engage, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment or enrichment related activities, including related research and development activities, following approval by the Joint Commission.

Q. ACCESS

74. Requests for access pursuant to provisions of this JCPOA will be made in good faith, with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the minimum necessary to effectively implement the verification responsibilities under this JCPOA. In line with normal international safeguards practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities, but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran's other non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. The following procedures are for the purpose of JCPOA implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and are without prejudice to the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto. In implementing this procedure as well as other transparency measures, the IAEA will be requested to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge.
75. In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.
76. If Iran's explanations do not resolve the IAEA's concerns, the Agency may request access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.
77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA's concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.
78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by

Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA's original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA's concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

R. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY

79. Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.
80. In this context:
 - 80.1. Iran will provide the IAEA with an initial inventory of all existing centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and subsequent reports on changes in such inventory and will permit the IAEA to verify the inventory by item counting and numbering, and through containment and surveillance, of all rotor tubes and bellows, including in all existing and newly produced centrifuges.
 - 80.2. Iran will declare all locations and equipment, namely flow-forming machines, filament-winding machines and mandrels that are used for production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows, and will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance on this equipment, to verify that this equipment is being used to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in this JCPOA.

S. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES

81. For 10 years, Iran's uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production activities will be exclusively based on gaseous centrifuge technology². Iran will permit IAEA access to verify that uranium isotope separation production and R&D activities are consistent with this Annex.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:
 - 82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

² For the purpose of this Annex, non-gaseous centrifuge uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production will include laser isotope separation systems, electromagnetic isotope separation systems, chemical exchange systems, gaseous diffusion systems, vortex and aerodynamic systems, and other such processes that separate uranium isotopes.

- 82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
- 82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
- 82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

Attachment: Arak conceptual design

Fundamental Principles:

- Maximize use of the current infrastructure of original design of Arak research reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40, according to their respective ratings.
- Modernizing of the original design in order to be a multi-purpose research reactor comprising radio-isotope production, structural materials and fuel (pins and assembly prototypes) testing and able to conduct other neutronic experiments which demand high neutron fluxes (more than 10^{14}).
- Using heavy water as coolant, moderator and reflector. Light water would be utilized as an annular ring around the compact new core for safety reasons if necessary.
- Around 78 fuel assemblies in a tight hexagonal grid spacing with the following preliminary characteristics will be loaded.
- Up to 3.67 percent enriched UO_2 , in the improved assembly design, will be used as fuel.
- Power will not exceed to 20 MWth.
- Adding different types of beam tubes to the existing beam tubes which being extended to the edge of the new compact core.
- Having one central channel in the center of the new core with passive cooling system for the purpose of structural materials and fuel pins and assembly prototypes testing with neutron flux beyond $2 \cdot 10^{14}$, twelve in-core irradiation channels (IIC) inside the core and twelve lateral irradiation channels (LIC) just next to the outer ring of fuel assemblies.
- The location of the in-core and lateral irradiation channels should be designed and fixed to meet the best anticipated performances.
- Consistent with relevant section of Annex 1, subsidiary laboratories are part of the modernization project of the Arak Research Reactor. In Addition, Annex III reinforce design and construction of subsidiary laboratories.
- The highest tolerable pressure for the first and second loop is 0.33 Mpa (at the interence of the reactor pit).
- The highest possible flow rate for coolant is 610 kg/s at the pressure of 0.33 MPa in the main piping system and 42 Kg/sec for Moderator with the same conditions.

Preliminary Characteristics:

Core Parameters	Values
Power (MW)	20
Number of fuel assemblies	~ 78
Active length (cm)	~ 110
Lattice configuration	Hexagonal
Fuel pellets Material	UO ₂
Fuel enrichment level	Up to 3.67 %
Clad material	Zr Alloys
Burnable poison	Yes, if necessary
Lattice pitch (cm)	~ 11
Coolant medium	D ₂ O
Moderator medium	D ₂ O
Reflector medium	D ₂ O
Reflector thickness (cm)	~ 50
Purity of D ₂ O	~ 99.8%
Mass of D ₂ O (mtons)	~60-70
Yearly makeup	Yes
K_{eff}	< 1.25
Core Excess reactivity (pcm)	<20000
Cycle length (days) approximately	~ 250
²³⁹ Pu at EoC (g)	~ 850
²³⁹ Pu purity at EoC	~ 78%
²³⁵ U consumption	~ 60%
Maximum Thermal Flux , E<0.625ev	~ 3·10 ¹⁴
Maximum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev	~ 1·10 ¹⁴
Minimum Thermal Flux , E<0.625ev	~ 1·10 ¹⁴
Minimum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev	~ 1·10 ¹⁴
Fluid velocity in channels (m/s)	~ 3.8
Channel mass flow rate (kg/s)	~ 2.4
Working pressure (MPa)	0.33
Fluid inlet temperature (°C)	~ 47
Fluid outlet temperature (°C)	~ 78
Core material	Mainly S.S. 304
Core wall Thickness (mm)	~ 30
Fuel Pellet Diameter (cm)	~ 0.65
Inner Clad Diameter (cm)	~ 0.67
Outer Clad Diameter (cm)	~ 0.8
Number of pins per assembly	12
Mass of UO ₂ in full core load (Kg)	~ 350
Core diameter (cm)	~ 240

JCPOA Annex II - Sanctions-related commitments

The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V (Implementation Plan) to this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

A. European Union¹

1. The EU and EU Member States commit to terminate all provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (as subsequently amended) implementing all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, to terminate all provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP (as subsequently amended), as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, and to terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required, in accordance with Annex V:

1.1. Financial, banking and insurance measures²

- 1.1.1. Prohibition and authorisation regimes on financial transfers to and from Iran (Article 10 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 30, 30a, 30b and 31 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
- 1.1.2. Sanctions on banking activities (Article 11 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 33 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
- 1.1.3. Sanctions on insurance (Article 12 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 35 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
- 1.1.4. Sanctions on financial messaging services (Article 20(12) of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
- 1.1.5. Sanctions on financial support for trade with Iran (Article 8 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);
- 1.1.6. Sanctions on grants, financial assistance and concessional loans (Article 9 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);
- 1.1.7. Sanctions on Government of Iran public-guaranteed bonds (Article 13 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 34 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
- 1.1.8. Sanctions on associated services³ for each of the categories above (see the references above).

1.2. Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors

¹ For the purposes of EU legislation, "Iranian person, entity or body" means:

- (i) the State of Iran or any public authority thereof;
- (ii) any natural person in, or resident in, Iran;
- (iii) any legal person, entity or body having its registered office in Iran;
- (iv) any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside Iran, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by one or more of the above mentioned persons or bodies.

² The headings and subheadings in this Annex are for descriptive purposes only.

³ For the purposes of this Annex, the term "associated services" means any service - including technical assistance, training, insurance, re-insurance, brokering, transportation or financial service - necessary and ordinarily incident to the underlying activity for which sanctions have been lifted pursuant to this JCPOA.

- 1.2.1. Sanctions on the import of oil and gas from Iran (Articles 3a, 3c and 3e of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 11, 12 and 14a, and Annexes IV and IVA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
- 1.2.2. Sanctions on the import of Iranian petrochemical products (Articles 3b and 3d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 13 and 14, and Annex V of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
- 1.2.3. Sanctions on the export of key equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles 4, 4a and 4b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 8, 9 and 10, and Annexes VI and VIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
- 1.2.4. Sanctions on investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles 6, 6a and 7 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 17(1), 17(2)(b) and (c), 17(3), 17(4), 17(5), 20 and 21 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
- 1.2.5. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).

1.3. Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors

- 1.3.1. Sanctions related to shipping and shipbuilding (Articles 4g, 4h, 8a, 18a and 18b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10a, 10b, 10c, 37a, and 37b, and Annex VIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
- 1.3.2. Sanctions related to the transport sector (Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
- 1.3.3. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).

1.4. Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage

- 1.4.1. Sanctions on gold, precious metals and diamonds, banknotes and coinage (Articles 4c and 4d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15 and 16, and Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
- 1.4.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).

1.5. Nuclear proliferation-related measures

- 1.5.1. Sanctions related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities (goods and technology, investment and specialised training) (Articles 1(1) (a), (b), (d), (e), (2), (3) and (4), 2, 3, 5, 14 and 21 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17(1) and (2)(a), 18, 19 and 22, and Annexes I, II and III of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
- 1.5.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).

1.6. Metals

- 1.6.1. Sanctions on metals (Articles 4e and 4f of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15a, 15b and 15c, and Annex VIIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

1.6.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).

1.7. Software

1.7.1. Sanctions on software (Articles 4i and 4j of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10d, 10e and 10f, and Annex VIIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

1.7.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).

1.8. Arms

1.8.1. Sanctions on arms (Articles 1(1)(c), (3) and (4), and 3 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 5(1)(a) and (c), 17(1) and (2)(a), and 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

1.8.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).

1.9. Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban)

1.9.1. Asset freeze and visa ban measures applicable to:

1.9.1.1. listed Iranian banks and financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran;

1.9.1.2. listed persons, entities and bodies related to the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;

1.9.1.3. listed persons, entities and bodies related to shipping, shipbuilding and transport;

1.9.1.4. other listed persons, entities and bodies not related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile- related activities;

1.9.1.5. listed persons, entities and bodies related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile-related activities; and

1.9.1.6. entities and individuals listed by the UN Security Council, as set out in Attachment 1, part I to this Annex for categories 1.9.1.1- Attachment 2, part I to this Annex for category 1.9.1.5, and Parts II of Attachments 1 and 2 to this Annex for category 1.9.1.6 (Articles 19 and 20, and Annexes I and II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 28a, 28b and 29, and Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).

1.10. Other provisions

1.10.1. The commitment in Section 1 covers all remaining provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 not specified above.

1.10.1.1. Definitions (Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

1.10.1.2. General and final provisions (Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 26a, 27 and 28 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 43a, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and Annex X of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).

2. The EU represents that the provisions listed in Section 1 above constitute the full and complete list of all EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. These sanctions or restrictive measures will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.

3. Effects of the lifting of EU economic and financial sanctions

- 3.1. As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 1 above, the following activities, including associated services, will be allowed, beginning on implementation day, in accordance with this JCPOA and provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with EU and EU Member States' laws and regulations in effect:⁴

3.2. Financial, banking and insurance measures (See Sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.8)

- 3.2.1. Transfers of funds between EU persons, entities or bodies, including EU financial and credit institutions, and Iranian persons, entities or bodies, including Iranian financial and credit institutions, without the requirement for authorisation or notification;
- 3.2.2. Opening of new branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States; and the establishment of new joint ventures, or the taking of an ownership interest or the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships by Iranian banks with EU banks; and opening by EU persons, including EU financial and credit institutions, of representative offices, subsidiaries, joint ventures or bank accounts in Iran;
- 3.2.3. Provision of insurance or reinsurance to Iran or the Government of Iran, an Iranian legal person, entity or body, or a natural person or a legal person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction;
- 3.2.4. Supply of specialised financial messaging services to any Iranian natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, including those listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex;
- 3.2.5. Entering into commitments by EU Member States to provide financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance; and into commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran; and
- 3.2.6. Sale or purchase of public or public-guaranteed bonds to and from Iran, the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, or Iranian banks and financial institutions or persons acting on their behalf.

3.3. Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.5)

- 3.3.1. Import, purchase, swap or transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products, natural gas or petrochemical products and related financing;
- 3.3.2. Sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment or technology, technical assistance, including training, used in the sectors of the oil, gas and petrochemical industries in Iran covering

⁴ Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons still subject to restrictive measures and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those referred to in Section 1. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on EU sanctions.

exploration, production and refining of oil and natural gas, including liquefaction of natural gas, to any Iranian person, in or outside Iran, or for use in Iran; and

- 3.3.3. Granting of any financial loan or credit to, the acquisition or extension of a participation in, and the creation of any joint venture with, any Iranian person that is engaged in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors in Iran or outside Iran.

3.4. Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors (See Sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.3)

- 3.4.1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of naval equipment and technology for ship building, maintenance or refit, to Iran or to any Iranian persons engaged in this sector; the design, construction or the participation in the design or construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers for Iran or for Iranian persons; the provision of vessels designed or used for the transport or storage of oil and petrochemical products to Iranian persons, entities or bodies; and the provision of flagging and classification services, including those pertaining to technical specification, registration and identification numbers of any kind, to Iranian oil tankers and cargo vessels;
- 3.4.2. Access to the airports under the jurisdiction of EU Member States of all cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or originating from Iran;
- 3.4.3. Cessation of inspection, seizure and disposal by EU Member States of cargoes to and from Iran in their territories with regard to items which are no longer prohibited; and
- 3.4.4. Provision of bunkering or ship supply services, or any other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels not carrying prohibited items; and the provision of fuel, engineering and maintenance services to Iranian cargo aircraft not carrying prohibited items.

3.5. Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage (See Sections 1.4.1 to 1.4.2)

- 3.5.1. Sale, supply, purchase, export, transfer or transport of gold and precious metals as well as diamonds, and provision of related brokering, financing and security services, to, from or for the Government of Iran, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, or the Central Bank of Iran; and
- 3.5.2. Delivery of newly printed or minted or unissued Iranian denominated banknotes and coinage to, or for the benefit of the Central Bank of Iran.

3.6. Metals (See Sections 1.6.1 to 1.6.2)

- 3.6.1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals, such as aluminum and steel to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.

3.7. Software (See Sections 1.7.1 to 1.7.2)

- 3.7.1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of software for integrating industrial processes, including updates, to any Iranian person, entity or body, or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.

3.8. Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) (See Section 1.9.1)

- 3.8.1. As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, releasing of all funds and economic resources which belong to, and making available funds or economic resources to, the persons, entities and bodies, including Iranian banks and financial institutions, the Central Bank of Iran, listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex; and
- 3.8.2. As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, entry into, or transit through the territories of EU Member States of individuals listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex.

B. United States⁵

4. The United States commits to cease the application of, and to seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, all nuclear-related sanctions⁶ as specified in Sections 4.1-4.9 below, and to terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622 and 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628, in accordance with Annex V.⁷

4.1. Financial and banking measures

- 4.1.1. Sanctions on transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including: the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other specified Iranian financial institutions; the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),⁸ Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and other specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control; and certain designated individuals and entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) Section 104(c)(2)(E)(iii)(I); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1245(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

⁵ For the purposes of U.S. legislation, "Iranian person" means (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; and (B) an entity organised under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.

⁶ The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply, and subsequently terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, pursuant to its commitment under Section 4 are those directed towards non-U.S. persons. For the purposes of Sections 4 and 6-7 of this JCPOA, the term "non-U.S. person" means any individual or entity, excluding (i) any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organised under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States, and (ii) any entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person. For the purposes of (ii) of the preceding sentence, an entity is "owned or controlled" by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 percent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity. U.S. persons and U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities will continue to be generally prohibited from conducting transactions of the type permitted pursuant to this JCPOA, unless authorised to do so by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

⁷ All citations to statutes and Executive orders included in this JCPOA refer to the statute or Executive order as amended as of the conclusion date of this JCPOA, including: the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), as amended by Section 102 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and Sections 201-207 and 311 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA); CISADA, as amended by Sections 214-216, 222, 224, 311-312, 402-403 and 605 of TRA and Section 1249 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA); the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), as amended by Sections 503-504 of TRA and Section 1250 of IFCA; Executive Order (E.O.) 13622, as amended by Section 15 of E.O. 13628 and Section 16 of E.O. 13645. The citations listed in Section 4 include authorities under which secondary sanctions will no longer apply as a result of actions described in Section 4.8.1.

⁸ Removal of NIOC from the SDN List, as provided for in Section 4.8.1, will include resolution of related designations and determinations.

- 4.1.2. Sanctions on the Iranian Rial (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 1(a), 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.1.3. Sanctions on the provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.1.4. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues held abroad, including limitations on their transfer (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.1.5. Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) Section 213(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.1.6. Sanctions on financial messaging services to the CBI and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 220; IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
- 4.1.7. Sanctions on associated services⁹ for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.2. Insurance measures

- 4.2.1. Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex (Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) Section 5(a)(7); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645).

4.3. Energy and petrochemical sectors

- 4.3.1. Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales, including limitations on the quantities of Iranian crude oil sold and the nations that can purchase Iranian crude oil (ISA Section 5(a)(7); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.3.2. Sanctions on investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors (ISA Sections 5(a)(1)-(2) and (4)-(8); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2),

⁹ See footnote 3 for the meaning of "associated services".

1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Section 1 of E.O. 13590, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i)-(iii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.3.3. Sanctions on the purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation, or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.3.4. Sanctions on the export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran (ISA Section 5(a)(3); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.3.5. Sanctions on transactions with Iran's energy sector including with NIOC, NICO and NITC (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); TRA Section 212(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.3.6. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.4. Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors

4.4.1. Sanctions on transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators including IRISL, South Shipping Line, and NITC, and the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas¹⁰ (TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d); 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.4.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.5. Gold and other precious metals

4.5.1. Sanctions on Iran's trade in gold and other precious metals (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(A) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.5.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.6. Software and metals

¹⁰ This commitment in Section 4.4.1 is based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.

4.6.1. Sanctions on trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B)-(C) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.6.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.7. Automotive sector

4.7.1. Sanctions on the sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i), 3(a)(i)-(ii), 5 and 6 of E.O. 13645); and

4.7.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.8. Designations and other sanctions listings

4.8.1. Removal of individuals and entities set out in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List (Removal of designations and/or sanctions imposed under ISA Section 5(a), IFCA Section 1244(d)(1) and TRA Section 212; and removals pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of certain persons listed pursuant to E.O. 13382, E.O. 13608, E.O. 13622, and E.O. 13645).

4.9. Nuclear proliferation-related measures

4.9.1. Sanctions under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT;

4.9.2. Sanctions on joint ventures relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium (ISA Section 5(b)(2)); and

4.9.3. Exclusion of Iranian citizens from higher education coursework related to careers in nuclear science, nuclear engineering or the energy sector (TRA Section 501).

5. Other trade measures

5.1. The United States commits to:¹¹

¹¹ To give effect to the measures described in this Section 5.1, the United States will license activities that do not involve any person on the SDN List and are otherwise consistent with applicable U.S. laws and regulations, including but not limited to the Export Administration Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.

5.1.1. Allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran by licensing the (i) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft for exclusively civil aviation end-use, (ii) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of spare parts and components for commercial passenger aircraft, and (iii) provision of associated serviced, including warranty, maintenance, and repair services and safety-related inspections, for all the foregoing, provided that licensed items and services are used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation;¹²

5.1.2. License non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person¹³ to engage in activities with Iran that are consistent with this JCPOA; and

5.1.3. License the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar.

6. The United States represents that the provisions listed in Section 4 above constitute the full and complete list of all U.S. nuclear-related sanctions. These sanctions will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.

7. Effects of the lifting of U.S. economic and financial sanctions:

7.1. As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 4 above, beginning on implementation day such sanctions, including associated services, would not apply to non-U.S. persons who carry out the following or that:¹⁴

7.2. Financial and banking measures¹⁵ (See Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7)

Engage in activities, including financial and banking transactions, with the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, Iranian financial institutions and other Iranian persons specified in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including the provision of loans, transfers, accounts (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions), investments, securities, guarantees, foreign exchange (including Rial related transactions), letters of credit and commodity futures or options, the provision of specialised financial messaging services and facilitation of direct or indirect access thereto, the purchase or

¹² Licenses issued in furtherance of Section 5.1.1 will include appropriate conditions to ensure that licensed activities do not involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods, or services are re-sold or retransferred to, any person on the SDN list. Should the United States determine that licensed aircraft, goods, or services have been used for purposes other than exclusively civil aviation end-use, or have been re-sold or re-transferred to persons on the SDN List, the United States would view this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under Section 5.1.1 in whole or in part.

¹³ For the purposes of Section 5.1.2 of this JCPOA, a non-U.S. entity is owned or controlled by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 per cent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.

¹⁴ Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons on the SDN List and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those cited in Section 4. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on U.S. sanctions.

¹⁵ For the purposes of the cessation of application of the provisions set out in Sections 4.1.1-4.1.7, the effects described for non-U.S. financial institutions extend to the activities outside of U.S. jurisdiction of international financial institutions.

acquisition by the Government of Iran of U.S. bank notes, and the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt.¹⁶

7.3. Insurance measures (See Section 4.2.1)

Provide underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities in the energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), or for vessels that transport crude oil, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical products to or from Iran.

7.4. Energy and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.6)

Are part of the energy sector of Iran; purchase, acquire, sell, transport or market petroleum, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; provide to Iran support, investment (including through joint ventures), goods, services (including financial services) and technology that can be used in connection with Iran's energy sector, the development of its petroleum resources, its domestic production of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products; or engage in activities with Iran's energy sector, including NIOC, NITC, and NICO).

7.5. Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors (See Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.2)

Are part of the shipping or shipbuilding sectors of Iran; own, operate, control or insure a vessel used to transport crude oil, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; operate a port in Iran, engage in activities with, or provide financial services and other goods and services used in connection with, the shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran (including the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas¹⁷), including port services, such as bunkering and inspection, classification, and financing, and the sale, leasing, and provision of vessels to Iran, including to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), NITC, and South Shipping Line Iran or their affiliates.

7.6. Gold and other precious metals (See Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.2)

Sell, supply, export or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, gold and other precious metals, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing including security, insurance and transportation.

¹⁶ Non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions with Iranian financial institutions (including the Central Bank of Iran) not appearing on the SDN List will not be exposed to sanctions as a result of those Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions or banking relationships involving Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List, provided that the non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institution does not conduct or facilitate, and is not otherwise involved in, those specific transactions or banking relationships with the Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List.

¹⁷ The effects described in Section 7.5 with respect to the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas are based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.

7.7. Software and metals (See Sections 4.6.1 to 4.6.2)

Sell, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, to or from Iran in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, and the sale, supply, or transfer of such materials to the energy, petrochemical, shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, and Iranian ports, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing, including insurance and transportation.

7.8. Automotive sector (See Sections 4.7.1 to 4.7.2)

Conduct or facilitate financial or other transactions for the sale, supply or transfer to Iran of goods and services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran.

7.9. Designations and other sanctions listings (See Section 4.8.1)

The removal of designations and/or sanctions as described in Section 4.8.1, ceasing the application of secondary sanctions for transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex; and unblocking of property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction for individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex.

ATTACHMENT 1 - PART I

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX II TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP
AND ANNEX IX TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012

ACENA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ADVANCE NOVEL
AGHAJARI OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
AGHAZADEH, Reza
AHMADIAN, Mohammad
AKHAVAN-FARD, Massoud
ALPHA EFFORT LTD
ALPHA KARA NAVIGATION LIMITED
ALPHA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
ARIAN BANK
ARVANDAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
ASHTAD SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
ASPASIS MARINE CORPORATION
ASSA CORPORATION
ASSA CORPORATION
LTD ATLANTIC INTERMODAL
AVRASYA CONTAINER SHIPPING LINES
AZARAB INDUSTRIES
AZORE SHIPPING COMPANY ALIAS AZORES SHIPPING FZE LLC
BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO CA
BANK KARGOSHA
BANK MELLAT
BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
BANK MELLI IRAN ZAO
BANK MELLI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY
BANK MELLI
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE
BANK REFAH KARGARAN
BANK TEJARAT
BATANI, Naser
BEST PRECISE LTD
BETA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
BIIS MARITIME LIMITED
BIS MARITIME LIMITED
BONAB RESEARCH CENTER
BRAIT HOLDING SA
BRIGHT JYOTI SHIPPING
BRIGHT SHIP FZC
BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
CEMENT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN
CHAPLET SHIPPING LIMITED
COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
CONCEPT GIANT LTD
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT BANK
CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE

DAJMAR, Mohammad Hossein
 DAMALIS MARINE CORPORATION
 DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 DARYA DELALAN SEFID KHAZAR SHIPPING COMPANY
 DELTA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
 DELTA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
 DIAMOND SHIPPING SERVICES
 DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
 EAST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
 EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
 EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
 EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
 EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 ELBRUS LTD
 ELCHO HOLDING LTD
 ELEGANT TARGET DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
 ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 EMKA COMPANY
 EPSILON NARI NAVIGATION LTD
 E-SAIL A.K.A. E-SAIL SHIPPING COMPANY
 ETA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
 ETERNAL EXPERT LTD.
 EUROPÄISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK
 EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN
 FAIRWAY SHIPPING
 FAQHIAN, Dr Hoseyn
 FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
 FASIRUS MARINE CORPORATION
 FATS A
 FIFTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK
 FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIRST PERSIAN EQUITY FUND
 FOURTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FUTURE BANK BSC
 GACHSARAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
 GALLIOT MARITIME INCORPORATION
 GAMMA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
 GIANT KING LIMITED
 GOLDEN CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
 GOLDEN SUMMIT INVESTMENTS LTD.
 GOLDEN WAGON DEVELOPMENT LTD.

GOLPARVAR, Gholam Hossein
GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
GOOD LUCK SHIPPING COMPANY LLC
GRAND TRINITY LTD.
GREAT EQUITY INVESTMENTS LTD.
GREAT METHOD LTD
GREAT PROSPECT INTERNATIONAL LTD.
HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING LINES
HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST & SHIPPING GMBH
HARVEST SUPREME LTD.
HARZARU SHIPPING
HELIOTROPE SHIPPING LIMITED
HELIX SHIPPING LIMITED
HK INTERTRADE COMPANY LTD
HONG TU LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED
HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
IFOLD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
INDUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT & RENOVATION ORGANIZATION
INSIGHT WORLD LTD
INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL
IOTA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
IRAN ALUMINIUM COMPANY
IRAN FUEL CONSERVATION ORGANIZATION
IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY
IRAN LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS CO.
IRANIAN OFFSHORE ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY LIMITED
IRANIAN OIL PIPELINES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY (IOPTC)
IRANIAN OIL TERMINALS COMPANY
IRANO MISR SHIPPING COMPANY
IRINVESTSHIP LTD
IRISL (MALTA) LTD
IRISL EUROPE GMBH
IRISL MARINE SERVICES AND ENGINEERING COMPANY
IRISL MARITIME TRAINING INSTITUTE
IRITAL SHIPPING SRL
ISI MARITIME LIMITED
ISIM AMIN LIMITED
ISIM ATR LIMITED
ISIM OLIVE LIMITED
ISIM SAT LIMITED
ISIM SEA CHARIOT LTD
ISIM SEA CRESCENT LTD
ISIM SININ LIMITED
ISIM TAJ MAHAL LTD
ISIM TOUR COMPANY LIMITED
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
JACKMAN SHIPPING COMPANY
KALA NAFT
KALAN KISH SHIPPING COMPANY LTD

KAPPA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
 KARA SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH
 KAROON OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
 KAVERI MARITIME INCORPORATION
 KAVERI SHIPPING LLC
 KEY CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
 KHALILPOUR, Said Esmail
 KHANCHI, Ali Reza
 KHAZAR EXPL & PROD CO
 KHAZAR SHIPPING LINES
 KHEIBAR COMPANY
 KING PROSPER INVESTMENTS LTD.
 KINGDOM NEW LTD
 KINGSWOOD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 KISH SHIPPING LINE MANNING COMPANY
 LAMBDA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
 LANCING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 LOGISTIC SMART LTD
 LOWESWATER LTD
 MACHINE SAZI ARAK
 MAGNA CARTA LIMITED
 MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY
 MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED
 MAROUN OIL & GAS COMPANY
 MASJED-SOLEYMAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
 MASTER SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
 MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY
 MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
 MELLAT BANK SB CJSC
 MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY PJS
 MELLI BANK PLC
 MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING INTERNATIONAL
 MELODIOUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
 METRO SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
 MIDHURST SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (MALTA)
 MILL DENE LTD
 MINISTRY OF ENERGY
 MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM
 MODALITY LTD
 MODERN ELEGANT DEVELOPMENT LTD.
 MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INCORPORATION
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY SRL
 NAMJOO, Majid
 NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG
 NARMADA SHIPPING
 NATIONAL IRANIAN DRILLING COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN GAS COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY NEDERLAND (A.K.A.: NIOC NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATION OFFICE)

NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LIMITED
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (NIOEC)
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTS DISTRIBUTION COMPANY (NIOPDC)
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL REFINING AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
 NEUMAN LTD
 NEW DESIRE LTD
 NEW SYNERGY
 NEWHAVEN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 NOOR AFZA GOSTAR
 NORTH DRILLING COMPANY
 NUCLEAR FUEL PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT COMPANY
 OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 OCEAN EXPRESS AGENCIES PRIVATE LIMITED
 ONERBANK ZAO
 OXTED SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 PACIFIC SHIPPING
 PARS SPECIAL ECONOMIC ENERGY ZONE
 PARTNER CENTURY LTD
 PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD
 PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA
 PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
 PETRO SUISSE
 PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD
 PETROLEUM ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
 PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE
 PETROPARS IRAN COMPANY
 PETROPARS LTD.
 PETROPARS OILFIELD SERVICES COMPANY
 PETROPARS OPERATION & MANAGEMENT COMPANY
 PETROPARS RESOURCES ENGINEERING LTD
 PETROPARS UK LIMITED
 PETWORTH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 POST BANK OF IRAN
 POWER PLANTS' EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING COMPANY (SAAKHT E TAJHIZATE NIROOGAHI)
 PROSPER METRO INVESTMENTS LTD.
 RASTKHAH, Engineer Naser
 REIGATE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
 REZVANI ANZADEH, Mohammad Reza
 RISHI MARITIME INCORPORATION
 SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LTD
 SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY
 SALEHI, Ali Akbar
 SANFORD GROUP
 SANTEX LINES
 SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG

SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED
 SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SHALLON LTD
 SHEMA CEMENT COMPANY
 SHINE STAR LIMITED
 SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY
 SILVER UNIVERSE INTERNATIONAL LTD.
 SINA BANK
 SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS
 SINOSE MARITIME
 SISCO SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
 SIXTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SIXTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SMART DAY HOLDINGS LTD
 SOLTANI, Behzad
 SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT)
 SOROUSH SARAMIN ASATIR
 SOUTH WAY SHIPPING AGENCY CO. LTD
 SOUTH ZAGROS OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
 SPARKLE BRILLIANT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
 SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED
 STATIRA MARITIME INCORPORATION
 SUREH (NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY)
 SYSTEM WISE LTD
 TAMALARIS CONSOLIDATED LTD
 TENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 TEU FEEDER LIMITED
 THETA NARI NAVIGATION
 THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 THIRTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED
 TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED
 TRADE CAPITAL BANK
 TRADE TREASURE
 TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LTD
 TULIP SHIPPING INC
 TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 UNIVERSAL TRANSPORTATION LIMITATION UTL
 VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE
 WEST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
 WESTERN SURGE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 WISE LING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 ZANJANI, Babak
 ZETA NERI NAVIGATION

ATTACHMENT 1 - PART II

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX I TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP AND ANNEX VIII TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012

AGHA-JANI, Dawood
 ALAI, Amir Moayyed
 ASGARPOUR, Behman
 ASHIANI, Mohammad Fedai
 ASHTIANI, Abbas Rezaee
 ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANISATION OF IRAN (AEOI)
 BAKHTIAR, Haleh
 BEHZAD, Morteza
 ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTRE (NFRPC) AND ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE (ENTC)
 FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.:
 HOSSEINI, Seyyed Hussein
 IRANO HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
 IRISL BENELUX NV
 JABBER IBN HAYAN
 KARAJ NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE
 KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
 LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
 MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
 MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
 MOHAJERANI, Hamid-Reza
 MOHAMMADI, Jafar
 MONAJEMI, Ehsan
 NOBARI, Houshang
 NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
 NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
 PARS TRASH COMPANY
 PISHGAM (PIONEER) ENERGY INDUSTRIES
 QANNADI, Mohammad
 RAHIMI, Amir
 RAHIQI, Javad
 RASHIDI, Abbas
 SABET, M. Javad Karimi
 SAJDARI, Seyed Jaber
 SOLEYMANI, Ghasem
 SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (SSL)
 TAMAS COMPANY

ATTACHMENT 2 - PART I

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX II TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP
AND ANNEX IX TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012

AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION, AIO
 AL YASIN, Javad
 ALUMINAT
 ANSAR BANK
 ARAN MODERN DEVICES
 ARAS FARAYANDE
 ARFA PAINT COMPANY
 ARFEH COMPANY
 ARIA NIKAN,
 ARMED FORCES GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANISATION
 ASHTIAN TABLO
 BABAEI, Davoud
 BALS ALMAN
 BANK SADERAT IRAN
 BANK SADERAT PLC
 BARGH AZARAKSH
 BEHNAM SAHRIYARI TRADING COMPANY
 BONYAD TAAVON SEPAH
 BORBORUDI, Sayed Shamsuddin
 DANESHJOO, Kamran
 DARVISH-VAND, IRGC Brigadier-General Javad
 ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS INDUSTRIES
 ESNICO (EQUIPMENT SUPPLIER FOR NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES CORPORATION)
 ETEMAD AMIN INVEST CO MOBIN
 EYVAZ TECHNIC
 FADAVI, Rear Admiral Ali
 FAJR AVIATION COMPOSITE INDUSTRIES
 FARAHI, IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi
 FARASEPEHR ENGINEERING COMPANY
 FATAH, Parviz
 GHANI SAZI URANIUM COMPANY
 HAERI, Engineer Mojtaba
 HIRBOD CO
 HOSEYNITASH, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali
 HOSSEINI NEJAD TRADING CO.
 INSTITUTE OF APPLIED PHYSICS
 IRAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES
 IRAN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY
 IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY
 IRAN COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES
 IRAN COMPOSITES INSTITUTE
 IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES
 IRAN MARINE INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
 IRAN POOYA
 IRAN SAFFRON COMPANY OR IRANSAFFRON CO.
 IRANIAN AVIATION INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION

IRGCAIR FORCE
 IRGCQODS FORCE
 IRGC-AIR FORCE AL-GHADIR MISSILE COMMAND
 ISFAHAN OPTICS
 ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
 JAFARI, Milad
 JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS
 JELVESAZAN COMPANY
 KARANIR
 KARIMIAN, Ali
 KHALA AFARIN PARS
 KHANSARI, Majid
 MAAASYNERGY MACPAR MAKINA SAN VE TIC
 MAHMUDZADEH, Ebrahim
 MARINE INDUSTRIES
 MAROU SANAT
 MATSA (MOHANDESI TOSEH SOKHT ATOMI COMPANY)
 MECHANIC INDUSTRIES GROUP MEHR BANK
 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS
 MOBIN SANJESH
 MODERN TECHNOLOGIES FZC
 MOHAMMADI, Mohammad
 MOHAMMADLU, Brigadier-General Beik
 MOVASAGHNIA, Mohammad Reza
 MULTIMAT LCVE DISTICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI
 NACCACHE, Anis
 NADERI, Brigadier-General Mohammad
 NAJJAR, IRGC Brigadier-General Mostafa Mohammad
 NAQDI, BrigGen Mohammad Reza
 NASERI, Mohammad Sadegh
 NASERIN VAHID
 NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP
 NEKA NOVIN
 NOAVARAN POOYAMOJ
 NOURI, Ali Ashraf
 OIL INDUSTRY PENSION FUND INVESTMENT COMPANY
 ORGANISATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH
 PAKPUR, BrigGen Mohammad
 PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
 PARTO SANAT CO
 PASSIVE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
 PAYA PARTO
 QASEMI, Rostam (a.k.a. Rostam GHASEMI)
 RAAD IRAN RAKA
 RESEARCH CENTRE FOR EXPLOSION AND IMPACT
 ROSMACHIN
 SAIDI, Hojatoleslam Ali
 SALAMI, BrigGen Hossein
 SAMAN NASB ZAYENDEH ROOD; SAMAN NASBZAINDE ROOD
 SAMAN TOSE'E ASIA
 SAMEN INDUSTRIES

SCHILLER NOVIN
 SEPANIR OIL AND GAS ENERGY ENGINEERING COMPANY
 SHAFI'I RUDSARI, Rear Admiral Mohammad
 SHAHID AHMAD KAZEMI INDUSTRIAL GROUP
 SHAHID BEHESHTI UNIVERSITY
 SHAKHESE BEHBUD SANAT
 SHAMS, Abolghassem Mozaffari
 SHAMSHIRI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali
 SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
 SHETAB G.
 SHETAB GAMAN
 SHETAB TRADING
 SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES
 SIMATEC DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
 SOLAT SANA, Abdollah
 SOLTANI, Hamid
 STATE PURCHASING ORGANISATION
 STEP STANDART TEKNİK PARÇA SAN VE TİC A.Ş.
 SUN MIDDLE EAST FZ COMPANY
 SURENA (A.K.A. SAKHD VA RAH-AN- DA-ZI)
 TABA (IRAN CUTTING TOOLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY - TABA TOWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN)
 TAGHTIRAN
 TAJHİZ SANAT SHAYAN
 TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION OFFICE OF THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
 TEST TAFSİR
 TIDEWATER
 TOSSE SILOOHA
 TURBINE ENGINEERING MANUFACTURING
 VAHIDI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ahmad
 WEST SUN TRADE GMBH
 Y.A.S. CO. LTD
 YARSANAT
 YASA PART
 ZADEH, Amir Ali Haji

ATTACHMENT 2 - PART II

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX I TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP
AND
ANNEXES V I I I TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012

7TH OF TIR.
ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun
ABZAR BORESH KAVEH CO.
AGHAJANI, Azim
AHMADIAN, Ali Akbar
AMIN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
AMMUNITION AND METALLURGY INDUSTRIES GROUP
ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES GROUP
BAHMANYAR, Bahmanyar Morteza BANKSEPAH
BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL
BARZAGANI TEJARAT TAVANMAD SACCAL COMPANIES
BEHINEH TRADING CO.
CRUISE MISSILE INDUSTRY GROUP
DASTJERDI, Ahmad Vahid
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION (DIO)
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE RESEARCH CENTER
DERAKHSHANDEH, Ahmad
DOOSTAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY
ELECTRO SANAM COMPANY
ESLAMI, Mohammad
ESMAELI, Reza-Gholi
ETTEHAD TECHNICAL GROUP
FAJR INDUSTRIAL GROUP
FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen
FARASAKHT INDUSTRIES
FARAYAND TECHNIQUE
FATER (OR FAATER) INSTITUTE
GHARAGAHE SAZANDEGI GHAEM
GHORB KARBALA
GHORB NOOH
HARA COMPANY
HEJAZI, Mohammad
HOJATI, Mohsen
IMENSANZAN CONSULTANT ENGINEERS INSTITUTE
INDUSTRIAL FACTORIES OF PRECISION (IFP) MACHINERY
JOZA INDUSTRIAL CO.
KALA-ELECTRIC
KAVEH CUTTING TOOLS COMPANY
KETABACHI, Mehrdada Akhlaghi
KHATAM AL-ANBIYA CONSTRUCTION HEADQUARTERS
KHORASAN METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
M. BABAIE INDUSTRIES
MAKIN
MALEK ASHTAR UNIVERSITY
MALEKI, Naser

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXPORT
MIZAN MACHINERY MANUFACTURING A.K.A.: 3MG
NAQDI, Mohammad Reza
NEJAD NOURI, Mohammad Mehdi
NIRU BATTERY MANUFACTURING COMPANY
OMRAN SAHEL
ORIENTAL OIL KISH
PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
PARS AVIATION SERVICES COMPANY
PEJMAN INDUSTRIAL SERVICES CORPORATION
QODS AERONAUTICS INDUSTRIES
RAH SAHEL
RAHAB ENGINEERING INSTITUTE
REZAIE, Morteza
SABALAN COMPANY
SAD IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY
SAFARI, Morteza
SAFAVI, Yahya Rahim
SAFETY EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT (SEP)
SAHAND ALUMINUM PARTS INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
SAHEL CONSULTANT ENGINEERS
SALIMI, Hosein
SANAM INDUSTRIAL GROUP
SEPANIR
SEPASAD ENGINEERING COMPANY
SHAHID BAGHERI INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SBIG)
SHAHID HEMMAT INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SHIG)
SHAHID KARRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SATARRI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SAYYADE SHIRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHO'A' AVIATION.
SOLEIMANI, Qasem
SPECIAL INDUSTRIES GROUP
TABATABAEI, Ali Akbar
TIZ PARS
YA MAHDI INDUSTRIES GROUP
YAS AIR
YAZD METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
ZAHEDI, Mohammad Reza
ZOLQADR, General

ATTACHMENT 3

IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL AND ENTITIES IDENTIFIED AS GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (GOI) ON THE SDN LIST; DESIGNATED ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS ON THE SDN LIST AND ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS LISTED ON THE FSE LIST; INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES SANCTIONED UNDER ISA; BLOCKED PROPERTY OF THE FOREGOING

AA ENERGY FZCO*
 ABAN AIR
 ADVANCE NOVEL LIMITED
 AFZALI, Ali
 AGHA-JANI, Dawood
 AL AQILI GROUP LLC
 AL AQILI, Mohamed Saeed
 AL FIDA INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING
 AL HILAL EXCHANGE
 ALPHA EFFORT LIMITED
 AMERI, Teymour
 AMIN INVESTMENT BANK*
 ANTARES SHIPPING COMPANY NV
 ARASH SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED*
 ARIAN BANK
 ARTA SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED**
 ASAN SHIPPING ENTERPRISE LIMITED*
 ASCOTEC HOLDING GMBH*
 ASCOTEC JAPAN K.K.*
 ASCOTEC MINERAL & MACHINERY GMBH*
 ASCOTEC SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY GMBH*
 ASCOTEC STEEL TRADING GMBH*
 ASHTEAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 ASIA BANK
 ASIA ENERGY GENERAL TRADING (LLC)*
 ASIA MARINE NETWORK PTE. LTD.
 ASSA CO. LTD.
 ASSA CORP.
 ATLANTIC INTERMODAL
 ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN
 AZORESS SHIPPING COMPANY LL FZE
 BAHADORI, Masoud*
 BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO, C.A.
 BANDAR IMAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 BANK KARGOSHAEE
 BANK KESHAVARZI IRAN*
 BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN*
 BANK MASKAN*
 BANK MELLAT*
 BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
 BANK MELLI IRAN*

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 BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE (OF IRAN)*
 BANK REFAH KARGARAN*
 BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL PLC BANKSEPAH*
 BANK TEJARAT*
 BANK TORGVOY KAPITAL ZAO*
 BANK-E SHAHR*
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 BAZARGAN, Farzad*
 BEHSAZ KASHANE TEHRAN CONSTRUCTION CO.*
 BEHZAD, Morteza Ahmadali
 BELFAST GENERAL TRADING LLC
 BEST PRECISE LIMITED
 BIIS MARITIME LIMITED
 BIMEH IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED*
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 BIIIC INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING LTD
 BOU ALI SINA PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
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 BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
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 CENTRAL INSURANCE OF IRAN
 CISCO SHIPPING COMPANY CO. LTD.
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 COMMERCIAL PARS OIL CO.*
 CONCEPT GIANT LIMITED
 CREDIT INSTITUTION FOR DEVELOPMENT*
 CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE
 CYLINDER SYSTEM L.T.D.*
 DAJMAR, Mohammad Hossein
 DANESH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 DAVAR SHIPPING CO LTD*
 DENA TANKERS FZE*
 DERAKHSHANDEH, AHMAD
 DETTIN SPA
 DEY BANK*
 DFS WORLDWIDE
 DIVANDARI, Ali
 DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
 EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
 EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 EGHTESAD NOVIN BANK*
 EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH

ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTER
 ESLAMI, Mansour
 EUROPAISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG*
 EUROPEAN OIL TRADERS
 EVEREX
 EXECUTION OF IMAM KHOMEINI'S ORDER*
 EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN*
 EZATI, Ali
 FAIRWAY SHIPPING LTD
 FAL OIL COMPANY LIMITED
 FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 FARSOUDEH, Houshang
 FAYLACA PETROLEUM
 FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED
 FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.
 FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK LTD.
 FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIRST PERSIA EQUITY FUND
 FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
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 GHADIR INVESTMENT COMPANY*
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 GHAVAMIN BANK*
 GHEZEL AYAGH, Alireza
 GOLDEN RESOURCES TRADING COMPANY L.L.C.*
 GOLDENTEX FZE
 GOLPARVAR, Gholamhossein
 GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 GOOD LUCK SHIPPING L.L.C.
 GRACE BAY SHIPPING INC*
 GREAT BUSINESS DEALS
 GREAT METHOD LIMITED
 HADI SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO
 HARA Z SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HATEF SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HEKMAT IRANIAN BANK*
 HERCULES INTERNATIONAL SHIP*
 HERMIS SHIPPING SA*

HIRMAND SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HODA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HOMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HONAR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HONG KONG INTERTRADE COMPANY*
 HORMOZ OIL REFINING COMPANY*
 HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 HOSSEINPOUR, Houshang
 HTTS HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST AND SHIPPING, GMBH
 IDEAL SUCCESS INVESTMENTS LIMITED
 IFIC HOLDING AG*
 IHAG TRADING GMBH*
 IMPIRE SHIPPING COMPANY*
 INDUS MARITIME INC
 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ORGANIZATION OF IRAN*
 INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL
 INTRA CHEM TRADING GMBH*
 IRAN & SHARGH COMPANY*
 IRAN & SHARGH LEASING COMPANY*
 IRAN AIR
 IRAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY*
 IRAN O HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
 IRAN O MISR SHIPPING COMPANY
 IRAN PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY*
 IRAN ZAMIN BANK*
 IRANAIR TOURS
 IRANIAN MINES AND MINING INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ORGANIZATION*
 IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED*
 IRANIAN-VENEZUELAN BI-NATIONAL BANK / JOINT IRAN-VENEZUELA BANK*
 IRASCO S.R.L.*
 IRINVESTSHIP LTD.
 IRISL (MALTA) LIMITED IRISL (UK) LTD.
 IRISL CHINA SHIPPING CO., LTD.
 IRISL EUROPE GMBH
 IRISL MARINE SERVICES & ENGINEERING COMPANY
 IRISL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CO.
 IRITAL SHIPPING SRL COMPANY
 ISI MARITIME LIMITED
 ISIM AMIN LIMITED
 ISIM ATR LIMITED
 ISIM OLIVE LIMITED
 ISIM SAT LIMITED
 ISIM SEA CHARIOT LIMITED
 ISIM SEA CRESCENT LIMITED
 ISIM SININ LIMITED
 ISIM TAJ MAHAL LIMITED
 ISIM TOUR LIMITED
 ISLAMIC REGIONAL COOPERATION BANK*
 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
 JABBER IBN HAYAN

JAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY
 JASHNSAZ, Seifollah*
 JUPITER SEAWAYS SHIPPING*
 KADDOURI, Abdelhak KAFOLATBANK*
 KALA LIMITED*
 KALA PENSION TRUST LIMITED*
 KARAFARIN BANK*
 KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC*
 KAVERI MARITIME INC
 KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
 KERMAN SHIPPING CO LTD
 KHALILI, Jamshid
 KHAVARMIANEH BANK*
 KHAZAR SEA SHIPPING LINES
 KISH INTERNATIONAL BANK*
 KISH PROTECTION & INDEMNITY
 KONING MARINE CORP*
 KONT INVESTMENT BANK
 KONT KOSMETIK
 KSN FOUNDATION
 KUO OIL PTE. LTD
 LANCELIN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 LEADING MARITIME PTE. LTD.
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 LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
 LOGISTICSMART LIMITED
 LOWESWATER LIMITED
 MACHINE SAZI ARAK CO. LTD.*
 MAHAB GHODSS CONSULTING ENGINEERING COMPANY*
 MAHDAVI, Ali
 MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY LTD.
 MARANER HOLDINGS LIMITED
 MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED
 MARJAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY
 MAZANDARAN TEXTILE COMPANY
 MCS ENGINEERING*
 MCS INTERNATIONAL GMBH*
 MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
 MEHR IRAN CREDIT UNION BANK*
 MEHRAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 MELLAT BANK SB CJSC MELLAT INSURANCE COMPANY*
 MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY, P.J.S.
 MELLI BANK PLC
 MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING INTERNATIONAL
 MELODIOUS MARITIME INC
 MERSAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
 METAL & MINERAL TRADE S.A.R.L.*
 MID OIL ASIA PTE LTD
 MILL DENE LIMITED

MINAB SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 MINES AND METALS ENGINEERING GMBH*
 MIR BUSINESS BANK ZAO
 MOALLEM INSURANCE COMPANY
 MOBIN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 MODABER*
 MODALITY LIMITED
 MOGHADDAMI FARD, Mohammad
 MOHADDES, Seyed Mahmoud*
 MOINIE, Mohammad*
 MONSOON SHIPPING LTD*
 MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INC
 MSP KALA NAFT CO. TEHRAN*
 N.I.T.C. REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE*
 NABIPOUR, Ghasem
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) LIMITED*
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) SARL*
 NAFTIRAN TRADING SERVICES CO. (NTS) LIMITED*
 NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG
 NASIRBEIK, Anahita
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD*
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY*
 NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY LLC*
 NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY*
 NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 NAYEBI, Pourya
 NEFERTITI SHIPPING COMPANY
 NEUMAN LIMITED
 NEW DESIRE LIMITED
 NEW YORK GENERAL TRADING
 NEW YORK MONEY EXCHANGE
 NICO ENGINEERING LIMITED*
 NIKOUSOKHAN, Mahmoud*
 NIKSIMA FOOD AND BEVERAGE JLT
 NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 NIOC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (LONDON) LIMITED*
 NIZAMI, Anwar Kamal
 NOOR AFZAR GOSTAR COMPANY
 NOOR ENERGY (MALAYSIA) LTD.*
 NOURI PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY NPC INTERNATIONAL LIMITED*
 NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
 NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
 OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 OIL INDUSTRY INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 OMID REY CIVIL & CONSTRUCTION COMPANY*
 ONE CLASS PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD.*
 ONE VISION INVESTMENTS 5 (PTY) LTD.*
 ONERBANK ZAO*
 ORCHIDEA GULF TRADING

P.C.C. (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED*
 PACIFIC SHIPPING DMCEST
 PAJAND, Mohammad Hadi
 PARDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 PARS MCS*
 PARS OIL AND GAS COMPANY*
 PARS OIL CO.*
 PARS PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 PARS PETROCHEMICAL SHIPPING COMPANY*
 PARS TRASH COMPANY
 PARSAEI, Reza*
 PARSIAN BANK*
 PARTNER CENTURY LIMITED
 PARVARESH, Farhad Ali
 PASARGAD BANK*
 PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD.
 PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA
 PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
 PERSIA OIL & GAS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CO.*
 PETRO ENERGY INTERTRADE COMPANY*
 PETRO ROYAL FZE*
 PETRO SUISSE INTERTRADE COMPANY SA*
 PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED*
 PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY FZE*
 PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY INTERNATIONAL*
 PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (PEDCO) LIMITED*
 PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA S.A. (PDVSA)
 PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE*
 PETROPARS LTD.*
 PETROPARS UK LIMITED*
 PIONEER ENERGY INDUSTRIES COMPANY
 POLAT, Muzaffer
 POLINEX GENERAL TRADING LLC*
 POLYNAR COMPANY*
 POST BANK OF IRAN*
 POURANSARI, Hashem*
 PROTON PETROCHEMICALS SHIPPING LIMITED*
 PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA
 QANNADI, Mohammad
 QULANDARY, Azizullah Asadullah
 RAHIQI, Javad
 RASOOL, Seyed Alaeddin Sadat
 REY INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 REY NIRU ENGINEERING COMPANY*
 REYCO GMBH.*
 REZVANIANZADEH, Mohammed Reza
 RISHI MARITIME INC
 RISHMAK PRODUCTIVE & EXPORTS COMPANY*
 ROYAL ARYA CO.*
 ROYAL OYSTER GROUP
 ROYAL-MED SHIPPING AGENCY LTD

SABET, Javad Karimi
 SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LIMITED
 SADAF PETROCHEMICAL ASSALUYEH COMPANY*
 SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
 SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY
 SAMAN BANK*
 SAMAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 SAMBOUK SHIPPING FZC*
 SANDFORD GROUP LIMITED
 SANTEX LINES LIMITED
 SARKANDI, Ahmad
 SARMAYEH BANK*
 SARV SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SEIBOW LIMITED
 SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED
 SEIFI, Asadollah
 SEPID SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH SEVENTH
 OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SEYYEDI, Seyed Nasser Mohammad*
 SEYYEDI, Seyedeh Hanieh Seyed Nasser Mohammad
 SHAHID TONDGOOYAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 SHALLON LIMITED
 SHAZAND PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 SHERE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY
 SHOMAL CEMENT COMPANY
 SIMA GENERAL TRADING CO FZE*
 SIMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 SINA BANK*
 SINA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 SINGA TANKERS PTE. LTD.
 SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS LIMITED
 SINOSE MARITIME PTE. LTD.
 SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP.
 SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SMART DAY HOLDINGS GROUP LIMITED
 SOKOLENKO, Vitaly
 SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT) BANKERS
 SOROUSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP MANAGEMENT COMPANY
 SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN
 SPEEDY SHIP FZC
 SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED
 STARRY SHINE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
 SWISS MANAGEMENT SERVICES SARL*
 SYNERGY GENERAL TRADING FZE*
 SYSTEM WISE LIMITED
 TABATABAEI, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Khatibi*

TABRIZ PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 TADBIR BROKERAGE COMPANY*
 TADBIR CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY*
 TADBIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GROUP*
 TADBIR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT GROUP CO.*
 TADBIR INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 TAFAZOLI, Ahmad
 TALAI, Mohamad
 TAMAS COMPANY
 TAT BANK*
 TC SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 THE EXPLORATION AND NUCLEAR RAW MATERIALS PRODUCTION COMPANY
 THE NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY
 THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 TONGHAM SHIPPING CO LTD
 TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED
 TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED
 TOSEE EQTESAD AYANDEHSAZAN COMPANY*
 TOSEE TAAVON BANK*
 TOURISM BANK*
 TRADE TREASURE LIMITED
 TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LIMITED
 TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 UPPERCOURT SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE CO SSK
 VOBSTER SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
 WEST SUN TRADE GMBH*
 WIPPERMANN, Ulrich
 WOKING SHIPPING INVESTMENTS LIMITED
 YASINI, Seyed Kamal
 YAZDI, Bahareh Mirza Hossein
 ZADEH, Hassan Jalil
 ZANJANI, Babak Morteza
 ZARIN RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY*
 ZEIDI, Hossein
 ZHUHAI ZHENRONG COMPANY
 ZIRACCHIAN ZADEH, Mahmoud*

BLOCKED PROPERTY	PROPERTY OF	TYPE	IMO NUMBER
EP-CFD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFH	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFI	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFJ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFK	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFO	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFP	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFQ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFR	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAA	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAB	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAC	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAH	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAI	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBA	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBB	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBC	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBH	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBI	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBJ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBK	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBN	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBP	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBQ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBS	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBT	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBV	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBZ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-ICD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-ICE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-ICF	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IDA	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IDD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IDF	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IDG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEB	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEC	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IED	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	

EP-IEF	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRK	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRN	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRR	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRS	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRT	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-MDD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-MDE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BXI	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BXL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BXM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CGS	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CGT	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHW	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHX	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHY	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHZ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CIQ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BHJ	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-BXN	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CIX	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CIY	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CIA	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CJK	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
RIONA	HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO	Vessel	9349588
MIRZA KOCHER KHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7027899
ASSA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7632814
AMITEES	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7632826
HORMUZ 2	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7904580
PARMIDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8105284
BARSAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8107581
PANTEA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8108559
IRAN AKHAVAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8113009
SARINA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8203608
SABRINA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8215742
ATTRIBUTE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309593
ALIAS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309608
AQUARIAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309610
ADVENTIST	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309622
AGEAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309634
ANGEL	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309646
AGILE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309658
AJAX	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309672
ACROBAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309684
SHADFAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309696
AMPLIFY	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309701
IRAN HORMUZ 21	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8314263
IRAN HORMUZ 22	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8314275
IRAN HORMUZ 23	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8319782

IRAN SHALAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8319940
IRAN YOUSHAH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8319952
AEROLITE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320121
ADRIAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320133
NAGHMEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320145
RONAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320157
ACCURATE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320169
TABANDEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320171
GULAFSHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320183
ALAMEDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320195
IRAN PARAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8322064
IRAN CHARAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8322076
IRAN HORMUZ 25	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8422072
IRAN HORMUZ 26	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8422084
DORITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8605234
IRAN SHALAMCHEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8820925
AAJ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8984484
IRAN HORMUZ 12	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9005596
IRAN KONG	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9007582
VISTA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9010711
VIANA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9010723
IRAN HORMUZ 14	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9020778
HAMD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9036052
SOBHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9036935
SATTAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9040479
ABBA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051624
BEHDAD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051636
PARSHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051648
VALERIAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051650
NEGEEN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9071519
ATTAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9074092
PARIN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9076478
TEEN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9101649
GOWHAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9103087
IRAN DALEER	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9118551
PATRIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9137210
NARDIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9137246
KADOS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9137258
ZOMOROD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9138044
BRELYAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9138056
NILDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165786
JOVITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165798
MANOLA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165803
GLADIOLUS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165815
ELYANA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165827
NEGAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165839
SAVIZ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167253
GLOXNIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167265
NESHAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167277
BEHSHAD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167289
JAIRAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167291
IRAN SHAHED	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9184691

GOLSAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193185
ZARSAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193197
ARVIN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193202
ARTAVAND	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193214
TERESA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209324
GABRIELA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209336
SARITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209348
SILVER CRAFT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209350
MAHNAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9213387
TERMEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9213399
MAHSAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9226944
HAMADAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9226956
TARADIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9245304
PARMIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9245316
ZAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9260160
ZIVAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9260172
VALILI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270646
SHAMIM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270658
IRAN SHAHR-E-KORD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270684
IRAN KASHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270696
SININ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9274941
PARMIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283007
AZARGOUN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283019
SALIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283021
GOLBON	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283033
PARDIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9284142
TANDIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9284154
SHERE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305192
UPPERCOURT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305207
TONGHAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305219
VOBSTER	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305221
GOLAFRUZ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9323833
ADALIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9328900
SHABGOUN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9346524
AGATA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9346536
BENITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9346548
MARISOL	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349576
ORIANA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349590
MERCEDES	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349667
RAMONA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349679
GILDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9367982
SANIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9367994
SARIR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9368003
SOMIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9368015
GLORY	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9369710
ARIES	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9369722
ABTIN 1	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9379636
ARSHAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9386500
PARSHAD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387786
HAADI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387798
RAAZI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387803
SAEI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387815

ARTMAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405930
BASKAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405942
BAHJAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405954
HAAMI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405966
SHAADI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405978
SHAYAN 1	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9420356
TABAN 1	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9420368
YARAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9420370
AMIN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9422366
AVANG	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465746
KIAZAND	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465758
BATIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465760
WARTA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465849
SALIM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465851
ARDAVAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465863
NAMI	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	8419178
GAS CAMELLIA	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	8803381
TESS	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	8913564
KATERINA 1	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	9031959
MARIA	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	9110626
SUN OCEAN	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	9408358
YOUNES ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8212465
YOUSEF ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8316106
YAGHOUB ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8316168
TOLOU ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8318178
VALFAJR2 ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8400103
BADR ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8407345
BANEH ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8508462
SARDASHT ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8517231
MARIVAN ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8517243
BRIGHT ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9005235
CARIBO ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9011246
AURA ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9013749
BICAS ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9077850
MAHARLIKA ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079066
NAPOLI ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079078
NYOS ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079080
NAINITAL ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079092
NATIVE LAND ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079107
ATLANTIC ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9107655
SPARROW ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9171450
SWALLOW ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9171462
SUPERIOR ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9172038
SPOTLESS ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9172040
SABRINA ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9172052
DESTINY ^x	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9177155

HUMANITY [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9180281
ORIENTAL [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9183934
SHONA [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187629
ABELIA [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187631
ALERT ⁺	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187643
SUNDIAL [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187655
SILVER CLOUD [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187667
HUWAYZEH [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212888
HORIZON [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212890
HAPPINESS [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212905
MARINA [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212917
HALISTIC [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212929
DELVAR [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218454
DAYLAM [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218466
DAMAVAND [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218478
DENA [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218480
DARAB ⁺	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218492
IRAN FAZEL [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9283746
FIANGA [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9283760
IRAN FAHIM [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9286140
IRAN FALAGH [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9286152
DECESIVE [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9356593
SANCHI [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9356608
MAJESTIC [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357183
SUCCESS [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357353
SUNEAST [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357365
SPLENDOUR [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357377
COURAGE [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357389
HONESTY [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357391
AMBER [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357406
DAL LAKE [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357717
JUSTICE [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357729
HYDRA [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9362059
DOVE [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9362061
ZEUS [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9362073
IMICO NEKA 455 [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9404546
IMICO NEKA 456 [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9404558
IMICO NEKA 457 [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9404560
SUNSHINE [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569205
DOJIRAN [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569619
ATLANTIS [×]	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569621

FORTUN ^s	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569633
SALALEH ^s	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569645
SMOOTH ^s	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569657
SKYLINE ^s	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569669
INFINITY ^s	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569671
DEMOS ^s	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569683
YANGZHOU DAYANG DY905 ^s	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9575424
SUNRISE ^{s*}	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9615092
ANTHEM	SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP	Vessel	8310669
JAFFNA	SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP	Vessel	8609515
OLYSA	SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP	Vessel	9001605

* Denotes blocked property of individual and entities identified as GOI by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. U.S. persons and foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person will continue to be prohibited from transactions with these individuals and entities, pursuant to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.

ATTACHMENT 4

ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun
ADVANCE ELECTRICAL AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES SL
ALUMINAT
ANDISHEH ZOLAL
ARIA NIKAN MARINE INDUSTRY
BUJAR, Farhad
DAYENI, Mahmoud Mohammadi
EYVAZ TECHNIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY
FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen
FARATECH
FARAYAND TECHNIQUE
FULMEN GROUP
IMANIRAD, Arman
IMANIRAD, Mohammad Javad
IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY
IRAN POOYA
JAHAN TECH ROOYAN PARS
JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS
KAHVARIN, Iradj Mohammadi
KALAYE ELECTRIC COMPANY
KHAKI, Parviz
MANDEGAR BASPAR KIMIYA COMPANY
MARO SANAT COMPANY
MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP
NEKA NOVIN
PARTO SANAT CO.
PAYA PARTOV CO.
PENTANE CHEMISTRY INDUSTRIES
PETRO GREEN
PISHRO SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY
POUYA CONTROL
PUNTI, Pere
RAHIMYAR, Amir Hossein
SIMATIC DEVELOPMENT CO.
TAGHTIRAN KASHAN COMPANY
TANIDEH, Hossein
TARHO PALAYESH
THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH T
OWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN
WISSER, Gerhard
YASA PART
ZOLAL IRAN COMPANY

JCPOA Annex III - Civil nuclear cooperation

A. General

1. Iran and E3/EU+3 decided to co-operate, among others, including through IAEA technical cooperation, where appropriate, and without prejudice to the existing bilateral agreements, in different areas of civil nuclear co-operation to be developed within the framework of this JCPOA, as detailed in this Annex. In this context, the Joint Commission will also support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, as appropriate.
2. All civil nuclear cooperation projects under this JCPOA will be mutually determined by the participating states and will be consistent with the JCPOA and the national laws and regulations of the participating parties.
3. The civil nuclear and scientific cooperation projects envisioned between Iran and the E3/EU+3 as part of this JCPOA may be undertaken in a variety of formats, with a variety of potential participants. A given project undertaken by the E3/EU+3 will not necessarily include participation by all E3/EU+3 parties:
 - 3.1. bilateral or multilateral cooperation arrangements with Iran. Such arrangements would be mutually determined by the participating states.
 - 3.2. projects under the auspices of the IAEA, either through IAEA technical co-operation projects including through Project and Supply Agreements.
 - 3.3. through International Science and Technology Centres.

Specifically, E3/EU+3 parties will undertake, to develop nuclear co-operation with Iran, in particular within the following areas:

B. Reactors, Fuels and Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes

4. Modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, technologies and facilities

E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will facilitate Iran's acquisition of light-water research and power reactors, for research, development and testing, and for the supply of electricity and desalination, with arrangements for the assured supply of nuclear fuel and the removal of spent fuel as provided for in relevant contracts, for each reactor provided. This may include the following areas for co-operation:

- 4.1. Construction as well as effective and safe operation of new light water power reactors and associated equipment, according to Generation III+ requirements, including small and medium sized nuclear reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate.
- 4.2. Construction of state of the art light water moderated multipurpose research reactors capable of testing fuel pins, assembly prototypes and structural materials with associated related facilities, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate.
- 4.3. Supply of state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems for the above research and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;

- 4.4. Supply of nuclear simulation and calculation codes and software solutions with regard to the above areas, including joint development, as appropriate;
- 4.5. Supply of first and second loop main equipment as well as core of the above research and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;
- 4.6. On-the-job training on fuel management scenarios and reshuffling for the above research and power nuclear reactors;
- 4.7. Joint technical review of Iran's current nuclear reactors, upon the request by Iran, in order to upgrade current equipment and systems, including concerning nuclear safety;

5. Arak Modernisation Project

- 5.1. As described in Section B of Annex I, an international partnership composed of E3/EU+3 parties and Iran, which may subsequently be enlarged to include mutually determined third countries will be established, to support and facilitate the redesign and rebuilding of the IR-40 reactor at Arak into a modernised, not exceeding 20MWth, heavy-water moderated and cooled research reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to Annex I).
- 5.2. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project. A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to support and facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities as described in Annex I. The Working Group could be enlarged to include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, especially in the key areas such as redesign, design review and certification, reactor core manufacturing, fuel design, fabrication and supply, safety and security, spent fuel treatment or disposition, as well as concerning the supply of materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems, and subsequently contracts would be concluded. The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.
- 5.3. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and operation.
- 5.4. Iran will continue to assume the primary responsibility for financing the modernisation project. Additional funding arrangements for the project, including for IAEA projects

supporting the Arak modernisation project, will be determined based on the official document and contracts to be subsequently concluded.

6. Nuclear Fuel

- 6.1. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will support assistance to Iran, including through the IAEA, as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel fabricated by Iran.
- 6.2. E3/EU+3 parties will seek to cooperate regarding the supply of modern fuels, including, as appropriate, joint design and fabrication, the relevant licenses and fabrication technologies and equipment and related infrastructure, for current and future nuclear research and power reactors, including technical assistance on purification processes, forming and metallurgical activities for different types of nuclear fuel clads and cladding for the modernised Arak heavy water research reactor.

C. Research and Development (R&D) Practices

7. To implement other aspects of this JCPOA and in support of a broader opening of scientific engagements between the E3/EU+3 and Iran, the E3/EU+3 and Iran will seek cooperation and scientific exchange in the field of nuclear science and technology:
 - 7.1. Accelerator-based nuclear physics and nuclear astrophysics research, and stable isotope production in international collaboration at the nuclear, physics, and technology centre at the Fordow facility. Iran will request from the E3/EU+3 and other interested parties specific proposals for cooperative international nuclear, physics, and technology projects and will host an international workshop to review these proposals. The goal is to realise international collaborative projects within a few years. The transitioning to stable isotope production of two cascades will be conducted in a joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon.
 - 7.2. Plasma physics and nuclear fusion;
 - 7.3. Research reactor applications at the TRR, modernized Arak reactor, or at other future research reactors in Iran, such as:
 - 7.3.1. Training
 - 7.3.2. Radio-isotope production and utilization
 - 7.3.3. Nuclear desalination
 - 7.3.4. Neutron transmutation doping
 - 7.3.5. Neutron activation analysis
 - 7.3.6. Neutron capture therapy
 - 7.3.7. Neutron imaging and materials characterization studies using neutron beams

- 7.4. E3/EU+3 parties and Iran could also explore co-operation in the following additional areas:
 - 7.4.1. Design, manufacture and/or assembly of in-core measuring instrumentation and technologies;
 - 7.4.2. Nuclear instrumentation and control, systems and electronics design, manufacture and/or assembly;
 - 7.4.3. Fusion technology and plasma physics and related infrastructure and facilitating contribution of Iran to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Project and/or similar projects, including relevant IAEA technical cooperation projects;
 - 7.4.4. Neutrino astronomy;
 - 7.4.5. Design and manufacturing, and supply, of different types of accelerators and supply of related equipment including through relevant IAEA technical cooperation projects;
 - 7.4.6. Data acquisition and processing software and interface equipment;

D. Nuclear Safety, Safeguards and Security

8. Nuclear safety

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran to establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, engage in workshops and training events in Iran to support interactions between Iranian nuclear regulatory authorities and those from the E3/EU+3 and elsewhere to, among other things, share lessons learned on establishing and maintaining regulatory independence and effectiveness, and training on implementing nuclear safety culture and best practices; facilitate exchanges and visits to nuclear regulatory authorities and nuclear power plants outside of Iran focusing on best practices for safe operation; and enhance and strengthen domestic emergency preparedness and severe accident management capability.

Provide support and assistance to enable Iran to join relevant conventions on nuclear safety and security, e.g. through workshops or seminars furthering accession to such commitments. Such workshops or seminars could also take place under the auspices of the IAEA.

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, will co-operate with Iran in the following areas of nuclear safety, as well as in other areas to be mutually agreed:

- 8.1. Conclusion of bilateral/multilateral agreements with related organisations and research centres;
- 8.2. Supply of valid codes, instruments and equipment related to nuclear safety;
- 8.3. Facilitate exchange of knowledge and experience in the area of nuclear safety;
- 8.4. Enhance and strengthen domestic emergency preparedness and severe accident management capability;
- 8.5. Arrange on-the-job training and apprenticeship courses for reactor and facility operators, regulatory authority personnel and related supportive organizations in the area of nuclear safety inside and outside of Iran;
- 8.6. Establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, which shall be equipped with necessary tools, techniques and equipment, in order to support and facilitate technical and professional training and exchange of lessons-learned for reactor and facility operators, regulatory authority personnel and related supportive organizations;

9. Nuclear Safeguards

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and transparency measures in Iran. Co-operation in the following areas can be envisaged:

- 9.1. Cooperation in the form of on-the-job trainings and workshops to strengthen nuclear material accounting and control process, human resource development, and quality assurance/quality control processes;

- 9.2. E3/EU+3 parties, and other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran for the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and transparency measures in Iran.
- 9.3. This cooperation could take the form of training and workshops to strengthen Iran's safeguards regulatory authority, nuclear material accounting and control processes, human resource development, and quality assurance/quality control processes.

10. Nuclear Security

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the implementation of nuclear security guidelines and best practices. Co-operation in the following areas can be envisaged:

- 10.1. Co-operation in the form of training courses and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear facilities and systems as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems;
- 10.2. Co-operation through training and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to protect against, and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems.

E. Nuclear Medicine and Radioisotopes, Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes

11. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran to improve the utilization of nuclear medicine in Iran in order to enhance Iran's expertise in diagnostic imaging and radiotherapy, increase the availability of medical radioisotopes for diagnosis and treatment of Iranian citizens, and facilitate Iran's participation in the broader international scientific and nuclear medicine community. Such cooperation may include:
 - 11.1. Upgrades to the infrastructure associated with existing cyclotron facilities, including for medical radioisotopes production.
 - 11.2. Facilitating Iranian acquisition of a new cyclotron, and associated radiopharmacy equipment, for medical radioisotopes production.
 - 11.3. Acquisition of state-of-the-art diagnostic imaging and radiotherapy equipment for existing or new nuclear medicine centers, including co-operation between hospitals for the treatment of individual patients.
 - 11.4. Cooperation on occupational and patient dosimetry procedures.
 - 11.5. Improved target utilization to increase radioisotope production.
 - 11.6. Acquisition of radioisotope sources for brachytherapy, and radiotherapy instrument calibration, and other medical and industrial applications.
 - 11.7. Supply of state-of-the-art radio-medicine center and necessary laboratories.

F. Waste Management and Facility Decommissioning

12. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in the safe, effective, and efficient management and disposition of nuclear and radiological wastes derived from Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities and nuclear medicine, radioisotope production and/or consumption activities.
13. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in areas of safe, effective, and environmentally friendly best practices for facility decontamination and decommissioning, including co-operation on long term storage facilities for the repository of low and medium level waste.
14. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to facilitate exchanges and visits to relevant sites and locations outside of Iran related to effective waste management and best practices.
15. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will facilitate the supply of appropriate equipment and systems for waste management and depository facilities in Iran.

G. Other projects

16. Other projects may be implemented between the relevant E3/EU+3 parties and Iran, as mutually determined by the participants in the JCPOA, including in the following areas:
 - 16.1. Construction of nuclear desalination and associated infrastructure in Iran;
 - 16.2. Development of laser technology for medical applications (e.g. for eye surgery);

JCPOA Annex IV - Joint Commission

1. Establishment, Composition, and Coordinator

- 1.1. The Joint Commission is established to carry out the functions assigned to it in the JCPOA, including its Annexes.
- 1.2. The Joint Commission is comprised of representatives of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), together, the JCPOA participants.
- 1.3. The Joint Commission may establish Working Groups in particular areas, as appropriate.
- 1.4. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ('High Representative'), or his/her designated representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission.

2. Functions

- 2.1. The Joint Commission will perform the following functions:
 - 2.1.1. Review and approve the final design for the modernized heavy water research reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories prior to the commencement of construction, and review and approve the fuel design for the modernized heavy water research reactor as provided for in Section B of Annex I;
 - 2.1.2. Review and approve, upon request by Iran, development, acquisition, construction or operation of hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 21 of Annex I;
 - 2.1.3. Review and approve plans submitted by Iran to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel, as provided for in paragraph 26 of Annex I;
 - 2.1.4. Review and approve, upon request by Iran, projects on new types of centrifuges to proceed to a prototype stage for mechanical testing, as provided for in paragraph 43 of Annex I;
 - 2.1.5. Receive information in advance about the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 44 of Annex I;
 - 2.1.6. Receive information about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 46.1 of Annex I;
 - 2.1.7. Assess and then approve, upon request by Iran, that fuel assemblies manufactured in Iran and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF₆, based on the objective technical criteria, with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran, as provided in paragraph 59 of Annex I;

- 2.1.8. Support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran, as provided for in paragraph 59 of Annex I;
- 2.1.9. Review and approve in advance, upon request by Iran, engagement by Iran, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment and enrichment related activities, including related research and development, as provided for in paragraph 73 in Annex I;
- 2.1.10. Provide consultation, and advise on the necessary means in the context of access as specified in paragraph 78 of Annex I;
- 2.1.11. Review and approve in advance, upon request by Iran, the design, development, fabrication, acquisition, or use for non-nuclear purposes of multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device and explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, as provided for in paragraphs 82.2 and 82.3 of Annex I;
- 2.1.12. Review and consult to address issues arising from the implementation of sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA and its Annex II;
- 2.1.13. Review and decide on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with, Iran, in accordance with Section 6 of this Annex and the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA;
- 2.1.14. Review, with a view to resolving, any issue that a JCPOA participant believes constitutes nonperformance by another JCPOA participant of its commitments under the JCPOA, according to the process outlined in the JCPOA;
- 2.1.15. Adopt or modify, as necessary, procedures to govern its activities;
- 2.1.16. Consult and provide guidance on other implementation matters that may arise under the JCPOA.

3. Procedures

- 3.1. The Joint Commission will meet on a quarterly basis and at any time upon request of a JCPOA participant to the Coordinator. The Coordinator will convene a meeting of the Joint Commission to be held no later than one week following receipt of such a request, except for consultations in accordance with Section Q of Annex I and any other matter that the Coordinator and/or a JCPOA participant deem urgent, in which case the meeting will be convened as soon as possible and not later than three calendar days from receipt of the request.
- 3.2. Meetings of the Joint Commission will be held in New York, Vienna, or Geneva as appropriate. The host country should facilitate entry formalities for those attending such meetings.
- 3.3. The Joint Commission may decide by consensus to invite observers to attend its meetings.

- 3.4. Except as provided in Section 6 of this Annex which will be subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN, the work of the Joint Commission is confidential and may be shared only among JCPOA participants and observers as appropriate, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.

4. Decisions

- 4.1. Except as stated otherwise in this Annex, decisions by the Joint Commission are to be made by consensus.
- 4.2. Each JCPOA participant will have one vote. Decisions of the Joint Commission are to be taken by the Representative or the Deputy Representative or other such alternate as the JCPOA participant may designate.
- 4.3. The vote of each JCPOA participant will be made known to all other JCPOA participants if any JCPOA participant requests a recorded vote.
- 4.4. Matters before the Joint Commission pursuant to Section Q of Annex I are to be decided by consensus or by affirmative vote of five JCPOA participants. There is no quorum requirement.
- 4.5. The Coordinator will not take part in decision-making on nuclear-related transfers and activities as set out in Section 6 of this Annex.

5. Other

- 5.1. Each JCPOA participant will be responsible for its own costs of participating in the Joint Commission, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.
- 5.2. JCPOA participants may request that the Coordinator circulates a notification to the other JCPOA participants at any time. Upon such a request, the Coordinator will circulate such notification without delay to all JCPOA participants.

6. Procurement Working Group

- 6.1. With the purpose of establishing a procurement channel, the Joint Commission will, except as otherwise provided by the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, review and decide on proposals by states seeking to engage in:
 - 6.1.1. the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INF/CIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and, if the end-use will be for Iran's nuclear programme set out in this JCPOA or other non-nuclear civilian end-use, all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INF/CIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the relevant State determines that they could contribute to activities inconsistent with the JCPOA; and,

- 6.1.2. the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above;
- 6.1.3. acquisition by Iran of an interest in a commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technologies as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and such investments in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them.
- 6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.
- 6.3. Each E3+3 State and Iran will participate in the Procurement Working Group. The High Representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group.
- 6.4. Except as otherwise provided by the Joint Commission or the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:
 - 6.4.1. Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA. The Procurement Working Group will have up to 30 working days to consider and decide on the proposal.
 - 6.4.2. "Necessary supporting information" for purposes of Section 6.4.1 means: (a) a description of the item; (b) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the exporting entity; (c) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the importing entity; (d) a statement of the proposed end-use and end use location, along with an end-use certification signed by the AEOI or the appropriate authority of Iran attesting the stated end-use; (e) export license number if available; (f) contract date, if available; and (g) details on transportation, if available; provided that if any of the export license number, contract date, or details on transportation are not available as of the time of submittal of the proposal, such information will be provided as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item.
 - 6.4.3. Each participant in the Procurement Working Group will have to communicate to the Coordinator, within 20 working days, whether it approves or rejects the proposal. The timeline for consideration may be extended for an additional period of 10 working days at the request of a participant of the Procurement Working Group.
 - 6.4.4. The proposal will be recommended for approval as soon as the Coordinator receives formal approvals from all the Procurement Working Group Participants or if, at the end of the 30 working day period, the Coordinator has received no disapprovals from any of the Procurement

Working Group Participants. If at the end of the 30 working day period, the proposal has not been recommended for approval, the proposal may, at the request of at least two Working Group Participants within 5 working days, be referred to the Joint Commission, which would decide on approval of the proposal by consensus within 10 working days. Otherwise the proposal will be recommended for disapproval. The disapproving JCPOA participant(s) should provide relevant information regarding the disapproval to the Joint Commission as appropriate, taking into account the need to protect confidential information.

- 6.4.5. The Coordinator will communicate the recommendation of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council no later than 35 working days, or in case of referral to the Joint Commission no later than 45 working days from the date the Coordinator transmitted the proposal and all necessary supporting information to the Procurement Working Group.
- 6.4.6. Except as decided otherwise by consensus, the Procurement Working Group will meet every three weeks for reviewing the proposals. When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.
- 6.5. All JCPOA participants will act in accordance with the procurement channel and will only engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1 following approval by the Joint Commission and the United Nations Security Council. Iran will not use, acquire, or seek to procure the items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology referred to in Section 6.1 of this Annex for nuclear activities which are inconsistent with this JCPOA.
- 6.6. Any JCPOA participant may refer a procurement-related activity to the Joint Commission under the dispute settlement mechanism if it is concerned that such activity is inconsistent with this JCPOA.
- 6.7. Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.
- 6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.
- 6.9. The Procurement Working Group will respond to requests for guidance on procurement activities from third parties, as communicated by the Coordinator. The Procurement Working Group will endeavor to respond to such requests for guidance within 9 working days from the date the Coordinator submits it to the Procurement Working Group.
- 6.10. The Joint Commission will report to the United Nations Security Council at least every 6 months on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues.

7. Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting

- 7.1. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibilities for reviewing and consulting on issues related to the implementation of sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA assisted by a working group on the implementation of sanctions lifting.
- 7.2. The Joint Commission participants will participate in this working group. The High Representative will serve as coordinator of this working group.
- 7.3. If at any time following the implementation day Iran believes that any other nuclear- related sanction or restrictive measure including related designations of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the working group.
- 7.4. The participants of the working group will review and consult, with a view to resolving the issue within 30 working days.
- 7.5. If after involvement of the working group, the issue remains unresolved, any participant of the JCPOA may refer it to the Joint Commission.

JCPOA Annex V - Implementation Plan¹

¹ This Annex is only for the purpose of determining the sequence of implementation of the commitments described in this JCPOA and annexes thereto and does not restrict or expand the scope of these commitments.

This Annex describes the sequence of the actions specified in Annexes I and II to this JCPOA.

A. Finalisation Day

1. Upon conclusion of the negotiations of this JCPOA, the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and Iran will endorse this JCPOA.
2. Promptly after the conclusion of the negotiations of this JCPOA, the proposed UN Security Council resolution referred to in Section 18 of this Annex will be submitted to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
3. The EU will promptly endorse the UN Security Council resolution referred to above through Council Conclusions.
4. Iran and the IAEA will start developing necessary arrangements to implement all transparency measures provided for in this JCPOA so that such arrangements are completed, in place, and ready for implementation on Implementation Day.

B. Adoption Day

5. Adoption Day will occur 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council through the resolution referred to above, or at an earlier date by mutual consent of all JCPOA participants, at which point this JCPOA comes into effect.
6. Beginning on Adoption Day, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations, including legal and administrative preparations, for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.
7. Iran will officially inform the IAEA that, effective on Implementation Day, Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol, pending its ratification by the Majlis (Parliament), and will fully implement the modified code 3.1.
8. Iran will implement paragraph 66 from Section M on "Past and Present Issues of Concern" of Annex I.
9. The EU and its Member States will adopt an EU Regulation, taking effect as of Implementation Day, terminating all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial EU sanctions as specified in Section 16.1 of this Annex, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of agreed nuclear-related measures.
10. The United States, acting pursuant to Presidential authorities, will issue waivers, to take effect upon Implementation Day, ceasing the application of the statutory nuclear-related sanctions as specified in Sections 17.1 to 17.2 of this Annex. The President will also take action to direct that all appropriate additional measures be taken to implement the cessation of application of sanctions as specified in Sections 17.1 to 17.4 of this Annex, including the termination of Executive orders as specified in Section 17.4, and the licensing of activities as specified in Section 17.5.

11. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will begin discussions on an official document to be concluded in advance of Implementation Day which will express strong commitments of the E3/EU+3 participants to the Arak Heavy Water Reactor modernisation project and define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.
12. The EU, its Member States and the United States will begin consultation as appropriate with Iran regarding relevant guidelines and publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures to be lifted under this JCPOA.

C. Implementation Day

13. Implementation Day will occur upon the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in paragraph 15 below, and, simultaneously, the E3/EU+3 taking the actions described in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, and with the actions described in paragraph 18 below taking place at the UN level in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.
14. **Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I:**
 - 14.1. Paragraphs 3 and 10 from Section B on "Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor";
 - 14.2. Paragraphs 14 and 15 from Section C on "Heavy Water Production Plant";
 - 14.3. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 29.1 and 29.2 from Section F on "Enrichment Capacity";
 - 14.4. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 from Section G on "Centrifuges Research and Development";
 - 14.5. Paragraphs 45, 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 from Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant";
 - 14.6. Paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 from Section I on "Other Aspects of Enrichment";
 - 14.7. Paragraphs 57 and 58 from Section J on "Uranium Stocks and Fuels";
 - 14.8. Paragraph 62 from Section K on "Centrifuge Manufacturing";
 - 14.9. Complete the modalities and facilities-specific arrangements to allow the IAEA to implement all transparency measures provided for in Annex I;
 - 14.10. Paragraphs 64 and 65 from Section L on "Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1";
 - 14.11. Paragraphs 80.1 and 80.2 from Section R on "Centrifuge Component Manufacturing Transparency"; and
 - 14.12. Within one year from Implementation Day, Iran will have completed the measures specified in paragraphs 47.2 and 48.2 of Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant".
15. **The European Union will:**
 - 15.1. Terminate the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspend the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.1.1- 1.1.3; 1.1.5 - 1.1.8; 1.2.1 - 1.2.5; 1.3.1, 1.3.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 16 and 17 of Council

Decision 2010/413/CFSP) and 1.3.3; 1.4.1 and 1.4.2; 10.1.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 39, 43, 43a of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012) of Annex II. EU Member States will terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required.

- 15.2. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.6.1 - 1.7.2 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.
- 15.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II of this JCPOA from Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012. Suspend the provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Section 1.9.1 of Annex II in relation to individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II.
- 15.4. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 of Annex II to implement the relevant provisions of the UN Security Council resolution referred to above.
16. **The United States will:**²
 - 16.1. Cease the application of the sanctions set forth in Sections 4.1 - 4.5 and 4.7 of Annex II, with the exception of Section 211(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA);
 - 16.2. Cease the application of the sanctions set forth in Section 4.6 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
 - 16.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List (FSE List), and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List as set forth in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II;
 - 16.4. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645 and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628 as set forth in Section 4 of Annex II; and
 - 16.5. License activities as set forth in Section 5 of Annex II.
17. **UN Security Council**
 - 17.1. In accordance with the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the provisions imposed in UN Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) will be terminated subject to re-imposition in the event of significant nonperformance by Iran of JCPOA commitments, and specific restrictions, including restrictions regarding the transfer of proliferation sensitive goods will apply.³

² The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply are those directed towards non-U.S. persons, as described in Section 4 of Annex II.

³ The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.

17.2. The E3/EU+3 will take appropriate measures to implement the new UNSC resolution.

D. Transition Day

18. Transition Day will occur 8 years from Adoption Day or upon a report from the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the UN Security Council stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.

19. The European Union will:

19.1. Terminate the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspend the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.1.4, 1.3.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 15 and 18 of Council Decision and Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation); 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 (in so far as it concerns Ballistic Missiles restrictions); 1.6.1 - 1.9.1 of Annex II.

19.2. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 2 to Annex II from Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012.

19.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II from Annexes I and II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP.

19.4. Terminate all provisions in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP suspended on Implementation Day.

20. The United States will:

20.1. Seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the statutory sanctions set forth in Sections 4.1-4.5, 4.7 and 4.9 of Annex II;

20.2. Seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the statutory sanctions described in Section 4.6 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to Annex II; and

20.3. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 4 to Annex II from the SDN List and/or the FSE List as set forth in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II.

21. Iran will:

21.1. Seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.

E. UNSCR Termination Day

22. UNSCR (UN Security Council resolution) Termination Day will occur in accordance with the terms of the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA, which is 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated.

23. On UNSCR Termination Day, the provisions and measures imposed in that resolution would terminate and the UN Security Council would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue.

24. **The European Union will:**

24.1. Terminate all remaining provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP.

F. Other

25. The terminations described in this Annex V are without prejudice to other JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates.

**Annex B: Statement by China,
France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United
Kingdom, the United States,
and the European Union, 14
July 2015**

Statement

China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union have concluded with Iran a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. To improve transparency and create an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the JCPOA, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union have set forth below certain provisions. Their participation in the JCPOA is contingent upon the United Nations Security Council adopting a new resolution that would, acting under Article 41 of the UN Charter: terminate resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015); require States to comply with the provisions in this statement for their respective durations; and facilitate, in cooperation with the Joint Commission established in the JCPOA, implementation of the JCPOA as provided in paragraphs 2 and 6(a) below.

As provided by a resolution so deciding, the following provisions would apply on the date on which the IAEA Director General submits a report verifying that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA:

1. The term "all States" as used in this document, and as incorporated in the resolution, means "all States without exception."
2. All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:
 - a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;
 - b) the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above; and
 - c) acquisition by Iran of an interest in a commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining or production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, *except that* approval in advance by the Security Council shall not be required for the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of equipment covered by B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 when such equipment is for light water reactors, low - enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors, as well as items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part 2 only when for exclusive use in light water reactors.

For any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that are approved by the Security Council pursuant to subparagraph (a) above, or are supplied, sold, or transferred subject to the exception stated above, States are to ensure that: (a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the referenced INFCIRC

have been met; (b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; they notify the Security Council within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and d) in the case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the referenced INFCIRCs, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer.

And except also that approval in advance by the Security Council is not required for the supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and the provision of any related technical assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, that is directly related to the necessary modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, the export of Iran's enriched uranium in excess of 300 kilograms in return for natural uranium, and the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design and, subsequently, on the agreed final design of such reactor, provided that Member States ensure that: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; (b) they notify the Security Council and Joint Commission ten days in advance of such activities; (c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the referenced INFCIRC have been met; they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and (e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the referenced INFCIRCs, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfers.

This paragraph shall apply until the date ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, except if the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion before that date, then the requirement to obtain approval in advance by the Security Council shall be suspended immediately and, beginning on the date of this suspension, the exceptions provided for in this paragraph shall continue to apply and all States may participate in and permit the activities set forth in this paragraph if they notify the Security Council and the Joint Commission at least ten working days in advance of each such activity on a case-by-case basis.

3. Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.
4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below *provided* that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:
 - a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; and
 - b) the provision to Iran of any technology or technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, or Iran's acquisition of an interest in any commercial activity in another State, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph a of this paragraph or related to the activities described in paragraph 3.

provided that in the event of an approval by the Security Council: (a) the contract for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and (b) Iran commit not to use such items for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

5. All States may participate in and permit, *provided* that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, and the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in this subparagraph.

This paragraph shall apply until the date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

6. All States are to:
 - a) Take the necessary measures to ensure that any activities described in paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 occur on their territories, or involving their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or involving their flag vessels or aircraft, only pursuant to the relevant terms of those paragraphs, and also to prevent and prohibit any activities inconsistent with these provisions, until the date ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier;
 - b) Take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the UN Security Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel from Iran by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran, until the date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier;
 - c) For eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier, continue to freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of the JCPOA, and freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the individuals and entities that were specified on the list established and maintained by the Committee pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) as of the date of adoption of the new resolution, with the exception of those individuals and entities specified in Attachment hereto, or that may be de-listed by the Security Council, and freeze those of additional individuals and entities that may be designated by the Security Council as: having engaged in, directly associated with or

provided support for Iran's proliferation - sensitive nuclear activities undertaken contrary to Iran's commitments in the JCPOA or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified in this statement; having assisted designated individuals or entities in evading or acting inconsistently with the JCPOA or the new resolution; having acted on behalf or at the direction of designated individuals or entities; or having been owned or controlled by designated individuals or entities, including through illicit means.

- d) For eight years from the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier, ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of designated individuals or entities. These requirements shall not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:
- i. To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Security Council of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Security Council within five working days of such notification;
 - ii. To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council and has been approved by the Security Council;
 - iii. To be necessary for the civil nuclear cooperation projects described in Annex III of the JCPOA, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council and has been approved by the Security Council;
 - iv. To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), is not for the benefit of a person or entity subject to the measures in this paragraph, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council; or
 - v. To be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in paragraph 2, or to any other activity required for the implementation of the JCPOA, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council and has been approved by the Security Council.

In addition, this provision shall not prevent a designated individual or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such individual or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in this statement; the payment is not directly or indirectly received by an individual or entity subject to the

measures in this paragraph; and after notification by the relevant States to the Security Council of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working days prior to such authorization.

In addition, States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to this paragraph of interest or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts were frozen, provided that such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these measures and are frozen;

- e) For five years from the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier, take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals described in paragraphs 6(c) above, although underlining that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory. The measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the Security Council determines on a case -by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Security Council concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the new resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA statute is engaged;
 - f) Take the required actions, in accordance with the resolution and guidance provided by the Security Council, with respect to items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement, and cooperate in such efforts.
7. All States are called upon to facilitate full implementation of the JCPOA by inspecting, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement; and are called upon also to cooperate in inspections on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement.

China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union note their understanding that, upon adoption of a resolution endorsing the JCPOA, the Security Council would make the practical arrangements to undertake directly the tasks specified in this statement, including to monitor and take action to support the implementation by Member States of these provisions, review proposals described in paragraph 2 of this statement, answer inquiries from Member States, provide guidance, and examine information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution. Furthermore, these states propose that the Security Council ask the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of these provisions every six months.

The duration of the provisions in this statement may be reviewed by the Joint Commission at the

request of any participant at its biannual ministerial-level meetings, at which time the Joint Commission could make recommendations by consensus to the Security Council.

ATTACHMENT

1. AGHA-JANI, Dawood
2. ALAI, Amir Moayyed
3. ASGARPOUR, Behman
4. ASHIANI, Mohammad Fedai
5. ASHTIANI, Abbas Rezaee
6. ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANISATION OF IRAN (AEOI)
7. BAKHTIAR, Haleh
8. BEHZAD, Morteza
9. ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTRE (NFRPC) AND ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE (ENTC)
10. FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.:
11. HOSSEINI, Seyyed Hussein
12. IRANO HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
13. IRISL BENELUX NV
14. JABBER IBN HAYAN
15. KARAJ NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE
16. KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
17. LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
18. MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
19. MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
20. MOHAJERANI, Hamid-Reza
21. MOHAMMADI, Jafar
22. MONAJEMI, Ehsan
23. NOBARI, Houshang
24. NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
25. NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
26. PARS TRASH COMPANY
27. PISHGAM (PIONEER) ENERGY INDUSTRIES
28. QANNADI, Mohammad
29. RAHIMI, Amir
30. RAHIQI, Javad
31. RASHIDI, Abbas
32. SABET, M. Javad Karimi
33. SAJDARI, Seyed Jaber
34. SOLEYMANI, Ghasem
35. SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (SSL)
36. TAMAS COMPANY

**Note by the President of the
Security Council, 16 January
2016**

S/2016/44*
16 January 2016

Security Council tasks under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

1. The present note sets forth practical arrangements and procedures for the Security Council for carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. The Security Council shall take any necessary action to support and improve the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), including:
 - (a) Monitoring the implementation of the resolution;
 - (b) Taking action, as appropriate, to improve the implementation by Member States of the resolution;
 - (c) Answering enquiries from Member States and international organizations regarding the implementation of the resolution;
 - (d) Responding appropriately to information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution;
 - (e) Undertaking outreach activities to promote proper implementation of the resolution, including the provision of practical guidance;
 - (f) Reviewing and deciding on proposals made by Member States pursuant to paragraphs 2, 4, 5 and 6 (b) of annex B to the resolution, including the review of recommendations from the Joint Commission regarding proposals by Member States and international organizations to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution and section 6 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (i.e., the procurement channel functions);
 - (g) Granting exemptions to the restrictions, as specified in the resolution.

Practical arrangements

3. To facilitate its work under resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council shall select on an annual basis one member to serve as its facilitator for the functions specified in the present note. The facilitator shall brief the other members of the Council on its work and the implementation of the resolution every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 7 below.

* Reissued for technical reasons on 25 February 2016.

4. In normal circumstances, the Security Council shall convene informal meetings at the expert level to carry out the functions specified in the present note.

5. Also in normal circumstances, the Security Council shall seek to make decisions related to the functions specified in the present note by consensus and under a no - objection procedure, with a deadline of at least five working days, without prejudice to the possibility of voting pursuant to the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure.

Secretariat

6. The Security Council requests that the Secretary-General appoint the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs as a point of contact in the Secretariat and to support the work of the Security Council and of its facilitator on those issues. The point of contact shall:

- (a) Assist the facilitator in the organization and staffing of informal meetings of the Security Council related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015);
- (b) Manage all incoming and outgoing communications related to implementation of the resolution and assist the facilitator in corresponding with Member States on behalf of the Security Council;
- (c) Draft correspondence, speaking notes and briefings of the facilitator related to the implementation of the resolution;
- (d) Maintain and archive all information and documents relating to the Security Council's work related to the implementation of the resolution;
- (e) Maintain and promote publicly available information on the restrictions imposed by the Security Council, including through the Council's website and outreach activities;
- (f) Provide administrative support for the Security Council's review of recommendations from the Joint Commission, including:
 - (i) Receiving proposals from Member States seeking to engage in nuclear- related activities or transfers;
 - (ii) Responding to queries from Member States about the procedures for the submission of a proposal to the Security Council and the process for review;
 - (iii) Circulating immediately to the Joint Commission Coordinator and the members of the Security Council incoming proposals and transmitting recommendations from the Joint Commission to the members of the Council and final decisions of the Council to the relevant Member States;
 - (iv) Receiving any other communications from the Joint Commission and transmitting them to the members of the Security Council, and transmitting any relevant communications from the Security Council to the Joint Commission;

- (g) Perform any other task, upon request from the Security Council, to support the implementation of the resolution.

7. The Security Council requests that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council every six months on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Prior to the public release of that report, the Security Council shall meet informally, normally at the expert level, to review the findings and recommendations contained in the report.

Procurement channel approval

8. The Security Council shall review and take action on proposals by Member States and international organizations to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and paragraph 6 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The process shall be as follows:

- (a) Member States shall submit proposals directly to the Security Council;
- (b) The Security Council shall immediately forward such proposals to the Joint Commission Coordinator for the Joint Commission's review;
- (c) The Joint Commission, following the procedures specified in annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as any further procedure developed by consensus, shall provide a recommendation to the Security Council;
- (d) After five working days following receipt by the Security Council of such a recommendation, that recommendation shall be deemed to be approved by the Council unless the Council has adopted a resolution to reject it;
- (e) The Security Council shall notify the proposing State of its decision.

9. Once the Security Council receives a recommendation from the Joint Commission, any Council member may request a vote of the Council to reject that recommendation. If a vote is requested, then the Council member requesting the vote should explain why it believes that the recommendation should be rejected. The member may also request an informal meeting of the Council to discuss the matter further. Any resolution to reject a recommendation from the Joint Commission must be adopted within five working days following receipt of the recommendation, or else the recommendation shall be deemed to be approved.

10. The Security Council shall strive to take other actions related to the present functions, including responding to enquiries, providing guidance and examining and taking appropriate action on information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the relevant restrictions, by consensus.

11. The members of the Security Council shall treat as confidential documents created by, transmitted to or sent from the Council under the present arrangements and procedures.

12. Communications submitted to the Security Council under the procedure specified in paragraph 8 of the present note shall not be considered as official documents of the Council.

13. The Security Council shall coordinate closely with the Joint Commission on all tasks of the Council related to the nuclear-related restrictions imposed in resolution 2231 (2015). The Council further notes that exporting States are requested to cooperate with the Joint Commission in accordance with annex IV of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Joint Commission documents

Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)

24 12 2015

Decision of the Joint Commission Established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

In furtherance of implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA, Iran has developed a plan to transfer its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) partially fabricated fuel plates and enriched targets out of Iran as well as provide for their return for future use. Iran shared this plan with the Joint Commission, and the Joint Commission considered and approved the plan in accordance with the parameters below, under its authority in consulting and providing guidance on implementation matters. This decision of the Joint Commission represents a common understanding of the scope of the relevant commitments of the JCPOA.

1. Iran will transfer out of Iran prior to Implementation Day all partially fabricated TRR fuel plates containing near-20% enriched uranium oxide mixed with aluminum and all near-20% enriched uranium oxide in the form of “mini-plates” for enriched targets, based on a commercial transaction in exchange for an agreed amount of natural uranium. Iran will repay the value of the natural uranium on a pro-rata basis. Such partially fabricated TRR fuel plates and “mini-plates” for enriched targets will be returned to Iran for future use, in increments no greater than 5 kg U3O8, to be used exclusively for fabrication of finished fuel elements for the TRR and enriched uranium targets for the TRR, beginning when Iran informs the IAEA of its readiness to receive these materials and thereafter upon IAEA verification that Iran has fabricated the previous increment into finished fuel elements or targets for the TRR and that finished fuel elements and targets in Iran have been tested as provided in paragraph 2 below. The IAEA is requested to undertake such verification and to notify the Joint Commission of the JCPOA and in parallel state parties involved in such return transactions when the conditions described in this paragraph and paragraph 2 have been met. Iran may request the return of the first 5kg increment of partially fabricated fuel plates and enriched targets to Iran immediately following Implementation Day.
2. Iran will conduct testing on all fabricated fresh TRR fuel elements by irradiating such elements prior to Implementation Day to achieve a level of at least 1 rem/hour (at one meter in air). Thereafter, Iran will conduct testing by irradiation as necessary such that all TRR fuel elements in Iran will measure no less than 1 rem/hour (at one meter in air) at all times until fifteen years after Implementation Day. Any enriched uranium targets imported by Iran or fabricated by Iran will be fully irradiated. Such irradiation of fuel elements and targets, and the transfer outside of Iran of any new scrap not in fuel plates, is to be completed prior to or simultaneous to the provision of an additional 5 kg increment of near-20% enriched uranium in any form.
3. Iran’s commitment not to build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back to UF6 includes the construction or operation of any component of a recovery line.

06 01 2016

Decision of the Joint Commission Established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Iran briefed the Joint Commission on its plan regarding certain enriched uranium materials, in accordance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Joint Commission has considered and approved the plan in accordance with the parameters below, under its authority in consulting and providing guidance on implementation matters. This decision of the Joint Commission represents a common understanding of the scope of the relevant commitments of the JCPOA.

1. All current low-level solid waste contaminated with low-enriched uranium (LEU) and future equivalent solid waste, which is deemed unrecoverable, is not part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA provided that Iran does not build or operate any facility or part of a facility capable of recovering LEU from solid waste for 15 years. Iran will store under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards such low-level solid waste contaminated with LEU.
2. All current low-level liquid and sludge waste contaminated with LEU up to 3.67 percent and future equivalent liquid and sludge waste, which is deemed unrecoverable, is not part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA provided that Iran does not build or operate any facility or part of a facility capable of recovering LEU from liquid and sludge waste for 15 years. Iran will store under IAEA safeguards low-level liquid and sludge waste containing uranium enriched up to 3.67 percent and may stabilize these wastes for long-term storage as a solid using a stabilization process that does not separate uranium from the waste.
3. The near-20-percent enriched uranium of laboratory contamination, which is at facilities that have been previously declared to the IAEA for processing of near-20 percent enriched uranium, is deemed unrecoverable and therefore is not part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA.
4. Prior to Implementation Day, Iran will process an amount of depleted uranium through the process equipment—which was used to convert near- 20-percent enriched uranium hexafluoride to uranium oxide—to dilute the enriched uranium held up within the process equipment, such amount calculated to result in an enrichment level of 3.67 percent or less. The resulting hold up is deemed unrecoverable.
5. Iran will retain laboratory standards, check sources, and samples collected for use in connection with IAEA safeguards activities, including device calibration, that contain no more than six kilograms of uranium enriched up to 5 percent. Iran will also retain laboratory standards, check sources, and samples collected for use in connection with IAEA safeguards activities, including device calibration, that contain no more than one kilogram of near-20-percent enriched uranium. These standards, check sources, and samples do not count against Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA.

14 01 2016

Decision of the Joint Commission Established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Iran raised with the Joint Commission its request to continue to operate after Implementation day the hot cells with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in the JCPOA. The Joint Commission considered and approved the operation of the following hot cells, subject to ongoing IAEA verification of the uses set forth below:

1. Two hot cells, each 2.41 by 1.84 by 3.63 meters, with no interconnection, collocated with the Tehran Research Reactor facility (TRR), which have been operated under the IAEA monitoring and declared to the IAEA under IRA DIQ (Design information questionnaire), used exclusively for the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and nondestructive Post Irradiation Examination (PIE).
2. Three interconnected hot cells, each 3.40 by 2.74 by 5.0 meters, collocated with the Tehran radio-medicine production complex, which have been operated under IAEA monitoring and declared to the IAEA under IRJ DIQ, used exclusively for the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE.
3. Six interconnected shielded cells, each 1.92 by 2.4 by 2.5 meters, collocated with the Tehran radio-medicine production complex, used exclusively for the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes.
4. Eight interconnected shielded cells, each 1.7 by 2.0 by 2.7 meters, collocated with the Karaj radio-medicine production complex, used exclusively for the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes.

14 01 2016

Decision of the Joint Commission Established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The Joint Commission has considered procedures to govern its activities with respect to the Procurement Channel, and under its authority in consulting and providing guidance on implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has approved the following attached documents with the understanding that these documents may be reviewed, if the need arises:

- Practical arrangements for the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for matters relating to the Procurement Channel
- Optional Application Form
- Explanatory Note: Optional Application Form
- Optional End-Use Certification
- Explanatory Note: Optional End-Use Certification
- Information on the Procurement Channel

The Joint Commission requests the Coordinator to make the following documents publically available, including through forwarding these to the United Nations for publication on the UN website.

- Optional Application Form
- Explanatory Note: Optional Application Form
- Optional End-Use Certification
- Explanatory Note: Optional End-Use Certification
- Information on the Procurement Channel
- Statement on Confidentiality in the Procurement Working Group and the Joint Commission for matters relating to the Procurement Channel

Revised February 2019

Information on the Procurement Channel

The Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission has provided this document to give practical information to States on the Procurement Channel. Further details can be found in UN Security Council [resolution 2231 \(2015\)](#) and Annex IV of the [JCPOA](#).

The Procurement Channel reviews proposals by States seeking to participate in or permit certain transfers of nuclear or dual-use goods, technology, and/ or related services to Iran. States submit proposals to the United Nations Security Council. The Joint Commission will then assess the application and provide a recommendation to the Security Council. The Security Council will decide on the basis of this recommendation and inform the State about its decision. States may wish to use this [form](#) to provide all relevant information and will need end-use certification by the appropriate Iranian authority (see model [end-use certification](#)).

Contact information for enquiries:

Security Council: SC-Resolution2231@un.org

Joint Commission/Procurement Working Group: PWG-enquire@eeas.europa.eu

A. General outline of the Procurement Channel

1. What is the Procurement Channel?

United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) requires States to obtain prior approval from the Council for certain specified activities with Iran. The Procurement Channel was established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and endorsed by the resolution as the mechanism to review proposals by States seeking to engage in these activities with Iran for nuclear and non-nuclear civilian end-uses.

Proposals should be submitted to the UN Security Council. The Security Council will forward proposals to the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, which is comprised of China, France, Germany, Iran, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Procurement Working Group will review proposals within a specified timeline and submit a recommendation on behalf of the Joint Commission to the Security Council for its final review and decision. The Security Council will then notify the proposing State whether its request has been approved or disapproved.

2. What does the Procurement Channel cover?

The procurement channel generally covers:

(1) The supply, sale or transfer of nuclear and dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology (set out in [INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1](#) and [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2](#)^{1} for nuclear and non-nuclear civilian end-uses, as well as any further items if the relevant State determines that they could contribute to activities inconsistent with the JCPOA).*

(2) The provision to Iran of assistance or services related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use of nuclear and dual-use goods (e.g. technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering).

(3) The acquisition by Iran of an interest in certain commercial nuclear-related activity in another State and related investments.

See Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and paragraph 6.1 of Annex IV of the JCPOA for more detail.

3. Which nuclear related activities do not need to be reviewed by the Procurement Channel?

Under paragraph 2 of Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), approval in advance by the Security Council shall not be required for:

A. the supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and the provision of any related technical assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, that is directly related to

- The modification of the two cascades at Fordow facility for stable isotope production*
- the export of Iran's enriched uranium in excess of 300kg in return for natural uranium*
- the modernisation of the Arak reactor based on the agreed design*

Provided that specific requirements are met: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; (b) they notify the Security Council and Joint Commission ten days in advance of such activities; (c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the referenced INFCIRC have been met; (d) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; (e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the referenced INFCIRCs, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfers.

¹ *Or the most recent versions of these documents as updated by the Security Council; this reference applies to all further "*" within this document.

B. the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of:

- equipment covered by Section B.1 of [INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1](#) when such equipment is for light water reactors;
- low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 of [INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1](#) when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors; as well as
- items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in [INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2](#) only when for exclusive use in light water reactors.

Provided that specific requirements are met: (a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the referenced INFCIRCs have been met; (b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; (c) they notify the Security Council within ten days of the supply, sale, or transfer; and (d) in the case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the referenced INFCIRCs, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer.

4. How do States submit a proposal under the Procurement Channel?

States are encouraged to send proposals by email to SC-Resolution2231@un.org. States may use the model [application form](#) that includes all necessary supporting information as specified by United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and Annex IV of the JCPOA. Additional information on how to fill out this form is available [here](#). It is helpful to submit the proposals in a machine readable format as this is likely to speed up the review process.

5. Can private entities, such as exporters or providers of technical assistance, submit a proposal or engage directly with the Security Council or Joint Commission?

The Procurement Working Group will endeavour to respond to requests for guidance from third parties. Private entities are encouraged to contact their national authorities first. Private entities cannot directly submit proposals or engage with the Security Council. Exporters and providers of technical assistance will need to apply to the competent national authority for the relevant authorisation, in accordance with their national legislation. The Security Council will not respond to inquiries received directly from companies or individuals.

6. What information is required in a proposal?

The necessary supporting information for a proposal is defined in paragraph 6.4.2 of Annex IV of the JCPOA. It includes:

- (a) a description of the item;*
- (b) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the exporting entity;*
- (c) the name address, telephone number, and email address of the importing entity;*

- (d) a statement of the proposed end-use and end-use location, along with an end-use certification signed by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) or the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade of Iran attesting to the stated end-use;*
- (e) export license number, if available;*
- (f) contract date, if available; and*
- (g) details on transportation, if available.*

If the information (e), (f) and (g) is not available when a proposal is submitted to the Security Council, it must be provided by the proposing State as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item.

Using the application form will help States to provide all necessary information. In addition, States may provide as much information and technical detail as they consider relevant. Particular attention should be given to the description of the item, which should allow for a proper understanding of the item in question (see question 19 below).

The proposing State may provide additional information while a proposal is being reviewed.

7. What happens if the proposal is incomplete?

Incomplete proposals will likely be disapproved due to the lack of sufficient information.

8. Can disapproved proposals be resubmitted?

Yes - if States resubmit disapproved proposals, they should include the original reference number assigned by the United Nations. It would be helpful to provide an explanation of the changes and amendments made.

The Procurement Working Group may provide information regarding a disapproval that would help any future submissions.

9. In what language can proposals be submitted?

Proposals should be submitted to the Security Council in any of the six official languages of the United Nations. If needed, documents will then be translated by the United Nations Secretariat. This will be done before the beginning of the review period in the Joint Commission.

10. How are proposals decided? How long will the review process take?

After receiving a proposal, the Security Council will consult the Joint Commission. The Procurement Working Group has 20 working days (extendable to 30 working days) to make a recommendation. Approvals will be based on consensus. At least two members of the Procurement Working Group may refer recommendations to disapprove to the Joint Commission for review within five working days. The Joint Commission will make a decision whether to approve the proposal by consensus within 10 working days.

Based on the Joint Commission's recommendation the Security Council will either approve or disapprove a proposal submitted by a State within five working days. The Security Council will notify the proposing State of the outcome of the review.

11. What if there are changes to the proposed activity during the review process?

States may need to resubmit the proposal if there are changes concerning any of the necessary supporting information as defined in Paragraph 6.4.2 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in particular (a) description of the item (including changes of the quantity); (b) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the exporting entity; (c) the name address, telephone number, and email address of the importing entity; or (d) a statement of the proposed end-use and end-use location, along with an end-use certification signed by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) or the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade of Iran attesting the stated end-use.

If the change concerns (e) export license number; (f) contract date; or (g) details on transportation, States do not need to resubmit the proposal, but should provide the Security Council with the updated information..

12. What happens after approval by the Security Council?

When notifying a proposing State of an approval, the Security Council will provide a letter of approval for the activity in question and assign the reference number. This certification can be used by the entities involved in the transaction as an accompanying document for the shipment of the items in question and be presented to national authorities.

13. How is the confidentiality of proposals treated?

The operation of the procurement channel is subject to the confidentiality of the UN. In addition to the confidentiality of the UN, the Procurement Working Group abides by the "Statement on Confidentiality in the Procurement Working Group and the Joint Commission for matters relating to the Procurement Channel".

B. Further questions and answers

14. Which State is responsible for submitting the proposal? What happens if more than one State is involved in the transaction?

The first State seeking to engage in a transfer requiring approval by the Security Council should submit the proposal. If the Security Council approves the proposed transfer, activities, such as financial, transportation, and insurance transactions directly related to the approved transfer that are consistent with UNSC resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA may also be considered approved for that transfer. Information on these activities must be provided by the State to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any event as a condition of approval before the activity taking place. States would need to submit a new proposal for any additional items not identified in the original proposal. Any State that has questions may contact the Security Council for guidance.

For an activity involving several States, there are optional fields in the application form for the State submitting the proposal to identify other entities involved in the transaction. In such circumstances, approval of the proposal identifying such other entities is sufficient to provide approval for the participation of such other entities (and there need not be a separate proposal).

15. Can a proposal cover multiple activities?

A proposal can cover multiple activities, such as the supply of several goods or the supply of goods together with related services. States are to submit national applications that cover all possible activities and related services (e.g. exports and related maintenance services). If the Security Council approves the proposed transfer, activities, such as financial, transportation, and insurance transactions directly related to the approved transfer that are consistent with UNSC resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA may also be considered approved for that transfer. Information on these activities must be provided by the State to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any event as a condition of approval before the activity taking place. States would need to submit a new proposal for any additional items not identified in the original proposal. Any State that has questions may contact the Security Council for guidance.

16. Can a proposal cover more than one item?

A proposal can cover several items. Separate sheets with a description of the additional items should be attached to the application form. A decision will be taken on the application as a whole.

17. Where can I find more information on the items in question? Where are INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2*?

The list of nuclear goods and technology (INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1) can be found [here](#) and the list of dual-use goods and technology (INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2) can be found [here](#). States are encouraged to check the items in question against these lists and provide the accurate control list entry. States should provide relevant information/documentation to support the classification.

18. Can a proposal include items which are set out in S/2015/546 as well as in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2*?

A proposal may include items which fall both under S/2015/546, as well as one of the INFCIRCS. Such a proposal should be submitted for review as an activity falling under Paragraph 2 of Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council will decide on such proposals based on a recommendation of the Joint Commission.

19. What technical information about the item is required?

States are encouraged to provide the relevant entry in [INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1](#) and [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2](#), if applicable. States should provide relevant information/documentation, including the relevant technical parameters, to support the classification.*

Additional technical specifications, such as a data sheet, product catalogue, diagram or picture may also be presented.

20. Which entities need to be included in the proposal?

Proposals must include the exporting entity, the importing entity and the end-user (if different from the importing entity). The exporting entity is the company or individual that enters into the contract with the Iranian counterpart. The importing entity is the entity in Iran importing the items or benefitting from related assistance or services. In many cases, this will be the end-user of the items or the recipient of the assistance or services in question. Additional entities involved in the transfer (e.g. agents, brokers, first consignees or freight handlers) should be provided on a separate sheet with an explanation of their respective roles in the transaction.

21. What should the statement of the proposed end-use and end-use location include?

The statement of proposed end-use should clarify whether the end-use will be for Iran's nuclear programme authorized by the JCPOA or a civilian non-nuclear end-use. If the end-use is for a nuclear purpose, the proposal will also be shared with the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA). It should also clarify the purpose for which the item(s) will be used. The end-use location is the location where the item is actually used or consumed. Its description should include an address, which may be different from the head office of the end-user.

22. What are the requirements of the guidelines set out in the INFCIRCs?

For transfers of nuclear goods as set out in [INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1*](#) this includes in particular the requirements set out in paragraph 9, controls on retransfers, of the guidelines for nuclear transfers.

For transfers of dual-use goods as set out in [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2*](#) this includes in particular the requirements set out in paragraph 7, consent rights over retransfers, of the guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology.

These requirements can be met by including relevant information in the end-user certification.

23. What information should be provided on end-use verification?

Proposing States should confirm that they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and location of end-use as required by paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC resolution 2231 (2015).

The proposing State may provide further information on the intended measures to verify the end-use

24. Who provides an end-use certification?

If goods and services are for Iran's nuclear programme as set out by the JCPOA, the end-use certification needs to be signed by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI). For non-nuclear civilian end-use, the end-use certification needs to be signed by the [Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade of Iran](#). The end-use certification should attest the stated end-use.

The end-use certification needs to be issued by the appropriate authority of Iran (see above). A model end-use certification for the purpose of the procurement channel can be found [here](#) and an explanatory note can be found [here](#).

25. What is the procedure regarding proposals for activities pursuant to paragraph 2 of Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) in cases where the goods in question are intended to remain in Iran only for a certain period of time and subsequently leave Iran?

Proposals for activities pursuant to paragraph 2 of Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) in cases where the goods in question are intended to remain in Iran only for a certain period of time and, subsequently, leave Iran, will follow the established procedure within the Procurement Channel, including an end-use certification signed by the designated national authority in Iran.

The Participants of the Procurement Working Group will endeavor to expedite and facilitate the process of providing a recommendation on proposals on temporary exports for demonstration or display in an exhibition. The proposing State may be contacted to provide information on the temporary nature of the export to Iran.

Statement on Confidentiality
in the Procurement Working Group
and the Joint Commission
for matters relating to the Procurement Channel

1. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) provides that the Procurement Working Group (PWG), as laid out in Section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, is “subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN.”
2. Each JCPOA Participant will take the necessary steps, including physical security arrangements as appropriate, in accordance with this Statement and their respective laws and regulations, to prevent the unauthorised disclosure of PWG information in proposals submitted for transfers and activities, as specified in paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including the necessary supporting information and any additional information (collectively, “the above-mentioned information”).
3. JCPOA Participants will not take commercial advantage of and will respect proprietary rights associated with the above-mentioned information.
4. The Coordinator will mark as “PWG in Confidence” the transmission of any information submitted to the Joint Commission that is covered by paragraph 2 prior to further transmitting it to JCPOA Participants.
5. Nothing in these general principles limits the extent to which the above-mentioned information may be protected under a JCPOA Participant’s laws, regulations, or procedures.

5 December 2015

Practical arrangements for the Procurement Working Group and the Joint Commission for matters relating to the Procurement Channel

A. General

1. The Procurement Working Group will provide a forum for discussion among the E3/EU+3 and Iran to address and make decisions with regard to questions and issues regarding the implementation of the procurement channel.
2. Except as decided otherwise, meetings of the Procurement Working Group will be held in Vienna.
3. Except as decided otherwise, the Procurement Working Group will meet every three weeks. The date and time of meetings will be determined by the Coordinator in consultation with the participants of the Procurement Working Group.
4. The working language of the Procurement Working Group and of the Joint Commission when dealing with matters relating to the procurement channel as set out in Section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA will be English.
5. The meetings of the Procurement Working Group may include a part to which the IAEA will be invited to participate as an observer.
6. For procurements for Iran's nuclear programme, the AEOI will sign the end-use certification. For procurements for a non-nuclear civilian end-use, the appropriate authority as specified and duly made known to the Working Group by Iran will sign the end-use certification.

B. Review of proposals by the Procurement Working Group and the Joint Commission

1. Upon receipt of a proposal from the Security Council the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group will forward the proposal without delay (within one working day) to the participants of the Procurement Working Group and if the proposal relates to items, materials, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA also to the IAEA. At this point in time the period for consideration of the proposal begins.
2. When circulating proposals to the Procurement Working Group participants, the Coordinator will indicate the end-date and time of the 20 working day consideration period. Each participant of the Procurement Working Group will communicate to the Coordinator within this 20 working day period whether it approves or rejects a proposal or whether it requests an extension of the consideration period.
3. If at the end of the 20 working day period or before, the Coordinator has received approvals from all participants of the Procurement Working Group, the Coordinator will notify the Security Council of a positive recommendation of the Joint Commission without delay (within one working day). If the Coordinator has received at least one request for extension, the timeline for consideration will be extended by additional ten working days unless the Coordinator has received one or more disapprovals from participants of the Procurement Working Group. In this case the Coordinator will notify all Procurement Working Group participants of the new end-date and time of the consideration period. The Coordinator will also notify the Security Council of an extension of the timeline for consideration.

4. If at the end of the 30 working day period, the Coordinator has received no disapprovals, the Coordinator will notify the Security Council of a positive recommendation of the Joint Commission without delay (within one working day).
5. If at least one disapproval has been received at the end of the review period (20 or 30 working days if extended), the proposal may, at the request of at least two participants of the Procurement Working Group, be referred within 5 working days to the Joint Commission for review. The Coordinator will inform the working group participants until which date and time participants need to request a review. If at least two requests are received by this date and time, the Joint Commission review will take place within 10 working days and the proposal will be decided by consensus. The disapproving JCPOA participant(s) should provide relevant information regarding the disapproval to the Joint Commission as appropriate, taking into account the need to protect confidential information.
6. Approvals and disapprovals in the Procurement Working Group will be communicated by the participants of the Procurement Working Group to the Coordinator to be forwarded to the other participants of the Procurement Working Group.
7. The recommendation of approval or disapproval of the Joint Commission will be communicated by the Coordinator to the Security Council and in parallel to the JCPOA participants.
8. Participants of the Procurement Working Group may provide relevant information regarding a disapproval of a proposal, including questions relevant for a resubmission of a proposal, as appropriate, to the Coordinator. The Coordinator will compile all information and questions provided by the participants and forward them together with a negative recommendation of the Joint Commission to the Security Council to be forwarded to the proposing state.
9. The Joint Commission will only provide a recommendation of approval or disapproval to the Security Council. In cases where the E3+3 and Iran decide that the proposal does not relate to transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, the Coordinator could return the proposal to the Security Council without action.

C. Reporting

1. The Joint Commission will report to the Security Council every six months on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any further implementation issues.
2. The Coordinator will compile the report to the Security Council, containing a list of all proposals which have been submitted to the Joint Commission during this period as well as any proposals from previous periods which are still pending. This list should state whether proposals have been recommended for approval or disapproval by the Joint Commission and whether they have been reviewed by the Joint Commission. For proposals which are still pending, the list should state the status of consideration.
3. Any further issues may be included in the report by consensus of the participants of the procurement working group.

D. Guidance

1. The Procurement Working Group will formulate and update as required guidelines on the procurement channel, which will be provided to the Security Council for publication on the UN website.

2. The guidelines for proposing states will include among others, an outline of the procedure and timelines, an application form and end- use-certification together with explanatory notes and advice on practical considerations in the form of questions and answers.
3. The Procurement Working Group will endeavour to respond to requests for guidance from third parties, as communicated by the Coordinator, within 9 working days. Such communication will be shared with the Security Council. The Procurement Working Group could advise states, by consensus whether a proposal relates to transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1 of Annex IV of the JCPOA. It could also advise on the completeness of proposals. The Procurement Working Group will not give preliminary decisions on the approval or disapproval of proposals.

E. End-use verification

1. Under the JCPOA, Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 imported following the procedure under Section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA. Under UNSC Resolution 2231, the exporting state must have obtained and be in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use. How end-use verification is implemented needs to be agreed between the exporting state and Iran.
2. The modalities for end-use verification may be described in the application.
3. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.

*Revised September 2017***Optional Application Form¹**

(For activities falling under paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231 (2015))

1 State submitting the proposal: _____**2 Proposed activity** (according to paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231)

- 2 (a) supply, sale, or transfer directly, or indirectly from their territories,
or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or for the use or benefit of, Iran,
and whether or not originating in its territory, of:

Specify type of the above activity (if applicable):

items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.13. Part 1² ☐items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.10 Part 2³ ☐further items if the State determines that they could contribute to
reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities
inconsistent with the JCPOA ☐**2 (b) the provision to Iran of:**technical assistance or training ☐
financial assistance, investment, brokering ☐
or other services ☐

Specify type of the above activity (if applicable):

and the transfer of financial resources or services related to the:

supply, sale, or transfer ☐
manufacture ☐
use ☐

Specify type of the above activity (if applicable):

of the items, material, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above

¹ Proposals submitted by States to engage in certain activities with Iran in accordance with UNSC Res. 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are protected under the confidentiality procedure of the UN, per paragraph 3.4 of Annex IV of the JCPOA.

² Or the most recent version of this document as updated by the Security Council.

³ Or the most recent version of this document as updated by the Security Council.

- 2 (c) acquisition by Iran of an interest in a commercial activity involving uranium mining or production or use of nuclear materials or technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1, and such investment in territories under its jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them ☐

3 **Supporting information**

(*: The asterisk denotes necessary supporting information according to Annex IV of the JCPOA and requirements for the proposing State according to paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231. The provision of the other information is optional.)

- 3 (a) Description of the item*

Description*:

(For items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/ Rev.13. Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2) Control list number:

(For items, material, equipment, goods and technology other than those set out in INFCIRC/254/ Rev.13. Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2)
Reason for submission:

Technical documentation (supporting document) ☐

Quantity/weight (if applicable): _____

Currency and total value in the exporting State (if applicable): _____

Additional items (separate sheet): ☐

- 3 (b) Name, address, telephone number, and email address of the exporting entity (or entity providing related service)*

Name*	
Address*	
Telephone number*	
Email address*	
Website (if applicable)	

Name, address, telephone number, and email address of other entities involved provided on a separate sheet (if applicable): ☐

- 3 (c) Name, address, telephone number, and email address of the importing entity*

Name*	
Address*	
Telephone number*	
Email address*	
Website (if applicable)	

- 3 (d) Statement of proposed end-use and end-use location*

End-use for Iran's nuclear programme authorized by the JCPOA ☐

Non-nuclear civilian end-use ☐

Description of end-use:

End-use location of the item (or the item in which the item will be incorporated):
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End-use certification signed by the AEOI or the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade of Iran attesting the stated end-use* ☐

The proposing State will ensure that the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 have been met.* ☐

Name, address, telephone number, and email address of the end-user (if different from the importing entity)*:

Name*	
Address*	
Telephone number*	
Email address*	
Website (if applicable)	

- 3 (e) Export license number* _____
(if not available when the application is submitted, such information must be provided by the proposing State to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item).
- 3 (f) Contract date* _____
(if not available when the application is submitted, such information must be provided by the proposing State to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item).
- 3 (g) Details on transportation* (if not available when the application is submitted, such information must be provided by the proposing State to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item).

State of origin (if different from State submitting the proposal):

State of consignment from which goods are sent to Iran (if different from State submitting the proposal):

Other State(s) involved in the transaction (specify function):

Type of conveyance (e.g. ship, air, if applicable)

- 3 (h) End-use verification (in accordance with Section 6.8 of Annex IV of the JCPOA)

The proposing State has obtained and is in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of all items to be supplied to Iran* ☐

Details on end-use verification (if appropriate)

3 (i) Additional information (if applicable):

--

Additional information in separate document: ☐

4 Point of Contact

Name	
Address	
Telephone number	
Email address	

5 Date of Submission

--

Information on additional items involved in the transfer
(in addition to those listed under 3 above)

Description:

(For items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/ Rev.13. Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2) Control list number:

(For items, material, equipment, goods and technology other than those set out in INFCIRC/254/ Rev.13. Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2)
Reason for submission:

Technical documentation (supporting document) ☐

Quantity/weight (if applicable): _____

Currency and total value (in the exporting State): _____

Information on other entities involved (if applicable):

Name, address, telephone number, and email address of this entity

Name	
Address	
Telephone number	
Email address	
Website (if applicable)	
Function	

Name, address, telephone number, and email address of this entity

Name	
Address	
Telephone number	
Email address	
Website (if applicable)	
Function	

Name, address, telephone number, and email address of this entity

Name	
Address	
Telephone number	
Email address	
Website (if applicable)	
Function	

Explanatory Note: Optional Application Form

(For activities falling under paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231 (2015))

This form can be used by States to apply for permission for all activities falling under paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231 (2015). It is intended to help States to submit proposals which include all necessary supporting information as specified in Annex IV of the JCPOA.

1 State submitting the proposal

Name of the State submitting the proposal in order to allow proper attribution.

The first State seeking to engage in a transfer requiring approval by the Security Council should submit the proposal. If the Security Council approves the proposed transfer, activities, such as financial, transportation, and insurance transactions directly related to the approved transfer that are consistent with UNSC Res. 2231 and the JCPOA may also be considered approved for that transfer. Information on these activities must be provided by the State to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any event as a condition of approval before the activity taking place. States would need to submit a new proposal for any additional items not identified in the original proposal.

For an activity involving several States, there are optional fields (later in the form) for the State submitting the proposal to identify other entities involved in the transaction. In such circumstances, approval of the proposal identifying such other entities is sufficient to provide approval for the participation of such other entities (and there need not be a separate proposal).

2 Type of proposed activity

In this section, the proposing State should specify the activity or activities, as set out in paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231 (multiple entries possible).

- 2 (a) This section covers the activities set out in paragraph 2 (a) of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231, that are **the supply, sale, or transfer** of items to Iran.

If applicable the type of the activity can be specified in the box below.

Tick box: type of item, material, equipment and technology. Multiple entries are possible for proposals relating to items set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13. Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Rev.10. Part 2¹, or any further items (not covered by the INFCIRCS) if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy-water related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA.

- 2 (b) This section covers the activities set out in paragraph 2 (b) of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231, that are **services and assistance related** to the supply, sale, or transfer of items to Iran or the manufacture or use of such items in Iran.

¹ Or the most recent versions of these documents as updated by the Security Council.

Tick box: type of related services. Multiple entries are possible. If applicable the type of the activity can be specified in the box below (in particular if the box other services has been ticked).

Tick box: type of activity to which proposed service or assistance is related to. Multiple entries are possible.

- 2 (c) This section covers the activities set out in paragraph 2 (a) of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231, that is the **acquisition by Iran of an interest in a nuclear-related commercial activity**. The application form is primarily designed for activities falling under 2 (a) and 2 (b). For activities falling under 2 (c) some of the following supporting information may not be applicable. The proposing States should attach further information.

3 Supporting information

3 (a) Description of the goods/description of the related service

This entry should contain a clear description of the items to be exported. A description is part of the necessary supporting information.

The entry should allow for an understanding of the relevance of the item or the service for the procurement channel. The entry should neither be too general (e.g. "tools") nor be limited to product names. A detailed description could help to clarify why goods fall under the criteria of the respective entry on the control lists and verify whether the transaction is in line with the JCPOA.

For **proposals covering several items**, only the first item should be described in the section. A description of additional items needs to be provided on a separate sheet.

For items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/ Rev.13. Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2, the NSG **control list number** should be provided. It is also useful, for NSG States, to use the NSG control parameters to describe the characteristics of the items.

If the proposal relates to **further items** which are not set out in INFCIRC/254/ Rev.13. Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2, the proposing State could specify its reasons for submission to the procurement channel.

Technical documentation may be provided by proposing States. This will be useful for the assessment of the proposal.

Quantity/Weight (if applicable): Indication of quantity of items; the type of unit applicable should also be indicated (e.g. units, kilograms, etc.)

Currency and total value (if applicable): Information on the value of goods to be exported or value of services provided, together with the currency. This information is useful for the assessment of the proposal and can be provided in approximate form. The value should be given in the currency of the exporting State.

3 (b) **Exporting entity/entity providing related service**

Name and details of the entity exporting the items or providing the related services. This is part of the necessary supporting information.

Other involved entities (if different from exporting and importing entity, if applicable) should be provided on a separate sheet: entries should identify other parties involved in a transaction and specify their role, e.g. agents, brokers, first consignees, freight forwarders etc. In order to avoid duplications and in order to get an immediate understanding of the proposal, it will be helpful to have explanations on the key entities involved in the transaction.

3 (c) **Importing entity in Iran / Iranian entity to which related services are provided to**

Name and details of the entity in Iran importing the items or benefitting from related services. This is part of the necessary supporting information. In many cases this will be the end-user of the items in question. If not, the name and details of the end-user need to be provided under 3 (d).

3 (d) **Statement of the proposed end-use and end-use location**

A statement of the proposed end-use and end-use location is part of the necessary supporting information.

The **tick-box** (End-use for Iran's **nuclear** programme authorized by the JCPOA/**Non-nuclear** civilian end-use): If the end-use is for a nuclear purpose as certified by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group will send the application to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (in addition to the Procurement Working Group).

The **description of the proposed end-use** should clarify the purpose for which the item(s) will be used by the end-user. The description should allow an assessment of the proposal without being overly technical. The description should correspond with the description in the end-use document.

End-use location: The entry should contain information on where the item in question will be used (details of location). If the good is being exported for incorporation into another product by the end user, information on that product should be provided instead.

End-use certification signed by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) or the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade of Iran attesting to stated end-use to be attached to proposal.

Guidelines in the INFCIRC: With this tick box the proposing State confirms that the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in INFCIRC/254/ Rev.13/ Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 have been met. This relates in particular to guidelines on re-sale, re-transfer, and re-export.

If different from the importing entity, name and details of the **end-user** need to be provided.

3 (e) **National export licence or reference number (if applicable):**

National export licence or reference number linked with the Country Code in order to allow proper attribution for State submitting the proposal.

If not available as of the time of submittal of the proposal, such information must be provided by the proposing State to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item. If the national reference number was provided in the original application and if the proposing State notifies the Security Council that the national processing number is identical with the final export licence number, this information does not need to be submitted again. If the proposal is approved prior to receipt of this information, the Security Council should note in its letter to the exporting State, that this information is required to be submitted prior to shipment, as specified in Annex IV, section 6.4.2 of the JCPOA.

3 (f) **Contract date**

Date when the contract was concluded (if applicable).

If not available as of the time of submittal of the proposal, such information must be provided by the proposing State to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item. If the proposal is approved prior to receipt of this information, the Security Council should note in its letter to the exporting State, that this information is required to be submitted prior to shipment, as specified in Annex IV, section 6.4.2 of the JCPOA.

3 (g) **Details on transportation**

Details on transportation will in many cases not be available when a proposal is submitted to the Security Council. If not available as of the time of submittal of the proposal, such information must be provided by the proposing State to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item. If the proposal is approved prior to receipt of this information, the Security Council should note in its letter to the exporting State, that this information is required to be submitted prior to shipment, as specified in Annex IV, section 6.4.2 of the JCPOA.

The following fields are meant to provide more guidance on the kind of information needed for the Procurement Working Group to understand the movement of the items. The information can also help to identify possible duplications of proposals. In the case of a technology or software transfer, transportation details may not be relevant.

State of origin (if different from state submitting the proposal): State from which the items are originating.

State of consignment from which goods are sent to Iran (if different from State submitting the proposal): State from which the items will be shipped to Iran.

Other States involved in the transaction (please provide explanation/function): Possibility to provide more information on the transportation route if deemed necessary.

Type of conveyance (e. g. ship, air, rail, truck).

As indicated in the explanations under 3(c), the name of the freight forwarder or shipping agent should be provided on a separate sheet.

3 (h) End-use verification

Tick box end-use verification: With this tick box the proposing State confirms to have obtained and be in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of all items to be supplied to Iran.

It will be helpful if the proposing State provides further information on the measures agreed to with Iran and the recipient company to verify the end-use.

3 (i) Additional information

The proposing State may provide additional information to support the consideration of the proposal.

4 Date of Submission

Date of submission of the proposal.

5 Point of contact

Important for the administration of the proposal, including – if appropriate – for obtaining further information on the proposal. This should be the appropriate authority of the proposing State, which has submitted the proposal.



Revised September 2017

Official headed paper of the authority of Iran

OPTIONAL END-USE CERTIFICATION¹
for presentation to the export control authorities
of [EXPORTING STATE] and the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the JCPOA

Section A – Parties

Consignee (name, address website and contact details)
End-user (name, address, website and contact details), if different from consignee
Exporting entity/supplier (name, address and contact details)

Section B – Items (goods, software or technology)

Description of the items (goods, software or technology)
Quantity/Weight (in case of technology not applicable)

Section C – End-use/Purpose of the items

Purpose of the items (goods, software or technology). Please specify:
a. Goods will be used in the form received and will not be re-exported, re-transferred, or further distributed without prior consent from the exporting State <input type="checkbox"/> .
b. Goods will be incorporated into the following products: _____ and will not be re-exported, re-transferred, or further distributed without prior consent from the exporting State <input type="checkbox"/> .
c. Goods or incorporated goods are to be re-sold, re-exported, or further distributed to the following end users _____ for the following end products _____ <input type="checkbox"/> .
d. goods are for temporary export to Iran for the purpose of a trade fair or demonstration sponsored by: _____ to be held on date: _____, without any Iranian entity taking permanent possession of the goods <input type="checkbox"/> .
- if the items (goods, software or technology) are to be incorporated into or used for the development, production, use or repair of another item please describe that item, its purpose and end-user:

¹ Proposals submitted by States to engage in certain activities with Iran in accordance with UNSC Res. 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are protected under the confidentiality procedure of the UN, per paragraph 3.4 of Annex IV of the JCPOA.

Section D – End-use location

Specification of the end-use location

Section E – Certification of the end-user undertaking by the end-user

The stated end-use (Section C) and end-use location (Section D) is hereby attested.

The end-user will not use the above-mentioned items and any replica thereof (or, in the case of technology any derived items) in the storing, processing, producing and developing of, or in any other way related to, weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems or any use other than we declared above.

The end-user will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of the above-mentioned items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part2.

Place, Date

Original signature

Official seal (if applicable)

Name and title of signer in block letters

Section F – Certification of the end-user undertaking by the appropriate authority of Iran

This is to certify that the above-mentioned items and any replica thereof (in case of technology also derived goods) will be used for:

- Iran's nuclear programme as set out in the JCPOA ☐
- a non-nuclear civil end-use consistent with the JCPOA ☐

The stated end-use (Section C) by the importing entity and end-use location (Section D) is hereby attested.

Iran will not use the above-mentioned items and any replica thereof (or, in the case of technology any derived items) in the storing, processing, producing and developing of, or in any other way related to, weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems or any use other than we declared above.

Iran will not retransfer the above-mentioned items within Iran without prior consent from the exporting State. Iran will meet the requirements of the guidelines as set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2.

Iran will permit the exporting State to verify the end-use of the above-mentioned items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part2.

Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1.

Place, Date

Original signature

Official seal

Name and title of signer in block letters

Explanatory Note: Optional End-Use Certification (EUC)
(For activities falling under paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231 (2015))

This form can be used by States to assess and obtain certification of the end-use for all activities falling under paragraph 2 of Annex B of UNSC Res. 2231 (2015). An end use certificate is among the necessary supporting information that is to be included with a proposal.

I. General Information

To facilitate timely consideration of the proposal, it is important that the proposing State provide a correct and complete EUC. An incorrect or incomplete EUC might lead to an incomplete proposal, which is likely to result in the proposal being delayed or denied.

The EUC needs to be signed and dated by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) for procurements for Iran's nuclear programme and the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade of Iran for procurements for a non-nuclear civilian end-use. 'Digital' signatures are not acceptable. All sections of the EUC should be completed legibly.

Be mindful of references to any unfamiliar abbreviations or acronyms particularly those referring to Consignees or End-Users. To avoid a delay or denial of your proposal, acronyms should be spelled out in full.

II. Guidance regarding the EUC

This sample EUC form encompasses 6 sections (A to F). The following headings deal with each section individually and offer a detailed explanation regarding all elements of each section.

Please be aware: the EUC form must be printed on an official headed paper of the Iranian authority, as noted in the upper left side of the EUC form.

1. Section A – Parties

- **Consignee:** The Consignee is the first recipient of the items, who can wield direct or indirect influence on the items. In certain cases, there might also be several Consignees. **In this case all Consignees must be named in the EUC.** A Consignee can also be the final End-User. Please note that a person/company, who/which only acts as a broker is not a Consignee.
- **End-User:** The final End-User is the entity, which consumes, uses, incorporates etc. the item. **The Consignee and the End-User can be identical.** In cases of identicalness please use the box Consignee solely.
- **Exporting entity/supplier:** The exporting entity/supplier is the contracting partner of the Consignee.

2. Section B – Items (Goods, software or technology)

a. General terms

- **Item:** The term item includes goods, software and technology. Software can be exported electronically (e.g. via email) or physically on a (mobile) data storage device (e.g. USB-stick).
- **Technology:** Technology encompasses documents, data, records etc. which can be used for the production of goods or production of parts of these goods or any developments or use of the aforementioned. Goods which will be produced with the assistance of the technology are referred to as derived goods.

b. Boxes of the section

- *Description of the item(s):* Please describe each item in as much detail as possible to enable a comprehensive technical evaluation.
- *Quantity/Weight:* These boxes must only be completed in cases of goods and software.

3. Section C – End-Use/Purpose of the item(s)

- *Purpose of the item(s):* Please describe the purpose of each item in as much detail as possible to enable a comprehensive technical evaluation especially regarding the intended end-use of the item.

Please be aware that this box is a vital element for the overall evaluation of the export. If the purpose is not clearly stated, this might lead to a denial of the proposal.

- *Tick-boxes re-transfer, incorporation of goods:* One (and only one) of the following four options for the purpose of the item should be selected: (a) Goods will be used in the form received and will not be re-exported, re-transferred or further distributed without prior consent of the exporting State, (b) Goods will be incorporated into specific products (to be specified) and will not be re-exported, re-transferred, or further distributed without prior consent of the exporting State, (c) Goods are to be re-sold, re-exported, or further distributed to specific end-users (to be specified) for specific end-products (to be specified), (d) Goods will be temporarily exported to Iran. These tick-boxes complement the above description on the purpose of the item(s).
- *In cases of incorporation of the item(s) or usage for the development, production, usage or repair of another item,* this item must be described in detail as well as the purpose and the respective End-User. Please note that this box is only to be completed, if the exported item(s) is (are) further used in the above specified way.

4. Section D – End-Use location

Please specify the exact *End-Use location* of the exported items. This location might differ from the address of the End-User (if different from the Consignee).

For example: Company X, with its central procurement office in city Y, buys the item but uses it in its production facility in city Z. In this case there is only one End-User (company X), but the End-Use location (city Z) differs from the order address (city Y).

Therefore please note: The End-Use location is the place where the item is actually used, consumed etc.

5. Section E – Certification of the end-user undertaking by the end-user

In this section the end-user attests the end-use/purpose of the item declared under section C and the end-use location declared under section D and permits the exporting State to verify the end-use of items set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2¹ which are to be imported following the procedure under Section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA.

All these statements and information must be signed by the end-user. This includes the mentioning of (1.) the place and date, (2.) the official seal (if applicable), (3.) the signature itself and (4.) the name and title of the signer in block letters.

6. Section F – Certification of the end-user undertaking by the appropriate authority of Iran

In this section the appropriate authority of Iran explicitly declares what the exported goods are going to be used for by checking one of the tick boxes. **Please be aware** that only one box can be ticked to have a valid EUC as these options are alternatives and cannot be present at the same time.

If goods and services are for Iran's nuclear programme as set out by the JCPOA, the end-use certification needs to be signed by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI). For non-nuclear civilian end-use, the end-use certification needs to be signed by the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade of Iran.

The appropriate authority of Iran confirms that the above mentioned items will not be retransferred in Iran without prior consent from the exporting State and that Iran will meet the requirements of the guidelines as set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part² 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2.

Furthermore, the appropriate authority of Iran attests the End-Use/Purpose of the item declared under Section C and the end-use location declared under Section D and permits the exporting

¹ Or the most recent version of this document as updated by the Security Council.

² Or the most recent version of this document as updated by the Security Council.

State to verify the End-Use of items set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 which are to be imported following the procedure under Section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA.

Iran will provide to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods, or technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev. 13/Part 1.

All these statements and information must be signed and verified by the appropriate authority of Iran. This includes the mentioning of (1.) the place and date, (2.) the official seal, (3.) the signature itself and (4.) the name and title of the signer in block letters.

14 01 2016

**Decision of the Joint Commission
Established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action**

Iran briefed the Joint Commission on its plan regarding excess heavy water, in accordance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Joint Commission has considered and approved the plan in accordance with the parameters below, under its authority in consulting and providing guidance on implementation matters. This decision of the Joint Commission represents a common understanding of the scope of the relevant commitments of the JCPOA.

1. Prior to Implementation Day, Iran will transfer out of Iran any heavy water in excess of 130 metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water or the equivalent in different enrichments. This material will remain outside Iran subject to verification by the IAEA and in anticipation of the expeditious sale and delivery to international buyers.

Procedure to determine the SWU attribution to the IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge types

I. General

1. This attachment outlines the procedure to determine the SWU attribution to the IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge types, as per Paragraph 55 of Annex I of the JCPOA.
2. The SWU per centrifuge in single cascade operation will be used to determine the installed enrichment capacity during years 11, 12 and 13 in accordance with Iran's enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
3. Measurements of the SWU will be performed for the IR-2m and IR-4:
 - a) Within 6 months before year ten for a small cascade of IR-4 centrifuges with no results to be communicated to the IAEA and Joint Commission.
 - b) In the beginning of year 11, once an IR-2m and/or IR-4 cascade has been installed, for cascade operation mode. The number of additional cascades will be based on this measurement.
 - c) During years 11, 12 and 13 every eight months cascade operation mode.
4. The SWU of the IR-1 is being assessed to be 1.0 kg U SWU per year per centrifuge based on historic experience.

II. Sets of measurements

1. Cascade measurements to obtain the SWU of IR-2m and IR-4 cascades will include two sets of measurements on the same cascade selected at random by the IAEA. Each set will consist of measurements at the declared nominal feed flow and at feed flow 15 per cent higher and 15 per cent lower than the nominal feed flow.
2. The final figure to be taken into account will be the arithmetic mean of the two cascade measurements at the declared nominal feed flow. This procedure to determine the SWU will be repeated if the IAEA deems this appropriate in order to resolve inconsistencies due to abnormal data.

III. Measurement procedure

Under full IAEA monitoring (as described in Section V):

1. Iran will operate all centrifuges at the nominal spinning frequency, feed, product and tails flow, temperature and internal settings as specified by Iran.
2. Iran will feed the cascade with UF₆ with the natural isotope abundance.

3. Each cascade measurement will begin after a lead time of 9 hours. During the lead time, the gas flow will be constant.
4. For a measurement time of 3 hours for cascade measurement, Iran will collect product and tail in appropriately sized containers with established tare weights and that are verified to be empty prior to use. All product and tails withdrawn from the cascade during the measurement period will be collected.
5. After the measurement time has elapsed, the collected product and tail samples will be weighed by Iran and the Agency.
6. Iran will homogenize the product and tail samples.
7. Iran will use half of the collected product and tail samples to determine the isotopic composition.
8. The Agency will use the other half of the collected product and tail samples to determine the isotopic composition at its laboratory.
9. The Agency will report back to Iran the results of the above measurements.

IV. Provision of information by Iran

1. Iran will provide to the Agency, before beginning of measurement, the nominal spinning frequency, the nominal feed, product and tail flows, temperature and the cascade configuration. The specified cascade configuration needs to be the cascade configuration used for production of enriched material.
2. Iran will provide the weight and isotopic concentration of the collected product and tail material within the DIQ to the Agency and the final averaged result for the IR-2m and IR-4 to the Joint Commission.

V. Verification measure of the Agency

1. Iran will provide access to the Agency to equipment and local measurement devices, as requested by the Agency, to enable the Agency to verify that Iran implements the agreed measurement procedure (as described in section III). In particular, the Agency will verify that:
 - a) Centrifuges are operated at nominal frequency, gas flow, temperature, the specified cascade configuration, and that all centrifuges are operating,

- b) All valves, the cascade configuration and operating status of all centrifuges, as declared, are set correctly,
- c) The feed material is UF₆ with the natural isotope abundance,
- d) The lead time is 9 hours and the measurement time is 3 hours for cascade measurements, and
- e) The feed flow does not vary during the lead time and the measurement time.

VI. Communication of results

1. The Agency will confirm to the Joint Commission that the weight and isotopic concentration of the collected product and tail provided by Iran in the DIQ is consistent with its own measurements.
2. If the Agency deems that the measurements provided by Iran are not consistent with its own measurements, it will raise the issue with Iran in order to resolve the inconsistency. In case this cannot be solved, the Agency will refer the issue to the Joint Commission.

VII. Calculation of the SWU

1. Based on the measurements, the SWU dU in Kg uranium per centrifuge and per year would be calculated according to the formula

$$dU = (31557600/tn) [PV(x_p) + TV(x_t) - FV(x_f)],$$

where $V(x) = (1 - 2x) \ln \left(\frac{1-x}{x} \right)$ and P is the mass of uranium in kg in the collected product, x_p is the isotopic concentration of the product (mole fraction), T is the mass of uranium in kg in the collected waste, x_t is the isotopic concentration of the waste, $F = P + T$ and x_f is the natural isotopic concentration, t is the measurement time in seconds and n is the number of centrifuges in a cascade.

Template for Describing Centrifuge Types

14 01 2016

Template for Describing Centrifuge Types: Explanatory Note

I. General

1. This attachment defines the template to be used for describing the different centrifuge types addressed in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as per Paragraph 54 of Annex I.
2. Iran will provide the numerical values and other information required to complete this template to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Joint Commission by Implementation Day.

II. Template, definitions, and tolerances

1. The attached table defines the numerical values and information required for the template, subject to the following definitions and tolerances.
2. As a fully developed and mature centrifuge design, and recognising that centrifuges are manufactured to precise specifications, the numerical information in the template for the IR-1 centrifuge is not subject to any further tolerance.
3. The following information provides further definition for selected design parameters listed in the template.
 - a) Rotor assembly length is the length of the assembled rotor from the top of the top rotor tube to the bottom of the bottom rotor tube.
 - b) Overall casing height is the height of the centrifuge machine from the top of the mounting block to the top of the casing upper flange, but exclusive of antennae or upper flange ports for instrument connection.
 - c) Casing outer diameter is the diameter of the centrifuge casing that is present over the majority of the centrifuge length.
 - d) Rotor tube length is the length of each rotor tube in the rotor assembly.
 - e) For rotor tube material of construction, Iran will provide the technical specifications (for composite material, ultimate tensile strength and specific modulus) or commercial manufacturer's product designator of the materials used for production of rotor tubes for each type of centrifuge.

- i. Iran will establish new locations at rotor tube manufacturing facilities solely for monitored storage of materials to be used for the manufacture of centrifuge rotors, for as long as paragraph 61 of Annex I of the JCPOA remains in effect, which will contain solely materials supplied in accordance with the procurement channel for as long as that procurement channel remains in effect.
- ii. The IAEA would maintain containment and surveillance at these storage locations.
- iii. For the materials to be used for centrifuge rotor manufacturing, the IAEA would verify the technical specifications of the materials prior to entering the monitored storage locations. When such materials are supplied in accordance with the procurement channel, such verification will be conducted outside Iran and the IAEA would maintain continuity of knowledge of these materials (e.g., through seals) until they enter the monitored storage locations. After the procurement channel is no longer in effect, for as long as paragraph 61 of Annex I of the JCPOA remains in effect, if such materials are received from an external supplier such verification will be conducted outside Iran and the IAEA would maintain continuity of knowledge of these materials (e.g., through seals) until they enter the monitored storage locations¹. Iran will arrange for such IAEA verification.
- iv. No materials would enter the monitored storage locations unless the IAEA has conducted verification of the technical specifications of the materials and maintained continuity of knowledge.
- v. The IAEA would verify that Iran only engages in manufacturing of centrifuge rotor tubes using the materials that are drawn from the above referenced dedicated monitored storage locations for as long as Paragraph 61 of Annex I of the JCPOA remains in effect, subject to the exception specified below.

¹ This is without prejudice to the exemptions specified in paragraph 2 of Annex B of the UNSCR 2231 of 20 July 2015.

- vi. Despite the readiness of supply, Iran may decide, consistent with the JCPOA, to manufacture centrifuge rotor tubes using its own materials of construction, provided that the IAEA has verified the technical specifications of these materials through sampling and maintained them under monitoring until their use in the manufacture of rotor tubes.
 - vii. The IAEA will report to the Joint Commission in case of any inconsistency of the materials used for the production of each type of centrifuge.
 - f) Estimated kg (U) SWU/y per centrifuge is an estimated range for the separative capacity of the centrifuge type when fully developed, in kilogram (uranium) separative work units per year per centrifuge.
 - g) For bellows material of construction, Iran will provide the material (metal or composite).
4. Numerical values in the template for all centrifuge types other than the IR-1 are subject to the following tolerances.
- a) For rotor assembly length, plus/minus 5 per cent of the specified value.
 - b) For rotor tube inner diameter, plus/minus 2 per cent of the specified value.
 - c) For overall casing height, plus/minus 10 per cent of the specified value.
 - d) For casing outer diameter, plus/minus 5 per cent of the specified value.

III. Changes to Template Information

For any deviation from the information for a centrifuge type in the completed template, a full presentation by Iran to, and approval by, the Joint Commission is needed.

Template Describing Centrifuge Types

	Design parameter	IR-1	IR-2m	IR-4	IR-5	IR-6	IR-6s	IR-7	IR-8
1	Rotor assembly length (mm)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	Rotor tube inner diameter (mm)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	Overall casing height (mm)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	Casing outer diameter (mm)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
5	Rotor tube material of construction	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
6	Number of bellows	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
7	Estimated kg (U) SWU/y per centrifuge	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
8	Rotor tube length (mm)	X	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
9	Bellows material of construction	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Explanation: X to be part of the template; O not to be part of the template

Sanctions Lifting

22 04 2016

Decision of the Joint Commission Established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Practical Arrangements for the Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting

A. General

1. The Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting will provide a forum for discussion among JCPOA participants to address questions and issues regarding the implementation of the sanctions lifting under the JCPOA, as described in paragraph B. The High Representative will serve as coordinator of this working group.
2. Except as decided otherwise, meetings of the Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting may be held in New York, Vienna or Geneva.
3. The date and time of meetings will be determined by the Coordinator in consultation with the participants of the Working Group on Sanctions Lifting. The agenda of each meeting will be distributed by the Coordinator among all participants at least 5 working days in advance.
4. The working language of the Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting will be English.

B. Review of issues by the Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting and the Joint Commission

1. Upon receipt of a notification from Iran that any other nuclear related sanction or restrictive measure including related designations of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in the JCPOA, the Coordinator of the Working Group will forward the notification without delay (within 1 working day) to the JCPOA participant concerned.
2. The JCPOA participant in question and Iran will consult with each other with a view to resolving the issue as soon as possible and within 30 working days. However, this resolution period can be extended through mutual consent by the JCPOA participant in question and Iran.
3. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or the JCPOA participant in question or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the Working Group.
4. The participants of the Working Group will review and consult, with a view to resolving the issue as soon as possible and within 30 working days.
5. If after involvement of the Working Group the issue remains unresolved, any participant of the JCPOA may refer it to the Joint Commission.

18 12 2016

**Decision of the Joint Commission
Established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action**

Iran briefed the Joint Commission on its plan, for irradiating low enriched uranium (LEU) at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) as specified below. The Joint Commission has considered and approved the plan in accordance with the parameters below, under its authority in consulting and providing guidance on implementation matters. This decision of the Joint Commission represents a common understanding of the scope of the relevant commitments of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

All LEU at an enrichment level of 3.67% or less in any form, such as fuel pellets, fuel pins, fuel elements, fuel assemblies, and targets or miniplates, tested or irradiated at the TRR, does not count against Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA, provided that such items have after irradiation a dose rate confirmed by the IAEA, through verification, of no less than 1.0 rem/hour (at one meter in air) at all times for 15 years from Implementation Day.

Enriched UO2 Powder Plant (EUPP)

10 01 2017

Decision of the Joint Commission Established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Iran briefed the Joint Commission on its plan, following the IAEA's safeguards-related nuclear material accountancy activities in the Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP). The Joint Commission has considered and approved the plan in accordance with the parameters below, under its authority in consulting and providing guidance on implementation matters. This decision of the Joint Commission represents a common understanding of the scope of the relevant commitments of the JCPOA.

1. Low enriched uranium (LEU) hold up in the EUPP equipment, which is deemed unrecoverable in accordance with the process described below, is not part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA provided that Iran does not build or operate any facility capable of recovering LEU from such hold up for 15 years starting from Implementation Day. If, in the future, Iran introduces enriched uranium into the EUPP equipment, the process described below may be used to deem future equivalent EUPP hold up in the portions specified in paragraph 2 as unrecoverable.
2. LEU hold up at the EUPP will be deemed unrecoverable once the IAEA verifies that Iran has fed depleted uranium through the portion of the EUPP equipment that converts uranyl fluoride solution to uranium dioxide and the scrap processing system until the output material from each portion is at the level of natural uranium or less. Any enriched uranium in the resulting output material does not count against Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA, provided that Iran downblends such material to the level of natural uranium or less within the timeframe specified below.
3. The estimated amount of enriched uranium in the EUPP equipment and the output material from the process described in paragraph 2 do not count against Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA while such process is ongoing, but for no more than 120 days from the start of the process.
4. The Joint Commission at experts' levels will engage with Iran's concerns about the enriched uranium stockpile, as defined in paragraph 56 of Annex I of the JCPOA.

**Resolution adopted by the
IAEA Board of Governors, 15
December 2015**

Board of Governors

GOV/2015/72

Date: 15 December 2015

Restricted Distribution

Original: English

For official use onlyItem 1 of the agenda
(GOV/2015/71)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action implementation and verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 15 December 2015

The Board of Governors.

- (a) Recalling all the resolutions and the decisions adopted by the Board on Iran's nuclear programme,
- (b) Recalling also the Board's decisions on the provisions of technical cooperation to Iran,
- (c) Recalling also the Director General's reports on this matter and taking note of his recent reports contained in GOV/2015/53, GOV/2015/54, and GOV/2015/68,
- (d) Reaffirming the need for all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply fully with their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as per Article IV of that treaty,
- (e) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran and to undertake the necessary nuclear-related monitoring and verification activities in Iran under the Joint Plan of Action agreed between E3/EU+3 and Iran on 24 November 2013,
- (f) Welcoming the conclusion on 14 July 2015 by E3/EU+3 and Iran of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) endorsed by the United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) on 20 July 2015, as well as the "Road-map for Clarification of Past and

Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Programme" agreed by the Agency and Iran on 14 July 2015, and contained in document GOV/INF/2015/14,

(g) Being guided by, inter-alia, the affirmation by the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015) that "conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue",

(h) Welcoming that all relevant participants have undertaken steps to fulfil their respective commitments under the JCPOA,

(i) Recognizing the long-term nature of the provisions of the JCPOA and their implications for the Agency,

(j) Mindful of Annex III of the JCPOA, setting the parameters for civil nuclear cooperation with Iran in the framework of the JCPOA, including through IAEA technical cooperation, where appropriate,

(k) Recalling its decision on 25 August 2015 to authorise the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices; and its decision to authorise the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission as set out in the report of the Director General contained in GOV/2015/53,

(l) Emphasizing the essential and independent role of the IAEA in verifying Iran's compliance with its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, including when provisionally applied, and in this context in providing credible assurance as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and underlining the IAEA's important role in verifying the full implementation of Iran's nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA,

(m) Welcoming Iran's reaffirmation in the JCPOA that it will under no circumstances ever seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and Iran's agreement that it will not engage in activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device,

1. Welcomes the commitments undertaken by Iran under the JCPOA, to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17 (b) of the Additional Protocol, seek its ratification within the time frame as detailed in Annex V of the JCPOA and fully implement modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement, communicated by Iran to the Director General of the IAEA on 18 October 2015;

2. Recalls that under United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) all provisions in the JCPOA are only for the purpose of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting a precedent for any other State or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and practices;

3. Affirms in this regard that the Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA should not be considered as setting a precedent for the IAEA's standard verification practices, and further affirms that it shall not be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter in any way the Agency's right and obligations to verify compliance by States with Safeguards Agreements and where appropriate Additional Protocols and to report to the Board as appropriate;

4. Requests the Director General to:

i) provide written reports before each regular quarterly Board meeting on Iran's implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and on matters relating to the verification and monitoring in Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) until the Board is no longer seized of the matter, and after that continue to provide written updates before each regular quarterly Board meeting on Iran's implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the full duration of those commitments, unless the Board decides otherwise;

ii) report, in this regard, in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) or the IAEA Statute, to the Board of Governors for appropriate action, and in parallel to the United Nations Security Council, at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern;

5. Supports the IAEA Secretariat in undertaking the activities provided for by United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA;

6. Also supports the Agency's consulting and exchanging information with the Joint Commission;

7. Urges all Member States to cooperate fully with the IAEA in its exercise of the tasks related to this resolution;

8. Notes the report of the Director General to the Board of Governors contained in GOV/2015/68, which, in line with the Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme, includes the final assessment of all past and present outstanding issues, as set out in the Director General's report in November 2011 contained in GOV/2011/65;

9. Also notes that all the activities in the Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule and further notes that this closes the Board's consideration of this item;

10. Reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the IAEA in implementing its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, including by providing access, reaffirms that such cooperation and implementation are essential for the IAEA to reach the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities and reaffirms also that Iran shall cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the IAEA in implementing its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA, including, inter alia, as set out in Annex 1, Section Q of the JCPOA and Annex 4, paragraph 6.7;

11. Decides that upon receipt by the Board of Governors of the Director General's report that the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of the Annex V of the JCPOA the provisions of its resolutions GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003), GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003), GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004), GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004), GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004), GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004), GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005), GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005), GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006), GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009), GOV/2011/69 (18 November 2011) and GOV/2012/50 (13 September 2012), shall be terminated, and also decides that the Board's decision on GOV/2007/7 and consequential decisions on the provision of technical cooperation for Iran, which were taken through the Agency's TACC based on GOV/2008/47/Add.3, GOV/2009/65, GOV/2011/58/Add.3, GOV/2013/49/Add.3 and GOV/2015/60/Add.3, shall be terminated;

12. Notes the importance of all relevant participants faithfully honouring their relevant undertakings and respective commitments under the JCPOA;

13. Decides upon receipt of the Director General's report that the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of the Annex V of the JCPOA to be no longer seized of the matter "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran" and to become seized of a separate agenda item covering JCPOA implementation and verification and monitoring in Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015);

14. Decides to remain seized of the matter until ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the Director General reports that the Agency has reached the Broader Conclusion for Iran, whichever is earlier.

Reports

Reports and Briefings by the Facilitator on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/reports-and-briefings-facilitator>



Reports of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/reports-secretary-general>



Reports of the Joint Commission to the UN Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/reports-joint-commission-established-jcpoa>



Reports by the IAEA Director General on the verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

<https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports>



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