

# Identification of a Livelihood Strategy and Programme to Address Underlying Causes of Food Insecurity in Somalia

Contract N° 2007/146532

## Final Report

Author of the report:

Antony PENNEY

*Mai 2008*



The project is financed by the European Union



The project is implemented by Gruppo Soges.

This project is implemented by Gruppo Soges. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.

The findings, conclusions and interpretations expressed in this document are those of the consultants team alone and should in no way be taken to reflect the policies or opinions of the European Commission.

## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

- 1. Summary**
- 2. Introduction and background**
- 3. Methodology**
- 4. Donor-funded projects and programmes**
- 5. Food security status and rationale**
- 6. Livelihood strategy**
- 7. Livelihood programme**
- 8. Institutional aspects**
- 9. Expected impact**
- 10. Sustainability**
- 11. Monitoring and evaluation**
- 12. Conclusions and recommendations**

## **Annexes**

- 1. Notes on food-insecurity's causes**
- 2. Food insecurity data 2007**
- 3. Employment in Somalia 2002**
- 4. Income and poverty in Somalia 2002**
- 5. Regional per capita income in Somalia 2002**
- 6. Livelihood logframe**
- 7. Food security thematic logframe**
- 8. Notes on LRRD**
- 9. Notes on food aid**
- 10. Glossary**
- 11. List of key persons met**
- 12. Terms of reference**

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFLC	Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis
AIDCO	European Cooperation Office
EC	European Commission
ECHO	EC Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
CFI	Chronically Food Insecure
CFP	Call for Proposal
CMR	Crude Mortality Rate
ERR	Economic Rate of Return
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FOCC	Financial Opportunity Cost of Capital
FRR	Financial Rate of Return
FSAU	Food Security Analysis Unit
FSHPC	Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification
FSRDSC	Food Security and Rural Development Sectoral Committee
FSTP	Food Security Thematic Programme
GAM	Global Acute Nutrition
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HE	Humanitarian Emergency
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IPC	Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification
JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
JSP	Joint Strategy Paper
LDC	Less Developed Country
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPV	Net present value
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RDP	Reconstruction Development Programme
SAM	Severe Acute Nutrition
SCZ	South and Central Zone
SISAS	Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia
SME	Small and Micro-Enterprise
SSS	Support Secretariat for Somalia
SSSP	Somalia Special Support Programme
SWALIM	Somalia Water and Land Information Management System
TFC	Therapeutic Feeding Centre
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UK	United Kingdom

### CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(January 2008)

Euro 1.00	=	US\$ 1.4692
Euro 1.00	=	Sh.S 22,000

### WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

m	million
bn	billion
t	metric ton
kg	kilogramme

### FISCAL YEAR

1 January to 31 December

## 1. Summary

This report's main aim was to identify a livelihood strategy and programme that addresses food insecurity's underlying causes. Their complexity and multiplicity required a rigorous analysis because (i) reaching consensus on their identification has rarely been obtained (ii) many of the causes are circular<sup>1</sup> and (iii) causes may vary over time and geographical area.

This report was assertive however in the identification of food-insecurity's underlying causes since it's based on economic, social, political and nutritional analyses as well as on in-the-field discussion with riverine<sup>2</sup>, agro-pastoralists, pastoralists and urban people including people affected by displacement.

The starting point was a food-security model that went beyond the simple question of food access and located food security in the wider context<sup>3</sup> of secure and sustainable livelihoods for the poor. It adopted the holistic analytical livelihood framework by:

- (i) treating the natural resource as just one among several assets<sup>4</sup> that people draw upon to make a living.
- (ii) seeing food-insecurity not as a failure of agriculture to produce sufficient food at national level but instead as a failure of livelihoods to guarantee household access to sufficient food.
- (iii) highlighting the importance of institutions and policies in shaping the opportunities and constraints that people face.
- (iv) emphasising the importance of vulnerability<sup>5</sup>.

The analysis also took account of (i) Somalia's needs, constraints and potential (ii) lessons learned from past and on-going projects and programmes and (iii) disaggregated comparison of the distribution of food insecurity with that of income-poverty, health poverty and education poverty.

The main issues addressed in this report included the meaning of food insecurity and its measurement, how many food-insecure are there, who are they, where are they and why are they food insecure.

The livelihood strategy and programme were flexibly designed based on the results and conclusions of the above analyses and avoided the prescription of a blanket approach since there is a huge internal diversity in Somalia in terms of food insecurity variation by region and over time. The strategy and programme also stressed the interdependence between participative economic growth and social protection as well as the opportunity for collaborative action and for addressing multiple conflicts such as clan, class and gender.

The main findings and conclusions were:

- (i) 70% of Somalia's population is household food-insecure.
- (ii) 80% of the population of South-Central-Zone (SCZ) is household food-insecure.
- (iii) Part of the natural resource base and environment is unstable and constrained.
- (iv) 80% of the food-insecure are rural and are dominated by the agro-pastoralists at zonal level.

---

<sup>1</sup> This means that causes may also be effects.

<sup>2</sup> Agriculturalist or farmer.

<sup>3</sup> It locates the food-access problem in a wider context in which people are also concerned with non-food expenditure and with protecting assets needed to generate future livelihood. This leads to identification of food-insecurity's underlying causes in a broad way instead of just in terms of a mechanical food-population balance. A crucial part of the analysis looks at riverines, agro-pastoralists and others who produce food and the non-producers who buy food in the market although some or many of the riverines and agro-pastoralists may be both food producers and buyers. A person may be forced into food insecurity for example even when there is plenty of food around if he is unemployed or there is a collapse in the market for goods that he produces and sells to earn a living.

<sup>4</sup> Including natural, physical, human and social. Assets also include income which is itself the output of their combined use. Income itself may also be counted as part of physical assets.

<sup>5</sup> Security's counterpart.

- (v) The largest food-insecure group at regional, district or village level may be the riverines, agro-pastoralists or pastoralists.
- (vi) Food insecurity is most severe in the urban areas especially for those people affected by displacement.
- (vii) Women tend to be disproportionately represented in all of the food-insecure groups.
- (viii) Some of the pastoralists are vulnerable but food-secure.
- (ix) Food production, marketing and consumption are important livelihood sources<sup>1</sup>.
- (x) It's not known with certainty whether or to what extent food-insecurity is being caused by market or marketing behaviour.
- (xi) Most of SCZ's population suffers from low longevity, high morbidity and low literacy.
- (xii) The underlying causes of food insecurity are insecurity, income poverty, health poverty and education poverty.
- (xiii) The performance of many donor-funded projects and programmes is below potential due mainly to the low-level skills of implementing NGOs, weak baseline survey, weak monitoring and evaluation and insufficient know-how on ECHO/AIDCO joint planning.
- (xiv) The value of the contribution of FSAU data to planning of food-security-oriented projects and programmes is below potential.

Food insecurity, income poverty, vulnerability and unemployment<sup>2</sup> are therefore large, widespread and rural while food insecurity is severest in urban areas. Health and education poverty are worse in rural areas and for women and economic-dependency ratios are highest in urban areas.

Based on findings and conclusions (i), (ii), (iii), and (xii), recommendation 1 is: improve household food security and the natural resource base.

Based on findings and conclusions (iii), (ix) and (xii), recommendation 2 is: build-up long-term strength in the human capital resource.

Based on findings and conclusions (iv), (v), (viii) and (xii), recommendation 3 is: support food-insecure groups such as the riverines, agro-pastoralists, pastoralists, women and urban including those people affected by displacement.

Based on findings and conclusions (x), recommendation 4 is: improve understanding of market and marketing behaviour.

Based on findings and conclusions (xii), recommendation 5 is: improve NGO implementing skills.

Based on findings and conclusions (xiv), recommendation 6 is: improve FSAU data and analysis.

Based on findings and conclusions (xii), recommendation 7 is: formulate an ECHO/AIDCO joint-planning strategy.

These recommendations were then encapsulated into 4 key broad interventions proposed for the livelihood strategy as follows:

Based on recommendations 1 and 3:

---

<sup>1</sup> Even though they may cause food insecurity in bad years. The rural population derives more than 50% of its cash income from farming, agro-pastoralism and pastoralism although one must be cautious because income sources may vary enormously and in different proportions within the same livelihood group. (Socio-Economic Survey 2002 Somalia, UNDP/World Bank, Report No 1, Somalia Watching Brief 2003).

<sup>2</sup> Probably included in the food-insecure, income-poor, vulnerable or all of them.

(i) Increase food production<sup>3</sup>.  
Based on recommendations 1, 2 and 3:

(ii) Diversify production away from food into the production of cash-crops and non-agriculture including small and micro-enterprises (SMEs)<sup>1</sup>.

Based on recommendations 1, 2, 3 and 4:

(iii) Make markets and marketing work better for the food-insecure.

Based on recommendations 2 and 3:

(iv) Move away from the vulnerable natural resource<sup>2</sup> into the building-up of long-term strength in the human capital<sup>3</sup> resource.

And success in implementing the livelihood strategy interventions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) combined would be based on recommendations 5, 6 and 7. All of these interventions are based on poverty reduction since food insecurity's underlying causes<sup>4</sup> are income poverty, health poverty and education poverty as mentioned earlier.

Equitable<sup>5</sup> growth would be at the heart of the strategy because it would provide a sustainable<sup>6</sup> livelihood for the poor and because a buoyant economy would be the best guarantee that resources would be available on a continuing basis to fund targeted programmes for food-security-oriented livelihood improvement.

No conceivable pattern or level of growth however would improve urban food security in the short-term term. About 0.7 m or 20% of SCZ's food-insecure<sup>7</sup> are urban and most of them are in humanitarian emergency suggesting that targeted measures aimed at the provision of safety nets<sup>8</sup> and direct transfers<sup>9</sup> would be needed. These would protect the poor's most valuable asset i.e. the human capital embodied in their health and education<sup>10</sup>.

The livelihood strategy would therefore address both current and future causes of food-insecurity through increasing consumption and investment whilst simultaneously protecting assets<sup>11</sup>, the environment and vulnerability.

## Livelihood Programme

---

<sup>3</sup> For home consumption as well as for generating cash income. It's unlikely that dependence on food production as an income source can be significantly reduced in the short-run.

<sup>1</sup> This would reduce risk and overdependence on a few crops especially given climatic uncertainty. The identification of new productive enterprises would be based on current and future market/price analysis and financial feasibility (whether or not long-run financial returns exceed the financial costs).

<sup>2</sup> While protecting rural lives and improving rural livelihoods in the interim.

<sup>3</sup> By investing in health and skills development. Human capital, unlike income, tends to remain built-up once it's built-up.

<sup>4</sup> Notwithstanding security.

<sup>5</sup> For everybody especially the food insecure.

<sup>6</sup> Sustainable because it's expected that the long-run financial returns would exceed the financial costs.

<sup>7</sup> Based on all of the IPC categories combined.

<sup>8</sup> A distinction may be made between safety net and direct transfer. A safety net is a food or income transfer that protects livelihood by complementing (not substituting for) measures to improve household food security. It's income insurance to help people through livelihood shock and stress such as those caused by drought, illness, unemployment or war displacement (people affected by displacement) and it's provided in case of sudden income or consumption collapse. It's targeted to support "those who may be temporarily in danger when events turn unfavourable".

A safety net using entitlement jargon is entitlement protection since its objective is to prevent or ameliorate an acute decline in living standard following short-term livelihood shock e.g. famine relief during drought. A safety net is therefore a compensatory mechanism that restores lost income rather than a mechanism that lifts the food-insecure out of food insecurity or reduces the severity of food insecurity.

<sup>9</sup> A direct transfer is targeted to "those unable to participate in growth".

<sup>10</sup> But a safety net only reduces food insecurity unsustainably unless it has a positive productivity impact.

<sup>11</sup> Including natural resources.

The Livelihood Strategy and Programme would focus on SCZ because its need is considered to be greatest and it would comprise the following Result Areas:

**Result area 1:** Agricultural and non-agricultural production, marketing and income diversified, improved and environmentally sustainable.

Rehabilitation/Development - support to small and micro-enterprise (SME) development in addition to cash transfers to facilitate progression from relief to development.

**Result area 2:** Affordable access to nutrition, safe drinking water and proper sanitation improved and sustained.

Humanitarian - provision of in-kind transfers such as therapeutic feeding and supplementary feeding.

Rehabilitation/Development - provision of information and awareness on diet, nutrition and child care.

**Result area 3:** Social protection<sup>1</sup> provided.

Humanitarian - provision of in-kind transfers including food and non-food.

Rehabilitation/Development - provision of (i) conditional cash transfers to encourage school and clinic attendance and (ii) unconditional cash transfers.

The activities are summarised in the logframe in Annex 6. Result area 1 aims to improve food security through the reduction of income-poverty while Result areas 2 and 3 aim to improve food security through the reduction of health poverty and education poverty. Each result area however would reinforce each other in contributing to the Programme purpose due to the inter-linkages between these underlying causes of food insecurity. The logical framework would support some of the objectives of the Somalia Special Support Programme (SSSP) and the 2009 - 2013 Joint Strategy Paper (JSP).

### **Food Security and Thematic Programme**

The Food Security and Thematic Programme would comprise the following Result Areas:

**Result area 1:** Entrepreneurial activities supported and developed particularly for women and those people affected by displacement

**Result area 2:** Conditional cash transfer provided for income, health and adult literacy with an emphasis on women, children and those people affected by displacement.

The activities are summarised in the logframe in Annex 7. Result areas 1 and 2 aim to improve food security by reducing income poverty, health poverty and education poverty. Each result area would reinforce each other in contributing to the Programme purpose due to the inter-linkages between these underlying causes of food insecurity as mentioned earlier.

The Call for Proposal would comprise:

- Support and development of entrepreneurial activities particularly for women and those people affected by displacement. The entrepreneurial activities would be identified based on analysis of market demand and financial profitability. Part of the cash transfer would be provided for the formation and strengthening of common interest and self-help women groups through village-level PRAs.
- Piloting of conditional cash transfers for income, health and adult literacy in which cash would be provided to the food-insecure household on condition that (i) mother and child (or children) regularly attend a health clinic and (ii)

---

<sup>1</sup> Including safety nets and direct (conditional/unconditional) cash transfers.

household members attend adult literacy class. Cash may also be provided to the health clinic to improve drug supply and to provide a financial incentive to doctors and nurses.

The cost of the Food Security and Thematic Programme would be Euro 12 m of which Euro 5 m would be for the Call for Proposal (CfP).

The expected impact of the livelihood strategy would be improved food security through increased current and future consumption and investment as well as the simultaneous protection of assets, the environment and vulnerability. Broad-based growth would provide a sustainable livelihood for the poor and because a buoyant economy would be the best guarantee that resources would be available on a continuing basis to fund targeted programmes for food-security-oriented livelihood improvement as already mentioned.



## 2. Introduction and background

This report's main aim was to identify a livelihood strategy and programme that addresses food insecurity's underlying causes. Their complexity and multiplicity required a rigorous analysis because (i) reaching consensus on their identification has rarely been obtained (ii) many of the causes are circular<sup>1</sup> and (iii) causes may vary over time and geographical area.

This report was assertive however in the identification of food-insecurity's underlying causes since it's based on economic, social, political and nutritional analyses as well as on in-the-field discussion with rural<sup>2</sup> and urban people including those persons who have been displaced.

The starting point was a food-security model that went beyond the simple question of food access and located food security in the wider context<sup>3</sup> of secure and sustainable livelihoods for the poor. It adopted the holistic analytical livelihood framework by:

- (v) Treating the natural resource as just one among several assets<sup>4</sup> that people draw upon to make a living.
- (vi) Seeing food-insecurity not as an aggregative failure of agriculture to produce sufficient food at national level but instead as a disaggregative failure of livelihoods to guarantee household access to sufficient food.
- (vii) Highlighting the importance of institutions and policies in shaping the opportunities and constraints that people face.
- (viii) Emphasising the importance of vulnerability<sup>5</sup>.

The analysis also took account of (i) Somalia's needs, constraints and potential (ii) lessons learned from past and on-going projects and programmes and (iii) disaggregated comparison of the distribution of food insecurity with that of income-poverty, health poverty and education poverty.

The main issues addressed in this report included the meaning of food insecurity and its measurement, how many food-insecure are there, who are they, where are they and why are they food insecure.

The livelihood strategy and programme were flexibly designed based on the results and conclusions of the above analyses and avoided the prescription of a blanket approach since there is a huge internal diversity in Somalia in terms of food insecurity variation by region and over time. The strategy and programme also stressed the interdependence between participative economic growth and social protection as well as the opportunity for cooperative action and for addressing multiple conflicts such as clan, class and gender.

---

<sup>1</sup> This means that causes may also be effects.

<sup>2</sup> Riverine agriculturalists, agro-pastoralists and pastoralists.

<sup>3</sup> It locates the food-access problem in a wider context in which people are also concerned with non-food expenditure and with protecting assets needed to generate future livelihood. This leads to identification of food-insecurity's underlying causes in a broad way instead of just in terms of a mechanical food-population balance. A crucial part of the analysis looks at riverines, agro-pastoralists and others who produce food and the non-producers who buy food in the market although some or many of the riverines and agro-pastoralists may be both food producers and buyers. A person may be forced into food insecurity for example even when there is plenty of food around if he is unemployed or there is a collapse in the market for goods that he produces and sells to earn a living.

<sup>4</sup> Including natural, physical, human and social. Assets also include income which is itself the output of their combined use. Income itself may also be counted as part of physical assets.

<sup>5</sup> Security's counterpart.

### 3. Methodology

The work methodology largely followed the contents of the Terms of Reference (TOR) in Annex 12. The Consultants were hosted in the Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU) and consulted regularly with its staff. The Consultants met with other key stakeholders such as the EC Delegation, ECHO, UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, local communities and NGOs such as SCUUK and CARE. Secondary data and discussion content were rigorously analysed while primary data were also collected and studiously analysed during field visits to selected projects in Somalia. The mission's<sup>1</sup> indicative implementation comprised four phases:

- 1st phase (January 22<sup>nd</sup>/23<sup>rd</sup> to February 3<sup>rd</sup>): secondary data review and meetings with staff of the key stakeholders such as the EC Delegation, ECHO and FSAU in Nairobi.
- 2nd phase (February 4<sup>th</sup> to February 6<sup>th</sup>): meetings and primary data analysis in Jowhar with CEFA and local communities.
- 3<sup>rd</sup> phase (February 11<sup>th</sup> to February 13<sup>th</sup>): meetings and primary data analysis in Dollow with CARE and local communities.
- 4<sup>th</sup> phase (February 19<sup>th</sup> to February 29<sup>th</sup>): meetings in Nairobi with staff of the EC Delegation, ECHO, FSAU, UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, local communities and NGOs such as SCUUK and CARE. Workshop/presentation on the 25<sup>th</sup> February with the EC and partners and final debriefing/presentation on the 29<sup>th</sup> February with the EC.

A key part of the work of the Consultants was regular sharing of their findings with the main stakeholders in order to improve everyone's understanding thereby increasing the chances of ownership and subsequent success of the strategy and programme. This is because one of the underlying causes of food insecurity is indeed a failure of understanding of its causes. The Consultants prepared an inception report that the Contracting Authority evaluated and commented upon. The inception report formed a basis for field work, logical framework development and the call for proposals

The working methodology stimulated the free expression of stakeholders' perceptions and needs balanced with the sustainability of the possible recommended actions. The methodology also aimed at the rigorous prioritisation of those actions that are likely to be able to be implemented in the short-to-medium term in response to the urgency of the food-insecure's needs and are consistent with the Programme Purpose to improve household food security in Somalia.

The Consultants during the implementation of their work believed the importance to show not only that an adequate acknowledgement of the problems would be achieved but also that this would produce a change in development approach. The relevance of this stems from the recognition that reducing food insecurity in Somalia needs an innovative approach otherwise food insecurity would become more widespread. Consequently the best way to utilise donor resources would be as instruments to facilitate change. The future of the food-insecure is the main time frame and priority concern but we should not forget the lessons from the past.

#### **Draft report organisation**

The draft report would include sections on donor-funded projects and programmes and lessons learned (Chapter 4), food security status and rationale (Chapter 5), the livelihood strategy (Chapter 6), the livelihood programme (Chapter 8) and conclusions and recommendations (Chapter 12).

---

<sup>1</sup> Excluding international travel days between UK and Kenya.

#### 4. Lessons learned from donor-funded projects and programmes

Many project evaluations from past and on-going donor-funded projects have been analysed for lessons learnt. The major findings are outlined below:

- Insecurity compromises project implementation and impact. Conflict sources include potential access to resources and the allocation of work, money and benefit. Project managers therefore have to spend many months resolving conflict or potential conflict. They also do remote monitoring from Nairobi during periods of evacuation due to conflict and insecurity.
- A strategy linking relief-interventions with development ones. The overall objective has to be to wean the recipient away from relief. Access to relief such as food aid<sup>1</sup> may sometimes be a disincentive to engage in or continue productive project activity.
- Capacity-building requires detailed planning and it appears to be most successful if starting small. Core group members can be used as trainers although this may be difficult when involving other clan members. Included in capacity building is the need to develop leadership-potential following a pre-agreed plan. But intense supervision is required at the outset on a continuous basis for at least two years. A programme of training, study tours and implementation of training would be required and experience has shown that a small group approach (10 - 15 persons) has the greatest chance of success.
- Linking capacity-building to the development of contingency plans in the event of disaster is necessary. Disaster preparedness has to be supported in group development and the absence of a functional government is a constraint.
- Care needs to be taken when developing appropriate interventions. Lack of knowledge and capacity together with low literacy make technology-transfer difficult and slow. Women are particularly adversely affected in such situations. Project management must be vigilant in such situations and have a coping mechanism to ameliorate the threat to the traditional and indigenous societal coping mechanisms.
- Farmer-to-farmer extension would suffer if a minority clan is involved. Extension information is transmitted through familial or kinship ties but given that knowledge is power, even the kinship or clan communication link has dissemination delays.
- The need for a robust and accurate monitoring and evaluation system is a pre-condition. If resources or technologies are to be distributed, a transparent and fair system needs to be developed and implemented. Many of the indicators selected in previous projects were not "SMART".
- If the technologies to disseminate involve prescription drugs or kits, it's essential to involve the relevant professionals such as veterinary surgeons or doctors if exist. Otherwise tensions may develop between unqualified Community Animal Health Workers and qualified veterinary professionals. The same is true in health and education.
- For sustainability, develop small-scale enterprise where an individual or group of individuals is working to create a livelihood. Self-interest and livelihood development is a strong incentive.
- Establishing a tendering process is not recommended as it will be subject to abuse. The most appropriate method is a straight-purchase transaction. EC procurement rules would apply although crisis procedures may also apply.
- Projects of less than 30 months in duration may not deliver the expected results. Projects or programmes of more than 48 months have better impact and sustainability.
- The development of local partner institutions is useful because enforcement of agreed rules and regulations remains a problem. Enforcement frequently leads to conflict or marginalisation of a disadvantaged group. Using local institutions is both sustainable and part of the developmental process although care needs to be exercised in their establishment. Most of the CBOs and local organisations already

---

<sup>1</sup> See Annex 8.

exist but need capacity building and support. Care therefore needs to be exercised in their promotion/development rather than establishment.

- Cash-for-work programmes are popular resulting in a positive outcome but the involvement of women is problematic. The site of work is frequently far from their home making participation in the activity difficult. Frequently the tasks are inappropriate so consideration is required to make the activity appropriate and culturally acceptable.
- The development of micro-projects such as the construction of ponds, dams and other water conservation structures requires environmental concerns to be assessed and ameliorated. Adequate engineering design and maintenance training are also important for sustainability. Access, ownership and other social issues need to be discussed. Many micro-projects may benefit from a literacy component which will enhance the degree of comprehension as well as engendering confidence. Micro-projects must clearly define the beneficiaries and use local materials, tools and techniques.
- A common weakness in project design is frequently the lack of an alternative strategy for the inclusion of women and other vulnerable community members.
- Sustainability lessons may be learned from some projects such as the design of financial and institutional mechanisms for the provision of drinking water and irrigation water. Some projects assessed the scope for and the level of the beneficiary's equity contribution to the project's capital, operating, maintenance and replacement costs and it seems that they have ensured that future income would be sufficient to finance some or all of the recurrent costs as well as periodic capital investment replacement costs.

## 5. Food security status and rationale

### Food security

There have been more than 200 definitions of food security since the 1974 World Food Conference but the one adopted in this report comes from the 1996 World Food Summit. It defined food security as being achieved when all people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and health life. The stress here is on individual access and the analytical unit is therefore the individual and not the household even though there are complex inter-linkages between the individual, household, community, nation and international economy.

Food security measurement is based on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC) which comprises categories such as Chronically Food Insecure<sup>1</sup>, Acute Food and Livelihoods Crisis<sup>2</sup> and Humanitarian Emergency<sup>3</sup>. It is understood that these categories may correspond respectively to permanent undernourishment<sup>4</sup>, temporary famine<sup>5</sup> and permanent famine. They may also correspond respectively to “food insecure, poor and vulnerable”, “very food insecure, very poor and very vulnerable” and “extremely food insecure, extremely poor and extremely vulnerable” if we introduce income-poverty and vulnerability concepts to the food-security-oriented livelihood picture.

This report indeed hypothesises that food insecurity, income poverty and vulnerability are interlocking phenomena and that food insecurity would be most severe where they overlapped. The income-poverty line may be defined as the minimum level of income required to meet basic needs while vulnerability may be defined as exposure and sensitivity to livelihood shocks<sup>6</sup>. Vulnerability is also commonly defined in income-terms with persons earning an annual income equal to 0.75 - 1.25 times the income-poverty line deemed to be vulnerable. The following sections broadly<sup>7</sup> show how food insecurity, income poverty and vulnerability are distributed amongst the population in SCZ since this is where the needs are considered to be greatest.

### How many food-insecure are there

Somalia in 2007 had an estimated 5.3 m food-insecure representing more than 70% of the total population<sup>8</sup> and about 4.6 m of them were rural comprising more than 3.8 m CFI, about 0.5 m in AFLC and 0.3 m in HE. There were also over 0.7 m urban food-insecure.

---

<sup>1</sup> CFI.

<sup>2</sup> AFLC.

<sup>3</sup> HE.

<sup>4</sup> It is reported by some researchers that undernourishment is more appropriate to describe people's nutritional state instead of undernutrition or malnutrition that is defined in terms of a given amount of food/nutrient irrespective of people's characteristics. If this is correct however, it still acknowledges that undernutrition and undernourishment are tied concepts. The relationship between food intake and nutritional achievement can vary greatly depending not only on sex, pregnancy, metabolic rate, climate and activities but also on access to factors such as health care and drinking water. A person's capability therefore to avoid food insecurity may depend not merely on food-intake but also on access to health care, medical facilities, elementary education, drinking water and sanitation.

<sup>5</sup> It should be pointed out that a famine may occur (i) without death when it causes hunger and poverty (ii) without food shortage and (iii) without starvation when mortality is caused by disease. A famine is (i) mainly a poverty problem and not necessarily starvation (ii) a process and not an event and (iii) often more of a health crisis than a food crisis. The best famine definition is considered to be “Famine is a socio-economic process which causes accelerated destitution of the most vulnerable, marginal and least powerful groups in a community to the point where they can no longer as a group maintain a sustainable livelihood.”

<sup>6</sup> Although it's not sure how vulnerability is measured.

<sup>7</sup> A more detailed distribution could not be illustrated owing to time constraints. It's hoped however that more detailed analysis would be undertaken in the in-the-field planning stage since this is a complex subject requiring an examination of each livelihood's dynamics and specifics in order to fully understand food-insecurity risk and vulnerability to shock.

<sup>8</sup> Data from FSAU's September 2007 Post Gu Analysis Report.

SCZ in the same year had about 4.2 m food-insecure representing 80% of SCZ's population and about 3.5 m of them were rural comprising 2.0 m CFI, 0.5 m in AFLC and 1.0 m in HE. There were also an estimated 0.7 m urban food-insecure comprising mainly those people who have been displaced through any kind of disturbance. The exact numbers of urban food-insecure including those who have been displaced as well as those who have not been displaced are unknown owing to data constraints but this does not affect the analytical conclusions.

The precise numbers are unimportant but what is crucial to know is that in SCZ (i) food insecurity is large and widespread and (ii) the number of CFI is twice that in HE implying that many more people are killed slowly by CFI than by the more confined occurrence of HE.


### Who are they

Most of SCZ's food insecure were rural<sup>1</sup> as inferred earlier and comprised the riverines, agro-pastoralists, and pastoralists. The largest number were the agro-pastoralist group although the greatest number at regional, district or village level may be the riverines, agro-pastoralists or pastoralists. Annex 2 provides details on who are the food-insecure by region and district.

There were also urban food-insecure<sup>2</sup> comprising mainly of those people who have been displaced<sup>3</sup> and these were the most<sup>4</sup> food-insecure. Women tend to be disproportionately represented in all of the food-insecure groups.

Figure 1 shows the food-insecure<sup>5</sup> by livelihood group/zone in 2005 - 2008. The most food-insecure livelihood group in this period were the southern agro-pastoralists. About 30% of them were food-insecure while only about 5% of the Dawa Pastoralists and South-East Pastoralists were food-insecure. The Southern Inland Pastoralists were food-insecure in 2005 - 2007 and the Riverines were also food-insecure in 2005 - 2008 although the Shabelle Riverines were food insecure only in 2007/08.

**Figure 1: Food Insecure by Livelihood Group/Zone 2005 - 2008**



<sup>1</sup> Food insecurity is usually prevalent in the rural areas simply because the basic requisites of existence such as food, clothing and shelter come from the land. Urban food-insecurity is a new phenomenon and generally dates back to the early 1900s.

<sup>2</sup> Data on the number of aged, disabled and orphans were unavailable.

<sup>3</sup> Assuming that all of the district capitals and surrounding villages qualify as urban. People affected by displacement normally move to rural areas when there are floods and clan-conflict but they return shortly after the problem has ended. Rural persons affected by displacement have been excluded from the analysis due to data constraints although anecdotal evidence suggests that they number about 13,000.

<sup>4</sup> Mainly in HE.  
<sup>5</sup> AFLC and HE.

Source: FSAU data


These data illustrate the dynamics of food insecurity with some livelihood groups moving into and out of it over time and therefore has implications for choice of intervention type.

**Where are they**

SCZ's Lower Shabelle Region had the highest number of food-insecure<sup>1</sup> in 2007 but Bay Region had the largest number of CFI. The urban food-insecure are mainly in Mogadishu, Gaalkacyo and Bossaso.

Figure shows the food insecure by region for the Gü seasons 2004 - 2007. Middle and Lower Shabelle were reasonably food secure (CFI) for all seasons except the Gü 2007. Middle Juba, Lower Juba and Gedo in contrast saw high levels of food insecurity especially in the Gü 2005 season. Bay was chronically food secure for Gu 2004 and 2007 but there were high levels of food insecurity in 2005 and 2006. Bakool has seen increasing levels of food insecurity since 2004.

**Figure 2: Food Insecure by Region/Zone for the Gü Season 2004 - 2007**



Source: FSAU data

These data also illustrate the dynamics of food insecurity with some regions moving into and out of it and therefore has implications for the choice of intervention as already mentioned.

**Why are they food-insecure**

The complexity and multiplicity of food insecurity's underlying causes make it difficult to achieve consensus on their identification and it's easy to confuse causes with symptoms. Food insecurity is usually not caused by one factor only since it generally reflects the failure of food production, trade and aid and indeed is caused by a combination of factors such as (i) supply failure plus demand failure (ii) drought plus income-poverty (iii) income-poverty plus health poverty and (iv) health poverty plus education poverty or any combination of these.

<sup>1</sup> In HE, AFLC and all of the IPC categories combined.

And each of these causes may also be an effect. Income-poverty<sup>1</sup> itself for example may cause health and education poverty while health and education poverty may cause income-poverty.

Food insecurity's underlying causes<sup>2</sup> based on theory and evidence are insecurity, income-poverty, health poverty and education poverty<sup>3</sup>. Causes have also been described as trigger, precipitating and contributory but these are by definition not underlying and some of them are detailed in Annex 1.

### **Income-poverty**

SCZ's lowest regional per capita incomes in 2002 were in Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, Mudug, Hiraan, Gedo, Bay and Bakool as shown in Annex 5<sup>4</sup>. Bakool was the poorest region<sup>5</sup>. SCZ's regional per capita incomes were then ranked and compared to the regional food-insecurity rankings and there appeared to be a link. Bay for example was found to be income-poorer and to have more food-insecure than Gedo while Bakool was found to be income-poorer and to have more food-insecure than Middle Juba. It seems that the data are validating the expected strong link between income-poverty and food insecurity.

It was impossible to compare food-insecurity's regional distribution with that of income-poverty because of lack of data<sup>6</sup> but income-poverty distribution by nation, urban and rural were available. They illustrated that 43% and 73% of Somalia's population were below the food poverty line<sup>7</sup> and the income-poverty line<sup>8</sup> respectively and that this poverty was mainly rural<sup>9</sup> as shown in Annex 4<sup>10</sup>. Income-poverty in Somalia was therefore large, widespread and to repeat, predominantly rural. It seems reasonable to assume therefore that these conclusions would also be valid for SCZ and if so would again reinforce the hypothesis that income-poverty and food-insecurity are linked given that FSAU data analysis already demonstrated that food insecurity in SCZ is large, widespread and mainly rural.

---

<sup>1</sup> Income poverty is the most widespread (worldwide) cause of food insecurity at household and national level. Food insecurity however is not synonymous with income poverty even though there is a strong connection between the two and this explains why food security and poverty reduction are separate objectives. The very poor are those who are unable to fulfil their food requirements because either they do not have the income to buy the food or because they do not produce it. It can also be the case that there is not enough food even if cash is available. Page 4 of the 2006 EC's "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - A Thematic Strategy for Food Security - Advancing the food security agenda to achieve MDGs" says that food insecurity is both a cause and a consequence of absolute poverty. The paper further argues on page 13 that research should be carried out in order to contribute to a better understanding of the underlying causes of food insecurity. Page 11 of the "European Commission Strategy for Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002-2007" says that food insecurity is caused by climate and insecurity.

<sup>2</sup> Food insecurity was once thought to be caused only by a lack of food (supply failure) but is now commonly analysed in terms of lack of food access (demand failure). The main causes of food insecurity have included climate (desertification, drought, flood and climate change), Malthusian (overpopulation relative to food supply), market failure (trader speculation or food hoarding) and entitlement failure (failure at household level to acquire sufficient food through production, purchase and gift). FSAU says that the underlying causes are security, environmental degradation and social marginalisation.

<sup>3</sup> Women's education accounted for 40% of the worldwide malnutrition-reduction over the last 25 years because of its strong influence on child nutrition. Other major factors are improvements in per capita food availability, health, environment and women's status.

<sup>4</sup> Socio-Economic Survey 2002 Somalia, UNDP/World Bank, Report No 1, Somalia Watching Brief 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Assuming that these income data are in real terms i.e. after price inflation has been taken into account.

<sup>6</sup> Although it's understood that UNDP Somalia would make these data available later this year.

<sup>7</sup> Equivalent to less than US1 per day which may be defined as the minimum level of income required to satisfy food consumption needs.

<sup>8</sup> Equivalent to less than US2 per day which may be defined as the minimum level of income required to satisfy food and non-food consumption needs.

<sup>9</sup> With rural food-poverty affecting 2.5 m or 53% of the population and rural income-poverty affecting 3.7 m or 80% of the population. Urban food-poverty and urban income-poverty affected 0.7 m and 1.77 m respectively or 24% and 61% of the national population.

<sup>10</sup> Socio-Economic Survey 2002 Somalia, UNDP/World Bank, Report No 1, Somalia Watching Brief 2003.



Economic dependency<sup>11</sup> data showed high ratios for national, rural and urban with the highest in the urban areas as derived from Annex 3 data. This implies that food insecurity and income-poverty may be worse in urban areas.

Employment data demonstrated that the number of unemployed in Somalia was 2 m of which 1.1 m were rural and 0.9 m were urban as shown in Annex 3. The number of persons without income<sup>1</sup> is therefore large, widespread and mainly rural again matching the above conclusions perhaps because they are included in the “food-insecure” and “income-poor”. It’s likely that these conclusions would also apply to SCZ although it cannot be validated without further data.

The depth of income-poverty<sup>2</sup> distribution by nation, urban, rural and region was unavailable so it could not be used to support the hypothesis that the depth of income-poverty was worse in the urban areas and therefore provide possible further support to the fact that the severity of food-insecurity was worse in the urban areas.

Rural Somalia had 4.6 m food insecure and 3.7 m income-poor<sup>3</sup> suggesting that there could be 0.9 m rural people who are food-insecure but not income-poor. If these data are reliable and comparable, it would provide support to some of the mission’s findings in-the-field that parts of Somalia suffer from household food-supply failure.

Rural Somalia also has 1.24 m employed in agriculture and 1.1 m unemployed<sup>4</sup> as mentioned earlier. These data imply that part of the livelihood strategy would require the promotion and intensification of agriculture assuming that (i) it has potential including long-term comparative advantage (ii) most of the food-insecure and income-poor are in agriculture and (iii) food production is a main source of food consumption, employment and income. More details on this are provided in Chapter 6.

### Health and education poverty

Table 5.1 shows selected social indicators<sup>5</sup> for Somalia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Low-Income LDCs.

**Table 5.1: Selected Social Indicators for Somalia for Selected Years in 2000 - 2006**

	Unit	Somalia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low-Income LDCs
Life expectancy at birth	year	48	47	59
Adult literacy	%	19.2	59	61
Male	%	23.0	n.a	n.a
Female	%	11.0	n.a	n.a
Urban	%	34.9	n.a	n.a
Rural	%	10.9	n.a	n.a
Gross primary-school enrolment	%	16.9	92	n.a
Male	%	20.8	n.a	n.a
Female	%	12.7	n.a	n.a
Urban (1)	%	41	n.a	n.a
Rural (1)	%	12	n.a	n.a

(1) This may also include secondary-school enrolment.

<sup>11</sup> Dependency ratio equals [(number of people aged 0 - 14) + (number of people aged 65 and over)] / [number of people aged 15 - 64] x 100%. Regional employment data were unavailable.

<sup>1</sup> Although some of them are likely to have a positive income owing to remittance or gift or both assuming that remittance is not synonymous with gift. (Socio-Economic Survey 2002 Somalia, UNDP/World Bank, Report No 1, Somalia Watching Brief 2003).

<sup>2</sup> There are no data on depth of poverty or the poverty gap index but if there were, it would tell us “how much” poverty there is in contrast to the headcount ratio which tell us “how many” poor there are. It’s conceivable that the depth of poverty is worse in the urban areas but this cannot be validated without data.

<sup>3</sup> Based on an income-poverty line of US 2 / day as shown in Annex 8.

<sup>4</sup> Probably included in the 4.6 m food-insecure or 3.7 m income-poor or both.

<sup>5</sup> Some of the data should be interpreted with caution because they relate to different years and therefore may be incomparable. Social indicators are often more informative about a country’s food insecurity status because of the problems of using per capita income as a development measure. Per capita income for example tells us nothing about income distribution. Life expectancy, adult literacy and school enrolment are less prone to distortion since they have natural upper limits while per capita income can be dominated by the high income of a few and there are no upper limits on personal income.

The data show Somalia's lack of social development as reflected by low life expectancy at birth<sup>1</sup> and low levels of adult literacy and gross primary-school enrolment especially for females. Health and education poverty are therefore worse in the rural areas especially for females.

Low life expectancy at birth and low levels of adult literacy and primary school enrolment are some of food insecurity's underlying causes but it was impossible to compare the regional distribution of health and education poverty with that of food insecurity owing to lack of data. It was therefore difficult to provide further support at regional level to the hypothesis that health and education poverty are inextricably linked to food insecurity and income poverty. A close correlation between health and education poverty and food insecurity and income poverty has been shown in most other Sub-Saharan African countries.

Somalia's Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>2</sup> ranking is estimated to be 161 out of 163 countries reflecting its low level of social and economic development. This ranking compares to a slightly better ranking of its per capita income but the discrepancy between them largely reflects the priorities that Somalia attaches to health and education especially to the education of women<sup>3</sup>.

## Vulnerability

It's not yet known with certainty who is vulnerable mainly because there are still doubts about how to define and measure vulnerability<sup>4</sup>. The FSAU however defined and practically applied vulnerability in relation to an event or shock capable of triggering a food-insecurity risk for example. It defined vulnerability as a function of livelihood asset and livelihood strategy.

---

<sup>1</sup> Life expectancy at birth in say 2008 is the average age to which a child born in 2008 can be expected to live on the basis of present circumstances. Life expectancy is not the average age of the population which is determined by other factors as well as life expectancy.

<sup>2</sup> The Human Development Index (HDI) is a development measure that was conceived by UNDP in 1990. It's a composite index measuring life expectancy, adult literacy, mean years of schooling and GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) and is meant to provide a better picture of development than the traditional GDP per capita measure. A national HDI is useful but it would be more useful to disaggregate it by income, gender, geographical region and ethnic group.

<sup>3</sup> Health and education therefore are low priority and it is reported that the pre-war Somalia Government allocated only 1% of its budget to each of health and education while almost 25% was allocated to military spending. It's likely that Somalia's HDI trend is worsening over time reflecting the lack of investment in human development. The latter is indeed both a cause and an effect of food insecurity but were human capital built up, it would be more likely to be sustainable unlike income that could fall at any time as mentioned earlier.

<sup>4</sup> A common definition used by some donors and expressed in income-terms describes vulnerable people as those who earn an annual income that is 0.75 - 1.25 times the income poverty line.

One source ("Measuring Vulnerability", The Economic Journal, 113 (March), C95-C102, Ethan Ligon and Laura Schechter (Undated)) defined vulnerability as a function of income poverty, aggregate risk, idiosyncratic risk and unexplained risk and concluded that (i) aggregate shock is worse than idiosyncratic shock although it's not sure how these shocks were defined (ii) households headed by an employed educated male are less vulnerable to shock than other households (iii) households with more educated heads are less vulnerable and face less aggregate and idiosyncratic risk (iv) households which own animals or live in villages (as opposed to cities) are less vulnerable mainly because of higher consumption (v) agricultural households bear no more risk than other households despite agriculture's reputation for being risky. Perhaps this is because of the unobserved mutual insurance mechanisms which are at work (vi) households which have many income-earning members but smaller family size are less vulnerable. These households also experience higher levels of and lower idiosyncratic risk in food consumption but more unexplained risk (vii) female-headed households bear greater aggregate risk (viii) households with older household heads are more vulnerable than those with younger household heads.

A second source (Vulnerability Analysis and Asset Management", Devyani Mani, United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD)(Undated)) defined vulnerability as the opposite to security and that a person is vulnerable if he or she is lacking in defence or support mechanisms at national, Government, community, household and individual levels. Some examples of vulnerable populations are small farmers, fishermen, pastoralists, forest populations, slum dwellers, female-headed households, traditionally-marginalised groups, landless and people affected by displacement.

A third source ("Quantifying Vulnerability to Poverty, A Proposed Measure, Applied to Indonesia", Lant Pritchett, Asep Suryahadi and Sudarno Sumarto, (Policy Research Working Paper 2437, Washington D.C., World Bank 2000)) defined a household as vulnerable if it had a risk of experiencing at least one episode of poverty in the near future or had a greater than 50% chance of falling into poverty.

A fourth source, the WFP, defined vulnerability as equal to exposure to risk plus the inability to cope.

The FSAU concluded that the middle-to-upper wealth pastoralists are generally less vulnerable to shock than the lower-wealth ones<sup>1</sup>.

Vulnerability is a complex subject but it's hoped that the FSAU and perhaps other institutions would (i) soon reach consensus on how to define and measure it (as well as food insecurity and income poverty) and (ii) start to collect and analyse such data as mentioned in Chapter 6. Detailed data on for example vulnerability by occupation, gender and age would then become available thereby facilitating the identification of correct and more detailed livelihood development interventions.

---

<sup>1</sup> A pastoral's ability to mitigate the negative impacts of rising food prices could be largely determined by savings or financial capital held in the form of the number of livestock-owned. Pastoral livelihoods and wealth levels are heterogeneous and pastoralists therefore would be vulnerable to different shocks dependent on this heterogeneity and therefore have different food-insecurity risks. The main shocks that impact on pastoral food security are drought (rangeland and water conditions), markets (livestock export and internal sales markets - prices and access) and conflict (clan conflict that prevents access to grazing and water sources and limits migration). An indicator of pastoralist purchasing-power is the terms-of-trade between goat and rice (North and Central Somalia) and goat and sorghum in SCZ. Pastoralists are generally well suited to Somalia's climate as their way of life and livelihood provide robust resilience to shock especially for the middle-to-upper wealth ones. The lower-wealth pastoralists are the most vulnerable to shock such as drought and market collapse as they have smaller livestock herds to draw upon in times of stress and less credit access.

## 6. Livelihood Strategy

Chapter 5's main findings and conclusions were:

- (i) 70% of Somalia's population is household food-insecure.
- (ii) 80% of the population of South-Central-Zone (SCZ) is household food-insecure.
- (iii) Part of the natural resource base and environment is unstable and constrained.
- (iv) 80% of the food-insecure are rural and are dominated by the agro-pastoralists at zonal level.
- (v) The largest food-insecure group at regional, district or village level may be the riverines, agro-pastoralists or pastoralists.
- (vi) Food insecurity is most severe in the urban areas especially for those who people who have been affected by displacement.
- (vii) Women tend to be disproportionately represented in all of the food-insecure groups.
- (viii) Some of the pastoralists are vulnerable but food-secure.
- (ix) Food production, marketing and consumption are important livelihood sources<sup>1</sup>.
- (x) It's not known with certainty whether or to what extent food-insecurity is being caused by market or marketing behaviour.
- (xi) Most of SCZ's population suffers from low longevity, high morbidity and low literacy.
- (xii) The underlying causes of food insecurity are insecurity, income poverty, health poverty and education poverty.
- (xiii) The performance of many donor-funded projects and programmes is below potential due mainly to the low-level skills of implementing NGOs, weak baseline survey, weak monitoring and evaluation and insufficient know-how on ECHO/AIDCO joint planning.
- (xiv) The value of the contribution of FSAU data to planning of food-security-oriented projects and programmes is below potential.

The data and their sources for (i), (ii), (iv), (v) and (vi) are provided in Annex 2 while those for (iii) and (viii) are derived from FSAU reports. Findings and conclusions (vii) and (xi) were based on UNDP/UNICEF data and findings and conclusions (ix), (x), (xii), (xiii) and (xiv) were based on past evaluation reports and Consultant discussions with stakeholders.

Food insecurity, income poverty, vulnerability and unemployment<sup>2</sup> are therefore large, widespread and rural while food insecurity is severest in urban areas. Health and education poverty are worse in rural areas and for women and economic-dependency ratios are highest in urban areas.

Based on findings and conclusions (i), (ii), (iii), and (xii), recommendation 1 is: improve household food security and the natural resource base.

Based on findings and conclusions (iii), (ix) and (xii), recommendation 2 is: build-up long-term strength in the human capital resource.

Based on findings and conclusions (iv), (v), (viii) and (xii), recommendation 3 is: support food-insecure groups such as the riverines, agro-pastoralists, pastoralists, women and urban including those people who have been affected by displacement.

---

<sup>1</sup> Even though they may cause food insecurity in bad years. The rural population derives more than 50% of its cash income from farming, agro-pastoralism and pastoralism although one must be cautious because income sources may vary enormously and in different proportions within the same livelihood group. (Socio-Economic Survey 2002 Somalia, UNDP/World Bank, Report No 1, Somalia Watching Brief 2003).

<sup>2</sup> Probably included in the food-insecure, income-poor, vulnerable or all of them.

Based on findings and conclusions (x), recommendation 4 is: improve understanding of market and marketing behaviour.

Based on findings and conclusions (xii), recommendation 5 is: improve NGO implementing skills.

Based on findings and conclusions (xiv), recommendation 6 is: improve FSAU data and analysis.

Based on findings and conclusions (xii), recommendation 7 is: formulate an ECHO/AIDCO joint-planning strategy.

These recommendations were then encapsulated into 4 key broad interventions proposed for the livelihood strategy as follows:

Based on recommendations 1 and 3:

- (v) Increase food production<sup>1</sup>.

Based on recommendations 1, 2 and 3:

- (vi) Diversify production away from food into the production of cash-crops and non-agriculture including small and micro-enterprises (SMEs)<sup>2</sup>.

Based on recommendations 1, 2, 3 and 4:

- (vii) Make markets and marketing work better for the food-insecure.

Based on recommendations 2 and 3:

- (viii) Move away from the vulnerable natural resource<sup>3</sup> into the building-up of long-term strength in the human capital<sup>4</sup> resource.

And success in implementing the livelihood strategy interventions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) combined would be based on recommendations 5, 6 and 7. The livelihood strategy would therefore focus on poverty reduction because food-insecurity's underlying causes are poverty-related.

Equitable<sup>5</sup> growth would be at the heart of the livelihood strategy because it would provide a sustainable<sup>6</sup> livelihood for the poor and because a buoyant economy would be the best guarantee that resources would be available on a continuing basis to fund targeted programmes for food-security-oriented livelihood improvement. But such growth would have to ensure that natural and environmental resources are developed without being degraded in order to prevent future generations being compromised by present ones. It's therefore important when formulating detailed livelihood development interventions to:

- Identify and analyse the empirical and causal linkages between the causes of food insecurity and the causes of the degradation of natural and environmental resources.
- Assess the economic importance of the degradation of natural and environmental resources.

---

<sup>1</sup> For home consumption as well as for generating cash income. It's unlikely that dependence on food production as an income source can be significantly reduced in the short-run.

<sup>2</sup> This would reduce risk and overdependence on a few crops especially given climatic uncertainty. The identification of new productive enterprises would be based on current and future market/price analysis and financial feasibility (whether or not long-run financial returns exceed the financial costs).

<sup>3</sup> While protecting rural lives and improving rural livelihoods in the interim.

<sup>4</sup> By investing in health and skills development. Human capital, unlike income, tends to remain built-up once it's built-up.

<sup>5</sup> For everybody especially the food-insecure.

<sup>6</sup> Sustainable because it's expected that the long-run financial returns would exceed the financial costs.

- Design economic incentives to reduce this degradation recognising that the economy and the environment are interdependent and not separate entities.

No conceivable pattern or level of growth however would improve urban food security in the short-term term suggesting that targeted measures aimed at the provision of safety nets and direct transfers would be needed. The urban food-insecure comprise the landless including those people affected by displacement, the unemployed and the “unemployable” such as the aged, sick and orphans. Most of them have no resources or no income or both and would not benefit from growth in the short term. The landless and the employable would need employment-based interventions and this would allow them to be treated as active agents instead of passive recipients of handouts. They would also need consumption/income subsidies such as safety nets or direct transfers. And even in the absence of food imports or food aid, the recreation of such income for the food-insecure would help to reduce food insecurity through a better sharing of available food. The “unemployable” would need unconditional support in the form of consumption or income subsidies.

The livelihood strategy was flexibly designed to avoid the prescription of a blanket approach since there is a huge internal diversity in Somalia in terms of food-insecurity<sup>1</sup> variation over time and by geographical area and livelihood group and sub-group. The strategy also stressed the interdependence between participative economic growth and social protection as well as the opportunity for cooperative action and for addressing multiple conflicts such as clan, class and gender.

The livelihood strategy would therefore address both current and future causes of food-insecurity through increasing consumption and investment whilst simultaneously protecting assets, natural resources, the environment and vulnerability.

### **Increase food production**

Food production, marketing and consumption are important livelihood sources even though they may cause food insecurity in bad years but this would be mitigated under the Livelihood Programme. It's also unlikely that dependence on food production as an income-source can be significantly reduced in the short-run.

Increasing food production would therefore be promoted for home consumption as well as for generating cash income and this may involve targeting high-potential areas even when food crops may not have a short-term or long-term comparative advantage. It's indeed acknowledged that rainfed agriculture<sup>2</sup> may often be marginal but it must also be remembered that food production is a key source of food security for many small farmers<sup>3</sup>.

It's reported that crop productivity has been declining for many years. If crop productivity refers to crop yield<sup>4</sup> and is declining, it's important to know why. It may be due to factors such as war, the quantity and distribution of rainfall, lack or cost of inputs, unfavourable relative output prices, unfavourable output-price/input-price ratios, poor resource endowment, lack of know-how or lack of extension officers. If it is, it's crucial to know which are the most important of these so that the EC can identify the correct interventions to increase crop yield provided that (i) the financial returns<sup>5</sup> exceed the financial costs<sup>6</sup> and (ii) favourable markets<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Including income poverty, health poverty, education poverty and vulnerability.

<sup>2</sup> But agriculture including the traditional rainfed sector is heterogeneous ecologically and socio-economically which means that some crop production areas in SCZ could have a short-term or long-term comparative advantage. And this comparative advantage may vary greatly (i) among farmers and (ii) for each individual farmer among years. Food-insecure groups for example are found in both dry and well-watered areas. Ecological factors may predominate in the dry marginal areas so that solutions would be required which raise crop productivity or employment there. And better-watered areas may be characterised by socio-economic inequality which may be the main factor underlying food-insecurity so that solutions would have to focus on improving the poor's resource-access.

<sup>3</sup> Notwithstanding the strategic recommendation to diversify away from the vulnerable natural resource base into the building up of long-term strength in the human capital resource.

<sup>4</sup> Crop production per unit of land as opposed to crop production per unit of family labour or to crop production that may fall due to declining planted area.

<sup>5</sup> Incremental.

exist. Point (i) assumes that the EC would base its intervention-choice on resource-use efficiency criteria.

It's also accepted that irrigation can be costly but there is a growing new consensus that this may not be entirely correct and indeed that the costs of irrigating could be much less than the costs of not irrigating when measured in economic prices<sup>1</sup>. If rainfed or irrigated agricultural production is to be increased therefore, per-hectare crop budgets would first have to be constructed for particular locations in order to demonstrate the impact of the new technology on the financial returns to family labour day, household production, employment, net cash income, food security and vulnerability. This would then allow the EC to design the correct interventions.

Production should however be increased as this would reduce the need for social protection and enhance the resources available for providing that protection thereby improving food security. One may also need price incentives to increase production and measures to encourage and enhance technical change, skill formation and productivity.

Price incentives are already being provided in the SCZ by the donors in the form of grants for inputs and for outputs such as food aid. There are many ways to provide price incentives but perhaps these are the easiest to supply in the SCZ. If increasing production is the main objective, provision of a grant-financed input such as fertiliser, seed or an irrigation pump would (i) reduce the input price (ii) increase input demand and (ii) increase production. There would be other effects too but their analysis would fall outside the scope of the Consultants' terms-of reference. The crucial question therefore would relate to what happens when the grant ends. It's quite common for some farmers to continue using the inputs after the grants have ended in which case production would continue to increase. These short-term grants in other words can and do produce long-term benefits.

The strategy would therefore generate employment<sup>2</sup> and income for the food-insecure including the resource-poor and those in environmentally-degraded areas bearing in mind that some groups such as female-headed households may be short of labour and therefore would require capital to raise productivity. Agricultural extensification may also be required where more land would be needed using the same level of labour, capital or technology.

Improving household food security could also be achieved by increasing livestock productivity or output per animal through improvement in health, hygiene, nutrition, management and breeding. Increased livestock productivity would also help to (i) meet an increasing domestic and export demand and (ii) improve the external-trade balance by generating or saving foreign exchange earnings thereby contributing to national food security.

---

<sup>6</sup> Incremental.

<sup>7</sup> Including low-cost market access.

<sup>1</sup> Planners and donors worldwide have long reached agreement that irrigation of agricultural production is generally too costly i.e. its costs are greater than its benefits perhaps because of political or intellectual fashion. But there is a growing new consensus that this may not be entirely correct and indeed that the costs of irrigating could be much less than the costs of not irrigating when measured in economic prices. It's further argued that the real problem is not so much whether or not costs exceed benefits but simply that irrigation is inadequately-financed. In other words, it often does make economic sense to irrigate. Detailed benefit-cost analyses should therefore be carried out on-site in order to determine whether or not the economic costs of irrigation exceed its economic benefits. The word economic is used to distinguish it from the word financial. Economic means that we are dealing in economic prices and therefore looking at the situation from the entire economy's point of view while financial prices are only used when analysis is based on the point of view of the individual such as that of the small farmer.

Suppose however that the financial costs of irrigation do exceed its financial returns but suppose also that the economic returns exceed the economic costs. This is a common scenario in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and would mean that irrigated agricultural production would generate a net benefit to the economy but a net loss to the farmer. Such production however could be switched from being "financially unprofitable and economically profitable" to "financially profitable and economically profitable" were the EC to temporarily grant-finance appropriate on-farm interventions. It must be remembered again that food production is a key source of food security for many small farmers.

One of the SC-UK's projects has already demonstrated that the volume of agricultural production in the Belet Weyne area can be increased although we don't yet know if the financial returns exceed the financial costs. Field visits with CEFA in the Jowhar area however did indicate that irrigated agricultural production may generate a net financial profit for some of the small farmers while other small farmers would require a 1-year investment grant but thereafter could be financially sustainable.

<sup>2</sup> Using more labour per hectare or animal.

## **Diversify production away from food into cash crops and non-agriculture including SMEs**

The diversification of production away from food into cash-crop production and into non-agriculture including SMEs would reduce risk and overdependence on a few crops especially given climatic uncertainty. The identification of new productive enterprises including SMEs would be based on market analysis<sup>1</sup> and financial feasibility<sup>2</sup>. Such diversification would increase SCZ's long-run chances to join in the process of economic expansion that took place in much of the rest of world.

This diversification may require targeting of high-potential areas where returns are highest and on cash crops with long-term comparative advantage. It may also involve allocating resources to low-potential areas to produce food or cash crops and to minimise the food-insecure's exposure to risk by stabilising food production's inter-annual fluctuations. The rural population in aggregate derives more than 50%<sup>3</sup> of its cash income from riverines agriculture, agro-pastoralism and pastoralism and it's unlikely that dependence on them can be significantly reduced in the short-run. It must be pointed out however that there may be large variations in the degree of dependence on a particular food/income source even within the same livelihood group<sup>4</sup> as inferred earlier.

## **Make markets and marketing work better for the food-insecure**

The strategy would involve analysis of current and future markets and prices as well as an examination of marketing in order to determine whether and to what extent markets and marketing behaviour contribute to food insecurity. This would allow identification of remedial action thereby allowing markets and marketing to work better for the food-insecure.

When many people facing food-insecurity produce world-traded agricultural commodities (food or nonfood), the first task would be to determine whether prices are below import parity<sup>5</sup> or export parity<sup>6</sup> prices because of price controls or exchange rates. Lifting these prices to world levels would promote growth generally and food security for many of the rural population. Knowing these import parity prices and export parity prices would allow the determination of whether or not it's cheaper to import or produce domestically and whether or not it's profitable to export. This is because (i) international trade is not costless since it comprises the cost of transport, handling and insurance and (ii) high trade costs reduce trade volumes. The calculation of import parity prices and export parity prices is a simple exercise but this has not been done to the consultants' knowledge. It's however very important to do since it would help the EC to identify the correct food-security-oriented interventions especially because of the increased potential for food-insecurity in SCZ that may result from the high transport-cost/world-price ratio<sup>7</sup>. A large divergence between the import parity and export parity prices would signify that the transport cost between world markets and the SCZ are equivalent to a high proportion of the world price.

---

<sup>1</sup> Assessment of current and future market and price prospects.

<sup>2</sup> The long-run financial returns of the enterprises should exceed their financial costs as demonstrated by a positive value of the Net Present Value (NPV).

<sup>3</sup> Socio-Economic Survey 2002 Somalia, UNDP/World Bank, Report No 1, Somalia Watching Brief 2003.

<sup>4</sup> The Bakool agro-pastoral for example is more dependent on livestock than on crops for food (through trade) and income while the Bay agro-pastoral is more dependent on crops than livestock for food and income. The low-income riverines in Juba is more dependent for food on wage-labour-income and market purchase than on crop production while the middle-income riverines is more crop-dependent for food and income.

<sup>5</sup> The import parity price may be defined as the price of supply to the location in SCZ from the major exporting country. This price includes the original purchase price (P) plus the transport/handling cost (T) involved in delivery. The import parity price = P + T.

<sup>6</sup> The export parity price may be defined as the return left to the farmer in SCZ after the transport/handling cost (T) has been deducted from the world price (P). The export parity price = P - T.

<sup>7</sup> SCZ transport costs may be so high in relation to the world price that trade potential is greatly reduced thereby increasing the potential for more food insecurity.



Markets and marketing also refer to inputs and more data would be required on:

- Input<sup>1</sup> sources, problems, availability, cost, quality, variety, knowledge and advice.
- Existing input supply channels and whether or not any of them are monopolies.
- Input delivery effectiveness.
- Casual or permanent labour availability.
- Extension.
- Institutional marketing arrangements.
- Costs and margins of production, storage, transport, processing, packaging, grading, standardisation, quality control and hygiene.

We also need more data on output markets and marketing such as the costs and margins of production, storage, transport, processing, packaging, grading, standardisation, quality control and hygiene.

Grain storage for example may be a possible intervention if it works for the food-insecure especially if it's correct that many farmers have to sell the entire harvest at one time owing to liquidity constraints. Indeed, it's understood that the EC is intending to finance grain storage and that this is based on the following rationale. Exogenous fluctuations in grain consumption (as opposed to marketed-grain consumption) can contribute to food insecurity and result mainly from changes in household and national production levels. These fluctuations however would be reduced through storage. Farmers, traders and consumers during the growing season would monitor the state of the next harvest and this may lead to anticipatory price movements with stockholders shedding stock in anticipation of another good harvest or buying up stock in order to prepare for harvest failure.

It's therefore important to know much more about how markets and marketing operate in SCZ in order to be able to identify how to make them work better for the food-insecure through identification of the correct intervention(s) if any. Marketing costs for example may be too high and may contribute to food insecurity. If this is correct, the appropriate interventions would reduce these costs and this in principle would lead to a decline in the urban consumer price and an increase in the farmgate price thereby benefiting both the small farmer and the urban consumer.

### **Move away from the vulnerable natural resource into the building-up of long-term strength in the human capital resource**

The strategy would also involve moving away from the vulnerable natural resource<sup>2</sup> into the building-up of long-term strength in another resource such as human capital by investing in health and skills development. Human capital, unlike income, tends to remain built-up once it's built-up.

One would therefore invest in health using a conditional cash transfer (CCT). This is a cash transfer provided to a food-insecure household on condition that the mother and child (or children) regularly attend a health clinic. Part of the transfer would be used for immediate consumption or relief and the remaining part for human capital investment or development. This intervention also happens to be a perfect example of a LRRD intervention.

Social protection would be needed to support both those able and unable to participate in economic growth including the very food insecure<sup>3</sup> and the "unemployable" such as the aged, sick, children and orphans.

---

<sup>1</sup> Seed, seedling, fertiliser, spray chemicals, sacks and packing materials, transport, storage, farm labour, farm machinery and water.

<sup>2</sup> While protecting rural lives and improving rural livelihoods in the interim.

<sup>3</sup> Without resources.

Safety nets<sup>1</sup> and direct transfers<sup>2</sup> would protect the poor's most valuable asset i.e. the human capital embodied in their health and education<sup>3</sup>.

## Targeting

Broad targeting could initially be based on FSAU data in order to select the geographical area and group. This would be followed by more detailed and disaggregated targeting at district or village level based on the following criteria (i) number of food-insecure (ii) degree of severity of food insecurity (iii) number of poor (iv) depth of income-poverty (v) number of vulnerable (vi) rural (vii) urban (viii) number of people who have been displaced (ix) proportion of women in each food-insecure group and (x) environment.

Other criteria may include (i) remoteness and accessibility (ii) presence or absence of other projects or development initiatives (iii) local revenue contribution (iv) quality of natural resource - climate, state of degradation, land capability (v) household income and assets<sup>4</sup> (vi) education coverage (vii) health coverage (viii) health indicators such as morbidity and mortality rates and (ix) level of awareness of development potential and processes.

The intervention-choice criteria would include effectiveness, efficiency, affordability, administrative feasibility, conditionality, precondition, sequence, political acceptability and sustainability. This would provide a basis for the systematic analysis of projects in terms not only of a cost-effective contribution to improving food security<sup>5</sup> but also in terms of administrative feasibility, political acceptability and long-term sustainability. These criteria may be ranked and weighted preferably using a matrix approach.

## Planning

The value of the contribution of FSAU data to the planning of food-security-oriented projects and programmes is below potential as mentioned earlier. The current partially-disaggregated analysis of the FSAU data does not adequately capture the socio-economic characteristics of the groups of food-insecure, poor and vulnerable. The Consultants feel that the FSAU should therefore inter alia:

- Define food security, vulnerability and poverty.
- Show how to measure and derive indicators for food security, vulnerability and poverty.
- Further disaggregate food security, vulnerability and poverty by rural, urban, age, gender, occupation, displaced peoples and location.
- Identify the underlying causes of food security, vulnerability and poverty.

Some of these tasks are already being undertaken by the FSAU but its reports should present the text, tables, graphs and analyses in a simpler way in order to reach a wider audience. It's accepted that in making things simple many caveats and complications may be glossed over. But everyone has to start somewhere and it's best to get the message across first and make things complicated later on rather than create a sea of confusion at the outset and hope that some people will swim through it. Many FSAU data-users have indeed informed the Consultants that the presentation of many of the FSAU reports is "user-unfriendly" and the

---

<sup>1</sup> A distinction may be made between safety net and direct transfer. A safety net is a food or income transfer that protects livelihood by complementing (not substituting for) measures to improve household food security. It's income insurance to help people through livelihood shock and stress such as those caused by drought, illness, unemployment or war displacement (People affected by displacement) and it's provided in case of sudden income or consumption collapse. It's targeted to support "those who may be temporarily in danger when events turn unfavourable". A safety net using entitlement jargon is entitlement protection since its objective is to prevent or ameliorate an acute decline in living standard following short-term livelihood shock e.g. famine relief during drought. A safety net is therefore a compensatory mechanism that restores lost income rather than a mechanism that lifts the food-insecure out of food insecurity or reduces the severity of food insecurity.

<sup>2</sup> A direct transfer is targeted to "those unable to participate in growth".

<sup>3</sup> But a safety net only reduces food insecurity unsustainably unless it has a positive productivity impact.

<sup>4</sup> Based on or confirmed by baseline survey.

<sup>5</sup> Interventions should be effective and efficient and the monitoring and evaluation of implementation and its impact would be essential.

Consultants agree with this. The FSAU's value-added in planning would be greatly increased if all of the above-mentioned tasks are successfully completed.

### **Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development**

Conceptually the European Commission has already issued documentation on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2001 (COM (2001) - final) urging greater congruency between ECHO and AIDCO. The Delegation already has the mandate to link relief with rehabilitation and development. The crux is **how** to achieve the same longer term specific and overall objectives; reducing poverty and reducing dependency on short term emergency interventions.

#### **The "HOW"**

Internal and external coordination is the key to success. The EU already has examples from other countries where working groups have been established to ensure direct links between ECHO and AIDCO ensuring better coordination of funding and management for a positive longer term developmental outcome.

**Action Point 1:** It's recommended that a point of congruence within Somalia (like the funding of the town water reticulation systems in Dollow or in Ghedweyne) be identified. The identified project activity would become the focus of ECHO and AIDCO collaboration.

**Action Point 2:** That a working group be created with the mandate to establish a successful point of collaboration with 6 months. The working group would plan and initiate a process with a 3-year time horizon for the relief, rehabilitation and development of a key structure. Planning would be undertaken with implementing partners and other governance structures.

The working group must be made up of officials from ECHO, AIDCO and implementing partners (NGO Partners). It's emphasised that the Heads of Sections must not be on the working group. The working group would be tasked with resolving the following:

- Working through procedural and operational issues: by implementation, trial and error, monitoring, reporting back and evaluating.
- Assessing different budget lines and funding mechanisms with a view to finding a harmonised funding process.
- Decision making - Rapid response with clear chains of command resulting in rapid decisions on funding, management and procedure.

The working group must be embodied at the earliest possible opportunity. It must have a mandate to coordinate and link ECHO and AIDCO activities initially on the project selected but latterly onto a wider mandate. The short-term objective is to determine a modus operandi and to determine how the different funding and resource allocations can be mobilised and coordinated over the different mandated timeframes (ECHO less than 12 months and AIDCO on a 3 - 5 year time horizon). The specific objective of the working group is simple and would be to make coordination between ECHO and AIDCO work and function. Once it has been pioneered, it can be used repeatedly.

#### **Procedural and Operational Issues**

AIDCO and ECHO have regulations and procedures which need to be harmonised. Regulatory antagonism must be identified and modified to flexibly accommodate other partner regulations. Implementing partners need to test the modified regulations to determine operational feasibility and if necessary the modified regulations need to be tested by the Commission. The new or modified mechanisms of collaboration would need to recognise the key European Union principles of management, coherence, accountability and transparency. Flexibility from all working group partners would be expected.

## **Resources and funding**

The mobilisation of resources (principally funding) is a key problem. Multiple funding instruments and budget lines exist but each with its own set of regulations. Complexity is increased and flexibility is diminished. An output of the working group within the time available must be to review the different funding instruments being used and to identify possible funding mechanisms and budget lines from ECHO and AIDCO that can be enmeshed in to a single funding line albeit with 2 lines of responsibility. This would generate seamless funding support in terms of its use by implementing partners in funding flows and activities.

## **Fast (Rapid) Decision making**

The EU is characterised by a slow response when making decisions. The whole purpose of de-concentration is that within certain parameters all decisions can be made in the delegations. The working group cannot afford to have a slow decision making process. It must develop a rapid reaction mechanism to achieve the goal of rapid decision making and the working group chairperson must have executive responsibility to contract, recruit and to fund.

Any rapid decision making mechanism must remain within the boundaries of current AIDCO, ECHO and other EU instruments and other decision making mechanisms. Any decision must therefore be fast-tracked within the delegation and it must involve key stakeholders, implementation partners and other donors. The key issue is to establish a fast method of making decisions on management and funding and ideally decisions need to be made within 14 days.

Concluding this section on LRRD, the issue of collaboration is structural. The aim of forming a working group is to identify points of discontinuity, work through problems and to develop a modus operandi. It's therefore about strategy, procedures and resolving difference in time frame, mandate and contracting mechanisms. The objective would be to negotiate the differences, develop a modus operandi and move forward.

## 7. Livelihood Programme

The livelihood-strategy's specific objective is "Vulnerable and poor, rural and urban households' livelihood assets developed and protected". The Livelihood Strategy and Programme would focus on SCZ because its need is considered to be greatest and it would comprise the following Result Areas:

**Result area 1:** Agricultural and non-agricultural production, marketing and income diversified, improved and environmentally sustainable.

Rehabilitation/Development - support to small and micro-enterprise (SME) development in addition to cash transfers to facilitate progression from relief to development.

**Result area 2:** Affordable access to nutrition, safe drinking water and proper sanitation improved and sustained<sup>1</sup>.

Humanitarian - provision of in-kind transfers such as therapeutic feeding and supplementary feeding.

Rehabilitation/Development - provision of information and awareness on diet, nutrition and child care.

**Result area 3:** Social protection<sup>2</sup> provided.

Humanitarian - provision of in-kind transfers including food and non-food.

Rehabilitation/Development - provision of (i) conditional cash transfers to encourage school and clinic attendance and (ii) unconditional cash transfers.

The activities are summarised in the logframe in Annex 6. Result area 1 aims to improve food security through the reduction of income-poverty while Result areas 2 and 3 aim to improve food security through the reduction of health poverty and education poverty. Each result area however would reinforce each other in contributing to the Programme purpose due to the inter-linkages between these underlying causes of food insecurity.

The Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) used the livelihood strategy's specific objective as its overall objective and it was "targeted rural and urban households' real income increased". The FSTP would comprise the following Result Areas:

**Result area 1:** Entrepreneurial activities supported and developed particularly for women and those people affected by displacement

**Result area 2:** Conditional cash transfer provided for income, health and adult literacy with an emphasis on women, children and those people affected by displacement.

The activities are summarised in the logframe in Annex 7. Result areas 1 and 2 aim to improve food security by reducing income poverty, health poverty and education poverty. Each result area would reinforce each other in contributing to the Programme purpose due to the inter-linkages between these underlying causes of food insecurity as already mentioned.

These logical frameworks were drafted falling under the aegis of the Somalia Special Support Programme (SSSP) logical framework. The livelihood strategy and programme comes at project level and the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) is at component level. Their logical frameworks interlock and support some of the SSSP's components including governance.

---

<sup>1</sup> Including activities of improving adult literacy and awareness in water, sanitation and hygiene.

<sup>2</sup> Including safety nets and direct (conditional/unconditional) cash transfers.

The Call for Proposal would comprise:

- Support and development of entrepreneurial activities particularly for women and for those people who have been displaced<sup>1</sup>. The entrepreneurial activities would be identified based on analysis of market demand and financial profitability. Part of the cash transfer would be provided for the formation and strengthening of common interest and self-help women groups through village-level PRAs.
- Piloting of conditional cash transfers for income, health and adult literacy in which cash would be provided to the food-insecure household on condition that (i) mother and child (or children) regularly attend a health clinic and (ii) household members attend adult literacy class. Cash may also be provided to the health clinic to improve drug supply and to provide a financial incentive to doctors and nurses.

The cost of the Food Security and Thematic Programme would be Euro 12 m of which Euro 5 m would be for the Call for Proposal (CfP).

---

<sup>1</sup> Refer to “people affected by displacement” to take into account host population.

## **8. Institutional Aspects**

The need for governance has been recognised by the UN and the donors including the EU which is co-funding the Joint programme on Local Government and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG). The Result area 1 (output 1) outcome of the JPLG is “*Local governments have basic structures, systems and resources to fulfil prioritised roles and responsibilities*”.

The need for functional local governance institutions is also recognised by many NGOs such as CARE Somalia which is working to build capacity through the involvement of local or community based organisations (CBOs). And a functional local government would in principle provide education, health and infrastructure maintenance.

Any conditional cash transfer (CCT) activity would support on-going education and health institutions and initiatives through the provision of skilled human resources and medical supplies and education materials. An outcome of the FSTP would be support to the development of functional local health and education institutions.

The FSTP would seek to develop institutions within the community by focusing on women, building their business capacity to market more and developing a savings and lending institutional capacity. This would re-enforce the importance and role of women.

The livelihood strategy and subsequent projects funded through the FSTP would target the development and strengthening of education and health institutions through initiatives to promote better child care and adult literacy. These would support other donor initiatives to support governance and the development of functional and democratic local government institutions.

Institution-building may be difficult to assess during the project period but the litmus test would be its durability or sustainability when external funding ends. The ultimate test of any institution however is not whether it exists or sustains itself but whether it manages to do something useful.

## **9. Expected Impact**

Increased and diversified agricultural production and non-agricultural production combined with improved marketing would lead to sustainable improved food security.

The provision of cash transfers to women-groups to start savings and income-generating SMEs would be expected to increase rural and urban household real income.

The expected impact of conditional cash transfers would be an increase in immediate consumption and human resource development thereby representing an automatic link between relief and development. Higher consumption, improved nutrition/health and better adult literacy would lead to cognitive development and higher labour productivity thereby reducing vulnerability and risk. These impacts would collectively contribute to increasing rural and urban household real income.

These impacts in turn would collectively contribute to improved food security through increased current and future consumption and investment as well as through the simultaneous protection of assets, the environment and vulnerability.

### **Assumptions and Risks**

The expected impact depends heavily on the successful mitigation or prevention of risks and the fulfilling of assumptions. The Livelihood and FSTP logframes identified the following risks and assumptions:

- No major large scale disaster.
- Target population is accessible.
- No major epidemics.
- Health care facilities are available in target areas.



## 10. Sustainability

Broad-based growth would provide a sustainable livelihood for the poor and because a buoyant economy would be the best guarantee that resources would be available on a continuing basis to fund targeted programmes for food-security-oriented livelihood improvement as already mentioned.

The entrepreneurial activities proposed for example are generally characterised by low implementation costs and the possibilities to create permanent sustainable institutions. This would increase the chances of sustainability so that there would be continued delivery of benefits to the target groups after the donor funding ends. The chances of designing and implementing a successful entrepreneurial activity would be increased if account were taken of the following:

- Stakeholder participation in investment design and implementation.
- Strong local organisations and institutions.
- Financial rate of return (FRR) greater than the financial opportunity cost of capital (FOCC) or the net incremental household cash flow must be positive and attractive after borrowing.
- Economic rate of return (ERR) greater than the economic discount rate.
- Income-generating core activity and supportive social infrastructure.
- Good monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system.
- Strong local leadership and integrity.
- Efficient use of recycled or revolving funds.
- Sound business planning and market analyses.

The proposed entrepreneurial activities may need to include provision of finance for beneficiary assessments and socio-economic surveys to be undertaken in each region or district, one at the early stage of implementation and two later in implementation. These surveys would assess in quantitative terms the impact of the activities including the effect on the target groups' level of employment, production and cash income. It would be ensured that the institutions and terms of references selected for these surveys would be acceptable to the EU. Expansion of the use of socio-economic surveys would increase the chances of the proposed activities actually reflecting the target groups' needs.

It's expected that the net incremental cash income<sup>1</sup> for would-be farmer and entrepreneurial borrowers as a result of the proposed properly-planned activities would be positive and attractive as measured by a benefit-cost ratio greater than one and a net present value greater than zero<sup>2</sup>. This would provide farmers and entrepreneurs with an incentive to innovate and to improve management.

It would be important for on-farm and entrepreneurial activities to generate sufficient revenue to ensure that the net incremental cash income after borrowing is not only positive and attractive but also sufficient to finance the necessary periodic capital replacement. Efforts

---

<sup>1</sup> Measured in financial or market prices.

<sup>2</sup> The investments would be financially non-sustainable only if the financial rate of return (FRR) is less than the financial opportunity cost of capital (FOCC), if the benefit-cost (B/C) ratio is less than 1 or if the net present value (NPV) at the assumed financial discount rate is less than 0. Sustainability may be incorporated into project design for example as follows (i) prepare per-hectare production budgets for annual food and cash crops based on existing technology and the project's new technology including the relative profitabilities in terms of the financial returns to family labour day, the key parameter for the small farmer. (ii) formulate financial budgets for livestock enterprises and small and micro enterprises (SMEs) (iii) construct household budgets to identify the appropriate crop/enterprise mix in order to demonstrate the project's impact on food security, household production, employment and net cash income (iv) use these budgets to quantify the required loan/grant/equity mix and to formulate the loan repayment terms so that the incremental net cash income would remain high and positive after borrowing thereby reducing the need to over-exploit natural and environmental resources and (v) assess scope for and the level of the beneficiary's equity contribution to the project's capital, operating, maintenance and replacement costs ensuring that future income would be sufficient to finance periodic capital investment replacement costs. This would therefore help to identify the required financial sustainability or cost-recovery mechanisms and facilitate financial sustainability.

would also be made to ensure that counterpart equities for some microfinance or SME-financed based activities would be adequate to ensure revolving fund sustainability after the investment life. The likelihood of the financial sustainability of the new investments would therefore be increased. High financial returns to microfinance- and SME finance-based activities in on-farm or SME would be more likely to attract private investors to provide capital.

Financial sustainability or cost-recovery mechanisms may therefore be identified through the assessment of the scope for and the level of the target group's equity contribution to the project's capital, operating, maintenance and replacement costs as mentioned earlier in Footnote 2. These mechanisms are indeed very relevant to SCZ and they have already been identified and put in place in for example the SC-UK Belet Weyne Project's irrigation water component. It then became possible or it's becoming possible for the community not only to finance some of the recurrent costs of this component but also some of its periodic capital investment replacement costs. This is a remarkable achievement in a war-torn country.

Mechanisms to achieve CCT financial sustainability would need to be identified using both domestic and external resources. Health CCTs typically comprise a subsidy for the demand for and a subsidy for the supply of the health service(s). And a consensus is emerging that more resources must be generated by charging user-fees for designated services such as curative care in selected facilities such as urban hospitals. Preventive care such as maternal and child care dispensed in rural primary health centres could be grant-financed as could be communicable disease control programmes. User-fees need not be onerous as some estimates suggest that they could range from 1.6% to 3.0% of average household income depending on whether only recurrent or total costs are charged. That charging user fees is unlikely to discourage the utilisation of health services is confirmed by the generally low price elasticities although more detailed investigations may indicate that the price responsiveness is greater among low-income patients. This suggests that user-fees should be levied only on the more affluent households or on services typically demanded by them since an across-the-board increase in user-fees may price the food-insecure out of the organised health care system.

An important point to end on in this section is that even if an institution is financially sustainable, it does not mean that the institution is necessarily useful. The fundamental point is whether or not the institution does anything useful.

## 11. Monitoring and Evaluation

It's essential that partners conduct (i) baseline surveys and (ii) beneficiary assessments and socio-economic studies in each district, one at the early stage of project implementation and two later in it. The use of these beneficiary assessments and socio-economic studies should be expanded so that the chances of the project actually reflecting the beneficiary needs are increased. The beneficiary assessments would assess in quantitative terms the project impact including the effect on the financial returns to family labour day, household production, employment, net cash income and food security<sup>1</sup>.

The partners or "outside institutions" selected for these baseline surveys, beneficiary assessments, socio-economic studies together with their terms of reference should be acceptable to the EC. It's acknowledged that some partners have limited capacity which means that training and budget would be required. These could be provided by the EC or by the partner itself. But the EC should introduce the following performance-based conditionality: that the partner would receive regular EC-funding only if conducting a baseline survey and if monitoring and evaluation are adequate.

Specific indicators to be measured are identified in column 3 of the logframes as shown in Annexes 6 and 7. The main indicators include:

- Incidence of Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis (AFLC).
- Rural and urban household income.
- Number of targeted groups with savings system in place.
- Number of targeted groups with increased turnover.
- Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate in targeted areas.
- Timely initiation of breast feeding.
- Adult literacy.
- Proportion of population above \$US 1 a day (MDG).
- Depth of poverty (measured by poverty gap index).
- Crop production.
- Returns (financial and non-financial) from livestock.
- Farm gate price and consumer price.
- Income from farm and off-farm sources.
- Household use of improved sanitation facilities.
- Increased use of ante and post natal care check-up.

It's accepted however that some quality may have to be forgone owing to SCZ's security constraint.

---

<sup>1</sup> And vulnerability as well once a consensus is reached on its definition, measurement and indicator-choice (see Consultants' Responses Number 16).

## 12. Conclusions and recommendations

The main findings and conclusions were:

- (i) 70% of Somalia's population is household food-insecure.
- (ii) 80% of the population of South-Central-Zone (SCZ) is household food-insecure.
- (iii) Part of the natural resource base and environment is unstable and constrained.
- (iv) 80% of the food-insecure are rural and are dominated by the agro-pastoralists at zonal level.
- (v) The largest food-insecure group at regional, district or village level may be the riverines, agro-pastoralists or pastoralists.
- (vi) Food insecurity is most severe in the urban areas especially for those people affected by displacement.
- (vii) Women tend to be disproportionately represented in all of the food-insecure groups.
- (viii) Some of the pastoralists are vulnerable but food-secure.
- (ix) Food production, marketing and consumption are important livelihood sources<sup>1</sup>.
- (x) It's not known with certainty whether or to what extent food-insecurity is being caused by market or marketing behaviour.
- (xi) Most of SCZ's population suffers from low longevity, high morbidity and low literacy.
- (xii) The underlying causes of food insecurity are insecurity, income poverty, health poverty and education poverty.
- (xiii) The performance of many donor-funded projects and programmes is below potential due mainly to the low-level skills of implementing NGOs, weak baseline survey, weak monitoring and evaluation and insufficient know-how on ECHO/AIDCO joint planning.
- (xiv) The value of the contribution of FSAU data to planning of food-security-oriented projects and programmes is below potential.

Food insecurity, income poverty, vulnerability and unemployment<sup>2</sup> are therefore large, widespread and rural while food insecurity is severest in urban areas. Health and education poverty are worse in rural areas and for women and economic-dependency ratios are highest in urban areas.

Based on findings and conclusions (i), (ii), (iii), and (xii), recommendation 1 is: improve household food security and the natural resource base.

Based on findings and conclusions (iii), (ix) and (xii), recommendation 2 is: build-up long-term strength in the human capital resource.

Based on findings and conclusions (iv), (v), (viii) and (xii), recommendation 3 is: support food-insecure groups such as the riverines, agro-pastoralists, pastoralists, women and urban including those people affected by displacement.

Based on findings and conclusions (x), recommendation 4 is: improve understanding of market and marketing behaviour.

Based on findings and conclusions (xii), recommendation 5 is: improve NGO implementing skills.

---

<sup>1</sup> Even though they may cause food insecurity in bad years. The rural population derives more than 50% of its cash income from farming, agro-pastoralism and pastoralism although one must be cautious because income sources may vary enormously and in different proportions within the same livelihood group. (Socio-Economic Survey 2002 Somalia, UNDP/World Bank, Report No 1, Somalia Watching Brief 2003).

<sup>2</sup> Probably included in the food-insecure, income-poor, vulnerable or all of them.

Based on findings and conclusions (xiv), recommendation 6 is: improve FSAU data and analysis.

Based on findings and conclusions (xii), recommendation 7 is: formulate an ECHO/AIDCO joint-planning strategy.

These recommendations were then encapsulated into 4 key broad interventions proposed for the livelihood strategy as follows:

Based on recommendations 1 and 3:

- (ix) Increase food production<sup>1</sup>.

Based on recommendations 1, 2 and 3:

- (x) Diversify production away from food into the production of cash-crops and non-agriculture including small and micro-enterprises (SMEs)<sup>2</sup>.

Based on recommendations 1, 2, 3 and 4:

- (xi) Make markets and marketing work better for the food-insecure.

Based on recommendations 2 and 3:

- (xii) Move away from the vulnerable natural resource<sup>3</sup> into the building-up of long-term strength in the human capital<sup>4</sup> resource.

And success in implementing the livelihood strategy interventions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) combined would be based on recommendations 5, 6 and 7. All of these interventions are based on poverty reduction since food insecurity's underlying causes<sup>5</sup> are income poverty, health poverty and education poverty as mentioned earlier.

Equitable<sup>6</sup> growth would be at the heart of the strategy because it would provide a sustainable<sup>7</sup> livelihood for the poor and because a buoyant economy would be the best guarantee that resources would be available on a continuing basis to fund targeted programmes for food-security-oriented livelihood improvement.

No conceivable pattern or level of growth however would improve urban food security in the short-term term. About 0.7 m or 20% of SCZ's food-insecure<sup>8</sup> are urban and most of them are in humanitarian emergency suggesting that targeted measures aimed at the provision of safety nets<sup>1</sup> and direct transfers<sup>2</sup> would be needed. These would protect the poor's most valuable asset i.e. the human capital embodied in their health and education<sup>3</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> For home consumption as well as for generating cash income. It's unlikely that dependence on food production as an income source can be significantly reduced in the short-run.

<sup>2</sup> This would reduce risk and overdependence on a few crops especially given climatic uncertainty. The identification of new productive enterprises would be based on current and future market/price analysis and financial feasibility (whether or not long-run financial returns exceed the financial costs).

<sup>3</sup> While protecting rural lives and improving rural livelihoods in the interim.

<sup>4</sup> By investing in health and skills development. Human capital, unlike income, tends to remain built-up once it's built-up.

<sup>5</sup> Notwithstanding security.

<sup>6</sup> For everybody especially the food insecure.

<sup>7</sup> Sustainable because it's expected that the long-run financial returns would exceed the financial costs.

<sup>8</sup> Based on all of the IPC categories combined.

<sup>1</sup> A distinction may be made between safety net and direct transfer. A safety net is a food or income transfer that protects livelihood by complementing (not substituting for) measures to improve household food security. It's income insurance to help people through livelihood shock and stress such as those caused by drought, illness, unemployment or war displacement (people affected by displacement) and it's provided in case of sudden income or consumption collapse. It's targeted to support "those who may be temporarily in danger when events turn unfavourable".

The livelihood strategy would therefore address both current and future causes of food-insecurity through increasing consumption and investment whilst simultaneously protecting assets<sup>4</sup>, the environment and vulnerability.

### **Livelihood Programme**

The Livelihood Strategy and Programme would focus on SCZ because its need is considered to be greatest and it would comprise the following Result Areas:

**Result area 1:** Agricultural and non-agricultural production, marketing and income diversified, improved and environmentally sustainable.

Rehabilitation/Development - support to small and micro-enterprise (SME) development in addition to cash transfers to facilitate progression from relief to development.

**Result area 2:** Affordable access to nutrition, safe drinking water and proper sanitation improved and sustained.

Humanitarian - provision of in-kind transfers such as therapeutic feeding and supplementary feeding.

Rehabilitation/Development - provision of information and awareness on diet, nutrition and child care.

**Result area 3:** Social protection<sup>5</sup> provided.

Humanitarian - provision of in-kind transfers including food and non-food.

Rehabilitation/Development - provision of (i) conditional cash transfers to encourage school and clinic attendance and (ii) unconditional cash transfers.

The activities are summarised in the logframe in Annex 7. Result area 1 aims to improve food security through the reduction of income-poverty while Result areas 2 and 3 aim to improve food security through the reduction of health poverty and education poverty. Each result area however would reinforce each other in contributing to the Programme purpose due to the inter-linkages between these underlying causes of food insecurity.

### **Food Security and Thematic Programme**

The Food Security and Thematic Programme would comprise the following Result Areas:

**Result area 1:** Entrepreneurial activities supported and developed particularly for women and those people affected by displacement

**Result area 2:** Conditional cash transfer provided for income, health and adult literacy with an emphasis on women, children and people affected by displacement.

The activities are summarised in the logframe in Annex 7. Result areas 1 and 2 aim to improve food security by reducing income poverty, health poverty and education poverty. Each result area would reinforce each other in contributing to the Programme purpose due to the inter-linkages between these underlying causes of food insecurity as mentioned earlier.

The Call for Proposal would comprise:

---

A safety net using entitlement jargon is entitlement protection since its objective is to prevent or ameliorate an acute decline in living standard following short-term livelihood shock e.g. famine relief during drought. A safety net is therefore a compensatory mechanism that restores lost income rather than a mechanism that lifts the food-insecure out of food insecurity or reduces the severity of food insecurity.

<sup>2</sup> A direct transfer is targeted to "those unable to participate in growth".

<sup>3</sup> But a safety net only reduces food insecurity unsustainably unless it has a positive productivity impact.

<sup>4</sup> Including natural resources.

<sup>5</sup> Including safety nets and direct (conditional/unconditional) cash transfers.

- Support and development of entrepreneurial activities particularly for women and those people affected by displacement. The entrepreneurial activities would be identified based on analysis of market demand and financial profitability. Part of the cash transfer would be provided for the formation and strengthening of common interest and self-help women groups through village-level PRAs.
- Piloting of conditional cash transfers for income, health and adult literacy in which cash would be provided to the food-insecure household on condition that (i) mother and child (or children) regularly attend a health clinic and (ii) household members attend adult literacy class. Cash may also be provided to the health clinic to improve drug supply and to provide a financial incentive to doctors and nurses.

The cost of the Food Security and Thematic Programme would be Euro 12 m of which Euro 5 m would be for the Call for Proposal (CfP).

The expected impact of the livelihood strategy would be improved food security through increased current and future consumption and investment as well as the simultaneous protection of assets, the environment and vulnerability.

## Annex 1

### Notes on Food Insecurity's Causes

Reducing food insecurity requires an understanding of its underlying causes in a broad way and not just in terms of a mechanical balance between food and population. The crucial part of the analysis is to look at the farmers who produce food and the non-producers who buy food in market. A person may be forced into food insecurity even when there is plenty of food around if he is unemployed or there is a collapse in the market for goods that he produces and sells to earn living.

Conversely, when food supply falls sharply in country or region, everyone can be saved from starvation by better sharing of available food (e.g. through creating additional employment and income for potential famine victims). This can be supplemented and made more effective by importing food but many potential famines have been prevented even without that - simply through more equal sharing of reduced domestic food supply. The focus has to be on economic power and freedom of individuals and families to buy enough food and not just on quantum of food in country in question.

The movement of households between being food insecure and being considered food secure is a dynamic process. Maps based on the IPC classification over time show both that the chronically food insecure (CFI) are being confined to Somaliland and Puntland with significant variability in SCZ. Dependent on season, parts of SCZ have moved between Humanitarian Emergency (HE), Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis (AFLC) and CFI.

These dynamics are shown at a macro level but there is variability in food security at the village and community level and it's essential to capture these differences at project level.

There is a huge internal diversity in Somalia in terms of food insecurity and income poverty variation by region and over time so a blanket approach cannot be prescribed.

It is strongly recommended therefore that NGO's, project partners and project managers undertake an analysis which can be part of their baseline and other monitoring and evaluation activities to confirm the specific underlying causes of food insecurity in their project area. Some unified system of their quantification may require development and where possible these may be linked to the FSAU's IPC system.

A rapid or participatory rural appraisal or SWOT analysis would quickly show the trigger, precipitating and contributory causes of food insecurity but this section describes causes as immediate or contributory. The immediate causes are those which have a direct and tangible impact while the contributory causes are those which may have a more indirect or synergistic impact. The contributory causes may be mitigated through careful and coordinated planning at the community level. The confirmation or validation of the causes of food insecurity would permit better planning including improved targeting.

## **1 IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF FOOD INSECURITY**

### **1.1 Civil Insecurity**

Civil insecurity is seen by relief and development agencies as the single most significant cause of food insecurity. In discussion with most of these agencies, it was agreed that the removal of civil insecurity would make development far easier.

The civil insecurity is exacerbated through inter-clan tensions and other ethnic tensions (the Bantu for example appear to be considered as low caste). Different clans, often supported by weapons, compete for access to resources such as drinking water, irrigation water and grazing as well as the establishment of ad hoc checkpoints on major highways from which to levy informal rental income. The last 17 years have not seen an attempt to control conflict with warlords and armed people taking what ever resource is available. Several NGOs however such as CARE in Dollow do have a peace-building capacity.



Inter-clan and sub-clan tensions adds to the uncertainty of conducting business and to the costs of doing it. The uncertainty has also led to the breakdown of law, order and governance. Such an environment means that development planning is difficult and even food aid delivery is high risk. It is reported that the high level of insecurity is exacerbated by the "Ethiopian" presence.

Some areas however which are dominated by 1 clan group may be quite stable with an appointed local government and some allegiance to the TFG but the administration does not appear to have any democratic legitimacy. It is however a positive move worthy of support.

Some development has been initiated in this environment although the potential for conflict is still high. Implementing agencies therefore have to negotiate and resolve potential disputes with competing sub-clans and ethnic groups over the location, position or the allocation of work such as food-for-work or cash-for-work. Such negotiations may take 2 - 6 months consuming much management time.

## **1.2 Poor Capacity, Literacy, Numeracy and Knowledge**

A literate and numerate population is a basis of economic development and a sustainable livelihood. According to UNDP data (2002), the national adult literacy level is 19.2% (adult literacy is deemed to be all persons over 15 years). The average figure hides significant variation with 34.9% urban adult literacy and 10.2% rural adult literacy (UNDP social survey 2002). These figures can be further disaggregated by district and Dollow District in Gedo Region for example has an estimated 337% adult literacy.

Some areas have primary schools but the overall school enrolment ratio is 20.8% and 12.7% for male and female students respectively (UNDP Social survey 2002). The level of knowledge and capacity to undertake different functions is therefore low.

High levels of illiteracy and poor school enrolment reduces the ability of the labour force to find off-farm employment. According to UNDP data, 47.4% (4.2 m) of people aged 15 - 64 years are unemployed. Urban unemployment is 61.5% (2.6 m) and rural and/or nomadic unemployment is 4.7% (0.2 m). The rural and nomadic people have therefore little prospect of employment outside agriculture.

The development of literacy, numeracy, capacity and knowledge has to be addressed for adults and children. Children's education, teacher training and education infrastructure are being addressed through the education strategy. The livelihood strategy may further support this initiative through the provision of adult literacy and numeracy training as "add-ons" to a livelihood initiative.

## **1.3 Competition for Resources (Land, Labour, Capital and Water)**

Conflict denies the use of resources to one or more users for an indeterminate period of time. The availability of agriculturally productive land is limited principally confined to the riverines flood plains. Irrigated cropping managed by the Bantu predominates. Competition for land and resources exist and several undocumented incidents have been cited. It's reported in Gedo Region for example that a clan took over the Bantu irrigated plots forcing the Bantu to flee to the other side of the river. The land was fallowed and no longer managed and unproductive. The clan in question is now negotiating with reluctant Bantu farmers for their return. Similarly in Luuq, 2 clans have disputed access to salt pans resulting in 20 killed and 80 injured. In both cases a peace agreement was brokered by CARE in the absence of a functional local government. Access to water in rangeland areas is also a potent flash point. Conflict denies the use of resources according to a CARE peace broker but the frequency of conflict has declined over the past 2 years indicating that it's possible to broker working peace arrangements.

Given the lack of resources and employment opportunities, all major highways have unofficial road blocks at which informal rental income is levied. The WFP estimates that US\$ 15/t is the “check point” fees equivalent to about US\$ 500/truck load. It is not known how this revenue is used.

Workable solutions however have been found often facilitated by an NGO. Potential conflict has been averted regarding the rehabilitation of a 13 km irrigation canal in Jowhar District through the establishment of a canal committee with representatives from 5 communities. The committee and canal keepers ensure the equitable distribution of water and that the “end user” problem does not occur.

Resource conflict is ever present but NGOs have shown that it can be avoided by investing time in negotiating an acceptable settlement to all parties in terms of location, management and the allocation of financial resources. Negotiation may take 6 - 9 months before project commencement as referred to earlier.

#### **1.4 Input Supply**

Agricultural and livestock production is handicapped by a variable input supply chain. Seeds, fertiliser and agro-chemicals are often difficult to procure and are of variable quality. Inputs costs also tend to be too high and vary daily according to exchange-rate movements. The same is true for veterinary drugs and supplies.

Input prices vary according to supply, price inflation and the transport cost including informal rental income. Diesel for example is currently priced at US\$ 1/litre in Mogadishu, US\$ 1.5/litre in Dollow or US\$ 1.75/litre in Jowhar. This can example make pump irrigation problematic.

Good quality seed is difficult to obtain but when it's delivered as in the case of the SCUUK project in Belet Weyne, yield increases under irrigation may reach 300%. It is reported that without NGO assistance, producers don't know what to purchase.

Many NGO's are working with pastoralists on vaccination programmes through the provision of drugs and other supplies as well as the building of capacity in the treatment of animal disease. Pastoralists have to pay for the animal health workers time and for the drugs used. It appears that little animal health activity would be under taken without NGO assistance. It is difficult for many pastoralists to access to drugs and expertise due mainly to high costs.

Hired labour in certain parts of Somalia such as Shabelle, Hiraan and Juba is scarce due to insecurity or migration. Work by CEFA shows that per hectare labour costs are about US\$ 27.5/ha in a maize - cowpea intercrop early sown in the Gü 2005 season while those for late sown Gü 2005 maize - cowpea intercrop are US\$ 76.7/ha. This reflected the shortage of labour later in the season caused by a clash with the harvest of the earlier sown crops.

Price inflation is also a constraint as inferred to above. The FSAU Technical Series Report Volume 13 (21/09/08) outlined the impact of Somali shilling devaluation on price. Imported rice prices for example increased by 39% in Juba and 66% in Shabelle. Fuel prices also increased by 29% and 24% in the central region and in the sorghum belt respectively.

#### **1.5 Disaster Preparedness**

Central and southern regions of Somalia have been subjected to a succession of droughts and floods over the past 5 years. Some areas such as Gedo have had successive years of drought causing a humanitarian emergency. Climate change is considered to increase the incidence of drought and removing vegetation from the range would increase runoff and may lead to flooding.

The absence of a local or regional government has prevented the planning of drought mitigation measures. But there is an urgent need for drought and disaster preparedness. The

World Bank-funded Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) articulated the actions required for a disaster preparedness strategy.

### 1.6 Market Dependence, Price volatility and international trade restrictions.


Many producers do not have the option of bulking up and transporting produce from a surplus area to a demand one mainly because of informal road blocks. This has led to high prices as an analysis of some marketing costs show has shown that almost 50% of these costs is mark up. High transport costs are also due to fuel prices and poor roads. Better farmer marketing and organisation may reduce marketing costs and therefore lead in principle to lower consumer prices and to increased farmgate prices

Price volatility is also a concern making it difficult for producers to determine the profitability of the succeeding season's crop. Analysis by CEFA during the Gü 2005 season showed that the retail price for cowpea in the Jowhar market was Sshs 5,000 - 6,000/Kg and the farm gate price was Sshs 4,500/Kg. The maize farm gate price was Sshs 2,000 with stover selling at an average of Sshs 400,000/ha or 100% higher than normal. The poor gross margins for maize coupled with the volatile prices provide little incentive to cultivate maize. Gross margins for maize in remote communities in Jowhar District (Gu 2005) show the maize margin to be US\$ 19/ha. Many producers have complained that food aid distribution lowers farmgate prices thereby providing a disincentive. A balanced analysis of food aid is shown in Annex 9

The livestock markets suffer from period bans imposed by importing countries (Kenya, Yemen and Saudi Arabia). A confirmed outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) resulted in the closure of the Garissa Livestock Market which adversely affected prices. The ban was lifted in January 2007 for cattle trade only. Consequently cattle prices according to FSAU reports rose by 27% and 26% in Juba Region and in the Sorghum belt respectively.

The FSAU calculated regional maize price trends and they show significant seasonal variation between the Juba and Shabelle valleys as shown in Figure 1. This variability and the absence of information on the farm gate price make it difficult to predict the following season's price. Even if producers were keeping records and calculating their margins, the risk of crop failure compounded by the possibility of low market prices may act as an disincentive to cultivate maize. This actually happened in Gedo (Juba valley) Region and it was suggested that a combination of high input prices, volatile markets and food aid distribution encouraged farmers to stop maize production. It should be noted however that prices have recently skyrocketed with problems for consumers.

**Figure 1: Regional trend in cereal prices (SoSH)**



## 1.7 Food Self Sufficiency and Cereal Balances

Table 1 outlines the cereal balance in 1985 - 1987 (CEFA). Lower and Middle Shabelle and Bay are the bread baskets for the whole of Somalia with significant surplus production. Other areas that produce a significant surplus include Gedo and Hiraan Regions. Surplus moved to and was consumed in the deficit areas because the market functioned. Somalia overall was self-sufficient in cereals by 14% based on an 80 kg per capita per year cereal consumption. Food imports during this period were estimated to be 38% of domestic food consumption and food aid accounted for 50% of these imports. The imported food was rice and wheat which appears to have prompted Somali producers to start cultivating rice.

**Table 1: Cereal utilisation requirements versus production, average over 1985 - 1987**

Regions	Cereal required in 1987 (t)	Maize produced (t)	Sorghum produced (t)	Maize plus Sorghum (t)	Cereal balance (t)	% surplus/ shortage
Lower Shabelle	68,000	169,497	15,033	184,530	116,530	171%
Bay	52,000	3,209	128,116	131,325	79,325	153%
Middle Shabelle	36,000	65,123	10,901	76,024	40,024	111%
Gedo	22,400	15,153	15,805	30,958	8,558	38%
Hiraan	17,600	6,960	14,854	21,814	4,214	24%
Lower Juba	16,000	15,925	179	16,104	104	1%
Middle Juba	24,000	15,002	6,324	21,326	-2,674	-11%
Galbeed/Awdal	48,000	8,740	25,668	34,408	-13,592	-28%
Bakool	12,000	1,143	6,885	8,028	-3,972	-33%
other	171,200	95	10,160	10,255	-160,945	-94%
Total	467,200	300,847	233,925	534,772	67,572	14%

Table 2 shows crop production at district level for 2007/08 (both the Gu and the Deyr seasons). Here none of the districts produces a surplus and overall Somalia is producing 32% of its total cereal needs. The 68% deficit will be made up through imports from a world market that is short of cereal grains. The world market price has increased significantly and a similar increase will be seen in Somalia. The price levels for sorghum and maize will probably be unaffordable to the majority of the population. What is disturbing on this occasion is that the safety net of food aid may not operate because the international community may be unable to afford the cost of the grain.

**Table 2. Cereal utilisation requirements versus production, 2007 – 08**

Regions	Population food need per year (t) (15Kg/PP)	Total Annual Production (t)	Cereal balance (t)	% surplus/ shortage
Hiraan	46,920	4,676	-42,244	-90%
Middle Shabelle	75,432	18,699	-56,733	-75%
Lower Shabelle	122,028	56,239	-65,789	-54%
Bay	88,872	43,490	-45,382	-51%
Bakool	44,856	3,073	-41,783	-93%
Gedo	44,472	16,700	-27,772	-62%
Middle Juba	33,144	14,261	-18,883	-57%
Lower Juba	47,004	4,851	-42,153	-90%
Total	502,728	161,989	-340,739	-68%

Table 3 puts the domestic production in the context of the cereal balance sheet - demand for grain vs. the supply for grain. The international community promised to deliver 130,000 t of food aid equivalent to about 25% of the total demand in a supply constrained market.

**Table 3. Cereal supply and demand balance sheet fro Deyr 2004 and Gu 2005**

	Required (t)	Supply (t)	Net Balance	% surplus / deficit
<b>Domestic utilisation</b>	636,000			
<b>Domestic production</b>				
Opening stocks		38,000		
Domestic cereal supply		172,000		
<b>Total Domestic availability</b>		210,000	-426,000	
<b>Imported and other Food sources</b>				
Anticipated commercial imports at 75% net commercial imports		300,000	-126,000	
Ethiopian Maize Imports (currently banned)		0	-126,000	
<b>Food Aid distributed, stocks transit and pipeline</b>				
WFP		92,000	-34,000	
CARE		39,000	5,000	0.79%

If the above cereal supply and demand balance sheet is correct, the actual cereal shortage will only be 0.79 % rather than 68%. Cereal markets will be very sensitive to the quantity and price of imports. Import parity prices are likely to be higher than the domestic farmgate prices. There will be competition for domestically produced maize effectively driving up the price.

Likewise if imports of Ethiopian maize or maize imported through Mogadishu or other ports were to fall, overall maize prices will fall.

The above calculations emphasise the urgent need to study the workings of the Somalia grain market including determination of the roles of food aid and food imports. This would provide an opportunity to develop intervention strategies to improve markets and marketing and therefore household food security.

### **1.8 Poor Infrastructure**

Most roads have deteriorated and have become impassable during the rains and passable at limited speeds during the dry season. The transport of vegetables for example is likely to be costly and to result in significant loss due to bruising and chaffing.

Access to safe drinking water is outlined in Table 4. The urban population has reasonable access to safe drinking water but there is room for improvement. The urban population's access to proper sanitation is quite good (93%) but only 28.2% of the rural population has access.

**Table 4. Percentage of population with access to safe drinking water and proper sanitation facilities**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Access to safe drinking water</b>	<b>Access to proper sanitation facilities</b>
Nationally	20.5%	49.8%
Urban	53.1%	93%
Rural	4.1%	28.2%

Source: UNDP (2002)

Medical and education facilities are concentrated in urban areas reflecting differences in rural and urban literacy rates. In urban areas such as Jowhar, school fees are set at Sshs 200,000/month and education materials are in short supply. Teachers' morale is low because they are paid from the school fees since central payment of teachers salary's ceased a long time ago. Many teachers have a secondary occupation such as running a store or business. Donors and NGOs in Jowhar have supported some schools but not others creating a disparity which is resented by teachers. There are few or no regionally based teacher training facilities. Some donors and NGOs are funding school establishment in rural areas such as in Ghedweyne) but there is a staff shortage.

Medical facilities are in most major centres but lack staff, drugs and other medical supplies. Table 5 shows the percentage of the population with access to health facilities. The rural figure is low which may account for the high child malnutrition rate seen across all regions in Somalia.

The local government has been appointed by the TFG but elections do not appear to be planned. Interviews were held with local government officials (District Commissioners, Mayors and other designated officials) who had a long list of requests and needs but no plans were developed. Lack of access to basic health and education is an underlying cause of food insecurity

**Table 5: Percentage of the population with access to at least 1 health facility**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Percent of population with access to at least 1 health facility</b>
National	54.8%
Urban	62.7%
Rural	36.4%

## **1.9 Debt System and Credit Access**

Groups or committees overseeing the development of water reticulation systems and the management of rehabilitated irrigation canals exist. Many women's groups run by NGOs appear to have been newly formed. Yet none of these groups appear to have had capacity building in savings and credit (It's recognised that banks and credit facilities under Sharia law is not permitted). Some women's groups interviewed however had a limited savings process but without capital accumulation which is the essence of savings.

Many donors do not give credit in principle and no banks exist in Somalia so saving is difficult and compounded by inflation and a variable foreign exchange rate. If entrepreneurial activity however is to be promoted at community level, the use of savings must be promoted.

The debt system is complex and does not appear to be well understood. It is known that traders give credit. With drought or crop failure however, producers collectively have difficulty in repaying their debts. Collective non-payment will squeeze the traders' ability to purchase inputs and to extend credit or to purchase the domestic crop and prices may rise. Prices rises may mean that some parts of the community will not be able to afford to purchase food. Food aid and cash aid may play a useful role in reducing the credit squeeze. The development of savings can help in improving food security and in reducing vulnerability.

## **2 CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES OF FOOD INSECURITY**

### **2.1 Lack of capacity or ability to intensify agricultural production**

Input supply is variable due to poor roads, informal check points or to demand and the level of agricultural production is low. No credit is available to finance the intensification of production through the use of better seed and artificial fertiliser (farm yard manure is difficult to obtain because of the extensive nature of cattle production). Although it may only make sense sometimes if inputs are used in irrigated areas since the risk of rainfall failure in rainfall areas may be too high to use improved inputs. This could increase debt and therefore vulnerability in case of failure.

SCUK provided a range of agricultural technologies which resulted in a 300% yield increase in sorghum and maize but no margin was calculated. A gross margin on maize was calculated in Gü 2005 to be US\$ 20/ha which could be an insufficient incentive to invest in increasing production.

The provision of livestock and veterinary drugs is also variable.

### **2.2 Poorly targeted Aid programmes**

A quote from the Institute of Development Studies (Devereux 2006) is germane; "Food aid without [crop] production is unsustainable, food aid with [crop] production is sustainable". cereal market. Some farmers in Dollow have stopped maize production preferring to accept food aid and CARE has consequently halved the quantity of food aid. See Annex 9 for a balanced view on food aid.

### **2.3 Environmental degradation**

The level of environmental degradation has reached high levels in an area about 1 km from the Juba River with no grasses or forbs. The area is acacia and crusted earth and is the result of a 2 - 3 year drought. The 2 - 3 km area around the water points is a dust bowl. Some evidence of charcoal making was seen in Dollow but not on an industrial scale. Near an improved water hole however were areas of pasture, browse and trees. And through international assistance irrigation canals in Jowhar District are being rehabilitated with improved water and environmental management.

The range areas however suffer from environmental degradation. A common pastoralist strategy would be to maximise biomass (livestock) production since mortality, drought and disease would erode the herd. It's therefore essential that a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is undertaken with key findings integrated into the international community activities although it should be noted that international interventions may have a small impact at national level or local level. EIAs therefore would be required prior to interventions. The impact of the livestock industry within the SEA needs to be assessed. Traditional herding practices and range management practices may require modification to ameliorate environmental impact. But it's acknowledged that they could be difficult to introduce on a large scale since all previous attempts failed. The present strategy therefore focuses on value added rather than on production. The promotion of afforestation appropriate to an arid environment is required in order to replace those trees removed through charcoal production<sup>1</sup>.

### **2.4 Carrying Capacity of the Land**

South-Eastern Pastoral and Southern Agro-Pastoral Livelihood Zones are recovering from drought (February 2005 - February 2007). The Gü 2007 rains were abundant and flash flooding was recorded. The Normalised Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) showed

---

<sup>1</sup> Although attempts by several projects failed. The solution may be to produce charcoal with some obnoxious plants such as *Prosopis* where it exists. Only producing good quality charcoal that competes with the *Acacias* could reduce its opportunity cost.



significant recovery for the drought affected areas. Other areas such as the Sool plateau, Addan pastoral and Hawad plateau remained above the historic average between 5 - 15%. It should be noted however that pasture composition often changes with non-palatable species. So it may not be a good measure. Recent studies in Dur Dur showed that most of the palatable species no longer exist and that some animals like sheep have adjusted to browsing for survival. 1985 was the last livestock census and Table 6 shows the estimated livestock numbers for different regions.

**Table 6: Livestock census figures 1985**

Region	Camels	Cattle	Sheep	Goat
North Western	1,308,260	308,980	5,837,320	4,790,000
Central	1,003,340	461,000	1,090,980	3,703,580
North Eastern	1,347,700	435,890	3,448,720	7,096,180
Southern	1,217,470	1,340,870	707,020	1,860,110
Juba Valley	1,417,460	2,061,850	741,660	2,047,900

If these data are reliable, camels are spread evenly throughout Somalia. The highest concentration of cattle is in the Juba Valley but the extent to which these animals are transitory is unknown. Sheep have the highest concentration in North Western with significant numbers in North Eastern. Goats have high concentrations over the whole of Somalia which does not bode well for the level of environmental degradation. High goat numbers can often imply high levels of environmental degradation with little chance of rangeland recovery even though they are browsers. Grazers also do much damage. The carrying capacity of the land and the current livestock population are unknown but such information is crucial in planning the future of the industry. The FAO is in the process of planning a livestock census which will include quantification of the level of livestock exports to Yemen and other countries.

It is understood that there has been severe environmental degradation through the removal of trees for charcoal production in addition to the high goat population figures. The NDVI however shows variation around the average but no significant decline in vegetation cover. Of greater interest is the vegetation specie mix. The less nutritious species invade in over-grazed range. The preferred species however like *Ergrostis spp* and *cenchrus spp* frequently do not recover further lowering the livestock production unit per hectare.

### 3 FLOODING

Flooding occurred in the Deyr 06/07 and flash flooding was reported in Somaliland and in Belet Hawa. The floods destroyed food stores, Deyr crops, destroyed infrastructure and displaced thousands of people.

Floods are ephemeral as is the damage they do. Some crops will survive temporary water logging (less than 5 days) and growth will be checked but the crop will recover. If the crop is at the ripening stage, the yield will be largely unaffected but prolonged water logging may lead to total crop loss.

### 4 ASSET DEPLETION

Producers who move from chronic food insecurity to acute food and livelihood crisis will start selling breeding stock or consuming next season's seed. Depleting these productive assets will have a detrimental impact on the following season and without them, crop yield and livestock reproduction would be reduced leading to household food insecurity. Asset depletion is not an underlying cause of food insecurity but it significantly adds to it.

## Annex 2

### Food Insecurity Data 2007

**Table 1: Food Insecurity in Somalia**

Zone	Region	Total Population (1)	Total Rural Population	CFI	AFLC (2)	HE (3)	Total (CFI & AFLC & HE) as % of Total Population
North		2341718	1291714	1291714	0	0	55
Central		680156	526774	526774	0	0	77
South							
	Bakool	310627	249189	169189	80000	0	80
	Bay	620562	493749	488749	5000	0	80
	Gedo	328378	247076	137076	80000	30000	75
	Hiraan	329811	260698	215698	30000	15000	79
	Juba Dhexe (Middle)	238877	184138	119138	65000	0	77
	Juba Hoose (Lower)	385790	261108	181108	80000	0	68
	Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	514901	419070	274070	60000	85000	81
	Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	850651	677937	422937	90000	165000	80
	sub-total (south)	3579597	2792965	2007965	490000	295000	78
	Banadir (6)	901183	0	0			0
	Total	7502654	4611453	3826453	490000	295000	61
				2007965			
			Rural population 61%				4611453
			Number of new people displaced since April 2007				325000
			Estimated number of existing displaced persons				400000
			Estimated total population in crisis (7)				5336453

- (1) Rural & urban UNDP 2005
- (2) Rounded to nearest 5000
- (3) Dan Gorayo included within Bari Region
- (4) UN - OCHA and UNHCR map December 2005
- (5) % of total Somalia population
- (6) Mogadishu
- (7) Urban (excluding people affected by displacement) are excluded from analysis

**Table 2: Distribution of Food Insecure by Zone by CFI, AFLC, HE and (CFI+AFLC+HE)  
(1)  
2007**

Zone	CFI	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
South	2007965	52
North	1291714	34
Central	526774	14
Total	3826453	100
Zone	AFLC	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
South	490000	100
North	0	0
Central	0	0
Total	490000	100
Zone	HE	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
South	295000	100
North	0	0
Central	0	0
Total	295000	100
Zone	CFI+AFLC+HE	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
South	2792965	61
North	1291714	28
Central	526774	11
Total	4611453	100

1/ Excluding Banadir

**Table 3: Distribution of Food Insecure by Region by CFI, AFLC, HE and (CFI+AFLC+HE)  
(1)  
2007**

Region	CFI	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Bay	489749	24
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	419938	21
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	272070	14
Hiraan	215698	11
Juba Hoose (Lower)	183108	9
Bakool	167189	8
Gedo	141076	7
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	118138	6
Total	2006966	100
Region	AFLC	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	91000	19
Juba Hoose (Lower)	82000	17
Gedo	79000	16
Bakool	78000	16
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	66000	13
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	61000	12
Hiraan	29000	6
Bay	4000	1
Total	490000	100
Region	HE	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	167000	56
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	86000	29
Gedo	27000	9
Hiraan	16000	5
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	0	0
Juba Hoose (Lower)	0	0
Bakool	0	0
Bay	0	0
Total	296000	100
Region	CFI+AFLC+HE	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	677938	24
Bay	493749	18
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	419070	15
Juba Hoose (Lower)	261108	9
Hiraan	260698	9
Bakool	249189	9
Gedo	247076	9
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	184138	7
Total	2792966	100

1/ Excluding Banadir

**Table 4: Distribution of Food Insecure in South by District by CFI, AFLC, HE and (CFI+AFLC+HE) (1) 2007**

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by District by CFI 2007**

<b>District</b>	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Baydhaba/Bardaale	245670	12
Jowhar/Mahaday	134167	7
Afgooye/Aw Dheegle	119605	6
Belet Weyne/Matabaan	112580	6
Buur Hakaba	99493	5
Qansax Dheere	81971	4
Marka	79039	4
Jamaame	76231	4
Bulo Burto/Maxaas	71673	4
Qoryooley	70364	3
Wanla Weyn	67627	3
Balcad/Warsheikh	65266	3
Diinsoor	62615	3
Kismaayo	56334	3
Jilib	52464	3
Baardheere	48628	2
Xudur	46939	2
Adan Yabaal	43717	2
Waajid	39972	2
Saakow/Salagle	39773	2
Tayeeglow	37261	2
Luuq	36027	2
Afmadow/Xagar	34212	2
Jalalaqsi	31445	2
Kurtunwaarey	31019	2
Baraawe	29239	1
Cadale	28920	1
Bu'aale	25901	1
Sablaale	23044	1
Rab Dhuure	22117	1
Ceel Barde	21844	1
Badhaadhe	20828	1
Belet Xaawo	16392	1
Garbahaarey/Buur Dhuubo	15771	1
Ceel Waaq	15437	1
Doolow	8821	0
Total	2012405	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by District by AFLC  
2007**

<b>District</b>	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Rab Dhuure	35000	7
Diinsoor	35000	7
Luuq	31000	6
Belet Xaawo	29000	6
Bulo Burto/Maxaas	27000	6
Saakow/Salagle	27000	6
Marka	24000	5
Qoryooley	22000	4
Garbahaarey/Buur Dhuubo	21000	4
Tayeeglow	20000	4
Cadale	20000	4
Bu'aale	18000	4
Waaqid	16000	3
Ceel Waaq	16000	3
Buur Hakaba	15000	3
Belet Weyne/Matabaan	15000	3
Jilib	15000	3
Baardheere	13000	3
Kurtunwaarey	12000	2
Wanla Weyn	11000	2
Qansax Dheere	10000	2
Badhaadhe	10000	2
Afgooye/Aw Dheegle	8000	2
Afmadow/Xagar	7000	1
Jalalaqsi	6000	1
Kismaayo	5000	1
Adan Yabaal	5000	1
Jowhar/Mahaday	4000	1
Balcad/Warsheikh	4000	1
Jamaame	3000	1
Baraawe	2000	0
Ceel Barde	2000	0
Doolow	1000	0
Xudur	1000	0
Sablaale	0	0
Baydhaba/Bardaale	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>490000</b>	<b>100</b>

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by District by HE  
2007**

<b>District</b>	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Jowhar/Mahaday	53000	18
Afgooye/Aw Dheegle	39000	13
Wanla Weyn	37000	13
Marka	35000	12
Qoryooley	28000	9
Balcad/Warsheikh	24000	8
Baardheere	17000	6
Kurtunwaarey	12000	4
Baraawe	8000	3
Sablaale	8000	3
Belet Weyne/Matabaan	7000	2
Bulo Burto/Maxaas	7000	2
Adan Yabaal	6000	2
Luuq	5000	2
Cadale	3000	1
Belet Xaawo	2000	1
Garbahaarey/Buur Dhuubo	2000	1
Jalalaqsi	2000	1
Doolow	1000	0
Ceel Barde	0	0
Rab Dhuure	0	0
Tayeeglow	0	0
Waajid	0	0
Xudur	0	0
Baydhaba/Bardaale	0	0
Buur Hakaba	0	0
Diinsoor	0	0
Qansax Dheere	0	0
Ceel Waaq	0	0
Bu'aale	0	0
Jilib	0	0
Saakow/Salagle	0	0
Afmadow/Xagar	0	0
Badhaadhe	0	0
Jamaame	0	0
Kismaayo	0	0
	296000	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by District by (CFI+AFLC+HE)  
2007**

<b>District</b>	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Regional Total</b>
Baydhaba/Bardaale	245670	12
Jowhar/Mahaday	134167	7
Afgooye/Aw Dheegle	119605	6
Belet Weyne/Matabaan	112580	6
Buur Hakaba	99493	5
Qansax Dheere	81971	4
Marka	79039	4
Jamaame	76231	4
Bulo Burto/Maxaas	71673	4
Qoryooley	70364	3
Wanla Weyn	67627	3
Balcad/Warsheikh	65266	3
Diinsoor	62615	3
Kismaayo	56334	3
Jilib	52464	3
Baardheere	48628	2
Xudur	46939	2
Adan Yabaal	43717	2
Waajid	39972	2
Saakow/Salagle	39773	2
Tayeeglow	37261	2
Luuq	36027	2
Afmadow/Xagar	34212	2
Jalalaqsi	31445	2
Kurtunwaarey	31019	2
Baraawe	29239	1
Cadale	28920	1
Bu'aale	25901	1
Sablaale	23044	1
Rab Dhuure	22117	1
Ceel Barde	21844	1
Badhaadhe	20828	1
Belet Xaawo	16392	1
Garbahaarey/Buur Dhuubo	15771	1
Ceel Waaq	15437	1
Doolow	8821	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2012405</b>	<b>100</b>



**Table 5: Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Livelihood System by CFI, AFLC, HE and (CFI+AFLC+HE) (1) 2007**

Livelihood System	CFI	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Agro-pastoral	887072	44
Pastoral	715788	36
Riverine	404105	20
Total	2006965	100
Livelihood System	AFLC	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Agro-pastoral	242000	49
Riverine	161000	33
Pastoral	87000	18
Total	490000	100
Livelihood System	HE	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Riverine	174000	59
Agro-pastoral	122000	41
Pastoral	0	0
Total	296000	100
Livelihood System	CFI+AFLC+HE	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Agro-pastoral	1251072	45
Riverine	802788	29
Pastoral	739105	26
Total	2792965	100

1/ Excluding Banadir

**Table 6: Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Region by Livelihood System by CFI, AFLC, HE and (CFI+AFLC+HE) (1) 2007**

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Region by Livelihood System by CFI 2007**

Region	Livelihood System	Absolute Number	% of Regional Total	% of Zone Total
Bakool	Agro-Pastoral	101741	61	5
	Pastoral	65448	39	3
Bay	Agro-Pastoral	430881	88	21
	Pastoral	58868	12	3
Gedo	Agro-Pastoral	20358	14	1
	Pastoral	108482	77	5
	Riverine	12236	9	1
Hiraan	Pastoral	91786	43	5
	Riverine	11782	5	1
	Agro-Pastoral	112130	52	6
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	Pastoral	40941	35	2
	Riverine	32601	28	2
	Agro-Pastoral	44596	38	2
Juba Hoose (Lower)	Pastoral	100283	55	5
	Agro-Pastoral	58820	32	3
	Riverine	24005	13	1
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	Agro-Pastoral	78643	29	4
	Pastoral	167770	62	8
	Riverine	25657	9	1
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	Pastoral	82211	20	4
	Riverine	296825	71	15
	Agro-Pastoral	40902	10	2
Total		2006966		100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Pastoralists by Region by CFI**

Region	Pastoral	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	167770	23
Gedo	108482	15
Juba Hoose (Lower)	100283	14
Hiraan	91786	13
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	82211	11
Bakool	65448	9
Bay	58868	8
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	40941	6
Total	715789	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Agro-Pastoralists by Region by CFI**

Region	Agro-Pastoral	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Bay	430881	49
Hiraan	112130	13
Bakool	101741	11
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	78643	9
Juba Hoose (Lower)	58820	7
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	44596	5
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	40902	9
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	20358	5
Total	888071	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Riverine by Region by CFI**

Region	Riverine	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	296825	74
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	32601	8
Juba Hoose (Lower)	25657	6
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	24005	6
Hiraan	12236	3
Gedo	11782	3
Bakool	0	0
Bay	0	0
Total	403106	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Region by Livelihood System by AFLC  
2007**

Region	Livelihood System	Absolute Number	% of Regional Total	% of Zone Total
Bakool	Agro-Pastoral	82000	49	17
	Pastoral	0	0	0
Bay	Agro-Pastoral	0	0	0
	Pastoral	4000	100	1
Gedo	Agro-Pastoral	19000	24	4
	Pastoral	49000	62	10
	Riverine	11000	14	2
Hiraan	Pastoral	0	0	0
	Riverine	5000	17	1
	Agro-Pastoral	24000	83	5
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	Pastoral	11000	17	2
	Riverine	44000	67	9
	Agro-Pastoral	11000	17	2
Juba Hoose (Lower)	Pastoral	22000	28	4
	Agro-Pastoral	23000	29	5
	Riverine	33000	42	7
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	Agro-Pastoral	54000	89	11
	Pastoral	0	0	0
	Riverine	7000	11	1
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	Pastoral	1000	1	0
	Riverine	61000	67	12
	Agro-Pastoral	29000	32	6
Total		490000		100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Pastoralists by Region by AFLC**

Region	Pastoral	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Gedo	49000	56
Juba Hoose (Lower)	22000	25
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	11000	13
Bay	4000	5
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	1000	1
Bakool	0	0
Hiraan	0	0
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	0	0
Total	87000	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Agro-Pastoralists by Region by AFLC**

Region	Agro-Pastoral	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Bakool	82000	34
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	54000	22
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	29000	12
Hiraan	24000	10
Juba Hoose (Lower)	23000	10
Gedo	19000	8
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	11000	5
Bay	0	0
Total	242000	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Riverine by Region by AFLC**

Region	Riverine	
	Absolute Number	% of Total
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	61000	38
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	44000	27
Juba Hoose (Lower)	33000	20
Gedo	11000	7
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	7000	4
Hiraan	5000	3
Bakool	0	0
Bay	0	0
Total	161000	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Region by Livelihood System by HE  
2007**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Livelihood System</b>	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Regional Total</b>	<b>% of Zone Total</b>
Bakool				
	Agro-Pastoral	0	0	0
	Pastoral	0	0	0
Bay				
	Agro-Pastoral	0	0	0
	Pastoral	0	0	0
Gedo				
	Agro-Pastoral	19000	24	6
	Pastoral	0	0	0
	Riverine	8000	10	3
Hiraan				
	Pastoral	0	0	0
	Riverine	16000	55	5
	Agro-Pastoral	0	0	0
Juba Dhexe (Middle)				
	Pastoral	0	0	0
	Riverine	0	0	0
	Agro-Pastoral	0	0	0
Juba Hoose (Lower)				
	Pastoral	0	0	0
	Agro-Pastoral	0	0	0
	Riverine	0	0	0
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)				
	Agro-Pastoral	65000	107	22
	Pastoral	0	0	0
	Riverine	21000	34	7
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)				
	Pastoral	0	0	0
	Riverine	130000	143	44
	Agro-Pastoral	37000	41	13
	Total	296000		100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Pastoralists by Region by HE**

	<b>Pastoral</b>	
	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Gedo	0	0
Juba Hoose (Lower)	0	0
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	0	0
Bay	0	0
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	0	0
Bakool	0	0
Hiraan	0	0
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	0	0
Total	0	0

**Distribution of Food Insecure Agro-Pastoralists by Region by HE**

	<b>Agro-Pastoral</b>	
	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	65000	54
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	37000	31
Gedo	19000	16
Hiraan	0	0
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	0	0
Juba Hoose (Lower)	0	0
Bakool	0	0
Bay	0	0
Total	121000	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Riverine by Region by HE**

	<b>Riverine</b>	
	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	130000	74
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	21000	12
Hiraan	16000	9
Gedo	8000	5
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	0	12
Hiraan	0	9
Bakool	0	0
Bay	0	0
Total	175000	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Region by Livelihood System by  
(CFI+AFLC+HE)  
2007**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Livelihood System</b>	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Regional Total</b>	<b>% of Zone Total</b>
Bakool				
	Agro-Pastoral	183741	74	7
	Pastoral	65448	26	2
Bay				
	Agro-Pastoral	430881	87	15
	Pastoral	62868	13	2
Gedo				
	Agro-Pastoral	58358	24	2
	Pastoral	157482	64	6
	Riverine	31236	13	1
Hiraan				
	Pastoral	91786	35	3
	Riverine	32782	13	1
	Agro-Pastoral	136130	52	5
Juba Dhexe (Middle)				
	Pastoral	51941	28	2
	Riverine	76601	42	3
	Agro-Pastoral	55596	30	2
Juba Hoose (Lower)				
	Pastoral	122283	47	4
	Agro-Pastoral	81820	31	3
	Riverine	57005	22	2
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)				
	Agro-Pastoral	197643	47	7
	Pastoral	167770	40	6
	Riverine	53657	13	2
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)				
	Pastoral	83211	12	3
	Riverine	487825	72	17
	Agro-Pastoral	106902	16	4
	sub-total (south)	2792966	100	100



**Distribution of Food Insecure Pastoralists by Region by (CFI+AFLC+HE)**

	<b>Pastoral</b>	
	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	167770	21
Gedo	157482	20
Juba Hoose (Lower)	122283	15
Hiraan	91786	11
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	83211	10
Bakool	65448	8
Bay	62868	8
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	51941	6
Total	802789	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Agro-Pastoralists by Region by (CFI+AFLC+HE)**

	<b>Agro-Pastoral</b>	
	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Bay	430881	34
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	197643	16
Bakool	183741	15
Hiraan	136130	11
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	106902	9
Juba Hoose (Lower)	81820	7
Gedo	58358	5
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	55596	4
Total	1251071	100

**Distribution of Food Insecure Riverine by Region by (CFI+AFLC+HE)**

	<b>Riverine</b>	
	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Shabelle Hoose (Lower)	487825	66
Juba Dhexe (Middle)	76601	10
Juba Hoose (Lower)	57005	8
Shabelle Dhexe (Middle)	53657	7
Hiraan	32782	4
Gedo	31236	4
Bakool	0	0
Bay	0	0
Total	739106	100

**Table 7: Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Livelihood Zone by CFI 2007**

Livelihood Zone	Absolute Number	% of Total	Cumulative % of Total
Bay-Bakool-Bardera Agro-Past (BY)	274649	14	14
L.Shabelle Rainfed and Flood Irrigated (LS)	242273	12	26
Southern Agro-Pastoral (BY)	156232	8	34
Southern Agro-Pastoral (H)	112130	6	39
Southern Agro-Pastoral (BK)	95643	5	44
Coastal Deeh: sheep (MS)	93722	5	49
Southern Inland Pastoral (G)	75828	4	52
Southern Inland Pastoral (MS)	74048	4	56
Southern Inland Pastoral (LS)	73793	4	60
Southern Inland Pastoral (BK)	65448	3	63
Southern Inland Pastoral (H)	61660	3	66
Southern Agro-Pastoral (MS)	60948	3	69
Shabelle Riverine (LS)	54552	3	72
Southern Inland Pastoral (LJ)	50119	2	74
Lower Juba Agro-Pastoral	49183	2	77
Southern Agro-Pastoral (LS)	40902	2	79
Southern Agro-Pastoral (MJ)	38816	2	81
Southern Inland Pastoral (BY)	35945	2	83
Coastal pastoral: goats & cattle (LJ)	33354	2	84
Dawa Pastoral (G)	32654	2	86
Ciid Pastoral (H)	30126	2	87
Shabelle Riverine (MS)	25657	1	89
Southern Juba Riverine (MJ)	25304	1	90
Southern Juba Riverine (LJ)	24005	1	91
South-East Pastoral (BY)	22923	1	92
Southern Inland Pastoral (MJ)	22725	1	93
Central Agro-Pastoral (MS)	17695	1	94
South-East Pastoral (LJ)	16810	1	95
Juba Pump Irrigated Riverine (G)	12236	1	96
Hiran Riverine (H)	11782	1	96
Southern Agro-Pastoral (G)	11751	1	97
Coastal pastoral: goats & cattle (MJ)	10984	1	97
Southern Agro-Pastoral (LJ)	9637	0	98
Bay-Bakool-Bardera Agro-Pastoral (G)	8607	0	98
Juba Pump Irrigated Riverine (MJ)	7297	0	99
South-East Pastoral (MJ)	7232	0	99
Bay-Bakool-Bardera Agro-Pastoral (BK)	6098	0	99
South-East Pastoral (LS)	5884	0	100
Lower Juba Agro-Pastoral (MJ)	5780	0	100
Coastal pastoral: goats & cattle (LS)	2534	0	100
	2006966	100	100

BK = Bakool  
 BY = Bay  
 G = Gedo  
 H = Hiraan  
 MJ = Middle Juba  
 LJ = Lower Juba  
 MS = Middle Shabelle  
 LS = Lower Shabelle

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Livelihood Zone by AFLC  
2007**

<b>Livelihood Zone</b>	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>	<b>Cumulative % of Total</b>
Southern Agro-Pastoral (BK)	72000	15	15
Dawa Pastoral (G)	49000	10	25
L.Shabelle Rainfed and Flood Irrigated (LS)	46000	9	34
Southern Agro-Pastoral (MS)	44000	9	43
Southern Juba Riverine (MJ)	34000	7	50
Southern Juba Riverine (LJ)	33000	7	57
Southern Agro-Pastoral (LS)	29000	6	63
Southern Agro-Pastoral (H)	24000	5	68
South-East Pastoral (LJ)	22000	4	72
Lower Juba Agro-Pastoral (LJ)	21000	4	76
Shabelle Riverine (LS)	15000	3	79
Southern Agro-Pastoral (G)	12000	2	82
Juba Pump Irrigated Riverine (G)	11000	2	84
South-East Pastoral (MJ)	11000	2	86
Bay-Bakool-Bardera Agro-Pastoral (BK)	10000	2	88
Juba Pump Irrigated Riverine (MJ)	10000	2	90
Central Agro-Pastoral (MS)	10000	2	92
Southern Agro-Pastoral (MJ)	8000	2	94
Bay-Bakool-Bardera Agro-Pastoral (G)	7000	1	96
Shabelle Riverine (MS)	7000	1	97
Hiran Riverine (H)	5000	1	98
South-East Pastoral (BY)	4000	1	99
Lower Juba Agro-Pastoral (MJ)	3000	1	99
Southern Agro-Pastoral (LJ)	2000	0	100
South-East Pastoral (LS)	1000	0	100
Total	490000	100	100

BK = Bakool  
 BY = Bay  
 G = Gedo  
 H = Hiraan  
 MJ = Middle Juba  
 LJ = Lower Juba  
 MS = Middle Shabelle  
 LS = Lower Shabelle

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Livelihood Zone by HE  
2007**

<b>Livelihood Zone</b>	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>	<b>Cumulative % of Total</b>
L.Shabelle Rainfed and Flood Irrigated (LS)	84000	28	28
Southern Agro-Pastoral (MS)	56000	19	47
Shabelle Riverine (LS)	46000	16	63
Southern Agro-Pastoral (LS)	37000	13	75
Shabelle Riverine (MS)	21000	7	82
Ciid Pastoral (MJ)	16000	5	88
Bay-Bakool-Bardera Agro-Pastoral (G)	11000	4	92
Central Agro-Pastoral (MS)	9000	3	95
Juba Pump Irrigated Riverine (G)	8000	3	97
Southern Agro-Pastoral (G)	8000	3	100
	296000	100	100

BK = Bakool  
 BY = Bay  
 G = Gedo  
 H = Hiraan  
 MJ = Middle Juba  
 LJ = Lower Juba  
 MS = Middle Shabelle  
 LS = Lower Shabelle

**Distribution of Food Insecure in South by Livelihood Zone by (CFI+AFLC+HE)  
2007**

<b>Livelihood Zone</b>	<b>Absolute Number</b>	<b>% of Total</b>	<b>Cumulative % of Total</b>
L.Shabelle Rainfed and Flood Irrigated (LS)	372273	13	13
Bay-Bakool-Bardera Agro-Pastoral (BK)	274649	10	23
Southern Agro-Pastoral (BK)	167643	6	29
Southern Agro-Pastoral (MS)	160948	6	35
Southern Agro-Pastoral (BY)	156232	6	41
Southern Agro-Pastoral (H)	136130	5	45
Shabelle Riverine (LS)	115552	4	50
Southern Agro-Pastoral (LS)	106902	4	53
Coastal Deeh: sheep (MS)	93722	3	57
Dawa Pastoral (G)	81654	3	60
Southern Inland Pastoral (G)	75828	3	62
Southern Inland Pastoral (MS)	74048	3	65
Southern Inland Pastoral (LS)	73793	3	68
Lower Juba Agro-Pastoral (LJ)	70183	3	70
Southern Inland Pastoral (BK)	65448	2	73
Southern Inland Pastoral (H)	61660	2	75
Southern Juba Riverine (MJ)	59304	2	77
Southern Juba Riverine (LJ)	57005	2	79
Shabelle Riverine (MS)	53657	2	81
Southern Inland Pastoral (LJ)	50119	2	83
Southern Agro-Pastoral (MJ)	46816	2	84
South-East Pastoral (LJ)	38810	1	86
Central Agro-Pastoral (MS)	36695	1	87
Southern Inland Pastoral (BY)	35945	1	88
Coastal pastoral: goats & cattle (LJ)	33354	1	89
Hiran Riverine (H)	32782	1	91
Southern Agro-Pastoral (G)	31751	1	92
Juba Pump Irrigated Riverine (G)	31236	1	93
Ciid Pastoral (MJ)	30126	1	94
South-East Pastoral (BY)	26923	1	95
Bay-Bakool-Bardera Agro-Past (G)	26607	1	96
Southern Inland Pastoral (MJ)	22725	1	97
South-East Pastoral (MJ)	18232	1	97
Juba Pump Irrigated Riverine (MJ)	17297	1	98
Southern Agro-Pastoral (MS)	16098	1	99
Southern Agro-Pastoral (LJ)	11637	0.4	99
Coastal pastoral: goats & cattle (MJ)	10984	0.4	99
Lower Juba Agro-Pastoral (MJ)	8780	0.3	100
South-East Pastoral (LS)	6884	0.2	100
Coastal pastoral: goats & cattle (LS)	2534	0.1	100
Total	2792966	100	100

BK = Bakool  
 BY = Bay  
 G = Gedo  
 H = Hiraan  
 MJ = Middle Juba  
 LJ = Lower Juba  
 MS = Middle Shabelle  
 LS = Lower Shabelle

### Annex 3

#### Employment in Somalia 2002

<b>Population by labour force (%)</b>			
<b>Economic status</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural/Nomadic</b>	<b>Total</b>
Economically active	54	57	56
Not in labour force	46	43	44
Total population	100	100	100
<b>Economically active population by employment status (%)</b>			
<b>Employment status</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural/Nomadic</b>	<b>Total</b>
Employed	39	59	53
Unemployed	61	41	47
Total labour force	100	100	100
<b>Employment by sector (%)</b>			
<b>Sector</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural/Nomadic</b>	<b>Total</b>
Agriculture	25	80	67
Industry	26	8	12
Services	49	12	21
Total	100	100	100

<b>Population by labour force</b>			
<b>Economic status</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural/Nomadic</b>	<b>Total</b>
Economically active	1561248	2628528	4189776
Not in labour force	1329952	1982925	3322877
Total population	2891201	4611453	7502654
<b>Economically active population by employment status</b>			
<b>Employment status</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural/Nomadic</b>	<b>Total</b>
Employed	645105	1558717	2203822
Unemployed	916143	1069811	1985954
Total labour force	1561248	2628528	4189776
<b>Employment by sector</b>			
<b>Sector</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural/Nomadic</b>	<b>Total</b>
Agriculture	225825	1248532	1474357
Industry	142879	121580	264459
Services	276402	188605	465006
Total	645105	1558717	2203822

<b>Population by labour force (m)</b>			
<b>Economic status</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural/Nomadic</b>	<b>Total</b>
Economically active	1.6	2.6	4.2
Not in labour force	1.3	2	3.3
Total population	2.9	4.6	7.5
<b>Economically active population by employment status</b>			
<b>Employment status</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural/Nomadic</b>	<b>Total</b>
Employed	0.6	1.6	2.2
Unemployed	0.9	1.1	2
Total labour force	1.5	2.7	4.2
<b>Employment by sector</b>			
<b>Sector</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural/Nomadic</b>	<b>Total</b>
Agriculture	0.23	1.24	1.47
Industry	0.14	0.12	0.26
Services	0.28	0.19	0.47
Total	0.65	1.55	2.2

## Annex 4

### Income and Poverty in Somalia 2002

#### Household Income in Somalia

Household Income			
Income	Urban	Rural/Nomadic	Somalia
Total of all Households (US\$ m)	672	875	1547
Per capita income (US\$)	291	195	226

#### Number of Poor in Somalia

	Extreme Poverty (1)		Poverty (2)	
	Population (m)	Population Share (%)	Population (m)	Population Share (%)
Urban	0.7	24	1.8	61
Rural/nomadic	2.5	53	3.7	80
Somalia	3.2	43	5.5	73

1/ less than US\$ 1/day (PPP)

2/ less than US\$ 2/day (PPP)

Source: Socio-Economic Survey 2002 Somalia, UNDP/World Bank, Report No 1, Somalia Watching Brief 2003.

## Annex 5

### Regional Per Capita Income in Somalia 2002

Region	Per Capita Income (\$US)	Per Capita Income as % of Rural Per Capita Income	Per Capita Income as % of National Per Capita Income
W/Galbeed	350	79	55
Awdal	315	62	39
Banadir	310	59	37
Togdheer	300	54	33
Sanaag	290	49	28
Bari	280	44	24
Sool	270	38	19
Galgadud	260	33	15
M/Shabelle	240	23	6
L/Juba	230	18	2
Somalia	226	16	0
Nugal	220	13	-3
L/Shabelle	210	8	-7
M/Juba	170	-13	-25
Mudug	160	-18	-29
Hiraan	140	-28	-38
Gedo	130	-33	-42
Bay	120	-38	-47
Bakool	110	-44	-51

Source: UNDP/World Bank 2003

W/Galbeed's per capita income is 79% higher than Somalia's rural per capita income and 55% higher than Somalia's per capita income. Bay is income poorer and has more food insecure than Gedo while Bakool is poorer and has more food insecure than Middle Juba. This pattern is repeated for many of the regions and may provide support to the hypothesis that there is a positive link between income poverty and food insecurity.



## Annex 6

### LIVELIHOOD LOGFRAME

Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Overall Objective:</b> To reduce food insecurity and poverty including promotion of private sector-led economic development.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Impact:</b> proportion of population above \$US 1 a day (MDG) increases by (as target) 1% p.a.</li> <li>2. <b>Impact:</b> the depth of poverty (measured by poverty gap index) has fallen by 1% p.a.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP Human Development report</li> <li>• FSAU reports</li> <li>• UNICEF multi-indicator cluster survey</li> <li>• World Bank Watching Brief</li> <li>• Government financial and banking reports</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Specific Objective:</b> Vulnerable and poor rural and urban households' livelihood assets developed and protected.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Incidence of Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis (AFLC) reduced (on average) from 382,100<sup>1</sup> to 229,260 (by 40%) by Deyr 2010/2011</li> <li>2. Poor and very poor households have increased income (financial capital) from US\$ 195/year (rural) or US\$ 220 (urban) to US\$ 260/year (increase of 33% rural and 18% urban), by 2010.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IP Classification</li> <li>• Food aid distributions</li> <li>• FSAU Surveys and reports</li> <li>• UN and NGO reports</li> <li>• World Bank watching brief</li> </ul>	<p>No major large scale disaster</p>

<sup>1</sup> 5 season rolling average from 2004 post Gü Analysis

Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Result area 1:</b> Agricultural and non-agricultural production, marketing and income diversified, improved and environmentally sustainable.</p> <p><i>Rehabilitation/Development – support of small and micro-enterprise development in addition to cash transfers to facilitate progression from relief to development ( but not in response to crisis).</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Production:</b> In targeted areas, 10% crop production increase from the post war average (PWA), by 2010.</li> <li>2. Returns (financial and non-financial) from livestock increased by 10%, in targeted areas, by 2010.</li> <li>3. <b>Marketing:</b> By 2010, in targeted areas, farm gate price raised from current levels by 10%, and that consumer price has fallen by 10%.</li> <li>4. <b>Income:</b> Income from farm and off-farm sources increased from current levels by 10% overall, by 2010.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN agency and NGO reports</li> <li>• FSAU livelihood baseline profiles and reports</li> <li>• EIA's</li> <li>• Baseline surveys</li> <li>• Gross margin data survey</li> </ul>	<p>No major large scale disaster</p>
<p><b>Result area 2:</b> Affordable access to nutrition, safe drinking water and proper sanitation improved and sustained.</p> <p><i>Humanitarian - Provision of in-kind transfers such as therapeutic feeding and supplementary feeding.</i></p> <p><i>Rehabilitation/Development - provision of long term access to a diversified diet, through access to information and awareness on diet, nutrition and child care.</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate in targeted areas has fallen from median rates of &gt;15.7% in 2008 to less than 15% by 2010.</li> <li>2. Households' use of improved sanitation facilities increased from 37% (current average) to 47% in targeted areas, by 2010</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FSAU reports and surveys (IPC classification and SAM and GAM data)</li> <li>• Below Poverty Line (income) data</li> <li>• Human development indices</li> <li>• UN and NGO reports</li> <li>• Baseline surveys</li> <li>• Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS)</li> </ul>	<p>Target population is accessible</p> <p>No major epidemics</p> <p>No major large scale disaster</p>

Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Result area 3:</b> Social protection provided (including safety nets and direct (conditional/unconditional) cash transfers).</p> <p><i>Humanitarian</i> – provision of in-kind transfers including food and non-food.</p> <p><i>Rehabilitation/Development</i> – provision of (i) conditional cash transfers to encourage clinic attendance and (ii) unconditional cash transfers</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. In targeted communities, increased use of Ante and post natal care check ups from 26% to 36%, by 2010.</li> <li>2. In targeted areas, timely initiation of breast feeding has increased from 36% to 46%, by 2010.</li> <li>3. In targeted areas, adult literacy increase from 25% to 36%, by 2010.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reports and FSAU documentation</li> <li>• Record of clinic attendance</li> <li>• Conditional and unconditional Cash Transfer programmes reports and evaluation reports.</li> </ul>	<p>Target population is accessible</p> <p>No major epidemics</p> <p>No major large scale disaster</p> <p>Health care facilities are available in target areas.</p>

**Annex 7**  
**FOOD SECURITY THEMATIC PROGRAMME LOGFRAME**

<b>Intervention Logic</b>	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicators</b>	<b>Sources of Verification</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
<p><b>Overall Objective:</b> Vulnerable and poor rural and urban livelihood assets developed and protected.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Incidence of Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis (AFLC) reduced (on average) from 535,000 in Deyr 2007/2008 to 214,000 (by 40%) by Deyr 2010/2011</li> <li>2. Poor and very poor households have increased income from US\$ 195/year (rural) or US\$ 220 (urban) to US\$ 260/year (increase of 33% rural and 18% urban), by 2010</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IP Classification</li> <li>• Food aid distributions</li> <li>• FSAU Surveys and reports</li> <li>• UN and NGO reports</li> <li>• World Bank watching brief</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Specific Objective:</b> Targeted rural and urban household's real income increased.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Targeted households' income in <b>rural</b> areas increased in real terms from US\$ 195/year to US\$ 260/year, by 2010</li> <li>2. Targeted households' income in <b>urban</b> areas increased in real terms from US\$ 220/year to US\$ 280/year, by 2010</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baseline survey (to be conducted)</li> <li>• FSAU surveys and reports</li> <li>• World Bank Watching Brief</li> </ul>	<p>No major large scale disaster. Target population is accessible</p>

<p><b>Result area 1:</b> Entrepreneurial activities supported and developed, particularly for women and people affected by displacement</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. By 2010, 70% of targeted groups supported have savings systems in place; keep proper and transparent financial and meeting records.</li> <li>2. By 2010, 70% of targeted groups supported, have increased their turnover by 35%</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baseline (to be undertaken)</li> <li>• NGO monitoring reports</li> <li>• Group records</li> </ul>	<p>Target population is accessible No major large scale disaster</p>
<p><b>Result area 2:</b> Conditional cash transfer provided for health and adult literacy, with an emphasis on women, children and people affected by displacement.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate in targeted areas has fallen from median rates of &gt;15.7% in 2008 to less than 15% by 2010.</li> <li>2. In targeted areas, timely initiation of breast feeding has increased from 36% in 2006 to 46% by 2010.</li> <li>3. In targeted areas, adult literacy increase from 25% in 2006 to 36%, by 2010.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO monitoring reports</li> <li>• Clinic attendance sheet</li> <li>• MICS</li> <li>• Adult literacy attendance record</li> <li>• Adult literacy test results</li> </ul>	<p>Target population is accessible No major large scale disaster Health care facilities are available in target areas.</p>

**Activities Result area 1: Income Generating Activities (IGAs)**

1. Develop a baseline of existing groups
2. Analyse groups' capacity in management, record keeping, entrepreneurial activities and other activities
3. Identify training needs and develop training modules accordingly, test them and adapt them
4. Facilitate creation of new groups when needed
5. Carry out training
6. Support groups to carry out feasibility study (including socio-economic impact, environmental impact and business plan) for an identified micro-project (including innovative approach)
7. Support and supervise implementation of the micro-project (including a cost share from the group) and business plan.
8. Support groups to put in place self-sustaining savings system (Capital accumulation rather than a “merry-go-round)
9. Assess market prospects and opportunities
10. Monitoring and evaluation

**Activities Result area 2: Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT)**

1. Carry out a baseline survey.
2. Develop targeting criteria and select household accordingly (poorest wealth groups)
3. Health service providers and health facility staff to be familiarised with Conditional Cash Transfer processes.
4. In consultation with health service providers and health facility staff to define, plan and establish at what level to set the child health care conditional cash transfer (the value of money to be transferred to the beneficiary, the frequency of distribution, incentives to staff (if required), conditionality's (95% attendance at ante and post natal clinics) and compilation of beneficiary list)
5. Adult education service providers to be familiarised with conditional cash transfer processes and to link with other on-going EU and other donor funded adult education activities.
6. In consultation with education service providers to define, plan and establish at what level to set the adult education conditional cash transfer (the value of money to be transferred to the beneficiary, the frequency of distribution, incentives to staff (if required), conditionality's (95% attendance at ante and post natal clinics) and compilation of beneficiary list)
7. Develop method and means of transferring cash to recipients (physical cash transfer mechanism – e.g. Hawallah system)
8. Develop nutrition education, child care messages and adult education course material.
9. Carry out awareness campaign and training in child health care and adult education
10. Develop a means of monitoring and verifying attendance at clinics (by nurse), adult literacy training (by teacher) and other awareness raising sessions.
11. Transfer of cash to beneficiary's households.
12. Monitoring and evaluation

## Annex 8

### Notes on LRRD

Emergencies are costly in terms of human life and resources. Better development can reduce the need for relief and better relief can contribute to development. Relief and development have costs and trade-offs and they include:

- (xv) investment to stabilise agricultural production may be at expense of faster growth.
- (xvi) investment in low potential areas may have lower social rate of returns than investment in high potential areas (but may not especially when relief costs are taken into account).
- (xvii) employment-based safety nets are more expensive to implement than free-food distribution and require substantial skills to plan.
- (xviii) holding foreign exchange reserve at macro or micro level has an opportunity cost in terms of consumption or investment foregone.
- (xix) if relief is planned to incorporate development, it may delay implementation.
- (xx) if development institutions are used to implement relief, they may become overloaded and ongoing development may suffer.

It's not always the case however that there are dilemmas and trade-offs between relief and development in terms of the allocation of resources between current consumption and investment. There are many positive links between relief, rehabilitation and development such as the effects of improved health on productivity and it is these links that will be identified and promoted in the strategy.

It's possible for example to turn a consumption subsidy into an investment one by for example using relief food aid or relief cash aid not for direct distribution but as a wage to pay for development such as road-building, tree planting, irrigation construction or soil/water conservation<sup>1</sup>.

It's also possible for example to provide a consumption subsidy and turn part of it into an investment one by for example using relief food aid or relief cash aid for both direct distribution and indirect distribution. The former would be used to increase current consumption or income while the latter could be used to encourage parents to send their children to school or to encourage mothers and their children to attend a health clinic. This food aid or cash aid would therefore increase current income and reduce future vulnerability thereby providing an automatic link between relief, rehabilitation and development.

The key to successful LRRD is simply is to ensure that such development can be sustained afterwards. Many of the interventions recommended in the Livelihood Strategy and the Food Security Strategy implicitly link relief, rehabilitation and development. These interventions include social protection that in turn comprise safety nets and unconditional or conditional cash transfers. Positive impacts from safety nets and direct transfers would have a better chance of leading to recovery and development which in turn would reduce the need for relief.

---

<sup>1</sup> Road-building, tree planting, irrigation construction or soil/water conservation. These interventions work only when there is sufficient pre-planning and administrative capacity, when they start early enough to employ people before they become too weak to work, if there is surplus labour and when they run alongside schemes to help those who cannot work such as the elderly, infirm and those with high demands on their time such as women and children.



## Annex 9

### Notes on Food Aid

Food aid is controversial. It amounted globally in the last decade to about 2 - 4 m t per year equivalent to around US\$ 0.3 bn or 5% of overseas development assistance (ODA). At the same time its proponents and opponents pursue a constant battle which has already lasted for over 40 years and with no end in sight.

#### Case for Food Aid

The case for using food aid as a development resource was set out by Nurkse in 1953, detailed by Ezekiel in 1955 and further elaborated by FAO in 1961. With later additions and clarifications, this case can be summarised in four propositions:

1. Food aid can lift the constraint in growth and self reliance by providing real resources necessary to expand investment or to dampen inflationary repercussions of an existing development plan (output aspect).
2. Food aid can have a disproportionately favourable impact on disadvantaged groups by supporting specific nutrition or food for work projects or by distribution at concessional prices (distribution aspect).
3. Food aid can assist government to set up storage and price stabilisation programmes at national, regional and local levels (stabilisation aspect)
4. The value of all these benefits is enhanced by the fact that food is at least partly additional - aid that would not otherwise be forthcoming in cash and food that would not otherwise be purchased (additionality aspect).

#### Case Against Food Aid

The case against food aid is more diffuse resting partly on a denial of the propositions advanced in favour of food aid and partly on the following four inter-related criticisms:

1. Food aid has a disincentive effect on local agriculture<sup>1</sup>, by its effect on government policy or directly by attracting agricultural labourers to food for work sites (disincentive aspect).
2. The allocation of food aid between countries does not reflect criteria of need but rather the economic, political and military interests of donor countries (allocation aspect).
3. Partly as result, food aid is associated with forces leading not to greater self-reliance but rather to greater dependence (dependency aspect).
4. Food aid is second-best aid, expensive, double-tied, dependent on surpluses, irregular, bureaucratic and often inappropriate (inferiority aspect).

It was reported during the mission's field work in Jowhar and Dollow in Middle Shabelle and Gedo Regions respectively that some farmers had given up growing food crops or farming altogether because of depressed farmgate prices arising from competition from food aid. The rationale behind this is that food aid increases supply faster than it stimulates demand thereby depressing food prices received by farmers and traders and creating disincentives to invest in improved on-farm technology or in storage and transport. This was at a time when some donors and NGOs were encouraging riverines and agropastoralists to invest in farming. It was also reported to the mission that some individuals did benefit from food aid since it increased their consumption of food or income even if some or all of the food aid was sold in the market.

The effect of food aid on prices depends on what is done with it but food aid generally is a complex and tangled problem since it may have positive and negative impacts and the net effect may be difficult to determine.

---

<sup>1</sup> Through the price mechanism.

Most research over the last 30 years concluded that there exists little empirical evidence to refute or confirm the belief that food aid has undermined markets<sup>1</sup> at both micro- and macro-levels. But there now appears to be empirical evidence<sup>2</sup> for the first time that unambiguously concludes that food aid acted as an incentive to agricultural market development. It's believed that this is due mainly to the fact that the empirical analysis is based on a new and improved methodology that takes account of more household variables in contrast to previous studies using fewer variables and where causal links were erroneously and automatically attributed to simple correlations such as that between food aid and food production.

Simple test statistics such as a comparison of means or simple regressions suggest that the disincentive effects of food aid on household behaviour are many, large and statistically significant. When account however is taken of household characteristics such as age, sex and education of head, land holding, size and location, many of these adverse effects vanish. There is indeed some suggestion that food aid leads to an increase in labour supply to agriculture, wage work and own business activities.

The key alleged problems surrounding food aid include:

- (I) displaced international trade.
- (II) depressed farmgate prices.
- (III) labour supply disincentives.
- (IV) delivery delay.
- (V) misuse by intermediaries.
- (VI) diversion to resale or feeding livestock or alcohol brewing.
- (VII) dependency.
- (VIII) inattention to beneficiaries' micronutrient needs.

But all of these problems revolve ultimately around the question of targeting. If the donors and NGOs could improve the targeting of food aid, it would more effectively accomplish its primary humanitarian and development aim i.e. the maintenance of the most valuable asset of the poor - human capital embodied in their health and education. This would reduce many of the errors that sometimes make food aid controversial or ineffective or both.

In many cases in SCZ, the problem of food insecurity is not one of food availability but of food access or demand failure<sup>3</sup>. It's therefore recommended that food aid in-kind should only be provided where (i) food is the limiting factor and the most effective and appropriate solution, and (ii) food is the means of support that beneficiaries request. Priority should be given where possible to local and regional purchases to satisfy food aid needs. Where some food aid continues to be justified, there is a need to ensure that it is managed in a strategic manner that is consistent with development objectives and targeted where it is needed most. But where food aid continues to be justified, there is a need for it to be managed in a strategic manner consistent with development objectives and targeted where it is needed most.

---

<sup>1</sup> The undermining of markets may be defined as "any reduction in production, employment or income" caused by food aid.

<sup>2</sup> From Cornell and Oxford Universities.

<sup>3</sup> Or food entitlement decline in Amartya Sen's language.

## Annex 10

### Glossary

<b>Acute food insecurity</b>	Temporary famine
<b>Aid</b>	Gift or low-interest (soft) loan. Lending for example by IBRD itself is not considered to be aid even if it's for development because the interest rate is commercial. Only lending by IDA is aid since this is concessionary i.e. low-interest (soft) loan.
<b>Chronic food insecurity</b>	Permanent under nourishment
<b>Conditional cash transfer</b>	A cash transfer which is conditional on the recipient's behaviour.
<b>Conditional food transfer</b>	A food transfer which is conditional on the recipient's behaviour.
<b>Dependency ratio</b>	The dependency ratio is the ratio of the economically-dependent part of the population to the productive part. The economically-dependent part is recognised to be children who are too young to work and individuals that are too old i.e. individuals under the age of 15 and over the age of 65. The dependency ratio equals [(number of people aged 0 - 14) + (number of people aged 65 and over)] / [(number of people aged 15 - 64)] x 100%.
<b>Famine</b>	Famine is a socio-economic process which causes accelerated destitution of the most vulnerable, marginal and least powerful groups in a community to the point where they can no longer as a group maintain a sustainable livelihood.
<b>Food aid</b>	Commodity aid that is used either to support food assistance action or to fund development more generally by providing balance-of-payments support in substituting for commercial imports or budgetary support through the counterpart funds generated from sales revenue. Food aid transfers are required to meet the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for official development assistance (ODA) - grants or loans with at least 25% concessionality intended for developmental or humanitarian purposes and organised by development cooperation agencies. Food aid can therefore include (i) direct aid acquired on the donor's internal market or internationally on open markets (ii) triangular transactions where acquisition is restricted to developing country sources other than the country of use and (iii) local purchases where the donor's agent acquires food for humanitarian or developmental purposes in the country of use.
<b>Food security</b>	Food security is achieved when all people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.
<b>Gina coefficient</b>	An aggregate numerical measure of income inequality ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). A Gina coefficient of 0.3 or less is normally considered acceptable.

<b>Headcount ratio</b>	Usually refers to the proportion of individuals, households or families that falls under the poverty line. Divides the number of people identified as poor by the total number of people in the community. The headcount ratio H ranges from 0% (nobody is poor) to 100% (everybody is poor) ( <i>Does not measure how much poverty</i> ).
<b>Human Development Index</b>	The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index of economic and social development. It covers life expectancy (LE), adult literacy (AL), and gross enrolment (GE) (primary, secondary and tertiary education) and GDP per capita (measured in PPP) The HDI = $((LE - 25/85 - 25) + (2/3*AL + 1/3*GE) + (\log(\text{GDP per capita}) - \log(100)) / (\log(40000) - \log(100)))$ . AL = $(AL - 0/100 - 0)$ and GE = $(GE - 0/100 - 0)$
<b>Income<sup>1</sup> poverty</b>	Poverty defined with respect to a money-based poverty line for income or expenditure. The distinction is made between this and other concepts that emphasise the many dimensions of poverty. The income poverty line is set internationally at one US dollar a day.
<b>Indigence</b>	A person who is indigent is in need and lacks the means for subsistence. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America has referred to an indigence line which at half the value of the poverty line is supposed to cover only basic nutritional requirements.
<b>Informal social protection</b>	Provided by mutual agreement through kinship, friendship or other informal network.
<b>Life expectancy</b>	Life expectancy in say 2008 is the average age to which a child born in 2008 can be expected to live on the basis of present circumstances. Life expectancy is not the average age of the population which is determined by other factors as well as life expectancy.
<b>Livelihoods analysis</b>	Livelihoods analysis considers people's assets and constraints and is a tool for finding ways to improve poor people's food-access. It also helps to understand transitory food insecurity and vulnerability e.g. how changes in vulnerability (HIV infection, drought), institutions (market reforms) or endowments (soil degradation) impact on livelihood outcome such as food security. The view of assets and livelihood strategies including non-farm ones is a way of moving thinking about food security away from an agriculture-only focus. The livelihoods framework builds on 4 or 5 types of assets/capital (natural, physical, human and social). Income is the output of the combined use of all of these assets and income itself can be accounted as part of physical capital.
<b>Malnutrition</b>	In a well-nourished population, there is a reference distribution of height and weight for children under 5 years of age. Under-nourishment in a population can be gauged by comparing children to a reference population which is the WHO/CDC/NCHS one. Indicators used are weight for age, height for age and weight for height. These may be

---

<sup>1</sup> Or consumption

expressed in standard deviation units (z scores) from the reference population median. A standard deviation of 2 means that the monitored population is considered moderately or severely underweight while a standard deviation of 3 is classified as severely underweight.

<b>National poverty line</b>	Poverty lines drawn by national governments or national statistical offices to measure poverty. It is not possible to make comparisons between countries using national poverty lines as each is calculated on the basis of criteria specific to that country.
<b>Net primary school enrolment</b>	Proportion of primary school age children actually enrolled in school.
<b>Poverty correlates</b>	The characteristics that are closely associated with being poor such as living in a rural area or having a large number of children. These can be used to target public expenditure in the absence of detailed information relating to every household of the individual.
<b>Poverty gap</b>	A measure of the average distance of poor individuals or households below the poverty line (Measures how much poverty on average but not how many are poor).
<b>Poverty line</b>	Represents the level of income or consumption necessary to meet a set of minimum requirements to feed oneself and one's family adequately and/or to meet other basic requirements such as clothing, housing and healthcare. Those with incomes or expenditure equal to or above the line are not poor. While what the minimum should be has an important subjective element, poverty lines are typically anchored to minimum nutritional requirements plus a modest allowance for non-food needs.
<b>Purchasing power parity</b>	Exchange rate at which cost of typical selection of goods is same in each country.
<b>Risk</b>	Probability of a hazard occurring
<b>Social assistance</b>	Cash allowance not usually linked to formal employment
<b>Social insurance</b>	Contributory insurance variously covering unemployment, health and accident.
<b>Social protection</b>	Policies and programmes which aim to prevent and mitigate the shocks that create and maintain chronic poverty and provide recovery assistance by protecting incomes and building the assets of the poor. Examples include pensions, food for education and cash for human development.
<b>Social security</b>	Social insurance and social assistance.
<b>Squared poverty gap</b>	A static concept capturing the fact that the poor are not equally poor. It is the average value of the square of the poverty gap for each individual. Poorest people contribute more to the index. Also called the Foster Greer Thornback (FGT) Index. If for example transient poverty in Yemen is 45% of the squared poverty gap, this means that almost half

of the index is explained by persons moving into and out of poverty.

**Structural food deficit**

A structural food deficit means that (i) the food deficit is long-term and (ii) production plus storage plus commercial imports are insufficient to meet demand. Aid is therefore typically used to ensure that total demand is met.

**Stunting**

Low height for age reflecting a sustained past episode or episodes of undernutrition.

**Targeting**

The process by which expenditure is directed to specific groups of the population defined as poor or disadvantaged, in order to increase the efficiency of the use of resources.

**Undernutrition**

???????????

**Vulnerable**

Vulnerability is a combination of exposure to risk, sensitivity to shock (i.e. impact when a shock happens) and level of resilience and often referring to persons with an income-poverty equal to 0.75 - 1.25 times the income poverty line. Vulnerability may also be defined as 'exposure and sensitivity to livelihood shocks'. 'Vulnerability to food insecurity' means that a wide range of risky events - drought, flood, earthquake, adverse price trend, civil conflict - could push people into a food insecure situation. 'Vulnerability to drought' however elevates one particular type of event as the underlying cause of food insecurity.

## Annex 11

### List of Key Persons Met

	NAME	ORGANISATION	DESIGNATION
1	Dr Graham Farmer	FAO	Officer in Charge for Somalia
2	Massimo Castiello	FAO	Livestock Project Coordinator for Somalia
3	Wesley Bii	Mogadishu University	Kenya Representative
4	Simon Mansfield	DFID	Regional Humanitarian Adviser
5	Mila Font	European Union	Governance sector adviser
6	Samuel M Rigu	CARE International	Project Manager, Strengthening Livelihoods in the Gedo Region
7	Dr Leonard Oruko	ASARECA	Senior Technical Officer (M&E)
8	Michael Eregae	VetAid	Somalia Support Officer
9	Dr Dan Owour	VSF	Livestock Coordinator (South Somalia)
10	Robert Bowen	Vetaid	Africa Regional Coordinator
11	Maulid Warfe	UNICEF, Somalia	Education Cluster Coordinator
12	Filiep Decorte	UN-Habitat, Somalia	Programme Manager
13	James Kingori	UNICEF, Somalia	Nutrition Cluster Coordinator
14	Georges-Marc Andre	European Union	Minister - Counsellor, Somalia
15	Paul Daniels	CARE International	Director of Somalia Program
16	Abdinasir M Sheik	DIAL	Executive Director
17	Joy Kendi	European Union	Rural Development and Food Security
18	Paula Vazquez Horyaans	European Union	Head of Section: Rural Development and Social Services, Somalia Operations Unit
19	Edda Costarelli	European Union	Programme Coordination & Quality Assurance
20	Alberto Rognoni	CEFA	Somalia Coordinator
21	Kamaal Quraisyh	European Union	EC Flight Coordinator
22	Ali A. Hersi	CARE International	Sector Coordinator, Economic Development Initiatives
23	Stephanie Rousseau	European Union	Attaché (Food Security)
24	Grainne Moloney	FSAU	Nutrition Project Manager
25	Genevieve Chicoine	UN- WFP	Programme Officer; Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
26	Owen Calvert	FSAU	Technical Manager
27	Cindy Holleman	FSAU	Chief Technical Adviser
28	Hibo Yassin	COSPE	Regional Coordinator
29	Luciano Mosela	European Union	Rural Development Technical Assistant
30	Isabel Candela	European Union	Governance and Security Sector, Somali operations
31	Lucy Wood	Terra Nuova	Regional Representative
32	Fatuma S Abdikadir	ALRMP	National Coordinator
33	James Oduor	ALRMP	Drought Management Coordinator
34	Aadrain Sullivan	ECHO	Programme Manager, Kenya & Somalia
35	Ben Foot	Country Director	Save the Children (UK), Somalia
36	Dr Kate Longley	Research Fellow	ODI, Humanitarian Policy Group

## **Annex 12**

### **Terms of Reference**

#### **Global objective**

Develop a strategy to address the underlying causes of food insecurity in a sustainable manner through a livelihood programme in Somalia taking into account identified needs, constraints and potentialities as well as past and on-going programmes and lessons learnt.

#### **Specific objective**

Taking into account needs, constraints and potentialities as well as lessons-learnt of past and on-going food security and livelihoods interventions, and using the EC-funded FSAU baseline data, field knowledge and information, the consultant will:

a) Develop a Livelihood Strategy and Programme to address underlying causes of food insecurity in Somalia, identifying priority areas and taking into account the funding envelope (€12 million). This will include recommendations for a LRRD strategy in the food security sector, and in particular to strengthen synergies between the Food Security Thematic Programme interventions and the ECHO funded operations.

b) Propose a formulation for the Call for Proposals Guidelines for Applicants to be launched beginning of 2008 for the implementation a livelihood programme to address underlying causes of food insecurity in Somalia, identifying priority areas and taking into account the funding envelope (€5 million).