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**...MILITARY DIMENSION...
AN INTEGRAL PART...
EU'S EXTERNAL ACTION...**

**...INTEGRATION
DOES NOT MEAN
AMALGAMATION.**

**...ENVIRON 2800
SOLDATS MALIENS... SUIVI
L'ENTRAÎNEMENT D'EUTM.**



**AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE
EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**

10 Months in Office: Progress in Integration and Comprehensiveness

By Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe (AT), EU Military Staff Director General



Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe (AT), Director General EUMS addresses the Polish National Defence University (NDU), Warsaw, in October 2013.

It gives me great pleasure to herald this summer's issue of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) 'IMPETUS' magazine by offering my own first impressions after 10 months in office. I wish to emphasize some highlights of our work and pay tribute to all those who make our achievements possible.

When I took over as Director General of the EUMS, the obvious challenges I had to face were to achieve further progress in the integration of the EU's military into the Comprehensive Approach, and to further promote the profile of the EUMS inside the External Action Service (EEAS). Much solid groundwork had been laid by my predecessor, but services and the environment continue to develop, at an accelerated pace.

I will therefore take this opportunity to highlight some of the more significant developments which emerged upon the average workload and offered additional possibilities for the EUMS to interact with its Brussels environment. I would like to highlight our experience in these areas, thus far.

Four key elements seem to me to be of particular significance in this context: The European Council on Defence as well as the security developments in Syria, the Central African Republic and Ukraine.

The European Council of December 2013 heralded the phrase "Defence matters". This appeal is even more evident in our current circumstances than it was even four months ago. The EUMS was fully integrated in all stages of preparation which finally led to the conclusions on ministerial, Heads of States and governments' level which now form the grid of our endeavour to improve key strands of CSDP. From a military perspective, I am convinced as a result of the Council clear messages that military capabilities are urgently needed. The military dimension is an integral part of the EU's external action and that cooperation is a prerequisite to maintaining and building capabilities. A broad sense of comprehensiveness permeates through all work strands defined by the Council.

These are the key tenets which will guide the EUMS' work and contribution to the broader EEAS achievements on the numerous taskings emanating from the Council. The staff's strongest involvement lies with Military Rapid Response. The situations we had to face over the past months demonstrate the importance of even better adapting our toolbox to the strategic and operational environment with which we are confronted. Cooperation with other services on this, and other strands, is positive and promising for the future. As an example, I would like to mention here the work on a maritime security strategy which is ongoing, and where we, together with the EUMC, were able to highlight a better understanding of the military dimension. This is a commendable start, but in the future, even earlier interaction on all levels is advisable. I am proud of our contribution to the European Council 2013 and the following elaboration on development lines as a valuable collaborative experience which enabled the staff to further integrate.

The highlighted developments in the EU's closer or more remote environment required the specific expertise of the military inside the EEAS. We learned to ameliorate the value of the Comprehensive Approach.

...military capabilities are urgently needed

The civil war in Syria descended to new lows in brutality and human loss in summer 2013, and the situation has not yet improved. The overall objectives of the EU remain to reduce human suffering, while gradually contributing to the improvement of conditions for a political solution. The role of the military in the EU could be characterized as providing situational awareness, including the provision of specific information. Supporting the EEAS' role in international efforts to contain the situation and to



support Delegations in the region is essential. All this was part of a broader initiative and there was no stand-alone military action. The EUMS provided planning expertise in the initial stage of the Chemical Weapon's Organization (OPCW) involvement with the removal and destruction of the Syrian government's chemical agents and ammunitions. This is an example for the EUMS delivering in short laudable notice temporary requirements. I expect more of this to occur in our work schedule, in future crisis situations. Here again, the military contribution was fully integrated with other services.

Late last year, the situation in the **Central African Republic** started to take on worrying symptoms of ethnic cleansing, with a risk of genocide. All ingredients of a CSDP military operation, embedded in a complex and comprehensive environment and including a clear requirement for rapid response, were highly evident in this case. The gravity of the humanitarian situation, combined with a serious lack of security, led to the urgent need for opening of humanitarian access by military means. Once again, the ability to plan quickly in order to facilitate an Operation Commander to start force generation was evident. This followed shortly after the Foreign Ministers expressed their political will to establish an operation, and is the product of integrated work. Naturally in such a situation, a large share of the burden lies with the military planners, but their product is embedded in a wider political, political-military and legal context. The complexity of this operation's environment underlines the need for comprehensiveness. The EUMS will continue now to support the operation wherever needed, safe in the knowledge that it is in excellent hands of the Operation Commander, Major General Philippe Pontières.

...thanking
all the
personnel of
my staff

Russia's attitude to relations with **Ukraine**, and particularly Crimea, reminded us sadly that respect for international law is not a given. This creates a new situation, the full consequences of which are not yet entirely visible. It is almost certain that, amongst many other elements, a military analysis will be needed to assess the effects on CSDP in its military dimension. The handling of the situation so far was mainly characterized by maintaining an enhanced level of situational awareness, and again, by reinforcing the EU-Delegation most involved. Such reinforcement can be used at a later stage as a starting point for a more visible presence of the EU. Again, and from the outset, the situation was multidisciplinary, complex, and led to a new form of comprehensiveness. I wish to emphasise that comprehensiveness is not only applicable in stabilisation, state building or post crisis management, but also in situations where all the players of the EU should sing from one hymn sheet. This will support a common policy in quite a different context, as in relation to Ukraine or Syria. The EUMS showed in these situations a broad spectrum of expertise and a high degree of readiness to respond to most urgent needs, alongside all other services involved.

Before concluding, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude. I wish to start by thanking all the personnel of my staff who regularly managed the frequently considerable extra workload with utmost efficiency and highest quality. It is not a lack of modesty to say that the EUMS' performance was well received by all stakeholders in EEAS and beyond. It is important to state that such a performance can only be sustained if Member States continue to provide the high quality of military personnel to the staff, as they have done in the past. I also wish to thank most sincerely Member



Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe (AT), Director General EU Military Staff, addresses the EUMS General Assembly, 31 March 2014.

States' support with the clear indication that this support needs to be maintained. To serve in the EUMS is not only in the interest of the EU's common performance in military external action, but also rewarding for each individual officer in terms of personal experience and added value for their post-EUMS assignments. Certainly, well trained military officers are a scarce resource and their posting to Brussels is often a strain on national resources. Therefore, they should be sent to the places where military expertise enhances the common endeavour and EUMS should have a very high priority here.

Much of the above holds true greatly for contributions to operations and missions. I recently was particularly heartened to see the brilliant personal engagement and example that our trainers offer to our missions dedicated

to build armed forces in Mali or Somalia. Building armed forces needs to be viewed in the long term; therefore we have to sustain our effort. Personnel and capabilities from Member States are the only resource which gives life to the military dimension of CSDP.


I also wish to commend other services, particularly the EEAS, and to stress the quality of cooperation, often in complex processes, where the need for military involvement was not always apparent from the beginning.

Summing up, I can look back positively on an intensive starting phase, on progressing integration of the military into the broader external effort of the EU and on a broadening implementation of the Comprehensive Approach. ■



Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe (AT), Director General EUMS speaking with Mr. Johan Raeder (SE), Director General for International Affairs, Ministry of Defence Sweden at the EU Policy Directors Meeting, Brussels 28 March 2014.

EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF



EUMS

Three Years & Three Cs

By Rear Admiral Bruce Williams (UK), EU Military Staff Deputy Director General



*Rear Admiral Bruce Williams (UK),
EUMS Deputy Director General*

As many have observed, it is often difficult to remember that, metaphorically, the object of your job was to drain the swamp when surrounded by crocodiles. As I approach the last few months of my 3 year tenure in the EUMS and, with the briefest of opportunities to reflect, it is clear how many advances the EUMS as an integral part of the EEAS, whilst being simultaneously responsible to the EU Military Committee, has made in that time. And advances made against a backdrop of an expanding operational portfolio.

Internally we have evolved into a less stove-piped, more adaptable organism – with much cross-pollination between directorates and an increased emphasis on a multi-disciplinary working group approach to problems. An approach that is a necessary consequence of the demands for increasing productivity from a lean, increasingly stretched, staff. Only by continued support by Member States to filling posts with quality personnel can we hope to deliver what is expected of us. When it comes to expertise, we are a structure built but one brick thick – each individual member of the staff covering a multitude of issues that in comparable staffs might be fulfilled by a number of desk officers.

**less stove-
piped, more
adaptable
organism**

Notwithstanding such advances, however, inevitably reform of the EUMS will be required to match the realities of the new EEAS environment, as described by the HR/VP's Review last year, if it is to remain fit for purpose. This purpose must depend on being ever more integrated with our civilian colleagues to deliver the CSDP input into the Comprehensive Approach and to remove the frictions consequent of historic mandates that pre-date the EEAS. But integration does not mean amalgamation. Our collective strength must be built on our unique attributes – our differences – and not result in the subordination of the military instrument by the larger diplomatic mass of the EEAS. The military's unique selling point is how it delivers collective military advice (not a set of military opinions) through tried and tested military staff process. And provision of a capability robust enough to deliver effect in even the most challenging of circumstances where others have often ceased to operate.

But in delivering that future of a military instrument ever more integrated into the EEAS whole, we face three big challenges now: coping with complexity, juggling with concurrency and assuring credibility – the three Cs.

Coping with complexity is more than just an assessment of how intellectually challenging the operational portfolio is becoming. It is also about rapid growth in relative risk to our people on the front line. Some will argue, of course, we have been there before; in EUFOR CHAD for instance. However, I believe the difference is now that we have to deal with the complexity consequent of the concerted, post Lisbon Treaty, effort to deliver truly Comprehensive effect. This means isolated military action is a thing of the past – no use of this instrument can now be conceived without recourse to the consequential effects and relationships with other instruments. Thus, although designing new initiatives can be resource and time consuming, once agreed, the impact of military action is significantly amplified when part of Comprehensive action. For example Operation ATALANTA's¹ disruption of pirate logistics dumps (an extremely modest military intervention by any measure) has generated long lasting impact well beyond what hitherto might have been expected of such limited military action by, effectively, being encouraged by other instruments to do so.

¹ EUNAVFOR Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Part of the complexity tapestry is also about economy of effort and realisation that in almost all cases a number of stakeholders will have interests in any particular situation. The growth of Military to Military relations, in support of wider partnership engagement, has become an essential complementary growth area. Again, given EU interests are global, this expansion of the EUMS's workload, without increase in the staff, has been utterly dependant on the innovation and internal reform of the EUMS mentioned above.

This rapid expansion of diverse tasks raises the second key challenge – juggling concurrency. Limited numbers of staff, and a remit stretching from concepts and capability development to current operations, means prioritisation of effort is vital. But one can only stretch the elastic so far and the EUMS's finite limit is now closing all too rapidly. In my three years I have seen staff productivity climb in both quantity and quality of output. Clearly implementation of the HR/VP's EEAS Review is now fundamental to helping sustain such improvements in both productivity and output.

Of course, much cannot be planned for. Unexpected emergent crises are inevitable. So developing a contingent capability of sufficient mass to absorb short term shocks will have to be factored into the design of processes to manage concurrency. Unsurprisingly (given the obvious strand running through this article), I believe the demands imposed by a combination of routine plus contingent capacity points to the need for a larger staff in the future. In these days of fiscal deficits and economic downturns, with an emphasis on savings and contraction, that would appear to 'buck the trend'. But I would contend this is not 'empire building'. Indeed such change should be modest – after all, having run such staffs for many years, I remain convinced that a relatively lean staff is often a more productive team than an over-resourced one. The EUMS

needs to be bench-marked to ensure it has sufficient resources to match future realities.

All of which leads to the last principal challenge now facing the EUMS – assuring our credibility. Failure at either of the first two challenges will irrevocably damage credibility amongst the wider military community. But much worse than that would be the failure to truly demonstrate the military instrument as an indispensable actor in the Comprehensive Approach. Trust that has built up with our civilian counterparts over the last 3 years has enabled even seemingly diametrically opposite mandates to work well together in the same operational space – for example the EUMS, who has an entirely partial mandate, and the very positive relationship with DG ECHO's entirely impartial mandate in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Three years and three Cs – given the not inconsiderable resource and mandate constraints, the EUMS has, and is, in my opinion adapting rapidly to the new reality of becoming an ever more integral component of the EEAS. There is much more to come and far more to offer, provided the appetite for change is not stifled by process and bureaucracy and a lack of proper resources. I feel immensely privileged to have been part of those first steps, of the EUMS in the EEAS, and equally proud of the team I will soon leave. But, in itself, that change is one of the strengths of this staff. Its continuous renewal, pumping new blood into an experiment in Comprehensiveness, that shows all the signs of becoming a world leader by daring to be different. Albert Einstein is reported to have said ***"we cannot solve our problems with the same type of thinking we used when we created them"***. I would beg to suggest we are in the process of setting the new way; with Europe, more than ever, recognised as a global security and defence provider who makes a difference where we are needed. ■

...
adapting
rapidly ...
becoming an ever
more integral
component of
the EEAS



Finnish Visit to the EUMS, 20 February 2014
From L to R: Rear Admiral Juha Sakari Rannikko (FI Navy), Chief of the Defence Command, Finnish Defence Forces, and Rear Admiral Bruce Williams (UK), EUMS Deputy Director General

EUTM Somalia – A New Start in Mogadishu

By Commander Stefan Mattsson (SE), EU Military Staff Operations Directorate



'Handover Take Over Parade', Mogadishu.

From Left to Right: Rear Admiral B. Williams (UK, Deputy Director General, EUMS), Brigadier General G. Aherne (IE, outgoing Mission Commander), Somalia Minister of Defence – Mr. M. Sheikh Hassan Hamud, Special Envoy of the EU to Somalia – Mr. M. Cervone D'Urso, and Brigadier General M. Mingiardi (IT, incoming Mission Commander)

The European Union's military training mission in Somalia, EUTM Somalia, was launched in April 2010 as part of the EU's comprehensive engagement in this conflict ravaged country. In response to the needs of the Somali people, the Mission aims to support the stabilization of Somalia and develop the country's security sector. Until the end of 2013, EUTM Somalia operated mainly in Uganda, however the extension of the Mission's mandate in March 2013 directed a significant change of focus. From 2014 EUTM Somalia's activities will be conducted in Somalia itself, particularly in Mogadishu. The Mission has been extremely successful to date, contributing to the training of approximately 3,600 Somali soldiers, with a special focus on training Non-Commissioned Officers, Junior Officers, Specialists and Trainers.

**EUTM
Somalia...
enhances the
Somali-owned
training
capacity...**

The last Somali trainees in Uganda

The last intake of Somali trainees to be trained in Bihanga Training Camp in Uganda arrived in September 2013. This well-established training package, conducted in close co-operation between the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force and EUTM Somalia, specialised in Company Commander Leadership, Combat Engineering, Military Intelligence and Civilian-Military (CIMIC) cooperation. The Mission has also trained many of the Somali soldiers to become instructors themselves, aiming to enhance the Somali-owned training capacity. In addition to this, the trainees received training in human rights, international humanitarian law, gender awareness, communications and combat lifesaving.

After three months of intense training, the 138 Somali soldiers of the last intake had their final parade in Bihanga Training Camp in December 2013. The ceremony was hosted by the former Mission Commander, Brigadier General Gerald Aherne (IE), in the presence of General Patrick de Rousiers (FR), Chairman of the European Union Military Committee. Also present at the ceremony was Major General David Muhoozi, Ugandan People's Defence Forces Land Forces Commander and Brigadier General Abdirizak Khalif Elmi, Deputy Commander of Defence Forces in Somalia. General de Rousiers expressed, on behalf of the Chiefs of Defence of the 28 Member States of the EU, their pleasure with the fruitful partnership between the EU, Uganda, the United States of America (US), the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Somali Authorities.

With the completion of the activities in Uganda, EUTM Somalia has trained approximately 3,600 Somali personnel, significantly contributing to strengthening the Somali National Security Forces that are dedicated to the improvement of the security situation in Mogadishu and beyond. General Elmi summarised the excellent results of the training carried out in Bihanga in one sentence, which he addressed to the Somali soldiers: *"Yesterday you started training as warriors but today you are professionals"*. He also passed on very warm words of thanks to the EUTM Somalia personnel stating that *"Mogadishu is your home and you are always welcome"*.

Move to Mogadishu

In parallel with the training activities in Uganda and with the security conditions in Mogadishu improving, the Mission established a **M**entoring **A**dvisory **T**raining **E**lement Headquarters (MATE HQ) in Mogadishu International Airport (MIA). The Mission continued to build its capacities, culminating in the declaration of Initial Operating Capability of the MATE HQ in Mogadishu on 7 May 2013. This was a major milestone in the EU's engagement and commitment to Somalia. It marked the beginning of the first permanent Post-Transition deployment by the EU in Somalia. The MATE HQ served as the Mission's initial establishment, preparing for the move to Mogadishu. It also delivered mandated activities by having regular meetings within the confines of MIA between the Mission's Mentors/Advisors and their Somali counterparts within the Somali Ministry of Defence



EUTM Somalia 'Strategic Advisory Team' Workshop arranged in Mogadishu with representatives of the Somali Government and the International Community

and General Staff. This included specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain and support and advice on security sector development.

In early 2014 the Mission had completed the move of the Mission Headquarters to Mogadishu. This means that all EUTM Somalia activities, including advising, mentoring and training, can now be carried out in Mogadishu, with the support of a Liaison Office in Nairobi and a Support Cell in Brussels.

The security situation in Somalia was, and remains, a cause for concern. The threat level in Mogadishu remains high and this, of course, has had an impact on the expansion of EU activities in Mogadishu. The Mission has made good progress in terms of establishing force protection measures. All preconditions for commencing activities both within the EUTM Somalia compound and at locations where the Mission will engage with their Somali counterparts in the future, outside of MIA, have been met. Force protection is a primary planning consideration for the Mission Commander, and remains an integral part of all EUTM Somalia activities.

EUTM Somalia continues to deliver

Brigadier General Massimo Mingiardi (IT) was appointed the new Mission Commander for EUTM Somalia by the EU's Political and Security Committee on 17 December 2013. He

assumed his duties on 15 February 2014, succeeding Brigadier General Gerald Aherne (IE), who had held the position since February 2013.

EUTM Somalia continues to operate in close cooperation and coordination with other international actors, particularly the UN, and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Planned activities for 2014 include continued advice and mentoring to the Somali Minister of Defence and the General Staff, including specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain and support and advice on security sector development. In addition, the Mission will continue to train and mentor Somali trainers who will, during the course of 2014, train approximately 1,300 soldiers of the Somali National Armed Forces in Mogadishu. This constitutes a major step forward towards a Somali-owned and led self-sustainable training organization. In addition, EUTM Somalia will also train specialists in four distinct areas:

- Administration;
- Non Commissioned Officer Training;
- Company Commander Training; and
- Military Intelligence

Other EU activities to support the Security Sector in Somalia

EUTM Somalia is a part of the wider EU political and diplomatic effort in Somalia. A range of EU instruments, in cooperation with international partners, contribute to the build-up and strengthening of the Somali security sector. The EU Naval Force - Operation ATALANTA, contributes to the prevention and deterrence of piracy and the protection of vulnerable shipping. Through its civilian mission EUCAP Nestor, the EU also contributes to building the capacities of coastal police and the judiciary in Somalia, among other countries in the Horn of Africa region. In addition, EU development aid supports alternative livelihoods, thus contributing to deter piracy recruitment. The EU has significantly contributed to AMISOM, the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, since its launch in March 2007, both financially and with planning and capacity building through the African Peace Facility. ■

**EUTM
Somalia is a
part of the wider
EU political and
diplomatic effort
in Somalia**



Somali military instructors previously trained by EUTM Somalia, return to train Somali soldiers in Mogadishu

Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) - A Part of the EU Comprehensive Approach

By Colonel Jozef Kozlowski, PhD (PL), EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate and Mr. Jose-Miguel Palacios-Coronel, PhD (ES), EU Intelligence Analysis Centre

Strategic intelligence focuses on issues at the macro level, while retaining links to tactical and operational issues and outcomes. It is, first of all, a manager's tool. It is all about decision-making on important and overarching issues. No leader or manager can be expected to function with full effectiveness without factual data. No one can hope to properly progress further ideas and projects without a high degree of understanding of relevant issues. Strategic intelligence is a key to providing this enhanced level of understanding. Strategic intelligence, intelligence at tactical and operational dimensions are all complementary - not competitive. They need to closely interact and preferably, where circumstances permit, integrate.

EU Intelligence Structures

The European Union Military Staff Intelligence Directorate (EUMS INT) and European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INT Cen) are the only European External Action Service (EEAS) bodies capable of delivering all-source intelligence. Their production processes are mainly based on the support provided by the Member States (MS) Civilian Intelligence / Security Services and Defence Intelligence Organisations (DIO), which allows both the civilian and military dimensions to be covered.

EUMS INT provides intelligence input to early warning and situation assessment. It contributes to the EU Military Staff (EUMS) planning through the provision of intelligence and intelligence planning expertise. In addition, EUMS INT provides the intelligence input to crisis response planning and assessment for EU military operations, civilian missions and exercises worldwide.

EUMS INT Directorate is organised into three branches: **Policy**, **Support** and **Production**. This structure was adopted from the very beginning of its existence. The **Policy** Branch is responsible for developing intelligence-related concepts in close co-ordination with relevant EU civilian bodies. It also contributes to the planning of EU military operations / civilian missions as well as prepares scenarios and intelligence specifications for exercises.

Intelligence **Support** Branch is in charge of fostering relations with EU Member States' DIOs. It also manages the flow of information and intelligence between EUMS INT and DIOs, co-operates with the EU Satellite Centre (EU SATCEN), and performs a co-ordinating role for future developments in the domain of intelligence.

Production Branch is the key component of EUMS INT. Analysts working in this branch are grouped into thematic and regional

sections. This entity works in close co-operation with EU INT Cen within the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) framework to develop together joint, all source intelligence products. The SIAC is an internal EEAS arrangement between the EU INT Cen and EUMS INT to bring together the EEAS intelligence analysis capacity into a single functional arrangement (Figure 1).




Figure 1 EU Intelligence Landscape (source: SIAC)

The EU INT Cen is the most recent name for an entity that was created in 2002 as the EU Joint Situation Centre. It monitors events in order to provide intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness to Catherine Ashton (High Representative / Vice-President). It focuses particularly on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats.

The EU INT Cen is currently composed of two Divisions. The Analysis Division - divided into sections - provides strategic analysis based on input from the security and intelligence services of MS. The General and External Relations Division deals with legal, administrative and Information Technology (IT) issues and provides open source support.

**EUMS
INT ... input
to early warning
and situation
assessment**

EEAS Intelligence Support Architecture

Instantaneously with the establishment of the EEAS and against the existing environment, EU intelligence elements have initiated the development of guidelines for intelligence support for the EEAS. The idea was to take into account all relevant developments and design an intelligence support package - to define responsibilities, provide direction

and guidance, create provisions for effective production and fast, secure and reliable dissemination of intelligence products.

The outcome of this whole process was the HR / VP Decision from 2012 establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS Intelligence Support Architecture (ISA). The ISA also includes provisions on coordination and liaison with the MS intelligence organisations, European Commission and with international organisations.



Figure 2 EEAS HQ Building in Brussels (source: EEAS)

The above-mentioned HR / VP Decision defines “intelligence” as information that has been collected, processed and disseminated for the use by decision makers and other customers and ISA as structures, processes and activities related to intelligence. It aims to optimise the intelligence function within the EEAS and encourages close cooperation and coordination across EU institutions and between intelligence stakeholders.

The ISA includes two central structures - the Intelligence Steering Board (ISB) and Intelligence Working Group (IWG). The Secretariat function for both ISB and IWG is provided jointly by EU INTCEN and EUMS INT.

The ISB defines intelligence requirements and priorities at the strategic level as well as endorsing structural, organisational and policy measures required to improve the Architecture. It also provides guidance to address deficiencies in the field of security. The Board is chaired by the HR / VP or EEAS Executive Secretary General (ESG).

The IWG further defines, specifies and adjusts EEAS intelligence requirements and priorities. In particular, it proposes the strategic intelligence direction and Prioritised Intelligence Requirements (PIR) for the intelligence. The IWG synchronises the tasking of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), defines SIAC product range, develops and monitors a feedback mechanism. The IWG is co-chaired by the Director EU INTCEN and Director EUMS INT.

Intelligence Dimension of the EU Comprehensive Approach

In 2006, based on the framework of the follow-up to the Hampton Court process, the Secretary General / High

Representative (SG / HR), Javier Solana, proposed the establishment of a more effective situation and risk assessment capacity. The idea at that time was to bring together, in a functional way, analytical capacities from both the EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN, now renamed EU INTCEN) and EUMS INT, thus benefiting from a wide EU knowledge base for producing enhanced and reliable intelligence. This resulted in the SIAC arrangement initiated by directors of EUMS and EU SITCEN in the beginning of 2007. In addition, and in line with the Comprehensive Approach concept, the EU intelligence community intensified its efforts to widen the scope of access to and utilization of all the information and data already available within the EU.

In this way, EU INTCEN and EUMS INT embarked on a Comprehensive Approach at a very early stage of its manifestation. They have become one of the EU forerunners in the field of producing synergies by a joint civilian-military approach. However, it is necessary to note that irrespective of internal arrangements, the quality of the SIAC products still predominantly depends on the value of the contributions from MS. Although some hurdles have yet to be overcome, the enhanced effect of the SIAC approach to intelligence has already been widely recognised by most actors within the EU.

Between 2007 to 2010 the production was relatively stable and EU INTCEN and EUMS INT have been working in close co-operation to generate together the whole range of all-source intelligence products. However, since end 2010 and the transfer of EU SITCEN and EUMS to EEAS, it has grown about 40% annually. This can be attributed to an increase in the number of intelligence customers, and a still increasing demand for intelligence products.

What Future Holds for EU Intelligence

With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, new challenges have emerged for the EU intelligence community. New organizational structures, new actors and new customer requirements require re-focused intelligence support. In a rapidly changing strategic environment, the need for accurate and timely intelligence products has also become even more visible.

To meet all these challenges, further systemic transformation is needed. At this stage, it is essential to revise and optimise processes, change the information sharing intelligence culture within the EU, adopt suitable technology and adjust the conceptual approach to the intelligence support function. In short, promote intelligence within the EU, as well as produce intelligence for the EEAS with a more operational and dynamic approach.

To this end, the enhancement of co-operation between EU INTCEN and EUMS INT will be constantly examined and focused on streamlining / harmonizing working processes, and providing additional synergetic effects. This also comprises the development and implementation of a future secure EU intelligence domain within the wider EEAS IT systems support architecture as a vital prerequisite to exploit fully the potential of enhanced intelligence support. ■

**enhancement
of co-operation
between EU INTCEN
and EUMS INT ...
constantly examined ...
providing additional
synergetic effects**

EU Missions and Operations



Since 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 30 missions and operations under CSDP. 9 are military operations/missions. The remainder are civilian missions. Currently, the EU is undertaking 15 missions and operations under CSDP (5 military and 10 civilian missions).

| Missions/Operations | Military | Civilian |
|---------------------|---|---|
| MIDDLE EAST | | EUJUST LEX-Iraq (Iraq), Mar 05 - 31 Dec 13 EUPOL-COPPS (occupied Palestinian territory), Jan 06 - 30 Jun 14 EUBAM Rafah (occupied Palestinian territory), 25 Nov 05 - 30 Jun 14 |
| EUROPE | CONCORDIA (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Mar – Dec 03 EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Dec 04 – Nov 14 | EUPOL Proxima (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Dec 03 - Dec 05 EUPAT (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) followed EUPOL Proxima , Dec 05 - Jun 06 EUPM BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 Jan 03 - 30 Jun 12 EUJUST Themis (Georgia), Jul 04 - Jul 05 EUP T Kosovo , Apr 06 - Feb 08 EULEX Kosovo , 16 Feb 08 - 14 Jun 14 EUMM Georgia , 01 Oct 08 - 14 Dec 14 |
| ASIA | | AMM (Aceh Province, Indonesia), Sep 05 - Dec 06 EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (Afghanistan), 15 Jun 07 - 31 Dec 14 |
| AFRICA | ARTEMIS (Ituri province, Congo RDC), Jun – Sep 03 EUFOR RD Congo (Congo RDC), Jun – Nov 06 EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad-Central African Republic), Jan 08 – Mar 09 Operation ATALANTA (EUNAVFOR Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia) Dec 08 - Dec 14 EUTM Somalia (Training Mission, Somalia), Apr 10 - Mar 15 EUTM Mali (Training Mission, Mali), Feb 13 – May 14 (awaiting a Council Decision to extend to May 2016) EUFOR RCA (Central African Republic, Africa) Apr 14 – to be confirmed | EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo RDC), Apr 05 - Jun 07 EU SSR (Guinea-Bissau), Jun 08 - Sep 10 AMIS 11 Support , Darfur Province (Sudan), Jul 05 - Dec 07 EU VASEC South Sudan, Sep 12 - Jan 14 EUCAP NESTOR , Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, 01 Aug 12 - 15 Jul 14 EUSEC RD Congo (Congo RDC), EUMS provides a POC for all issues related to the execution of the mandate Jun 05 - 30 Sep 14 EUPOL RD Congo (Congo RDC), 01 Jul 07 - 30 Sep 14 EUCAP SAHEL Niger , 17 Jul 12 - 16 Jul 14 EUBAM Libya May 13 – May 15 |

Note: Missions/Operations in bold are ongoing. Dates refer to agreed mandates and do not mean that missions/operations will necessarily close on dates indicated. Information correct at time of printing April 2014.

MIDDLE EAST

MILITARY MISSIONS

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

EU BAM RAFAH

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Type: | EU Border assistance and monitoring mission. |
| Objectives: | To provide a "Third Party" presence at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) on the Gaza-Egypt border, mandated to verify and evaluate the professional conduct of the Palestinian Authority (PA) border police and customs services at the RCP and to contribute to confidence building between Israel and the PA. |
| Mandate: | Operational phase began on 25 November 2005. However, operations at the RCP have been suspended since June 2007 due to Hamas' violent takeover of the Gaza Strip. The Mission has maintained its readiness and capacity to redeploy to the RCP once political and security conditions allow. The mission was recently extended until 30 June 2014. |
| Commitment: | The authorised and actual strength of the Mission is 4 international mission members, currently contributed by 3 EU Member States. The budget for the period of July 2013 to June 2014 is €0.94 million. |
| Head of Mission: | Gerhard Schlaudraff (DE). |

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

EUPOL COPPS

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Type: | EU Police and rule-of law mission. |
| Objectives: | To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership, in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the EU's institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector, including Criminal Justice Reform. |
| Mandate: | Launched on 1 January 2006 for an initial duration of 3 years, the current Mission mandate was recently extended from an initial 1 year, until 30 June 2014. |
| Commitment: | Headquarters in Ramallah, the Mission has an authorised strength of 71 international and 41 local mission members. The current strength is 60 international mission members, including police experts, judges and prosecutors. A total of 19 Member States and the third states of Canada, Norway and Turkey contribute Mission personnel. The budget for the period of July 2013 to June 2014 is €9.570 million. |
| Head of Mission: | Assistant Chief Constable Kenneth Deane (UK). |

EUROPE AND ASIA

MILITARY MISSIONS

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

BOSNIA AND HERZGOVINA



EUROPEAN UNION FORCE ALTHEA –EUFOR ALTHEA–

| | |
|-------------|---|
| Type: | Military EU-led operation. |
| Objectives: | Under the authority of the Council and in line with the mandate, EUFOR ALTHEA supports Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) efforts to maintain a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), and in parallel, conducts capacity building and training of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) in order to contribute to the stability of the state. |
| Mandate: | In December 2004, EUFOR took over responsibility of maintaining a SASE in BiH from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The EU-led military Operation EUFOR ALTHEA is a United Nations (UN) Chapter VII mission. |
| Commitment: | In October 2011 the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) decided to keep the executive role to support BiH's authorities' efforts to maintain the SASE. By September 2012, the operation had been reconfigured with forces which, in addition, will focus on capacity building and training. There are currently nearly 600 troops from 17 EU Member States and 5 Third Contributing States ready to carry out these tasks. EUFOR is backed up by the Intermediate Reserve Forces and stands ready to respond to any security challenge. Common costs for the operation in 2014 are €14.4 million. |
| Command: | The operation is conducted under Berlin+ arrangements, where EU Staff Group in NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) acts as an EU Operational HQ. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), General Sir Adrian Bradshaw (UK) is the EU Operation Commander . Major General Dieter Heidecker (AT) is the Force Commander (COM EUFOR) of EUFOR ALTHEA. |

GEORGIA



EUMM GEORGIA

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Type: | EU civilian monitoring mission under the CSDP framework |
| Objectives: | Following the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, EUMM Georgia monitors the implementation of the ceasefire agreement brokered by the EU on 12 August and Implementing Measures of 8 September. EUMM has the following mandated tasks: <i>Stabilisation, Normalisation, Confidence building and Information</i> . |
| Mandate: | Launched 15 September 2008, the Mission's mandate has been extended to 14 December 2014. |
| Commitment: | Headquarters in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices in Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi, the Mission has an authorised strength of 282 international staff. A budget of €26.065 million is allocated for the period up to 14 December 2014 (fifteen months). |
| Head of Mission: | Toivo Klaar (EE). EUSR: Philippe Lefort (FR) until 31 January 2014, new EUSR to be appointed, for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia; Head of Delegation: Philip Dimitrov (BG). |

KOSOVO



EULEX KOSOVO

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Type: | EU Rule of law mission. |
| Objectives: | As the largest civilian mission launched under the CSDP, EULEX Kosovo's task is to monitor, mentor and advise national authorities with regard to police, justice and customs, while retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence. |
| Mandate: | Launched on 16 February 2008, the Mission's current mandate runs until 14 June 2014. |
| Commitment: | Headquartered in Pristina, the Mission has an authorised strength of 1250 international mission members. All EU Member States and the 5 Third State contributors Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Canada and USA are supporting the Mission. A budget of €110 million is allocated for the period of 15 June 2013 to 14 June 2014. |
| Head of Mission: | Ambassador Bernd Borchardt (DE). EUSR and Head of EU Office: Samuel Zbogor (SI) |

AFGHANISTAN



EUPOL AFGHANISTAN

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Type: | EU Police mission with linkages into wider rule of law. |
| Objectives: | To support the Afghan Government in moving towards the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements that will ensure interaction with the wider criminal justice system under Afghan ownership. Objectives are implemented through assistance in policy-level reform of the Ministry of Interior, training and capacity-building of Afghan National Police leadership as well as through support to relevant justice institutions. |
| Mandate: | Launched on 15 June 2007, the mandate extended until 31 December 2014. |
| Commitment: | Headquarters in Kabul with 2 Field Offices (Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif), the Mission has an authorised strength of 400 international mission members, including police, legal and administrative experts. The current strength is circa 200 national and 290 international mission members. A total of 24 EU Member States and Canada as a Third State contribute Mission personnel. The budget for the period of 1 June 2013 to 31 December 2014 is to is €108.5 million. |
| Head of Mission: | District Police Commissioner Karl Åke Roghe (SE). EUSR: Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin (DK). |

AFRICA

MILITARY MISSIONS

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO



EUSEC RD CONGO

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Type: | Support mission in the field of Security Sector Reform. |
| Objectives: | Provides advice and assistance on defence reform (as part of SSR) in the DRC with the aim of assisting the Congolese authorities in establishing a defence apparatus capable of guaranteeing the security of the Congolese people. |
| Mandate: | The SSR mission was launched on the 08 June 2005. In September 2012 the PSC agreed on the need to extend EUSEC RD Congo for 1 year (mandate 7), followed by a final transition phase of 12 months (mandate 8, 2014). During this period EUSEC should strive for a finalization or effective hand over of its tasks to the Congolese authorities, other EU instruments or bilateral or international actors with a view to sustainability of the result |
| Commitment: | The mission consists of 40 military and civilian personnel from 10 EU Member States and one from the USA. The mission is located in Kinshasa and has 1 detachment in Goma. Bukavu detachment was closed on the 12 September 2013. The mission budget for 2014 is €8.5M million. |
| Head of Mission: | Colonel Jean-Louis Nurenberg (LU). |


DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO



EUPOL RD CONGO

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Type: | EU Police mission with a justice interface. |
| Objectives: | Supporting Security Sector Reform in the field of policing and its interface with the wider justice system. |
| Mandate: | EUPOL RD Congo was launched on 1 July 2007, with a mandate that has been extended, with successive modifications, until 30 September 2014. |
| Commitment: | Headquarters in Kinshasa, the Mission has an authorised strength of 40 international mission members. A total of 7 EU Member States contribute Mission personnel. A budget of €5.85 million is allocated for the period of October 2013 to September 2014. |
| Head of Mission: | Chief Superintendent Jean-Paul Rikir (BE). |

LIBYA



EUBAM LIBYA

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Type: | EU Border assistance. |
| Objectives: | The objectives of EUBAM Libya are, in the short term, to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya's land, sea and air borders and, in the long term, to develop a broader integrated border management strategy. |
| Mandate: | The mission was launched on 22 May 2013 for an initial period of 2 years. |
| Commitment: | The Mission operates from its Headquarters in Tripoli although its work is to benefit all the country's borders. The annual budget for the first 12 months is €30.3 million. The Mission has an authorised strength of 111 international staff. During the build-up phase, until spring 2014, the actual mission strength is 50 international staff. |
| Head of Mission: | Antti Hartikainen (FI). |

EUCAP SAHEL



NIGER

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Type: | EU Capacity building mission. |
| Objectives: | Through training and advising, the Mission aims to improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces (Gendarmerie, National Police, National Guard) to fight terrorism and organised crime in an effective and coordinated manner, with a view to contribute to enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in Niger and in the Sahel region. |
| Mandate: | The initial mandate is set for 2 years from 16 July 2012 to 15 July 2014. |
| Commitment: | Headquarters in Niamey, with liaison officers in Bamako (Mali) and Nouakchott (Mauritania), the Mission is staffed with up to 52 international and 26 local mission members. A budget of €6.5 million was allocated for the period of 1 November 2013 to 16 July 2014. |
| Head of Mission: | Filip DE Ceuninck (BE). Head of Delegation: Raul Mateus Paula (PT). |

HORN OF AFRICA AND THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN



EUCAP NESTOR

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Type: | Capacity building mission. |
| Objectives: | A regional civilian mission augmented with military expertise, aiming at enhancing the maritime security, including counter-piracy, and maritime governance of initially five countries in the Horn of Africa region (Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia and Tanzania). The Mission is complementary to Operation ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia, and follows a regional approach to address a regional problem. |
| Mandate: | Initially 2 years from 16 July 2012 to 15 July 2014. |
| Commitment: | The mission has its headquarters in Djibouti and country offices in Seychelles and Kenya. A Nestor liaison officer is embedded in the EU Delegation to Tanzania and the mission deploys staff on a semi-permanent basis to Somalia. For the period from 15 November 2013 to 15 July 2014, the allocated budget amounts to €12 million. |
| Head of Mission: | Mr. Etienne de Poncins (FR). |

WE NEED
THE LOGO OF
EUFOR RCA

MALI



EU TRAINING MISSION MALI – EUTM MALI –

| | |
|-------------|---|
| Type: | Military mission to contribute to the training and advice of the Malian Armed Forces (MAF) |
| Objectives: | EUTM Mali responds to the invitation of the Malian authorities and to the UNSCR 2071 (2012) adopted on 12 October 2012, which expressed its grave concern about the consequences of instability in the North of Mali and stressed the need to respond swiftly in order to preserve stability across the Sahel region. It invited international partners, including the EU, to provide training to the Malian army and security forces, under control of the legitimate civilian political authorities. |
| Mandate: | The mission was launched on 18 February 2013 and initially planned for 15 months. During the mandate the Mission had provided military training and advice to the Malian Armed Forces (MAF). 4 Battalions, each consisting of 650 to 700 personnel, have been trained. EUTM Mali shall not be involved in combat operations and mentoring. Following the last Strategic Review (Nov 2013), the Mission should be extended until mid-May 2016 pending a Council Decision, with a renewed mandate aiming at strengthening Malian ownership on the rebuilding of Armed Forces, through an increase of the advising role and a Train the Trainer programme. |
| Commitment: | The mission comprises 565 personnel including 200 instructors, mission support staff Force Protection and Air MEDEVAC. The Mission Headquarters is located in Bamako and the Training area is in Koulikoro, 60 km north-east of Bamako. Costs for the mandate are estimated at €23.4 million. |
| Command: | Brigadier General Marc Rudkiewicz (FR) was appointed EU Mission Commander on the 1 April 2014. The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander |

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

EU FORCE, REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE – EUFOR RCA –

| | |
|-------------|---|
| Type: | Military EU-led operation |
| Objectives: | To contribute to the resolution of crisis in RCA, the EU decided to utilise a short-term military CSDP operation to contribute to a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), providing a temporary support to facilitate the full deployment of MISCA (African Union-led operation). When deployed, EUFOR's presence in the Capital, or in the area of operations (Bangui), will create a deterrent environment to any armed group acting against the civilian population and against the effectiveness of MISCA. As a consequence, the freedom of movement will improve for the population and the humanitarian actors. IDPs may return to their area of origin and economic life will improve. |
| Mandate: | EUFOR RCA will act under the mandate given by UNSCR 2134(2014) for a period of six months from the declaration of its Full Operational Capacity (FOC). |
| Commitment: | On the ground, the composition of the Force will be a battalion-sized grouping, consisting of 4 Infantry Companies, 1 Gendarmerie Company, together with appropriate Command and Control (C2), enablers (engineering, ISTAR...), logistic and medical support. Estimated common costs are €25.9 million. |
| Command: | Major General Philippe PONTIÈS (FR) has been appointed EU Operation Commander. The OHQ of EUFOR RCA is located at Larissa, Greece. Brigadier General Thierry LION (FR) is the Force Commander. The FHQ will be located in Bangui, RCA. |

SOMALIA

EU NAVFOR SOMALIA OPERATION ATALANTA

| | |
|-------------|---|
| Type: | Anti-piracy maritime operation. First EU maritime operation. |
| Objectives: | In support of UN Security Council Resolutions calling for active participation in the fight against piracy. The areas of intervention are the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean off the Somali Coast. The mission includes: Protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; protection of AMISOM shipping; Deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast; protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis; in addition, Operation ATALANTA shall also contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. |
| Mandate: | Launched on 8 December 2008, and initially planned for a period of 12 months, Operation ATALANTA has been extended until December 2014. |
| Commitment: | Operation ATALANTA typically consists of 4 to 8 surface combat vessels, 1 auxiliary ship and 2 to 4 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Common costs for the operation in 2014 are €7.5 million. |
| Command: | The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Northwood (UK). Rear Admiral Bob Tarrant (UK) is the EU Operation Commander . Rear Admiral Jürgen zur Mühlen (DE) is the Force Commander . |

SOMALIA



EU TRAINING MISSION SOMALIA – EUTM SOMALIA –

| | |
|-------------|---|
| Type: | Military mission to contribute to the training of Somali Security Forces in Mogadishu. |
| Objectives: | On 22 January 2013 the Council adopted the decision on a new mandate with the objective to contribute to building up the Somali National Security Forces accountable to the Somali National Government. In line with Somali needs and priorities EUTM Somalia will provide political and strategic level advice to Somali authorities within the security institutions (Ministry of Defence (MoD) and General Staff), support and advise on Sector Security Development as well as specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain. |
| Mandate: | The mission was launched on 07 April 2010. On 22 January 2013, the Council adopted a new decision extending the EUTM Somalia mandate until March 2015. |
| Commitment: | The mission comprises currently about 93 personnel from 12 Member States and 1 participating third state (Serbia). Estimated common costs for the extended mandate (Jan 2013 - March 2015) are €11.6 million. Since January 2014 all EUTM Somalia activities including advisory, mentoring and training are now carried out in Mogadishu with the support of a Liaison Office in Nairobi and a Support Cell in Brussels. |
| Command: | The Mission Headquarters is situated in Mogadishu. In February 2014 Brigadier General Massimo Mingiardi (IT) was appointed EU Mission Commander. The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander. |

Taking Forward Military Cooperation with Partners: An EUMS Perspective

By Colonel Martin Cauchi-Inglott (MT), EU Military Staff, ACOS External Relations



Col M. Cauchi-Inglott (MT), Branch Chief, ACOS External Relations

The Council Conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of November 2013 emphasised that the European Union is being called upon to assume increased responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security, in order to guarantee the security of its citizens and the promotion of values and interests. Meanwhile, the financial crisis is posing challenges to security and defence capabilities of European Member States. This affects the EU's ability to react to a crisis, which is becoming ever-more evident when generating forces for operations. One way of addressing such force deficiencies is by working with Partners, the Council highlighting the importance of developing relationships with the UN, NATO, OSCE and African Union. This also includes Strategic Partners and Partner countries in the neighbourhood, with due respect to the institutional framework and decision-making authority of the EU.

It is in this context that the European External Action Service (EEAS) pro-actively pursues opportunities to strengthen dialogue, consultation, and cooperation with Partners with the objective of encouraging them to support CSDP actions, in accordance with the political direction given. This is achieved under the leadership of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), with the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability in support.

Once Partnerships are institutionalised through the signing of Framework Participation Agreements and Permanent Security Agreements for the Exchange of Classified Information, one could question to what degree EEAS military-to-military (Mil-to-Mil) engagements

with certain like-minded and able Partners, should progress, if at all? Another pertinent question worth contemplating is whether cooperation with certain Partners should go beyond crisis management matters and widened to other military fields such as capability development? This is already the case with EU-NATO cooperation.

Though the above questions query the development of a policy for Mil-to-Mil engagement with Partners, or even a conceptual document on Mil-to-Mil cooperation with Partners, there are certain clear and evident advantages of engaging militarily with Partners. For example, Mil-to-Mil allows the EEAS to interface directly, and in depth, with Partners' General Defence Staffs in certain military themes. These include operations, with emphasis placed on interoperability, especially Partners' participation in NATO's 'Planning and Review Process (PARP)'; Concepts, especially lessons learnt; and various other technical fields, including medical, engineering and supply doctrine. Any such Mil-to-Mil engagements, which must be triggered, controlled, and steered by the political level, could commence with lighter Mil-to-Mil cooperative interfaces. These then progress to Mil-to-Mil collaborative ventures by working together to achieve common goals.

State of Play

Last November, the Council stressed its commitment to working in close collaboration with Partners by developing regular security and defence dialogues within the framework of EU political dialogues with these same Partners. Priority was to be given to cooperation with those who share the EU common values and principles and are able, and willing to support EU crisis management efforts. It is in this vein that the EEAS has organised security and defence consultations with Ukraine over several years, and more recently with Moldova and Georgia. This followed the latter's interest in participating in CSDP operations and missions. At the military level, the EUMS frequently organises multi-disciplinary discussions with the US, particularly US AFRICOM, at Flag or Colonel level. All EEAS stakeholders are invited to discuss regional instabilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Representatives from the office of the Chairman, EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Commission, are also invited to participate.

the
ambition ...
concrete deliverables
through Mil-to-Mil
Collaboration ... in
support of political
objectives

Crisis management cooperation with China is developing at a steady pace with security and defence consultations having taken place in Brussels in March. An EUNAVFOR Atalanta-China naval exercise in the Gulf of Aden also took place before these consultations. The EEAS also received numerous other delegations from Asian Partners in Brussels, especially ASEAN countries, as well as Japan and the Republic of Korea. The possibility of taking forward collaboration with Australia is being examined, given their ability to interoperate with EU forces.

Though the EU does not structure its military engagement with Partners, the EUMC formally interfaces with non-EU European NATO members and other candidate countries for accession to the EU through the formal Plus 7 Format. This includes Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia and Turkey, the latter two countries providing significant contributions to CSDP operations and missions.

Apart from the Format above, when considering Mil-to-Mil, one could place Partners into two lightly-woven baskets: the first basket containing those Partners which have a non-binding military relationship with the EU (Military Cooperation); and the second basket containing Partners which take on a stronger and/or legally binding form of military relationship with the EU (Military Collaboration).

Military Cooperation

Partners placed in the first basket could include those where Military Cooperation is in its initial stages with the EUMS supporting political objectives, and/or EEAS Management Directorate confidence building initiatives, sometimes under the umbrella of a regional strategy. A typical example is when the EUMS co-hosted, in conjunction with the Management Directorate Asia, a study visit for Directors from Arab Defence Colleges in Brussels during October 2013. Such opportunities foster mutual understanding, whilst emphasising the EU's Comprehensive Approach in addressing a crisis. This example demonstrates that the military is able to support EEAS' foreign policy ambitions, sometimes bridging with those Partner nations which view their militaries as a prime organ of government, or which depend on their militaries for salient responsibilities such as counter-terrorism. Pakistan is a case in point.

Military Collaboration

Though Mil-to-Mil Cooperation with Partners (Basket 1) has many benefits, the ambition remains to gain concrete deliverables through Mil-to-Mil Collaboration (Basket 2) with certain partners, in support of political objectives, especially those listed in the November 2013 Council Conclusions. A pre-requisite is, however, the signing of a Permanent Security Agreement for the Exchange of Classified Information and/or Framework Participation Agreements, and once in place, the EU and Partners could pursue shared goals in at least four different areas, as highlighted below:

- Supporting capacity-building of Partner countries and regional organisations in crisis situations to enable them to increasingly prevent or manage crisis by themselves. The EU is, in this respect, supporting the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the EUMS, in particular, collaborating with the African Union through the provision of logistics and communications experts to the Amani Africa Planning Team.
- Partners are able to contribute to CSDP missions and operations through political support, or more tangible means, such as the provision of equipment, manpower or financial resources. Eastern Partners are particularly active in this regard, for example with Ukraine having deployed a frigate to EUNAVFOR Atalanta in early 2014; and Georgia having decided to contribute an infantry company to EUFOR RCA.
- Military collaboration is also common practice when the EU conducts operations in common theatres with other international organisations such as the United Nations or NATO. In such cases, coordination and the exchange of information are essential to ensure complementarity of effort, avoid duplication, and offer one another the ability to provide mutual support. This is demonstrated around the Horn of Africa where EUNAVFOR Atalanta operates side by side with NATO's Operation Ocean Shield. Such coordination allows the division of labour and de-confliction of deployments.
- Mil-to-Mil collaboration offers Partners training opportunities which are essential prior to CSDP deployments. Furthermore, military advisers could ensure that appropriate elements of Partners' forces would be operationally capable and interoperable with EU forces and structures. This was the case prior for the Georgian deployment to EUFOR RCA. The ability for Partners to receive valuable information on Lessons Learnt prior to deploying on EU operations may be as important as Partners feeding into the process upon completion of a CSDP mission or operation.

Reduction of military capabilities ... is compelling the EU to actively foster military cooperation with Partners

Way Ahead

Prevailing austerity, coupled to the ensuing reduction of military capabilities in Europe is compelling the EU to actively foster military cooperation with Partners, especially when addressing force generation for CSDP missions and operations. One method of intensifying cooperation is by establishing Military Dialogues with like-minded and able Partners in which long term military objectives are prioritised with corresponding milestones. Though this is deemed essential to promoting interoperability and motivating Partners to participate in CSDP actions, a certain degree of innovation is also required with the possible development of policies, or even a conceptual document, which would guide the EUMS in taking forward military cooperative ventures with Partners. This would translate political goals into prioritised military objectives in accordance with political objectives established by the Council. Whichever the case, defence diplomacy could be used as a vehicle to support the EEAS' foreign policy ambitions. ■

EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali): «Together for Mali» Introduction avec brève sur l'exercice final du 4e groupement tactique inter armes (GTIA)

Par le Capitaine Jean-Yannick (FR), EUTM Mali



'Balanzan' Debut de Formation GTIA 4.

Décision et la mise en place d'EUTM

Le 18 février 2013, en réponse à la demande des autorités maliennes et en accord avec les Résolutions 2071 et 2085 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations-Unies, le Conseil de l'UE a officiellement lancé une nouvelle mission militaire relevant de la Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune (PSDC).

La mission d'entraînement de l'UE au Mali (EUTM Mali) a pour objectif de contribuer à améliorer les capacités militaires des forces armées maliennes afin de leur permettre d'assurer à terme la sécurité et la souveraineté du Mali. Elle fait partie intégrante de l'approche globale adoptée par l'UE face à la situation au Mali et au Sahel.

Le choix du format de la mission

EUTM Mali assure une formation militaire aux unités combattantes maliennes (GTIA) mais l'expérience tirée d'autres missions PSDC a démontré la nécessité d'« associer et intégrer les autorités locales » aux objectifs de la mission. Ainsi, EUTM par le biais de son volet conseil et expertise, Advisory Task Force (ATF) conseille et appuie les autorités maliennes dans la réforme de leur outil militaire. Cet appui s'exerce dans les domaines suivants : commandement opérationnel et organique, soutien logistique, ressources humaines, préparation opérationnelle et renseignement. Après avoir effectué un état des lieux, partagé avec les autorités maliennes, les actions entreprises visent à :

- Appuyer le Ministère de la Défense et des Anciens Combattants (MDAC) au niveau stratégique : ATF a ainsi soutenu le Ministère dans la formulation du projet de réforme et travaillé à la mise en place d'un mécanisme de pilotage comprenant un niveau décisionnel, un niveau de coordination et un niveau technique (groupes de travail multi disciplinaires).

**Appuyer
le Ministère
de la Défense et
des Anciens
Combattants au
niveau
stratégique**

- Fournir conseil et assistance au Chef d'Etat-Major Général des Armées (CEMGA) et aux chefs d'états-majors d'armées et directeurs de services, dans l'organisation et le suivi des moyens dont ils disposent (rénovation du centre de commandement interarmées par exemple).
- Participer au renforcement de la cohérence de la formation des cadres (mise en place de cursus cohérents)
- Appuyer la refondation de la chaîne Soutien, par l'adoption de procédures efficaces (en mettant fin à la rupture de comptabilité des matériels par exemple) et la mise en place d'un maillage territorial pour le soutien direct.
- Poursuivre l'amélioration de la gestion du personnel avec la définition de parcours professionnels adaptés, l'adéquation grade/poste/formation et la mise en place d'un SIRH1 permettant d'une part de fiabiliser les bases de données RH grâce à un recensement exhaustif des militaires maliens et d'autre part de mieux gérer la ressource grâce à l'installation de ce système au cœur des états-majors et directions.

Concernant l'entraînement des GTIA, le choix a été fait de les former aux missions qu'ils auront à remplir lors de leur déploiement dans le nord du pays. La formation est ambitieuse mais réaliste : ce sont des soldats qui forment des soldats.

Cette formation est faite à la fois d'instruction mais aussi d'éducation, dans les domaines tactiques et techniques, de la vie militaire mais également dans les domaines du commandement, permettant ainsi de créer un véritable esprit de corps et une cohésion au sein des GTIA. La méthode de formation est cohérente : EUTM s'adapte résolument au cadre de travail qui sera celui des GTIA déployés au Nord, au sortir de leur période de formation. Le Power point est banni, nous utilisons le tableau noir, les explications, les démonstrations, la pratique (drill) et l'évaluation. La langue de travail est le français, mais nous disposons de 40 interprètes, bambara et tamasheq pour faciliter la compréhension.

La formation dure 12 semaines et se décompose en 3 parties :

- 2 semaines de pré-stage pour les cadres du bataillon,
- 2 semaines de formation commune de base afin de revenir sur les actes fondamentaux du combattant (tir, topographie, actes réflexes du combattant etc.),
- 5 semaines de formation spécialisée par domaine (infanterie, génie, artillerie, commando, TACP etc.) du niveau groupe de combat au niveau compagnie,
- 3 semaines d'exercices au niveau du bataillon avec une dernière semaine consacrée à l'exercice de synthèse final.

Une des innovations de la mission a également été de mener une action de sensibilisation et de formation des soldats au droit international humanitaire (DIH), pour prendre en compte le contexte spécifique du conflit au nord du pays et les violations des droits de l'homme constatées l'an dernier. Le DIH occupe une place importante dans la formation dispensée aux bataillons

¹ Système Informatisé de Ressources Humaines, projet financé par une donation du gouvernement canadien.



'Balanzan' EOD Training.



'Balanzan' Specialised Infantry Training.

maliens. EUTM Mali conduit à Koulikoro un cours spécifique dans ce domaine ainsi que dans le cadre de la prévention des violences sexuelles. Ce cours est conduit de manière globale, en partenariat avec les organisations internationales, il touche l'ensemble des soldats du bataillon en formation. Avec un contenu adapté aux soldats maliens :

- Basé sur la Convention de Genève, le Protocole additionnel II, le droit international des droits de l'homme (DDIH), les résolutions de l'ONU et le droit coutumier et la loi malienne. La situation des droits de l'homme au Mali et les violations signalées dans le nord sont aussi pris en compte dans cette formation.
- Le niveau de l'auditoire est pris en compte avec des cours interactifs par petits groupe, qui insiste sur les exercices pratiques. Dans la quasi-totalité des exercices tactiques, les formateurs intègrent des « incidents » ayant trait avec la formation DIH. Cela permet aux soldats maliens d'appréhender des situations complexes auxquelles ils seront peut-être confrontés.
- Les officiers suivent en parallèle du bataillon un cours sur les mêmes thèmes mais qui insiste sur le commandement et la responsabilité pénale.

Depuis l'entrée en formation du 1er bataillon, le 2 avril 2013, ce sont environ 2800 soldats maliens qui ont suivi l'entraînement d'EUTM. L'objectif initial de former 4 bataillons a été atteint quantitativement mais surtout qualitativement.

Les évolutions de la mission

Le mandat de la mission est sur le point d'être renouvelé pour une période de 24 mois supplémentaires. Au cours de ce nouveau mandat, 4 GTIA supplémentaires seront formés, soit un total de 8 GTIA formés par EUTM. 4 autres GTIA seront formés par les maliens.

Au cours de ce nouveau mandat, qui correspond à une phase de stabilisation, un certain nombre d'évolutions seront menées parmi lesquelles la formation de formateurs maliens (Train The Trainers-TTT). Cette formation a pour objectif de permettre une accroissement de l'autonomie autonomisation de l'armée malienne dans l'entraînement de leurs unités. Ce concept, différent de celui de l'entraînement des GTIA maliens, visera, à terme, à permettre à ces futurs formateurs maliens de pouvoir planifier et conduire l'entraînement des unités jusqu'au niveau du GTIA. Un stage pilote du TTT a été mis en place parallèlement à la formation du GTIA 4. La méthode utilisée est semblable à celle utilisée dans la plupart des pays européens. Chaque thème (de l'entraînement physique à la tactique de niveau des unités élémentaires) est divisé en plusieurs sessions qui comprennent des parties théoriques et pratiques, chacune d'entre elles ayant une durée de une à deux heures.

Le stage pilote « train the trainers » (TTT) se décompose en trois phases, la première d'une durée de trois semaines, est dédiée à l'acquisition des connaissances les plus importantes pour un soldat ainsi que de la pédagogie pour transmettre ces savoir-faire. Pendant la seconde période de 10 semaines, couplées à la formation d'un GTIA, les stagiaires formateurs restent aux côtés des instructeurs européens afin de poursuivre l'apprentissage de la pédagogie et de la planification de l'entraînement. Enfin, lors des deux semaines de la troisième phase, les stagiaires sont évalués sur leurs capacités théoriques et pratiques, à planifier et conduire des entraînements.

A la fin du stage de formation des formateurs (TTT), les stagiaires rejoindront leurs unités. Les élèves deviendront alors les formateurs pour entraîner des unités maliennes.

Une autre des évolutions de la mission concerne la période « inter GTIA ». Celle-ci sera plus longue et mise à profit pour le « recyclage » des unités

formées par la mission; dans leurs garnisons dans la partie sud du pays, avant un redéploiement en zone opérationnelle. Il s'agit là d'un besoin identifié lors du processus de retour d'expérience établi tout au long de la formation des bataillons, et à l'occasion du dialogue avec l'encadrement du 1er GTIA formé par EUTM (Waraba) après son désengagement du Nord du pays, au terme d'un déploiement de 6 mois. Il a ainsi été possible de mesurer, d'une part l'adéquation entre l'entraînement reçu à Koulikoro et la réalité de l'engagement opérationnel effectué, et d'autre part les possibles actions de formation complémentaires qu'EUTM pourrait apporter.

Dans le domaine du conseil, il s'agira d'aider les FAMA à mettre en œuvre la loi d'orientation pour la réforme des armées en déclinant année après année les mesures prévues dans cette loi.

En particulier, il s'agira :

- de les aider à mettre en place des outils de coordination et de pilotage du plan d'action ministériel,
- d'appuyer la rénovation et la création des unités de l'armée de terre et de l'armée de l'air ainsi que la consolidation de leur chaîne de commandement organique,
- d'appuyer la rénovation des capacités de commandement opérationnel et de préparation à l'engagement des Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMA),
- de les aider à développer l'attractivité du métier militaire et améliorer la formation,
- d'appuyer la refondation du soutien afin qu'ils adaptent et densifient le dispositif de soutien organique et opérationnel,
- de les aider à prendre en compte le nécessaire développement d'une capacité de planification budgétaire,
- de participer à la mise sur pied de la chaîne de renseignement d'intérêt militaire.

Conclusion

Cette nouvelle mission de la PSDC témoigne de la réactivité de l'Union Européenne face à une crise majeure, et de la solidarité des états membres pour aider le Mali à redevenir un état démocratique souverain. EUTM semble être un succès, les trois premiers GTIA formés ont été engagés au nord et ont participé à des opérations conjointement avec la Force Serval et la MINUSMA. Tous les retours d'information ont été positifs, mais il convient bien sûr de poursuivre les efforts initiés pour permettre aux forces armées maliennes d'être autonomes dans la sécurisation de leur territoire. ■



'Balanzan' Cérémonie Fin Formation GTIA 4.

Action!

CIS Business in Support of EU CSDP Daily Life

By Lieutenant Colonel Eric Albertini-Rosso (FR) EU Military Staff Communications and Information Systems Directorate

Au sein de l'Etat-Major de l'Union Européenne (EMUE-EUMS) la division Systèmes d'Information et de Communications (SIC-CIS) est en charge à la fois des aspects concepts d'emploi et expression des besoins (Policy & Requirements Branch) et de la sécurité des technologies d'information (Information Technology Security Branch). Dirigée par un officier général, aujourd'hui le contre-amiral Santiago Barber Lopez (ES), et forte de 11 officiers et de 6 sous-officiers, elle œuvre dans tous les secteurs du monde des SIC et au sein de toutes les activités liées à mise en œuvre de la Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune



Branch Meeting. L to R: Cdr H. Schroeder-Lanz (DE), Cdr M. Fara (IT), Lt Col E. Albertini-Rosso (FR), Col V. Sabinski (BG) and Maj L. Kuzmanov (BG).

Colonel Vasil Sabinski (BG), Policy & Requirements Branch Chief: "I meet my Action Officers (AO) every morning. I started this at the beginning of my appointment in the EUMS in order to become more familiar with the business here, and now, after more than 3 years I can say that the morning brief is fundamental to the efficiency of our small team. This is a great way to share views, confirm our calendar and share information. This last point is crucial, since each of my AOs is involved in simultaneous work strands related to different EUMS internal and external activities: for example, Operations and Missions, projects led by the EEAS, European Defence Agency or NATO, budget preparation, training etc., etc.... Also there is almost no overlap between AOs areas of responsibility, so close coordination is crucial".

(PSDC-CSDP). Ses personnels participent, en collaboration avec ceux de l'ensemble des divisions de l'EMUE, aux actions qui concourent à la planification et au déploiement des opérations de l'Union Européenne (UE), à l'évolution des capacités, au développement des futurs systèmes, à la préparation et à la conduite des exercices, à l'exploitation des retours d'expérience, à la maintenance des systèmes, à la veille sécuritaire et à l'aide aux utilisateurs.

Les photos et les propos joints illustrent en partie différentes facettes de l'engagement permanent des personnels SIC de l'EMUE en soutien des activités liées à la CSDP.

La division SIC est souvent présentée comme un exemple condensé des entités similaires existant au sein des états-membres de l'Union Européenne et couvrant les mêmes champs de compétence. Certaines différences fondamentales existent et contraignent l'action de cet organisme idéalement placé au sommet de l'Europe. Tout d'abord elle ne dispose pas en propre d'unités SIC. Ensuite, il n'existe pas de structures SIC permanentes, en dehors du réseau EU Ops Wan (EOW). Celui-ci relie les états-majors d'opération (Operation Headquarter/OHQ) fournis par les états-membres (Allemagne, France, Grèce, Italie et Royaume-Uni) à l'EMUE et à travers lui aux principaux organes traitant de la PSDC à Bruxelles. Une architecture SIC spécifique est donc élaborée et déployée pour chaque opération de l'UE. La fourniture des moyens et la bonne réalisation des déploiements SIC sont à la charge des états-membres.

Les architectures sont élaborées par le commandant de l'opération (Operation Commander/OpCdr) et son état-major en étroite coordination avec l'EMUE qui met en œuvre dès le début des travaux de planification une équipe (Core Planning Team/CPT) formée de l'ensemble des experts nécessaires des différentes divisions. Un officier de la Policy & Requirements Branch est donc désigné pour couvrir les aspects SIC. Lorsque l'opération est déployée et a atteint sa capacité opérationnelle initiale (Initial Operational Capability/IOC) une équipe de suivi de l'opération ou de la mission (Mission Monitoring team/MMT) vient remplacer la CPT.

Compte-tenu de l'existence de plusieurs opérations militaires et de nombreuses missions civiles, la plupart des officiers de la division sont membres d'au moins une de ces équipes. Ils

assurent une mission d'expertise au sein de celles-ci et jouent un rôle de point d'entrée unique, pour les questions relatives au domaine SIC, au profit des officiers des cellules SIC (J6), pour les opérations militaires, ou des chefs de bureau SIC (Chief of CIS Office), pour les missions civiles. Ils restent ainsi au contact de la réalité des déploiements opérationnels en complément de leur implication dans les nombreux projets de l'Agence Européenne de Défense (AED/EDA), le développement des nouveaux systèmes, l'élaboration des concepts, les processus liés au retour d'expérience, l'évolution des capacités. Tous ces travaux s'effectuant en étroite collaboration avec les officiers des autres divisions de l'EMUE.



MILSAT Team. L to R: ADC B. Remy (FR), WO T. Villalba Mesa (ES), Sgt J. Cann (UK), Maj A. Bartsotas (EL), and WO M. Oleszczyk (PL).

Captain Anton Vojcik (SK): "Information Technology and Security (ITS) Branch of CIS directorate provides support to CSDP life by many actions performed on a daily, weekly and monthly basis with support of its MILSAT team and AOs. Work consists of direct support to Operations and Missions by providing CIS assets and expertise to all EUMS and CPCC personnel. The main focus is related to classified and unclassified communications in Missions and Operations. Classified communications include the Video teleconference capability (VTC), NOMAD terminal usage with classified data and voice transfer, Sectra XS voice capability and support of the Deployable Package satellite asset which is able to provide extension of EUMS classified systems to military missions led by EUMS/OPSCEN. Our work includes the direct support of military Missions or Operations with Athena funded equipment and MILSAT support of IT equipment deployed".



Briefing, Cdr H. Schroeder-Lanz (DE).

Commander Hannes Schroeder-Lanz (DE): "One of my tasks is to deal with CIS budget issues. This is a long term planning process. Plans for CIS are made and staffed throughout the year following concepts, plans and policies. I collect CIS requirements, propose priorities and estimate if they fit into the existing CIS landscape, projects and budget lines, or if I need to prepare a new project. Permanent requirements, maintenance and support are regularly supplemented by new projects. A preliminary draft budget is presented at the end of the year to the decision making bodies – but budget plans will always look into the future. For example, in 2014 the budget is prepared for 2016. In addition, I look at other budget means, like common funding, the Athena mechanism, or other project funding mechanisms to answer questions brought to EUMS. Sometimes, I would like to have quicker access to finance in order to more quickly comply with our requirements. But then, as I fully understand, there are well-tested procedures and mechanisms which must be followed in order to ensure that well planned and budgeted plans are catered for correctly".

Interview of Major Peter Lamberti (DE) on the evolution of the EU Command and Control Information System (EUCCIS)

Q: What about EUCCIS? The release of Maintenance Release 1 (MR1) wasn't the final release?

A: No, for instance in May it will be decided, if MR2 will be accepted. After that MR2 will be the current release in use.

Q: What's the difference between MR1, MR2 and in the future maybe MR X?

A: EUCCIS was specially designed to the initial needs and requirements of the EU OPSCEN. As you probably know from software in private use, updates according to changed requirements, adaptation to new IT environment or improved features, are always necessary.

Q: Who takes care of this in the EUMS?

A: Among others, one of the main actors is the EUCCIS Implementation Group comprising representatives of users of EU OPSCEN and CIS Directorate. This group meets on a weekly basis to provide: Lessons learnt, for example, after MILEX 13; new or changed user requirements to the contractor; to perform System Acceptance Tests and to participate in or conduct Workshops for future Maintenance Releases. The other main actor is the EUCCIS Steering Committee. This is the group which makes final decisions, like the user acceptance of the latest version of EUCCIS, and the way ahead for the project. Of course, issues like benefits of proposed changes and the impact to the budget are always a further element in the decision process.

Q: So work for EUCCIS is still in progress?

A: Yes, it was already decided that the maintenance phases will continue after MR3 based on a new framework contract, which shall be in place for January 2016. ■

EU Military Staff: The Role of the Medical Advisor in EU-led Operations

By Lieutenant Colonel Evert-Jan Sloodman (NL), M.D., MSc., EU Military Staff Logistics Directorate

Introduction

In the past, medical matters were regarded strictly as a national responsibility within the Logistics domain. There was therefore considered to be no real requirement for the establishment of a high-level military medical authority giving advice to the Operation Commander. This has changed, culminating in the formation of a stand-alone CJMED (Combined Joint Medical C2 team) at the EU OHQ and FHQ level, independent of our logistics colleagues.



First Multinational Integrated Medical Unit, SIPOVO, BiH.

During the early missions, IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, concepts of operations placed increased emphasis on joint military operations, enhancing the importance given to the coordination of medical support. The first steps beyond coordination of medical support were made in the late 1990s within SFOR, when UK, CA, NL, CZ and BE established the first Multinational Medical Management Steering Group (MMMSG). The MMMSG managed the manning, training, standard operating procedures and cultural integration of personnel in the Role 3 Multinational Integrated Medical Unit (R3MIMU) in Sipovo, Bosnia Herzegovina.

Operational environment

More recently, the EU sees itself operating in a far more complex environment. The effectiveness of medical support is high on the "radar" of families, national Ministries of Defence and the unblinking eye of the world's media. The EU seeks to balance the collective contributions of 28 member states, Third States and the increasing number of contractors who contribute to operations. The expectations of care can only be met through effective coordination of delivery at every level. The CJMED is the key to medical coordination and management. The provision of effective medical support is the responsibility of the Commander, coordinated on his behalf by the CJMED/Medical Advisor. Although medical resources provided for operations will remain under national command, multinational cooperation will be necessary for an effective and efficient support throughout the patient care pathway, from point of illness or injury, through initial treatment, evacuation, definitive treatment and rehabilitation. The degree of cooperation will vary at different stages of this pathway, but effective liaison is essential at every level, particularly where patients are handed over; the patient care pathway should be "seamless".

...a far
more
complex
environment

Coordinating the multinational medical effort

- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Economy
- Equity
- Ethics



Military Healthcare

Military healthcare is an essential service that is subject to management considerations, quality control measurement and financial challenges. As every contributing nation to EU operations has pressures, both domestic and international, that seeks value for money and aims for greatest output for least resource.

Balancing the Operation Commander's requirement against the realities of national considerations.

To mitigate this to the largest extent possible, the EU has embraced the principles of Healthcare Quality Assurance as a means of establishing and maintaining the expected level of healthcare for the forces entrusted in operations.

Management of military healthcare is based on three pillars:

- a. Capability and capacity of the military healthcare service (planning, implementation, auditing and evaluation).
- b. Resources (personnel, infrastructure and information).
- c. External relations including users of services (outcome).

Managing these three pillars requires adequate numbers of CJMED personnel, with the appropriate competencies and identification of critical management support systems that can function within the operational working conditions.

The number of qualified medical staff and their competencies are detailed in the force generation process and periodic mission review. The CJMED/Medical Advisor (in theatre) must first identify the critical processes, (pre-hospital care, medical timelines, hospital care, outcome, information, data-collection, medical evacuation etc), then identify how successful (or otherwise) efforts to improve one or more of these systems are, and what the constraints of the management-chain are in terms of competencies. It is the CJMED's responsibility to create an enabling working environment and must consider, amongst other things, whether the roles, authorities and related responsibilities have been clearly defined and communicated. He must also consider how medical managers will be held accountable for their decisions and results, both within the EU, the operational environment and to their national structures.

From Golden Hour to Platinum 10 minutes



The concept of the “Golden Hour” was introduced by R. Adams Cowley¹, an army surgeon and pioneer of shock trauma medicine. The Golden Hour emphasized the importance of moving an injured person to medical care as quickly as possible to an established medical facility. Recently, the medical community rediscovered that even more important than the Golden Hour was **the first 10 minutes after a traumatic injury**. The first 10 minutes is now sometimes called the “Platinum 10”. The first 10 minutes asserts that a critically injured soldier stabilized in the first 10 minutes has an excellent chance of survival provided the casualty will be treated by skilled medical aid (doctors, nurses, paramedics) within one hour of injury latest. It further establishes that those who require surgery need to be in a facility equipped for this within two hours of injury. The Golden Hour did focus on getting the patient to definitive surgical care within one hour, but didn’t properly focus on the care given in the first 10 minutes, and en-route to the hospital.

So what does this mean to Commanders on the ground? The first 10 minutes are far more critical than getting the casualty to the Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) first. If the bleeding is not stopped, breathing established and airway properly cleared in the first 10 minutes, it doesn’t matter how quickly the soldier gets to the MTF. This is where advanced ‘buddy aid’, combat lifesavers and medics have the opportunity to save lives.

Management

Efforts must be directed both at ‘doing the right thing’ (effectiveness) and ‘doing things right’² (efficiency). The requirements for medical support, in terms of quantity and quality, are listed in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). The resultant Force Generation process takes a multinational approach, given that effective (and efficient) support cannot be provided by nations alone; the nations must no longer look to work ‘Home alone’ but rather ‘away together’³. Essential medical requirements, such as Role 2 Medical Treatment Facilities, are listed and are common funded under the ATHENA-mechanism⁴.

**Key...CJMED
has direct access
to the
Commander...**

¹ Cowley RA, Hudson F, Scanlan E, et al. An economical and proved helicopter program for transporting the emergency critically ill and injured patient in Maryland. *J Trauma* 1973; 13(12): 1,029–38.

² R.Espejo, W.Schuhmann, M.Schwaninger and U.Bilello, (1996) *Organizational Transformation and Learning: A Cybernetic Approach to Management*. Chichester: Wiley

³ Catusus, B. and A. Gronlund (2006), ‘Images of Peace. Reformulating New Public Management – The Case of the Swedish Armed Forces,’ Paper presented at EIASM 4th Conference on Accounting, Auditing and Management in Public Sector Reforms, Siena, Italy.

⁴ [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/common-security-and-defence-policy-\(csdp\)/financing-of-csdp-military-operations](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/common-security-and-defence-policy-(csdp)/financing-of-csdp-military-operations)

In order to achieve an effective and efficient medical support system the following authorities must be granted to the CJMED:

- **Coordinating authority:** The provision of effective medical support is the responsibility of the Commander, coordinated on his behalf by the formation CJMED.
- **Transfer of Patients authority:** To sustain medical support to ongoing operations, as the capacity of each facility increases and decreases with patient flow, it will often be necessary to share patients among the appropriate available facilities. Although the formation CJMED may not have direct command of the medical facilities, the CJMED is responsible for coordinating support in his or her area of responsibility. The CJMED will need to develop good working relationships with national medical leads and foster a climate of cooperation.
- **Direct access to the Commander:** A key principle is that the CJMED has direct access to the Commander, as a member of the special staff, in order to provide specialist medical advice. Such advice will be less effective if this must pass through subordinate layers.

Challenges



Stating the required capabilities and capacities is relatively easy when compared with sourcing these assets. However, the ATHENA common funding regulations, where the EU collectively funds critical resources that nations are unable to provide, are an important step.

Managing the healthcare services requires an insight into the primary process of healthcare. Data collection, required to perform statistical analysis, has not yet reached full national support, with most nations trusting only to national data exchange. For the future, it is critical that the EU ensures that CJMED personnel have the appropriate competences (knowledge and skills), not only as an individual but also as a team, if they are to be the effective command and control structure for our medical forces.


Way Ahead

‘We can’t wait until we have a perfect world to do something’.

There is a definite interest within every nation represented in the EU to ensure the most effective healthcare of the deployed forces, whatever their origins.

EUMS/EU OHQ/FHQ Military medical managers must be familiar with management principles and practices. It is clear that we can no longer gain expertise in critical medical management principles from just “doing the job”. In the complex environments we face both today and in the future, we need to have personnel who are skilled to a high standard, a standard which is achievable across all EU Member states. ■

MILEX 13 (November 2013)



L to R: Lt Col C. Gerber (EUMS, DE), Col J. Drage (EUMS, UK) and Commandant D. Burke (Augmentee, IE)

'Farewell Greeting' (December 2013)



From L to R: BG H. Geens (BE) says 'farewell' to Ms Julie Bloom (UK)

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| 10 Months in Office: Progress in Integration and Comprehensiveness | 2 |
| By Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe (AT), <i>EU Military Staff Director General</i> | |
| Organization Chart | 5 |
| Three Years & Three Cs | 6 |
| By Rear Admiral Bruce Williams (UK), <i>EU Military Staff Deputy Director General</i> | |
| EUTM Somalia – A New Start in Mogadishu | 8 |
| By Commander Stefan Mattsson (SE), <i>EU Military Staff Operations Directorate</i> | |
| Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) - A Part of the EU Comprehensive Approach | 10 |
| By Colonel Jozef Kozlowski, PhD (PL), <i>EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate</i> and Mr. Jose-Miguel Palacios-Coronel, PhD (ES), <i>EU Intelligence Analysis Centre</i> | |
| Global Memo | 12 |

| | |
|--|----|
| Taking Forward Military Cooperation with Partners: An EUMS Perspective | 16 |
| By Colonel Martin Cauchi-Inglott (MT), <i>EU Military Staff, ACOS External Relations</i> | |
| EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali): «Together for Mali» Introduction avec brève sur l'exercice final du 4e groupement tactique inter armes (GTIA) | 18 |
| Par le Capitaine Jean-Yannick (FR), <i>EUTM Mali</i> | |
| Action! CIS Business in Support of EU CSDP Daily Life | 20 |
| By Lieutenant Colonel Eric Albertini-Rosso (FR) <i>EU Military Staff Communications and Information Systems Directorate</i> | |
| EU Military Staff: The Role of the Medical Advisor in EU-led Operations | 22 |
| By Lieutenant Colonel Evert-Jan Sloodman (NL), M.D., MSc., <i>EU Military Staff Logistics Directorate</i> | |



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