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**Programming of the
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 2014-2015**

**Strategy Paper/Multi-Annual Indicative Programme
Libya (2014-2015)**

Country Strategy Paper/Multi-Annual Indicative Programme

Libya **2014 - 2015**

Country Strategy Paper

Executive Summary

The European Union's medium to long term aim in Libya is to support the on-going Libyan transition towards becoming a democratic, stable and prosperous country in the European Union's neighbourhood. More specifically this involves promoting "deep and sustainable democracy", based on an inclusive constitution as well as fostering the emergence of strong, transparent and accountable institutions, an alert civil society and a vibrant private sector. In the areas of stability and security this requires addressing the root causes of conflict, supporting reconciliation efforts and promoting the integration of Libya within the region and the world at large. In this regard, support for the diversification of the economy and the creation of employment and trade opportunities will be critical.

To promote Libya's integration in the rules-based international political and economic system, the EU will seek to re-launch negotiations of a comprehensive bilateral agreement similar to the Association Agreements concluded with the other countries in the Maghreb. Such an agreement would cover EU - Libya political dialogue and key sectors like trade, energy, migration, security and a whole range of cooperation sectors.

The full range of instruments will be made available to ensure the success of the on-going transition as well as the modernisation of the country. This includes both programmes funded by the EU as interventions directly funded by Member States.

The EU will continue to support Libya's participation and membership in regional fora, such as the Union for the Mediterranean, as well as promoting closer links with its neighbours.

Libya urgently needs to adopt more modern administrative and management techniques, strengthen its capacity to plan and implement comprehensive strategies, build its institutions and administrative capacity and develop its legislative and regulatory framework. The success of these processes will determine the speed of Libya's transition and the establishment of a successful partnership with the EU in key areas of common interest such as integrated border management, migration, improving basic services like health and education, developing energy resources in hydrocarbons and renewable energies, creating the bases for successful investment in new sectors, such as information and communication technologies (ICT), improving fundamental freedoms and human rights. The European Union with its vast experience in assisting third countries, including under the European Neighbourhood Policy, is ready to make – at Libya's request – its expertise available in relevant focal areas.

The strategy for 2014 - 2015 can benefit from the progress made in EU-Libya cooperation in 2011 - 2013. In this period the EU focussed on the following sectors: public administration, democratic transition, civil society, health and education, migration, and security. The EU CSDP mission on border management EU BAM Libya is gradually becoming operational and an important programme on police and justice reform is now being implemented. For 2014 - 15 the EU has selected sectors that may contribute to reducing the risk of conflict while

building on the network and experience gained so far. Proposed areas for cooperation therefore include: continue with strengthening public administration and key democratic institutions such as the national parliament, but also elected municipal councils, supporting police and judiciary reform to promote higher confidence of the population in these key bodies, strengthening local government, supporting envisaged reforms of the health system and fostering job creation and capacity building, democratic participation and social inclusion amongst the Libyan youth. More emphasis will be placed on supporting the conduct of the elections and on the gradual development of a strong and vibrant civil society whose importance will grow even further in the context of a protracted political transition. In line with the concept of the integrated approach, supporting measures may be considered to the EU BAM mission on integrated border management.

1. Country analysis

1.1 Political situation

Since the Revolution in 2011, Libya has made significant **progress on the path of democratic transition** as witnessed, among others, by the first ever free elections in July 2012. The first elected Libyan government took office in November 2012, completing the official transfer of power from the interim authorities. Elections for the Constitutional Drafting Assembly took place in February 2014. However, security problems persist and the state's inability to hold the monopoly of the use of force continues to pose a significant challenge.

The management of the constitutional process and the related National Dialogue will dominate the political agenda in 2014 and possibly beyond. Other essential issues to be addressed include the security situation and the disarmament and reintegration of the armed groups, the interaction and division of power between central authorities, local communities and regions, the interaction between parliament and the government, meeting the citizens' expectations in terms of provision of public services and the transitional justice and reconciliation processes.

These important reforms and debates are due to take place against a background of weak and vulnerable state institutions. The previous regime undermined institutional stability by suspending the constitution and frequently and radically changing government structures. Power was concentrated in informal networks surrounding the Gaddafi family, as well as allied clans and tribes. In addition, Libyan state formation is recent in historical terms, as is the emergence of a central government controlling the Libyan territory. Libya emerged as a single polity only in 1951 and as a centralizing state in 1963. Memories of political loyalties to cities, tribes, or regions have remained alive, not least because tribal politics played a significant role under the previous regime. Such loyalties were reactivated during the Revolution, thereby shaping the course of the civil conflict, which had major implications for the post-conflict period. The political scene is dominated by a plethora of local actors of which most never lived in a democratic society. Political bargaining is a new phenomenon and often focuses on the rearrangement of networks reactivated or created by the Revolution.

The **constitutional process** could become the instrument through which the Libyans can debate and decide on a wide range of issues where their opinion was never asked before (e.g. role of the State, role of Libya as a Nation or the role of religion). For this process to be effective, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly will need to properly guide the overall

process, to actively communicate to the Libyan public and to ensure the inclusiveness of the process.

From a **security** perspective, the lack of a state monopoly on the use of force is considered a key driver of conflict, especially in a situation with high instability in the neighbourhood and the Sahel region. While the government still depends on armed groups to ensure security in large parts of the country, other groups continue to run prisons and enforce their own forms of justice, while yet others resort to violence to achieve political or criminal aims. All this triggers more grievances and further undermines confidence in the state. Religious extremists and organised crime find fertile breeding ground in a situation of permissive security environment and weak state control. Urban areas are suffering an increase of drugs trafficking and consumption together with a rise of petty crime, this has contributed to social unrest. Security problems in the country include revenge targeted killings (of particular concern in the East), opportunistic kidnappings, provocation attacks and bombings, inter-communal fighting and a sharp increase of common crime.

The Libyan authorities, supported by the international community, have started a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and a Security Sector Reform (SSR) process. While some progress has been made in training ex-fighters and reintegrating them in the police force, there remain significant challenges. The issue of arms and ammunition is among the key concerns as Libya has become a major provider of weapons to conflicts in the wider region. The lack of political settlement, weak institutional capacity, lack of internal coordination and the sheer size of the challenge contribute to the slow progress.

The **situation in the south** is particularly fragile as fighting has been occurring in places like Kufrah or Sabha since the fall of the previous regime. The formal state security apparatus is weak and the burden of maintaining security usually rests on coalitions of ex-fighter groups often only nominally under government control. The security situation along the porous southern border has implications on the stability of the country as well as the entire region as smuggling of weapons, access to strategic trading routes, identity and ethnic discrimination (e.g. against the Tebu) remain underlying sources of tension.

Establishing **secure and stable borders** constitutes a prerequisite for national security and economic development and is essential to ensure well-managed migration. Securing Libya's borders would also reinforce stability in the Sahel region and is critical to wider efforts aiming at managing migration and fighting terrorism, human trafficking and smuggling of drugs and arms. The lack of a functioning security apparatus, ongoing tribal conflicts and the absence of a clear government policy explain the lack of progress made so far. The 4,348 km of Libyan land borders represent an additional challenge to the ability of the authorities to control illegal trafficking and possible penetration of rogue elements from the Sahel region. The 1,770 km of Libyan coastline is the longest of any African country bordering the Mediterranean. In line with its pledge to assist Libya to improve border management, the **EU launched a civilian CSDP mission on integrated border management**. The mission will train, mentor and advise Libyan personnel so as to develop the country's capacities for securing its land, sea and air borders while remaining focused on human rights. Synergies with the ongoing and foreseen cooperation programmes will be sought in order to keep a comprehensive approach.

The **decentralization process** could become a major driver of tension if not addressed properly, but could equally be a powerful driver of peace and stability, bringing decision-making and essential services closer to the people. Early 2014 the General National Congress

(GNC) decided that (part of) the central government budget will be transferred to the – recently elected – municipal councils. For an effective decentralisation, a formal articulation of mandate and powers between the national and lower tiers of government would be required.¹

At the social level, several factors contribute to enhanced levels of social unrest: expectations on service delivery by the state are very high and so far unmet; lack of trust in police and justice, the large inflow of migrants triggers violence as these migrants are often associated with the previous regime and suffer racial discrimination.

The **lack of trust in the central authority** complicates the ability to deal with conflicts and the introduction and maintenance of the Rule of Law. While local mediation structures have played a positive role in many cases, they can often only diffuse violence, not address the root causes. The most needed **transitional justice** process may also suffer from a lack of legitimacy and public administration capacity. In the absence of a functioning police and justice system and a credible transitional justice process, there will remain a risk of armed groups taking justice in their own hands.

As a result people taking "justice" in their own hands, severe **violations of human rights** have occurred involving former officials, prisoners, migrants and minority groups considered to be on the "wrong side of history". While the authorities have undertaken significant efforts to comply with human right standards the lack of enforcement capacity over groups of ex-fighters has led to a substantial degree of immunity and lack of judicial consequences regarding violations committed by these groups.

Human rights concerns include:

i) **Protection of vulnerable groups**, notably migrants, asylum seekers and Internally Displaced People (IDPs). **Migrants**, particularly those of Sub Saharan origin, continue to suffer arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention, beatings in some cases amounting to torture, and exploitation in the hands of armed ex-fighter groups. **Asylum seekers**. The absence of a national asylum system and the non-recognition of the status of an asylum-seeker means that persons who under normal circumstances would have the right to certain basic protection – such as the right to have one's refugee status determined in accordance with a standard process – are actually denied such fundamental rights. No difference is made between irregular migrants and asylum-seekers in terms of treatment and conditions for staying in the country or being returned to countries of origin or transit. UNHCR's unofficial status in Libya and the pending signature of a long awaited MoU continues to limit the agency's ability to assist refugees and provide durable solutions such as voluntary repatriation, integration or resettlement. Similarly, other organisations focused on assisting refugees have been hampered in doing their work, including for projects financed by the European Commission. Regarding **IDPs** the forced displacement of the Tawergha (approximately 35. 000 people) and other smaller groups (Mashashya, Siaan and Gawalish) remains unsolved.

ii) Despite continuous calls from the elected authorities and international actors ex-fighter groups continue to arrest people and hold them in **unofficial detention facilities**. Continuing reports of torture, illegal detention and executions are cause of great concern. The authorities have acknowledged the problem and passed a law criminalising torture and abductions. The

¹ Some groups in Cyrenaica, so called "federalists", advocate for a radical interpretation of the above. Their level of representation seems however marginal, as shown by the election results of 12 July 2012

process of transferring into state custody the thousands of detainees is in progress, although at a slow speed.

iii) **Freedom of expression** improved remarkably with the fall of the former regime. Multiple new media outlets have mushroomed across the country and have experienced an unprecedented level of liberty. However, the situation has deteriorated throughout 2013 and early 2014 as some media and journalists have experienced attacks, detention and assassinations as a retaliation for their reports or publications.

iv) **Freedom of religion and belief** has suffered an important regression since the end of the civil conflict. Non-orthodox Sunni Muslims (Ahmadis and Sufis), Shias, Christian Copts, Greek Orthodox, Catholics and other religious minorities, have suffered episodes of harassment, terrorist attacks, detention, physical threats and destruction of shrines and properties.

v) **Women's rights.** Women are also subject to discrimination based – albeit not exclusively - on religious law. Discriminatory provisions against women (and children from “mixed” Libyan-foreign marriages) are included in Libyan marriage, divorce and inheritance law. Violence against women, especially domestic violence is a common problem that is hidden by Libyan social, religious and cultural customs. Rape as a weapon of war was used during the fighting in 2011. The social stigma which rape implies in Libya's society motivates that – still to date – many of the victims (women and men) continue to suffer their trauma in silence without seeking professional support.

vi) **Capital punishment** is still formally in force in the State of Libya although it has not been applied since the collapse of the former regime. Numerous illegal executions by militia have however been reported.

vii) The cooperation of the Libyan authorities with the **International Criminal Court (ICC)** regarding the case of Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, subject to an arrest warrant issued by the ICC following the adoption of UNSCR 1970 (2011), still constitutes an issue.

1.2 Economic situation, vulnerability and potential

Libya's economy is **structured primarily around the nation's energy sector**, which generates about 95% of export earnings, 80% of GDP, and 99% of government income. Substantial revenue from the energy sector coupled with a small population gives Libya the highest per capita GDPs in Africa. The oil and gas exploitation is additionally expected to further expand.

Oil production has shaped Libyan politics and society since the 1960s. Government expenditure is the ultimate source of almost all economic activity, and is therefore also the ultimate object of political power struggles. Through employment in the public sector and multiple channels of revenue distribution, the majority of Libya's population is directly or indirectly dependent on government funds. Different networks controlling the allocation of expenditure and public sector jobs have grown over the decades, and are at the heart of the political bargaining processes. The private sector is mostly limited to imports, retail and services; manual labour and hospitality services are overwhelmingly provided by foreign migrants. As a result, there is virtually no Libyan working class. Instead of common socio-

economic background and interests, networks and pressure groups are primarily structured around families, towns and tribes.

Libyans will have to decide what **economic model** they wish to see: an oil based dependency state with high subsidies and stipends or a more diversified market economy based on competition among **more autonomously operating** economic actors. The current system is buying social peace by distributing hand-outs but fails to create meaningful employment and alternative occupations for armed militias. At the same time, the early dismantling of the subsidy and hand-out system could trigger unrest if not properly planned and communicated. The issue of finding job formulas that would allow former fighters to make a living while maintaining a social status once having left the militia constitutes another major challenge.

The **picture on Libya's economy is mixed**. Oil production reached pre-revolution levels by mid-2013 but was seriously affected by the oil blockades in the East and later the West, reducing the exports to a trickle (300.000 bpd). The agreement reached in April 2014 with the group responsible for the oil blockade in the East should provide for a resumption of exports but seems to encounter serious opposition. Reluctance from foreign oil companies to invest in the country has increased after the attack against the In-Amenas gas plant in Algeria in 2013 and as a result of the overall deterioration of the security situation.

In 2013, the authorities announced the **resumption of works around big infrastructure projects**. Early resumption would send an important signal internally and externally showing that the country is back in business. A committee has been entrusted by the government to study and evaluate 17,000 contracts with a total value of LYD 140 billion (EUR 82 billion). Despite the very substantial income generated from hydrocarbons (EUR 38 billion per year) the system to convert these funds into goods or services does not function properly. Staff in the administration (possibly as high as 90% of total workforce) is paid regularly but large capital expenditures don't take place as a result of the heritage from the previous regime where almost all decisions having a financial implication were taken by Gaddafi's inner circle and no effective procurement system is in place. As a consequence, in 2012 only 32% of the development budget was implemented.

The IMF has expressed its concerns over the **lack of progress in diversification of the economy** from both a fiscal as an economic perspective. The sharply increased wages and subsidies risk crowding out capital expenditures thereby delaying economic recovery. The oil industry is typically a low labour intense sector; job creation strongly depends on growth in non-carbon sectors. The lack of alternative revenue-sources makes Libya very vulnerable for oil price fluctuations or indeed oil blockades. At the same time, Libya faces formidable challenges to establish a transparent and efficient public financial management (PFM) system. Budget preparation and budget execution control need to be improved, international accounting and reporting standards introduced, and a modern procurement system created. PFM reform is a prerequisite to ensure a sustainable use of hydrocarbon resources and to fight corruption. PFM is also a most relevant issue at the local levels as soon local councils will start to receive significant budget transfers.

1.3 Social situation and vulnerability

The **Human Development Index** (HDI) for 2012 ranks Libya at place 64 out of 187 countries, similar to Malaysia and Serbia. In 2012, GDP per capita averaged USD 12,059. However, considering a population growth of 2.1% per year and close to 50 % of the

population below 25 years of age, a large influx of entrants to the labour market can be expected in the next decade. Strong GDP growth will be required, as well as a determined policy to diversify the economy and to create jobs.

Given the recent instability, as well as the previous regime's standard practice of under reporting **unemployment**, it is impossible to provide accurate figures on youth employment. Unemployment is officially measured at 26% in 2010, but is believed to be much higher.

As in many other countries, the well-educated Libyans have a tendency to pursue careers abroad. This '**brain drain**' decreases the ability to develop 'high knowledge' and productive industries. The social stigma associated to labour intensive employment, as well as high salary demands, is the result of a general expectation that the public sector will be able to provide young graduates with employment opportunities.

In 2012, **higher education** comprised 12 universities with a total of 160 faculties, in addition to 16 technical faculties, 81 higher technical and vocational institutes and five private universities. In 2011, some 340.000 students were enrolled in higher education institutions (41% male and 59% female)². Universities have some way to go to adapt their curricula to the needs of the labour market, both in terms of the nature of the training provided and of the level of skills required.

Technical vocational education and training (TVET) still works as a second chance for educational failures, rather than as a key service for enterprises and an effective instrument for inclusion in the labour market. Likewise, a true system for monitoring the labour market to collect and manage figures on flows on the labour market and TVET is missing.

In 2011, gross enrolment rates stood at 110% for **primary education** and 94% for **secondary education**, which is high by international standards. Enrolment has also increased rapidly in higher education and stood at 55.8% in 2011. During the Gaddafi regime there was a massive increase in teachers and administrative staff at schools. As a result, Libya has the lowest student-teacher ratio in the world — 1 to 5. The quality of education is presumably affected by other factors such as, the shortage of qualified teachers in key subjects; the use of reserve teachers; and teachers' status, motivation or qualification³.

With regards to **health services**, these may nominally be available and free of charge for most, but they are often of poor quality, which effectively serves to disenfranchise vulnerable groups which are unable to purchase services in the private sector or travel abroad. On the other hand, preventive services, mental health and primary health care are under-provided relative to need. Health services are also inappropriately configured to suit the needs of specific groups, such as those infected with HIV/AIDS.

There are a total of 86 hospitals: 33 teaching tertiary hospitals, 20 secondary hospitals and 31 rural hospitals. The state of public health provision deteriorated significantly during the conflict. Data show that there are major capacity constraints in terms of governance, organisation and management. Overall scores of general service availability and readiness are also low. They stand at 54% for general service availability and 64% for readiness.⁴

² EACEA/NTO Report 2012

³ UNICEF Report, 2012

⁴ The Post Conflict Hospital Libya Survey (2013) is available at <http://www.seha.ly/site/>

Libya ranks poorly on **women empowerment**. In 2012, female participation in the labour market was only 30.1 % compared to 76.8 % for men. On a positive note, 55.6 % of adult women have reached a secondary or higher level of education compared to 44% of their male counterparts. On the other hand, maternal mortality rates are seemingly high. For every 100,000 live births, 58 women die from pregnancy related causes; and the adolescent fertility rate is 2.6 births per 1,000 live births (HDR 2013).

1.4 Sustainable agricultural and food security situation

Climatic conditions and poor soils severely limit agricultural output, which is further expected to aggravate due to the changing climate. Libya currently imports about 80% of its food. Libya's primary agricultural water source is the Great Manmade River Project which has capacity to transport around 1.7 million cubic metres of water per day from the South of the country to the coastal provinces.

Most of Libya's population are food secure, with the exception of IDPs, many migrant workers, and some minority groups. Food insecurity is therefore linked to specific socially vulnerable groups, rather than as a widespread phenomenon.

1.5 Environmental situation and climate change

The nine months of armed conflict in 2011 took place mainly in urban areas with cities like Misrata or Sirte being exposed to long periods of fighting. As a result **mines and other 'explosive remnants of war' have littered the country**. Some progress has been achieved by local authorities and by international nongovernmental organisations to identify and to clean areas that remain contaminated by unexploded ordinance. In 2012, considerable efforts were made to provide comprehensive Mine Risk Education (MRE) to at risk children and communities. In the course of 2013, national capacities to effectively provide and manage MRE were further strengthened.—The long-term impact of this pollution remains to be assessed.

Libya's coastal zone hosts 85% of the country's population and most of its industrial and agricultural activity. There are no natural rivers in the area, only wadis (temporary dry rivers), which transport sediment, litter and pollutants from inland to the sea during storms. The major environmental concerns in Libya before the conflict in 2011 were **water availability and the depletion of underground water** as a result of overuse in agricultural developments, causing salinity and sea-water penetration into the coastal aquifers. Water resources are also likely to be affected by climate change.

Pollution resulting from human activities is mainly found in the vicinity of large coastal cities, and is concentrated in a limited number of urban/industrial centres along the coast. The main sources of pollution are urban and industrial sewage, in addition to improper solid waste management. Oil pollution is observed near terminal facilities.

Libya has built its economic development on access to very cheap oil (1 litre of petrol costs less than EUR 0.10). As a result, it has **very high energy consumption** relative to other countries in the region. In 2006, it consumed per capita 3.1 tonnes of oil equivalent, compared to 1 tonne in Algeria, 0.9 tonnes in Tunisia and 0.4 tonnes in Morocco. Libya's per capita consumption is close to the levels observed in European Mediterranean countries. Its CO2

emissions are also comparatively large, with 8.96 tonnes of CO₂ per capita in 2003 (2.2 tonnes in Tunisia and 1.1 tonnes in Morocco).

The **use of renewable energies remains very limited** in Libya: in 2006, its consumption amounted to only 0.17 million tonnes of oil equivalent (1 million tonnes in Tunisia and 0.47 million tonnes in Morocco). However, the potential for the development of renewable energy sources seems spectacularly high, in particular solar but also wind energy. It is estimated that this potential amounts to 157 000 TWh per year.

1.6 Country capacities

The challenges to the Libyan government are manifold and complex. There are urgent **needs to reform and strengthen capacity for effective and efficient service delivery**; to ensure effective strategic planning, financing and management to improve the efficiencies of the workforce.

Significant pressure exists for the government to improve service delivery outcomes for its citizens. There are competent officials within many ministries as well as articulate interlocutors. Some Libyan leaders have shown potential to provide transformative leadership. Their greatest challenge will be to regain and sustain the momentum of reform, encourage the definition of national development objectives and renounce the temptation to import 'ever-ready' blueprint models.

The Revolution triggered an avalanche of independent civil society organisations. Most new NGO's compensate their lack of experience with their enthusiasm and willingness to play a role in the political debate. Youth and women groups are of particular relevance. The above-mentioned enthusiasm is, however, rapidly decreasing as a result of the political stalemate.

Libya was pre-revolution primarily a socialist economy with the private sector to a large extent in the hands of a few players, often with close ties to the former regime. The revolution has unleashed previously restrained entrepreneurial activity and increased the potential for the evolution of a more market-based economy but a conducive framework for investment and private sector development needs to be put in place.

1.7 Regional integration and cooperation

The **erratic and sometimes aggressive foreign policy of the previous regime belongs to the past**. The new authorities are actively reaching out to Arab and African neighbours seeking to conclude agreements which can add stability to the volatile Sahel and Maghreb regions. Agreements for cooperation on border management and security have been concluded with Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.

In March 2012, **Libya hosted a Ministerial Regional Conference on Border Security**, during which the Tripoli Action Plan was adopted. A follow-up meeting took place in Rabat in November 2013 where ministers from the Maghreb and the Sahel agreed on a number of operational measures such as the establishment of a secretariat in Tripoli in charge of steering the implementation of the Action Plan.

Regional integration and cooperation is deemed essential to address security concerns, (e.g. Sahel/Mali crisis) and to foster economic growth and the ability to attract FDI in non-oil

sector. As soon as security is less of an immediate concern, **Libya's integration with the region should be further energised**, especially regarding trade, energy, climate change and transport cooperation **but also in areas such as ICT**.

In February 2013, Libya participated for the first time in a meeting of the Union for the Mediterranean (as observer). They were also actively involved in technical discussions at senior official level, for example on climate change and environment. **Full participation from Libya in the ENP and in EU-led regional programmes** will be sought.

Libya is already taking part in regional programmes such as the Mediterranean Intervention Epidemiology Training Programme (MediPIET), which aims to expand EU public health training to the Mediterranean region, so as to prevent and control national and cross-border public health threats.⁵

Research is a key component meant to boost growth and employment. In this regional perspective and with support from the EU, Libya has appointed a National Contact Point (NCP) for the 7th Framework Programme for Research, which covers activities in the field of research, technological development and demonstration (RTD) for the period 2007 to 2013.

In the education sector, Libya is part of three regional mobility projects in the field of higher education, which operate under the framework of the Erasmus Mundus programme and aim to enhance the quality of higher education in Europe and promote the EU as a centre of excellence for learning and teaching. Libya is also part of three regional Tempus projects, which aim to promote institutional cooperation primarily on the reform and modernisation of higher education systems.

Libya also participated in the technical assistance project for climate change, CLIMA South, which is designed to build capacity in the partner countries on this issue.

1.8 Conclusion

An inclusive constitutional process leading to a wide consensus will be essential for the overall trajectory of the transition process. Without a satisfactory settlement of key elements of the political process, such as disarmament, the role of religion, the relation between central and local government, it is hard to imagine that a sustainable solution to the foundations of a new, democratic Libya can be found. This requires an inclusive dialogue.

As part of the constitutional process, an **agreement on the division of resources and power between local and central authorities** will have to be reached. Given the strong wish for some level of autonomy at the local level and delicate questions in relation to the distribution of revenues from natural resources among the regions, this could be a potential deal breaker; if handled well, this could facilitate the transition process. Capacity building at all levels to support the required policy dialogue will be needed as well as a strong public outreach campaign.

For a peaceful constitutional process and to reduce the risk of conflict, a **disarmament and reintegration process** is essential. For this process to be successful, sufficient institutional

⁵ In 24 months, MediPIET aims to: i) establish a network of training sites and trained national MediPIET supervisors within the Mediterranean region; and ii) set up a training programme in field/intervention epidemiology, with trained supervisors, appraised training sites, accessible training material and agreed selection processes for future MediPIET fellows to be trained in national accredited training sites.

capacity of the government to organise and implement the complex process is required. Security institutions (army, police and border guards) should be ready to absorb ex-fighters in their organizations. This process should be accompanied by a community based public outreach campaign.

Ex-fighters need meaningful alternatives, hand-outs will not satisfy their need to be recognized and have an acceptable social status. The SME sector could offer many **job opportunities for Libyan youth**. For a more balanced economic growth, a well-considered **economic diversification** strategy is required.

A functioning police and justice sector, contributing to public security and trusted by the people, as well as a broadly accepted transitional process is essential to avoid armed groups taking justice in their own hands and to start the reconciliation process that would allow Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to return home.

Without some form of **reconciliation process**, the DDR process will be seriously hampered and revenge killings will continue to take place thereby exacerbating the risk of violence and conflict. Recurrence of human rights violations against migrants, detainees and other vulnerable persons (e.g. IDPs) can lead to radicalism within these groups which could pose additional pressure to the already fragile political process.

Enhanced border security will contribute to external and internal security. Libya's 6000 km of borders also pose a threat to the stability in the region if they are not better controlled. The CSDP mission will provide training, mentoring and advice to help build up Libya's capacity to implement integrated border management. A regional approach will be important, including agreements with neighbouring countries on joint border control.

The Libyan population is aware of the wealthy natural resources lying underground their soil. The poor nature of public service delivery is normally contextualised by referring to the negligence of the previous regime. Public perception needs therefore to feel an **improvement on the delivery of crucial public services** like health or education

For the above and other key reforms, **improved effectiveness of the civil service** is essential. A full civil service reform programme will require many years, however the government should be able to strengthen the effectiveness of the civil service in selected priority areas (e.g. security, health). Structural policy reforms without a minimum level of functioning of the civil service seem inconceivable. For any civil service reform initiative to be successful, inter-ministerial coordination under the leadership of the PM Office is required, as well as a shared vision of how a competent civil service should look like.

The same logic applies to **improved Public Finance Management, especially budget preparation and execution**, both at the central as at the local government levels. Most of the priorities mentioned here will not be addressed if Libya persists in its inability to turn oil dollars into expenditures and to manage this expenditure efficiently. The demand for change in this area will have to come from civil society and parliament.

The success and sustainability of PFM and other reforms will partly depend on the **ability of civil society and the private sector to hold government to account** and to demand reforms. This requires that government accepts empowered and organized civil society as a dialogue partner with whom the government will share information. Civil society and the private sector

should assume this new role in a responsible manner and engage constructively with government on policy issues.

2. Overview of past and present donor cooperation, complementarity and consistency

2.1. EU development cooperation and lessons learned

EU cooperation with Libya was only embryonic under the previous regime (mainly focused on health and migration) but increased rapidly after the Revolution. There was no National Indicative Programme (NIP) for the period 2007-2010. A total of EUR 8 million under ENPI were earmarked for the Benghazi Action Plan (BAP) on HIV/AIDS and funds were committed as special measures. An additional EUR 10 million was committed in 2010 as a special measure in the field of migration.

The NIP 2011-2013 with an **overall budget of EUR 60 million** was signed with the Libyan government in June 2010. It included two focal areas: (i) Improving the quality of human capital; (ii) Sustainability of economic and social development. With the outbreak of the Libyan crisis in February 2011 all on-going cooperation contracts were technically suspended and no new operations signed. A revised NIP was signed with the new authorities on 30 August 2012.

In the meantime, the **2011 allocation (EUR 10 million)** had been reoriented towards the most urgent needs caused by the armed conflict:

- **Education:** In the area of basic education a 24-month project supporting quality education and increased inclusiveness is currently under implementation. This project aims to improve access to quality education for all children with a special focus on the most vulnerable children, including children affected by the conflict and those internally displaced.
- **Public Administration:** A programme was designed to support Libyan institutions (GNC, government institutions) with their state building activities.
- **Civil society:** The "Civil Initiatives Libya" programme (EUR 3.1 million) aims at strengthening Libyan NGOs through the set-up of 4 resource centres (Benghazi, Tripoli, Misrata and Sabha) and the provision of capacity building and small grants.

Furthermore, the thematic budget lines "Non-State Actors and Local authorities in development" (NSA) and the "European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights" (EIDHR) provided support to develop and cater for the needs of the Libyan civil society.

The **2012 Special Measure (EUR 25 million)** was adopted on 14 December 2012 and activities started early 2013 in the following sectors:

- **Technical Vocational Education and Training** (EUR 6.5 million), providing both immediate service delivery and building blocks for the quality improvement of the sector.

- “Libya **Health Systems Strengthening**” (EUR 8.5 million) is addressing strategic planning, financing and management of health service delivery and human resources through targeted reforms.
- “**Security and Justice** support programme” (EUR 10 million) promotes the rule of law in Libya through strengthening democracy, good governance and civilian culture in the security and justice sectors. In particular, it focuses on justice and police reform providing expertise and mentoring.

In the 2013 Annual Action Programme, additional support (EUR 25 million) has been approved and implementation will start in 2014 in the following sectors:

- **Economic development:** The “ Economic Integration, Diversification and Sustainable Employment” programme (EUR 10 million) will aim at developing micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, enabling them to create employment and livelihoods for Libyans with a particular focus on women and youth.
- **Protection:** The “Protection of vulnerable people in Libya” programme (EUR 5 million) is aiming on the one hand at improving the living conditions of detainees and on the other hand at providing vulnerable people including internally displaced people with psychosocial rehabilitation and socio-economic integration.
- **Migration:** a EUR 10 million programme “Support for rights-based migration management and asylum system in Libya” is addressing the need for strengthening the capacity of public institutions to effectively plan and deliver on migration management in line with international standards and best practices to guarantee that migrants are treated with full respect of human rights and human dignity and in line with international standards guaranteeing international protection. A particular focus of the programme will be also on improving living conditions for migrants in retention facilities by reviewing administrative procedures, improving services provided to migrants and facilitating their access to employment.

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) has five on-going Exceptional Assistance Measures worth €12.5 million aiming at: local risk detection and criminal investigation, security mapping, mediation of conflicts and dialogue, clearance of mines and unexploded ordnances as well as the protection of vulnerable people.

Regarding support to Libyan civil society, a “EU Libya Civil Society Forum” was organised in May 2012 in Tripoli and in Benghazi which gathered around 150 Libyan organisations in each location. This Forum was the opportunity to explain how the EU is working with the civil society but also to foster partnerships between European and Libyan NGOs. A first call for proposals was launched in July 2012 for the Non-State Actors and Local Authorities programme (NSA/LA) (EUR 2 million). It was followed by a joint call for proposals in 2014 for the (NSA/LA) programme and the "European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights" (EUR 3 million in total).

The lessons learned from the on-going portfolio are that there is a need for a realistic – modest- and incremental approach. The legacy of over four decades of dysfunctional administration has an overarching impact on the different government bodies which is being addressed only gradually. Moreover, the unstable political and security situation further complicates the capacity of the public administration to operate normally. Therefore, EU

cooperation programmes should remain flexible. They should address both service delivery and systemic issues, working both at local and national level, developing synergies between the two, increasing the chances to get results. They will all foster structured dialogue between the civil society and the government in order to keep the momentum of change.

2.2. Information on programmes of other donors and donor coordination

Donor co-ordination is carried out at country level by the EU Delegation in co-ordination with the UN Special Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) whose mandate bears the responsibility of overall co-ordination of the international assistance to Libya.

Member States are involved in a wide range of sectors but with a predominance for governance and security sectors.

The US provides assistance for reform in a number of areas including reform of security sector institutions and strengthening democratic governance. Other international donors include Canada and Japan, which have also expressed an interest in joining EUBAM. The World Bank is developing a range of support programmes with the Libyan authorities, with a particular focus on public finance management and private sector development.

Policy formulation remains at an early stage in most core government functions, with donor involvement until now focused on preliminary steps contributing to the progressive establishment of future sector policies. Policy coordination and dialogue among donors takes place under the overall mandate of UNSMIL, with sectoral coordination groups in a number of technical areas being led by specific donors. The Ministry of Planning assumes the role of national coordinator for international assistance, and is expected to play a key role, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordinating Libya's negotiating positions related to the future EU-Libya bilateral agreement.

2.3. Political and policy dialogue between donors and partner country

In the absence of a bilateral agreement framing EU – Libya relations political dialogue takes place mainly via the regular exchanges between the EU Delegation and the Libyan authorities and through ad-hoc high-level political visits. Unlike with other countries in the region there are no annual planned EU - Libya high-level meetings (e.g. Association Councils).

Policy dialogue on security issues takes place regularly with strong involvement of the EU Delegation, notably in the area of border security. However, the follow-up to one of the main recommendations of the Paris Conference (February 2013) to create a Tripoli-based group of key actors to enhance coordination and burden sharing on security is still awaited.

There have been several Council conclusions in recent years calling upon the European Commission to start a Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security under the framework of the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). Since Libya is a priority country in the Neighbourhood, as soon as conditions allow for a Dialogue with Libya to take place, it will be launched immediately.

In the health sector, there are considerable opportunities for policy dialogue and dialogue on reform. There are competent managers within the Ministry of Health and articulate interlocutors within the Libyan health workforce. Libyan stakeholders also have considerable

exposure to diverse models of health care delivery. In September 2012, the EU established a forum for regular policy dialogue with the Ministry of Health and Libyan healthcare leaders with a view to encourage the definition of national health objectives and reform priorities. Dialogue leverages the EU LHSS programme and is articulated around the EU LHSS Steering Committee and four Technical Working Groups. In the field of primary education, policy dialogue is carried out under the framework of a UNICEF-implemented project worth EUR 2.4 million and aiming to improve access to quality education for vulnerable children.

2.4. State of partnership with partner country, aid effectiveness agenda and progress towards harmonisation and alignment

Earlier negotiations of an EU – Libya Framework Agreement were suspended at the early days of the Revolution. During several missions to Libya and return visits to Brussels, Libyan counterparts have indicated their interest to explore the possibility of launching negotiations of an agreement similar to those concluded between the EU and Southern Mediterranean neighbouring countries (Association Agreements).

The Aid Effectiveness agenda is not implemented yet in Libya. Member States are generally not engaged in Libya with traditional development cooperation funds programmed on a multiannual basis. Support instruments are allocated on an ad-hoc or annual basis. They often have no visibility about available funds beyond 2014 nor definite intentions to remain present as a donor in Libya on a longer term basis. No Member State except Denmark has a strategy paper.

As a first step, it was agreed to develop the EU country strategy paper jointly with Member States. Given the lack of medium term visibility about future engagement the value added of full joint programming remains uncertain. Strengthened operational coordination in identification and implementation of projects seems a more relevant option.

2.5. Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)

The Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) work programme aims at enhancing the coherence of EU policies with development objectives. Building on the PCD Council conclusions of November 2009, this work programme outlines how the EU will address, through relevant policies, processes and financial means, five global challenges in a development-friendly manner:

- trade and finance,
- climate change,
- global food security,
- migration and
- security.

Different instruments are in use in Libya: ENI, the thematic lines, the [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#) (IcSP; previously "IfS - Instrument for Stability"), and a CSDP mission.

Security is a key sector for Libya and the development of a coherent EU strategy is underway. The design of the CSDP mission has involved all relevant EU departments and the different preparatory missions (exploratory mission, Technical Assistance Mission) were jointly carried out with Member States.

The conflict sensitive programming methodology has been used to prepare the 2014/2015 programme involving all relevant EU departments in Brussels during an ad hoc seminar. It was also carried out in Tripoli with the Member States.

Considering EU commitment to dedicate 20% of its budget to climate related issues, climate change is to be considered as a cross-cutting issues as appropriate.

Libya Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014/2015

Introduction

Since the Revolution in 2011, Libya has made some progress on the path of democratic transition with the first ever free elections in July 2012, and the subsequent formation of a democratic government. However, the transition process remains fragile, with the government's authority compromised by the weakness and vulnerability of state institutions. In particular, the formal security structures remain unable to deal effectively with challenges from diverse armed factions which impacts in the deterioration of the security situation. Building national consensus about future governance arrangements through the planned constitutional process is likely to be a prolonged process, while at the same time the population is increasingly impatient for concrete results from the transition process in terms of security, justice, improved public services and increased economic opportunities.

The management of the constitutional process is expected to dominate the political agenda in 2014 and possibly beyond, with issues related to the future division of power between central authorities, local communities and regions remaining contentious. However, the provisions of the transitional constitutional declaration of the former National Transitional Council have left a large measure of uncertainty as to how the constitutional process will be managed. The role of civil society in voicing Libyan aspirations for the future constitution can be a positive factor to keep the process on track. If successful, the process will highlight long-term needs for far-reaching institutional strengthening across the whole range of democratic governance institutions whose roles and responsibilities will be defined in the constitution.

In parallel with the constitutional process the security situation and the disarmament and reintegration of the armed groups of ex-fighters must urgently be addressed. Progress with national reconciliation and transitional justice appear essential for stabilisation of the country.

The Libyan government strongly advocates Libya's adherence to international human rights standards and shows willingness to improve the situation. However, and despite government's commitment, the human rights situation has been deteriorating steadily. The main reasons for the negative trend are the weak State monopoly of force with the subsequent impact on the enforcement of rule of law, continuing gaps in relevant legislation and lack of institutional capacities.

As regards the economic context, the role of the oil and gas sector is dominant. In recent years it has generated about 80% of GDP and given Libya one of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa. Employment is strongly dependent on the public sector, with the private sector outside of oil and gas mostly limited to imports, retail and some services. Oil and gas exports were seriously affected by the deteriorating security situation in late 2013, creating doubts over future state revenues and the ability to maintain public spending at current levels. It is widely agreed that Libya needs to begin diversifying its economy both to reduce the state's dependence on the oil and gas sector, to boost the development of less rich areas of the country and to create wider employment opportunities for young Libyans. Coherent measures are needed to improve the business environment and encourage SME development, and to realign the education and professional training systems to respond better to the future skills requirements of the economy.

In Libya, health services may nominally be available and free of charge for most, but they are of very poor quality, which effectively serves to disenfranchise vulnerable groups that are economically and socially disadvantaged and are unable to purchase services in the private sector or to travel abroad to access health care. Assisting transformations in the organisation and delivery of health care services would help address social inequality entrenched in health policies, services and systems and ensure social justice. More broadly, ensuring equal access to health services is accepted as being part of the social contract binding citizens together. It is a precondition for civic and political participation and for inclusiveness of economic growth, and plays a critical role in democratic consolidation and in stabilisation efforts.

Libya's environmental challenges include limited water resources, droughts and land degradation, depletion of natural resources, fragmented mechanisms for environmental management and monitoring, inadequate solid and hazardous waste management, and oil spills. There is an urgent need to establish sound environmental management systems, supported by legislative and policy instruments. Climate change is expected to increase problems of water shortages which if not addressed could contribute to further instability.

During the period of implementation of this MIP, the EU and Libya will seek to deepen and formalise the relationship that has emerged since the revolution through conclusion of a formal bilateral agreement on the model of those already existing between the EU and other partner countries in the EU Neighbourhood region.

1. EU Response

1.1. Strategic objectives of the EU's relationship with the partner country

The objectives of the EU's relationship with Libya over the period of this MIP have been defined in the light of the stabilisation context and conflict sensitivity analysis and the new deal endorsed at the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid effectiveness in Bussan in 2011. The

overall objective is supporting a transition from a "peace-making" phase, to a longer-term "peace-building" phase. Taking account of the uncertainty and volatility of the current context, some flexibility will be needed in the definition of specific actions.

The development and implementation of the future constitution is seen as central to Libya's stabilisation. EU support should aim at engaging with and supporting the process, with a focus on developing the institutions of democratic governance whose roles will be defined under the constitution. Depending on the speed of progress in the coming period support will focus on the constitutional drafting process; institutional support to core government functions among which justice (including transitional justice); elections and democratization; capacities for sub-national governance; promotion and protection of human rights, promotion of rule of law and good governance; reconciliation.

The participation of women in the ongoing transition process and in the upcoming elections is deemed essential in order to pave the way for a democratic society where all Libyan citizens share rights and obligations. To help achieve this objective the EU intends to mainstream Gender Equality in all policies, strategies and cooperation actions in Libya and to finance measures which directly support women's empowerment.

Social and economic integration of Libyan youth will remain a key priority for the Libyan authorities in the coming period. Reinforced efforts in this area are needed to contribute to peace building by facilitating the reintegration of former fighters in the shorter term. In the medium term, EU support should be consistent with realisation of broader social and economic development objectives, in areas including education, vocational training, social integration, private business development and improvement of the investment climate, employment policy, subsidies and pension policies. Although environmental concerns are not seen as a focus of cooperation in the current situation, the new constitution, the institutional reforms and the related capacity building represent opportunities to prepare the foundations to respond to environmental challenges which will deliver benefits in the longer term.

In a stabilisation environment, health systems strengthening can play a major contribution to social stability and, more widely, to the state and peace building agenda. It has long been recognised that public service provision enhances government performance, legitimacy and perceptions of responsiveness thereby reducing societal propensity towards conflict. Governance reforms have wider consequences for the consolidation of the state that extend beyond the institutions necessary for the direct delivery of health services. They impact upon perceptions of the legitimacy of the state; they encourage governments into greater levels of responsiveness and contribute to enhanced legitimacy; they bridge the divide between belligerent communities; and, most crucially, they contribute to the protection of core institutions and people, thus consolidating stability. Besides, health issues can be a vanguard of reintegration and demobilisation processes, a major priority in the Libyan context.

Libya remains a transit and destination country for a large number of economic migrants, asylum seekers and refugees who face problems of legal recognition and social integration. The institutional weakness poses challenges for the development of adequate responses to the multi-faceted migration phenomenon. EU cooperation is largely addressing this issue with five on-going programmes totalling EUR 40 million and a new programme (EUR 10 million) in the framework of the Annual Action programme 2013 focussing on the prevention and management of irregular migration, the strengthening of border management, the assisted voluntary return and reintegration of stranded migrants as well as the strengthening of the capacities for effective and protection-sensitive management of mixed migration movements in Libya.

At beginning of 2014, Libya is facing an increased level of political and criminal violence. The EU is providing assistance in the security sector through different instruments. A civilian CSDP mission on integrated border management, EUBAM Libya, was launched in May 2013. The strategic objective of EUBAM Libya is to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of their land, sea and air borders in the short term, and to develop a broader Integrated Border Management strategy in the long term. In the framework of the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument, there is a programme of EUR 10 million to support internal security and justice which started in 2013 for four years. The Instrument for stability is funding different programmes for clearance of mines and UXOs as well as addressing small arms and light weapons issues. Through funds allocated via the Common Foreign and Security Policy a “Physical Stockpile Security Management programme” started also in 2013⁶.

Without a political settlement, additional commitments would not yield results and a Security Sector Reform is currently out of reach. However, EU cooperation will strive to develop stabilisation hubs by developing synergies between the existing and future activities in both security and development sectors at local level engaging the national and local authorities, the civil society and the private sector in selected areas. This initiative is aiming at catalysing Libyans’ demand for change and developing an environment conducive to democratisation and stabilisation.

1.2. Choice of sectors of intervention

Sector 1 - Democratic governance

Activities in this area are intended to support the process expected to begin from early 2014 with the election of the constitutional drafting assembly (CDA). It is currently planned that the CDA will complete its tasks by mid-2014.

The EU has a number of ongoing or planned activities to support the electoral process, as well as the long-term institutional development of the national electoral authority. EU support to the General National Congress has included proposals on the rules of procedure for the future CDA. High-level technical and legal advice on the drafting process will be made available to respond to the needs of the CDA. At the same time, EU support to Libyan civil society has contributed to developing awareness of the forthcoming CDA election, including a project focusing specifically on issues of particular relevance to women. The EU supports an important project focused on improving capacities of Libyan media to cover issues related to the constitution and the democratic transition. EU support to civil society organisations (CSOs) will continue enhancing their participation in the Democratic and constitutional process.

The EU's current involvement with the constitutional process is expected to lead to identification of opportunities to engage in technical support to the emerging institutions of democratic governance and to contribute to the effective implementation of the constitutional provision.

⁶ COUNCIL DECISION 2013/320/CFSP of 24 June 2013 in support of physical security and stockpile management activities to reduce the risk of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in Libya and its region

The subsectors/institutions that could be covered include: the legislature (Parliament); the judiciary, core government functions and administrative systems (in particular public policy management, statistics, human resource management, internal accountability..) aspects of the public finance management system (including management of the social protection system); the electoral commission; institutions concerned with various levels of sub-national governance (particularly local councils); possible future initiatives launched to deal with national dialogue, transitional justice and reconciliation and human rights; the public audit body; etc.

Institution-building support will be defined for key institutions in the context of the EU's dialogue and development cooperation with national and local authorities. Priority areas of intervention will be identified, in consultation with national authorities, local councils as well as CSOs and in coordination with other international actors, in view of improving the management and organisational capacity of state and CSOs and to support a constructive and balanced dialogue. EU support will be an inclusive process aiming to reinforce CSOs and the state's response in meeting citizens' needs and expectations in terms of effective democratic participation, respect of justice and human rights and promotion of good governance and accountability. In the context of good governance and accountability good quality and comparable statistics are vital and need to be supported in view of making trustworthy data available for measurement.

Human rights violations, namely abuses against vulnerable groups (e.g. migrants), torture and other forms of ill-treatment, condition of detainees and freedom of expression will be included as part of the governance component. Supporting institutional capacity of state bodies with a mandate to monitor human rights will be addressed.

Resources will be managed with a degree of flexibility to respond to evolving needs.

In line with the Communication “The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations”⁷, the EU programme under this sector of the MIP will engage with Libyan CSOs to develop their capacities to actively play a role towards democratic governance (i.e. monitoring the implementation of the constitution, participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of the national strategies and reforms, reconciliation initiatives, electoral process, etc.)

Sector 2 - Youth: active citizenship and socioeconomic integration

Complex issues having an impact on youth economic and social integration need to be addressed in a consistent manner.

Lack of employment opportunities is a key factor contributing to difficulties with the reintegration of former fighters and armed groups, while the persistence of such groups is a major challenge to the planned democratic transition and constitutional process. At the same time the unfavourable social and economic context is seen as contributing to increasing criminality and potential for radicalisation. The poor quality of the education and qualifications systems is not preparing young people to enter the labour market.

⁷ COM(2012) 492 final

Areas to be addressed include support for an active citizenship, initiatives aiming at preventing youth involvement in drugs use and criminality, education and skills development and employment policy, as well as SME development. In the short term Libya needs to implement a credible set of measures to facilitate the reintegration of fighters, predominantly young (some will be reabsorbed into the security sector, but the majority should return to civilian life); in the longer term relevant sector development strategies in support of economic diversification including low carbon development should be designed and implemented.

EU-supported programmes initiated in 2012 and 2013 are beginning to address the development of national capacities and systems in the fields of vocational education and SME support services. In addition the EU is supporting efforts to achieve access to quality education for all children, with a special focus on the most vulnerable, including children affected by the conflict. In complementarity with these programmes, the present MIP will support the development and implementation of a comprehensive approach to Youth issues involving all institutional stakeholders (e.g. Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Higher Education, TVET Board, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Youth and Sport, Warriors Affairs Commission, etc.) through a suitable high level national structure such as the Ministry of Planning.

In addition, the EU programme will engage with civil society organisations to ensure Youth ownership, develop policy dialogue at national and regional level and promote innovative programmes for developing youth participation and citizenship, economic and social integration, and especially young women. Areas of intervention could include social entrepreneurship, the use of micro-credit to support local income-generating activities, community social and economic initiatives including awareness raising of sustainability, specific education and training schemes for drop-outs, youth networks and promotion of youth centres, promotion of sports including national and local leagues, prevention of addiction, promotion of the culture and the arts, and education for democratic participation including in the national dialogue. Civil society projects should be implemented in partnership with government programmes where possible, and could contribute to monitoring government policies and programmes in these areas. Projects would seek to engage private sector sponsorship in promotion of social integration initiatives.

Sector 3 - Health

The rationale for investing in health service delivery in Libya is two-pronged.

In Libya, health services are citizens' direct line to government. They make the state tangible through an almost daily interaction. In the prevailing context, characterised by high expectations of "change", efficient and effective health care delivery will play a pivotal role as a tool for peace building.

Despite the availability of financial resources –at least nominally– there is a lack of capacity to identify entry points to engage external technical assistance and to articulate the terms of such engagement. Hence, donor-funded technical assistance can play a catalysing function.

A strengthened health system is also supportive to economic growth and employment, which is at the forefront of the agenda of Libya's government. Good health has a positive, sizable and statistically significant effect on aggregate output. Conversely, poor health generates an economic burden to individuals, companies and countries. In particular, an unhealthy

population generates higher healthcare costs, which hinder economic growth, and greater public expenditures. Environmental factors have a significant and complex impact on health, addressing environmental issues including climate change directly can also improve health and reduce healthcare costs.

The strategy for EU engagement in this sector is built on a platform that helps overcome four elemental gaps: reducing exclusion and social disparities in access to health care through expanded access to health care services and essential medicines; promoting sustained change in patient safety through focused interventions that will provide tangible results at the point of care; availing reliable data vital for public health decision making, health sector reviews, planning, monitoring and evaluation; and addressing needs for fundamental change in health professionals' education so as to promote learners' ability to work more effectively and collaboratively and ultimately provide better patient care. The Ministry of Health has indicated that patient safety is a top priority. Non-communicable diseases place poor and marginalised individuals and households at high risk of not having access to appropriate services and incurring payments for health care that push them deeper into poverty. The country annual road traffic fatality rate of 49.6 deaths per 100,000 population is the highest in the world. The Libyan government is also faced with rising expectations from both the public and the health workforce.

Despite these challenges there are also considerable opportunities for reform at present. The European Union is already engaged in the health sector providing technical assistance to support targeted reforms in health service delivery, management, strategic planning, health financing, human resources and physical rehabilitation for people with disabilities.

The EU-funded Libya Health Systems Strengthening Programme (LHSS) has already contributed towards building capacity building of the Directorate of Health Financing to guide decisions on health financing, preparing National Health Accounts exercise to use finances more equitably and efficiently, defining a Basic Health Care Package to be delivered in nine primary health care sites, reviewing contractual arrangements including part-time options and dual practice arrangements, launching a workforce analysis to review staffing policies, qualifications and geographic distribution, and defining the functions of a General Health Care Council and the Libyan College of Physicians and Surgeons.

Early outcomes of this programme have been independently reviewed in September 2013 and have been described as making 'a lasting impact'. Technical assistance mobilized through this programme is fully embedded in the Ministry of Health and the European Union has established an intimate relationship with Libyan counterparts at all levels. The proposed areas of intervention of the MIP are fully complementary to this programme and aim to expand its scope and deliverables. Civil society participation will be mainstreamed throughout project implementation. In 2014, a Mid-Term Review will be launched to take stock of lessons learned.

1.3.- Cross-cutting issues

The mainstreaming of gender issues as well as environment and climate change issues will be made in the three areas.

2. Financial overview (indicative amounts)

The indicative allocation for 2014-2020 is EUR 126,000,000 – EUR 154,000,000. The indicative allocation for the first programming period (2014-2015) is EUR 36,000,000 – EUR 44,000,000.

The indicative breakdown by sector is as follows:

	Sector of intervention	Amount	% of total
1.	Democratic governance		45
2.	Youth: active citizenship and socioeconomic integration		28
3.	Health Sector Support Programme		16
	Support to CSO's		5
	Measures for TA		6
	TOTAL		100

In addition to programmed bilateral allocations, Neighbourhood countries may benefit from supplementary allocations provided under the multi-country umbrella programmes referred to in the Neighbourhood-wide programming documents. Such supplementary allocations will be granted on the basis of progress towards deep and sustainable democracy and implementation of agreed reform objectives contributing to the attainment of that goal.

Libya is also eligible for support under a number of other EU instruments, such as the Instrument Contributing to Peace and Stability, Humanitarian Aid, the Partnership Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation, Macro-Financial Assistance, Development Co-operation Instrument thematic programmes and external actions under EU internal programmes for e. g. research and innovation, energy, transport, education, youth culture and media (in particular Erasmus+ and Creative Europe). Where possible, Member State political action and assistance will also be co-ordinated with EU action, as a way of achieving political leverage and as part of a coherent foreign policy approach. Libya may also be targeted for specific diplomatic action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, depending on political circumstances.

3. EU support per sector

3.1 Democratic governance (indicative 45%)

3.1.1 Overall and specific objectives

The overall objective of EU support in this area is to support Libya's democratic transitional processes based on the adoption and implementation of a new constitution responding to the aspirations and values of all Libyans.

Specific objectives are as follows:

- 1. Strengthening institutions of democratic governance: strengthening the ability of national institutions – at both central and local levels - to respond to citizens' needs, ensure respect of the rule of law, justice and protection of human rights and run effective and

scalable social protection programmes. Encourage inclusive, nationally owned and participatory political decision-making processes related to the democratic transition.

- 2. Strengthening Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) capacities in order to enable them to participate in and exercise oversight of democratic governance and the constitutional process. Promote dialogue and interaction between the state institutions and the civil society on key governance and accountability issues.

Intervention' priorities will be defined through identification of institution building needs in key constitutional institutions, providing the basis for preparation and implementation of tailored technical assistance packages. Structured and inclusive consultations will be carried out with the civil society ensuring that the voice of women as well as the voice of minorities is heard.

Support will be provided to key democratic and legitimate institutions and entities such as Parliament; core government ministries or agencies functions and administrative systems including aspects of the public finance management system; bodies concerned with rule of law; electoral commission; the supreme public audit body; sub-national/local authorities; bodies established to deal with national dialogue, transitional justice and reconciliation; public bodies dealing with human rights; including environmental rights etc. The support aims also to reinforce the capacities of Libyan civil society organisations to actively play a role towards democratic governance (i.e. monitoring the implementation of the constitution, reconciliation initiatives, electoral process, etc.).

The gender dimension and relevant environmental issues will be taken into account in the definition of policies as well as in the implementation of activities.

3.1.2. Results under this sector will be defined specifically through agreement on Terms of Reference for each democratic governance institution and for the targeted civil society organisations. However, in general EU support aims to achieve the following results:

For specific objective 1:

- Libyan institutions' capacity are reinforced in line with good governance and rule of law principles
- Government led donor coordination is set up and operational

Activities will relate among others to: preparation and implementation of organisational development plans for the targeted institutions; capacity building and training activities, exchanges of experience with institutions from EU countries.

For specific objective 2:

- Increased CSOs capacity to perform their role as independent actor in supporting and monitoring the transition process (reconciliation, elections...)
- civil society awareness of key democratic governance issues is enhanced and its capacity for provisions of services is reinforced
- Inclusive and structured CSOs' participation to democratic governance is increased including policy dialogue, human rights mechanisms and domestic accountability both at local and national levels.

3.1.3. The main indicators for measuring the aforementioned results are contained in the sector intervention framework attached in Annex 1.

3.1.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:

In the light of the UN Security Council resolution 2040 of 12 March 2012, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is charged with managing and coordinating technical advice and assistance to the Libyan electoral process and the process of preparing and establishing a new Libyan constitution. The EU will therefore fully participate to the established UNSMIL coordination mechanisms while carrying out proper coordination at EU level during EU cooperation meetings. Potential EU actions in the field of Public Finance Management will be closely coordinated with the World Bank and IMF.

The EU will also continue to support government led donor coordination within the Ministry of Planning (or any other appointed institution).

3.1.5. Government's financial and policy commitments: It is difficult to ascertain the government's financial commitment as the transition is not completed and the care-taker governments are succeeding one another. However Libya's commitment to the constitutional process to which this support responds was established through the Interim Constitutional Declaration adopted by the National Transition Council in August 2011 and confirmed by subsequent decisions of the National General Congress, including the law for the election of the constitutional drafting assembly.

3.1.6. Environmental assessment: Whenever relevant, the appropriate type of environmental assessment will be carried out and as determined by screening policy development and related activities will take into account climate change compatibility and environmental principles.

3.1.7. The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention: EU support for democratic governance in Libya faces a number of risks that are inherent in the political, social and security context, and uncertainties in the ongoing transition process. The calendar (120 days) for the constitutional drafting process defined in the Interim Constitutional Declaration may be too short to allow for a credible broad-based consultation process. Deterioration in the security situation in Libya could impact on the pace of the democratization process.

The engagement of Libya's international partners, particularly the EU, with the constitutional process and the development of democratic institutions is seen as strongly supportive of the credibility and dynamism of the processes.

3.2 Youth: active citizenship and socioeconomic integration (indicative 28%)

3.2.1 Overall and specific objectives

The overall objective in this area is to support the Government and civil society organisations to promote youth's democratic participation and socioeconomic integration in view of a more inclusive sustainable and stable society.

Specific objectives of the intervention are as follows:

- To promote active citizenship, political participation and civic engagement and to prevent radicalisation of Libyan youth;
- To support and enhance Libyan youth's long term social integration with a particular attention to those facing vulnerable situations;

- To promote economic opportunities in support of economic diversification including low carbon development of young Libyans, particularly the former revolutionaries, through quality education and entrepreneurship.

3.2.2. EU support aims to achieve the following expected results:

For specific objective 1:

- increased level of awareness and understanding of democratic processes and rejection of radicalization among young Libyans;
- strengthened youth's participation in decision-making processes at all levels (central and local) as well as in the national dialogue;
- increased number of community level initiatives for social purposes led by youth.

For specific objective 2:

- strengthened services targeting youth for the prevention and treatment of drugs use as well as psycho-social services;
- established social reintegration programs for young revolutionaries willing to phase out the security sector;
- increased offer of cultural and/or sports initiatives seeking to enhance youth's human development.

For specific objective 3:

- improved public services in support of young job seekers;
- improved employability of youth by offering training opportunities in Libya and encouraging exchanges abroad;
- enhanced youth's entrepreneurship and self-employment through start-up and micro-finance/financial inclusion initiatives.

In order to achieve a more inclusive society, all programmes will put emphasis on the participation of women and minorities.

Areas of intervention could include social entrepreneurship, the use of micro-credit to support local income-generating activities, green and low carbon economy initiatives, community social and economic initiatives, youth networks and promotion of youth centres, promotion of sports including national and local leagues, prevention of addiction, promotion of the culture and the arts, and education for active youth's participation (including exchange programmes) and youth participation at all decision-making levels as actors of the stabilisation process. Civil society projects should be implemented in partnership with government programmes where possible, and could contribute to monitoring government policies and programmes in these areas.

The actions will take into account the complementarity and synergy with Erasmus+ projects namely youth exchanges, the European Voluntary Service, mobility and training of youth workers as well as the participation of youth in the Structured Dialogue meetings with decision makers.

3.2.3. The main indicators for measuring the aforementioned results are contained in the sector intervention framework attached in Annex 1.

Whenever relevant the indicators will be broken down by age and gender.

3.2.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:

A number of donors and international partners including EU Member States are involved in the field of youth's social and economic integration, employment policy, education and vocational training, and local development initiatives with civil society and local authorities. Donor coordination will be sought at EU level in line with EU code of conduct and at the wider donor community level. The EU will also continue to support government led donor coordination within the Ministry of Planning (or any other appointed institution).

The EU will seek to provide technical assistance to Libyan public bodies focused on policy measures and public-sector programmes relevant to youth's social integration (e.g. Ministry of Youth and Sports, Ministry of Culture and Civil Society, Ministry of Labour, Ministries of Education and Higher Education, Ministry of Social Protection, TVET Board, Ministry of Economy, ICT Ministry, Warriors Affairs Commission, etc.). To ensure the necessary coordination between the relevant Libyan bodies the support will be prepared, coordinated and delivered through a suitable high level national structure such as the Ministry of Planning. Structured civil society consultations will be set up in the framework of an inclusive policy dialogue.

3.2.5. Government's financial and policy commitments:

It is difficult to ascertain the government's financial commitment as the transition is not completed and the care-taker governments are succeeding one another. However Youth is unanimously perceived as a priority by the Libyan authorities even if Libya's public policies on youth social integration and employment have not yet emerged in the period following the revolution. EU support will serve to enhance dialogue on such policies and will adopt a phased approach relying on the civil society and local initiatives.

3.2.6. Environmental assessment: Whenever relevant, the appropriate type of environmental assessment will be carried out and as determined by screening activities will take into account the climate change compatibility and environmental principles.

3.2.7. The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention:

EU support for youth employment and social integration in Libya faces a number of risks that are inherent in the political, social and security context, and uncertainties in the ongoing transition process. Further deterioration in the security situation in Libya could create major problems for the practical implementation of local-level initiatives.

A high level of frustration among Libyan youth persists regarding their limited participation in the country's economy and political life. Should this not be addressed, there is a risk of an increased disengagement of Libyan youth that could result in further instability.

3.3 Health (indicative 16%)

3.3.1. Overall and specific objectives

The overall objective is to promote improved health status through increased access to quality health care services.

The specific objectives are:

- To reduce disparities and expand access to quality health care services, including for women and minorities;
- To increase access to essential medicines, medical products and technologies through pro-poor cost-efficient planning, better procurement, supply and distribution, quality assurance, strengthened monitoring and evaluation and rational use;
- To strengthen public health surveillance and health information systems including environmental information so as to avail vital information for public health decision making, planning, monitoring and review.

3.3.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

For objective 1: increased accessibility and readiness of quality health care services; improved patient safety; and upgraded curricula, teaching methods and materials.

For objective 2: updated national list of essential medicines; strengthened public procurement and supply management systems; upgraded norms and standards and effective enforcement of policies and regulations to ensure quality, safety and efficacy; and improved prescribing and dispensing.

For objective 3: A reliable health information system based on improved collection, compilation and analysis of health and relevant environmental data.

3.3.3. The main indicators for measuring the aforementioned results are contained in the sector intervention framework attached in Annex 1.

Whenever relevant the indicators will be broken down by gender.

3.3.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue

In September 2012, the EU established a platform for regular policy dialogue with the Ministry of Health and Libyan healthcare leaders and other relevant stakeholders with a view to encourage the definition of national health objectives and reform priorities. Dialogue leverages the EU-funded Libyan Health Systems Strengthening (LHSS) programme and is articulated around the LHSS Steering Committee and four Technical Working Groups, which meet on a weekly or biweekly basis at the Ministry of Health. This structure for policy dialogue started in Tripoli but all efforts are made to ensure a geographical balance.

3.3.5 The Government's financial and policy commitments are:

It is difficult to ascertain the government's financial commitment as the transition is not completed and the care-taker governments are succeeding one another. However, there is strong political support for health sector reform. The EU has established a very close dialogue with the Ministry of Health.

3.3.6 Environmental assessment: When needed the appropriate type of environmental assessment will be carried out and policy development and activities will be assessed against climate change compatibility and environmental principles and appropriate measures will be taken in response to the assessments.

3.3.7 The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention:

Several risks can be identified. The slow pace of implementation of reforms coupled with high expectations may create frustrations. Analytical and policy work may not translate into changes in everyday practice at the point of delivery. Dependency on external factors such as broader government public sector reforms may reduce the locus of control for sector-wide reforms.

To address these risks a common understanding of reform priorities and political feasibility is needed. Careful analysis of the policy context, including stakeholders, is an important prerequisite for successful health care reform. Due attention will be paid to the public reform agenda and its role in determining the success of sector-wide reform processes.

4. Measures in favour of civil society

Two years after the end of 42 years of dictatorship in Libya, the context in which Libyan civil society organizations (CSOs) operate is characterized by its volatility and uncertainty about the evolution of the political context. Libyan civil society organizations still have a long way to go towards building a relationship with the government and the public, setting visions and strategies, and increasing their technical and institutional organizational knowledge and managerial capacity.

Within this context, EU support has included helping civil society actors develop the (basic) skills to run their organisations, develop projects and bid for funds. Specific education and training has been provided in areas such as human rights, women's rights and knowledge of elections and the constitution. Additional objectives of the support have been to improve governance (institutional development of the ministries and related bodies) as it might affect the sector and support the development of any legislation for the sector. Progress to achieve the latter has been difficult due to the absence of basic decision-making structures and strategies within the institutions. In conclusion, there is still a long way ahead in the process of establishing a strong and cohesive Libyan civil society community.

As foreseen, in the guiding principles of the programming exercise, the involvement of the CSO's will be integrated into sector programmes in order to promote a participatory approach at political level and to fully involve the CSO's in the design and implementation of the above three focal sectors' programmes.

In addition to the support related to the three focal sectors, a more structural approach is needed to promote a conducive environment for CSOs and to enable them to participate in domestic policies, as well as in the EU programming cycle and in international processes and to play their role as independent development actors more effectively. The EU is developing a vision and priorities for its engagement with civil society in the Roadmap exercise that will not only involve the Member States but also local civil society which will be extensively consulted to ensure ownership, quality and relevance of the Roadmap process. The result of this process will inform the design of the activities of the Special Measure for civil society.

The programme will be defined after consultation of the civil society including women and minorities' associations.

5. Provision for technical assistance

A provision for technical assistance would continue the support to the negotiations of the EU-Libya Framework Agreement that should be starting soon. Support in this area would complement the activities initiated under the allocation of EUR 2 million under the 2013 budget.

Technical Assistance measures are foreseen to cover strengthening of intra-governmental coordination structures, specifically in relation to management of the relationship between Libya and the EU, as well as more general capacity building for the Ministry of Planning and the Prime Minister's Office, together with technical support on specific issues within the expected scope of the future EU Libya agreement.

Furthermore, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will also support the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the future dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of intervention chosen.

Annex 1. Template for Sector of Intervention Framework

The results, indicators and means of verification specified in the present annex may need to evolve to take into account changes intervening during the programming period.

Baselines will be included at the latest in Action documents.

Sector 1 - Democratic governance		
Overall objective: to support Libya's democratic transitional processes based on the adoption and implementation of a new constitution responding to the aspirations and values of all Libyans.		
Specific objective 1: Strengthening institutions of democratic governance		
Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R1- Libyan institutions' capacity are reinforced in line with good governance and rule of law principles	I.1 Degree of implementation of the provisions of the new constitution within the deadlines set by the Libyan Government I.2 Number of organisational development plans approved and implemented by the Libyan Government yearly	Project reports of EU implementing partner/s and EU political assessments.
R2 - Government led donor coordination is set up and operational	I.3 A government led donor coordination mechanism/platform is established before end of 2015 I.4 Number of meetings of the above mechanism/platform held on a yearly basis following set-up	Projects reports and monitoring
Specific objective 2: Strengthening Civil Society Organisations participation and oversight of democratic governance and constitutional process		
Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R3 – Increased CSOs capacity to perform their role as independent actors	I.5. Number of CSOs and CSOs members participating to capacity building activities	Project reports of EU implementing partner/s
R4 - Civil society awareness of key democratic governance issues is enhanced and its capacity for provisions of services is reinforced	I.6 Number of people working for CSOs trained in issues such as reconciliation, human rights, good internal governance and accountability per year	Projects reports and monitoring Ex ante/ex-post surveys
R5 Inclusive and structured CSOs' participation to democratic governance is increased	I.7 Number of CSO dialogue platforms/ networks set up in key areas such as: reconciliation, human rights and accountability covering the three regions	Projects reports and monitoring

Sector 2 - Youth: active citizenship and socioeconomic integration

Overall objective: to support the Government and civil society organisations to promote youth's democratic participation and socioeconomic integration in view of a more inclusive and stable society.

Specific objective 1: To promote active citizenship, political participation and civic engagement and to prevent radicalisation of Libyan youth

Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R6 Increased level of awareness and understanding of democratic processes and rejection of radicalization among young Libyans.	I.8 Percentage of youth from targeted areas displaying increased knowledge after democracy educational programmes supported by the EU.	Survey (ex ante/ex post) on youth political culture as part of the programme activity Project reports and monitoring
R7 Strengthened youth's participation in decision-making processes at all levels (central and local) as well as in the national dialogue	I.9 Rate of youth participation and representation in local or national level governments I.10 Number of meetings and/or MoU signed between youth associations and Government at local/national levels	Project reports Media surveys Members' lists of local/national mechanisms (survey)
R8 Increased number of community level initiatives for social purposes led by youth.	I.11 Number of social youth initiatives developed with EU support per year I.12 Number of participants in the above initiatives (per year)	Project reports Community based surveys

Specific objective 2: To support and enhance Libyan youth's long term social integration with a particular attention to those facing vulnerable situations

Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R9 Strengthened services targeting youth for the prevention and treatment of drugs use as well as psycho-social services	I.13 Rate of youth surveyed displaying increased knowledge about risks of drugs abuse I.14 Number of youth drug users treated following WHO standards.	Secondary schools based surveys as part of the programme activity Ministry of Health and targeted services provider reports
R10 Established social reintegration programmes for young revolutionaries willing to phase out of the security sector	I.15 Rate of youth effectively reinserted to civilian life after benefiting from social reintegration programmes supported by the EU	Tracer studies as part of the programme activity Project reports Government and WAC statistics

R11 Increased offer of cultural and/or sports initiatives seeking to enhance youth's human development	I.16 Number of cultural and sport initiatives developed in local communities targeting youth with EU support per year I.17 Number of youth participants in the above initiatives (per year)	Project reports
Specific objective 3: To promote economic opportunities of young Libyans, particularly the former revolutionaries, through quality education and entrepreneurship		
Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R12 Improved public services in support of young job seekers	I.18 Number of staff participating in EU supported capacity building activities	Project reports Beneficiaries and public services surveys Government reports
R13 Improved employability of youth by offering training opportunities in Libya and encouraging exchanges abroad.	I.19 Number of youth who entered the labour market after having benefited from a specific vocational training supported by EU	Tracer studies as part of the programme activity Project reports Beneficiaries survey Government and WAC statistics
R14 Enhanced youth's entrepreneurship and self-employment through start-up and micro-finance/financial inclusion initiatives.	I.20 Number of new of micro/small/medium enterprises created by young Libyans with EU support per year	Project reports Beneficiaries survey Government and WAC statistics

Sector 3 - Health		
Overall objective: to promote improved health status through increased access to quality health care services.		
Specific objective 1: To reduce disparities and expand access to quality health care services		
Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R15 Increased accessibility and readiness of quality health care services	I.21 Percentage of the population with access to Essential Package of Health Services as defined by the Ministry of Health	Project progress reports WHO Service Availability and Readiness Assessment Survey. MoH reports, facility-level records and official documents.
R 16 Improved patient safety	I.22 Number of health centres supported by EU complying with minimum standards of patient safety as per WHO definition	Project progress reports HIS data Independent surveys
R17 Upgraded curricula, teaching methods and materials	I.23 Number of graduates who participated to EU funded	Project progress reports Key informant interviews

	upgraded training	Students' statistics
Specific objective 2: To increase access to essential medicines, medical products and technologies through pro-poor and cost-efficient planning and budgeting, better procurement, supply and distribution, quality assurance, strengthened monitoring and evaluation and rational use		
Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R18 Updated national list of essential medicines.	I.24 Proportion of population with access to affordable essential medicines as per WHO definition	WHO reports and statistics HIS data MoH reports, records and official documents. Independent surveys Project progress reports
R19 Strengthened public procurement and supply management systems.	I.25 Stock out days of tracer medicines	WHO reports and statistics HIS data MoH reports, records and official documents Independent surveys Project progress reports
R20 Upgraded norms and standards and effective enforcement of policies and regulations to ensure quality, safety and efficacy of essential medicines and health products.	I.26 Number of staff trained in norms and standards for quality, safety and efficacy.	Project progress reports.
R21 Improved prescribing and dispensing	I.27 Rate of medicines use against practice guidelines as per WHO definition	WHO reports and statistics HIS data MoH reports, records and official documents Independent surveys Project progress reports
Specific objective 3: To strengthen public health surveillance and health information systems if possible including environmental information so as to avail vital information for public health decision making, planning, monitoring and review		
Expected Results	Indicators	Means of verification
R22 Reliable health information system based on improved collection, compilation and analysis of health and relevant environmental data	I.28 Percentage of districts that submit timely, complete and accurate reports to national level to inform the health information system. I.29 Number of citations in policies/laws/regulations of data collected through the above indicators by the Ministry of Health and other relevant stakeholders per year	MoH reports, records and official documents

Annex 2. Template for Indicative timetable for commitments

The amounts mentioned in this table are indicative

	Indicative allocation (in %)	2014*	2015*
SECTOR OF INTERVENTION – Democratic governance	45%		
Support to the democratic transition at national and local level		20%	
Reinforcement of good governance and rule of law in the framework of the national reform programme			25%
SECTOR OF INTERVENTION – Youth: active citizenship and socioeconomic integration	28%		
			28%
SECTOR OF INTERVENTION – Health	16%		
Health Sector Support Programme (HSSP)		16%	
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE and CIVIL SOCIETY	11%		
Provision of TA programme			6%
Support to civil society			5%
Total Commitments	100%	36%	64%