

EC SOMALIA UNIT

UPDATED Strategy for Peace building and Civil Society.

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This programme has the purpose of **enabling Somali civil organisations and state structures to apply participatory, transparent, accountable, democratic and gender sensitive principles, approaches and systems, to deliver demanded services and to promote the improvement and maintenance of good governance and peace in the country.**

In order to support reconciliation and peace building and to enhance good governance, the EC envisages support to local and country wide peace processes, governance institutions and the active involvement of a better-organised and empowered civil society.

Broadly speaking, three entities will be addressed: administrative structures, including at the decentralised level; parliament(s) as the basis of democratic practice; and civil society. The envisaged Commission interventions are:

- *Support administrative structures in applying principles of good governance;*
- *Support the contribution of civil society to the enhancement of good governance;*
- *Contribute to reconciliation and sustainable peace building.*

When addressing the problems of administrations, the Commission will employ appropriate levels of flexibility and even-handedness. Support to general thematic areas such as awareness and training concerning good governance, will be provided with particular emphasis on democracy and taking into consideration the fundamental constituents of Somali society. After careful selection, assistance will be provided to administrative structures, including the provision of basic equipment and rehabilitation of administrative premises, to go hand in hand with capacity building, improving management techniques and enhancing transparency and accountability. Areas for particular focus would include the functions of the judiciary, economic policy formulation, demobilisation and monitoring. Support to civil society will address both traditional and modern strata with particular attention to women's organisations, with the intention of introducing principles and systems of good governance through out the broader society. Support to these organisations will be given in the area of capacity building and also through funding for small-scale project implementation. Activities to support the creation of common civil society agendas will also be funded.

A variety of counterparts will be engaged to undertake the broad variety of activities. The primary counterparts will continue to be International Non Governmental Organisations, however certain governmental organisations (UN, GTZ and BBC) will be utilised for projects of a more political nature or requiring specific skills.

The issues of governance affects and has direct implications on all sectors in which the Commission is engaged. Co-ordination and joint planning are therefore of vital importance.

To date not a single donor or implementing partner has put together such a broad programme with the specific target of helping the return and consolidation of peace to all of Somalia. This strategy recognises that peace is a process, which takes years to install in a sustainable manner, and will require ongoing support for a considerable amount of time. A number of projects are proposed to work on the creation of conditions in which peace can take hold. These projects provide a basis upon which specific targeted initiatives can be launched to address conflict on a country wide level.

2 PROBLEM ANALYSIS

2.1 Historical context and causes of conflict

Historically, Europe and Ethiopia's colonisation of the Horn of Africa imposed **alien colonial systems** on Somalis. This established a new political and economic order which disrupted the pastoral communities of the Somalis by: (i) dividing the area into "five Somalias" according to Italian, British, and French interests¹; (ii) imposing centralised state structures on the indigenous traditional systems. The new Republic of Somalia in 1960 (incorporating British Somaliland and Italian Somalia) inherited critical questions of national identity for Somalis whose clan territory straddled borders.

The first independent elected leaders were ousted by the military regime of Barre in 1969 (backed by USSR) and introduced a radical program of "scientific socialism" supported by urban intelligentsia and technocrats' moves against pastoralism and clannism. However early socialist ideals soon gave way to dictatorial military rule.

In 1977, with growing dissatisfaction at home, Barre took advantage of pan-Somali aspirations and the weakened Ethiopian State to claim Ogaden (including the Haud grazing lands). The Soviet Union's opportunistic Cold War strategy in switching support from Somalia to Ethiopia resulted in Somali defeat. The **loss of nationalist aspirations** and unity against the external enemy of Ethiopia combined with domestic dissatisfaction over **unequal distribution of state resources**. The Somali State began to fracture with the formation of the SSDF (1978) in central regions and the SNM (1981) in north western regions. The Barre regime responded by consolidating clan-based support, instigating **divide and rule policies among clans/ sub-clans**, and continuing with arms build-up to suppress discontent - including **brutal retaliation** and scorched earth policies against rebel forces and civilians.

The Barre regime reinforced and aggravated the worst effects of colonisation. First, the regime manifested as a predatory State, a dominating and centralising force, in which the central clan-based elite monopolised power and resources. The State extracted resources from the peripheral territories (e.g. through taxation), with investment and development associated closely with Barre's own clan territory. This was reinforced by the **Cold War legacy** to Somalia (USSR 1970s, US 1980s) of a **huge build-up of arms** (army and weapons) providing the means for conflict to escalate. By 1982, Barre's army of 120,000 (Somali population 7-8m.) was larger than that of Nigeria (population 90m.). **Cold War-driven foreign aid** also reinforced the central State and centralisation through focussing on the resource-rich South. This undermined indigenous structures and traditional systems further. At the end of the Cold War, the US disengaged, investment and aid dropped, and competition over scarce resources controlled by the central State increased in the face of the **shrinking resource-base** and growing poverty.

Second, the **disruption and manipulation of traditional systems** acted as disintegrating and centrifugal forces. These indigenous systems had evolved historically for the management of environmental resources and conflict between clans and sub-clans but were undermined by military coercion and "divide and rule" policies. Government policies such as the "civilisation of nomads",

¹ Somalis lobbied unsuccessfully against incorporation of the crucial Haud grazing lands (Ogaden) by Ethiopia in '54 and the inclusion of NFD in independent Kenya in '63.

privatisation of communal grazing lands, and imposition of a **market and cash economy** aggravated this further by disrupting both the socio-economic basis of pastoralism and traditional systems of social organisation and conflict resolution. Overall the central State and its policies created the conditions in which **clan solidarity** offered the best strategy for survival, contributing to the radical localisation of politics to clan territories.

In sum, the Barre regime was neither legitimate nor functional. Decisions were made in an apparently arbitrary manner and enforced brutally, with violations of basic human rights. People had little opportunity to engage constructively in their own governance. Increasing poverty exacerbated dissatisfaction with the regime. The defeat of Siad Barre's military by the Ethiopians in 1979 was a crucial turning point in Somalia's history, after which Barre relied increasingly on traditional clan politics as a system for 'divide and rule'. At the same time, the policies of the State meant that clan solidarity was the best survival strategy both politically and economically. Increasingly, political allegiances became localised to clan territories, there was distrust between clans and dominance of minority clans, combined with acute competition over state resources. The breakdown of the State and deterioration in peace and security happened over a long period and remains directly relevant to the situation in Somalia today.

Given its **critical geopolitical importance**, Somalia was also affected by the general instability in the Horn and the divergent interests of various international powers, manifested most obviously by the Cold War strategies of the USSR and the USA. Both engaged actively in influencing the politics and economy of Somalia, as well as the broader region.

Both colonial and postcolonial governance systems failed to build upon the strong traditional governance systems of the Somali people. All Somali people share these traditional systems for management of resources and conflict, which evolved historically to regulate nomadic society. The failure to impose external legal and governance systems on these traditional systems was demonstrated when the 'modern state' as an institution collapsed in 1991. All institutions associated with the State became dysfunctional and schools, ports, police posts and other State resources were looted.

2.2 Deadlock in conflict.

Siad Barre's regime was defeated by a consortium of rebel movements, each dominated by a single clan or sub clan. None of the movements had developed a political agenda beyond the removal of the dictatorship, resulting in the inability of any one entity to take control of the nation and increased distrust between the clans.

Two exceptions can be noted. Firstly the SNM, the most advanced and disciplined rebel movement, took control of the majority of the former British Somaliland, did not attempt to make territorial gains, nor engage in conflict in the south. The SNM was able to take control of north west regions without significant rivals to oppose them militarily.

Similarly the SSDF, dominated by the Majerteen, focussed exclusively on its historical territory in north east Somalia and negotiated a peace treaty with clans to the south. The SSDF was able to establish undisputed control and prevent deterioration of law and order. The formation of the Puntland State was an attempt to broaden the basis of the SSDF by incorporating the Harti (one step above the Majerteen in the clan family tree). However the nascent institutions failed to incorporate these broader coalitions and political dynamics remained fixed in the traditional clan makeup. These factors combined with

engagement in wider Somali politics has more recently led to the deterioration of the security that Puntland had enjoyed.

The entities that emerged from the civil war have shown an **inability to evolve or develop political agendas**. Divisions along clan lines have become greater with the deterioration of certain militia/political groupings to a sub clan level, reflected in continuing violence over resources.

None of the “political” entities that emerged from the civil war has been able to present a political vision or develop political agenda (with the exception of Somaliland, whose agenda is limited to seeking international recognition for its secession from Somalia). Each entity is **limited in geographical coverage**. Support has been obtained traditionally through clan patronage and the development of specific **war economies**. Thus certain individuals affiliated to the political process have direct vested interests in maintaining the status quo. The majority of leaders come from a military background and have little to offer as political leaders in any emergent government of the future. Leaders are inaccessible, unaccountable and lack the necessary skills for political leadership. Those who might fulfil the **need for more effective civil political leadership** are intimidated and deterred from effective engagement by those with vested interests in the status quo.

The absence of political vision, development agendas and leadership skills in the military/political elite reinforce the **Somali public’s deep-seated mistrust of government**, further compounded by the presence of former members of the Barre regime within the current military/political leadership. The general public continues to view government in terms of the predatory state that will exploit power and resources for the benefit of a clan-based elite. This aggravates tensions over power sharing in both centralised and decentralised systems of governance. Existing local administrations tend to reinforce these concerns by mirroring the Barre model of governance at local level. There is little sense of the function of government to serve its people, for example through provisions of social services.

As with the vast majority of deep-rooted internal conflicts, Somalia has emerged from a conflict of identity. As a result of the policies of the previous regime, compounded by the ensuing civil conflict, clan identity is primary. Clan structures provide individuals with relative security, protection and a social welfare safety net. The continuing low-level conflict in Somalia, with power struggles mobilised on the basis of clan identity, results in a common perception that the systems of clan protection are dysfunctional and counter productive. Nevertheless, currently there are **no alternative affiliations as powerful as clan identity**, other than Islamic organisations and private sector operations.

Human rights, which were traditionally upheld by Somali culture, have been seriously undermined. Minority groups in particular have suffered from the lack of effective clan protection. Over 15 years of civil conflict have divided Somalis further through the thousands of **unsettled inter-clan grievances and war crimes** – from genocide and crimes against humanity, to murder and rape.

The only institution today operating throughout the country is the Somali Red Crescent, which has succeeded in sustaining the common perception of its non-political nature. This is a reflection of the total disintegration of the civil and state apparatus of the former Somalia.

The departure of UNOSOM was, in reality, the **end of serious international engagement** with the politics of Somalia. Western international engagement has since focussed entirely on the provision of social services; in some areas social services are more accessible and of higher quality today than pre-1991. Thus the interventions of the international aid agencies can undermine the role and necessity of

the state and compound the common perception of government as extracting and dominating resources, rather than serving the people (see above).

Political resolution in Somalia continues to be **undermined by regional and international politics** within the Horn of Africa and Arab world. Somali factions capitalise on these external differences to promote their own narrow agendas. Beyond this, a longer-term political agenda in the Gulf region is focussed on the promotion of stronger Islamic ties and the incorporation of Islam into state structures, which is opposed by other regional and international actors. The latter are unlikely to provide significant support to any emerging government that they view as dominated by a radical Islamic agenda.

2.3 Opportunities

While a number of dynamics contribute negatively to the potential for peace within Somalia, there are also significant unifying factors.

The Somali people predominantly share one culture, language, religion and history - few countries share as many common features as the Somali people.

Somalis are also inter-dependent economically. Even Somaliland in the north west is directly affected by economic dynamics in the south. At the same time the private sector has in many ways remained cross clan, with all leading companies being operational in all the commercial centres of Somalia irrespective of the political situation on the ground.

The removal of the former oppressive regime and the continuing absence of a state authority has enabled rapid growth of the private sector and flourishing of media outlets. Civil society has begun to evolve in the vacuum of a state authority.

As a result of the continuing conflict in Somalia, the historic migration of Somalis to the Gulf and the West has increased with an estimated 15% of the former Somali population now living outside the country. A number of refugees remain in camps in neighbouring countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen). Significant numbers of Somalis comprise an educated and engaged Diaspora who offer potential leadership and considerable investment capital.

Post-September 11th, global dynamics have focused greater international attention on Somalia as a failed state, which in itself presents an opportunity for more effective political engagement. This is of critical importance in light of the regional political agendas that affect internal resolution of the Somali conflict.

Overwhelming opportunities lie in both the weakening of the faction leaders, who can no longer access sufficient resources to maintain and benefit from the conflict, and the desire of the Somali people for stabilisation, security and a future that offers their children opportunities beyond becoming militia.

2.4 Target groups

Engagement is required at all levels in order to support Somali initiatives for sustainable peace. Different tools will be required in a coordinated manner, all directed towards achieving peace and good governance.

- Faction leaders;
- Representatives of civil society in Somalia: elders, religious leaders, local NGOs, artists, journalists; community based organisations; women's, youth groups and professional associations;
- Private sector;
- Government officials / institutions, law enforcement officers and militia;
- International actors (United Nations, international NGOs) and regional governments.

The *Civil Society* comprises all unarmed groups who do not possess legislative or executive powers. *Civil Society Representatives* refers to all unarmed individuals or organisations who do not have legislative or executive powers **and actively pursue the well-being of the society at large through peaceful means**.

Civil society representatives in Somalia comprise both traditional and modern forces. *Elders* continue to be the most significant representatives of Somali civil society and are gradually regaining their influence and power in decision-making. *Modern forces*, particularly the local NGO movement, are at early stages of evolution (after a period of rapid proliferation in response to UNOSOM in the early 1990s). However important groups such as professional associations continue to evolve around clan. There are geographical variations in the state of evolution of civil society representatives in Somalia, with NGOs at a more advanced stage of development and function in areas of relative stability (in the north). However, communities in the south have a greater opportunity to participate in leadership. Considerable effort will have to be directed towards building the managerial capacity of all types of local organisations as an important element of instituting good governance practices from the grassroots.

The private sector has evolved significantly in the prolonged absence of a state authority and the associated deregulation of the economy. The business community is involved in all areas of public life in Somalia and will be engaged in this programme by supporting its desire to find durable systems for the practice of trade and commerce.

Three administrations exist within the borders of Somalia: the Somaliland administration, the Puntland administration, and the Transitional Government (TG) (created from the Djibouti-led peace process in 1999). Only the Somaliland administration is fully functional and has limited legitimacy. None of these entities receives appreciable direct institutional donor assistance (beyond limited assistance to the TG from the Gulf). The lack of functionality and legitimacy of the administrations is compounded by failure by the international community to engage and address the causes. This may contribute to future conflicts by failing to provide guidance to emergent administrations in a constructive manner.

Sustained positive evolution of civil society and the private sector depends upon support to the *state structures*. Should the *peace process* produce an outcome to which the Commission subscribes, then components of this programme would be activated in order to pursue the evolution of systems of governance at the federal and regional levels that are democratic and endorsed by the majority of the concerned Somali people. During the transitional period, the *legal framework* component of this programme provides an option for supporting the preparation of the future Somali Constitution. The legal framework is also crucial for regulating and structuring the future of the role of the civil society in Somalia.

In the absence of a viable solution for the Somali political crisis, support would target existing executive structures from a district level to an interregional level. Specific focus is required to distinguish the difference between the various branches of government (Executive, Judiciary and Legislature).

2.5 Specific problems:

Attach Problem Tree

3 JUSTIFICATION

3.1 Justification for programming

The EU, through the EC, is the single largest donor to Somalia. This assistance is highly vulnerable to conflict and will never achieve sustainability until peace is achieved. Does the EC intend to ensure unending aid to Somalia? If a 'killer' assumption is present in every project, then it cannot be ignored, as it represents a loss of taxpayers money and a deterioration of peoples lives.

The overall objective of the EC strategy in Somalia requires more innovative and courageous interventions if contributions towards its attainment are to be substantial. This super objective reads: **to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and to the promotion of a more peaceful, equitable and democratic society in Somalia.** In reality this aim is no different from that of any other major donor funding projects within Somalia. Within the planning process, a clear assumption has been repeatedly made: that the security situation would improve or is maintained. Unfortunately, this clearly has not happened, hence the assumption has become a 'killer' assumption.

There is unanimity within the international community regarding the imperative of moving forward, from purely humanitarian related activities towards rehabilitation and development. The difficulty in implementing projects in Somalia is that irrespective of whether the intervention is in primary education or irrigated agriculture, the achievements made can be reversed if (or rather when) conflict returns. Peace and security has been achieved only in Somaliland for a period longer than 5 years. But even there, the situation is not stable and could deteriorate rapidly given the proximity of conflict in southern Somalia. In the more conflict-ridden south, a safer and more peaceful environment has become necessary to conduct more effective humanitarian operations. Maintaining the guiding assumption as it is should be considered as optimistic not realistic.

Even where fully-fledged conflict is the case, realisation of sustainability will not be achieved with no public confidence in administrative structures. This is clearly the case in Puntland and partially the case in Somaliland.

Individual project and clusters of projects often achieve their immediate objectives & goals in this unstable environment. In fact, the majority of projects when assessed against their technical objectives, prove to be successful. After all, in log frame language, projects are not designed to achieve the overall objective, only contribute to it. And they do contribute to reduction of poverty and "the return to peace". But peace is not returning and Somalis, in real terms, are becoming poorer.

In order to assist the attainment of peace, these well-intended and technically reliable sectoral projects need to complement a sound and well-intended political process.

3.2 Justification in the International context

Asylum seekers: Over the past 15 years Somalia has provided a disproportionate amount of asylum seekers to the EU. From a country of around seven million people, there are currently around one million Somalis in the Gulf, Europe and North America. Simple examples can be quoted: In 2001 the EC employed 4 Somali secretaries, 2 of them today are asylum seekers in foreign countries, both abandoning secure jobs in safe parts of the country for a refugee life elsewhere. Conclusion: the outward flow will continue and promises to increase.

Between 1985 and 2002, 144,000 Somalis sought asylum in the European Union, on average 8,000 a year. This does not show the numbers of illegal immigrants to Europe. If each individual costs (in terms of cash, food, accommodation and social services) around €7 a day, then the simple economic implications is in the tune of €63 million a year or 1.8 billion over 5 years – the same period in which the EC will provide 149 million in aid to Somalia, that is in addition. At current rates this bill will grow by an additional 24 million a year (on average 9500 new Somali asylum seekers per year)². In simple terms it is cheaper to solve the conflict in Somalia than continue to allow the inflow of refugees (a legal / human right type of obligation that will never go away if the situation remains unsolved). The legal obligation will not be removed unless peace and stability is achieved in Somalia.

International law: As the world increasingly globalises, international law is required to play a more important role. International law depends entirely upon state legal systems to provide the support required. Somalis are not accountable to anyone nor can they hold anyone accountable for actions against them. The rule of the gun is the law of the land. This clearly has significant implications for the global economy and international **terrorism**. The recent example of the arrest in Mogadishu of a suspect in the bombings of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, is a good illustration of this point, as well as the suspicions that the 2002 Mombassa bombing was facilitated through Somalia. A clear indication of this was shown in October 2001, when the US and EU authorities closed Somalia's single largest remittance company for allegedly funding terrorist organisations. This potentially could be the tip of the iceberg. It is alleged that Somalia (like Afghanistan) is a transshipment point for the illegal **drug trade**, much of which travels to Europe. This along side the **weapons** trade and other illegal businesses are clearly of significance to the whole international community.

Terrorist organisations also have links with Somalia. It will not be possible to destroy these links through bombing campaigns or short-term military action, as no set targets exist. The only genuine control systems, which are viable for the future of Somalia, are the return of the rule of law.

4 PROGRAMME OVERVIEW

A comprehensive and integrated programme for durable peace building and good governance targets the civil society, the state structures, the private sector, and militia.

The Programme Title: Early in the process of developing a fresh programme in support of the Somali civil society and as a result of various field missions, a significant shift was identified. It was recognised that while there are numerous opportunities for enhancing the role of civil society, these could not be implemented with durable results unless incorporated within a single frame of peace building and good governance, in intimate association with the Commission's political strategy for Somalia. This is because the foundation for a new and politically active civil society in Somalia cannot emerge or

² UNHCR statistics

develop in a legal vacuum. More critically, such a programme must build on existing efforts of the various sectors and in order to promote demonstrable progress in the area of sustainability.

The strategy is designed to support peace initiatives prior to and after any peace accord.

5 FEASIBILITY

5.1 Programme strategy description, intervention logic. (Bottom up).

The six results pursued by this programme all address clusters of problems that directly impede the realisation of durable peace, effective rule of law and a stimulated role for civil society. It is important to note that the results are considered to be inter dependent upon one another, to engage in one area of intervention and not others will lead to an unintended imbalance.

The programme also addresses effective internal co-ordination of the different components, as well as with other sectoral interventions. Governance and peace can build upon many of the solid achievements obtained through specific sectoral interventions. At the same time there is need to strengthen the Rights based approach in broader programming, whether it is in relation to education or infrastructure projects.

The programme is designed to integrate peace building and good governance practices in all of its main activities, while individual results focus on specific target groups. One component is directed at awareness raising amongst the general public, one addresses state structures and the legal framework, two components target civil society organisations, one supports conflict resolution mechanisms, and one focuses on the demobilisation of militia.

5.1.1 Description of programme philosophy and strategy

The philosophy for each of the results is countrywide in nature but implementation takes into consideration the geographical variations of conditions at the local level. A single countrywide concept for each of the nine functional programme outputs will have to be developed by the Somalia Unit in collaboration with key partners, although implementation will vary from one area to another.

Civil society has been selected as a key tool. Local organisations gain increasing credibility with the communities they serve as they become more involved in the successful delivery of developmental social services. Gradually, such organisations will be enabled to play an increased role of advocacy for the benefit of the community at large. When coupled with a strengthened role of traditional elders, this provides an opportunity for the voice of communities to be heard and their shared interests to be protected. The programme therefore envisages providing funding assistance towards both the technical and organisational capacity of civil society groups in order to support their role as agents for development and in their representational function.

Supporting the conditions for the development of sustainable peace is a central priority for the Commission in Somalia and the focus of this programme. In supporting the development of more functional administrative structures and a more organised civil society, every opportunity should be taken to embed peace building capabilities and applicable approaches at every level addressed by development funding from the Commission, in order that peace will continue to be built and preserved.

5.2 Description of results and activities.

5.2.1 Public awareness with regard to human rights, good governance and the rule of law are enhanced.

The intention is to increase public awareness of the foundations for sustainable peace, namely respect for human rights, the principles of good governance and the rule of law. A permanent countrywide campaign of awareness for peace and its universal qualifications, using whichever suitable and efficient medium, will have to be maintained for the duration of the programme. Over the years this result will absorb sizeable resources.

Previous interventions implemented by UNESCO and Life and Peace Institute have focussed on capacity building of local organisations through training and workshops on issues such as human rights and the principles of good governance. UNESCO established a number of peace resource centres throughout the country as bases for future local initiatives and also produced a radio magazine and soap opera and a monthly magazine. An evaluation of UNESCO's civic education project took place in January 2003 and recommendations have been taken onboard. In order to support the development of a free and responsible press, the BBC journalism training project provided training courses for media journalists, developed a journalists handbook, and established the basis for journalist associations.

Planned activities for 2003/4

The EC's planned activities – described below – are intended to build upon the strong oral traditions within Somalia and to provide a platform for cross-regional engagement and dialogue on issues of concern to Somalis and a medium for promotion of the universal qualifications for sustainable peace.

1. Through the BBC Journalism Training project, a Somali (countrywide) monthly magazine will be launched in coordination with the journalist associations to include sections on political, economic and social issues, input from the Diaspora and a cultural section. It is expected that the international agencies will use the magazine for advertisements (e.g. of job vacancies) and promotional campaigns (e.g. public health). The magazine will be commercially viable within the two-year period of the project through sales, advertising and Diaspora outlets.
2. Through the BBC Journalism Training project, a radio awareness programme will be produced with contracts for programme production awarded to media stations on the premise of exchange and broadcasting of programmes from other areas. The BBC journalism project also has training elements for "trailers" (such as public health awareness) and for field-based broadcasting (such as interviewing the general public) and it is envisaged that the radio programmes can build on these training elements.
3. The EC will co-fund the Life Skills and Literacy project implemented by Africa Education Trust, which uses the medium of radio to promote awareness of basic life skills (such as health awareness, human rights) and to provide a basis for classroom-based adult literacy classes. Target groups for taught classes include women, youth, ex-combatants, police and those with disabilities. The project is already operational in the north (Somaliland and Puntland) and is establishing bases in the south.

Further projects may be developed using other media such as video films in order to reach a wider audience, particularly those who are not literate.

5.2.2 Improved respect for the rule of law and enhanced delivery of services by the administrative institutions.

The intention is to target the legal environment and the state structure which are conducive for peace building and a healthy growth of civil society. These are among the would-be projects the Commission may consider should the outcome of the on-going peace process be assessed as suscribable. They involve providing

support to the drafting of the permanent Constitution and seizing the opportunity of early introduction of good governance practises in the development of various and selected state capacities and structures. However, a slowly evolving peace process could also be assisted by the launch of these components at different levels from the district upwards. Under any set of circumstances, the development of laws and regulations which ensure legal sustainability of formal and functional relations among the civil society organisations and between them and any administrative structures will have to be undertaken.

It is also important to ensure that interlinks are established with many of the technical interventions which are dealing with specific line ministries. The intention will be to help all interventions work upon the same principles and rules of accountability.

As this result is directly linked to the political processes on the ground the Commission have remained predominantly responsive. In 2002 three notable examples can be quoted showing how the commission has remained responsive to needs on the ground. Firstly, the Commission looked at providing support to the Transitional National Assembly, through fielding a study with the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), this project failed to materialise as security did not improve. Secondly, the EC funded the local elections in Somaliland. Lastly it has provided consistent and ongoing support to the IGAD sponsored peace process. Each of these interventions have had the intention of (and in some cases have) strengthening democracy and the rule of law.

Planned activities for 2003/4.

In many respects it is not possible to predict which responses will be required by the political developments on the ground. However three proactive engagements are being planned presently:

1. In early 2003 the EC intends to fund a new initiative, which is designed to strengthen governance at a local level by providing training and support to local governance structures through UN-HABITAT. Target date June 2003.
2. The UN-Habitat project will be reviewed in February 2004, the review will provide lessons learnt and map out the way forward for future modes of support to local government – in terms of institutional and financial assistance.
3. It is planned to field a comprehensive ‘feasibility / project planning’ study looking at the make up and delivery capacities of the existing administrations on the ground is planned. This study will lay the basis and justification for future capacity building project. No target dates has been set as it is directly linked to elections in Somaliland, IGAD peace process and turmoil in Puntland.
4. In Southern Somalia demobilisation will have a component of integrating militia into security forces. This will require specific activities aimed at training and structuring forces to assist the return of the rule of law.

5.2.3 The capacities of civil society organisations (both managerial and technical) are improved.

This result is about the capacities of civil society organisations, both in the areas of good management and technical (sectoral) capabilities. Many of the technically orientated projects (e.g. a health project) have local counterparts, which could benefit greatly from the introduction and/or strengthening of their management capacities. This will no doubt improve their delivery capacity and is a greater assurance of sustainability. This has been partially done by projects from the technical sectors. However, the objective of these projects has not been the local organisations, but the implementation of specific activities. There is a need to encourage and support the existence of the few efficient local organisations, and the creation of new interest groups and professional associations. The programme

also envisages investments in the legitimacy of successful local organisations by indirectly (through international implementing partners) supporting them to implement small to medium scale projects.

A number of international partners were surveyed and a project started in 2002, implemented by Novib. As part of this project a survey of currently existing civil society organisations was carried out; this information is being used to identify interest and capacity building needs of these organisations. A pool of Somali consultants has been created and trained to provide a resource basis for future capacity building.

Planned activities for 2003/04

1. A project supporting the management capacities of local NGOs, with a fund for these organisations to implement small projects, the focus of this project will be for organisations involved on education and human rights (including women's rights) and in areas in which international assistance is not big.
2. A study on professional associations will be carried out during 2003. This study will pave the way for a project in support of these organisations.
3. Depending on availability of funds, a project in support of community-based organisations (CBOs) will be prepared in conjunction with the food security sector. This sector has been chosen as it is the one in which more CBOs are most active.

5.2.4 Mechanisms of dialogue for conflict resolution are enhanced.

The EC has been active in 2002 supporting the IGAD reconciliation process for Somalia in Eldoret / Mbagathi. Interventions vary from the support to the core costs of the conference, information coverage of the process, support of civil society in the conference, including support for the participation of women..

This commitment to Eldoret, with the EU as the lead body in terms of policy and implementation of development assistance, has re-emphasised the EC / EU in the lead position in Somalia. This has been achieved through the active engagement of the EC, Somalia's single largest donor, firmly upholding a policy of political neutrality. The majority of leading initiatives, including peace, are funded directly by the EC. Those EU Member States who have retained an active engagement in the country, have co-ordinated and, in many cases, joined or contribute directly to EC initiatives.

This has placed the EC in a position in which it is widely accepted, recognised and respected by the Somali population. The EU is well placed within the regional politics of the Horn of Africa. Maintaining close links with every country, directly or indirectly, associated with Somalia's conflict.

The EU is a diversified body, which has the capacity to engage at all levels of dialogue and at the same time interact with other regional international and worldwide interested counterparts (such as IGAD and the US).

Country wide it is proposed that 3 specific interventions be launched, in order to draw together the results achieved and sustain the momentum towards peace. The fielding of these projects is a **political decision**. **By fielding these projects the EC / EU will be taking the lead** and be the direct counterpart to IGAD. These initiatives would be enhanced by fielding a leading European figure to head the most prominent project and in turn give the whole initiative a high profile. This would encourage regional states and Somalis to give serious attention to the process.

1. Traditions reconciliation initiatives at a local level.

Much of this subject has been addressed in theory. Yet investments in implementation leave much to be desired. Activities of the programme's results aim at strengthening the capacity of selected organisations and individuals in appropriate and applicable reconciliation methodologies at the local level. Special focus is placed on the traditional leadership by elaborating what has proved viable in the conflict resolution approaches, and providing support for their implementation and improvement. The areas in which peace exists in Somalia today can all be attributed to in country peace processes financed and organised by the Somalis themselves. To this end, the EC should consider favourably active support in real terms to the efforts of the Somali elders, so that traditional reconciliation processes are strengthened and enabled to adapt to the modern environments.

2. Sanctions

One of the strongest driving forces behind the Eldoret process was the public statement by the EU presidency proposing targeted sanctions to be imposed against those who are seen as violators of peace. A similar commitment was made by IGAD member states. It is clear that violations of all types have taken place, but no system for imposing these sanctions was in place. The UN arms embargo report documents examples of violations which have direct implications for IGAD member states, and yet no action has taken place, let alone any form of condemnation.

It is proposed that a small project is launched with the following objectives:

- § Collection of detailed information on individual factions, such as their sources of funding, and how they are vulnerable to sanctions.
- § How will violations be monitored and certified as violations or not? (For example some Somalis state that if Somaliland is not present at a peace conference, this should be considered as a violation.)
- § Research into sanction schemes appropriate for Somalia.
- § Provide assistance to member states and the EC to table motions in the UN Security Council with specific relevance to sanctions in Somalia.

3. Introduction and interpretation of the Eldoret committee work into Somali society at a local level. What are the implications of the peace conference at a local level.

A specific project would target certain communities ensuring basic understanding of the issues affecting them in terms of conflict. A number of these issues were tackled within the committees of the peace process. However, the conclusions of the committees will not have relevance unless people on the ground have a detailed understanding of how they will be affected. For example, if the constitutions committee places a city like Galkayo within a specific Federal state, there is a high chance of conflict. Other concerns relate to Sool and Sanaag with their geopolitical 'swing' status between points of power.

This dialogue process should be formally linked to the Somali peace process, and be a way of launching what results are achieved in a countrywide dialogue.

5.2.5 Dialogue between civil society structures and administrations, the private sector and international community is improved.

The real target group are the Somali entities. Formal links will be initiated and/or supported in the three main centres in Somalia, namely, Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Bosaso, as well as between the civil society and the leadership. At a lower level, linkages will be built as local entities receive support. A forum for

the co-ordination of the support of the international community to the Somali civil society is been pursued by the Commission within the SACB umbrella and has started its work in the year 2002. There are also provisions for enhancing efficiency of co-ordination of international partners inside Somalia. In the area of links among civil society some activities have taken place in 2002:

- § Development of a code of conduct of LNGOs
- § Organisation of the biggest meeting of civil society organisations in Somalia. As a result of this meeting the participants signed a declaration stating their vision.
- § Meeting to start the forum of Non State Actors (NSA) in the context of Cotonou.

In the area of links between civil society and the international community the following activities have taken place in 2002:

- § Creation of the Civil Society Task force within the SACB forum.
- § Discussions at the NGO Consortium between international NGOs and Somali NGOs have started, mainly in the area of “what is partnership between an INGO and a LNGO”
- § A one-day seminar was organised to present the results of a study carried out on donor coherence in Somalia.
- § The last two days of the civil society symposium mentioned earlier were opened to the international community and a panel of discussion was organised.

Planned activities for 2003/04

1. Project supporting the networks of LNGOs. The role Somali networks can play in the development of the Somali civil society cannot be forgotten. Currently these networks are focusing in developing common agendas for the organisations they represent and given the large number of local organisations existing in Somalia, there is a need of these structures in order to improve communication with other parts of the society and the international community.
2. Support to the creation of a forum of Non State Actors (NSA). This project will support the creation of a forum of non-state actors and will also start developing links with the administrations. As part of this process a number of interregional meetings will be organised. These meetings should aim at having representative and legitimate structures that will be part of the Somali forum.
3. The project in support of professional associations should not only improve these organisations, but also improve the relations between this part of civil society with the private sector and administrations. Private sector constituencies should be encouraged to form organisational structures. Programmes to improve the links between civil society and the administrations will include studies for the development of laws related to their areas of expertise.

5.2.6 Disputes are no longer resolved through the use of the gun.

In practical terms this result is about disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. The rule of law, good governance, peace, civil society and sustainable development will not have a realistic chance unless the thousands of militia within Somalia are provided with an alternative means of support which does not involve violence. Experience has shown that demobilisation has little chance of success in the absence of a valid peace agreement. In fact, to be sustainable, alternatives to living by the gun need to be introduced when the threat of war is remote. In Somalia this is not the case and, even if the peace process succeeds, this does not guarantee immediate peace.

Any demobilisation activity is directly relevant to a broad variety of sectors. The majority of work is put on reintegration of individuals into civilian life. The private sector, agriculture and education sectors all have lead roles to play.

To date the EC has been able to elaborate and test demobilisation concepts. These projects have been evaluated and a feasibility study conducted. It is now necessary to move activities to a countrywide footing. It is notable that the main activities of achieving this result in a comprehensive way are costly (in the region of €80 million over 5 years) and it is essential to encourage the participation of other donors.

Planned activities for 2003.

Following on from the recommendations of the feasibility study, and the fact that the peace process is some way off concluding its task, it has been decided to field a short term project to prepare the ground for large-scale activities. GTZ will implement a follow on project, which will undertake the following activities:

- § Complete demobilisation case-load from pilot interventions.
- § Advise on restructuring of Somaliland's National Demobilisation Commission.
- § Advise on formation of similar institutions for southern Somalia.
- § Advise on necessary policies required in the south and their amendments in the north.
- § Ensure that verifiable monitoring systems are put in place.
- § Conduct a socio economic survey of militia throughout the country.
- § Build the capacity of local institutions / NGOs in the area of demobilisation.
- § Raise the awareness of the principles and objectives involved in DDR programmes.

This project will be supported by UN funding and activities which will help primarily in the area of institutional training, restructuring and development of policies where required.

5.2.7 Management and coordination

Coordination is critical between programme activities in all 6 areas in order to maximise impact through synergy of interventions. Activities in a number of areas directly inter-relate, for example public awareness/ civic education interventions with regard to respect for rule of law, or for enhancing dialogue for conflict resolution. Public awareness programmes using BBC Somali Service are already internally coordinated and this will be enhanced with respect to project activities in the other areas of intervention. In other cases, such as internal dialogue between Somali structures, and capacity building for civil society, there are also clear inter-relationships. Projects in overlapping areas, such as support for the development of a Non State Actors forum and capacity building for professional associations and civil society, will also enhance synergy as will support for dialogue for peace.

The civil society element of this programme makes heavy demands on human resources and as such, it will be implemented through international partners and not directly by the EC. Since none of the existing international agencies has the necessary comparative advantages in all areas in Somalia, it will be crucial to ensure an effective co-operation and co-ordination mechanism. In order to ensure integration and effective co-ordination of the three components of this element of the programme and as it relations with other technical sectors requires strong internal coordination.

It will also be important to develop concepts for all the six functional programme results that are to be co-ordinated by the Somalia Unit. In addition, it is envisaged that the Somalia Unit would employ a

dynamic monitoring and evaluation system with functional backstopping provided uniformly during the implementation phase.

5.2.8 Indicators

The primary indicator required is the acceptance of the programme by the EC first and then EU Member States followed by other international and national counterparts engaged in Somalia.

The indicators to be used to measure the programme implementation will be the number of projects approved compared with the number of projects planned. Each project will have a set of indicators measuring the specific objectives of the project.

5.2.9 Programme Purpose

The articulation of all six programme results into (timely) projects with implementing partners would **enable the Somali civil society organisations and state structures to apply participatory, transparent, accountable, democratic and gender sensitive principles, approaches and systems, to deliver demanded services and to promote the improvement and maintenance of good governance and peace in the country.**

5.2.10 Overall goal

Under the conditions that the purpose is achieved and extremism / fundamentalism minimised the Commission would be effectively **contributing to the accelerated achievement of a well-grounded respect for human rights, justice through rule of law, pluralism, good governance and sustainable peace in Somalia** - *Programme Overall goal*.

5.3 Programme analysis

In the uncertain environment of Somalia, relative peace and security exists in some areas, where local administrations are able to provide limited services and facilitate the implementation of certain aid operations. When providing aid, the EC and other donors have pursued a main guiding principle: the *Peace Dividend Approach*, which intends to support areas which achieve basic standards of governance and provision of security, and to encourage similar patterns in less fortunate areas. Unfortunately, after a decade of civil strife and the virtual absence of any governance, the international donor community has to admit the limitations of this approach, which has not induced a positive spill-over effect in terms of promoting peace and reconciliation in other regions. In order to support the expansion of peace in Somalia, there will be a gradual shift towards a more pro-active application of the peace dividend approach, complementing it with a *Peace Building* approach.

This movement to more proactive peace building has direct implication on the mode of operation. In many environments it is not possible for foreigners to operate in Somalia and hence the need to work more proactively and build the capacities of local partners (for practical and programmatic reasons).

There are two primary reasons why this continued support to Somalia is essential. Firstly, there is **the poverty alleviation imperative**: even before the civil war, Somalia was already one of the world's poorest countries. This has been exacerbated by 10 years of conflict and destruction, which has had

dire effects on poverty levels. Social indicators (where they exist) all point to a severe deterioration in the situation of ordinary Somalis. Secondly, there is **the political imperative**: the longer that Somalia remains as a failed state, the greater the risk that radical elements could take hold. The re-establishment of democracy and the rule of law is the best safeguard against this risk. Both dimensions – poverty alleviation and political development - have to be addressed in order to achieve impact on either.

5.3.1 Lessons from past experiences.

Based on its long experience in the Somali context, the Commission concludes that a significant and durable impact can only be realized if both the well being of the population and governance/peace building, are simultaneously addressed. This reflects the dualistic and mutually reinforcing nature of the Somali dilemma: the suffering of the population and the absence of functioning state structures leading to further suffering. In line with this potentially negatively reinforcing cycle, further progress by EC-supported activities in a number of sectors, such as health, education or infrastructure, is seriously constrained by the limited capacity of Somali institutions (such as the Ministries or local administrations). However, these operations in many cases provide the entry point upon which ‘soft’ projects related to governance can be fielded.

At the same time, the critical lesson from previous experience and feedback from partners is the absence of substantial and meaningful partnership in terms of engagement with Somali institutions. The EC and its international implementing partners engage with Somali institutions (whether the administrations or local organisations) primarily at the level of dialogue only, with little or no delegation of responsibility for management or outcome of objectives. The impact of interventions in the area of capacity building is seriously constrained when this is not complimented by direct experience of implementation.

Other agencies engaging in the area of capacity building with Somali institutions, for example CARE, focus primarily with their Somali partners on management rather than advocacy.

This programme will move forward in more direct engagement with Somali institutions through both (i) technical support and capacity building for institutions and (ii) enabling them to exercise this capacity by direct implementation of “mini-projects”.

In addition, an in-depth assessment of Somali civil society conducted by the EC in 2000 revealed the need to strengthen its organisational capacities and skills level as a major prerequisite for its empowerment. Support will address both traditional and modern strata of civil society. Particular attention will be also given to women’s organisations, which appear to play a key role in the promotion of the reconciliation process at grass roots level and sustainable implementation of development activities in all sectors.

In relation to the process of peace and the conferences which have been conducted, the programme aims to address some of the short comings experience. Firstly by taking the debate into Somalia as well as making the discussion directly relevant to the local conditions. If this is done constructively and linked to the international and broader Somali context then many of the shortcomings can be addressed.

5.3.2 Linkages with other operations

As indicated above, sustained impact by EC-supported activities in a number of sectors (such as health, education, economic growth, infrastructure) **are seriously constrained by the limited capacity of**

Somali institutions. In turn, this limits the impact of interventions directed at poverty alleviation. Thus support to peace building and development of Somali institutions is fundamental to the overall long-term objective of the EC support to Somalia, to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and to the promotion of a more peaceful, equitable and democratic society in Somalia. Support to the programme results covers all aspects of EC support to Somalia from the promotion of good governance to the alleviation of poverty.

There is close coordination with the EC Somalia Unit on interventions in all sectors with the support to Somali institutions, both administrative structures and civil society elements. In the health sector, there will be capacity building of health institutions. The demobilisation and reintegration component will be closely coordinated with interventions in the sectors of economic growth, education and rural development/food security. Key issues from all the sectors will be incorporated in the public awareness component, which will provide a channel for communication of key messages and information.

Activities and projects funded by other donors are coordinated through the mechanisms of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) (see 5.5). The SACB continues to provide orientations in the form of **sector strategies** and provides an essential platform to develop **joint positions** for negotiations with various local Somali administrations, in administrative and security matters. The EC will continue to be actively involved in the SACB, stimulating cross-sectoral coordination whenever possible.

5.3.3 Risks and assumptions related to the implementation.

The risks and assumptions are common to all EC-funded development projects in the Somali context. The primary assumption is that the security situation will be maintained (or improve sufficiently) for implementation of projects. However in contrast with strategies in other sectors, the peace building strategy attempts to support the pre-conditions for the process of sustainable peace to develop – for example, through support to local dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms, pre-demobilisation activities, civic education, and institution building.

Risks extend beyond the immediate “local” Somali security situation and relate to both regional and global dynamics.

Regional interests support competing warlords (both financially and with arms) and thereby both low-level conflict and the war economy are sustained. The recent report on violations of the UN arms embargo documents a variety of economic interests in neighbouring countries and beyond, which are fostered by the continuing conflict and lawlessness of Somalia. The war economy includes trade and transshipment of arms and illegal drugs, as well as printing of Somali banknotes. Stabilisation and emergence of government in Somalia threatens those who are benefiting economically from the current deregulation and absence of accountability. A dual approach is required to both engage these parties actively in dialogue for the process of peace building (whereby they can see the benefits of the “peace economy”) and to develop a system for targeted sanctions to be imposed on those violating the UN arms embargo and peace agreements (as proposed by the EU and IGAD member states).

Competing regional agendas also manifest at the level of ideological difference, such that extremist groups (“fundamentalists”) can take advantage of the long-standing conflict, coupled with extreme poverty in the majority of the population, by offering apparent certainty and solidarity. The peace building programme offers alternatives through awareness raising, civic education and grassroots dialogue on issues such as conflict resolution and human rights, complimented by the other elements of

the EC support strategy directed at poverty alleviation. Initiatives in the education sector are also required, particularly for regional university scholarships to English-speaking universities and for adult education.

The combination of these elements (unregulated environment, economic interests, competing ideologies) provides circumstances on which terrorist organisations can capitalise and there are demonstrable links in Somalia with terrorist organisations. The closure of Somalia's largest remittance company in October 2001 for suspected funding of terrorists organisations is one example of the renewed attention to Somalia post-September 11th. The recent arrest in Mogadishu of a suspect in the bombings in Nairobi and Dar-Es-Salaam in 1998 is another. While military action (such as bombing campaigns) is unlikely in the Somali context – in the absence of identifiable targets – it is equally unlikely in the current global context that external powers will allow the indefinite continuance of a “stateless state” with no recognised government. The only viable and lasting alternative is the emergence of governance systems and the return of rule of law.

5.4 Programme implementation

5.4.1 Physical and non-physical means.

It is clear that none of the interventions outlined above can be done in isolation, as the interlink ages are strong and a strong focus on any one intervention will not be able to produce the required programme purpose. It is also clear that the funds required are beyond the means of the EC and will need close interlinks with other donors. Specific focus will be required to work with the Member States and other donors such as USAID and the World Bank. This process has already started with some donor co-financing of ongoing ventures such as demobilisation and BBC journalist training.

The EC will need to engage in a variety of ways. Firstly political dialogue and through high-level engagement and the network of liaison offices within Somalia. This dialogue will focus on the implementation of the principles enshrined within the Cotonou agreement and be provided in support of the projects which will be funded in the areas of good governance and peace building.

The EC technical team will also need to play a key role in providing support and ensuring coherence within the various implementing partners and other non funded players through active engagement in the SACB (the EC currently holds the chair of the SACB governance committee).

5.4.2 Organisation and implementation procedures.

As mentioned before there is a need of a coordinated approach in the implementation of this strategy. On top of the use of the SACB as a coordination mechanism, meetings will take place between the partners involved in this programme. Two yearly meetings will take place in order to have updates of project and activities among the various implementing partners and with the objective of revising the projects if needed, to avoid overlaps and make use of positive synergies.

5.4.3 Appropriate technology.

A variety of approaches will be used depending on the target group. In view of the low literacy rate in Somalia, awareness-raising activities include use of media outlets such as radio and video films as well as newspapers in order to reach a broader audience. Community-based dialogue is an effective medium in the Somali oral society (for example, for activities directed at conflict resolution, civic education).

Training and capacity building activities will be complemented by direct implementation activities wherever possible.

5.4.4 Timetable; cost and financing plan.

As described above an allocation of €57.2 million will be required to follow on from much of the work initiated and designed under the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th rehabilitation programmes. All new interventions will be preceded by feasibility / project design studies. These will lay the basis for future programme interventions.

With the current funding availability from the 4th rehabilitation programme sufficient funds are available to remain engaged in all the sectors identified and to some extent expand project activities. However it is essential that fresh finances become available for programming by September 2003 so as to ensure that funding gaps are not experienced.

Currently within the EC Kenya Delegation, there is a Somalia Unit composed of 2 Officials, one ALAT (Agent Local Assistance Technical) and eight Technical Assistants, with the support of an additional Technical Assistant working as a political adviser. Dedicated time with respect to the interventions described here comprise one Official, two Technical Assistants and 30% of time from an ALAT. This portfolio will remain sufficient for the next seven months. However it is envisaged that a full time expert will be required for the demobilisation and reintegration portfolio since this intervention requires considerable cross-sectoral coordination and input, as well as strong servicing for additional donors supporting the programme. Specific expertise will also enhance donor confidence in the process.

The strategy itself has been under implementation of the past one and half years and hence the initiation period will be solidly grounded by the middle of 2003.

Primary commitment	Start up :	November 2003
	End date:	December 2009

To help ensure that the programme is able to move solidly in the direction of achieving its goals, it is recommended that a specific **primary commitment** is put in place to guarantee that the required funds are available. The table in Annex 1 outlines the primary interventions, which will be needed in this commitment. In most areas figures remain indicative as feasibility / project preparation phases are either underway or yet to start.

5.4.5 Special conditions and measures to be taken by the local counterpart/community.

Each of the projects to be implemented will have a contribution from both the implementing partners and the local counterpart/community. There will be variations in funding contributions depending on the specific characteristics of projects, as the funding contribution from local counterparts in certain sectors are difficult to quantify.

5.4.6 Monitoring arrangements and follow up.

Each individual project contractor will be contractually obliged to provide, initially a preliminary report detailing work plans against the individual logical frameworks. Therefore they will be required to submit six monthly progress and financial reports accompanied by work plans for the coming six months. In

addition one page monthly reports will be submitted electronically to ensure timely support can be provided when required.

These reports will be officially submitted to the EC Somalia unit, for detailed clearance by the technical assistants through the official. The staff of the delegation will regularly monitor operations in the field to verify that reports are accurate. Technical assistants will be directly monitored by the delegation.

All partners will be obliged to participate in half yearly programme co-ordination meetings to ensure that interlinks are functional. They will also be required to report against those plans of action agreed upon in these meetings. Additionally partners will be expected to actively participate within the SACB.

Each project will also be subjected to external mid term evaluations and final evaluations.

6 SUSTAINABILITY

6.1 Beneficiaries ownership.

Since most of the activities are targeting local structures and the final aim of the programme is the improvement of these structures, the involvement of these local partners is crucial for the realization of the objectives. As organisations are empowered, there is a high possibility of sustainability. Beneficiaries will be involved, not only in the implementation of the programme, but also in the planning and design of specific projects.

6.2 Cross-sectoral sustainability.

Activities in other sectors of EC support to Somalia (such as social services, rural development, economic growth) reach a ceiling of effectiveness due to the absence of or lack of capacity in administrative structures, mirrored by the low level of organisation of civil society structures. This is aggravated by the lack of public awareness of effective structures of governance and the absence of effective rule of law. Thus progress in achievement of each of the results of the peace building strategy will improve the effectiveness and sustainability of all other development interventions.

Experience has demonstrated that women hold the key to successful implementation and sustainability in many sectors. The strategy aims to enhance their role in public policy-making and application through greater public awareness of human rights and the principles of good governance, combined with improved capacity of civil society organisations.

Activities directed at undermining the war economy will address the exploitation of natural resources and environmental degradation, enhancing sustainability of activities in the rural development and economic sectors (particularly the livestock sector). This will have to be complimented by alternative means of livelihood, for example in the demobilisation and re-integration of militia.

6.3 National policy measures.

Somalia is unique in that no national government exists, and if it is to emerge this programme will be instrumental in helping develop sectoral strategies, legal frameworks and legislation. Regional administrations, to a certain extent, have developed limited strategies and policies. It will be the responsibility of each functional project that these frameworks are adhered to.

Secondly, the international community is grouped under the umbrella of the SACB; a voluntary association of donors, UN agencies and NGOs engaged in humanitarian and development activities within Somalia. The SACB has developed a range of strategies and principles to which all EC funded operations must subscribe.

At the same time this programme fits within the EC's own country strategy paper, which is the guiding document for all EC funded interventions.

6.4 Institution capacity building.

As mentioned before a key component of this programme will support the capacities of both the private and public sectors. In the private sector, support will be targeted at civil society organisations, including professional associations. In the public sector, support will be primarily at the district and regional level.

6.5 Complementarity and sectoral co-ordination between donors.

In the continued absence of a state authority to co-ordinate the implementation of assistance, this function has been embraced by the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), in which the EC is actively involved. The EC chairs the governance sectoral committee³ and plays an active role in the civil society and human rights working groups. There are regular co-ordination meetings of EU Member States with the EC and frequent bilateral discussions with key donors and the UN.

6.6 Economic and financial sustainability.

Each project within the programme will be obliged to demonstrate the cost efficiency of interventions. Clearly in the areas described the rate of return is not the best indicator, as governance and peace are more about peoples' mind sets and regulatory systems than simple profit and loss. Development and poverty eradication are simply not possible in a situation where conflict persists. Hence a primary precondition for future development in Somalia could be achieved through proactive interventions outlined in this document.

Projects will be compared to similar ventures in other parts of the world, which are also emerging from chronic crises and conflict. Similar programmes in countries such as Mozambique, Bosnia or Ethiopia have run in the hundreds of millions. The proposed primary commitment should, therefore, be relatively cost efficient.

³ Key figures have also contributed to the drafting of the strategy.

Annex 1

Proposed primary commitment (5 years)

Results	Area of intervention	Geographical areas	Committed expenditure 3-4 th rehab	Estimated Total	EC contribution
1	Civic Education	Country wide	1,950,000	4,000,000	3,000,000
2	State structures / rule of law	Country wide / focus on north	1,700,000	20,000,000	10,000,000
3	Support / stimulation of Civil Society	Country wide	1,900,000	15,000,000	5,000,000
4	Conflict resolution local and country wide	Country wide / focus on south	2,462,000	13,000,000	4,000,000
5	Interlinkages CS and others/Cotonou	Country wide	1,350,000	7,000,000	3,000,000
6	Demobilisation	Country wide / focus on south	650,000	80,000,000	25,000,000
	Evaluations and studies	Country wide			1,000,000
	EC management costs (T.As/ECLO)				3,500,000
		Totals	10,012,000	139,000,000	54,500,000
			Contingencies 5%		2,725,000
			Grand total		57,225,000