



IMPETUS



MAGAZINE OF THE EU MILITARY STAFF, EEAS, BRUSSELS - WINTER 2021 ISSUE #31



20 YEAR ANNIVERSARY EDITION

EUMS: 20 YEARS CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Dear Reader,

We hope that you enjoy this special edition of IMPETUS that commemorates 20 years since the establishment of the European Union Military Staff. In this edition, we reminisce on the humble beginnings of the EUMS to its current position as the source of military expertise within the European External Action Service. This edition provides a brief tour of the EUMS past, through the perspectives of the former Directors General, on its 15 year anniversary, and future through the vision of the current incumbent, Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean. This edition provides an overview of our current military missions and operations, and welcomes the contributions of our strategic partners. We hope that you enjoy this edition, twenty years in the making. Thank you, the IMPETUS Team.

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
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EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS



Military Missions/Operations
Civilian Missions

7 ongoing military Missions/Operations

11 ongoing civilian Missions

Military and civilian working together utilising an Integrated Approach to make a meaningful contribution to European Security.

Objectives:
Peace-keeping, conflict prevention, strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, prevention of human trafficking and piracy.

¹This Mission is not managed within CSDP-structures, but its objectives are very similar to the other Missions, so we include it here

¹The Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell is a CSDP action which facilitates EU support to security and defence cooperation amongst G5 Sahel countries (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina-Faso, Niger and Chad).

FOREWORD

EUMS 20 year anniversary

BY HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY / VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, **MR JOSEP BORRELL FONTELLES**

Josep Borrell
Fontelles



Dear Reader,

As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), Europe's security is increasingly challenged by new and fast-evolving threats. The geopolitical landscape around us is be-

coming increasingly complex, as international crises unfold simultaneously and threats to our security become harder to identify and deal with.

The EU as a global security actor should be able to protect its citizens and uphold its values. For that, we urgently need to enhance our capacity to think and act in strategic terms. We must develop our strategic autonomy to navigate an increasingly multipolar and unstable world. The way forward is to combine our forces and strengthen both our capabilities and our will to act. I am convinced that this will make also us a better partner for the US and benefit NATO.

We do not start from scratch. The Balkan wars of the 1990s sparked an agenda to provide Europe with the military and civilian capabilities to deal with security crises. Within a handful of years, from the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998 to the launch of the first military mission in 2003, the foundations of what we now call the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were set up. This was complemented in the early 2000s by the establishment of the three entities that would become the cornerstones of this policy: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

Today, 20 years and 13 military missions and operations later, these entities have proven how useful they are for the EU's security and defence. Over 2,600 troops EU troops are currently deployed in the EU's seven military Operations and Missions, contributing to a more stable world and a safer Europe. We Europeans should be proud of this achievement.

Thanks to the EU Military Staff and the EU Military Committee, the EU has started to become a global security provider through peacekeeping, conflict prevention and crisis management. During these two decades, the EUMS has constantly helped to ensure the success of our military missions and operations, contributing to the enforcement of international law and providing security to EU citizens and allies around the world.

Over time, the evolving challenges and needs have required us to expand the tasks of the EUMS, which now include a broader intelligence function and a stronger role in the field

of capability development, cyber defence, or military training and education.

The establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) in 2017 as the permanent operational headquarters for non-executive missions has further enhanced the EU's capacity to react to a conflict or crisis. The MPCC is currently responsible for four training missions in Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic and Mozambique, a fact that highlights the EU's growing role as a strategic partner of choice in military capacity building.

However, we cannot be complacent. The Afghanistan crisis, coupled with the worrying developments in the Sahel or in our Eastern neighbourhood demonstrate that we must go further and faster. We need to enhance our capacity to detect, prevent and respond to threats; addressing key capability shortfalls, including transport and other strategic enablers; raising our level of readiness, for example through joint military training, live exercises or advanced planning.

More importantly, we should reinforce our capacity to act. The proposal for a Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5,000 troops would enable us to undertake rapid and robust action in crisis situations. Helping to secure an airport in challenging circumstances, as in Kabul, is an example of what we should be able to achieve by ourselves in the future.

That is where the Strategic Compass, which I just presented to Member States a few days ago, should make a difference. It offers a common assessment of the threats we face and sets out our ambitions for the next 10 years to build a more flexible, resilient and forward-looking EU security and defence policy.

I have no doubt that the EUMS will continue playing a pivotal role in strengthening the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. In that context, I congratulate the EUMS on 20 years in operation and I wish the EUMS continued success as it goes from strength to strength.



The European Union has never been more prepared to respond to CSDP Missions and Operations


BY VICE ADMIRAL **HERVÉ BLÉJEAN**, DIRECTOR GENERAL EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF /DIRECTOR MILITARY PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY

It is indeed an honour and a unique privilege to have the opportunity to write this introduction to this special edition of **IMPETUS** as we mark 20 years since the establishment of the European Union Military Staff. The publication of this edition approximately marks the mid-point of my appointment as Director General and so it is an opportune time to reflect on the events of the last 18 months and to check the course for the remainder of my appointment and beyond.

The range and complexity of the events that we have witnessed in this relatively short period underlines the importance of an agile and reactive EU Military Staff! When I reflect on the experiences of my predecessors, the EU Military Staff's ability to rapidly adapt to complex situations would seem to be one of its defining characteristics! In this regard, the EU Military Staff is clearly going from strength to strength and I acknowledge and recognise the Trojan work done by the former DGs and that of all members of the EUMS, both current and former.

In reminiscing over the last 20 years, it is evident that the security situation faced by Europeans was always characterised as challenging, complex and uncertain. An additional feature however defining today's security environment is the pace

at which these characteristics are changing and the impact of events in our neighbouring regions have on the EU. As a result, of this, it is becoming more apparent to Member States that failing to ensure security and stability beyond EU borders will affect its society, security and economy. In addition to this, there is an increasing expectation that the EU and Member States must be better equipped to protect its citizens. However, given the scale and complexity of global security threats, it is increasingly obvious that this cannot be the sole responsibility of any one Member State. Fortunately, the European Union is uniquely equipped to make a credible contribution as a global security provider. The requirement that the EU 'have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces' gives the EU the possibility to intervene outside its territory through civilian and military crisis management missions and operations.



*Vice Admiral
Hervé Bléjean*





The EU as a Global Security provider

The interventions made by the EU in global security are not only be of benefit to the EU member state, they are also of benefit the regions into which the EU deploys. And it is through this unique blend of soft and hard power, using security and defence instruments alongside diplomacy, sanctions, development cooperation and trade, that the EU applies an Integrated Approach for sustainable security. Adopting this unique approach enables the EU to take a leading role in peacekeeping, conflict prevention and capacity building by working, where applicable, with the host Governments. This multifaceted and cooperative approach significantly improves the chances of creating sustainable and lasting security and allows the host nations develop their own security architecture and governance structures at an achievable pace.

As an integral component of the EU's Integrated Approach to conflict and crisis, and acting under the direction of the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff continuously monitors all military aspects of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military Operations namely Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, IRINI in the Mediterranean and ATALANTA in the Indian Ocean. These operations have an executive mandate and as such are authorised to conduct governmental or executive tasks in support of a government, or in the absence of a governmental authority.

The EU Military Staff also supports the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) for the EU's CSDP non-executive military training missions, presently in Central African Republic, Somalia Mali and most recently, Mozambique. These missions concentrate on capacity building, mentoring, monitoring and training; they have no specific power to undertake activities that are the legal and rightful responsibility of the government and its ministries.

A tangible measure of the success of the EU Military Staff

and indeed the EU as a global strategic partner of choice is The EU Council decision to accede to a request from the Mozambican authorities for reinforced EU engagement in the areas of peace and security. This deployment of an EU military training non-executive CSDP mission to Mozambique was welcomed by the country's President, Mr Filipe Nyusi. This will bring EU's CSDP deployments to 18 CSDP Missions and Operations, spread across three continents, with over 5,000, personnel deployed, contributing to European security and defence. It is difficult to imagine this number of deployments or personnel deployed when the EU Military Staff first came into existence 20 years ago.

The future of the EUMS

Looking forward, the EUMS will continue to develop its capabilities, structures, financial instruments and cooperative frameworks to enhance its delivery of CSDP objectives. These developments include the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the European Defence Fund, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, and a new set of EU Capability Development Priorities. In addition to this, a new off-budget instrument, the European Peace Facility will also enhance the capacity of the EU to react faster and more efficiently to a conflict or crisis and facilitate capacity building.

Finally, the Strategic Compass - to be delivered in early 2022 - will help strengthen a common European security and defence culture, show greater operational clarity, enhance EU resilience, develop high-tech capabilities and work closer with strategic partners. All of which will help define the right objectives and concrete goals of the EU's CSDP.

These structures and capabilities are designed to streamline and improve the EU's Crisis Management ability. Augmenting these developments, the EU conducts simulations to exercise and evaluate its response procedures and mechanisms,



such as the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism and the Joint EU Consular Crisis Preparedness Framework, created to address a crisis with an external dimension. In 2022, we can look forward to EU Exercise Integrated Resolve, and MILEX 22. Both training exercises are designed to assess the EU's ability to plan, coordinate and respond to external conflicts and crises.

All of these developments are aimed at ensuring that the EU is best positioned to address the security and defence challenges of the future.


Conclusion

The contribution the EUMS has made to EU security and defence over the last two decades is difficult to accurately quantify. Working under the direction of the EU Military Committee and under the authority of the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of

the European Commission, it will continue to be the source of collective military expertise and strategic military advice within the EEAS.

Recent and significant events have highlighted the futility of trying to predict what the security environment will look like in the future, with unforeseen events unfolding with little warning or indication. On the other side of the time spectrum is the time required to develop the capability to react to such events. The challenge therefore is not so much in developing capability for future events that we cannot predict, but rather to develop capability that is sufficiently adaptable and flexible to ensure that the EU can best react and protect its citizens in an increasingly uncertain security environment.

I have no doubt but that the EUMS is a key enabler in achieving this.



EU CSDP Military Missions and Operations in Action

EUMS 20 year anniversary; special message from NATO DGIMS

BY LT GEN HANS-WERNER WIERMANN

Lt-Gen Hans-Werner Wierman, DG NATO IMS



Over the last 30 years, the NATO-EU partnership has flourished, promoting peace, security and economic stability across the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. This success is partly due to the ever-growing relationship between both organisations and the work undertaken by both our political and military entities. Today, our cooperation includes 74 projects in the domains of military mobility, hybrid,

information exchange, logistics and cyber defence, exercises, as well as training and education. Cooperation between the EU and NATO is now the norm and practiced daily at different levels throughout the political and military structures.

At the military level, we have a well-established routine of sharing mutual invitations to relevant high-level meetings. The NATO and the EU Military Committees meet routinely to provide each other updates on Operation ALTHEA. Cross briefings are held on ongoing activities, missions and operations. This interaction is also present at lower levels, such as between the NATO and EU Military Staffs. In 2013, my predecessor and the Director General of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) established biannual conferences to promote open and transparent dialogue between all the Directors of the EUMS Directorates and the NATO International Military Staff Divisions. Respective military staffs have demonstrated a continued commitment to taking this cooperation forward in a swift, fully coordinated and coherent way across domains, in peacetime and crisis.



More recently, first under the leadership of Lieutenant General Esa Pulkkinen and now, Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean, our respective staffs have been meeting regularly to coordinate military efforts on the ongoing pandemic, exchange information and coordinate support to NATO Allies, EU Members and partners. This crisis has shown the key role that the military plays in support of national civilian efforts, and the importance of NATO mechanisms to coordinate assistance. Through tools like the Multinational Medical Coordination Centre/European Medical Command (MMCC/EMC), NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), the Rapid Air Mobility initiative, and NATO's Operation Allied Hand, NATO and EU military staffs have ensured that all efforts are coherent, com-

plementary and transparent. It has helped avoid duplication, and make the most effective use of resources.

Complementarity remains central to the NATO-EU cooperation, especially in military-related work and activities. For example, as a flagship project, military mobility is a cornerstone of our joint efforts. As a shared priority and common interest that would ensure seamless movement of military equipment across the EU in response to crises. It will make not only EU but also NATO defence more efficient and contribute to strengthen our shared security. Over the past few years, we have achieved some key deliverables in this area by effectively working together. These areas of improvement, include regulations for swift border-crossing, close coordination between military forces and civil government bodies, access to necessary transport capabilities, and ensuring that national transport infrastructure is fit for purpose.

The recent announcement that three NATO Allies – Canada, Norway and the US – have been approved to join the EU PESCO project on military mobility is a clear demonstration of how important this is to both NATO and EU members. I expect these nations to bring invaluable expertise and knowhow to the project with regard to troop deployment, host- and transit-nation activities. This project is part of a broader set of initiatives to improve military mobility. Work is also ongoing on the development of joint Military Supply Route maps to lay the groundwork for defining dual-use requirements. These maps will be key tools in planning military mobility, while also helping identify where funding could be concentrated to serve both civilian infrastructure development as well as military requirements.

As Director General of the NATO International Military Staff, I can speak to the value of having integrated and on-hand military expertise, covering all areas of knowledge and skills. As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the EUMS, I can attest that the EUMS has grown into an integral and dependable military contributor by, consistently, providing an overarching and essential military perspective to the EU. Within organisations, like NATO and the EU, the military structure – at tactical, operational or strategic level – facilitates the execution of foreign, defence and security policy decision-making. Much like my own staff, I have found in the EUMS a group of multinational, hard-working, professional and committed individuals who strive daily and in unison to make sure their organisation fulfils its mandate. I commend Vice Admiral Bléjean on his outstanding staff and the work they have been doing and extend my heartfelt congratulations to all on this special day.

Hans-Werner Wiermann
Lieutenant General, German Army
Director General of the NATO
International Military Staff

Parting Thoughts of the Former DGs

The CSDP's first steps

BY MAJOR GENERAL (RETD.) MESSERVY-WHITING CBE¹

The European Union's politico-military structure started to take on flesh in late 1999. Javier Solana arrived as the first Secretary-General/High Representative, with Pierre de Boissieu as his Deputy, and the Policy Unit (PU) started to form up. In early 2000, an interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC) and interim Military Body (iMB) held their first meetings and the author was selected, as the first serving military officer in the Council General Secretariat, to head a team to design and deliver a new military Directorate-General, the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The design was completed, 'sold' to all the stakeholders and approved by the end of that year.

By spring 2001, the EUMS was forming up and moving from the Justus Lipsius to the purpose-adapted Kortenberg building some 700 metres away. It did so not alone but along with all its key colleagues in the EU's politico-military structure, such as the bulk of the Directorate-General for External Affairs, the PU and the Joint Situation Centre. By the end of 2001, the Political and Security and Military Committees (PSC and EUMC) had taken their place as official Council bodies and a 130-strong EUMS had attained 'full staff capability'.

A few personal snapshots of the first two weeks of what was to become the interim Military Staff. After Javier Solana's telephone call to me in England, on Thursday 8 March 2000, confirming my appointment to head the interim Military Staff (iMS) and asking me to start work as soon as possible, I quickly sorted out some temporary cover in my existing job, made the necessary family arrangements, then flew to Brussels to start things moving on Monday 13 March. I walked into the Justus Lipsius in civilian clothes on Day One, not wanting to cause too much consternation, but Solana quickly made it clear that he positively wanted ESDP's first steps to be militarily visible. I was made most welcome, not just by Solana and his Cabinet team, but also by Pierre de Boissieu and his senior leadership team, without whom nothing touching on people, budget, office-space, equipment or communications could have been achieved.

Having settled in to my temporary office, in the Fisheries corridor, the face-to-face briefing I presented for Solana's approval that first week was my outline work plan covering suggested main responsibilities, initial operating concept and draft timelines. The second such briefing, on Tuesday 21 March, was for the selection of the first tranche of seven candidates to be called forward soonest from the Member States to start forming up the iMS, to be followed by a second tranche of five before the summer; several of these pioneers would bring with them their invaluable WEU experience of policy, plans and operations in the European arena. The third briefing, this

time to de Boissieu and his team, covered: what the iMS needed logistically and pretty much immediately to start its design work, collocated in an empty conference room with the interim Situation Centre; and also an urgent draft input to the following year's Council Secretariat budget lines for a future EU Military Staff. On Friday 24 March, I was invited by the Presidency to brief the iMB on how I saw the development of the iMS and its evolution into the EUMS.

I welcomed the first member of my team, Jean-Luc Lagadec, on Wednesday 29 March. By the end of week two I had already given, at Solana's suggestion and in my Fisheries office, the first power-point presentation on the iMS to a curious but not unfriendly US Assistant Secretary of Defence.

And so the ball started to roll!



Maj-Gen Messervy-Whiting



The Justus Lipsius Building, first home of the EUMS.

- ¹ Major General (Retd) Messervy-Whiting CBE a member of the judiciary for England and Wales and an academic at the University of Birmingham. In March 2000, he was recruited by Dr. Javier Solana to design a military staff for the EU, becoming the interim DG of the implementation team to recruit, house, equip, train and deliver a fully capable staff. He became the first Chief of Staff of the new EUMS when Lieutenant General Rainer Schuwirth was appointed as the DG.
- ² A detailed description of the design work in 2000 leading to the EU's Military Staff, capabilities catalogue, crisis-management procedures and exercise policy is in the author's article in the December 2000 edition of the RUSI me 145 No 6).

The Establishment of a Military Staff



BY GENERAL (RET.) RAINER SCHUWIRTH, DG EUMS 2001-2004

It gives me great pleasure to wholeheartedly congratulate all members of the EU Military Staff on the anniversary of its existence. This in itself is good news – and it has been complemented by steady and prosperous developments and transformations, by a significant and successful output and, most of all, by its professional and motivated military and civilian personnel.

Gen Rainer Schuwirth



Together with numerous civilian counterparts in other parts of the complex EU institutions, the EUMS has proven to be a solid and constant key element in support of the European and now Common Security and Defence Policy – within the General Secretariat of the Council and now in the External Action Service.

And in conjunction with

the Military Committee it has permanently represented the military element of the corresponding EU's level of ambition. The achievements and contributions of the EUMS have added up to an impressive list of activities. Activities that range from searching for offices, desks and chairs in early 2001 to defining and receiving a legal status within Belgium and an appreciation within the EU. Other achievements included developing working procedures and getting hands on more sophisticated equipment, producing all kinds of drafted concepts for the Military Committee and other actors, preparing, conducting and evaluating training and exercises, preparing military advices for missions and operations, contributing to command and control, cooperating with other organisations, engaging for capability improvements, identifying and performing re-organisations. All of this hard work was completed whilst enjoying sportive and social activities, thus creating a strong sense of esprit-de-corps.



Operation ARTEMIS, was conducted in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) and the Council's Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003. It marked the first autonomous EU military mission outside Europe and an important milestone in development of the European Security and Defence Policy.

I think it is only normal that I look back with deep gratitude, respect and pride to the initial team. It started to assemble in an improvised environment in Justus-Lipsius, then moved into the refurbished Kortenberg Building, and developed with excellent motivation and spirit in roughly nine months from almost zero to full operational capability in line with the agreed peacetime establishment at that time. There was a significant drive to implement the political decisions taken by the Heads of State and Government of the EU in Nice, Cologne or Helsinki. This gave a strong support also for our work. But some dogmas, like the fear that the autonomy of decision-making might be endangered, also created obstacles again and again. The agreement on Berlin Plus was quite a relief in that regard, although the implementation later suffered again from political influences.

There are many nice recollections – just two of them: I still remember several working lunches with my NATO counterpart in local restaurants and in civilian clothes – in order not to get accused on either side as doing something illegally. We also conducted a number of sessions for the EU establishment to inform that those strange individuals wearing military uniforms did not pose any danger to their lifestyles – however, for some it remained difficult to accept the military straight-forward workstyle.

I am still convinced that the EU project and the Common European Security and Defence Policy remain indispensable – to give Europe the capacity to act if and when required, and to improve its common capabilities, also for the benefit of contributions in other organisations.

Sadly the intensive work completed has not created the kind of improvements that one might have expected – and we all know the main reason: it is relatively easy to produce papers, communiques and declarations. But translating those intents into reality with the necessary will is a different story. So there are excellent reasons to continue the common efforts – even more when we remember two of the disastrous and terrorist events enveloping those fifteen years: USA 9/11 in 2001 and Belgium/Brussels 3/22 in 2016.

Again – all the best for the EUMS and CFSP/CSDP.

When I was proud to be DG European Union Military Staff

BY **LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RET.) JEAN-PAUL PERRUCHE** DG EUMS 2004 - 2007

In late 2002, I was Deputy-COMKFOR in Pristina when the French Chief of Defence asked me whether I would be the French candidate to become DG EUMS.

What was a surprise to me, but since I had enjoyed many opportunities to work in international framework, including in operation, I did not hesitate very long.

In addition I had welcomed the decision to make the EU a security actor through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) whose competence, organization, structures and assets were defined in the Nice Treaty (December 2000), to deal with crisis management outside the EU territory.

At the end of 2002 I learned that my nomination was agreed by the EU Military Committee and endorsed by the Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana.

In fact, I was the second appointed DG EUMS due to take over from my predecessor on the 26th of February 2004. This event celebrated during the very first military parade organised inside the entrance Hall of the “Justus Lipsius” building stays in my mind as a unique and unforgettable moment. The picture of 200 European military greeting the EU flag while a Belgian military band was playing the European Anthem was for me the clear indication of the new EU challenge: making Europe more responsible, more capable and more effective in the field of Defence and security.

While my predecessor had to create and shape the building blocks of the EUMS, including the working procedures, cohesion, doctrines, concepts etc. . . , I was able to rely on a well-trained team ready to prove its capacity in operations. This was fortunate because the year 2004 was a very busy time for the EUMS. The first EU autonomous military operation in DR Congo Operation “Artemis” was hardly ending when I was tasked by Javier Solana to plan the take over from NATO in Bosnia and so EUFOR Operation ALTHEA commenced. Although the situation in this country had calmed down since the IFOR deployment, peace and stability was still fragile and the country reconstruction at its very outset. This operation launched in cooperation with NATO with reference to the so-called “Berlin+” agreement was an interesting experience that gave us the opportunity not only to test the crisis management procedure of the EU but also to assess the cooperation between the EU and NATO. Finally the takeover happened successfully in Sarajevo in early December 2004 after 8 months of planning.

In parallel, the EUMS was involved in:

- The setting of the Requirement Catalogue aiming to express the need of military capabilities of the EU to cover the whole spectrum of its potential missions (Petersburg tasks)
- The writing of the new “Battle group” concept, proposed by a UK/DE/FR initiative of march 2004
- The welcome and integration of new people coming from the 10 new EU Member-States (1st May 2004)
- The creation of a new planning civ-mil cell within the EUMS to improve the global approach of the EU in crisis management.

The following years were relatively calmer, but included: setting of the Force catalogue, planning of the ACEH civil operation, assistance mission to the African Union in Darfur in 2005, planning and running of the EUFOR DRC operation, opening of liaison teams with the UN and NATO in 2006, implementation of the (non-permanent) Operation Centre within the EUMS inaugurated in 2007.

This was indeed a very busy but also very exciting and blossoming period for the EU military. When I handed over to my successor on 01 March 2007, I was proud of the job accomplished and convinced that the European Military are able to deliver very credible and efficient military capabilities.



Lt-Gen Jean-Paul Perruche



Establishment of EUFOR Operation ALTHEA 2004

My tour as DG EUMS was one of the most interesting of my military career

BY **LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RET.) AD LEAKEY** CMG CBE – DG EUMS 2007 – 2010

Lt-Gen Arundell
David Leakey



The British have a long and strong attachment to NATO and a tendency to Euroscepticism. It was, therefore, a surprise and even a moment of anxiety for some people that a British general should become DG EUMS in 2007. However, having previously been the first Com EUFOR in Bosnia, my EU credentials were well known in Brussels.

It was probably NATO who took more 'interest' in the new British DG EUMS. At the time there was tension between NATO and the EU. Some characterised this as rivalry between the two organisations. Many could not see the point of two Brussels based military organisations that shared many of the same member States.

However, in Bosnia the EU was able to show the added value of having a military force alongside the other 'instruments', all working together within the same international organisation on stability, recovery and the rebuilding of the Bosnian state. This provided a strong political coherence between the various EU missions under the EU High Representative. And there was excellent practical collaboration between EUFOR, the EU Police Mission, other EU actors and the many strands of the Commission's work. This 'comprehensive approach' using all the EU instruments, civilian and military, was something which NATO as a uniquely political and military alliance could not deliver as effectively or in the same way.

The EU's military capability has also usable purpose in regions where operations led by NATO would not be acceptable to the regional states. This was one reason why the EU deployed a force of some 4,000 to Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 to deter and prevent the Darfur rebellion spreading westwards from Sudan. Neither the UN nor NATO, as a provider of an international military force, were acceptable to some key players in the region at that time.

Similarly, it was the EU who responded when an international force was needed at very short notice in Georgia in 2008 to monitor the ceasefire between the Russians and Georgia. A monitoring mission provided by NATO would have been perceived by the Russians as provocative. Although the EU mission in Georgia was primarily a civilian mission, it was the EUMS who provided much of the emergency planning and force generation capability in Brussels. And many of the monitors were military personnel.

Another example of the utility of the EU's military capability was when the international community sought to establish a naval operation in the Indian Ocean in 2008 to counter the piracy operating off the coast of Somalia. The piracy was proving costly and disruptive to international shipping. There was already a US-led naval coalition operation in the region to which NATO contributed force elements. However, the EU set up and maintained a dedicated Operational HQ and a Command and Control structure dedicated to running the maritime counter-piracy operation. One of the principal benefits of this EU-led operation was the willingness of other non-EU members to participate or at least cooperate, China, Russia and India to name but three who would not have been willing to operate under a NATO banner.

My tour as DG EUMS was one of the most interesting of my military career. It was highly rewarding to lead a truly multinational team of military and civilian staff in helping to establish and orchestrate operations in Sudan, Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, the Central African Republic, Georgia, Kosovo, and the Indian Ocean.

Amidst these and many other rewarding missions and EUMS work, I experienced three particular disappointments during my three and half years. The first was the conservatism, reluctance, and even unwillingness of so many military and civilian officials, MilReps and diplomats to genuinely embrace the modern requirement to develop a truly 'comprehensive approach' to operations. Second, I regretted the frequent lack of harmony between NATO and the EU. And third, I was sad to leave; I enjoyed such professionalism, humour, spirit and camaraderie amongst the EUMS. I miss the many friendships, but raise a glass to the EUMS on its 15th Birthday.

European Union Naval Force Somalia, now EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, is a current counter-piracy military operation at sea off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean. It was the first naval operation conducted by the European Union.



The youth has a future

BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RET.) DRS. TON VAN OSCH DG EUMS 2010 - 2013

Wonder why the EU is so much in the media? I assume because of its promising potential to protect our European interests and a widespread impression that it does not fulfill that promise. Is that a reason for turning our back on it? No. The EU did not cause the crises at our borders, but it can be an essential part of the solution. If we would not have the EU in this period of common threats, our heads of state and governments would most likely come together and start developing it. The only way to solve the many crises is to do so commonly, using all means of power, including the military. The EU has the potential to do so, but not in isolation.

Even without a detailed analysis of the crises around Europe, it is valid to assume that none of these crises can be solved by just one Member State and also that all our Member States directly or indirectly feel the negative consequences. So, we have to counter the related threats together. It is also valid to assume that none of these crises can be solved by only one instrument in isolation. So, we need a comprehensive approach to crisis management using all instruments of power, including the military. This is not a brilliant new idea but one of the basic thoughts behind the EU Treaty of Lisbon. It is the reason why we have a HRVP with the mandate to coordinate external actions including crisis management, with the EEAS supporting her and the EU Military Staff being part of it.

So if the idea is good, why then is it so difficult to make the EU work? Why is there a growing number of politicians who promote a national way forward, who make voters believe that threats will go away if we close the national borders, which of course they will not. My experience is that most Member States, if not all, tend to mainly look from a national perspective. Threats which are closest to the national borders should have the highest priority, with divided opinions in the EU as a result. Many national politicians tend to gladly take the honour if something goes well, but blame the EU if it goes wrong, even if they were part of decision making and did not take a fair share of the common burden. Their attitude is understandable, because their position is determined by national elections. The effect is that their voters think that they could do better without the EU. It is of course also true that effective decision-making in the EU is hampered by internal bureaucratic tensions. But these tensions are often the same as we see within national governments, in which all ministers agree that the minister for Foreign Affairs should coordinate external action, but continue to have their separate opinion on what should be their own individual role. If we understand the logic of these mechanisms, it is easier to accept. It also underlines that if we want the EU to be successful, we all have a responsibility to bridge the differences.

As the military, we always have understood that we cannot solve a crisis by ourselves. We can only be successful if our op-

erations are synchronised with all civilian actions towards the same political goals. Until now, our EU operations have been relatively modest, but we can give many examples in which the military had a very positive contribution. It is also true that there is still much to be improved. I find it very motivating to feel the eagerness in the EU Military Staff to do so. I hear excellent ideas on how to clarify comprehensive decision making procedures, improve cooperation with strategic partners like NATO and improve operational planning capacities, all essential for future success. As the EU Military Staff becomes 15 years old and already had quite some success which deserves congratulations. Being 15 years in existence, it is not strange that there is also still room for improvement. May all good ideas come to effect and thus improve the EU's capacity to safeguard our future, in concert with the other EU services, the EU Member States and partners. The future is yours.



Lt-Gen Ton Van Osch



The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the European Union's diplomatic service. Based in Brussels, but relying on an extensive network of EU diplomatic presence worldwide, the EEAS brings together European civil servants, diplomats from the foreign services of the EU member states and local staff in countries around the world.

A key aspect of the work of the EEAS is its ability to work closely with the foreign and defence ministries of the member states of the EU and the other EU institutions such as the European Commission, Council and Parliament. It also has a strong working relationship with the United Nations and other International Organisations.

The head of the EEAS is the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and it is managed by a Secretary General. It is divided into both geographical and thematic directorates, including a Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response directorate.

On 1 January 2011, the EU Military Staff, transferred from the Council General Secretariat to the EEAS, where it is the source of collective military expertise within the EEAS and advises the HR/VP on military and security issues.

Three years as DG EUMS: my impression looking back

BY **LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RET.) WOLFGANG WOSOLSOBE** (RIP) DG EUMS 2013 - 2016

Lt-Gen Wolfgang
Wosolsobe



When asked to write about the memories you keep about a precise period in the past, a good method is to use what immediately springs to your mind. This is what I will do. The task is easy, the distance is only 9 months since I left the post. We had an intensive time, between 2013 and 2016. The EEAS was still very

young and the slightly older EUMS had joined this young organisation not a long time before I took over. Much remained to be explained about the military, what they could bring to the broader picture and how they fit into a large civilian service. Not only for me but for the entire staff this brought a steep learning curve.

We managed while continuing to live up to our normal responsibilities as a staff, as planning for missions and operations, supporting the EU Military Committee, and providing expertise in a broad spectrum of areas. Many of our civilian colleagues considered the staff as a very large service, compared to other units of the same level. It took time to make the understanding grow that, in fact, the EUMS was too small rather than too big. This was easier to explain to military interlocutors, particularly the Military Committee. Which does not mean that the staff was given the resources to grow. So we were working under permanent and steadily growing pressure. This is the right place to thank my personnel, military and civilian, for the intensive and excellent work they have provided throughout these three years.

For me personally, it meant that not very much existed outside my mission as DG EUMS. It was sometime a challenge to keep it all together and to translate the political will into military guidance for the staff. I invested much energy and time in four activities: explaining to the EEAS what the military dimension meant in a specific political situation, translating the answer from the EEAS into military guidance, supporting the Military Committee while maintaining the staff's freedom of action and explaining to multiple audiences what the military dimension of the EU is about. In fact, this was as much about communication as it was about strategic military leadership. I am well aware that in all these areas, I could only do a beginning and one single man's work is only a drop of water in a vast ocean. This is why I tried to share my passion with my personnel, tried to convince them that the EU is worth supporting by a military effort, tried to make them follow my example. I believe, largely that I succeeded! I even dare to address the EUMS personnel of today in repeating my message to all those who left the EUMS: remain a messenger, more than that, an ambassador for the European Union, for the External Action of the EU and for the role the military can and should play in this action!

My commuting between the EEAS, the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS did not leave much time for the "real" military life. The bigger was the pleasure and interest I took in my visits to operations, missions, and headquarters. This was for me a reality check and a possibility to get into contact with our deployed soldiers. What I saw was a dedication and professionalism, for which I am sincerely grateful. What I also saw, was the immense tasks, which still lie ahead of us, of you. Only a continuous and steady effort can achieve what the EUMS stands for.

For this, I wish all my successors and their personnel the best of luck and success.

Lt Gen Wosolsobe passed away on 24 September 2018. Under his leadership the EUMS, delivered military expertise and contributed to the four main EEAS initiatives. They included the development of the EU's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy; the development of the NATO – EU Joint Declaration; the review of the EU's Defence package; and the review of the EEAS crisis management structures, the latter resulting in the establishment of the EU's Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC).

He is remembered, not only for his professionalism and his ability to build bridges between the military and the civilian domains based on trust within a strong global network, but also for his approachability and openness. His memory lives on in the EUMS.



Three tours of development of the EUMS, Lt Gen Esa Pulkkinen DG EUMS 2016-2020

INTERVIEWED BY **HANNA GREKULA** /IMPETUS OFFICE



You have had the great opportunity to see EUMS development in its 20 years having three posts in different stages. Your first posting stated 2000, at the very beginning of the European Union Military Staff as newly founded body of the Council secretariat.

What would you say were the biggest challenges you encountered when you arrived in the early years of EUMS?

We were the first ones in uniform in Justus Lipsius and Solana, who was at the time HRVP, told us to use uniforms so that all other staff would get used to soldiers. There is actually a funny story to this, one day there was a group of men who came knocking on our door who said; 'what are you soldiers doing here, EU institutions are for peace' turned out they were staff union workers who were worried that we are coming to EU to take their jobs and such. Then not too long after we had a group of women knocking on our door who said; 'it is great that we have had such well behaving soldiers here who know to say good morning and show good manners as now the civilian colleagues have also started to improve their behaviour to match'.

I find that this is well describing of the time, how there were prejudice but then quite fast everyone got used to us and noticed that we are no threat to anyone but just normal part of the EU workers.

I also heard that you might have had something to do with our EUMS logo?

Yes, that was quite an interesting process. SO, we needed to have a logo and I asked my French colleague Jean Luc Lagadec if there would be any assistance on design as I am no heraldic myself. He said there is this company Monnaie de Paris they could be good help. Therefore, I contacted them and my French at the time was not yet quite so good [as now], so we had some linguistic challenges in the beginning but soon enough we got to an understanding. They soon started sending multiple different looking drafts that were heraldically good looking, they used the EU stars, the 12 stars as base and three branches, marine, military, and air force. For the air force, they had put a giant eagle with wings in there and they were unwilling to change that. So we organised a meeting where I would have had drafted a compromise proposal, I took my colleague Jean Luc Lagadecs uniform, detached his air force wings pin and walked to the copy machine. I took a copy of them on a paper, and cut them off and clued them on the draft of the logo and asked is this a doable compromise. They agreed that this works. So today, if you look at the EUMS logo and if you take a French air force officer with their better uniform, you can see it is exactly the same image for the wings. However, the story does not end here there were two small things. Firstly, I did not know that the EU stars and the flag base had a copyright

Lieutenant-General
Esa Pulkkinen DG
EUMS 2016-2020



and us using it without asking for a permission created a lot of uproar. My superior then told me; Esa you will need to “disappear” for a couple of days so that no one can contact you. Funny enough that seemed to have calmed it over. Then secondly, when we got the bill from the first 50 crests ordered, that took most of our

entire budget, as these were not cheap. It turned out the company at the time was the best in the world but also the most expensive. The story ends in 2003 when I was leaving the EUMS I wrote down this whole story and made a folder also including all the other drafts of the logo to the then DG. An hour after I had handed the folder over I was call to his office. He then actually gifted me one of the crests for job well done. I still have it with me.

After your first tour, you returned in 2008 as the director of OPS

Yes from 2008 to the end of 2010, my term ended early as I was selected to this current job at the ministry [of Defence] so I was recalled to Helsinki before the end of my tour.

In this time between the two terms (and almost a decade), could you see EUMS develop?

I would say that between the first and second tour there was not so much change mainly just growth. Then with my second and third tour there was, as the EUMS moved from under the Council Secretariat to under the new EU External Action Service [in 2010]. This change actually happened when I was there, exactly as I was about to leave so I did not quite experience the change myself yet at that time we were just preparing for it. I have to say looking

back; I maybe liked it more under the secretariat of the Council because it felt that they did not try to control us the same way as some of the SGs of EEAS later did. Then on the other hand being part of the EU foreign policy service brought more impact and resources to what we were doing.

What had changed was the addition of a CivMil CELL that is a civilian military coordination organisation [that not everyone liked and it was dismissed 2009 and a lot of that work moved under OPS directorate]. My friend Giovanni Manione was actually then the head of the CivMil CELL, so we have been working multiple times together.

As you came for your third tour as the Director General of the EUMS, is that where you could see more change?

Organisation did not change anymore so much between the second and third tour as EUMS had then established under the EEAS. However many changes then again occur during the time I was there for my third posting when we started building the MPCC. In addition, Giovanni Manione then came to work as the DDG in 2017. It is nice to see familiar people returning to different roles.

We are actually quite a few doing multiple tours. However, I do not think anyone else has been doing three tours, not that I know of. Two tours more often and I think that is good as it creates some institutional memory.

Anything you would like to add to the end for the future generations of EU Military Staff?

Our first mission given to us by HRVP Solana when he met us in the very beginning, he told us “Gentlemen, I am a very busy man and you have a difficult task, maybe even impossible one. You need to create a military identity and structure to EU and you cannot fail”. So if things seem difficult even impossible, they can be achieved if you have determination and some support.



Happy Birthday EUMS!

BY MS CHRISTINE DELGADO



While around me, every 3 years there is change of director general and his team, I'm one of the permanent civilians in the European Union Military Staff Structure. I have learned enormously from the EUMS over these past years, and I have very fond memories of all the people I have had the privilege to work with.

My time working within the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), since its establishment in 2001, can be characterised as challenging, rewarding, sometimes frustrating, but always interesting. As I reflect on this time, my overarching memories are of the excellent people that I have worked with, both military and civilian and how we continue to ensuring that the EUMS contributes to European Security and Defence through the provision of military expertise within the European External Action Service (EEAS).

On 1st March 2001, I was appointed Personal Assistant to the first Director General of the EUMS. At that time, Lt Gen Rainer Schuwirth from Germany was the first Director General of the newly established EUMS. To say that this was a challenging period would be an understatement, as all of the processes and staffs had to be designed and organised anew. This was the initial building blocks of what is the EUMS we see today.

During that initial fledgling period, during its initial growing-phase and in addition to establishing a new Directorate, the EUMS undertook two operations: Operation CONCORDIA in FYROM from March to December 2003 and Operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from June to September 2003. During this initial 3 years, the EUMS was comprised of a dedicated staff of approximately 80 Officers, NCOs and Civilians.

Lt Gen Jean-Paul Perruche from France took over the post of DG EUMS in **March 2004**. During this time the EUMS continued to evolve and restructure in. At that time, the EUMS was assisted by a Civilian/Military Cell and the staff working within the EUMS reached 120. Again, the EUMS continued to run operations, including EUFOR Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which commenced in December 2004 and continues to this day and EUFOR RD Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from July to November 2006).

In February 2007, Lt Gen David Leakey from the United Kingdom was given a 3 year mandate as the new DG EUMS. At this stage, the EUMS had grown to reach a staff that was 180 strong. For me personally, during these 3 years, having British colleagues brought me back to a more "comprehensive" standard of English speaking which sometimes lacks in the Institutions! We all understand each other in an institutional English speaking! Operations of course continued to be conducted, including in Chad and Central African Republic with EUFOR Tchad-RCA from January 2008 to March 2009 and off the Horn of Africa with EUNAVFOR in Somalia (Operation ATALANTA) which commenced in December 2008 and is ongoing.

Lt Gen Ton van Osch from The Netherlands took over the post **in 2010**. Once more, we were facing a new challenge with the creation of the European External Action Service. I found it particularly interesting as we are merging officials from the Commission, officials from the Council, delegations and external. We did encounter some expected organisational and bureaucratic stumbling blocks but this was a positive development in the EUMS. During this period, not only did the EUMS develop as a directorate within the EEAS, its staff numbered just under 200!

Ms Christine Delgado, Administrative Assistant to DG EUMS



In 2013, Lt Gen Wolfgang Wosolsobe from Austria was appointed as the Director General of the EUMS. And it was during his mandate, that DG EUMS became double hatted as the Director of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). This additional portfolio brought a new dynamic to the appointment which was interesting to say the least. At the time, I was working for the Chairman of the EUMC then which gave me a very good picture of the other side of our Military structure.

Lt Gen Esa Pulkkinen from Finland was assigned to the post of DG EUMS/D MPCC **in 2016**. This for me was a renewed acquaintance as Esa was one of my first colleagues during the initial setting-up of the EUMS in 2001 and he brought a significant amount of corporate knowledge and previous experience to the appointment. The dual role of his appointment as DG EUMS and Dir MPCC was at this stage gaining momentum, which brought with it a significant amount of travel to Europe, USA and Africa. My abiding memory of this was organising over 300 missions for him and his Cabinet! This stands in stark contrast to the current travel environment resultant for the COVID Pandemic.

Since July 2020, I am working as the PA of the new DG EUMS, Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean from France. I am fully confident that my abiding memory from this period will not be the fact that for the first DG EUMS is a Naval officer but how the COVID-19 pandemic added a unique dimension to the usual set of challenges we are so used to overcoming. For the past year, we have had to reduce the presence in office

and I must say it is strange to see the almost completely empty lifts, offices and corridors. Teleworking has become norm but I also find it uplifting that the work output of the EUMS remained the same. This, I think is the mark of a dedicated and highly motivated staff!

Throughout my career, EU officials ask me if working with military staff, in a military environment is too rigid or if all of the uniforms bother me. My honest answer is always the same; it is very easy to work for a clear hierarchy and rank structure and not at all disturbing to see the various uniform around me. In fact, the different uniforms working together is a very visible manifestation of what the EU is, many Member States working for the common good and promotion of the EU. Admittedly, I am still struggling to recognise all of the rank insignia or uniform emblems or what they mean but what I can recognise is a work environment of mutual respect and professionalism within the EUMS regardless of rank or uniform.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all my past and current colleagues (military and civilian) who make my daily professional life enjoyable! I would add that EUMS has a great spirit of multinational friendship and I enjoy the professionalism, comradeship and loyalty of my colleagues and despite not having a uniform, I do feel very much a part of the EUMS military family.

To conclude, we must remember 3 things that we can never touch again, the water when it has flowed, the words when they are said and time when it has passed and with that in mind, as the EUMS should continue to look to its future and the contribution it makes to European Security and Defence.



EUFOR OPERATION ALTHEA



BY LT COL PHIL KIELY EUFOR STRATCOM OFFICER

On 2nd December 2004, EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Operation Althea with an initial strength of 7,000 soldiers, assumed its mission from Stabilisation Force (SFOR) who had succeeded Implementation Force (IFOR). Althea is regarded by many as the Greek goddess of healing. With the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina stabilised, Operation ALTHEA was to assist the healing of the country and all its peoples.

The mandate for EUFOR's Operation ALTHEA is in two parts, **Executive** and **Non-Executive**. The **Executive mandate** is given by the UN Security Council, and the EUFOR mission is then based on the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) Joint Action which includes an **Executive** part derived from the UN Security Council (Supporting the BiH authorities to maintain a safe and secure environment). It also includes and a **Non-Executive** part (Supporting AF BiH collective and combined training). This supports BiH in its progress to being a 'security provider' rather than a 'security consumer'.

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1551, adopted unanimously on 9 July 2004, welcomed the EU's intention to launch a military mission in BiH. The decision by the EU to launch ALTHEA followed the decision by NATO to conclude its successful SFOR-operation.

This was followed by UNSCR 1575, adopted unanimously on 22 November 2004 which authorized the Member States, acting through or in cooperation with the EU, to establish a multinational stabilization force (EUFOR) as a legal successor to SFOR, under unified command and control, which would fulfil its missions in relation to the implementation of Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement. EUFOR now has the main peace stabilization role under the military aspects of the Peace Agreement.

The Resolution also welcomed the EU's increasing engagement in BiH. EUFOR's mandate was extended by UNSCR 1639 (2005) on 21 November 2005 ALTHEA is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, on the basis agreed with NATO ("Berlin Plus").

Upon commencement of Operation ALTHEA, with 7,000 personnel EUFOR assumed all mission tasks previously assigned to SFOR, with the exception of the search of the individuals indicted by the ICTY, which remained a NATO mission. EUFOR did have police duties against organized crime, believed to be linked to suspected war criminals. EUFOR worked with the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) and with the BiH Police. The European Union Special Representatives (EUSR) in BiH provided political guidance to EUFOR at the time.

In 2005 Operations Spring Clean and Harvest were completed by Operation ALTHEA. 'Operation Spring Clean' was designed to detect and disrupt illegal activities by those involved in organized crime and corruption. Operation ALTHEA was in place to help set conditions so that law enforcement agencies could do their jobs more successfully. ALTHEA continued "Operation

Harvest" and through its Multi-National Task Force (MNTF) managed to collect an impressive amount of weapons of varying calibre and through this contributed to a more safe and secure environment for the people of BiH.

With the support of Operation ALTHEA, the joint armed forces at the state level, the Armed Forces of BiH (AF BiH) was established in 2006, with their Operational Command located within EUFOR Camp Butmir. This year also saw BiH take over from ALTHEA responsibility for controlling airspace above 3,000m with ALTHEA retaining control over airspace below that.

In 2007 a force Re-Organisation was completed; the MNTF was disbanded and a number of EUFOR camps in BiH were closed (Doboj, Senica, Tuzla, Mostar, and Rajlovac). ALTHEA retained three camps with a force strength of 2,500 personnel. ALTHEA retained the right to conduct inspection and control of the movement of weapons and ammunition, but handed over control and responsibility from 39 weapons storage sites as well as the collection of weapons.

2008 was a sad year for Operation ALTHEA with the loss of 15 personnel in two separate helicopter accidents. These accidents claimed the lives of eleven Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, two German and two Spanish soldiers.



Maj Gen
Alexander Platzer
Commander of
EUFOR Operation
ALTHEA



In 2011 COMEUFOR in BiH handed over the report on "Project Soteria" to the Chief of Joint Staff AF BiH. Soteria was an ALTHEA led project to assess six prospective ammunition storage sites across BiH. The assessment was conducted in partnership with the AF BiH, NATO and OSCE.



Capacity Building and Training (CB&T) began in 2012. For the first time in its mission, Operation ALTHEA personnel were working within the AF BiH structures side by side with BiH soldiers, in a joint effort aimed at helping AF BiH reach their goals. Within a relatively short period of time, EUFOR had designed a new training concept with an emphasis on Mobile Training teams and Embedded Advisory Teams who would work closely with the AF BiH. This was also the year that the strength of Operation ALTHEA was reduced further to 600 personnel. Operation ALTHEA provided massive support to BiH and its people during record breaking snowfall. Operation ALTHEA personnel, helicopters and other equipment were involved in providing food, medical supplies and evacuation of people from the high-risk areas. The following year Operation ALTHEA would assist BiH again, this time in the combat against forest fires during the summer months all across BiH. 2013 witnessed the first iteration of Operation ALTHEA "Exercise Quick RESPONSE". This Exercise, which was aimed at assessing and enhancing the ability of EUFOR in BiH to activate, rapidly deploy and integrate troops in and outside of BiH, was completed twice, once in April and again in September. The worst floods ever experienced in the region struck BiH in 2014 and Operation ALTHEA made an enormous contribution to support BiH, its people and institutions in all possible segments. Over 900 people were rescued, with over 40 being provided with emergency medical treatment by Operation ALTHEA. Operation ALTHEA further assisted in the post flood clean-up of infrastructure and continued the delivery of humanitarian aid in a close coordination with AF BiH.

In 2016, Project "Explode", an OSCE project was completed in partnership with the BiH MOD, EUSR and UNDP. This project included the destruction of chemically unstable ammunition and complex weapon systems that posed a constant threat to the security of people and the environment. This project supported the AF BiH in the reduction of military ammunition stockpiles to manageable quantities and in the implementation of infrastructure upgrades.

A strategic review of Operation ALTHEA was conducted in 2017, retaining the focus on SASE and phasing out CB&T activities by end of 2018, to be handed over to NATO HQ Sarajevo. Further transition to end of oversight and support to BiH in AWE and de-mining activities by November 2019.

COVID-19 impacted on Operation ALTHEA and BiH in 2020 just as it did globally. ALTHEA provided assistance to people of BiH through donations of medical aid and personnel protective equipment, and by assisting in the logistical distribution of similar EU delegation donations.

The mission was required to adapt to the challenges of the pandemic and implemented the appropriate control measures to combat the spread of the virus, one of which was the amendment to the annual Mine Risk Education campaign conducted by the Operation ALTHEA Liaison Observation Teams, of which there are 17 of spread across the country. The campaign aims to educate, children and groups with increased exposure to potential mined areas as to what mines are, how to avoid them and how to respond to locating mines. Operation ALTHEA adapted and created a virtual Mine Risk Education campaign in 2021 so that despite the pandemic, children and adults of BiH could access the campaign material online from the safety of their homes. 2021 also saw the completion of ammunition marking, an important milestone for EUFOR, with the completion of weapon marking to be achieved.



Operation ALTHEA is the EU's oldest EUFOR in operation and with 19 troop contributing nations it continues to support BiH authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment in BiH. Looking forward, Operation ALTHEA will continue its support to AF BiH collective and combined training, assisting them in their progression towards NATO standards and BiH membership of the EU, and to provide deterrence and continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH. In this vein EUFOR ALTHEA reiterates its pledge to leave BiH as soon as possible but to remain as long as necessary.

As Commander of EUFOR Operation Althea, the longest serving EU military mission under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, I wish to congratulate EUMS on its 20th Anniversary. The role of EUFOR ALTHEA in supporting the security services of BiH in maintaining a safe and secure environment, under UN Mandate 2594, is critical to the advancement of peace in BiH and its integration into the EU. I look forward to the continued support and cooperation of EUMS as our mission advances and wish you ever success into the future.

Major General Alexander Platzler
COMMANDER EUFOR

EUNAVFOR Somalia Operation Atalanta, the European Union Naval Force for Somalia takes stock after 13 years operating.



BY MAJOR VICTOR GALLARDO COCA, SPOKESPERSON AND MEDIA CHIEF OPERATION ATALANTA

The EU launched Operation Atalanta, named after the mythological Greek huntress, in December 2008 as a collective initiative of its Member States in support of UN Security Council Resolutions to fight Somali piracy at source, when the crisis was hitting its peak.

Nowadays, piracy, although largely suppressed, has not yet been eradicated. Criminal networks associated with piracy have diversified their activities and reoriented their activities towards other maritime crimes, such as the illicit trade of weapons and human trafficking. However, there is no room for complacency. The last major attacks in 2018 and 2019 occurred more than 240 nautical miles – some 500 kilometres – off the Somali coast, and were carefully planned and launched deliberately. It is understood that criminal networks involved in piracy have diversified their activities, seeing former pirate kingpins involved in smuggling and other illicit activities.



Over the last 13 years, EU NAVFOR has become an internationally respected part of the broader regional maritime security architecture, working hand-in-glove with national and multi-national military partners to uphold the freedom of navigation. In this regard, the Cooperation Concept of Operation ATALANTA (COCOA) is the best framework for sharing information with our partners, such as the Combined Maritime Forces and European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (currently deployed as part of Op. AGENOR), and coordinating efforts to protect such a vast area of operations. As a tool of EU's joint Foreign and Security Policy, EU NAVFOR represents more than just ships. It is a network of military, civil and diplomatic capability that certainly includes maritime patrol aircraft and on-board vessel protection detachments, but which also links into legal, political, commercial and development objectives whilst taking into account Gender and Human Rights perspectives into the operation.



Vice Admiral José María Nuñez Torrente, EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA Commander

- Under EU NAVFOR protection, nearly 77.000 metric tons of WFP humanitarian aid have been escorted safely into Somali ports, using a combination of both, EU and partner military assets in support of the Somali population. In March 2020, EU NAVFOR signed a Memorandum of Understanding with WFP to extend cooperation and allow for a closer coordination in other areas in the region.
- Under its 'legal finish' policy, 171 suspected pirates have been arrested by EU NAVFOR and transferred into regional justice systems for prosecution. This 'legal finish' has proved a powerful deterrent effect, which still forms one of the most important building blocks in what has informally been termed the 'ATALANTA acquis' with 145 successful convictions thus far.
- The operation's Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) has registered hundreds of thousands of commercial vessels transiting the contested waters of the Horn of Aden since 2008, in order to assess vessel vulnerability and afford appropriate protection from piracy and other security threats.
- Local maritime capacity-building efforts performed by EU NAVFOR in support of security and development have seen training sessions organised with African coastguard, port security and military forces in fields as varied as harbour security to forensic evidence protection.





The EU Naval Force is part of the EU's Integrated Approach and supports its Common Security and Defence Policy sister missions, EUCAP Somalia and EUTM-Somalia on the ground in their efforts to support Somalia in enhancing security and stability across the country. Specific training has been provided to Somali maritime security actors and regular interactions at all levels are aimed to increase situational awareness and ensure the commonality of approach.



In order to support the setup of a regional maritime security architecture, EU NAVFOR works closely with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and has contributed to the training and education of regional coordination and information fusion centres, military and law enforcement forces, and their legal and judicial systems across the region. It also cooperates closely with the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

Hence, the partnership developed with the commercial shipping industry remains crucial. EU NAVFOR is a signatory to the Best Management Practices handbook (BMP5), advising seafarers and shipping companies on precautions and

self-defence measures, when transiting the High Risk Area. In addition, through MSCHOA's promulgation of quarterly Industry-Releasable Threat Assessments (IRTAs) and ad hoc Industry-Releasable Threat Bulletins (IRTBs) based upon expertise from EU NAVFOR and CMF, the shipping industry receives military graded information on attacks – piracy and others – which occur in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. In conclusion, EU NAVFOR ATALANTA has proven to be a key tool for the European Union in the Western Indian Ocean to maintain appropriate levels of security at sea, off the coast of Somalia, it up holds the freedom of navigation, supports



the EU Integrated Approach to foster Somalia's development and is a strategic partner for other maritime security actors in the huge area of operations. Despite the diversification of criminal networks, changing their roots in search of a more complex variety of targets, not to mention piracy, EU NAVFOR is able to adapt and confront them, through the framework of its new mandate.

It is appropriate however that the final word on this Operation comes from Vice-Adm Nuñez Torrente, the Operational Commander of EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta,

"Now, as we continue to fight piracy and protect World Food Program ships and other vulnerable vessels in the area of operations, which remains our core tasks, we are also beginning to contribute to the fight against other illegal activities, such as drug trafficking and weapons smuggling to Somalia, in which these piracy networks are involved. All this in order to increase maritime security in this vital region"



OPERATION EUNAVFOR MED IRINI



BY ANTONELLA DE BIASI, PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, OPERATION IRINI

On 31 March 2020, EU NAVFORMED, Operation IRINI was mandated by the European Council to carry out the implementation of the UN arms embargo through the use of aerial, satellite and maritime assets. In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016) this mission is able to carry out inspections of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected of carrying arms or related material to or from Libya. Operation IRINI is one of a number of actions, in addition to political, economic and humanitarian actions, decided upon by the Berlin Conference in establishing a truly "holistic approach" to the Libyan crisis.

IRINI commenced operations at a time when regionally, Libya was still in the midst of heavy military confrontations between the Haftar Forces and the Government of National Accord in Tripoli. And globally, the world was plunged into a COVID-19 pandemic that negatively affected every aspect of normal life and provided a further challenge to the operational capabilities of IRINI. In addition to this, the Operation was also the focus of a concerted media campaign that was critical of its resolve, capacity and ability to hinder the flow of weapons into the Libya.

The tasks assigned to IRINI by the European Council are the same as those previously carried out by Operation SOPHIA, only prioritised differently. The main task is to ensure the respect of the Arms Embargo as per UNSC Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 2292 (2016). Secondary tasks are gathering information on oil smuggling, contributing to the disruption of the human trafficking business model and providing capacity building and training to the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy. Despite the magnitude of this mandate, IRINI must operate with a limited number of assets and a lack of some key components to its mandate such as the availability of the Libyan Government to proceed with the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy or an agreement with strategic partners that would have magnified IRINI's capacities in multiple fields.

EUNAVFOR MED IRINI acts in full compliance with international law and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. In particular, the Resolution 2292 of 2016, authorizing offshore inspections and port diversions of suspect embargo breakers, was extended until 3 June 2022 (UNSCR 2578 of 2021). It is however important to highlight that the Operation can act only within the strict margins allowed by those UN resolutions as well as the International Maritime Law. Furthermore, IRINI's area of Operations does not include Libya's landmass, its territorial waters or that of its neighbours. Nevertheless, IRINI has shown its ability to project a clear deterrence effect over the Central Mediterranean. This is achieved through kinetic activities that has led to the direct control of more than 200 merchant vessels, including the first ever European Union diversion operation, and through monitoring activity that have targeted nearly 4000 ships and 600 suspect aircrafts flying across IRINI's Area of Operations. Therefore, there can be no doubt that those who mean to violate the UN Arms Embargo on Libya are surely aware of the risks they are running of being

monitored, inspected or have their activities reported to the UN agencies for whatever actions they regard as appropriate. According to the IRINI analysis, actors who seek to violate the embargo attempt to do so by sea, air and land. However, it has to be noted that since the 23 October 2020 ceasefire, illicit transfer of arms to Libya has been drastically reduced, including due to an effective deterrent effect exert by IRINI.




Rear Admiral Stefano Turchetto, EU NAVFOR MED Operation IRINI Commander

While delivering on its tasks, Operation IRINI enjoys enhanced cooperation and a constant exchange of information with a number of stakeholders and in particular with the International Shipping Community. Operation IRINI is now perceived as a security provider in the Central Mediterranean sea, a role that is important and one that is taken seriously by the Operation! The Libyan Coast Guard & Naval authorities have both indicated how important it is to ensure security in the Central Mediterranean Sea. From an economic perspective for example, this is underlined by the fact that 20% of global maritime traffic passes through the Mediterranean Sea and that it contains some of the world's main maritime choke points. There is no denying that unsecured Sea Lines of Communications have a negative regional if not global economic impact and that these negative economic impacts disproportionately affect countries experiencing instability. Therefore, Operation IRINI's role in policing its area of Operations in an impartial manner and in accordance with its mandate is a key enabler of security





through the UNSMIL-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, provide a window of opportunity that deserves to be supported and developed. The selection of a new Government of National Unity and its near-unanimous vote of confidence from the Libyan House of Representative on 10 March 2021 in Sirte is very encouraging. The Prime Minister, Abdulhamid




and development not just those countries but regionally. We see here an iterative relationship between security, stability and economic development, which in itself perpetuates security and stability.

Effective and functioning State institutions in Libya remains the desired end state to avoid the enduring proliferation of illicit activity, including human and arms trafficking, oil smuggling and terrorism. The creation of these conditions is always at the forefront of how Operation IRINI carries out its mandate. The still fragile security situation in Libya also highlights the need for continued maritime security presence in the Central Mediterranean, an area where other actors are increasing their footprint to fulfil their own interests. There is therefore a clear need, primarily, to enable Libyan security ownership through stabilisation and capacity building. The Government of National Unity, sworn in on 15 March 2021, the de facto ceasefire, which started in the summer of 2020 and the ensuing progress especially of the political track,

Dbaihah, has accordingly started in earnest working to fulfil its mandate to prepare the Country for general elections by 24 December 2021, while addressing the key issues affecting its population. After ten years of civil war, this is a daunting task but ending the current state of conflict is only possible if this task is owned by the people of Libya.

One year on from then, IRINI is being granted a Mandate renewal by the European Council for two years (instead of the initial one year) and it is being commended by all EU Member States for the positive results it has achieved in its first year of action. IRINI is clear evidence of a convergence process where EU Member States have increasingly joined in a more unified voice and stance behind the blue starred flag of the Union. The fact that the 24 EU Member States contribute to the Operation with staffing and assets provides further evidence of the unity and resolve of the EU behind IRINI. This progress represents a vindication of the full-out EU engagement in a holistic approach to the problems that seemed unsolvable just one year ago. The political vision provided by the High Representative, Mr Borrell, at the launching of Operation IRINI, reflects the holistic approach agreed at the Berlin Conference. Within that process, IRINI has shown its capacity to play its part as a key enabler and it will continue with its ultimate aim of contributing, pro-actively to restoring the peace and stability that the people of Libya so richly deserve.



EUMS and ESDC

15 years of cooperation



BY **DIRK DUBOIS**, HEAD OF ESDC AND **ALIN BODESCU**, ESDC TRAINING MANAGER (MILITARY)

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) contributed to a large part of the Common Security and Defence Policy's (CSDP) development over the last 15 years.

By the time of the ESDC's establishment in 2005, the EUMS was a relative young entity. Set up in 2001, the EUMS had already been consolidating its position in the newly established CSDP framework, alongside the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). This was in the aftermath of the historic European Council decision at its Helsinki meeting on 10-11 December 1999.

It was not a surprise that, at the time, the ESDC needed support from a more experienced partner in terms of resources and the ability to reach out to relevant training audiences. From the outset, the EUMS recognised and promoted the ESDC as the main CSDP training contributor, tasked with providing training and education on CSDP matters and facilitating the development of EU security and defence culture. In practical terms, the EUMS has provided the ESDC with continuous and essential support. In particular, the EUMS has provided speakers for most of the ESDC courses. In addition, it has provided external evaluation, facilitators for the High Level Course and delivered lessons learned from military operations and exercises, and provided recommendations for curricula review. The EUMS has also facilitated a reach-back capability for the ESDC in terms of existing expertise in a multinational context (e.g. EUROCORPS or Multinational Joint HQ Ulm). Furthermore, it has supported an initiative promoting the exchange of young officers, inspired by the Erasmus programme. At the same time, the ESDC has supported the EUMS by providing access to the e-learning environment and by organising the CSDP orientation course and EU HQ Foundation Training.



ESDC, EUMS and MPCC led-EU Logistics Courses, 2019, Brussels

The EUMS plays a leading role in terms of the number of participants in ESDC courses. It is very important to note that, although the EUMS is attached to the EEAS, almost all staff are seconded National Experts who spend a limited period of time on the job. From this perspective, we can regard the EUMS not as an EU entity but as an extension of the Member States (MS) in Brussels. It is therefore well placed in ensuring that personnel are trained through a wide variety of ESDC courses. For example, over the last three academic years (2018-2021), the ESDC has trained almost 450 participants from the EUMS. This represents roughly 5% of the personnel trained by the ESDC for the period in question.

The EUMS is one of the main providers of CSDP orientation courses under the ESDC. Currently, the ESDC training programme includes 10-12 CSDP orientation courses per year. However, in 2012, this course was rare and the ESDC was looking for solutions to increase the number of times the course was run. Accordingly, the EUMS offered to co-host the course with the ESDC Secretariat on an annual basis. Since 2012, the EUMS has therefore run a CSDP orientation course every year (traditionally in September) as part of its training plan for newcomers. This course is open not only to all MS and EU institutions (a default option for ESDC courses) but to NATO and 3rd countries.

In 2019, the EU HQ community decided to convert EU HQ Foundation Training into a CSDP orientation course. The aim was to standardise training in terms of the EUHQ database and facilitate access to the Advanced Modular Training programme. The ESDC Steering Committee agreed to the EUMS proposal. Since that time, the EUMS has run, under the ESDC umbrella, two additional CSDP orientation courses on an annual basis. This raises its contribution to almost 25% of EU-level provision of this course. It is worth noting that the EUMS and ESDC will co-organise their 10th iteration of the CSDP orientation course in September 2021. This is another good cause for celebration.

ESDC, EUM-led CSDP orientation Course, hybrid format, Sep 2020, Brussels





The ESDC and the EUMS also cooperate on the running of seminars and conferences on security and defence with various partners around the world (e.g. China, Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN). The focus is on military issues and the aim is to promote mutual trust, which could eventually lead to closer military cooperation in the longer term. These events aim to increase our partners' knowledge of how the EU works. Particular attention is devoted to how the military contributes to both Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP.

Ever since the establishment of the EU Military Training Group (EUMTG), the ESDC has, in consultation with the EUMS, actively contributed to various work strands. The ESDC's training managers regularly attend EUMTG meetings. Through these they contribute to various workshops and so help carry out training requirements analysis for discipline leaders (i.e. Civil-Military Cooperation, Multinational Logistics, Cyber Defence, and Military Role in Border Management). They also help in the design of integrated, feasible training solutions. The recently reviewed EUMTG Terms of Reference now clearly acknowledge the role of the ESDC: 'The ESDC plays a central role in coordinating and conducting the CSDP military training at EU level. [...] The ESDC may act as a facilitator between the EUMTG and the EUCTG [EU Civilian Training Group] as far as civilian-military training is concerned'.

Since 2018 and on an annual basis, the ESDC, the EUMS and other crisis management structures have organised the 'CSDP Training and Education Conference'. The event brings together staff from CSDP missions and operations (Deputy Heads of Mission/Mission Commanders, Heads of Training Units, Heads of Human Resources as well as Press and Public Information Officers), training experts from various MS ministries, repre-

sentatives of relevant EU institutions and agencies, as well as training providers in the crisis management field.

Following a request from the Chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) in 2016, the ESDC and the EUMS, in a combined effort, developed and delivered two important initiatives: the Advanced Modular Training (AMT) and Sectoral Qualifications Framework for Military Officers (SQF-MILOF). The first pilot AMT was carried out in 2018. It was then continued on an annual basis, with the last 2 iterations (2020, 2021) conducted in virtual format. The aim of the AMT is to provide civilian and military senior officers with the skills and knowledge needed to help them perform their duties in the CSDP area. The EUMS and the MPCCC are the main training audience for this course, contributing almost 50% of the participants.

The SQF-MILOF was completed in December 2020 after more than two years of work conducted within a dedicated working group, with direct support from the EUMS and extensive consultation with MS. It was in the context of validation that the ESDC Secretariat invited the EUMS to test specific elements of the SQF-MILOF. Thirty-six officers (with the rank of Major, Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel), assigned to the EUMS from twenty-six MS, answered the ESDC request and informally validated the SQF-MILOF. The aim of the informal validation was to verify to what extent the learning outcomes described by the SQF-MILOF and MILOF-CORE cover the actual knowledge, skills, responsibility and autonomy acquired by individual officers in the MS during their career.

We take this opportunity to thank EUMS for the steady, professional and outstanding cooperation.

Congratulations on the 20th anniversary!

Experts for EU Crisis Response Capability

BY **LIEUTENANT GENERAL JÜRGEN KNAPPE**, COMMANDER OF THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT HEADQUARTERS ULM AND THE JOINT SUPPORT AND ENABLING COMMAND


The Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm was established in 2013 to serve as Germany's key contribution to strengthening the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The primary goal was to substantiate the EU's capacity for action and crisis response capability by enhancing planning and command and control capabilities at the military-strategic and operational levels. Establishing the "Ulm Command" was Germany's response to challenges posed by international crises in Europe's immediate neighbourhood.

With its military and civilian staff from currently eight nations (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Romania), the Ulm Command has since made considerable contributions to the EU's CSDP. For the future, the Command intends to further expand its cooperation with the EU Military Staff and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) on the basis of its realigned mission, using its valuable EU and NATO expertise gained in Ulm, and its unique functional infrastructure nowhere else to be found in the Bundeswehr.

Reorientation of the MN JHQ Ulm

The Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm and its predecessor, the Response Forces Operations Command, have been making considerable contributions to the EU's crisis response capability since 2009, when the Federal Republic of Germany pledged the Command to the EU. Along with five other national EU command headquarters in France (Paris), Greece (Larissa), Italy (Rome), Spain (Rota), and—on a case-by-case basis—in Poland (Krakow), the MN JHQ Ulm is currently available for the planning, command and control of operations across the entire Petersberg task spectrum at the military-strategic level outside Brussels.

COVID-19 conditions permitting, we will host the annual EU Commanders' Conference attended by the Director General of the EU Military Staff and the commanders of the EU command headquarters here in Ulm in November 2021. It is a visible sign



"In my capacity as Commander of the Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm, one of five national military-strategic headquarters pledged to the EU, it is my sincere pleasure to extend my congratulations to the EU Military Staff on its 20th anniversary. Along with my heartfelt thanks for our long-standing, successful cooperation, I assure you that the EU Military Staff can continue to rely on the Ulm Command to support the EU with its expertise in planning and command and control capability at the military-strategic level in the future."

Lt Gen Knappe, Commander of the Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm and the Joint Support and Enabling Command.

of the close cooperation between the Ulm Command and the EU Military Staff. In addition to participating in regular conferences and meetings hosted by the EU community, the Ulm Command has been actively involved in conceptual studies and concept developments for many years. Joint EU exercises, such as the recent "EU Integrated Resolve 2020," are high on the agenda of the MN JHQ Ulm. The multinational military staff as well as the civilian members of the Ulm Command use these exercises together with their colleagues from other EU command headquarters and the EU Military Staff to practice and coordinate their actions and reactions to crises in an integrated approach typically applied by the EU.

The MN JHQ Ulm has been subject to reorganization since early 2021. The reason for this structural adjustment is a redefinition of its mission using the valuable and proven EU expertise gained in Ulm over the years. The new structure is intended to reach the central goal of strengthening the EU's military planning and command and control capability. In its new structure, the MN JHQ Ulm will continue to embrace its responsibilities to the EU and, with the help of its multinational partners, make an essential German contribution to strengthening the EU CSDP. At the core of this reorganization is the establishment of an HQ Directorate capable of being augmented. It is designed to serve as a basis for building up two independent headquarters, the EU Operation Headquarters (EU OHQ) and a Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) headquarters.

Coinciding with Germany's takeover of the EU Council Presidency, the standby phase of EUBG 2020-2 began on 1 July 2020, and was extended to end on 31 March 2021. Now, we will continue to stand ready as ever to serve the EU as a military-strategic EU OHQ.

UTM command translates politico-military EU requirements into military action





Planning Capability Package: capabilities and expertise for EU command structures

In the coming years, we will share our expertise and long years of experience to help enhance and strengthen the EU's central command structure.

Being familiar with Brussels structures and actors, the Ulm Command knows about the EU's planning and command and control processes as well as its concepts, which the Command helped develop. The Ulm Command can also look back on many years of practical experience as a military-strategic headquarters establishing and preparing EU Battlegroups. In 2018, NATO certified the MN JHQ Ulm as an operational-level Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ). In the future, the Command will be able to contribute its valuable NATO expertise to the EU Military Staff as part of increasing EU-NATO cooperation. In 2018, the Ulm Command was also tasked with supporting the establishment of a new NATO headquarters in Ulm, the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC). JSEC will attain full operational capability in September 2021.

The MN JHQ Ulm has capabilities and expertise designed to temporarily reinforce central EU command structures in the EU Military Staff and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), enabling the EU to increase its response capability. Standing by to be called upon when needed by the EU, the modular Planning Capability Package (PCP) in Ulm can be used as a planning reinforcement providing an essential contribution to take the EU's Military Planning and Conduct Capability to the next level, especially in the time-critical early stages of an operation.

We will also share our expertise and long years of experience to help prepare and provide another DEU-led EUBG in 2025. In order to prepare for these future tasks, we need to undergo regular training. As part of our training efforts, we will support the MILEX exercise series with our PCP from 2022, and again, as OHQ for the Integrated Resolve/Multilayer 2024 exercise.

Future interface for closer EU-NATO cooperation

Cooperation between the EU and NATO should continue to intensify as it is paramount for Europe's safety and security, and harbours additional potential to boost EU resilience and capacity to act in terms of security and defence. Both organ-

izations are integral and indispensable components of the European security architecture.

The focus is on close cooperation in key areas, such as military mobility, aimed at facilitating the deployment of personnel and materiel. Conducting joint military exercises is intended to improve crisis and conflict response capabilities. Cyber defence and resilience building are two areas holding opportunities for even closer cooperation.

Thanks to the establishment of JSEC in 2018, the relocation of NATO's strategically oriented Standing Joint Logistic Support Group (SJLSG) headquarters, and the reorientation of the MN JHQ Ulm, this location in Ulm, Germany, provides the ground for a unique European melting pot of synergies between NATO and EU headquarters, staffs, and different echelons.

In future, the complex "Military Mobility" project in particular will also be implemented below the politico-strategic level. Due to their military mission, JSEC and the SJLSG have a fundamental interest in this specific field. Resulting from its dual role as a JLSG HQ and an EU OHQ, the topic of Military Mobility has been gaining ground within the MN JHQ Ulm as well.

Modern and functional infrastructure equips Ulm garrison for future challenges

Our infrastructure contributes to strengthening security and defence efforts undertaken by the European Union and NATO. The specialized infrastructure currently being implemented at Wilhelmsburg Barracks offers modern, state-of-the-art functionality.

The construction of new multi-functional buildings for the multinational headquarters located inside the Wilhelmsburg compound offers the possibility to store, manage and perform maintenance on cutting-edge technical equipment and mobile infrastructure while training military personnel. This ensures quick availability for operations. This important milestone in materiel management serves to further improve the headquarters' deployability and command and control capability, and represents a vital contribution to strengthening EU and NATO security and defence efforts.

This will further enhance Ulm's standing as a multinational garrison. As one of a kind in the entire Bundeswehr, we are at Germany's centre of multinational expertise and international military cooperation for the EU and NATO. This is our contribution to strengthening EU cooperation and crisis response capability.

NATO AND EU, STRENGTH IN ELEMENTARITY

BY **LT GEN HANS-WERNER WIERMANN**, DG NATO IMS

Built on a foundation of common interests and challenges, the NATO-EU cooperation has grown into a strong and mutually beneficial partnership. Initiated in the 1990s, this relationship was institutionalised over a decade later with the 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy. This milestone set out common political principles and reaffirmed the EU's access to NATO's planning capabilities for its own military operations. To this day, one of the key tenants of the EU-NATO cooperation remains the single set of forces. This means that common members should not have two sets of capability requirements, but only a single set for both. Therefore, efficiency must be ensured and duplication avoided.

Each subsequent NATO summit has further enriched this cooperation. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the NATO Allies approved the Strategic Concept, which, amongst others, committed the Alliance to working more closely with other international organisations, such as the EU, to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations. In Warsaw in July 2016, the two organisations outlined areas for strengthened cooperation in light of the common emerging security threats to the east and south, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security and exercises. Two years later, in Brussels, both institutions agreed, through a joint declaration, to focus on areas such as military mobility, counter-terrorism and strengthening resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related risks as well as promoting the women, peace and security agenda. Today, our cooperation includes 74 projects to promote European security, capacity building, crisis management and training.

Bridging the gap between NATO and the EU has been an important element in the development of an international comprehensive approach to crisis management, especially for the COVID-19 crisis, which has required the effective application of both military and civilian means. This crisis has shown the key role that the militaries play in support of national civilian efforts, and the importance of NATO mechanisms to coordinate assistance. Across the Alliance and the EU, national armed forces have been supporting the civilian response, deploying military medics to assist over-run civilian facilities, constructing almost 100 field hospitals, evacuating patients as well as repatriating citizens, securing borders and helping with testing and transport of medical supplies. The pandemic has seen the largest peacetime military deployment in history. The pandemic also reiterated the requirement for coordination in the medical sector, especially between civilian and military entities. Established in 2019, the Multinational Medical Coordination Centre/European Medical Command (MMCC/EMC) builds bridges between civilian and military medical experts and stakeholders – from NATO, the EU and their respective nations – to increase their medical interoperability and their operational readiness. This complements



LT GEN HANS-WERNER WIERMANN, DG NATO IMS

the efforts by NATO and EU staffs to exchange information, regularly, on the work to support NATO Allies and partners. Staff from NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) have remained in close contact with the EU's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) and with the its Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). This has ensured that all activities remain coherent, complementary and transparent.

Last year, NATO also established a trust fund for the purchase of urgently needed items, and a stockpile of medical supplies. To date, sixteen NATO Allies have made financial contributions to the NATO Pandemic Response Trust Fund, including Albania, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Slovakia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Some NATO Allies have benefitted from the trust fund, for example, Albania, Czech Republic, Montenegro and North Macedonia have also received more than 1.5 million euros in medical supplies. More than half of the receiving Nations are also EU Members, demonstrating that support provided by NATO also lightens the burden of responsibility for the EU.

Additionally, since last April, the Rapid Air Mobility initiative has facilitated hundreds of NATO flights to deliver critical supplies around the world. Allied aircraft on relief flights now use a NATO Call Sign, and receive priority handling by Air Traffic





Control in Europe. This has been made possible thanks to close cooperation with EUROCONTROL, which handles the flow of all air traffic over Europe. Besides having contributed to a rapid and substantial force mobilisation in responding to the virus, NATO has upheld its military readiness. From its battlegroups in the east of the Alliance to its missions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO's enduring commitment to peace and security has not wavered. Securing its deterrence and defence posture, benefits not only NATO Allies but the wider Euro-Atlantic region as well.

Work previously initiated, between NATO and the EU, on countering disinformation has come into sharp focus in the last year during this pandemic, as state and non-state actors attempt to exploit the COVID-19 crisis. Both organisations and their members have been actively targeted by malicious sources trying to sow divisions and undermine democracies. Therefore, NATO and the EU have been working closely and diligently with all Allies and partners to identify, monitor and expose disinformation by sharing information and insight. In times of crisis, the truth and conveying accurate information to the public can save lives.



This cooperation extends across most operational domains. As NATO marks the fifth anniversary of its enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland, – the embodiment of reliable deterrence and defence – the ongoing work between the two institutions on military mobility has been essential. Through legislative measures, the simplification of procedures and diplomatic clearances to enable rapid crossing of borders, on land, in the air, and at sea, NATO has been able to improve the readiness of its forces, as well as increase their ability to move within Europe, in peacetime, crisis or conflict.

Besides boosting its own military posture from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, NATO has also been supporting the EU's maritime activities. In the Aegean, the Alliance has been actively supporting efforts to reduce human trafficking and illegal migration. NATO ships are providing real-time information to the coastguards and relevant national authorities of Greece and Turkey, as well as to the EU's Frontex operation, helping them in their efforts to tackle this crisis.

Our cooperation has also taken to the skies. Other than, the recent NATO Call Sign established during the pandemic, NATO and the EU have joined forces on a number of projects. The most notable must be the establishment of the Multi Role Tanker Transport Capability (MRTT-C). Set up by 6 NATO Allies – Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway – all EU Members, with the exception of Norway, the MRTT-C project has enabled these nations to pool their resources and collectively acquire an Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft as well as establish a multinationally owned and operated fleet of MRTTs. This is another prime example in avoiding duplication and maximizing resources.

In the cyber domain, NATO and the EU are cooperating through a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence. In light of common challenges, they are strengthening their cooperation, notably in the areas of information exchange, training, research and exercises. For example, in 2019, the NATO Secretary General attended CYBRID, an EU hybrid exercise in Estonia, while EU representatives took part in NATO's annual exercises such as CMX and cyber coalition. Parallel and coordinated exercises help NATO and the EU improve their knowledge of each other's working methods and their ability to coordinate. Furthermore, the NATO and EU cyber incident response teams exchange policy updates and best practices. Space is the youngest of NATO's operational domain. While both NATO and the EU have been exploring its potential and defence individually, cooperation remains limited at this stage. Considering that, of the around 2,400 satellites in Earth's orbit - 60% of which belong to NATO countries or companies located in the Alliance's territory – synergies in this domain seem inevitable.

So for the last 30 years, this partnership has flourished, promoting peace, security, economic stability while avoiding duplication. This is partly due to a better understanding of the role of each organisation but also because there has been a flexibility to adapt and evolve. In an attempt to improve on the delivery of their respective missions, both NATO and the EU have undertaken a process of self-examination to ensure they remain fit for purpose. For NATO, it takes the form of the NATO 2030 process, which aims to provide a more integrated approach to resilience, more investment in technology, closer partnerships, and address the security implications of climate change. For the EU, the Strategic Compass will strengthen common European security, by defining future threats, goals and ambitions in defence. But most of all it is an opportunity to align and expand our ambitions for the NATO-EU cooperation, to look to the future together and develop a common understanding of the challenges and opportunities that we face.

UN Liaison Office

BY UN LIAISON OFFICE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

On behalf of the United Nations, the UN liaison office for peace and security (UNLOPS) in Brussels congratulates the EU Military Staff on its twentieth anniversary. In this time a long-standing and trusted partnership between the UN and EU has developed linked to the work of the EUMS on peace operations and crisis management. This began in an operational setting in 2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), where the EU deployed its first ever-military mission CONCORDIA/FYROM, backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1371.

Only two months later, the EU deployed operation Artemis to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in support of MONUC. 2003 also saw the formal establishment of the EU-UN partnership on crisis management and peacekeeping through a first Joint Declaration, followed by a Joint Action Plan in 2011 and a first set of joint priorities for strategic engagement on peacekeeping and crisis management in 2015. The semi-annual EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management has proven key in ensuring the practical follow-up of joint priorities, providing a platform for regular strategic dialogue.

As a result, in the framework of the joint priorities for the years 2019-2021, the EU and the UN were able to strengthen their cooperation on key issues of mutual interest, including cooperation on the ground in a number of theatres, including in Mali, where EUTM Mali and MINUSMA work closely together in support of the defence sector.



HR/VP Josep Borrell (left), Under-Secretary General Jean-Pierre Lacroix (centre), and Portuguese Minister of National Defence João Gomes Cravinho (right) met at the informal defence ministers meeting in Lisbon on 28 May 2021 (photo: UNLOPS).

Other key highlights of the partnership on the ground include the stabilisation of Bangui by EUFOR RCA from 2014 in preparation for a handover to MINUSCA in 2015, as well as the launch of EUFOR RD Congo in support of MONUC during the election process in the DRC in 2006. As the EU is developing its Strategic Compass, the UN looks forward to exploring how to further enhance the UN-EU partnership in peace operations and crisis management in order to ensure its continued effectiveness in the face of the ever-increasing complexity of global conflicts and crises.

EU/UN Relationship

The EU is committed to multilateralism, with a strong and effective United Nations at its core. This commitment is rooted in the conviction that to be able respond to global crises, challenges and threats, the international community needs an efficient multilateral system, founded on universal rules and values.

Over the years the EU and UN have developed a strong strategic relationship, with cooperation taking place on a broad range of cross-cutting areas. These include the promotion of peace and security, human rights, winning the race against climate change, shaping the global digital agenda and most recently, re-building after the COVID-19 pandemic. All of which, having the intent of making the

This positive relationship permeates to the tactical level, with all EU CSDP missions having their own Technical agreement with the UN forces on the ground.

The EU will continue to support the UN as an indispensable forum for multilateral solutions to global challenges, and will continue to demonstrate global leadership, with a view to promoting a safer and better world for all.

UN/EU Cooperation at the tactical level ►

world a safer and better place.

In relation to Peace Operations and Crisis Management, the following areas for coordination are the priority of the EU and UN Strategic Partnership.

- Women Peace & Security.
- Cooperation between missions and operations.
- Transitions and stabilisation of mission-settings.
- Facilitate EU Member States' contributions to UN peace operations.
- Conflict Prevention and support to political solutions within mission-settings.
- Policing, Rule of Law & Security Sector Reform.
- Cooperation with and support to African peace operations.
- Training and capacity-building.





Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)

BY **LT COL GEORGIOS GAVRILAKIS**, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER WITH THE MILITARY PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY

DG EUMS and Dir MPCC at the Change of Command Ceremony RCA



training, assisting, advising and educating the NE Special Operation Forces (SOF) for an estimated period of two years.

The EU supports the efforts of Mozambique in promoting peace in Cabo Delgado and its neighbouring provinces with the establishment of the EU CSDP Military Training Mission Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique). The EU Council decided to launch EUTM Mozambique on 15 October 2021.

MPCC Review

The MPCC was established by the Council Decision of June 2017. Since then, it has assumed command of four EU Training Missions (EUTM) in Somalia, Mali, Central African Republic (CAR) and recently in Mozambique. MPCC developed and standardised the Mission Plans and represented those Missions in the ATHENA special committee (Currently EPF). Right now, the MPCC has validated its place as a permanent military command and control capability at the military-strategic level. By planning and conducting the four non-executive missions in Somalia, Mali, CAR and Mozambique, it has demonstrated to be able to provide added value to EU military crisis management as part of a wider effort to enhance EU's role as a civilian-military security provider. As also pointed out in Council conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy, the MPCC is an important contribution to the aim for the EU to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, as a part of its integrated approach to external conflicts and crises. In addition, during the Exercise EU Integrated Resolve 20 it has shown to be able to plan and conduct an executive operation of a Battle Group size, under COVID19 conditions and shortcomings mainly in manning, infrastructure and CIS. The MPCC is currently on its way to reach Phase 1 conditions. Any further developments beyond Phase 1 is subject to agreement by the MS. At previous EUMC meetings at the level of CHODs (Nov 2019, July 2020 and Nov 2020), the need to further evolve the MPCC was supported, in order to address the current and future security challenges and demands.

Introduction

During its first four years, the MPCC has validated its place as a permanent military command and control capability at the military-strategic level. It has provided added-value to EU military crisis management as part of a wider effort to enhance the EU's role as a civilian-military security provider. MPCC continues its development, following a phased approach.

Three years after its activation as a static command and control entity in Brussels, the MPCC assumed the responsibility of an Operational Headquarters during the EU Integrated Resolve 20 (IR20) exercise. The exercise scenario of EU IR20, certainly tested MPCC's ability to act as an Operational Headquarters responsible for the strategic planning and conduct of a military operation. All this in the midst of a real-life pandemic that provided an additional but significant challenge.

In 2020, the mandates of the three EU Training Missions in Mali, Somalia, RCA were reviewed. MPCC, as the Operational Headquarters, developed the respective Mission Plans and it continues to plan in close coordination with the EUTMs for the preparation of the execution of new tasks derived from the renewed mandates.

On the 20 May 2021 the Political and Security Committee (PSC) approved the offer of Germany to integrate the Military Assistance Task Force (MATF) GAZELLE in EUTM Mali, operating in Niger and providing military assistance through

JSCC

MPCC works in parallel and in a coordinated way with the Civilian Planning and conduct Capability (CPCC) most notably through a Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC). Its function is to bring civilian and military expertise together in key mission support areas, and to strengthen and enable effective civilian-military coordination and cooperation in the operational planning and conduct of CSDP missions. Through the JSCC, the Director MPCC and the Director CPCC have a tool to enhance and promote civil-military synergies.

JSCC has produced so far tangible results in all Mission Areas for the benefit of EU's military and civilian missions.



The Secretary General of the EEAS and Director MPCC at the Mission Force Commanders' Conference

MPCC Main Challenges

■ COVID-19 Evolution

2020 and 2021 will be globally characterized by the COVID-19 pandemic and its societal and economic impact. The pandemic restrictions imposed challenges to the HQ in Brussels, but also the duty of care to all personnel in all three mission areas. MPCC reacted and adapted in a timely and effective way by issuing direction and guidance covering all possible areas. The missions adapted and reduced temporarily their presence by redeploying their non-essential personnel to reduce the risk to EUTM personnel and the Host Nations (HN). MPCC facilitated EUTMs self-sustainability for Medical Supplies and Strategic Air Medical Evacuation in close coordination with the missions, Member States and other entities (eg. European Air Transport Command). The Missions remained active in support of the Host Nations. Advisory activities were conducted mainly via remote means. MPCC developed “indicators” for monitoring Host Nation’s situation with a view to resuming training activities when the situation permitted. The measures taken were out of an abundance of caution but the safety of EUTM personnel as well the Host Nation’s population was paramount in MPCC planning.

■ Changes to the Missions Mandates (The Enlargement of the Missions Areas)

A greater level of ambition and a wider Mission Area require a greater force. This has been built up according to the conditions set on the ground and in continuation of the previous mandates.

■ Ownership of Defense Sector Reform


The Host Nations capacities to sustain their planned progress on the Defence Sector Reform, notably on new recruitments to form the final Armed Forces composition are to be kept at realistic levels, supportable by the EUTMs.

■ Third countries continued and growing influence

It is essential to figure out ways how to promote the EU's primary role on Defence Sector reform in view of increasing third countries influence in the missions’ areas.

■ Mobility and support

In order for decentralised activities to be provided, intra-theatre mobility and medical evacuation are of paramount importance. In cases that the revised force structure is not fulfilled, alternative options are being explored through contracting solutions. As depicted in Strategic review regarding enablement of effective, safe and secure delivery of the new tasks it is crucial to maintain awareness about importance of air mobility and aeromedical evacuation with regard to third party support priorities.



MPCC joint operations centre being exercised during EX IR20



MPCC Dir and MPCC Deputy Dir & COS at the MPCC Mission Force Commanders Conference 2021

European Union Training Missions – The Integrated Approach

The Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy identifies the Integrated Approach as the framework for a more coherent and holistic engagement by the EU to Crisis Management. It promotes human security and thereby increases the security of the EU and its citizens.

It is clear to EU Member States that current security challenges cannot be improved by military means alone. However, the EU has at its disposal a range of policies and instruments to respond to these security challenges including those in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. These instruments are multi-dimensional and include Diplomacy, Economic actions, Humanitarian Assistance, Development cooperation and CSDP activities, which includes the deployment of security and defence actors. It is multi-level, applied at the local, national, regional and global levels, as needed. The Integrated Approach is also multi-phase and is applied throughout all phases of a conflict, including prevention, crisis response, stabilisation and longer-term peacebuilding, in order to contribute to sustainable peace. This multi-lateral approach brings together Member States, relevant EU institutions and other international and regional partners as well as civil society organisations. The more coherent all actors work together - the more effective and efficient is the EU's engagement. The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as the military-strategic Headquarters for the EU's non-executive military CSDP Missions in Brussels is part of the EU's Integrated Approach in Mali, Somalia, RCA and Mozambique, locally and on a regional basis.



MPCC Exercise Integrated Resolve 20



EUTM Mali

The restoration of a lasting peace and stability in Mali is essential for long-term stability in the Sahel region, which in turn affects regional peace and stability in Africa and indeed European security. At the request of the Malian Government and based on UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), in particular the UNSCR 2071, EU Member States agreed to establish an EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to train the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF). The First Mandate for this mission was established in January 2013. The mission's mandate has been renewed four times, the latest of which was adopted in May 2020. As part of the Integrated approach and in order to optimise support to the MaAF, EUTM Mali cooperates and coordinates with its partners such as MINUSMA and the French Operation Barkhane.



Following the EU's recent Strategic Review process for EUTM Mali, an EU Council decision expanded the scope of EUTM Mali's mandate to all five Sahel countries, to support their respective defence sectors/National Armed Forces, and all G5 Sahel Joint Force contingents. EUTM Mali's mandate was also extended until 18 May 2024, with a potential mid-term Strategic Review half way.

The mission contributes to improve MaAF operational capacities under civilian oversight and in that scope provides training, advice, non – executive accompaniment and military assistance. To date over 15,000 MaAF soldiers NCOs and Officers have benefited from this contribution. In addition to this, the first activities in support of G5S JF and regional activities in Centre Mali have successfully been conducted.



Robust Training, EUTM Mali



A solid academic foundation is a key component of the training provided by EUTM Mali

Currently there is a balance between centralised and decentralised activities conducted in various places (Sevare, Gao, Kidal, Tibuktu, Segou, Banankoro). Efforts to rebase EUTM Mali in Bamako and to establish a permanent footprint in the country's centre (SEVARE) are currently ongoing; this will lead to a strategic reorientation of the Mission in line with the Malian Armed Forces' needs as concluded by EU Member States during the latest Strategic Review.



Graduation ceremony, EUTM Mali

Military Assistance Task Force (MATF) GAZELLE

The integration of MATF GAZELLE into EUTM Mali has become effective since the 14th of August 2021. MATF's GAZELLE visibility, so far, is high in Niger and it has proven its reliability and credibility. The integration of MATF GAZELLE in EUTM Mali leads immediately to EUTM Mali's mandate delivery in Niger through a well-established, qualified and credible force, highly trusted by Niger's authorities. The integration of the Military Assistance Task Force (MATF) GAZELLE in EUTM's Mali 5th mandate allows the EU's commitment in the effort that started as a bilateral DE-NER cooperation. The EUTM Mali through the MATF GAZELLE focuses on establishing a NER Special Forces structure based on a self-sustained BSI (Bataillon Special intervention) through training, educating and mentoring pillars. It also supports the build-up of a SOF School in TILLIA to enable autonomous and permanent NER capacities to train sufficiently the NER SOF on a self-sustainable basis. There is full complementarity of EUTM Mali with all the other EU activities in Mali and Niger. EUCAP SAHEL Niger, EUCAP SAHEL Mali and the EU's support to the Sahel Joint Force consist the proof of the EU's paramount role as a provider of development and humanitarian assistance the region through its institutions.



Planning is a key component in all military training and education. EUTM Somalia in action.



EUTM Somalia

Following its Strategic Review, the 7th Mandate remains focused supporting the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) through advisory, mentoring, “train the trainers” and specialized training in order to develop its Defence Institutions. Beyond this, the current mandate has the potential to address all Somali Security Forces/Services as required. This would be in coordination with EUCAP Somalia (the civilian CSDP Mission) and partners such as AMISOM, UNSOM/UNSOS, the US and UK.


In the training domain, the Mission is handing over tactical level combat troop training for Light Infantry Companies to SNAF trainers qualified by the Mission and - whenever possible - mentoring their performance to safeguard quality. The Mission EUTM Somalia is also developing options to assess the impact and performance of the EUTM trained units and supports the set-up and establishment of a Joint Logistic Command. This is a major step, requiring Mission activities beyond Mogadishu, and given the volatile security environment, would require additional PSC approval, if it were to go ahead.

EUTM Somalia has delivered on its training mission, which benefited over 7000 SNAF personnel, ranging from regular soldiers up to high-ranking officers. In total eight Light Infantry Companies have been trained since the launch of the mission in 2010.

The Mission’s mentoring pillar is mainly focused on developing a Somali owned training system. This is supported through specific Train the Trainer courses and by mentoring the Somali management of the General Dhagabadan Training Centre in Mogadishu.

Additional Mission deliverables include the production of legal codes, the planning of future structures (MoD guide 2020), the drafting of key security policies, cooperation under Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) Strand 2A, the development of a functioning SNAF HQ operations room and the support to joint operational planning with AMISOM.

Progress is heavily dependent on Somali political decision-making on the future model of the State (e.g. which form of federalism), the agreement of a final Constitution, and related roles and responsibilities, notably for future Somali National Armed Forces. While, the Mission’s progress appears measured, the implementation of serious Security Sector Reforms needs to be founded on inclusive Somali consent if it is to be meaningful.



Graduation Day for SNA Cadets



EUTM RCA

The third mandate of the EU Training Mission (EUTM RCA) in the Central African Republic (CAR) was extended until 19 September 2022 and sees an enlargement of the Mission Area to cover the whole territory of RCA. This is to allow EUTM RCA to provide military assistance (including non-executive accompaniment) in garrisons as required by FACA for the implementation of the National Defence Plan (NDP) and to assess performance of EUTM RCA trained FACA units.

Along with an extended Mission Area, the EU Member States approved a 27% increase in the ceiling of the revised force structure.

This Mission's objective is a modernised, effective and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA).

Since its launch in June 2016, EUTM RCA trained and educated almost 8,500 FACA personnel and has engaged in the training of FACA units, from Commanders to recruits. The mission provides a large variety of 'Quick Impact and Specialised Courses' and now is changing its approach from "train FACA soldiers" to a "monitor FACA trainers" and from "individual" to "collective training".

Quick impact and qualifying courses were delivered in different domains to more than 2,750 Officers, NCOs and specialists/enlisted personnel. These courses lasted from one week to several months, and focused on radio operations, leadership, tactics, IHL, Human Rights, sexual violence prevention, HIV/AIDS, leadership, gender, logistics intelligence, administration and combat first aid monitor.

The Operational training was provided to five Battalions, totalling 2,500 personnel. The duration of training was between three to seven months and focused on improved unit performance within the command-and-control system. Platoon leaders and Company Commanders completed additional leadership courses, including combat tactics, combat shooting, combat rescue, international humanitarian law (IHL) and the courses already mentioned above.

In addition to this, and in addition to the provision of advice to the MoD and General Staff in all functional areas, it has also provided validation and certification of FACA personnel trained by a third party to 300 personnel and 4 basic training iterations for more than 2,850 recruits. The Mission has also supported FACA in building an operational trainers pool, capable of independently providing training and education.

Under advice of EUTM RCA, the authorities of CAR have drafted a significant amount of regulatory and doctrinal documents for the governance of FACA. This includes the DSR strategy, the NDP, the Military Programming Law (2019–23), the Military Justice Code (Code de Justice Militaire, 2017) as well as the Law on the General Statute of the Military (Loi sur le Statut General des Militaires, promulgated in Jul 2020).

MINUSCA is the main provider of support to the CAR-owned SSR process and has a leading role in the coordination of the international community support efforts. EUTM RCA has the leading role in DSR, it is closely working with CAR authorities and International Community acting in CAR.



EUTM Mozambique deploys as the request of the host nation

EUTM MOZAMBIQUE

On 30 March 2021, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) endorsed a Political Framework for Crisis Approach in Cabo Delgado and considered that a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) action would be appropriate, focused on training of, and assistance to, the Mozambican armed forces, in the context of the Union's Integrated Approach for the crisis in Cabo Delgado. By letter dated 3 June 2021, the President of Mozambique welcomed the deployment of an EU non-executive CSDP mission in Mozambique, in order to help build the capacity of the Mozambican defence and security forces to respond more efficiently to security and humanitarian risks in Cabo Delgado. The EU established a military training mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) in order to support a more efficient and effective response by the Mozambican armed forces to the crisis in Cabo Delgado in compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law. Following the establishment of the Mission in July 2021, the Council decided to launch the EUTM Mozambique on the 15th October 2021.

The strategic objective of EUTM Mozambique is to support the capacity building of the units of the Mozambican armed forces selected to compose a future Quick Reaction Force (QRF), in order for them to develop the necessary and sustainable capacities to restore safety and security in Cabo Delgado.

For that purpose, EUTM Mozambique is to:

- provide the selected units of the Mozambican armed forces and their leadership with military training including operation-

al preparation, specialised training including on counter-terrorism, and training and education on compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians, and on respect for the rule of law;

- support the development of command and control structures and mechanisms of the QRF, such as a sustainable operational cycle, and trains the QRF leadership to perform their duties according to their operational objective;

- as part of the training curriculum, where equipment, which is equipment other than military equipment, or platforms, designed to deliver lethal force, is provided by a Union assistance measure, train the selected units to properly use and maintain such equipment;

- Establish, in close coordination and consultation with Mozambican authorities, a knowledge management cycle to track the conduct of the trained units once deployed in Cabo Delgado and assess their compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law.

The establishment of EUTM Mozambique constitutes a part of the EU's response to the request of the Government of Mozambique to address the crisis in Cabo Delgado including political dialogue, humanitarian aid, peacebuilding, security and development. Over the next 2 years, the new mission will train selected Mozambican units to compose a quick reaction force to help the local armed forces in their efforts to bring back safety and security to Cabo Delgado province.



EUMS and EDA, Distinct Partners, Common Goal

BY MR JIŘÍ ŠEDIVÝ, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)



Separate European entities with different legal bases and roles, yet part of the same EU defence cosmos: the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) not only work under the same authority - the EU High Representative/Vice President of the Commission/Head of EDA - but are

also close partners working hand-in-hand towards the same objective of contributing to a stronger and more efficient Europe of Defence.

EDA and EUMS are both indispensable in the European Union's institutional defence architecture. While EDA offers the platform and expert hub for collaborative defence research and capability development in Europe, the EUMS - under the direction of the EU High Representative/Vice President of the Commission, as well as the EU Military Committee (EUMC) - supports the European External Action Service (EEAS) and has thus the crucial role of coordinating the military instrument, with a particular focus on EU CSDP missions and operations, both military and civilian requiring military support. This division of labour has proven itself: here, the

EUMS dealing with the operational, military aspects of CSDP missions and operations as well as the identification of CSDP related military requirements and related capability shortfalls through the Headline Goal Process; there, EDA with a broad mandate to look at the entire European defence capability landscape, facilitating and managing collaborative defence capability development and research to support Member States in their related efforts. Two sets of roles and tasks that are unique and therefore complementary. Both must be used hand-in-hand to support a strong European defence landscape from which the forces and capabilities are drawn to conduct military operations effectively.

Hence the need for close cooperation and complementarity between the EUMS and EDA; something our two institutions have cultivated and practised throughout the years.

Capability Development Plan (CDP)

A prime example of our good cooperation is the revision of the agreed EU Capability Development Priorities derived from the Capability Development Plan (CDP). Since 2008, the EDA has been producing the CDP to address short- to mid- and long-term security and defence challenges, which also benefits from key contributions provided by Member States, as well as the EUMC and the EUMS. The CDP includes the results of the military Headline Goal Process which sets the requirements for military CSDP, but also long-term trends and Member States' national plans and programmes, including the R&T and industrial dimension, which contributes to coherent long-term capability development amongst Member States. The CDP is created to guide decision-making at EU and national levels regarding defence capability development and to provide a set of the agreed EU Capability Development Priorities, as a common reference for CARD, PESCO and the EDF. The overall objective is to increase coherence between Member States' defence planning and to encourage European cooperation by looking together at future operational needs.

The CDP revision benefits from several inputs such as the Headline Goal Process, studies on long-term trends, lessons learned from missions and operations and information on current plans and programmes. The resulting EU Capability Development Priorities are the outcome of an in-depth assessment conducted on the basis of contributions provided by Member States, EUMC and EUMS on short-term, mid-term and long-term capability trends: capability shortfalls analyses and lessons learned from recent CSDP operations provided by the EUMC, defence plans and their potential for future European cooperation in each of the capability domains, and long-term capability trends and evolution of related military needs based on technological perspective (2035 and beyond), benefiting from EDA expertise in defence R&T domain.



CARD FOCUS AREAS



CARD

EDA and the EUMS also have shared responsibilities (together with the EEAS) in the secretariat of the EU's Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). The CARD is a key tool in support of the overall coherence of defence capability development in the EU. It has the function to provide a comprehensive overview of the European defence landscape over time and also serves as a pathfinder for collaborative opportunities. The first full CARD cycle was completed last November when EDA delivered to Ministers of Defence the 2020 CARD Report with a comprehensive set of findings on the current defence landscape and actionable recommendations on how to reduce the fragmentation of European defence landscape and boost joint planning, defence research and collaborative capability development in the future. Together with the EEAS, the EUMS was fully engaged in all four phases of the CARD exercise - preparation of the CARD initial information, bilateral dialogues with Member States, CARD analysis, drafting of the final CARD Report. In particular, the EEAS/EUMS contributed with an analysis of the implementation of the High Impact Capability Goals (HICGs), an analysis of participating Member States' operational activities and resulting collaborative opportunities in support of CSDP operations and missions.

Here again, without such close cooperation, the final CARD assessment, findings and recommendations would not have been as informative and operational for the future as they proved to be. We should pursue on this cooperative path for the next CARD cycles.

PESCO

EDA and the EEAS/EUMS also work together very fruitfully in the PESCO secretariat which serves as a platform where the Member States participating in the Permanent Structured Cooperation can identify, assess and consolidate possible projects to make sure they respond to capability gaps and priorities previously identified in the CDP. While we work hand-in-hand in the PESCO secretariat, each of us has its specific role to play. The EUMS and EEAS notably contribute to the High Representative's (HR) annual assessment of PES-

CO Member States' contributions with regard to operational aspects and the contribution of proposed PESCO projects to operational needs. EDA complements the HR's assessment of Member States' contributions with regard to capabilities. In addition, EDA facilitates collaborative capability development projects, including by ensuring that there is no unnecessary duplication with existing initiatives also in other institutional contexts.

As already said before: a division of labour that has proved its merits and, therefore, should be continued in the future.

Support to missions & operations

Another important - and growing - dimension of the EDA-EUMS cooperation is the support the Agency provides to CSDP missions and operations by offering different tools and instruments to mission commanders. Today, these services range from commercially procured Satcom solutions (EU Satcom Market project) and the pooling & sharing of governmental satellite communications (GOVSATCOM Demo project) to maritime surveillance support (MARSUR project), the provision of commonly procured air medical evacuation (AIRMEDEVAC project), geospatial information support (GISMO project), common diplomatic clearances for the crossing of airspaces/land and the organisation of cyber awareness seminars for mission headquarters, to name only them. By putting all those existing (and potential future) services at the disposal of Member States and the various CSDP missions and operations, EDA helps the EUMS and EUMC to create the right circumstances in which the military can conduct their operations and missions in the field, together with their civilian partners. EDA is proud to be part of that endeavour and will further enhance its efforts in that domain in the future.

EDA-EUMS cooperation is indispensable and will remain in the future. The various EU defence actors should indeed work together, as each of them plays its specific role and brings to the table its own expertise while working for the same common objective: to make European defence stronger, together.

Happy Birthday, EUMS!

Civilian Planning Conduct Capability

BY FRANCISCO ESTEBAN PEREZ, CPCC CIVILIAN OPERATIONS COMMANDER

Francisco Esteban Perez



A 20th anniversary marks a true coming of age. I would like to extend my warmest congratulations, those of the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability staff as well as those of all personnel serving in the EU's 11 civilian missions, to our colleagues in the EU Military Staff past and present on reaching this momentous milestone. You have laid many

of the important foundation stones of Europe's future security and defence architecture.

Many of us on the civilian side of CSDP crisis management work closely with our military counterparts on a daily basis, whether in headquarters or in the field contributing to Team Europe impact on the ground. But the EUMS is more than a military counterpart to CPCC. It is also a partner and an ally, sharing a common outlook and bound by a similar operational culture. EUMS is also a neighbour. We work alongside each other in relevant CSDP structures but equally in close proximity, sharing office space and facilities, exchanging ideas and best practices. I am happy that this is set to continue when we both move to the same new premises next year. Our ability to project CIV-MIL capability to respond to crises around the world is the EU's signature calling card on the world stage and one of the many reasons why our crisis management expertise is so much in demand. In the coming years I have no doubt that we will work to reinforce our cooperation and ties so that we can deliver a truly integrated CIV-MIL crisis

response. That should be our goal.

Work on strengthening existing coordination in the area of logistics support through the Joint Support Coordination Cell must continue. But we should also look to the broader horizons of permanent cooperation in a number of different areas such as training, as well as improved strategic coordination on the ground and in Headquarters. We must explore every potential avenue open to us to make us more effective as a force for positive change. This will strengthen our ability to deploy the broadest range of crisis management tools to achieve our objectives, offering a multi layered response with strength in depth. We already do a lot together but I look forward to doing a lot more.

Good things we are told come in threes. This year we have already celebrated the 10th anniversary of the European External Action Service, now it is the turn of the EU Military Staff to look back with pride at 20 years of achievement. In June of next year it will be the turn of CPCC to mark its 15th anniversary as the Head Quarters of EU civilian crisis management. We are planning a broad range of activities and events to celebrate this landmark. Some of these activities will be one offs and other will have a longer-term legacy. Naturally, we will be using the occasion to shine the spotlight on the contribution civilian CSDP makes to EU crisis management, charting the way ahead in the aftermath of the adoption of the Strategic Compass.

But for now the focus is on EUMS and its achievements. Congratulations!

Launched in July 2012 as EUCAP Nestor, EUCAP Somalia contributes to the establishment and capacity building of maritime civilian law enforcement capability in Somalia





The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is the permanent Headquarters for CSDP civilian crisis management Missions. It is led by the Civilian Operations Commander Francisco Esteban Perez. The 11 civilian CSDP Missions deployed on three continents promote stability and the rule of law in fragile environments. CPCC civilian experts advise and train local partners in Africa, Europe and the Middle East. They also monitor the EU brokered ceasefire agreement in Georgia. The mandates of the civilian CSDP Missions are agreed by the Member States of the European Union and delivery is driven by the strategic leadership of the Civilian Operations Commander acting under the political direction of the Member States in the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative.



EUROCORPS, A FORCE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

BY COMMANDER EUROCORPS, LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER DEVOGELAERE



The Commanding General of EUROCORPS, Lieutenant-General Devogelaere, congratulates the EU Military Staff on its 20-year anniversary. EUROCORPS benefits from cooperation with the EUMS and the expertise it provides, especially through its commitments in the European Union Training Missions in both Mali and the Central African Republic. EUROCORPS looks forward, jointly with the EUMS, to contributing to EU security and defense for the next 20 years and beyond.



EUROCORPS is a multinational Army Corps Headquarters, respected for its military capabilities and performance in international operations. It benefits both the European Union and NATO. Founded in 1992, the goal was to create a military unit that could make a concrete contribution to the security of Europe. Today, EUROCORPS is one of the most engaged Corps Headquarters in Europe, and is consequently very experienced. Whilst at the same time deploying detachments in the European Union Training Missions in Mali and the Central African Republic, EUROCORPS is preparing, planning, and transforming towards its role as NATO Joint Headquarters in 2024, and as a Force Headquarters for the European Union Battlegroup in 2025.

EUROCORPS IS A CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND ITS PARTNERS.

Only six years after its foundation, EUROCORPS was assigned the task of leading operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR 1998-2000). Since then, EUROCORPS has been engaged in Kosovo (KFOR 2000), Afghanistan (ISAF 2004/2005 and 2012), in the European Union Training Missions in both Mali (2015 and 2021) and the Central African Republic (second semester 2016-2017 and 2021). The next rotation to the Central African Republic is scheduled for February 2022.

MEETING TODAY'S SECURITY DEMANDS! VERSATILE, FLEXIBLY DEPLOYABLE AND READY!

As a multinational, fully deployable and highly autonomous Headquarters, EUROCORPS is able to plan and conduct military operations across the full operational and intensity spectrum. It leads military operations within and beyond borders to protect the Union and its citizens from modern threats in a complex and volatile world. Hence, contemporary domestic security concerns, especially over terrorism, have prompted the conduct of military operations beyond our borders.

IN THE AFTERMATH OF TWO DECADES' PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, rigorous introspection in defines and security institutions is ongoing.

Amid increasing calls for more European defence, a powerful EU requires the means to expand its role as autonomous security provider. To augment the EU's institutional capacity, the existing EUROCORPS capabilities are available to command and control assigned standby troops. The already existing training, exercise and readiness cycles are well suited to implementing the EU's crisis response approach.


EU defence and security autonomy is not about separating from our transatlantic partner. On the contrary, NATO and EU defence policies and capabilities are complementary. EUROCORPS will therefore continue to foster multinational cooperation. Our Headquarters could play a greater role and deepen its relationship with the European External Action Service. We will continue demonstrating that our organization is a unique, professional and operational tool available and ready for both the European Union and NATO.

EUROCORPS would also take this opportunity to congratulate the EU Military Staff on its 20-year anniversary. EUROCORPS benefits from cooperation with the EUMS and the expertise it provides, especially through its commitments in the European Union Training Missions in both Mali and the Central African Republic. EUROCORPS looks forward, jointly with the EUMS, to contributing to EU security and defence for the next 20 years and beyond.



EUMS
Contributing to European Defence
and Security since 2001

EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF - EUMS STRUCTURE



= Functional Line
= EUMS Command Line
= MPCC Command Line

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EU Military Operations and Missions

