



Cultures of Governance and Conflict Resolution

A Euro-Indian Workshop



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in cooperation with the
Delegation of the European Commission to India

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Cultures of Governance and Conflict Resolution

A Euro-Indian Workshop

edited by

Balveer Arora, Peter Ronald deSouza, Angela Liberatore

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Table of contents

Introduction	7
Acknowledgments	9
Welcome and opening address	10
Inaugural address.....	13
Session One – Cultures of Governance and Perspectives on Diversity	16
Session Two – Global Governance and the Universal Values Quest	18
Session Three – Europe and India: Cultures of Governance and Mutual Perceptions	20
Session Four – Conflict Resolution and Human Rights	22
Session Five – Cultural Traditions and the Road Ahead	24
Concluding remarks and perspectives	26
Compendium of Abstracts	27
1. Conflict resolution, peace building and just peace - Karin Aggestam	28
2. Cultures of governance in pluricultural civilisations – Balveer Arora.....	31
3. Cultures of economic governance: the influence of representative democracy on economic policy convergence in Europe and in India – Basudeb Chaudhuri.....	34
4. Agreeing on the operating norms of the new political community: India and Europe – Peter R. deSouza	35
5. Ethnic conflict vs. class conflict – Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray	37
6. The role of religion in the cultures of governance, and the potential causality of violence in societies - Jésus Garcia Ruiz.....	39
7. Majoritarianism, institutional erosion and the challenge of governance – Zoya Hasan.....	40
8. Determinants and patterns of EU governance, with special emphasis on EU security governance – Emil J. Kirchner	43
9. Exported universalism or shared universality? – Nicole Lapierre	45
10. Transcultural strategies for a multipolar cultural world: the principle of reciprocal knowledge – Alain Le Pichon.....	47
11. Global governance, democracy, security and the role of Europe – Angela Liberatore	49
12. Images of the EU in India and beyond – Sonia Lucarelli	51
13. The politics of silence in the Mahabharata and the structures of conflict in theatre – K. Madavane.....	54
14. European babel? The politics of language in Europe – Roland Marti.....	58
15. Historical roots of India's strategy of planned development with democracy – Aditya Mukherjee	60
16. The search for a universal language of governance – Rukmini Bhaya Nair	62
17. Dealing with conflict resolution and developing avenues of governance: A comparative examination of cultural and legal traditions of Euro-India relations – Javaid Rehman	71
18. Governing conflicts or dialogue on conflicts? Notes on a rebel's interview – Ranabir Samaddar	74
19. Citizens in the making - schooling processes, student practices, youth cultures and the making of citizens: France and India – Meenakshi Thapan	77
20. India and EU facing the challenge of a new multilateralism. Looking at the evolving Indian-European partnership – Mario Telò.....	82
Contributors.....	84
List of Participants	90

Introduction

Held in New Delhi and Shimla on 20-22 November 2008, the workshop was the result of cooperation between the European Commission (Directorate General for Research, Brussels, in cooperation with the EU Delegation in New Delhi), and the Indian Institute of Advanced Study/ IIAS, Shimla, with the support of the Transcultural International Institute, Paris..

Aim of the workshop was to discuss and compare research conducted in Europe and India on issues of common interest and high policy relevance such as governance, democracy and conflict resolution where mutual learning can enhance current and future analytical work. It brought together 25 researchers from Europe and India whose contributions were organised around four interconnected themes: Cultures of Governance and Perspectives on Diversity; Global Governance and the Universal Values Quest; Cultures of governance and Mutual Perceptions; Conflict Resolution and Human Rights; and Cultural Traditions and the Road Ahead. Both in New Delhi and Shimla –and during the journey between the two locations- participants engaged in deep and frank debate and mutual learning.

The discussion was opened by Ms Danièle Smadja, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to India and Dr Bhalchandra Mungekar, Member, Planning Commission, Government of India. These were followed by presentations by scholars in the fields of political science, sociology, economics, history, linguistic, semeiotics and anthropology.

In the following pages the reader will find the opening remarks of Ms Smadja and Mr Mungekar, a short synthesis of the discussion that took place in each of the sessions and the extended abstracts of the presentations -including those by Alain Le Pichon and Ranabir Samaddar who unfortunately could not attend but shared their views in writing.

As an 'appetiser' of the next sections, we would like to note some of the many interesting points that emerged during the workshop:

✓ Europe and India face a common and complex challenge for governance: the one of fostering 'unity and diversity', namely the unity of a democratic polity -supranational in the EU case and federal in the Indian context, with due respect to cultural diversity within and beyond these polities. Such common challenge is however confronted with very different cultural, geopolitical, historical, socio-economic conditions that influence both, the ways such challenge is experienced in the EU and in India, and also the relations and mutual perceptions between -people in- India and the EU (Contributions by Balveer Arora, Peter R. deSouza, Sonia Lucarelli).

✓ For example, protection of minorities is a crucial issue in both contexts, and there are sophisticated procedures and institutions in place to address them both in the EU and in India –for example, the Indian National Commission for Minorities. However, while a regional and supranational approach to such protection has been developed in Europe (by the Council of Europe and, within the EU, by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and antidiscrimination provisions in binding Community law) a regional approach is much harder to conceive and implement in the South-Asian context. This is due, among other factors, to the diversity of political regimes in the area -India being the only consolidated

democracy in the region- and a perceived 'giant syndrome' as India is, with China, the largest country in Asia and worldwide (Contributions by Zoya Hasan, Javaid Rehman).

✓ Other important examples of such common but differentiated approach to 'unity and diversity' relate to language politics –including the choice and transformation of language(s) in bureaucratic and legal contexts and in the broader social processes of identification. Another interesting point relates to the importance of mythological narratives in public culture and debate, for instance concerning the interpretations of power, conflicts and resistance in texts such as Mahabharata or Antigoni (Contributions of Rukmini Bhaya Nair, Roland Marti, K.Madavane).

✓ The 'burden sharing' between smaller and bigger states in handling political and security issues can be seen as another way of relating unity and diversity within a regional or a federal polity. In addition, different historical roots shape the relations between democracy and economic development within and across countries, and processes of convergence and divergence emerge due to globalisation (Contributions by Emil Kirchner, Basudeb Chaudhuri, Aditya Mukherjee).

✓ Conflicts within and across countries and societies are part of the experience of Europe and India, including in their mutual relations in colonial and post-colonial times. Socio-economic polarisation, identity mobilisation (on ethnic, religious or other grounds) to exclude or fight 'the other', disregard for claims for justice, transmission of stereotypes of others as bad or violent, all contribute to cause or escalate conflicts. On the contrary, access to political representation and justice, education to and practice of non-violence, speaking out against injustice –including by intellectuals, fostering empathy and human rights protection are factors that contribute to the prevention or transformation of violent conflicts (Contributions by Karin Aggestam, Joan Esteban, Meenakshi Thapan).

✓ India and Europe cannot but act in a global context that raises important economic, social and security challenges for governance. In addition, phenomena of both de-territorialisation and hyper-territorialisation due to globalisation are challenging traditional ways of organising politics and other domains, including religion. Such global challenges raise the question of whether there are universal values that can underpin multilateral action: an issue, which is both important and contested. For example, the language of universal human rights can be interpreted as an (other) colonial imposition – especially if different standards are applied concerning the sanctioning of human rights violations perpetrated by more or less powerful entities. At the same time, the fair implementation of international law and the representation and negotiation of different perspectives in the context of regional cooperation and multilateral institutions can enable the development of shared values (Contributions by Nicole Lapierre, Angela Liberatore, Jesús Garcia Ruiz, Mario Teló).

The summaries of discussions and the extended abstracts documented in the following pages provide many more insights and other possible links between the rich and diverse contributions offered to this unique Euro-Indian workshop.

Balveer Arora, Professor of Political Science, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India

Peter Ronald deSouza, Director, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, India

Angela Liberatore, Governance and Ethics Unit, Directorate General for Research, European Commission

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank colleagues whose help was crucial to make the idea of a Euro-Indian workshop a reality: Andrew Sors, Delegation of the European Commission to India –who provided his experienced and gentle guidance before retiring from the European Commission; Indraneel Ghose, EC Delegation –who assisted in all the practical details of the workshop’s preparation (with the smiling support of Tejinder Kaur); Ashok Sharma, IIAS - who kindly helped to take good care of all participants in the beautiful premises in Shimla; Alain Le Pichon who was among the initiators of the workshop’s idea but could not attend its realisation; Jean-Michel Baer, Peteris Zilgalvis and Upton Van der Vliet, EC Directorate General for Research in Brussels, for supporting the initiative. Thanks also to Karin Aggestam, K. K. Kailash, Sonia Lucarelli and Javaid Rehman for inputs to the summaries of the discussions - all responsibilities in the final draft rests nevertheless with the editors of this report. And, of course, our gratitude to Ms Smadja, Mr Mungekar and all participants for their valuable insights. Thanks also to Ms Farah Fahim, trainee at the DG Research, for assistance in proofreading and formatting the final text.

Welcome and opening address

Ms Danièle SMADJA

*Ambassador, Head of the Delegation
of the European Commission to India, Bhutan and Nepal*

It is a pleasure to welcome such a distinguished group of scholars to this Euro-Indian Workshop on 'Cultures of governance and conflict resolution'.

This is quite a unique event as it is the first scientific workshop in the field of social sciences and the humanities taking place in the context of EU-India scientific cooperation. This is part of our commitment to enhance the international dimension of the European research programmes and make sure that the European Research Area is part of a multilateral, global cooperation effort – consistently with some of the global governance issues that will be discussed at this very workshop.

The organisation of the workshop can be described as a genuine 'meeting of minds'. Social science research on governance, democracy, citizenship, conflicts, security and human rights is being supported for more than a decade now in the context of the EC Framework Research Programme. At the same time, the richness of Indian research on these very issues lead to some Indian institutions to be part of ongoing research in the Framework Programme and –more generally- is reflected in an excellent record of scholarship.

Europe and India can and should learn more from each other in this area of research. How to facilitate such cross-cultural learning is quite a fascinating task in itself that also require proper consideration to methods of interdisciplinary and intercultural communication.

It is thus fully suitable that the workshop is a joint initiative and results from the joint effort of the European Commission, the Indian Institute of Advanced Study and the International Institute Transcultural. The joint agenda-setting for the workshop indicates the genuine coming together of research interests developing in India and in Europe on cultures of governance and conflict resolution.

I would like to thank all those involved in the organisation -in particular Prof Balveer Arora, Prof Peter R. deSouza and Angela Liberatore for an excellent cooperation, and to thank all the participants who enthusiastically accepted to debate and share their knowledge in an interdisciplinary and comparative perspective.

The workshop and the priorities of EU-India cooperation

The themes and outfit of the workshop are very relevant in relation to three current priorities of the **EU-India Joint Action Plan** as adopted in September this year, namely: 1) *Promoting peace and comprehensive security*, 2) *Promoting research and technology*, and 3) *Promoting people to people and cultural exchanges*.

1) The topics under discussion today in Delhi and in the coming days in Shimla are clearly very relevant for the first priority of EU-India cooperation, namely **Promoting peace and comprehensive security**.

An analytical discussion of '**cultures of governance**' in comparative perspective can inform not only research but also policy making and public debate on issues such as the *roles of the EU and India in global governance* in areas ranging from security to development and protection of human rights. It can highlight the challenges for *effective multilateralism* in a changing system of international relations where regional organisations, emerging powers and transnational non-governmental actors are all involved and where classic hegemonic models are contested. And it can also clarify the *challenges for democracy* in contexts shaped by diversity of cultures, institutions, languages, socio-economic conditions such as India and the EU. We both need to continuously deal with the challenge of finding unity while acknowledging diversity, and to consider the implications of this for democratic representation, citizens' participation and the proper functioning of checks and balances.

Conflict resolution is a permanent preoccupation of Europe and India, both having experienced the atrocities of violent conflicts, war and terrorist attacks. The very origin of the EU lay in the explicit and vigorous attempt to overcome a long history of wars that culminated with the brutality of Nazism and World War II. As Robert Schuman –a founding father of the European Economic Community- stated in the famous Declaration of 9 May 1950, "*World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. (...) A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.*" While peace among EU members was achieved, war has been ravaging many areas of the world and parts of Europe -as the tragic experience of the Western Balkans shows. India and the EU have important responsibilities in fostering conflict resolution and durable peace in their neighbourhood and worldwide.

Human rights are a key element both in the debate on governance and in tackling conflicts. The implementation of international human rights and humanitarian law is a crucial element of global governance. The relation of human rights and conflicts is also important as human rights violations are often both a cause and a consequence of violent conflicts. In addition, violation of human rights is not only perpetrated by authoritarian regimes but also by democracies, thus we need to be vigilant and foster all means to protect human rights domestically as well as externally.

2) In addition to the relevance of the topic addressed at the workshop for the policy priorities I just mentioned, this joint endeavour is important for another priority of EU-India cooperation, namely the **Promotion of Research and Technology**.

Not surprisingly, technological research receives the main attention in the context of EU-Indian cooperation as it is also the most significant component of science and technology budgets in our contexts and worldwide, and due to the importance of technologies in addressing energy, environment, health, communication and other issues.

At the same time, research cannot 'forget' to address also one of the most difficult and important fields of inquiry: our very societies. In the Framework Research Programme, research in the field of social sciences and the humanities started in the IV Framework Programme –after the launching of many technological areas- and it constitutes only 1.5 % of the whole Framework budget. Nevertheless, it remains the largest social sciences and humanities programme internationally, worth 623 Million EUR.

In an increasingly interdependent and –at the same time- very diverse world, it is important that research examines and compares the diversity and similarity between cultures, economies, societies, institutions, histories, legal systems in Europe and in other countries and continents, and their mutual relations and perceptions. This workshop can provide a significant contribution to such comparison and exchange in a Indo-European perspective and possibly be the seed for further cooperation.

3) Last but not least, the exchange of views and cooperation between researchers is a key component of another priority of EU-India cooperation, which is the **Promotion of People to People and Cultural Exchanges**.

Research cooperation has been in many cases one of the first and, sometimes, only venue of cooperation between people divided by wars and walls. This was, for example, the case of East/West research cooperation at the times of the Cold War or cooperation between researchers in war-torn societies in the Middle East. It is also one of the venues for intercultural dialogue in its deepest meaning –which is, in terms of developing knowledge of each other and overcoming cultural stereotypes. This workshop can contribute to such mutual and 'transcultural' learning and knowledge development between the rich research traditions developed in India and Europe on the topics chosen for this joint workshop.

Conclusions

Research cooperation, enhanced reciprocal knowledge and circulation of ideas can benefit not only the Indian and European researchers involved but also public policy and debate in our societies, and beyond. Thus, I hope this initiative can provide the seed of further Euro-Indian cooperation on governance and conflict resolution research and in other fields of social sciences and the humanities.

Inaugural address

Dr Bhalchandra MUNGEKAR

*Member, Indian Planning Commission &
Chairman, Indian Institute of Advanced Study*

Cultural diversity has become a political challenge throughout the world and this stems from a complex set of factors. One of the major factors of cultural diversification in various societies is globalisation resulting in the intensified flow of capital; post-Fordist modes of production and the global spread of Western consumer culture that has prompted a variety of social movements to emphasize their own ethnic, linguistic or religious distinctiveness.

Another prominent aspect of such cultural diversification is the emergence of transnational migrant networks, facilitated by growing inequalities in the capitalist world-system as well as by new technologies of transport and electronic communication. All these new social movements whether based on ethnicity, language or religion, have commonly demanded full and equal inclusion in society, while claiming the recognition of their particularistic identities in the public sphere. They criticize the assumption of congruence between political unity and cultural homogeneity that was, once, a strong characteristic of the classical model of the nation-state.

The core feature of the modern nation-state is a structural coupling of political organization and collective identity, which has deeply shaped our political vocabulary including such notions as constitutionalism, democracy and human rights. Thus, since the French Revolution popular sovereignty was conceived in terms of state independence and national self-determination, with the consequence that human rights were identified with citizen rights and attached to national identity. The best illustration of this structural coupling of statehood and national identity is the institution of citizenship. Citizenship can be considered as being composed of two major elements: firstly, the rules of formal membership and individual rights through which individuals are incorporated organizationally into the state, and secondly, the forms of national identification through which individuals are incorporated symbolically. However, the close correspondence of political and cultural collectivity, assumed in the classical model of the nation-state, was rarely a historical reality, as most states had culturally heterogeneous populations. Yet, under the impact of that model, state-formation and nation-building were often accompanied by policies of cultural homogenization. Claims for recognition put forward by ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities were thus routinely seen as a threat to state stability and to national cohesion.

Today, conflicts about cultural diversity seem to contest the homogenizing assumptions of the classical nation-state model. Policies of assimilation or of differential exclusion are increasingly considered as illegitimate, both at domestic and international levels, while pluralistic policy responses, as exemplified by anti-discrimination legislation, affirmative action programmes or special minority protection, have gained momentum. Policies of “multiculturalism”, as adopted by the governments of Australia, Canada, Sweden and some other countries in response to the poly-ethnic situation induced by international migration, are particularly noteworthy in this respect, as they aim simultaneously to

achieve individual inclusion and respect for cultural differences. What we seem to witness is thus a certain decoupling of statehood and national identity.

In political theory, the question of political governance in culturally diverse societies has, over the past decade, been extensively discussed in controversies surrounding the “politics of cultural recognition”. Two major dilemmas are addressed in these debates. First, how can the recognition of cultural differences be reconciled with the social reproduction of trust and solidarity that is necessary for the maintenance of a democratic polity? Here, the question is which constitutional arrangements guarantee the functioning of a common sphere, while leaving room for the maintenance of diverse cultural practices and identities. The second dilemma is how to reconcile the recognition of minorities as groups with the concept of human rights, which focuses on the rights of the individual person. Put differently, how can constitutional arrangements mediate between different groups’ collective rights of self-rule and the individual’s rights to inclusion in the larger polity?

One of the major factors explaining the rise of politics of cultural recognition as well as more pluralistic policy responses to cultural diversity is the multifaceted process of globalisation. As a particularly important dimension of this process is the institutionalization of human rights in cultural and social frameworks at a transnational or global level. Two transformations which directly affect the institution of national citizenship may be distinguished in this respect. Firstly, the transnational diffusion of ideas of human rights and their institutionalization in international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, has established a status of “universal personhood” to which rights are, at least in principle, attached independently from formal state membership or nationality. And secondly, within the transnational human rights discourse there has been a proliferation of new rights which clearly go beyond the classical modern political tradition. Thus, rights of equality and non-discrimination have been specified in articles on individual rights to cultural identity and minority rights, which oblige state governments to adopt a proactive approach to the promotion of the identity of ethnic or national, linguistic and religious minorities on their territory.

Within the United Nations (UN), where strong references to questions of minority protection had initially been avoided, the principles of non-discrimination and equality have been supplemented by the idea that states should not only protect, but also promote the identities of minorities. This trend is documented in the changing interpretation of Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by the United Nations in 1966. The article states: In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. (Article 27, ICCPR) Whereas this article used to be interpreted in a rather restricted way, its content and coverage have recently been expanded so as to oblige the state to create favourable conditions for the maintenance of group identities and to include “new minorities”. Thus, the Human Rights Committee, in its general comment on Article 27 ICCPR, has stated:

“Although the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, they depend in turn on the ability of the *minority group* to maintain its culture, language or religion. Accordingly, *positive measures* by States may also be necessary to *protect the identity* of

a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to practice their religion, in community with the other members of the group.”

In its current understanding, Article 27 ICCPR thus constitutes the basis for broad conceptions of a “pluralism in togetherness” according to which minority identities are to be promoted by the state, while ensuring social integration in a common public sphere. The same trend is manifested, by the *Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities* adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 47/135 in 1992 which calls upon states to “protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and [...] encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity”

The *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 31st session in 2001 points in the same direction. At the level of regional human rights regimes, similar developments can be observed, especially after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, under the auspices of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* (1992) and the *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* (1994) are the most notable documents in that respect. All these developments in transnational human rights law contribute to a de-legitimization of the classical model of the nation-state with its assumptions of cultural homogeneity of its citizens. They strengthen the position of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities and thus necessitate new public policies of governing diversity.

The governance of cultural diversity is a key issue in contemporary politics, both domestically and internationally. Accommodating increased cultural diversity by balancing the recognition of differences with the promotion of equal participation in the common public sphere is a task that will, for the foreseeable future, be with us to stay.

Conflict is inevitable within a pluralistic society. What cross-cultural conflict resolution needs, is a way to build bridges across differences and to promote diversity rather than to curb it. The rule of law must not be undermined in the resolution of cross-cultural conflicts. The rule of law provides a set of norms, which have been accepted by members of a society, directly or indirectly, as representative of the values, which they seek to promote within that society. Rules guiding action and inaction within society are, arguably, formulated on the basis of societal values. Laws are made upon consideration of, and on the basis of societal values, and the values which are sought to be promoted within a society. All societies possess rules or norms that dictate the standards of behaviour within those societies. Thus, rules are necessary for peaceful co-existence, and the extent to which those rules promote peaceful values is critical to peace. The rule of law can serve the function of establishing or realising values that promote peace within pluralistic communities. What is advocated is not merely the resolution of conflicts on the basis of rights and duties through the court system: it is important that there are laws in place, and that the rule of law is promoted to achieve cohesion. That is to say, the rule of law, when properly administered through good governance can promote shared values.

Session One

Cultures of Governance and Perspectives on Diversity

Synthesis of the discussion

Some of the issues pointed out in the opening remarks by Ms Smadja and Mr Mungekar were echoed in the first thematic session of the workshop. This explored different aspects of the challenge of fostering unity and diversity from the point of view of the governance cultures that developed over time and their historical and institutional frameworks.

Following the presentations by Balveer Arora, Emir Kirchner, Mushirul Hasan and Jésus Garcia Ruiz, the discussion developed around questions and remarks regarding: (a) the cultural roots of governance and the significance of diversity, b) the importance of identity politics and institutional arrangements to represent diversity, (c) the relations between cultures of governance and conflict resolution.

Cultural roots of governance and the significance of diversity

The need to contextualise a concept such as governance and to trace its cultural roots was addressed in the opening contribution of Balveer Arora who stressed the notion of pluricultural (as distinct from multicultural) civilisation as an element that contributes to the resilience of Indian democracy since its independence from colonial rule.

Some cultures are more open than others to diversity, and pluralism may be addressed very differently in places such as India, China and Europe. Liberal institutions such as the rule of law and the politics of accommodation –e.g. concerning languages and minorities- are key; but the working of institutions need to be seen in the broader cultural context. Governance may be analysed as an evolutionary process as illustrated, for example, by Mushirul Hasan in the case of the *Qasbati* culture: groups there learned over time how to live together, which resulted in specific ideas and practices of conflict resolution and meaning of pluralism and religious tolerance; the role of intellectuals in fostering the latter –or the opposite- was also highlighted.

Even though most agreed that religion *per se* is not the cause of conflict, the growing importance of religion in politics challenges the nation state both from above (globalisation) and below (identity politics). Jésus Garcia Ruiz stressed that we are witnessing a transformation of loyalty, which moves beyond state boundaries and turns transnational by the transfer of religious ideas and groups who become global actors. The discussion stressed the need to analyse these patterns of non-governmental actions as networks of governance of increasing significance in the current context of globalisation.

Identity politics and institutional arrangements to represent diversity

Ethnicity and religion are key identity markers as are locality, regions and languages – also as a reaction to globalisation- leading in some cases to local/regional, ethnic and/or religious chauvinism. This is a widespread phenomenon present in India and Europe and

many other contexts. With regard to the Indian context, it was discussed how the caste based system has become politicised, and religious and ethnic cleavages have resulted among other things in a hegemony-seeking hindu-nationalism (*hindutva*) in the political arena. At the same time, it was underlined in the discussion that, even with multiple and at times conflicting identities, pluralistic societies have to manage these tensions via constitutional arrangements, democratic practices and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Critical concepts discussed in this context were representation and cultures of decision making with comparison between India and Europe. In the European context, Emil Kirschner discussed the way different patterns of decision-making evolved in the European Union, with an in-built bias to over-represent the small countries in seats and votes (where Qualified Majority Vote is applied), and noted that while some large countries contribute disproportionately to the EU budget, small countries contribute greater proportions with respect to certain collective security policies. Concerning representation, the discussion highlighted the need to distinguish between institutional arrangements and perceptions, e.g. over-representation in voting can be accompanied by psychological under-representation.

Relations between cultures of governance and conflict resolution

The way conflicts are perceived also determines the way they are addressed and resolved. As Balveer Arora noted, certain cultures of governance are more open to dialogue and exhibit greater patience in their handling of conflicts than others. The Gandhian tradition was discussed, including its focus on coexistence as the ability to understand each others fears and anxieties. The role of the state in facilitating dialogue between various identity groups was also addressed; it was pointed out that such mediation is very difficult as identities are constantly being negotiated and reconstructed within states, and this in turn leads either to the further erosion of the concept of nation-state (that is largely obsolete due to globalisation) or its revival (at times in ethnic terms). Some reflections were also suggested with regard to the role of state secularism in India and in most European countries and its ability or limits in handling tensions over different normative positions –including norms conveyed by religious minorities and by other minorities in society.

Session Two

Global Governance and the Universal Values Quest

Synthesis of the discussion

The second session was introduced with presentations by Nicole Lapierre, Rukmini Bhaya Nair, Peter R. deSouza and Mario Telò and the discussion focused on three main themes: the notion of universalism of values and rights; the role of identity politics – including the role of language in it; and the implications of values and identities for sovereignty and multilateralism –including the possibility of a ‘third way’ between mere instrumental bilateral/multilateral cooperation among states and cosmopolitan dialogue about universal values.

Values and Rights

Following Nicole Lapierre’s presentation a debate arose on the possibility to talk about “universal values”. The participants seemed to agree on the impossibility to assume a universality of values, for several reasons: (i) values in absolute terms do not tell much as they need to be interpreted in the context of different political-social systems; (ii) even in domestic contexts, particularly if very differentiated and plural, values are the result of a social construction of a shared universality. As the discussion proceeded, the idea that a shared universality can only be constructed through inclusive argumentation was applied to both the domestic/national and the international context.

As far as rights are concerned, the notion of given and agreed “universal human rights” was considered problematic. Lapierre suggested that it would be preferable to think of them in terms of *processes* of universalisation (*universalising rights*), processes which, according to several participants, can only happen through inclusion and argumentative debate.

In terms of institutional protection of human and minority rights, both in France and in India (the two main cases investigated in this section), there has been a resort to affirmative action as a way to grant voice to minorities. This has partially infringed a taboo in the case of France, where the republican egalitarian identity has excluded any direct reference to the “racial question” from the public debate for a long time. In the case of India, communities are becoming the core of political programmes, but this is also associated with an instrumental use of ethnic and “othering” language by political leaders, which rises fragmentation and tension. Some participants underlined how in fragmented and hierarchical societies mere inclusionary policies are a useful but not sufficient step to accommodate minorities' claims and needs.

Identity, politics and institutions

Another topic which has been central to the debate has been the role of institutions and language in the creation and maintenance of a political community. Following Peter R. deSouza’s presentation, the debate explored the role of institutions and elites in

supporting the cohesiveness of political communities. Institutional design might not be sufficient to support political communities as institutions are slow to adapt to change and might also produce unintended consequences. Emphasis was put on the positive role currently played by bottom-up movements and NGOs. Participants also underlined the role that intellectual elites do or could play in public debate and in the pursuit of the public interest. In other words, an institutional democratic setting is fundamental in order to guarantee peaceful coexistence in plural societies; at the same time, it might not be sufficient as it needs to be supported by both grassroots and elites.

Following the presentation of Rukmini Bhaya Nair, participants discussed the relationship between language, identity and institutions. Nair's affirmation which created more debate regarded the role of bureaucracy in shaping language identity; the main issue at stake here is not simply that bureaucracies impose canons of "political correctness" but that they use language as a form of political control (this was particularly clear in the case of English in India). However, several Indian participants, included Nair, underlined how English has now been "Indianised" and how young educated Indians choose to mix up languages without attaching to their use of English a colonial connotation. Language mix is not new but points to important social processes of adoption and transformation of languages, as well as of social transformation of identities.

Sovereignty, multilateralism and multipolarism

Mario Telò's presentation pointed to the need to move beyond the utilitarian vs. cosmopolitan approach to the relations between countries in the international system; he argued that we need to go beyond the mere realist logic of alliance and cooperation between powers and spheres of influences within a new multipolar order and take stock of the most innovative features of both Indian and European cultures of governance.

The discussion that followed highlighted that sharing certain values –including the need, or otherwise, to foster global governance and multilateralism to address shared problems- should be seen as a process rather than a precondition. Furthermore, the discussion focused on the relationship between sovereignty, multilateralism, multipolarism and regionalism. The 'unipolar moment' following the end of the Cold War is over –India being one of the raising 'poles' in the developing world, with China and others, and the EU evolving as a distinct supranational actor. At the same time we need to reconceptualise multilateralism and face global challenges through a coordinated mix of national, regional and global solutions. The role of the US and Europe in such a new multilateral project, the relations between India and the above, and the need to democratize international regimes and make them more inclusive were discussed. It was also noted that a multilateralism which implies some cession of sovereignty is more difficult to accept by countries that have only recently experienced sovereignty –after freeing themselves from colonization or occupation. In other words, it was observed, the readiness to accept limits to a country's sovereignty depends on historical factors as well as on the perception of being marginalized or truly included in multilateral decisions.

Session Three

Europe and India: Cultures of Governance and Mutual Perceptions

Synthesis of the discussion

Session three was opened by the welcome of Prof Peter R. De Souza to Shimla at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study. This was followed by presentations by Sonia Lucarelli, Roland Marti and Meenakshi Thapan and by discussion around three main aspects of understanding mutual perceptions: methodologies to assess such perceptions, the role of languages, and the processes of identity formation and transmission.

Methodological aspects of mutual perceptions and external images

Following the presentation of Sonia Lucarelli on the external images of the European Union –where she noted significant discrepancies between the EU projects itself and the way it is actually seen in other parts of the world (e.g. how the projection of civil power and human rights advocate seems less widely perceived –or more contested- than its economic role) the discussion focused on how to know about such perceptions and how they are formed and change. Indeed, how to identify the image that others have of a country or organisation may seem banal but is not, especially in very diverse and complex societies. It was argued that a methodology for such research should include a combination of formalized methods (opinion polls, content analysis of the press and other sources, etc.), as well as an in-depth country analysis to read data in the light of a country's culture, socio-economic conditions, politics and history. The symmetries and asymmetries in mutual perceptions, the time-span of the analysis, the use of notions (e.g. governance and democracy) in different languages and transcultural approaches were discussed.

Language and power

Complementing Rukmini Bhaya Nair's previous presentation on language politics in the Indian context, Roland Marti discussed language as a main tool used in relationships involving authority and power with regard to the European and EU experience. He noted the difference between the official and the working languages –the first stipulating an equality between all languages, the second being based on a choice of some of them, eventually using a 'three languages' formula in both the EU and the Indian context. The discussion focused then on whether the idea of the three-language-formula was a good model. While recognising that three languages is a way of recognising some diversity rather than having just one 'lingua franca', it was argued that such formula could be mainly applied in the context of the elites and of certain small nations and it would probably contribute to the growing domination of English in the EU and of both English and Hindi in India. Whether the central role of English in both India and the EU facilitates mutual knowledge or otherwise was touched upon. In a pragmatic sense, this is a diffused vehicle of communication; at the same time, it provides a selective perception of the other. For instance, it was noted that Anglo-American culture tends to

be more known in India (and more globally) than the broad spectrum of European cultures expressed in other languages, and that Europeans are often not aware of Indian research and arts expressed in other languages (including European ones such as French or Portuguese) than English.

Formation and transmission of identity

The issue of identity formation and transmission was addressed by Meenakshi Thapan with focus on schooling, and comparing India and France. She discussed how certain key symbols –whether events, places or people- are addressed in school curricula and how these are experienced by children and contribute in the formation of their identities. She found that French children would not find especially interesting a visit to the Verdun battle ground of the First World War or show enthusiasm for French national history; the question for further analysis is whether this is a specific case or a widespread feature among children who are generations apart from certain events. In India, the investigation of a particular school revealed that children were not sure about the identity or characteristics of Mr Gandhi: Gandhi was not perceived as a hero as he was seen as passive and the pupils were more interested in Bhagat Singh perceived as a brave and strong personality.

During the discussion it was suggested that the project to diversify the Indian nation was a project initiated soon after independence in 1947 but the efforts to nurture diversity were seriously challenged, as was reflected in the Gujarat riots and the communalism that ensued. Comments were made about the role and identities of the young immigrants to Europe and the testing of loyalties through the so-called Tebbit Test: this relates to the famous remarks made by a former British politician Sir Norman Tebbit over the questionable loyalties towards Britain of the immigrants from South Asia. In addition to identity formation and transmission, it was also noted that this is still mainly locally and nationally based; however mobility, migration, regionalisation and globalisation are making identity formation more complex. In such regard, it was noted that a ‘European identity’ is very much a ‘work in progress’ and surely a case where ‘unity and diversity’ leads to multiple identities rather than one homogeneous identity.

Session Four

Conflict Resolution and Human Rights

Synthesis of the discussion

Conflicts and their resolution proved to be a cross-cutting theme in the whole workshop, and so was the issue of human rights: different types of conflict emerge in all societies, violence within and across countries is quite widespread, and human rights are not only differently interpreted (in spite of a universalising language) but clearly continue to be grossly violated in many contexts –including democracies. Governance is, after all, also about tackling and regulating conflicts with diverse means and degree of success -also based on the different cultures of governance itself. This session addressed in more depth some specific aspects of conflict, peace and human rights.

Roots of violence and conflict entrepreneurs

As pointed out by Aditya Mukherjee in his presentation, one of the roots of violence is the assumption that the truth is only on one side. This one-sidedness is often nurtured by historical narratives, educational curricula, and political discourses that see only one side as the hero or the villain, the victim or the perpetrator. Aditya Mukherjee further discussed the relations between conflicts, politics and the economy –a topic also addressed by Joan Esteban. He elaborated on the intense debate and bargain that took place in the Indian national movement between contending forces of the Left and Right, ultimately leading to a workable consensus - Nehruvian consensus- at independence on adopting a democratic path to rapid economic development. The question was raised of what remains of such consensus in handling economic as well as political and communitarian cleavages in India.

Joan Esteban discussed the role of class and ethnic cleavages in fostering violent conflicts; he argued that the latter tend to prevail and that ethnic conflict can be based on a division of roles by which the rich within a group can supply the resources for conflict, while the poor supply conflict labour. The debate highlighted the role of conflict entrepreneurs in fuelling violence as noted with regard to the ‘peace spoilers’ in many peace building processes, and also with regard to some instrumental use of minority claims to make them the source of not-recognising other claims instead of a source of acknowledging diversity.

Peace building and the quest for justice

Understanding the roots of conflicts and violence is a necessary while not sufficient component of peace building. What is peace, for whom and whether there can –or cannot- be peace without justice were among the issues debated following the presentation of Karin Aggestam. She stressed the importance of mutual recognition –a long and difficult process- as a step to build just peace from the perspective of all those involved. She also noted the complex relations between the liberal paradigm of peace building and the risk of contributing to violent polarisation (rather than overcome it) if, for

example, democratic symbols and procedures are imposed and used in a rhetorical manner (the case of too early elections with ethnically based parties was taken as an example).

The discussion highlighted the importance of developing empathy between parties in conflict –and the role of education, media, grassroots organisations, intellectuals and others in this. At the same time, structural conditions and institutions were also considered key; in this respect, reference was made to the role of third party mediation and of regional organisations (including the EU but also regional organisations in Asia, Africa, Middle East) in providing a context (in the neighbourhood and internationally) and a perspective (including political and economic) for moving out from conflict.

Human rights and democracy

Zoya Hasan's presentation highlighted the challenges for human right protection –and for the very working of democracies- related to huge economic inequalities, to territorial disputes and to the accommodation of religious minorities. All these factors -discussed by Zoya Hasan with focus on the Indian context but also important in Europe and elsewhere- can bring conflict and violence and the violation of fundamental rights (ranging from right to life and access to health or education, to protection from torture, freedom of expression and others).

The discussion highlighted significant links with the issue of identity formation and mobilisation discussed also in other sessions; in particular it was noted that identity mobilisation on strong communitarian basis can collide with the very notion of accommodation and coexistence if such mobilisation is of exclusionary and divisive character. It was noted that minorities' representation is sometimes the prerogative of some of the most conservative figures who tend to overdo the communitarian aspects and the polarisation between minorities and majorities; this raises important dilemmas for democratic institutions.

Additional dilemmas were discussed concerning the issue of how to deal with extremist violence and with terrorism: rule of law should never be sacrificed for the interest of individual politicians who may see gains in raising their profile by promising shortcuts to checks and balances. In addition, the issue of trust in law enforcement authorities –and the need to tackle corruption or unlawful practices within such authorities to allow for both citizens' trust in them and for effective action - was pointed out. Last but not least, the role of institutions such as minority rights commissions in monitoring and providing advice for action was also stressed: while often having a limited mandate and resources, the role of such commissions can be very important.

Session Five

Cultural Traditions and the Road Ahead

Synthesis of the discussion

Session five had three presentations which focussed on both the themes, cultures of governance and conflict resolution. Madavane used drama to make a connection between different cultures of governance. Basudeb Chaudhuri compared cultures of governance in Europe and India on the economic question and Javaid Rehman presented multilateral institutions as a conflict resolution mechanism in South Asia.

Silence and power

Madavane's presentation focused on the Mahabharata and the conflict situations between brothers –with focus on the game of dice between the Pandavas and the Kauravas, in which the former lost everything including their personal freedom. This game was being watched by innumerable people who could have intervened before things went out of hand, yet all the key figures kept silent at the most vital moments. Draupadi's question as to how Yudhishtra who had lost his personal liberty and become a slave himself, stake her in the game perplexes everybody including the many elders who are sitting in the audience. Her question "Whom did you lose first, yourself or me?" remained unanswered. Timely intervention according to Madavane could have saved the day, and he used the analogy of keeping silent at crucial moments to show how modern governments do not act at key moments. The politics of silence was seen as contrary to the tenants of good governance: governments need to take hard decisions at the right time. In the discussion the connection between myth and the real world was brought out; myths or shared accounts can provide a conceptual framework and steer behaviour, and social science should draw from them; for instance, silence could be seen as a deep normative position. The interpretation of mythical and religious texts was discussed (for example, Madavane's reference to the silence of Krishna puzzled Rukmini Bhaya Nair who saw Krishna as the main speaker in the Gita). The notion of conflict being triangular between two parties in conflict and a silent third party that contributes through silence –or action- was debated.

Cultures of economic governance and the notion of populism

Basudeb Chaudhuri's presentation was on the cultures of economic governance and the influence of representative democracy on economic policy convergence in Europe and in India. He referred to the two hypotheses that have been used to explain economic policies -the ideological/partisan model and the electorate model- and showed the convergence by comparing the labour party in Britain and the CPM in West Bengal, where both appear to have embraced the dominant consensus of the times. In his view, the major political schism in India took place when the 'green revolution' was launched to bring about increased food production, while today there seem to be only rhetoric of being 'pro-poor' in the form of populist discourses but no substantive policies.

While the risks of populism in many parts of the world were acknowledged in the discussion, the view was also proposed that democracy has its compulsions and it would be too simplistic to say that 'pro-poor' claims are always populist claims. Furthermore, the question was raised of whether in a country like India -where there is so much inequality- is it possible for life to go on as normal without politics intervening in the economy. The international financial crisis was pointed to as one of the events that make such question relevant also for Europe, the US and several other contexts.

Conflict resolution in a regional perspective

Javaid Rehman's focus was on conflict resolution and human rights protection in the Asian sub-continent and he argued that the only realistic way forward was a multilateral approach to conflict resolution. He drew a parallel with how Europe managed to solve its problems through regional organisations and suggested that South Asia could follow a similar path that would help resolve the disputes (e.g. by considering the relations between India and Pakistan in the broader regional context).

In the discussion, the African Union was mentioned as another example of multilateral approach to conflict resolution and the important role of civil society based movements was also stressed. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the demographic question should be considered: India's size matters and whatever India does tends to carry the tag of 'big brother' in the region when it acts out of goodwill. While multilateral institutions can keep big countries 'under check' as they would be forced to comply with the guidelines or legal agreements that are issued, the question of how to deal with strong asymmetries in size and power need to be considered. The different shapes and implications of the cooperation between democracies or between democracies and non-democratic countries also needs to be examined.

Concluding remarks and perspectives

In the final brainstorming session the benefits of interdisciplinary and transcultural research and debate were stressed.

Both comparative analysis and in-depth analysis of each society were pointed out as fostering a much needed mutual learning between the EU and India.

Such mutual learning needs, in turn, to consider both historical roots and future perspectives in a rapidly changing global context. A context where the challenges and opportunities of multipolarity and interdependence are facing India and the EU with important responsibilities in tackling security, economic and social issues and in contributing to global governance on the basis of their rich and diverse cultures of governance and conflict resolution

Compendium of Abstracts
(Arranged in alphabetical order of authors)

Conflict resolution, peace building and just peace

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Since the end of the Cold War, numerous peace-building missions have held ambitious agendas to reconstruct state-society relations. Yet, several of these missions have encountered obstacles and thus have a poor record of implementation. This presentation critically discusses peace building in relation to just peace. The argument is, that to claim just peace there has to exist stability and order. To perceive just peace, it has to be legitimate. To identify just peace it has to be durable. However, the strive to establish order, legitimacy and durable peace may generate counterproductive results. The second part therefore puts forward the argument that just peace needs to be built on an intersubjective understanding and thus elaborates how such an understanding may be constructed.

Order

One major problem facing various peace-building efforts is restoring order, security and the monopoly of violence after having reached a peace agreement. This is a focus on negative peace more than positive peace, which is considered a more pressing strategic objective as it primarily attempts to avoid a relapse into conflict. Order is a minimum condition of co-existence without necessarily focusing on shared values. In a number of policy documents (eg. responsibility to protect) and academic texts, which raises the concerns for humanitarian interventions, have reinvigorated the so-called just war tradition. This theory on just war argues that the use of force may be justified if a number of criteria are fulfilled (*jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*). Moreover, there are several attempts to develop the tradition to include *jus post bellum* – to claim a just war, peace and a morally acceptable order has to be secured. Also Mary Kaldor argues that force in exceptional circumstances may be necessary, even though she distances herself against the just war tradition. Roland Paris in his path-breaking book on peace building “At Wars End” stresses that the first task and prerequisite of peace builders is to restore security and create order and space for a political process to take place.

Legitimacy

The liberal peace paradigm has influenced most peace-building missions in recent years as a remedy for violent conflicts. The liberal peace assumes that good governance, human rights, market economy, rule of law, etc. promote justice and social stability. Yet, there has been a tendency to ignore the precarious transition processes between war and peace. Rapid liberalisation and marketization may spur further conflicts. As Mark Duffield illuminates, liberal peace building may generate the creation of illiberal zones of peace. Moreover, democratization often triggers violence and may be destabilising. For instance, early elections are often pursued as an attempt to legitimize a peace process and to demilitarise or transform rebel groups into political parties, which frequently are supervised by international actors. However, as Roland Paris underlines the great risks to hold premature elections is that they may produce counterproductive results, resulting in ethnically based party systems, polarisation of the electorate and large-scale violence. Furthermore, there may be politicians adopting a democratic language and symbols only rhetorically as a new platform, which may undermine the transition to democracy in the long run. The consequences of democratic rhetoric and continued repressive rule may

result in widespread resentment of the idea of democracy. Likewise, international legitimacy is also being sought to support and justify a peace process. Most contemporary conflicts are asymmetrical, involving non-state actors. The question of recognition and legitimacy for many of these actors is therefore critical. A common strategy is to internationalise the conflict and to build coalitions with external actors as a way to compensate for the disparity in power and structural imbalance. Consequently, the quest of international legitimacy has, as Oliver Richmond rightly points out, turned many peace negotiations into new battle grounds and sites for contestation rather than for compromise and conflict resolution. In short, the idea of just peace may not depend in the end on to what extent agreement is based on justice principles, but rather on the perceptions of the internal and external sources of legitimacy.

Durability

Several of the peace agreements that have been signed in the last decades have collapsed within five years. Thus, there is a growing body of literature, which conceptualises peace as temporary and contested in terms of being fragile, precarious, frustrated and turbulent peace. Durable peace requires a qualitative peace which survives the test of time and encompasses dimensions of legitimacy, justice principles, accountability, and reconciliation. Particularly the question of reconciliation is critical in the construction of just and durable peace, which leads us over to negotiation, conflict resolution and just peace.

Negotiating just peace

There is relatively little research on justice and negotiations in general and how justice principles, such as equality and proportionality promote the durability of peace agreements in particular. The argument here is that just peace is based on an intersubjective understanding and perceived as such. Moreover, if peace negotiations are conducted in a fair manner it has implications on how just a peace process is perceived. Most important, durable peace needs to be grounded in local visions based on the interrelationship between peace and justice.

One critical dimension in peace building is the question of transitional justice. How is the past managed and memory of violent conflict dealt with? This determines to a large extent the perception of justice. From a negotiation perspective, William Zartman identifies two distinct approaches: forward and backward looking negotiations. The difference relates to how much of the conflict the negotiations should deal with and how many layers they seek to resolve. Backward looking negotiations aim to end violence and seek accountability for past atrocities. Forward-looking negotiations focus more on preventing future violence and to build new relationship. Zartman's conclusion from various empirical case analyses is that changes towards just and durable peace often appears in sequences and includes both forward and backward-looking mechanisms. One important sequence is mutual recognition by the former disputants. Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller in their elaboration on just peace emphasise a process-oriented perspectives and the evolution of two types of recognition: thin recognition (the parties recognise each other as partners to solve the conflict), and thick recognition (recognises each other's identity, culture, history).

Constructing just peace

Adopting a process-oriented approach and moving beyond the traditional divide in negotiation theory between distributive and integrative negotiation strategies, just peace

cannot be as Andrew Hurrell states deduced from rational principles but is rather a negotiated product of dialogue and deliberation and thus always subject to revision and re-evaluation. Borrowing Benjamin Broome's notion of a "third culture of negotiation", it may generate the construction of an intersubjective understanding of just peace. Such a negotiation perspective emphasises a *relational approach* that aims to expand the horizon of understanding between the parties and thus co-construct realities. It is not about reconciling narratives and bridging differences, which is a common approach in conflict resolution. Instead, it is *empathy* and *communication* that stand in focus of the negotiation process, which include an acceptance of diversity of narratives (again differing from traditional conflict resolution that emphasises similarity). Empathy does not mean sympathy, but is a way to situate oneself in a relationship without having to abandon or disregard one's own perspective.

Cultures of governance in pluricultural civilisations

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In the sphere of conflict resolution, which is the other element under discussion, the following postulate may be considered: the ways in which conflicts are conceived and perceived, and eventually handled, are all rooted in cultures of governance. Certain cultures of governance are more open to dialogue and exhibit greater patience in their handling of conflicts than others, where the boiling point and the brink are reached with great speed.

The underlying assumption however is that this governance of conflicts is rooted in democracy and the rule of law, so that we can have a consistent framework for comparison. Extra-legal and extra-constitutional deviations and aberrations are presumed to be detected and sanctioned by the means available to democratic societies, notably a free press, an active civil society and mechanisms for the enforcement of public accountability. Of course the efficacy of these mechanisms across different democratic systems is subject to variations, and sometimes considerable deficits.

The historical roots and civilizational resources that sustain cultures of governance in India, viewed as a pluricultural civilisation, are therefore the starting point of our reflections on the resilience of governance structures developed by India's federal democracy since Independence from colonial rule.

India is a pluricultural civilization marked by deep internal diversity of peoples, of languages, socio-economic conditions, historical memories and institutional heritage. The term pluricultural embodies the very valuable concept of pluralism. In multiculturalism of the Anglo-American variety, civic pluralism has been replaced by communitarian pluralism, and embodies the values of libertarianism in both social and economic spheres. This is why we prefer, for the present discussion, pluricultural to multicultural.

The contribution of the colonial phase to the development of this culture of governance is a matter of debate. While some unintended consequences of a positive nature undoubtedly exist, such as the English language, the system of railways and cricket, there are sharp discontinuities too. The adoption of democracy with universal suffrage was a leap of faith. India defied conventional wisdom when it declared itself democratic, since it was not considered ripe to do so.

The role of history and memory in the shaping of cultures of governance are crucial in this regard. The process of shaping of mutual perceptions is obviously a key element. The idea of the other has different meanings, and has to be contextualised both geographically and historically. The site of the encounter with the other is important. In India, most of the encounters with the outside world took place on Indian soil, if one parenthesises the travels of pilgrims and the tales of merchants.

To the extent that cultures of governance are critical factors in resolving conflicts, we need to look at those components of cultural traditions which predispose societies

towards greater or lesser tolerance and acceptance of diversities. Has electoral politics sharpened the intolerant strains in cultures otherwise predisposed to tolerance, which ultimately threaten democracy itself? If so, we need to look at ways in which democracy can be protected from such tendencies.

In the second part, we assess the colonial impact on indigenous cultures of governance and what remains of the Gandhian tradition as a distinct idiom and approach to conflict resolution. Indigenous traditions of governance have also to be considered. There is strong evidence of a composite culture and good governance in the erstwhile princely states: Mysore, Travancore, Cochin. Also, there were multiple colonial presences: while the Dutch and the French left little trace on governance practices, Goa continues to have a Portuguese heritage in its statutes, with regard to a uniform civil code and the land ownership regime.

What Morris-Jones called the 'saintly idiom' commanded respect and reverence, but was essentially seen as doomed to extinction. However, with Baba Amte and Medha Patkar, the tradition continues. Gandhi's yardstick of the ability to coexist was essentially based on the ability to understand each others fears and anxieties. Gandhian secularism was also different to what prevailed eventually. Gandhi saw in religion a vital resource, both moral and political. The State was, in his vision, to work with religion, in order to produce dialogue and harmony.

This vision lay in tatters after partition and the secularism that was embodied in the Constitution was differently inspired. It saw religion as essentially a divisive force to be shunned, or at least kept at arm's length, while the State went about the task of creating citizens, and a sense of common citizenship. While the equality of religions and the equal recognition and equidistance of the State from religions is a principle that is easily enunciated, it is difficult to maintain in practice.

In the third section we see how consensual decision making practices of adjustment and accommodation often yield in the presence of a sharpening of identity based confrontations. The twin politics of externalisation and exclusion are very much in evidence when we look at the way in which identities have been incorporated in social and political processes.

Caste-based identities were largely politicised and absorbed by the dynamics of electoral politics. The federalisation of the party system and the emergence of federal coalitions have facilitated this process. The All-India parties, multi-state parties and single state parties have found their place under the sun, and caste based parties have adapted to the requirements of structures of electoral offices.

Religion based identities continue to be a major source of political cleavage, between secular and communal parties. This cleavage has been sharpened in recent times as the struggle for power has become more intense, and the strident rhetoric of communal parties is greatly in evidence.

Finally, region or locality based identities often coincide with linguistic boundaries and language as a marker of identity remains a potent force in regional chauvinism.

The ways in which tensions arising from conflicting identities have been absorbed in the effort to maintain unity in situations of accentuated, even exacerbated diversities, have been looked at for insights into the interplay between political institutions and cultures of governance.

The case of Tamil nationalism illustrates the problems faced by pluricultural civilisations. The origins of the movement are complex, rooted in the anti-Brahmanism ideology and the demands for social justice. What started as linguistic nationalism was absorbed in electoral politics and competition was reduced to two equally Tamil parties with competing claims to effective governance.

In sum, we argue here that multiple identities have been accommodated and contained within the framework of a federal union, but not without significant tensions and costs.

The resources on which the Indian political system has drawn to attempt this seemingly impossible task have been explored in an attempt to understand how pluricultural civilisations cope with internal tensions through essentially democratic processes.

The tensions arising from the resurgence of what has been inappropriately called 'Hindu Nationalism' and which is in reality an attempt to impose Hindutva hegemony on other elements of this pluricultural civilisation, demonstrate clearly the limits of exclusionary cultures of governance.

To conclude, in a transcultural dialogue, it becomes clear that there exist different cultures of governance, and that universal values are capable of being differently interpreted through the prisms of these cultures. We started with the thought that good governance was subject to different interpretations. The challenge therefore lies in identifying ways to have a very open discussion on the issue of "universal values" and their various interpretations. What are these universal values, how are they perceived and interpreted differently, and whether the different meanings of governance which flow from them are or can be connected?

Cultures of economic governance: the influence of representative democracy on economic policy convergence in Europe and in India

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There is one common element in the democratic experience and its role in determining economic policy in the post World War II period in Europe (mainly Western Europe) and in India: competitive democracy and the repeated nature of the electoral process has created what economists call policy convergence. By using examples, we shall first examine the nature and the extent of these policy convergences in several European countries and in India.

Secondly, this policy convergence has been accompanied in many major democracies in Europe – and in India – by what specialists of political economy and rational choice models of political behaviour have called a shift from ideological – or partisan regimes to electoralist regimes. The nature of the political divide, or the diversity of the political spectrum in each country, has shaped the extent of this shift in both contexts. The effects of example have been contagious. In the context of the Western democracies, the contagion effect has been between countries, but also between regions. In the Indian context, different states of India, in competitions with each other, have tried to copy the successful policies of the more dynamic states. India has also been influenced by the economic policy choices of its more successful Asian neighbour's policy. This has often blurred the distinction between left and right parties worldwide.

One of the dangers of economic policy convergence is that political parties, in order to distinguish themselves from each other, might take up more extreme or radical positions on other and potentially more divisive issues, such as immigration, national identity, ethnicity, and related questions. Focalizing on such issues also enable the conversion of elections to single-issue platforms, and also avoiding the treatment of more deep seated and complex problems such as persistent inequalities in income distribution and wealth, by using identity or ethnicity as a focal point of political coalitions.

The same inability or unwillingness to tackle these issues can happen through a different argument. In order to obtain labels of 'good governance', a wide variety of governments have used the arguments of the constraints imposed by globalisation. To conclude, we ask, as an open question: the extent to which, on critical issues such as justice or equity in representative democracies, the globalisation argument is instrumentalized to mask the limits of representative democracy. This is also particularly the case in Western democracies, and we shall analyse the empirical evidence on this question.

Agreeing on the operating norms of the new political community: India and Europe

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In the last 60 years both India and Europe have been attempting to create a new political community. Common to both attempts is the search for operating norms that will be acceptable to those who are its members, whether these be individuals or states, and that will govern their behaviour. While the process in Europe involves a movement from separate nation-states seeking membership of this emergent European political community, a slow coming together of nations-states in an expanding Europe, (and the membership is still growing) the process in India is in the reverse direction where, from a centralized nation state that had been formed at Independence, a more federal more decentralized state is emerging. Here too the number of constituent states is growing. This process of an emerging federal community, in both India and Europe, that is to be based on common operating norms, involves a process of negotiation by the constituent units. These negotiations concern the rules that are to govern the political behaviour of both individuals and states and that will serve as the basis of its institutions that will regulate the political, social, economic, and perhaps even environmental life of the emergent community.

This is a fascinating process because it remains unclear, in both contexts, whether this emergent political community should be a thick or a thin community, whether the operating norms that are being negotiated should govern only a minimalist political community or should also extend to the social, economic, cultural and even ecological domains of the emerging community. The question on which there is an interesting public discussion is: What then should be the extent of this extension of norms? In both the Indian and the European cases the political community is layered, with, in the European case, the thick political community being at the level of the states and the thin at the level of Europe, while in the Indian case there is perhaps an equal distribution between the union and the states. A look at the historical evolution of the political community shows that both deliberate design and fortuitous circumstances (Umberto Eco's 'Serendipity') have played a part. Not every institution has emerged because of general agreement among negotiators. Some have emerged because of responses to events and these have subsequently proved to offer valuable norms for the new polity, such as the Public Interest litigation in India and the Human rights jurisprudence in Europe.

In this note I want to foreground just one issue that needs sustained scholarly study. While there is considerable academic attention, on treaties, and institutions, and authorities, and jurisdictions, there is inadequate attention on the elements of the political culture needed to sustain these institutions, and on the strategies available to create such a political culture where it is not present i.e., an agreement among the members of the community to be bound by the operating norms. Here is where the challenge for both India and Europe lies. Here is where the issue that echoes through most of the papers at the workshop, of the relationship between the universal and the particular, needs to be addressed.

While in the last few decades there has been considerable discussion on the overstated claims of the 'Universals' of the European Enlightenment, since they have not factored in

power, and context, and history, and culture, and hence are merely the parochial of Europe masquerading as universals, the time has come to refashion 'appropriate universals' that meet these objections of suppressed voice and excluded presence, that are inclusive in their scope and that can be identified with by the populations that they are to govern and serve. The emergent political community, whether it is to be thick or thin - thickness or thinness being determined by the robustness of the 'appropriate universals' that have been fashioned – will require some universals. We have ignored the fact that universals are necessary, in our zest to undermine the enlightenment universals, and hence fashioning these universals is where the challenge lies. In what follows I shall list some of the aspects of this challenge.

The first is the factor of 'size'. Large populations are always internally plural. Such plurality may be along lines of religion, or language, or ethnicity, the older lines of difference, or along lines of perspective, preference, or politics, the newer lines of difference. India and Europe are blessed by such plurality. Forging an agreement on the common operating norms of the polity is hence a difficult exercise especially since it involves negotiations, and compromises, with core beliefs and meaning systems. This is a particularly difficult exercise in complex and old societies where the overlapping area between comprehensive doctrines is small and thin, as in the case of India. I am unclear about the size of the overlapping area in Europe. Increasing this overlapping area is hence the first big challenge of the emerging polity. The questions that must be asked are: (i) What norms are to be agreed upon by the culturally different groups? (ii) What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for such agreement? (iii) How does political and electoral competition, which is the only route to accessing state power, affect this agreement? (iv) Are there regular breaches, and how should one respond when they are? And finally are such operating norms to be imposed by an enlightened elite, such as the case of the Indian Constitution, or should they be agreed upon by a referendum of the whole people, the failed attempt to have a European Constitution being a case in point? These are interesting questions and go to the heart of the matter since they concern the relationship between universals and particulars.

The second aspect of the challenge is to respond to the consequences of the political spaces and opportunities that emerge when such a community is, or is being, forged. One consequence that has, again, received little attention is the role played by political elites. In a plural polity such as India, which has been described by D.L.Sheth as a 'democracy of communities', such elites play the politics of identity. In a competitive electoral system this results, at least in the short run, in ethnic outbidding. There are several consequences of such a politics of ethnic outbidding such as: (i) The politics of constructing the other as a 'hostile other' sometimes being presented as the 'enemy within'. Examples of this are the increasing hostility towards migrants in Europe and towards Biharis in Mumbai. (ii) Insulating the political leadership from criticism creating a loyalty among the followers raising thereby the threshold for 'exit' and 'voice'. (iii) This loyalty makes implementing the 'rule of law' difficult particularly when the leadership breaks the law, or breaches the 'operating norms' since a law and order problem soon ensues as supporters are mobilized on the streets. The agreement on norms, therefore, remains a feeble agreement and is unable to constrain the behaviour of political elites who wish to contravene it. Looking at the issue of universals, through the lens of democracy in both Europe and India, is hence laden with interesting issues. It is also a good platform to sustain a dialogue between India and Europe.

Ethnic conflict vs. class conflict*

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A classical theme in social analysis views economic class divisions as the main cause of social conflict. Yet many, if not most of the conflicts we observe today appear to be ethnic in nature. It appears that the “vertical” nature of class divisions is often dominated by the “horizontal” antagonisms across groups delineated by non-economic markers. Indeed, when ethnicity is strongly correlated with income, ethnic conflict may cover a deeper class based conflict. However, our point is that, even when income and ethnicity are uncorrelated, ethnic conflict will be prevalent. This is because of the perverse synergy of economic inequality *within* ethnic groups, and its role in the salience of ethnic conflict.

We view social conflict as the attempted takeover of “budgets” or “policies” that produce various public goods. Such budgets or policies may be used to benefit one class over another; e.g., health (public versus private), education (primary versus higher), etc. They may also have distinct ethnic implications; e.g., the funding and support for religious festivals and processions, the proclamation of “secular or “majoritarian” identities, etc. To seize these budgets groups must form either class-based or ethnic alliances (but not both). Or there may be no conflict.

Of course, if the status quo budget is extremely biased against a particular class or ethnicity, it will pay that group to form an alliance and trigger conflict. However, what our work shows is that even in the absence of any bias in the status quo allocation of the budget, ethnic conflict is definitely prevalent over class conflict. In the case of equal treatment of ethnic groups and income classes class conflict cannot occur. And this continues to hold true even for deviations from equal treatment that are not too extreme.

The argument is as follows. A class division creates groups that display strong within-group economic homogeneity. While this makes the resulting class conflict clear and well-defined, it also makes it extremely difficult for the poor to conduct, because the opportunity cost of resources is so very high. The rich, on the other hand, do have a low opportunity cost of resources. But even if they could marshal a mercenary army of the poor to pursue their ends, they lack the incentive to initiate an overt redistributive conflict.

In contrast, ethnic alliances display high within-group economic inequality. Such inequalities possess their own perverse synergy. Specifically, the rich within a group can supply the resources for conflict, while the poor supply conflict labour. It is a synergy that can be put to powerful use and one that is missing within an alliance based on class alone. The fact that the rich have the money and the poor their labour also permits us to highlight a particular pathway precipitating ethnic conflict. In some cases, the rich may prefer overall peace, yet “propose” an ethnic alliance in order to prevent a class conflict

* Based on “On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict” by Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray, *American Economic Review* 2008 **88**, 000-000.

initiated by the poor. Moreover, we show that this is an alternative that the poor rationally accept.

Let us finish by mentioning some implications of our argument. In the first place, our model provides an explanation for the poor performance of the empirical tests linking aggregate income inequality and conflict. The critical information is the income inequality within each ethnic group. Secondly, our results are consistent with the evidence that a positive economic shock increases the probability of ethnic conflict. This shock most often benefits the elite –at least in a first stage— and hence increase within-group inequality and therefore the possibility of ethnic conflict. Thirdly, in societies with very unequal distribution of the population over ethnicities, equal treatment policies may lead the majority group to trigger ethnic conflict. Lastly, as the conditions become more favourable to class conflict, the higher the incentive for the rich of the majority ethnicity to promote ethnic conflict.

The role of religion in the cultures of governance, and the potential causality of violence in societiesGarcia Ruiz

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By the middle of the twentieth century, the decline of religion seemed inevitable, and to be in the logic of things. But the picture today is no longer that of the 1950s. Ethnic claims have rooted their search for identity, in some cases, in a religious analyzed as residual, and in other cases through massive conversions under the form of a neo-Protestantism from the United States.

Western modernity had relegated the religious to the private sphere, but globalisation has given a new role in the "forging" of the individual, compliant and compatible.

No prognostic is possible on changes to come, burn-out and future renewal of religion. De-territorialisation of religion on the one hand and hyper-territorialisation on the other, has led to an unprecedented situation which is being translated by the juxtaposition of ethnic and religious enclaves of a wide variety requiring in some cases, the invention of new ways of urban management.

Majoritarianism, institutional erosion and the challenge of governance

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Over the past few years, India has witnessed an intensification of social conflicts along several different axes, most notably the Hindu-Muslim conflict, and the phenomenal growth of what has been variously termed as Hindu nationalism or Hindu right. Some of India's largest political parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its affiliates have instigated or defended violence and hate against minorities. Gujarat 2002 was the most extreme example of the phenomenon. More recently, the attacks against Christians are emblematic of a growing tide of intolerance and violence that is sweeping across much of India. Despite expressions of outrage and statements of concern on the part of the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, political parties and civil society about the plight of the Christians, both central and the state governments failed to stem the violence.

A brief delineation of events and key issues during the last few years and months reveals contradictions in policies and practices of secularism. In this regard it is useful to focus attention on political practice which is more important and revealing than the conventional debate on religion and secularism. The principal challenge facing the Indian nation state pertains to: (1) tolerance, (2) responsiveness and fairness of government and its institutions (3) the erosion of institutions. Together these challenges raise concerns with regard to the place of minorities in the body politic. The critical issue is the relationship between secular politics and religion or separation of religion and politics. It is therefore important to examine the relationship between secular politics and majoritarianism.

Communal disturbances are not a new phenomenon; however, it has important implications for governance of the country. A quick survey of actions and the functioning of democracy suggest that the basic constitutional framework of rights and obligations is clearly under stress from forces of intolerance and the purveyors of prejudice. Practices of governance often do not satisfy the requirements of rule of law as events in Orissa, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Assam have shown, clearly, the rule of law is under serious threat and that there is widespread popular disillusionment with the instruments of the state. The primary responsibility for this lies with the delayed justice dispensation system which is responsible for dissatisfaction and distrust among some large segments of society.

Most damaging is the intensified communal mobilisation and the majoritarian definitions of Muslims and Christians as external to the state and nation. The growing acceptance of such prejudiced notions in several different contexts has had an adverse impact on communal peace apparent from the attacks on Christian institutions and the controversy over conversion (specifically to Christianity and Islam) conceptualized as hostile to national solidarity and incidents of violence against Muslims in Assam.

An anti-conversion campaign has been conducted by the VHP and the Sangh Parivar organizations for the past few years, especially in tribal regions of the country where they claim tribals fall victim to the inducements offered by Christian organizations. The

campaign has thus aimed to prevent the conversion of tribal and Dalits to Christianity in Orissa, Chattisgarh, and Karnataka and so on. There are enough laws in the statute books of the central government and the state governments prohibiting conversion by force or inducement. The NCM has repeatedly asked the state governments to tell us how many cases have been filed under these laws. The answer is none to negligible. Yet, there is a massive campaign against conversions which has created an atmosphere of prejudice and suspicion against the Christian community and Christian priests and organizations.

One of the most significant findings derived out of National Commission for Minorities visits to violence affected areas in Orissa, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Assam is that minorities, especially Muslims, have lost trust in the state and its instrumentalities. This includes political parties, executive, bureaucracy, police, judiciary and media. The minorities argue that secular forces lack the courage to tackle communal elements head-on. And this includes communal elements in the minority communities as well. Indeed, conservative figures are accorded importance on the baseless assumption that they are the true representatives of the followers of their faith.

The police force is also under severe criticism. The police, it is widely believed, do not always observe the due process when they go about apprehending suspects in terrorist-related incidents. Suspects from the minority communities are routinely denied bail, unlike suspects from the majority community. Suspects from the minority communities also languish in jail for years as under-trials. Approximately 30 per cent of the under-trials in Maharashtra are reportedly Muslims. Trials drag on and on. The rate of convictions is abysmally low.

The police, the district administration and state governments have been found wanting in their response to the outbreak of communal tensions. One major reason for this repeated failure is the inability of state institutions to anticipate such tensions. Hate speeches and hate literature are seldom examined let alone acted upon. Through their inaction authorities allow the atmosphere to be vitiated. Once any political party is found engineering riots and inciting communal passions for electoral gains, directly or indirectly, through its agents, stern action should be taken against such politicians including de-recognition of such political parties by the Election Commission.

Various Commissions set up to enquire into communal violence take an inordinate amount of time to submit their reports. Governments routinely ignore their recommendations. Various studies and Commission's reports are simply shelved in the libraries and the specific and concrete suggestions to pre-empt violence are never implemented. The authorities are also perceived to be soft on non-minority offenders. It has taken years, for example, to implement a fraction of the recommendations of the Srikrishna Report. The report on the demolition of the Babri Masjid has yet to see the light of day. It has been recently given its 44th extension. The perpetrators of the Gujarat violence have got away. Communal violence is an issue that Indian policymakers have ignored for too long.

The politics of coercion and collective violence has two important dimensions. In the first place, it is justified in the name of public anger and the exercise of democratic rights, thus making it difficult for the law and order machinery to deal with it effectively. Mobs and rioters are considered political actors and therefore entitled to deference. This, in

turn, enhances the efficacy and attraction of violence to articulate demands. In the second place, the politics of coercion and violence unfortunately hold a certain value as spectacle. Hence, there is huge media coverage of such instances. It seems that bad politics is becoming good business not just for the organizations engaged in it but for many others as well.

Undeniably, democratic politics has divided people along cultural identity lines. However, despite all its imperfections, democracy remains the only means to create a society where all citizens are assured equal treatment and an equal voice in determining a vision of the common good. And pluralism remains the best tool for ensuring the security and human rights of all groups living within a society. However, if we believe that minorities and other disadvantaged groups are to be treated as equal citizens, we must recognize the interlocking nature of inequalities—social, economic, cultural. Equality is a complex notion and social policies based on democratic principles must address these complexities. The contemporary relevance of pluralism is hard to exaggerate. Its acceptance is central to the practice of secularism and even-handed treatment of adherents of different religious faiths. If people do not have confidence that the law is being implemented without fear or favour and that no one is above the law, their faith in the efficacy of institutions and the Constitution will be eroded. The greatest challenge of democratic governance in our times is the skilful accommodation and management of multiple identities.

Determinants and patterns of EU governance, with special emphasis on EU security governance

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Historical legacies of the Second World War, the cold war experience, and treaty provisions on interstate interactions are among those factors that have clearly left their imprint on the aims and conduct of EU governance. Yet the evolution of the EU has not followed a single path of governance, but has developed different patterns. Some of these are evident in the different decision-making modes (e.g., QMV, unanimity, OMC) that the EU has adopted in the pursuit of different policies. What is most striking in this context is the way the EU has found ways to deal with the principles of equity and solidarity. For example while there is an inbuilt bias to over represent the small countries in seats and votes (where QMV is practised) terms, and while some Member States contribute disproportionately to the EU budget, small countries (mostly EU-15) contribute greater proportions than larger countries with respect to certain collective security policies. Such countervailing contributions, either in budgetary (shares in the European Development Fund or the European Refugee Fund) or in personnel terms (shares in ESDP civilian missions) promote both the establishment of a culture and effectiveness of EU governance. In turn this helps to cement the solidarity among EU states, which is already a feature in terms of manifest crisis (e.g., steel policy management) or natural disasters (as proposed in the Lisbon Treaty). The following observations are drawn from the findings by Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (*Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union*), which will be published in *International Organization*.

Burden-sharing is a relevant issue in EU security governance that is likely to grow in importance as the EU seeks an autonomous ability to act effectively across the spectrum of global and regional security governance challenges. It is reasonable to expect that a deepening and broadening of EU prerogatives in security governance will only occur if the member states perceive the costs and benefits of collective security provision as fair. We have argued that the risk of uneven burdens or free-riding varies according to policy area. Where there is a high risk of free-riding, EU members face a choice. They can either accept most of the burden to be shouldered by a few members who could then dictate the direction of policy 'on the ground'; for example, the decisive French contribution to EUFOR DR Congo provided Paris with leverage over the mission's implementation. Alternatively, the larger states can institutionalize security cooperation in such a way as to minimize small-member free-riding (e.g., place the ESDP or JHA under the Community Method).

Generalizing insights from public-goods models, joint-product models emphasize the importance of specifying issue-specific aggregation technology and asymmetric costs and benefits. Careful empirical testing fails to yield evidence that consistently supports the theoretical expectations derived from these models for EU security governance. This point can be further illustrated with the four EU security dimensions which were chosen for this research: prevention (dealing with the root causes of conflict), assurance (measures taken in post-conflict situations), compellence (peace-making intervention) and protection (internal security). For assurance and protection, we observe that smaller countries carry a heavier load. Admittedly, in both areas, the absolute burden borne for

the common policies remains modest. Possibly, the EU members 'trade in public goods' with the smaller EU members specializing in policing tasks, assurance and protection, leaving military coercion, compellence, to the larger EU members. This still leaves an unexpected finding, namely that burdens are shared evenly in compellence and prevention.

As our analysis of security governance demonstrated, it is important to carefully identify the factors which may uniquely determine burden-sharing in particular policy areas. It seems reasonable to expect that the same would apply to other policies, such as immigration and asylum, weapons procurement, or epidemiological surveillance. The issue of burden-sharing is rendered generally moot for policies falling under Pillar I (e.g., prevention) that are financed from Community budget. Only EDF contributions remain subject to an unfettered national prerogative. Here we observe richer countries and those that generally spend more on foreign aid to contribute disproportionately to the EDF. Compellence conforms to the expectations of the joint-product models: lower marginal costs of providing troops best explain uneven contributions; a factor clearly shown by the unique importance of NATO membership to explain contributions to NATO/US-led military operations.

The absence of chronic free-riding in the four categories of EU security governance policy confounds the expectations of public-goods models. The high degree of national policy integration and institutionalization within the EU may explain why free-riding does not pose a serious problem to the provision of collective security goods, but it is less clear why we observe the smaller states making disproportionately large contributions to the policies of assurance and protection. This perhaps unexpected small-state behaviour even holds when allowing for any unequal distribution of benefits; in other words, contrary to Chalmers (2000) we cannot find any 'small-state bias', at least regarding common EU security policies. The most likely explanation is that assurance and protection so far only require minor, possibly even symbolic, contributions; for example, a total of 1,722 person years are deployed to civil crisis management compared to 232,111 to military missions. Arguably, the smaller EU member states willingness to make disproportionately large, albeit in absolute terms small, contributions reflects a political calculation that those contributions will supply the necessary credibility for shaping the future development of common security policies.

The equitable burden-sharing in each category of security governance also demonstrates that the different aggregation technologies that apply to the four security areas—summation for assurance and prevention, best-shot for compellence (and somewhat less clearly prevention), and weakest-link for protection—do not pose an insurmountable barriers to the optimal supply of public goods. The high degree of policy coordination and integration in all three pillars of the EU, and the norms conditioning reflexive compliance with Commission rules, suggest that either lower marginal costs (as in the case of compellence) or higher political benefits (as in the case of assurance for the Accession countries) better explain the disproportional contributions of EU member states to security governance. Thus, the institutional and normative frameworks governing EU member-state security policies blunt the anticipated political pathologies ascribed to the different technologies of public-goods production.

Exported universalism or shared universality?

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Western universalism is from now on the target of deep criticisms, such in numerous international meetings and in post-colonial theories. This is highlighted for example, on the question of the universality of human rights which is disputed by intellectuals from many countries. They question the centrality of the West, its ethnocentric vision of the Other, its claim to civilize the world in which its exported universalism contradicted the real disparities lived by colonized peoples, women or discriminated minorities.

This debate emerged quite recently in France, which is proud of being the homeland of the Enlightenment and the cradle of human and citizen's rights, but which has also a tendency to forget or hide its colonial pasts, led in the name of one claimed « civilizing mission ». This part of history was quickly forgotten without having been read, studied and taught. The past is not assumed and spatters in the present, the current disparities reminding the injustices of yesterday. Numerous young French people, whose families came from the former colonies such as the Maghreb or West and Central Africa, or from the French West Indies, where their ancestors were slaves, rebelled against social disparity and racial discrimination of which they consider themselves as victims.

If the republican model of integration, based on the strict principle of citizen's equality allowed many French people of foreign origin to merge into the Nation, this model is more and more disputed. It is indeed colour blind and incapable to see the injustices based on colour or origin. Thus, during the past ten years, a movement rose in the French public space, based on the denunciation of discriminations undergone by black population in the country. Previously, if racism was denounced, penalized and fought, antiracism remained an ideological and political fight, carried out against the extreme right party. The problem of racial discrimination remained invisible and inexpressible in French society. As for the fight against inequalities carried by leftist organizations and parties, it is traditionally and structurally focused on social question, economic exploitation, and territorial segregation, and is unaware of the problem of discrimination, i.e. the racial question. Even the leaders of the black movement spoke about « diversity » and the fight for « effective equality ». But they did not explicitly mention the question of colour which remained a kind of taboo in the French political scene at least until the year 2005.

Then, a series of violent and spectacular events had changed the perception of that question. It is in this context that the Representative Council of Black Associations (CRAN), federating 72 West-Indian and African organizations was created in November 2005. Its initiators are intellectuals who have different political backgrounds but they agree on the same target: the equality for Black citizens in France. They also support two bills; one to reserve part of the government contracts and aid for companies open to diversity; the other is to reserve financing for political parties which take into account minorities. For them, if the black race does not exist, there is indeed a « black condition » shared by those living the social experiment to be generally regarded as blacks. By linking the existence of the black community in regard to others rather than with a specific identity, they avoided the Community register rejected by the republican culture.

But it should also be noted that the Blacks which call for the recognition of slavery as a crime and the commemoration of its abolition, claim for equal social opportunities for everyone referring to the French revolution's ideal and its promises, asking for its effective realization. Like other minorities elsewhere, they refuse the exported and abstracted universalism, which was used as an alibi in the past and remains misleading in speech. But by requiring the equality in diversity, one should preserve the horizon of a shared universality.

In such a view, the value of Human Rights is operative: they serve as an instrument and argument in the fight for human dignity, guaranteeing the freedom and achievement of equality, including against those who have promoted these rights without having fully respected them.

Transcultural strategies for a multipolar cultural world: the principle of reciprocal knowledge

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Even though deeply rooted in ancient Greek epistemological tradition, and notably in Aristotelian philosophy (Nicomachos Ethics), the principle of reciprocity, and, consequently, the reciprocal knowledge concept, has been in western societies progressively forgotten.. And this happened, along with the historical process of western cultures, as, in the same time, science was developing a behaviour based on the exact opposite principles of autopsy and dissection.

This paper is based on the main idea that, today, due to the process of globalisation -of cultures and of knowledge- returning to the principle of reciprocity to be applied and considered on both the ethical and epistemological point of views, could be the milestone for the management of intercultural relations in producing and using real transcultural methodologies.

In an attempt to participate in the necessary refoundation process of human knowledge, Transcultural has developed an experience, together with a team of Chinese, African and Indian scholars, through an academic transcultural network. This network is organised according to the very principle of reciprocal knowledge, in an observatory triangle working through a couple of different cultural observers, between different Asian, European and African cultures. We'll try and present some aspects of this approach, mainly applied in a transcultural and reciprocal analysis of key words and key concepts, as a preparatory and experimental phase to develop transcultural methodologies or rather meta-methodologies, and progressively build new patterns of the anthropological relation, which could be used to improve intercultural relations in international cooperation.

As Ludwig Wittgenstein asserts, "the eye cannot see itself", and there can be no anthropological knowledge if it is not based on reciprocal observation and mutual recognition. This reciprocal knowledge should include a reciprocal evaluation of the different distortions due to the conditions of observation, which cannot be detected, except from the position of an outside observer. But this outside observer should himself be submitted to the same rule, in a reciprocal process. The optical game, known under the name of "anamorphosis", using the reciprocal reflection of a genuine object, according to the different optical distortions of different mirrors, to reproduce in the end the right and corrected image of the object, can offer an interesting pattern of this process.

As a consequence of these considerations, we can observe the difference which exists between a transcultural and an intercultural relation, as well between intercultural and transcultural analytic or critic methodologies. The different patterns of knowledge, particularly due to the different patterns or "games of languages" (Wittgenstein) are here playing the role of the mirrors' distorting curves. Because of its proper history, anthropology as a specific discipline as well as other human sciences is deeply rooted in

the context of the history of western cultures, including especially the question of their relations with non western cultures. In this context and for these reasons, reciprocal knowledge has not been considered nor practiced in the different fields of human sciences. Considered in a possible, even if unpredictable, issue of a multi-polar and multicultural world, the process of globalisation should include a radical change and pave the way for renewed and innovating practices in international relations, in the cultural, economic, scientific and political fields.

Global governance, democracy, security and the role of Europe

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'The EU's contribution to global governance' is one of the chapters of the White Paper on Governance issued by the European Commission in 2001, and it proposes –inter alia- to promote a discussion on the reform of global institutions and improve dialogue with 'third countries' actors. 'Europe in the World' is also one of the main headings of EU external relations and of the 7th Framework Programme in the field of social sciences and the humanities.

From a more personal point of view, while obviously connected to the above, I would like to offer three points for consideration: commonality and diversities of democracy systems and governance arrangements; accountability of institutions –including global institutions; governance capacity for the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

Democracy can take many forms and shapes, while being based on some shared, basic elements such as respect of fundamental rights, rule of law, political competition, checks and balances. In addition, democracy is a process that may involve diverse transition paths (as shown by transitions to democracy from fascist and communist regimes) and never to be taken for granted even in its 'mature' stages. The European Union can therefore contribute to its own democratisation and to support democratisation in other parts of the world by respecting diversity and, at the same time, continuously monitoring democracy within its own borders. This, for example, in relation to the rise of the far right and of xenophobic trends in recent period, the introduction of some restrictions of civil liberties and fundamental rights (and related debates in domestic and international fora and in the context of EU/US relations –e.g. on Guantanamo and extraordinary renditions) before and following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

The *accountability of global institutions* (increasingly challenged by vocal social movements), is clearly an issue to be tackled. If it is already complex to further democratise a supranational setting like the EU, and it is clearly harder (to some even 'mission impossible') to aim at 'democratising the international system'. This is partly due to the fact that non-democratic countries are part of it –obviously- and would not subscribe to its democratisation; and even if the entire world was run by democratic governments, it is hard to conceive a workable 'global democratic system'. Still, chains and procedures of accountability can and should be developed for institutions that have an important influence in economic matters (as the financial crisis acutely showed) as well as in other important fields (e.g. climate and environment protection, labour standards, health care). The European Union can share its experience in developing accountability for transnational institutions, and do so in cooperation with key countries in the developing world such as India –with which it shares important values, history (including controversial parts) and interests.

Governance capacity for the prevention and transformation of conflicts is also a far from obvious issue and indeed aspects like state fragility, corruption, lack of an effective judiciary, oversight, vibrant civil society and other governance aspects have been often correlated with propensity to exacerbate or even ignite violent conflicts. Last but not least,

Europe was blessed by decades of 'cold peace' (as one cannot but consider such qualification of the word 'peace' for the experience that went in parallel with 'cold war') after the destructions brought about by the Second World War. Not all areas of the world had the same 'luck', and in addition violent conflicts –including within Europe, as in the Western Balkans, or in its neighbourhood, as in the Middle East- remind us that security and stability are far from to be taken for granted. It has been demonstrated that democracy allows for negotiation of different interests and values through rules for social dialogue, legislation for protection of minorities, fora for public debate and media coverage on the most controversial issues. At the same time, democracies are not necessarily 'peaceful' -as war interventions in Vietnam, Iraq, and other areas show; in addition, some democratically elected governments did resort to military occupation of territories claimed by other people and entities, with the related infringement of fundamental rights -which should be a basic requirement for a democracy to be called so. Therefore, the development of democratic governance capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts seems a difficult but urgent task. The European Union and India can share many important experiences and intelligence (especially 'open intelligence', as the one offered by research) to take on such task.

Images of the EU in India and beyond

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The EU is increasingly talked about in tones that suggest it has finally become a 'global power' of a peculiar type. Documents such as the 2001 Laeken declaration explicitly highlight that "Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation" by describing it as a "power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest." Similar claims regarding the "distinctiveness" of the EU's external relations is present also in the scholarly literature which refers to the EU as a civilian, normative or structural power. Needless to say this discourse is permeated by a Euro-centric approach and does not seem to take into consideration what the rest of the world thinks of the EU. Precisely in order to investigate what such external perceptions are, within the framework of the Network of Excellence on *Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation: the Role of the EU* (GARNET)¹, a series of case studies on the external image of the EU were coordinated. The goal of this research was to analyze what images of the EU could be found by surveying public opinion, political elites, civil society organizations and the media in a sample of countries from four continents around the world (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, Japan, India, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Russia, Palestine, South Africa, Venezuela and USA), and international and transnational actors (such as the UN, the World Bank, Al Jazeera, the African Union, Heads of EU Commission delegations abroad).

As far as India is concerned, the analysis revealed that, despite the fact that India and the EU share quite a lot in terms of fundamental values - from democracy to free press, to the respect for human rights or the firm belief in religious, ethnic and social tolerance - Indian society does not seem to be particularly interested in the EU. This **lack of interest** for the EU, however, is not confined to India: in all countries of our sample, press coverage of the EU tends to be rather limited and the degree of public knowledge of the EU rather low. As a matter of fact, in spite of the Euro's popularity and the widespread presence of its starry flag, the EU is still a stranger for common citizens around the world. Until 2005, less than half the citizens had heard about the EU in countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa. In China, it was less than a third until 2002, while in Venezuela it hovers around one fifth. In middle-income countries such as Mexico, which signed a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU, knowledge of the EU has gradually grown reaching about three fourths of the population in 2008. Yet, its approval rate is consistently lower than that of the USA (51% vs. 32%). While knowledge of 'Europe' and the European powers is rather common in industrialized societies such as Australia, Canada, Japan and the USA, even here confusion arises with respect to what the 'EU' actually is and does. Probably more worrisome is the fact that, among those

¹ The project's results can be read online at:

- Lucarelli S. (ed.) *Research report: The External Image of the European Union*, 2007, http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/1707.pdf
- Lucarelli S. and Fioramonti L. (eds) *Research report: The External Image of the European Union Phase Two*, 2008, on Garnet's website: <http://www.garnet-eu.org>

citizens who have some knowledge of the EU, only a small minority believes it is a significant world power, ranging from 7% respondents in India to 25% in Japan. These percentages fall even further when respondents are asked what their projected estimate of the EU power would be in 20 years. On the contrary, the US is overwhelmingly perceived as the only super power across the board, though respondents firmly believe that China will catch up in the near future. Moreover, perceptions of the EU are often filtered through predefined images of some leading European countries (especially Britain, France and Germany), due to former colonial ties, specific cultural relations, intense bilateral cooperation and trade-related factors. It also appears that the 2004 enlargement has contributed to shaking off the preconceived image of the EU as 'the West', especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America where colonial factors have long moulded the perception of Europe. Arguably, the lack of knowledge of the EU has also to do with the scant media coverage it enjoys outside Europe. In the case of India the press reveal an imbalanced appreciation for the US with respect to the EU.

The most recurrent perceptions of the EU, in India as well as in other countries of the sample, relate to the **EU's economic might**. By most political leaders in emerging markets such as India or Brazil, the EU is viewed as a strategic counterpart to boost development and economic growth. Similarly, the Japanese press emphasizes the role of the EU as a commercial actor and Chinese officials frame their relationship with the EU through the lens of 'economic complementarity'. Yet, the recognition of the EU as a trade giant goes in parallel with a severe criticism of its protectionist policies. Criticisms target especially agricultural subsidies and non-tariff trade barriers, which are often described as subtle distortions of free trade rhetoric. They are echoed by political leaders as well as by most trade unions, local associations, and European NGOs, which describe the EU's agricultural policy and other protectionist measures as a hard-to-die hangover of the domination imposed on Africa, Asia and Latin America by the former colonizers.

Our survey reveals that the **EU's commitment to peace-keeping, democracy promotion and diplomacy** has not gone unnoticed in India and in other corners of the world. For instance, the EU's role in encouraging talks and diplomatic means with North Korea and Iran has reverberated in the press throughout the world, from India to Venezuela. In South Africa, the EU has been mentioned as a relevant actor in the political and economic crisis of Zimbabwe as well as in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Interestingly, though, in Palestine the view of the EU as a key supporter of the Palestinian cause seems to have waned in the past few years. The EU's inability to use its financial power to put pressure on Israel and its refusal to interact with Hamas have been seen as critical shortcomings of the EU's role in the peace process, making local politicians believe that only the US has the power to influence Israel's policies in the occupied territories.

With possibly the only exception of trade, political elites in India and elsewhere appear to approve of the EU's approach to global governance. Roughly speaking, the EU is often viewed as a **potential counterforce to the American hegemony**, particularly through its emphasis on multilateralism as not just a means to an end but a way to democratize international politics. Interestingly though, such an emphasis on **multilateralism**, which implies a collective effort to reach commonly agreed decisions, is often interpreted in terms of 'multipolarism', which simply underlines the constitution of alternative 'poles' to the US.

Third, the EU is worldwide regarded as the most successful example of ***regional integration***. In India, Brazil and South Africa, the European integration process is often studied as a model for their own regions. Also in Mexico, the EU is viewed as a key example of regional integration, at least for Latin American countries that have reached a certain level of democratic stability and economic development. Even in Venezuela, the system of structural funds is analyzed with interest as a means to promote horizontal harmonization and equitable development across rich and poor regions. Against this background, it must be signalled the intense debate triggered by the dire negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements in 2007. In Africa, a number of political leaders have begun to question the genuine interest of the EU for regional integration by pointing out that the trade agenda proposed by the European Commission would divide Africa into externally-imposed sub-regions thereby generating imbalances and undermining existing processes of integration based on indigenous strategies.

The politics of silence in the Mahabharata and the structures of conflict in theatre

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The role of mythology in the collective consciousness has often been underestimated in contemporary times by relegating it to a purely academic pursuit. Mythology has shaped the human psyche in many ways from time immemorial through rich oral as well as written traditions. That mythology is not an individual product born in a specific time, but a collective oeuvre spanning different epochs, should be pointers to its wealth in terms of lessons imparted regarding human relations, governance, resolution of conflict etc. The present article attempts to draw upon mythological sources to study, how in times of conflict certain strategies have been used for better or worse, due to ignorance or poor governance. It also highlights certain myths that have prevailed through centuries and have had a lasting impression on the present collective consciousness.

Let me state at the outset that I position myself as a practitioner of theatre having directed over 50 plays and scripted a few. As a playwright, my source of inspiration has been Indian mythology. However, the characters I shall be dealing with in my presentation have no religious colour. Since our source is a written work, these characters are, above all, literary characters in interesting dramatic situations.

It is impossible to speak about the cultural heritage in India without mentioning the great epic *The Mahabharata*. The narrative is complex, with multiple extrapolations constructed in labyrinths. It was originally conceived as a lesson in good governance for a young king Janamejaya in the form of the story of his ancestors, bringing in the concept of *dharma*, loosely understood as a model of duty, justice, wisdom, generosity and path of life. The epic contains numerous episodes that illustrate wonderfully the theme of this conference. I will however restrict myself to the study of the myth of feuding brothers in *The Mahabharata*.

Ancient great civilizations have given us myths and legends, which for most part, repeat themselves. The case of Moses (from *The Bible*) and Karna (from *The Mahabharata*) is the myth of the abandoned infant on the waters. Many such commonalities can be found in myths from different civilizations which have been studied in depth by scholars like Mircea Eliade, Georges Dumézil etc. Among all these myths, the one of the feuding brothers is the most enduring due to its powerful dramatic situation. The most well known examples of feuding brothers are: Genesis, Cain who stabs his younger brother Abel in the back; the foundation of Rome, the eternal city of Italy, is stained by the death of Remus the twin of Romulus; in Greece it is the rivalry between the sons of Oedipus, king of Thebes, who die fighting for their father's throne. The myth of feuding brothers has given birth to several literary works. The best example is *Antigone* of Sophocles, one of the most beautiful plays of Ancient Greece.

While it is possible to provide a brief outline of the main story of *The Mahabharata* through its 18 *parvas* or books (220,000 lines), the richness of the epic lies in the 'story within a story' format, stretching to infinity. One of the ways of summing up *The Mahabharata* is the following:

Two brothers, Dhritarashtra the blind king, and Pandu the pale, inherit the kingdom of their ancestors. They cannot rule in peace due to their physical deformities. Their children do not possess the wisdom or the generosity of their ancestors in order to share their kingdom and live in peace. The five Pandavas, sons of Pandu (Yudhishtira, Bhima, Arjuna, Nakula and Sahadeva) claim their share while their cousins, the 100 Kauravas, sons of Dhritarashtra refuse to share the kingdom. Even though *The Mahabharata* rarely presents a situation in black and white, the Pandavas have been favoured by the divine Krishna and are therefore considered as the incarnation of Good. They are the sons of Kunti and Madri, wives of Pandu. However, these sons were conceived with five powerful gods of the Hindu Pantheon. It is worthwhile to mention an episode that will have serious consequences on the epic. Well before her marriage to Pandu, when still a young girl, Kunti had conceived a son with Surya, the Sun god. This son, her first born, was Karna, who was abandoned on the waters of a river. He was later adopted by a couple of a lower caste.

The feuding brothers in *The Mahabharata* are the 5 Pandavas and the 100 Kauravas who find themselves finally in the battlefield of Kurukshetra. Their hatred and determination to go to war is symbolized by the two sons of Kunti, Karna (son of Surya) and Arjuna (son of Indra, King of Gods), the bone of contention being the right to the ancestors' heritage, very often symbolized by the throne, or by Draupadi.

Even after both the clans accept the division of the kingdom, the Kauravas decide to ruin and humiliate their cousins the Pandavas. They invite them to a game of dice where the stakes are their kingdom and their freedom. The scene of the game of dice is the most important and the most popular one of the epic. The King's council is comprised of the immortal Bhishma, and Drona the invincible general. The blind king Dhritarashtra presides over the session. Seated, beside him is Queen Gandhari with a self imposed blindfold. All the four represent the official power of the Kaurava clan.

Right from the start, one can guess the Pandavas' defeat in the game of dice. They lose everything including their freedom and that of Draupadi, their shared spouse. She is dragged by her hair into the hall when in fact she is supposed to be in isolation due to her menstrual period. Vulnerable and humiliated, and with blood stained clothes, she is forced to be present in an assembly composed mainly of men. She braves the situation and asks her famous question, first to the audience and then to Yudhishtira, the eldest of the Pandavas.

"Whom did you lose first, yourself or me?"

The entire assembly remains silent on this issue at a crucial moment, when an intervention from those in power is most needed to resolve the conflict. This silence encourages the Kauravas to perpetuate their crime. According to certain critics, the silence denotes the absence of *dharma*. A timely intervention could have helped resolve the conflict and avoid the fratricidal war. Such occasions do occur elsewhere in the epic, where the silence of certain protagonists, brings about bloodshed.

It would seem that in *The Mahabharata*, silence maintained by those in power was the source of all the conflicts. The politics of silence is quite the contrary of good governance. In the history of nations we have many examples where the government decides not to act. In India, the case of the demolition of Babri Masjid is one such

example. The timing of the intervention is equally important. Many historians have pointed out that in European History, some European powers contributed indirectly to Hitler's rise due to their silence. The disarmament of Germany was one of the principal clauses of armistice at the end of the First World War. Governments of this epoch preferred not to react to the rise of the Third Reich. This led to the Second World War.

Needless to say, the myth of the feuding brothers and the inevitability of conflicts are not exclusive to *The Mahabharata*. The *Vedas* and The *Puranas* also recount similar situations, specially the conflict between Devas and Asuras. In Hindu myths, the resolution of a conflict must be through a war. Even if a resolution must be brutal, Hindu myths do not see it in a negative light. They perceive it as a necessary evolution/transformation. The philosophy behind the birth/arrival of the 10 avatars of Vishnu, suggests this interpretation.

While the narratives of these conflicts may seem complex, cinema and theatre have appropriated their essence, deconstructed the architecture of these conflicts for a clear and stronger narration. As for the structure of the conflict in the myth of feuding brothers, I can visualize it on stage in the form of a triangle.

Indian cinema has, indeed, exploited this theme very well. In the well known film *Chandralekha* (1948) the Siamese twins enacted, by M.K.Radha, fight to claim the kingdom of their father and earn the love of Chandralekha. In *Mother India* (1957), the triangular conflict is represented by the actors Sunil Dutt, Raj Kumar and their mother played by Nargis who symbolizes morality, rules and duty of the Indian society. The film *Deewar* (1975) takes up the same theme by showing two feuding brothers played by Amitabh Bachchan and Shashi Kapoor fighting for their mother's love (Nirupa Roy). If "roundness calls for a caress" as declares the phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard, I must state that the angles in a triangle provoke conflicts. A Russian proverb says "with two persons, there are bound to be three political parties". The triangle is therefore fundamental to a conflict.

As a theatre director and playwright, I have observed that the triangle offers innumerable possibilities of stage direction. Let me give you an example of the structures of conflict on stage. In theatre there is conflict only if three energies are present. Conflict therefore is always triangular. Without conflict there is no drama. The third element in a conflict is not necessarily a character, but could eventually be represented by an actor or an accessory (I used 1,5 km of cloth to represent the third element of the conflict, that is, the myth of Oedipus in Jean Cocteau's *The Infernal Machine*). The positioning or blocking of actors (*la mise en espace*) on stage to portray a conflict often warrants a triangular position.

Let's be clear that we are not talking about an equilateral triangle. Perfect geometrical forms such as an equilateral triangle, circle or rectangle do not exist in nature. Personally I avoid perfect forms on stage in order to emphasize pure emotion. I use blocking techniques based on the principle that the sides of the triangle are in constant movement according to the forces of power which are ever changing. (I used the larger than life shadow of Antigone in Jean Anouilh's *Antigone*. Thanks to a clever light design, Antigone's shadow was changing all the time to visualize the ever changing power equation between Creon and Antigone). I can safely state that unequal sides of the triangle lend themselves better to situations of conflict.

It would be lengthy to quote examples that visualize conflicts on stage within the framework of this abstract. In the event of any publication, examples of this technique taken from various productions such as Jean Anouilh's *Antigone*, Jean Cocteau's *La Machine infernale*, or my own play *The Mahabharata of Women*, etc. could be envisaged.

European babel? The politics of language in Europe

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The paper begins with the argument that Politics is 'the complex of relationships of people in society, especially those relationships involving authority or power'. In this language is the main tool used in these relationships, and the choice of a particular tool (language) is an expression of power. Thus contact of languages and the need for regulation is a political issue. The article aims to explore as to how Europe grappled with this problem.

Firstly from a historical perspective, the presentation suggests that within the linguistic landscape of Europe, there has been the domination of Indo-European and Finno-Ugric languages. Within Indo-European there has been a shift from a former domination of Celtic languages to the actual predominance of Slavonic, Germanic and Romance languages. There has also been an influence of the linguistic situation outside of Europe (colonial languages: 'Americanisation' of English, Spanish, and Portuguese; later 'Africanisation' of Dutch leading to the emergence of Afrikaans). The paper elaborates on the attitudes of the ruling elites towards linguistic diversity in Europe. It notes the attitude of the Christian Church(es) and elaborates upon the theory of three 'sacred' languages: Hebrew, Greek and Latin. The view at State level was that within multi-ethnic States there was one official language (Latin in the middle ages and later the language of the dominant group in the state) though there were in fact many spoken languages. In post-war Europe, language and linguistic rights became part of the human rights paradigm with linguistic non-discrimination being a central theme.

Secondly the problem of language on a supranational level is addressed. The paper advances the view that the European Union as a supranational organisation is in need of linguistic regulation. Amongst intergovernmental organisations, three types of linguistic regulations can be detected: Presidential (monophonous) – CIS (Russian), UPU (French); collegial (oligophonous) – UNO (6 official languages), Council of Europe (English, French); egalitarian (pantophonous) – EU. Ever since the Treaties of Rome (EEC, Euratom) when Dutch, French, German, and Italian as the official languages of the then member states were recognised as the official and working languages of the supranational organisation this tradition was continued; from four original official and working languages the number grew to 23 and all of them are recognised as being equally authentic. While formal equality is guaranteed to all languages in the EU, in reality some are more equal than others. Within such a formula, the paper raises several concerns, which include the concern that equality of languages in the EU context is to some extent a linguistic myth. The EU in fact favours French and especially English; to a considerably lesser extent German is also given preference over the remaining languages. It is also argued that while there is some support for languages that are not official and working languages of the EU they in fact lose out. It is only the Council of Europe with its charter of regional and minority languages that tries to provide special protection for them.

In its final note, the paper attempts to draw a comparison with India. Parallels but also differences can be seen in the multitude of official languages, the de facto dominant role

of English, a three-language-formula having been proposed both for the European Union and for India. In a historical perspective parallels can be seen between Sanskrit for the Indian cultural realm and Latin or Church Slavonic for Europe. Similarly the projects of unification (Serbo-Croatian in Yugoslavia and Hindustani in India) show interesting parallels.

Historical roots of India's strategy of planned development with democracy

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One of the most important questions to be investigated about the evolution of Indian state and society is how it has been able, reasonably successfully, to handle great diversity- linguistic, religious, cultural, political and economic. In this paper I shall focus on the economic.

The nature of Indian state and society that emerged after the independent Indian state was born in 1947 was to a critical extent influenced by the nature of the movement that gave birth to the independent Indian state.

At independence, leaders, planners, etc., even the tallest among them such as Jawaharlal Nehru had to operate within certain given historical parameters created to a great extent by the Indian national movement.

The Indian national movement which was a *prolonged* (nearly a hundred years) *mass movement* (involving millions of people) because of its very mass nature and prolonged impact had ensured that certain ideas had permeated deep down into the minds of the Indian people, creating a certain culture: a culture that insisted on Sovereignty (which also meant anti-imperialism), democracy, a pro-poor orientation (though not necessarily socialism) and secularism. A secularism which celebrated diversity as complimentary to nation making and did not celebrate the fragment as a cite to challenge the nation as was done by the colonial state and subsequently by a motley crowd of post modernists, post colonialist and the self-proclaimed subalternists.

This meant that the planners, political leaders etc., had to operate with certain 'historical givens', i.e., their economic plans had to be within the parameters of a democratic system, independent development and a certain pro-poor orientation. No one could argue, for example a semi-democratic or semi-sovereign path to quick growth.

The Indian national movement was a democratic, popular movement. It remained ideologically 'open ended' and intense debate, argument and bargaining occurred within the movement between contending forces of the Left and Right since the early decades of the 20th century, ultimately leading to a workable consensus at independence on the path of economic development to be adopted by India. One may call it the Nehruvian consensus. This meant that the Indian 'national revolution' did not start with a civil war or the necessity to suppress difference on any significant scale. This was critical to the birth and the nurturing of a functioning democracy in India.

The critical element of the Nehruvian Consensus was that there was a consensus on adopting a democratic path to rapid economic development. This, despite the acute awareness that it was an uncharted path in world history. All the countries which had hitherto industrialized had done so (especially in the early phase) not only in the absence of democracy in their own country but also through colonial subjugation of other peoples. The paths of slavery, enclosures, forced land tax, forced collectivization and colonial

exploitation being used to promote economic development were not open to India. Not even Indian business argued for the model seen in some Latin American and East Asian countries where an authoritarian regime in partnership with an industrial bourgeoisie tried to push through rapid economic growth postponing the issue of democracy and civil liberties to the future.

Nehru on his part, despite his enormous personal prestige did not push his own personal socialist beliefs by force. He was among the first in the world to break from what has appropriately been called Stalin Marxism. He initiated the process of planned development in India borrowing a lot from the Soviet model with the critical difference that in India planning was to be consensual and not a command performance.

The result was that the economic model adopted in India was what has been called a mixed economy. The market was never abandoned just as the state never pulled out fully. A judicious mix of state intervention and the free play of the market was sought to be introduced from the very beginning. A strategy which today seems to be globally more and more acceptable.

The unanimity on democracy mentioned earlier has been critical in keeping the country together. There was no other way this diverse country could be kept together. One may add that democracy was understood by Nehru, as it was not by the Indian national movement, as being simply majoritarianism. It was much more, it was to ensure consensus which was inclusive of the smallest of groups and opinions which were not to be snuffed out by brute majority.

The search for a universal language of governance

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This paper, presented at the session on 'Global Governance and the Universal Values Quest' is primarily an attempt at self-criticism. Many of us at this conference on 'cultures of governance' occupy dual positions as both administrators and academics. In this capacity, we sometimes see ourselves engaged in a lofty search for the most universal and benign of bureaucratic modes by which we might facilitate the processes of democratization and the sharing of knowledge across nations. Yet, the quest for such a utopian trans-cultural language of governance is not without its dangers, as a cautionary note from Umberto Eco's work *The Search for a Perfect Language* indicates. In this book, Eco traces the quixotic attempts in Europe from the 17th century on to construct a 'rational', 'logical' and by extension, 'perfect' language - from John Wilkins' Universal Grammar to Esperanto. *Question One: Why did these highly motivated attempts to 'reform and universalise' the ordinary languages and 'imperfect' writing systems used in everyday communication fail and what implications does this quest for linguistic perfection have for us today as we seek to analyse 'good governance' and deepen our understanding of global democratic processes?*

Democratizing Language?

One aspect of identity within democracies that is often invoked but infrequently analysed in any detail is, of course, **language**. In my paper, I shall concentrate on language and the very specific role it plays in structuring ideas of democracy in postcolonial 'Asian' nation states like India, where many languages compete for representational space.

Let me begin with a provocative statement: Natural languages in themselves can be viewed as being notoriously undemocratic. For example, approximately 90% of the world's languages are spoken by less than 10% of the world's population, which means that 'big' languages like English, Hindi-Urdu and Mandarin dominate discourse about 'democracy'. Language behaviour, in short, is often hegemonic rather than egalitarian. There may therefore be significant lessons to be drawn for governance from the histories of language policy in pluri-lingual, post-colonial states like India which have actively worked towards 'democratising' the relationship between their various languages. But has the Indian state succeeded in this brave endeavour? Well, to some extent. **India currently boasts 22 'official' languages, including English, and 326 'recognized' languages;** yet it is evident that some of these languages tend to be extremely powerful while others are highly endangered.

Consequently, it is my plea, that as administrators in both postcolonial and post-modern democracies, we must school ourselves to persistently self-criticise. This requires a constant awareness that our most well-intentioned policies can easily be subverted by powerful social and historical forces. As far as language use, in particular, is concerned, we have to learn to sensitise ourselves to the tendency in all societies towards what one might call, again after Marx, 'language capital accumulation' and linguistic false consciousness' - if we wish to preserve both democracy *and* difference in what have sometimes been called the newly emergent 'post-identity' societies.

Post-identity Cultures? Let's begin this section with two views:

“As soon as labour is distributed, each person has a particular, exclusive, area of activity which is imposed on him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman or a critic and he must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood. In communist society, however, where nobody has an exclusive area of activity and each can train himself in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production, making it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner just as I like, without ever *becoming* a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critic.” From ***The German Ideology*** by Karl Marx

“The disappearance of the category of the Other from the Official Gaze is, like other strange cultural shifts, a belated recognition of a post-identity culture - a culture characterized by the difficulty— indeed, the impossibility— of imagining a distinct identity narrative, whether based on ethnicity, gender, class, or age. Indeed, these categories themselves have been so many times collapsed, whether in academic circles or in the popular media, that their fictive elements become too pronounced to ignore. Official culture producers, such as the media... [now] refuse to recognize difference not because they have lost their power to do so, but because *difference is ubiquitous. Embraced by the culture producers, difference is everywhere and, thus, nowhere*” From the first issue of the journal ***Post-Identity***, University of Michigan Press, 1997, ed: Nicholas Rombes, Hugh Culik and Jennifer A. Howard.

It is clear from the passage above that Marx's view of post-identity is splendidly utopian. In a communist society, no one will be trapped within a single identity, but will have the freedom to move between being 'a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critic' as one wishes. The more pessimistic perspective of the editors of the journal *Post-Identity* suggests, however, that too many identities may dissolve into homogeneity. Imagining a 'distinct identity narrative' is becoming increasingly difficult. This, in turn, poses a real, pressing, practical problem in a global world: *difference is everywhere and, thus, nowhere*. How then does one succeed in resisting such homogenization, a totalizing loss of cultural identity? Here, again, my contention is that we may have lessons to learn from the case of India. In particular, I want to suggest, going back to my notion inspired by Marx of 'linguistic false consciousness', that the relationship between linguistic identities and personal and cultural identities (such as describing oneself as Nepali because the language one speaks is Nepalese, which leads to logical confusions if, let's say, one's first language is Nepali but one is not a citizen of the Nepalese nation-state) is mediated in multilingual states such as India's by a bureaucratic creation. This is what might call the illusion of 'linguistic democracy'.

In this idealised representation, all languages have apparently equal status. So, Marathi and Bengali have the same status as Urdu or Telugu, while 'English', which is far and away the most potent of the Indian languages, is neatly separated out of the mix as a language that is not quite relevant when comes to heart-felt matters of identity. Now we

all recognize this sort of official presentation of language democracy is an absurdity and yet we are all under its spell when taking important educational and other decisions.

So, my first suggestion is, we need to think ourselves more into the position of conflicted language users rather than know-all language administrators when it comes to preserving language democracy – and, by implication, democracy itself. *Question Two, then: how do we go about reassessing the language paradigm in pluri-lingual states like India in order to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of how modern ‘democratic’ states might actually handle language and cultural conflict better?*

Combating universal indifference?

In this section, I shall try and approach the second question raised above in a binary fashion by:

- a) presenting a general analysis of the way modern bureaucracies in general function
- b) relating this general analysis to language identities and identifications in the fashioning of ‘Indian democracy’.

First, the general analysis of modern bureaucracies: here I want to return to a point made by the Harvard anthropologist Michael Herzfeld in his book *The Social Production of Indifference: the Symbolic Routes of Western Bureaucracy* (1993) as well in my own work *Lying on the Postcolonial Couch: the Idea of Indifference* (2002). In slightly different ways – but quite independently – we both have a similar thesis – he about ‘Western democracies’ and I about so-called ‘post-colonial democracies’, which is that: Contemporary democracies – most of which were operationalized and fine-tuned during a 100-year period from the early 18th to the early 19th century which happened to coincide with the heyday of high colonialism – are designed to manufacture a psychological ‘state of indifference’ towards the governed even as they theoretically protect the ‘democratic’ right of various communities within the state to preserve their ‘differences’.

Herzfeld’s contention is that modern Western democracies have concocted a highly ritualistic meta-language of control which enables them to legitimately be ‘indifferent’ and distant towards citizens at large. This impenetrable bureaucratic language, according to Herzfeld, is just as ‘symbolic’ as the language used by ‘shamans’ and other high priests in pre-modern, non-democratic societies and the purpose is precisely the same: i.e. control over ‘freedom of speech and expression’ in the ‘real world’. In other words, this language is purposively undemocratic and ‘irrational’ even though it’s expressed and ‘rational’ purpose is to serve democracy.

In my own book, I come to similar conclusions, arguing that there is a major difference between *European post-modern/ post-industrial societies* and *non-European post-colonial societies*. That is, while ‘post-modernity’ routinely celebrates polyphony, pastiche and a plural buzz – in short, the multifarious joys of difference, ‘post-colonialism’ essentially promotes a diametrically opposite perspective. Post-colonialism, I suggest, is about the bureaucratic production of political indifference. Indifference, in my analysis, was a cognitive stance invented by colonial rulers to deal with the extremely varied forms of linguistic and cultural difference which they were confronted with, for example, on the Indian subcontinent – and elsewhere in South East Asia, Africa and Australia.

All the census formats, the legal discourses and impenetrable bureaucratic procedures that the colonial administration created as a consequence were paper-and-pencil attempts to deal with this overwhelming problem of 'Otherness', leading them to adopt an 'impartial' position that I am calling indifference – an indifference at once culturally, linguistically and emotionally dehumanizing.

The dim, conservative corridors of institutional power, where the barriers must always be kept up, are thus where indifference can be observed at its political best. Indifference as an attitude actually derives its genealogy from the site of colonialism which required that power be exhibited as emotional and cultural distance - a cold life-denying apparatus of printed rules, meaningless reductionisms and arcane formalisms. The colonial rule-book, handed down to us from colonial times, functions in this context as the '**fifth Veda**'. Locked away in steel cupboards and interpretable only by the governmental high-priests, its main function is to produce superior-grade 'indifference'.

Indifference, in short, is a bureaucratic mode of response to pluralism, necessarily reductionist in its erasure of differences of style, opinion and culture. Something of this Medusa nature of indifference has been captured by Gilles Deleuze (famously the author, along with Felix Guattari, of *Schizophrenia and Empire*) in his lesser known remarks: Indifference has two aspects: the undifferentiated abyss, the black nothingness, the indeterminate animal in which everything is dissolved - but also the white nothingness, the once more calm surface upon which float unconnected determinations like scattered members: a head without a neck, an arm without shoulders, eyes without brows. The indeterminate is completely indifferent but such floating determinations are no less indifferent to each other..."
Gilles Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*

Deleuze's comment reminds us of what is self-evident from history: namely, that the systematic, deeply institutionalized protocols and rituals of indifference inherited from colonialism in various corners of the globe have long helped contain linguistic and cultural pluralism not only on the Indian subcontinent, but across the world - a pluralism that could easily have become uncomfortably threatening to 'world-order' if it was not administratively controlled and linguistically contained. In post-colonial societies like India, it certainly remains undeniable that our institutions of government, education, and even entertainment continue to illustrate in their daily workings the pernicious strains of colonial indifference towards the governed. At the base of the pyramid of institutional structures, this 'postcolonial narrative' shows up as the attribute of '*fatalism*' among the mass poor; it construes itself as '*apathy*' among the upwardly mobile middle classes; and finally stands revealed as '*bland and total unconcern*' among those who hold positions of awesome political and/or bureaucratic power. The conclusion from all of which seems to be: Like the old gods, the colonizers may now have vanished but they seem to have left us with an inescapable mythic inheritance. Today, it appears that we are beginning to hear neo-colonial reverberations of a self-same indifference. For, bombarded as we are with so much fragmentary information - just as the colonizers once were - the temptation to stereotype 'the Other' in black and white and dehumanizing Deleuzian terms is almost irresistible.

Question Three: How then, shall we resist such bureaucratic indifference, the black-and-white paper and pencil reductionism of which Deleuze speaks, in a world that is seemingly moving inexorably towards a homogenizing uni-polar 'post-identity' culture?

Changing our language policies, speaking 'English' differently?

A short answer to the question raised above might be, again taking our cue from Marx, is that we should learn from history. Specifically, we should consider how post-colonial language policy is currently being revised on the ground in countries like India, so as to provide resistance 'from below' to established language hegemonies. When, in the 1950s in a newly independent India, the 'language question' was debated extensively in the Indian parliament, four main conclusions were reached:

1. The Indian state adopted the principle of **Linguistic States**.
2. It adopted by just one casting vote, **Hindi as the National Language**.
3. It adopted the **three-language formula** which meant that every child who passed through the schooling process in India had to learn three languages: his or her mother-tongue, Hindi the national language and one 'international' language, English or some other.
4. It adopted **English** as an interim language, for an initial period of fifteen years, until Hindi and the 'other languages' of India became sufficiently 'strong'. (The Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India specifically lists these languages).

For lack of space, I will here consider only the 4th decision concerning the role that English was to play in the newly constituted Republic of India. Today, as we know, English, far from being 'given up' after fifteen years, is well entrenched in the Indian – and world – system. The 'policy decision' made 60 years ago by the planners of Indian democracy can simply no longer be adhered to. Economic globalisation, the rise of the IT industry in India and the privileging of electronic media the world over, as well as the dominance of the United States of America as a super-power, has changed language contexts in such a way that Indian democracy must now respond to these forces in a manner that was simply unforeseen when India's language and educational structure was first laid out after decolonization. The stock of English in the world-markets and its power as potential 'intellectual capital', pace Marx, has today made it a universal and hegemonic lingua franca: a power, money and glamour language to which enormous 'soft power' is attached. Given this current dominance of English as a language of aspiration in India, we face a classic dilemma of 'value' which has been strongly articulated by no less than two recent Prime Ministers.

One, inaugurating a seminar on the national language, Hindi, when he was Prime Minister, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee contended: "It is a bitter truth that even now (56 years of Independence), Hindi has not been able to achieve the desired position (of an official language). What happened that we have not been able to make it an effective language of communication? Why have we failed in this endeavour?" In his own words: "*Hindi ki baat bahut hoti hai. Lekin Hindi me baat kam hoti hai*" (*There is much talk about Hindi, but less talk in Hindi*) After these remarks, Vajpayee went on to refer, apparently, to the anti-Hindi agitation in South India long ago in the sixties, but then added, significantly: "The real fight is not between Hindi and the regional languages nor between Hindi and English but between *the Indian and English mentality*".

Two, speaking at the Oxford Union, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared on, July 8, 2005: “It used to be said that the sun never sets on the British Empire. I am afraid we were partly responsible for sending that adage out of fashion! But, if there is one phenomenon on which the sun cannot set, it is the world of the English-speaking people, in which the people of Indian origin are the single largest component. Of all the legacies of the Raj, none is more important than the English language and the modern school system... Of course, people here may not recognise the language we speak, but let me assure you that it is English! In indigenising English, as so many people have done in so many nations across the world, we have made the language our own. Our choice of prepositions may not always be the Queen's English; we might occasionally split the infinitive; and we may drop an article here and add an extra one there. I am sure everyone will agree, nevertheless, that English has been enriched by Indian creativity as well and we have given you back R.K. Narayan and Salman Rushdie. Today, English in India is seen as just another Indian language.”

I would contend that these musings by two recent Indian Prime-Ministers reveal something of the ‘split-personality’ of postcolonial discourse in that both Prime Ministers express such opposed views on the role played by the English language in our culture, education and structures of governance. Or, to put the matter in more ‘bureaucratic’ terms, it may be said that we now face an extremely conflicted choice between two models of language education: the ‘multi-literacy’ model enshrined in our Constitution, whereby we still pay lip-service to the many vibrant local languages of India and the mono-literacy model, wherein is inscribed a deep need to acquire ‘an English mentality’ at the cost of all our other languages in order to ‘succeed in the world.’ Today, these mono- and multi-literacy models exist side by side in our consciousness, seemingly ‘indifferent to each other’, in a manner Deleuze and Guattari might claim typifies exactly the ‘schizophrenia of post-Empire.’ *So where do we go from here? How do we make a choice?*

Answer: we need to look at the situation on the ground. Here is a small, illustrative example: In a study I have done of my students at the IIT (see Nair, pp. 466-494 in Kachru, Kachru and Sridhar *Language in South Asia*, Cambridge University Press, 2008) I find they often use **an almost equal proportion of Hindi and English** in their speech as the table below shows.

HINGLISH IN IIT	English	Hindi	Suffixes	Total
Nouns	9	10	-	19
Verbs	8	5	-	13
Adjectives	5	5	-	10
Speechacts Exclamative	1	2	-	3
Speechacts Declarative	0	1	-	1
Suffixes	-	-	6	6
Total	23	23	6	52

In other words, to return to Eco, this ‘mixed’ form of English derives its vitality from its ‘imperfection’ rather than its perfection. Furthermore, it is to be noted that these ‘Export Quality Indians’ from the IITs, youthful, self-confident and unselfconscious, *carry* their hybrid language with them as they travel across the globe. This is significant because,

not only is India today predominantly a young country with about 65% or more of its population below the age of 35 but it is also estimated that it will have the largest number of English speakers outside the UK within the next decade or so. This means that models of what 'English' is are transforming in a most radical manner and showing us new linguistic ways to 'bridge the gap' between the vexed mono-literacy and multi-literacy models that we have inherited.

Similarly, to my mind, some of the most exciting ethical issues in Indian and other postcolonial democracies will arise out of struggle of various groups – such as women, Dalits, and so on - to enter the literacy stakes and to insert their own texts and forms of language as well as theories of text and language into the traditional educational canon as they increasingly gain power through literacy. The questions concerning English can therefore be broken down further in relation to these **future contexts** for the democratic growth of our institutions of education and will include the following queries: *Questions 4 a-c: 4a. How, if at all, can English in India enter mass culture when it is used by less than 10% to negotiate problems in their everyday life and read for pleasure by no more than 2% of the population?*

4b. How might a language which has had a very visible history of elite 'indifference' to exploitation, a language that is perhaps the most powerful language the world has ever known, be used in ways that are not alienated and exploitative, but empowering - imaginatively empowering - as much as politically liberating?

4c. How might English be 'transformed' and 'democratized' by the plural and multicultural contexts within which it operates today?

Not giving up on the quest for universal values, transforming ourselves, transforming the world?

On the matter of India's present polity, the writer Salman Rushdie has commented that various new political and economic forces are now affecting the country "so fundamentally that one could say that the country which came into being in 1947 is being transformed into something else." At the end of this paper, we might ask: *What is this mysterious 'something else' that India is allegedly 'transforming into' and what part, if any, do language politics and especially the politics of the English language play in the process of such a cultural transformation? Or, to put it in the form of Prime Minister Vajpayee's strange question, can there be said to be particular mentalities associated with a former colonial language like English, especially attitudes like 'indifference'? If so, how do overcome these pathologies?*

What I have tried to suggest in this paper, is that such mentalities and anti-mentalities, if they at all exist, have to be actively understood through constant self-criticism and through properly imbibing the lessons of history in order to avoid as far as possible the conflicts and schizophrenias that inevitably plague the minds of governments and individuals everywhere. This means that the specific questions and observations that we have about 'democratizing' English or any other language in the Indian context need ultimately to be related to a more universal set of questions. Such questions have, of course, long been a part not only of India's cultural repertoire but of all world quests for the holy grail of 'universal value' and they include, for example:

- Gautama Buddha's *sarvam dukham*: 'Why is there suffering in the world?'

- Aristotle: 'What is the nature of tragedy?'
- Confucius: 'With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my crooked arm for a pillow - is not joy to be found therein?'
- Mughal Emperor Akbar's *din-i-illahi*: 'Can there be a single syncretic faith that brings together all peoples?'
- Kabir's *kahu ke man ki ko jaanat*: 'Who can know the mind of another?' (Kabir was a near-contemporary of Emperor Akbar and legend has it that both he and the illustrious emperor were formally illiterate].
- Karl Marx: 'How does one change the world to enable fair economic relationships?'

And many others, the whole point about these questions being, that they entirely resist 'final solutions'. That, indeed, is what makes them 'fundamental'. Such enquiries stimulate debate, not still it, and therefore, in my view, are still revolutionary enough to be revived as we seek new languages for a fraught new millennium.

THE OLD BUREAUCRAT OR 'BABU'



asperrulespleasemakeitconvenienttoattendsarkarikamvipsinedietheend

AND THE NEW?



for good governance we must attack both real hunger & epistemic hunger so lets begin

Dealing with conflict resolution and developing avenues of governance: A comparative examination of cultural and legal traditions of Euro-India relations

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Introduction and Underlying hypothesis

The underlying hypothesis in this paper is as follows: Learning from the experiences of Europe, the only realistic way forward for India is to have a multi-lateral, regional approach for conflict resolution and developing cultures of democratic governance. Following on from this hypothesis is the argument that the growth of 'Indianisation' or a 'Hindustani' approach as opposed to a 'South-Asian regional approach' to conflict prevention will not only be counterproductive and negative, but in the long run, dangerous. The paper examines the European experiences, compares and contrasts these with the experiences of South-Asia.

European Experiences–Conflict Management, promoting values of governance and human rights

Rationale for Regional Organizations:

The paper looks initially at the European experiences of conflict management and the promotion of values of governance and human rights. Amidst the European experiences, it is argued that despite terrible atrocities of the two world wars in the last century (and indeed because of the atrocities) and to neutralize the threat of aggression from certain States, there was recognition of the necessity to have effective regional organizations. The Council of Europe, rapidly emerged in 1949, and what was then the European Economic Community was formed through the Treaty of Rome in 1957. There was the recognition in the post-world war two scenario of the value of regional organizations and supra-national mediators even for liberal and sustained democracies of Western Europe.

Process and fulfillment of Objectives:

The Council of Europe, at its inception had the rather idealist goals of strengthening democracy and rule of law. The progress of the organization from its inclusion of countries such as Spain and Portugal in mid 1970's now to include over 47 States, including all EU members has been significant. Similarly, the impact which the Council of Europe has had through its instruments, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has been quite remarkable. All European Union members remain committed parties to the ECHR, now with the possibility of ratification of Protocol 14 of the ECHR. There are of course gross limitations in Convention mechanisms, and indeed it does not *per se* deal with conflict resolution/ conflict management. That said, there is considerable jurisprudence of the Court in engaging with many of the issues revolving around such conflicts (see e.g. *Ireland v. United Kingdom*, Judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A. No. 25; *Cyprus v Turkey*, App. No. 8007/77, 13 DR 85 (1978)). The point that was made earlier, about the dangers of even liberal democracies going stray (and the need for a watch-dog for these democracies), can be portrayed vividly by the frequent reprimand which UK has received from the European Court of Human Rights in its governance of Northern Ireland as well as treatment of Catholics minority therein.

(See e.g. *McCann and Others v. United Kingdom*, Judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A, No. 324 (App. No. 18984/91).

The European Economic Community, in its essence driven by economic motives, had also an underlying sense of conflict management and economic development. In its progressive development, the organization, now the European Union has (post Maastricht in 1992) a serious and substantial role not only in security policies and conflict management, but also the induction of the concept of European Citizenship as well as the recognition of human rights values and constitutional traditions of Member States. In relation to establishing a culture of democracy and autonomy within Europe, the results are not insignificant. Without going into too many details, the paper points to responses from such groups as Scots or Irish or Basques as feeling (rather) confident partners of the Union, as opposed to members of their own nation States. It is argued that the perception of being EU citizens has lessened some of the previous minority-majority tensions prevalent within nation-States.

South Asian Experiences:

The paper asserts that any contrast to South Asia, could not be any more distant and unreal: It is argued that effective regionalism cannot be said to have been established within South Asia. This region consists of over a fifth of the global population, contains some of the most poorest and undeveloped portion of the world and has really serious substantial conflicts. India itself has various internal conflicts but there are other serious regional disputes e.g. Kashmir, Tamil issue, Nepal, Bhutanese Refugee problem etc. Whatever little regionalism that exist, South Asia was late in coming round even to this; in fact behind the Americas, the Arab States, the Far East, and Africa, in the latter case of Africa, the OAU having been established in 1963.

Regionalism in South Asia:

Progression of Regionalism in the world has been dramatic—the paper outlines a transformation of Europe, now to a European Union, with significant undertakings including dispute resolution, democracy, rule of law and human rights. In Africa, changes are also evident. The African Union (emulating the European Union) was formed in 2002. An African Court of Human Rights is in place with an impending African Court of Justice. For India and South Asia, multilateralism remains an essential feature for progress: Despite growing strength, India is unable to manage critical issues (such as minorities, territorial disputes, and terrorism) on its own. It is argued that in the context of South Asia, contestations that internal self-governance and autonomy for example in Kashmir might be inadequate. There continues to be a form of negativity about developing regionalism within South Asia. Such negativity remains evident at inter-governmental levels, but also within the civil society. At the inter-governmental level, SAARC remains a neglected political animal, often confined to the annual meetings of the SAARC council.

Some Conclusions – and the Role of ‘EURASIA-NET’

The unfortunate and tragic terrorist attacks in Bombay (November 2008) only too readily highlight the need for a concerted regional effort to deal with issues such as terrorism and conflict management. Preliminary reports suggest that the terrorists may have received training or may have contacts with neighbouring States. As indicated in this paper, such a tragic incident underlines the necessity of regional cooperation and dealing with issues of terrorism and conflict management at a regional level.

Our current initiative—thanks to the European Commission for support through the FP7 project— are to enhance and encourage values of minority protection and human rights at the regional level. Our objectives within the ‘EURASIA-NET’ project include *inter alia* the development of a South-Asian Convention on the protection of Human Rights and Minority Rights. This, we hope, would be followed by concrete recommendations for structures of effective institutional mechanisms at regional level for effective implementation of binding treaties on human rights and minority rights (in ways similar to the ECHR and the Council of Europe’s National framework Convention on Minorities).

Governing conflicts or dialogue on conflicts? Notes on a rebel's interview

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Cultures of governance are essentially cultures of how conflicts are governed. In this matter we must at the outset understand what is at stake in this discussion. Let me therefore put that point first.

In speaking of a particular culture of governance we are speaking of a particular rationality – governmental rationality, the particular reason for governing, and the particular reasoning on which governmental practices in question are based. In the emergence of the particular governmental rationality of our time, we can observe a break. The break is occasioned by the transition from the *reason of the state (raison d'état)* to *reason of government*. Empires or imperial states had always an awareness that several communities, some major some minor, inhabited the imperial societies, and besides the subjects professing the religion of the state there were other faiths and other communities as subjects of the empire, who at times would get special favourable treatment from the emperor and imperial administration or at times subjected to harsh treatment particularly when suspected of disloyalty or of hiding wealth. But otherwise the imperial administration would treat all as subjects of the empire. The histories of the empires of late middle ages and the early modern age, such as the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Mughal Empires bear out a distinct politics of security management through maintaining huge armies, complex revenue earning system, a complex structure of subsidiaries and alliances of groups or units, and a system of imperial arbitration of disputes happening within the imperial space. This was not only an early specimen of the reason of the state (*raison d'état*), this rationality entered into the proper state consciousness of modern age, when irrespective of the fact that the polity in question was not an empire, but a monarchy, or republic, it would always and invariably be a strong centralised system, but again focusing on security, that is to say stabilising the state. Reasons of state, laws, centralisation (which meant the gradual formation of standing professional armies) went together.

However, governance implies not the reason of the state, but *reason of government* – in other words, here the task is, how without using or minimally using violent means, that is to say without “securitising”, conflicts can be managed and if possible resolved. The governmental history is a long history of attempts to create a milieu where passions would be controlled, disloyalty would be nil almost, the occasions for coercion would be few and far between, and an atmosphere of civility would reign. This is a condition where we can say that governing becomes the soul of the state. We shall require less and less the monster called the state, because governing would mean rational administration of norms. It is through rational administration of norms that the emptiness of the state would be filled in, weak state would become strong, and citizens would not become once again unruly subjects engaging in politics of the streets.

Yet as we know not all conflicts were resolved in the way, exceptional powers were always needed at hand, and governmental reason in this way mixed with state reason. They overlapped, and today even though governmental rationality has its specific ways

of functioning, - such as arbitration of conflicts in ways so that the existence of the subjects of government always remain contingent upon governmental practices (these modes ranging from those of managing culture to turning an anonymous mass of population into identifiable, governable population units, from laying down norms of representation through elections to combining the policy of guaranteeing rights with ensuring methods of control of the subjects who are becoming citizens, in short an agenda of changing the face of society so that it becomes synonymous with a governable whole) – yet, classic issues of security, taxation, revenue raising, and war making still remain important. All in all, we are in a hybrid state.

The significant question here will be: In this hybrid scenario where the political society (neither the state, nor the government, but the society that assumes its social character only by being political) stands on the divide or the intersection of both kinds of reason, how do the political subjects, that is to say the members of this society, respond to this hybrid state?

I aim to give a possible answer to this question by studying a conflict situation, precisely speaking an interview, which is a neutral zone, to reflect on how traditional issues of state and governance fare in that twilight region, where a rebel ready to compromise gropes for a redefinition of some of the classic issues of politics and finds that governmental rationality is really not a departure but a continuity of the *raison d'état*?

In the eyes of the state the question of rebellion is clear – it is to be crushed because it is a challenge to sovereignty. But for government, the assignment is not simple and straight. Precisely because conflicts are not to be crushed, but are to be governed, the government faces the reality of the discontented subject. The fact of course is that the political subject arises in modern history as the *other*, the *counter figure of sovereignty*. This figure of the subject that has run counter to the sovereign norms of authority and power has found its expression in many ways – as I have shown elsewhere, the *Wahabi*, the mutinous soldier, the terrorist-revolutionary, the figure that tries to cut the bonds of memory to rise in action, the figure that courts death as well as practices dialogue, the figure that the regime of rule of law tries to subordinate and yet the figure that exceeds the conditions of subjection and assumes the agency of the subject. The process of subject formation (called *subjectivation* or *subjectification*) therefore runs differently, though related to, from the process of formation of modern sovereignty (based on *subjection*). We can say that *subjectivation* has thus within it *subjection*, yet overcomes the latter in its own process. In the history of this figure of counter sovereignty we can witness various articulations of a different idea of sovereignty, articulations that pose the problematic of war/ politics/ governance in a different way. Politics (specifically speaking dialogic politics) here sits at the heart of any such alternative idea of sovereignty, a resultant act of displacement. It is time to examine the idea of the political subject from this angle. This angle runs counter to the idea of sovereignty, also counter to governmental rationality, hence is able to problematise the issue of war/ politics/ governance in a new way.

I want to problematise an interview that some years ago the BBC had with Thuingalam Muivah, the Naga rebel leader. The transcript shows not only the problematic of sovereignty caught in this dual rationality, but also and this is important for me, how the political subject views the problematic in the mirror of practical reasoning. If practical reasoning was at the bottom of the transition of the first kind of reason to the other kind, can there be any other kind of reasoning? What kind of reasoning does Thuingalam

Muivah pose as challenge for us? I want to also show, why dialogue as the mode of the neutral become a problem not only for the state, but for the logic of governance too? Can we then say that the imperative is to find another language of politics that prises open the *aporia* of the two enmeshed reasons, state and governmental? I want to show that Thuingalam Muivah in this interview (where he discusses the problem of sovereignty, modes of conflict resolution, etc.) challenges us to see if we are ready to innovate, to view the dual problematic of state rationality and governmental rationality from the angle of the political subject, of the *governed*. I am thereby suggesting that the dialogic rationality belongs to neither of the two, though it has links with them. It is the third face, the third dimension, the way out of the *aporia*.

Citizens in the making - schooling processes, student practices, youth cultures and the making of citizens: France and India

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Processes of global movement, although increasingly about physical and psychological traversals, and the movement of people giving rise to the experience of fluid identities, are really about exclusion and difference. Borders are crossed, within nations and transnationally, but simultaneously, in the context of the nation and nationhood, there is an experience of 'othering', undoubtedly heightened post 9/11 in the western world, and entangled with the webs of history in Asia's, and indeed in Europe's, troubled past and present. The movement of people transnationally has therefore resulted in fluidity in identities, a well-worn trope in studies of migration, but concurrently, within nations, in the production of more specifically grounded identities in relation to the nation. My work focuses on how the spaces of secondary schools in different cultural and regional contexts seek to develop/ build/ create national identities. I am particularly interested in the lived experience of young people as they negotiate their way through school texts, pedagogic practices, and interactive processes, including peer cultures, in the making of their identities as citizens in a changing world. In these contexts, what binds the experience of young people in these cultures? What makes them so similar even as they rest in different cultures, languages and indeed civilizations that are distinctive in their markedly dissimilar social and cultural realities?

I am concerned also with an understanding of the psychological dimensions of citizenship, experienced through emotions such as belonging, as to belong contains the experience of an emotional tie or even love for the nation and how this is produced in young minds, through bodily practices and emotional bonds. Like Veronique Benei, I seek to therefore focus on 'the emotional and embodied production of the political' (2008:7) through educational spaces. However, I depart from Benei in my contention that this production, although present in schools, takes shape and form through contestation and negotiation, as student cultures never fully accept what they are supposed to accept and in that sense I am concerned with the creation of citizenship ideals by students themselves in the process of identity formation in the spaces of schools. The relationship between belonging, an aspect of the experience of identity, and exclusion, the experience of othering, is fraught with the struggles and dilemmas of seeking to be part of a legitimate space that belongs to the 'authentic' citizen. I have sought to understand this relationship in diverse global settings, namely, France and India, with vastly different historical, social and cultural contexts that to my mind all connect, perhaps not in their rhetoric of justice, equality, democracy and secularism, but certainly in the prevailing conditions of violence and social exclusion that prevail inspite of their apparent commitment to justice and democracy.

I seek therefore to locate the threads that might tie together at some point and be disengaged at others, in this complex and heterogeneous global space that we all understand as modernity. I therefore suggest that the problems that beset the constitution of identity in relation to citizenship are not isolated dilemmas of societies in their particularity; rather, they are a predicament of contemporary society that is based on frameworks that increasingly celebrate individualism, separation, and difference. I therefore suggest that the problems that are apparently distinctive to a society because

of a certain history, or political and socio-economic framework, become similar to other societies that have different histories but face similar dilemmas in different forms in modern times.

At the time I conducted fieldwork in May 2006, France had experienced extreme violence in Parisian suburbs as an outcome of discrimination against North Africans and their marginalization both socially and in the labour force. The banlieues are perceived as urban spaces 'where tension and violence prevail as modes of collective expression' (Kastoryano 2006). Families in these spaces do not choose to live there; they are forced to due to poverty and lack of upward mobility. And the permanent nature of the settlements in the suburbs is, it is argued, the bastion of 'non-integration' (ibid.). To quote in full:

'Rage has settled in those spaces. It is expressed through violence. Verbal violence, political violence, and physical violence guide interpersonal relations in public; it has its own rules and is part of the "street code"...with a specific language and accent. Violence gives the neighbourhood a territorial and ethnic collective expression, a means of ruling by provocation. Acts are localized. Solidarities are made, unmade and remade. The combination produces a fragile and incidental structure that appears mainly as a challenge to the law'.

In these 'high priority urban zones', there are schools that exist as 'high priority zones of education' in an apparent affirmative action that seeks in fact to 'reinforce the negative images of these territories of identities' (ibid.). I therefore did not consciously study a school in such an area but sought to instead understand schooling processes at a college, the college Françoise Derre (a pseudonym), in a south-eastern suburb of Paris. My objective was to understand the contemporary scenario in the teaching and understanding of civic education at a college which was not obviously located in the more troubled northern outskirts of Paris. If we can understand the so-called 'normal' and the ordinary, that seeks to produce and reproduce the 'normal', the authentic, the domain of difference and deviance might become clear. It is when we can understand how civic education is transacted in schooling spaces that are considered problem-free that we can begin to understand how the construction of the normalcy creates or results in difference, marginalisation and exclusion.

My findings suggest that the college makes a rather focused and sustained effort year after year to build love, and a bond with the nation through the sacrifice of human life and the spectacle of war through, for example, annual visits to Verdun. There is a failure however in the students' inability to connect with the purpose. Their goals, urges, desires rest in the life of the student culture which is articulated in the senior classes through the presence of a culture of drugs and the peddling of drugs within school premises. The school therefore represents the space where drugs and different forms of violence take shape and are routinised. These forms of violence range from bullying and ragging, known as 'le racquet' and the more frightening forms where students attempt to strangle other students until the 'last moment', as the Principal told us with horror. There are also verbal taunts against children who are Jews and against girl students. Keeping a 'check' on the violence and security of the college for students becomes the main priority of the Ministry which is therefore not apparently concerned with the distant task of developing 'love' for the nation.

At the same time, students' responses (in the same class of 25 students, 13 boys and 12 girls) to a question in a larger questionnaire about their favourite figure from history from among Louis XIV, Napoleon, Robespierre, Danton and Marat elicited the following response. There was no overwhelming selection of a particular personality. One fourth of students left the question blank, another one fourth selected Louis XIV as their favourite choice. Their reasons ranged from "Because he was loved by women", to "Because he is a personality who was important in history and even if he was bad, he was not consciously bad" to "He is the only king who reigned for a long time and he contributed to the blossoming (essor) of France". There is almost a casual concern with history and its figures. There are a few students who do however admire Napoleon for his ambition, his ability to strategise and conquer new territories, his taking a 'new step to help humanity' as well as one student mentioning his aversion to Napoleon's use of violence. On the whole, students exhibit a lack of concern and even chide the researcher for asking meaningless questions.

In the context of urban Indian schools, we find that the relationship between understandings of identity and citizenship is fraught with tensions and uncertainties as there are conflicting expressions and understandings of citizenship based not just on the varying backgrounds of students that endow them with different forms of capital but, most importantly, on the images and understandings of citizenship given out in the classroom and beyond. This complex situation plays itself out in the lives of students who experience identity and subjecthood in vastly different ways. It is important to emphasise that identities are in no way experienced as exclusive and, as Hasan and Asaduddin point out, 'identities are inclusive and often rooted in local cultures, languages, oral traditions, influenced by complex historical processes' (2002:15). However, the efforts of fundamentalists, theologians and politicians have in the past damaged this multi-layered experience of identity which is often axiomatically boxed into particular cultural or religious idioms.

The Hindu obsession with the Muslim 'other' has existed for several decades in Indian society but has taken dangerous forms in the riots that have taken place in recent years in which thousands of Muslims have lost their homes and lives. The relationship between the Muslims and the Hindus has a history which points to the continuous mistrust between them in spite of close friendships and networks among individuals and families. This has created a certain anxiety in sections of society that believe they have reason to fear the Muslims as violent, marauding and oppressive others. This is partly due to the history textbooks in schools that have portrayed Muslims in a particular way and this has been the subject of several studies.

My emphasis however is on the fact that students do not actually remember very much of what is written in texts as the pedagogic encounter in most state and many private schools in India rests on the 'dictation of notes' as its singular method of communication. Students, I have discovered in the years of my interaction with them, take down these notes with the express purpose of merely repeating them in the annual examinations and with no further interest in them. They usually do not engage in a dialogue with teachers out of fear of reprimand and are apparently passive participants in the process. They are however rather clear about the fact that while these notes are not important, they can provide their own understanding of the historical and contemporary moments that frame interpersonal relations in particular directions. In this process, the Muslim is always the enemy, located in the tragedy of the political partition of the country and the demonization of Muslims by the rhetoric of textbooks, right wing organizations

and the painful memories of those who lived the difficult and traumatic times of division and conflict. This is the scenario in which students express their understandings of what it means to be a 'good' citizen in the contemporary moment of India's modernity.

The idea of the 'good' citizen, in Indian schools, serves to dwell on and reproduce ideas about the 'practice' of good citizenship through developing certain socially desirable behavioural traits and practices. This is done through developing a respect for authority, the rule, the law, socially constituted and legitimised norms for good behaviour that are rewarded and reproduced, and through rituals and ceremonies in school, a reiteration of national ideals, a celebration of collective life and the value of an ideal community. The obedience that is sought to be inculcated reflects a concern with developing a particular kind of subjectivity that recognizes the necessity of compliance and agrees to submit, rather than question, in view of the complexities that prevail among the school lives of children. Apart from this limitation, the more damaging omission is the complete lack of actively developing a concern and empathy for others regardless of their caste, class, religion, or gender.

My study of a government school located in a crowded area of northern Delhi, where children of the working class and poor study, shows the extent to which students are completely alienated from the efforts of the state to inculcate. The writings of class 9 students for example point to their complete disavowal of privileging the authority of the textbook in articulating their preference from among the leaders of the national struggle against the colonialist regime. They are almost unanimous in voicing their preference for the one leader who, in their minds, used violence and led a passionate struggle against authority and British rule. Gandhi is clearly not the preferred choice. Although almost equal numbers of students prefer Gandhi and Bhagat Singh over other leaders, Bhagat Singh is valorised for his spirit of sacrifice and the belief that had he not been there, India would not have attained freedom from British rule. The reasons they give for their support of Bhagat Singh point to the ideals of aggression, violence, fearlessness within an overall language of social acceptability, viz. the value of 'sacrifice' for the nation-state. Although textbooks do not 'teach' this particular contribution made by Bhagat Singh, students seem to have imbibed it from somewhere.

The popular culture, through Bollywood films, television, folklore, stories, comic books, no doubt influences student constructions of valour and heroism. The peer group further develops these understandings into a more coherent perspective and provides legitimacy to that which would otherwise remain embedded in the 'private' worlds of children, unspoken and unknown to others, especially teachers and other adults. Textbook teaching which is about government education does not prepare students for supporting violence but clearly, the student culture remains committed to its own values and perceptions of India's past and role in the present. Gandhi's emphasis on non-violence as a strategic tool is not understood by these youth who view him in fact as a traitor, betraying the cause of freedom for moral and idealistic causes such as non-violence and truth. The students do not accept the official discourse of how India's freedom movement flourished under the leadership of Gandhi. In addition, they have a heightened sense of patriotism to the nation which is marked by their idea that the policing of borders is necessary in order to keep out the dangerous Muslim other embodied in the figure of the Pakistani national. They extol the virtues of violence in dealing with the hostile and dangerous other. In this manner, they have developed their own understanding of being a 'good' citizen in modern India, that is caught in the twist of a troubled past and the

politics of the fundamentalist right. This then is their 'moral and political engagement with the world' as they see it.

The Indian students' appropriation of 'sacrifice' as a symbol of valour and patriotism is in stark contrast to the French students' rejection of the sacrifice of French soldiers in the war. It is the flamboyant Louis XIV who is their preferred leader. The Indian students reject the symbols of peace and collective life that are placed before them by the school in its efforts to promote patriotism and nationalism. In turn, they accept violence as the singular way of life to maintain borders and keep nations secure. Violence appears to be a significant component of the school lives of French youth as well. Violence therefore appears as a recurring motif in youth cultures in two vastly differing societies and constitutes their lived experience. In this context, how do we understand the 'idea' of the nation and students' relationship to it, as it is shaped in different spaces of secondary schools? What is the experience of citizenship for the heterogeneous populations in different societies? And why has violence captured the imagination of young people around the world? Is the nation-state a complete failure as it is unable to understand and support the diversity of its people? These are questions for further research and in answering them, we need to perhaps focus on the students belonging to 'minority' populations to understand better their lived experience of being 'othered', excluded, marginalized, and the relationship, emotional bond, that they develop to the nation in the context of this experience. It is through our understanding of the complex and vexed experience of becoming citizens in different societies that we might then begin to understand the causes of violence in contemporary times.

India and EU facing the challenge of a new multilateralism. Looking at the evolving Indian-European partnership

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The paper explores a possible third way between mere instrumental bilateral/ multilateral cooperation among states and cosmopolitan dialogue about universal values.

Of course, the instrumental cooperation matters (economic, technological etc), but is far below what would be possible to achieve between two complex entities such as India and EU. Sharing the UN values is also very relevant as a common framework for people understanding; however, it risks being quite vague and general. Furthermore, the question of the universality of values as human rights and religious tolerance is often critically addressed as Eurocentric and will be raised as an obstacle.

The wished middle way would therefore consist in going beyond the mere realist logic of alliance and cooperation between powers and spheres of influences within a new multipolar order and take stock of the most innovative features of both Indian and European cultures of governance of the last 60 years: on the one hand the internal federalist tolerant, democratic culture of India; on the other hand, the experience of EU internal governance, sharing and pooling national sovereignties towards regional cooperation and convergence.

Paving the way to a deeper and broader multilateral and bilateral cooperation would provide much more than mere conflict prevention even if less than universal norm setting. What we need is a path towards a joint Euro-India research agenda, regarding cultures of governance which could be relevant for other federal states and regional entities as well.

By committing them self to this joint innovative agenda, both India and EU are challenged to take some critical distance from the agendas of other global players: India from the multipolar agenda of China and other emerging powers; and the EU from the assertive universal agenda of the US and from its west-centred orientation.

To what extent is this middle way innovating traditional multilateral cooperation? What is at stake is a special kind of new idea of multilateralism emphasizing the best European and India achievements: on the one hand, the EU external relations as linking the underpinning internal multilateral negotiation among the 27, and the external deal with the "strategic partner"; on the other hand, India emphasizing the unique experience of democratically managing internal diversity at the scale of more than 1 billion people.

New multilateral cooperation is also including dialogue and cooperation about the respective social system reforms, the respective paths towards a more sustainable development, the possible joint research in view of innovative models of knowledge society, human and democratic rights protection, and the implications of these internal patterns for global regional and governance.

What do we mean by new multilateral cooperation?

The joint research agenda should work on the following nine issues of multilateralism as:

- a) a value and as a part of a belief system and not merely as a means, a consumption good, an instrument, an *ad hoc method of governance*. As identity marker new multilateralism could be more efficient than the traditional concept of “internationalism”). In any case, if asserted in a consistent way, this feature would improve the EU’s image, drawing the attention of the EU as a value-based political community, not only stopping any security dilemma by neighbours, but also allowing that political community to act as a single actor at global stage.
- b) a multilevel and multidimensional form of governance and not only as a global trade focused one. Multilevel means 4 levels of global governance: an enhanced role of intraregional multilateralism (cooperation among neighbouring states), interregional partnerships (between regional and macro-states belonging to different continents);
- c) based on diffuse reciprocity and not on simple reciprocity;
- d) both functional, issue-driven and territorial, rather than just territorial or functional;
- e) sovereignty-pooling and not sovereignty-enhancing mode of institutionalized governance;
- f) an increasingly inclusive form of governance: neither traditionally exclusive, nor illusory, by its utopian universalistic promises².
- g) a transnational-cooperation form and not merely a set of interstate regimes;
- h) a political framework for a global coalition for change, rather than a technocratic-diplomatic management of the *status quo*;
- i) a pluri-legitimate form of governance. Unlike any kind of democratic state, however multilateral legitimacy should be more than contingent in the following ways: 1. providing ordinary citizens with benefits; 2. asserting universal values of human rights protection and democracy; 3. compatible with the standards set by the epistemic community; 4. including accountability mechanisms, at national and supranational levels.

This new multilateral approach would possibly lead to a new kind of universalism, a bottom-up universalism and a reform of universal organizations (UN, IMF, WTO...).

² The good quality of the “G5 Declaration” of August 2008 (Tokyo) brings evidence that the G20 is not the only possible alternative to the delegitimized G8 as leading body

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