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ATALANTA CONTINUES FIGHT AGAINST PIRACY

CYBER SECURITY & DEFENCE IN EU MILITARY STRATEGIC LIFT IN CRISIS RESPONSE



EU MILITARY STAFF 'A PARTNER FOR MILITARY EXPERTISE

European Military Staff: A Partner for Military Expertise

By Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe (AT), EU Military Staff Director General



Expertise is

required

Firstly I would like to welcome you all back after, what I use hope was a relaxing summer break. The autumn issue of IMPETUS also offers a podium to welcome all those who recently joined the EU Military Staff and, of course to thank those leaving. In addition to my thanks, I would also reiterate my wish that they, back in their respective home-countries, would act as ambassadors for the European Union and for the value of the military as part of the EU's external action. **Military**

We will need our renewed energy to be ready for new challenges ahead. I would like to take this opportunity to highlight some developments which I consider crucial for the coming months, and to add some thoughts.

The specific advantage of the comprehensive approach as a guiding principle of the European Union's external action is now well understood and widely recognised. The EU Military Staff has successfully continued its integration into the multifaceted environment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). When it comes to defining the place of the military in this concept of an EU specific comprehensive approach, however, further work can prove useful. I will therefore seize this opportunity to provide some tangible elements of explanation on the military's place in the system.

The past few months have required the EU Military Staff to deliver against an expanding portfolio of requirements expressed by the EEAS and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). I expect this tendency to accelerate in the future. As you are well aware, crisis situations around Europe intensified and simultaneously reached a level of magnitude which needed permanent consideration by all services, particularly of the EEAS of which we are members. Last August's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) agenda was a telling example of this development as it addressed

volatile situations in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Gaza. All this was coming on top of our 'normal workload' which includes 5 current military operations and missions. In addition, we are continuously looking for opportunities to sharpen the profile of EU's military dimension, the largest part of which is shaped by Member States military contributions to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

nsive approach

INTEGRATION

Most, but not all of our work is related to CSDP. Military expertise is required long before the idea of a military operation or mission starts to mature. In many cases, nonmilitary options will be selected inside or outside the context of CSDP, but military expertise will remain part of the broader and continuous multidisciplinary assessment. In this spirit, there are an increasing number of cases where delivering expertise is becoming the main output of the EU's military. Intelligence occupies a large and central part in this but there is a much broader variety of issues on which we deliver. What we call in jargon «prudent thinking» or «prudent planning» draws on all strands of military expertise, even if the results never transform, in the end, into fully fledged missions or operations.

The EU Military Staffs' ability to provide a broad spectrum of products is appreciated by a growing number of EEAS services which leads, in turn, to increasing demand. Delegations have particularly reiterated their wish to benefit from military expertise, especially intelligence and in other areas. Cooperation with delegations has intensified in geographic areas where a military dimension is or could become relevant. In this exchange with delegations, we become increasingly aware of the immense added value knowledge and experience which delegations can also bring to our work. This should be further developed.

Expertise is mainly built on personal experience, organisation of knowledge and a compendium of updated collective lessons. Our system of rotating personnel every three to five years has the convincing advantage of regularly bringing fresh national military experience to the staff. But this system also obliges us to create a stable knowledge base. We have to build on our intellectual capital, develop it, maintain it and make it accessible to others. Also in this spirit, the EU Military Staff should bring a military contribution to the larger challenges system of the EEAS. This would be an appropriate answer to the always broadening spectrum of expertise required.

Ready

for new

ahead

In terms of lessons, we organised a «High Level Seminar on Lessons Learnt» in early summer, together with the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris. The seminar not only underlined the general importance of a lessons process but also offered a large number of operational insights to a large and interested audience. The dialogue triggered by this should last and will continue.

Apart from crisis situations, operations and missions, a number of issues need to be addressed to better embed the European military in the EU's s action and to make best use of Member State's contributions. Much of this has to be seen through the spectrum of a constructive EU-NATO relationship. The reason obviously is that, not only have we 22 EU Member States as NATO Members (and 5 more are NATO partners), but that such an overlap in membership creates a far-reaching community of interest.

With this in mind, the results of the NATO-summit in Wales take particular importance and deserve thorough analysis on the part of the EU. Recent events and the continuing



Mahamet KAMOUN of the Central African Republic.

security challenges in the EU's closer and more remote environment should lead both organisations to recognise the pressing need to re-energise EU-NATO cooperation. A collaborative and synergetic approach between organisations should be further developed in order to bring investment to individual Member States' military resources, to encourage mutual benefit.

Conclusions from the NATO summit certainly will have an impact on the Member States' Armed Forces, which in turn will likely influence their ability to contribute to military

missions and operations of the EU. This is why we should approach capability development in effort. For the EU side, EU Military Staff in continuous dialogue with Member States, develop the specific requirements to enable EU action. Close cooperation between EU Military Staff and the European Defence Agency (EDA) will help transform these

requirements into fields of concrete cooperation, dedicated to specific capabilities.

Reflection triggered by the NATO summit will give additional substance to the implementation of the mandate of European Council 2013 (EC 13), and pave the way towards the European Council on Security and Defence envisaged for spring 2015. Work on a Maritime security strategy, on a Cyber strategy and on military rapid reaction is well under way. The capability strands brought forward by the Council remain guiding principles for further work e.g.; Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), Air to Air Refuelling, Cyber and Satellite Communications (SatCom). This will be complemented by additional efforts in important shortfall areas.

I now wish to continue with an explanation on our developing concept of military rapid response. There are of course high and largely justified expectations to improve the conditions for the use of Battle Groups. Financial

the broadest spectrum possible and in a collaborative way. On both sides, EU and NATO, cooperation between Member States remains instrumental to such an

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INTEGRATION



EU Open Day 2014 - DG EUMS Lt Gen Wolfgang WOSOLSOBE meets with Mr Agostino MIOZZO, EEAS Managing Director, Crisis Response & Operational Co-Ordinator.

limitations and a frequently mentioned lack of political will to use the Battle Groups cannot be addressed by the EU Military Staff, at least not directly. What we are preparing in our remit of work, is a broader set of innovative reflections on rapid response, of which larger, joint, flexible and framework Battle Groups are part.

I expect the reflection on a broader EEAS assessment of new threats and challenges to take shape soon. EU Military Staff will bring its share of experience and knowledge to this as well. A Work on Military Rapid Reaction is well under way

strategic level reflection will be essential to further define the EU's ambition in the security area. Here again, comparing notes with NATO while maintaining each organisation's full autonomy, could add to the quality of the outcome.

Together with many other activities I have mentioned so far, the military contribution to strategic reflection should be a product shared between Member States and EU Military Staff. It would therefore be important to reach back to Member States' capabilities of analysis at the earliest possible stage. Such complementarity with Member States should be further explored. This not only would help EU Military Staff to respond to increasing demands within a constant resources envelope, it also would make an ever broader set of expertise available to EEAS.

On operations and missions, firstly I wish to highlight two recent developments. Since its start in late spring 2014, EUFOR RCA (Central African Republic) has brought tangible added value in terms of security and confidence to the local population in Bangui. On the other hand, it has also proven that in a complex and volatile environment, security cannot be imposed without a firm military presence

which needs to be sufficiently resourced. These are prerequisite to keep difficult situations under control and to transform them into opportunities for success. I pay particular tribute to the Operation Commander, Force Commander and all soldiers involved in this operation as well as to all Member States offering their contributions in this difficult place.

EUTM Somalia has taken up its full activity in Mogadishu. Here as well, the environment is complex and demanding. All soldiers, commanders and contributing Member States, continuously prove their

professionalism and dedication to a mission which remains a crucial building block towards a better consolidated Somalia.

EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUFOR Althea and EUTM Mali deserve praise for having fulfilled their respective missions in an outstanding manner and for their very important contributions to the EU's credibility in their respective operational areas.

In the context of operations, our C2 structure plays a central role. The EU relies on a number of very efficient Operational Headquarters (OHQ) offered by Member States. These are complemented by Force Headquarters (FHQ). Recent experience shows that an even more standardised cooperation with these Headquarters, and an early and regular link to Brussels, could help make even better use of these valuable assets.


This is just a small overview of what we will find on our agenda in the coming months. I am fully confident in the EU Military Staffs' ability to cope with the task and to continue providing high quality products both to EEAS and EUMC.

I wish all our partners the best of success.



Signing of Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) agreement, DG EUMS Lt General Wolfgang WOSOLSOBE and Mr Ilka SALMI, Director INTCEN.

ORGANISATION



Role, Function and Working Procedures of the European Union Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG)

PSC tasks the

EUMC to deliver

specific Military

Advice

By Lt Colonel Matthias Klein, Assistant to Chairman



This article will provide a short overview of the role, function and working procedures of the European Union Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG).

The Decision of the Council back in 2001 setting up the Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC) as the highest military body within the European Union also provided to it a military support structure in the form of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EUMC Working Group (EUMCWG), in order to facilitate and support its work as appropriate.

The EUMCWG as the EUMC's preparatory body is therefore also a permanent part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) structures in Brussels. It provides following EUMC tasking's, an additional platform for detailed discussions of national positions and Member States views, with the common aim of achieving consensus in support of EUMC discussions and decisions wherever possible. In order to achieve a possible consensus during Member States representatives' discussions at the Working Group table, the EUMCWG can agree on behalf of the EUMC to documents, by using a «silence procedure» involving all 28 Member States in the final decision.

Working Procedures in support of the EUMC are in general as follows:

- 1. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) tasks the EUMC to deliver a specific Military Advice.
- 2. After an initial discussion in EUMC and an agreement on suggested timelines, the EUMS drafts and releases a specific Military Advice for Member States written comments.
- 3. After receiving Member States written comments, the revised draft Military Advice is discussed in several EUMCWG meetings (always «Word by Word and Para by Para») until consensus can be achieved.
- 4. The final draft Military Advice is then put under silence procedure for final agreement by Member States and forwarded afterwards via EUMC to the PSC.

The EUMCWG is chaired by an elected chairman (CEUMCWG), currently Rear Admiral (German Navy) Juergen EHLE,

who is appointed for a term of 3 years. He is directly supported in his chairman's office by

a Military Assistant (MA) and a Personal Assistant (PA), in order to staff the vast range of topics discussed within the Working Group, by the respective experts of the EUMS and also by personnel of the General Secretariat of the Council. The Chairman EUMCWG has no permanent deputy, but may be replaced when absent by a designated high-ranking officer of the Member State running the current Presidency of the European Union. The core tasks of the EUMCWG

are to provide Military Advice on EU missions and

operations (e.g. EU NAVFOR ATALANTA) and conceptual documents (e.g. EU's Force Generation).

The EUMCWG regularly meets, as directed by the EUMC, normally twice a week (Mondays and Thursdays), but can also come together on short notice driven by current events for extraordinary meetings. These meetings in general take place in Council premises to assure its formal decisional role.

Informal meetings outside Council premises, for example hosted in the EUMS building, are also possible, in order at an early stage to pre-discuss a topic before its formal finalisation. This helps to inform delegates ahead of upcoming formal discussions and possible decisions required.

Achieving consensual decisions and implementing them always requires intensive and detailed discussions, exchange of views and national positions within all representatives of the 28 Member State delegations. The delegates of the EUMCWG, usually ranking up to Colonel/Captain (Navy), discuss documents drafted by the EUMS, which is represented at each meeting by an Action Officer as subject-matter expert for the particular topic, and drafter of the document to be discussed. Depending on the topic, capitals may send national experts to reinforce the Working Group delegates.

It is always clear that Member States are at the heart of the EU's general capacity to decide. Thus, in its regular and event driven meetings, Member State representatives strive to reach consensus whenever possible. It helps to build confidence through hands-on work in Brussels where the 28 Member State representatives meet regularly. Confidence, personal contacts and interaction among all Working Group delegates play a very important role.

To be successful in achieving consensus, the Chairman EUMCWG ensures at any time, that the work of the EUMCWG is conducted impartially, having everybody on board during the common effort of finding agreeable language. Therefore, the impartiality of Chairman EUMCWG at any time is of the upmost importance together with his constant effort of having every voice and standpoint heard during the dis-

time and effort is needed and normally pays off in the end. The atmosphere in the Working Group is always driven by collegiality and professionalism.


EUMCWG's meetings are therefore always managed as an easy to use exchange forum of information and views. Bringing the representatives together and giving them an insight to the possibilities of what the EUMCWG has to offer, has already shown success. The experience of the representatives directly to the different topics of interest seems also to have make good developments. This success can be supported through constant communication and by working closely with people who know each other and their business. Constantly stimulating this dialogue between Member States is one key priority in order to find common solutions. The dialogue can be sometimes challenging but is always fruitful.

The EUMCWG can be seen as the «engine room» of the EUMC, always trying to prepare or directly provide sound military advice as tasked by the EUMC. Therefore, the Chairman EUMCWG is in close contact with the Chairman EUMC and personally reports back as the spokesperson of the EUMCWG to him following each meeting. He also gives regular updates to the EUMC concerning the current state of play of the Working Group discussion, especially when topics at the Working Group level are starting to get too difficult and therefore need additional guidance and/or decisions by the Senior Military Representatives in the EUMC.

Sometimes re-utilising existing solutions and maximising the use of existing data sets in order to not having to reinvent the same approaches over and over again, can be seen as beneficial to find an agreeable way out of upcoming possible impasses. Therefore, a sort of collective memory in an environment of constantly changing people and delegates, seems important together with the need of commonly shared awareness. Here the EUMCWG with its frequent meetings, offers an ideal platform together with the expertise of its delegates, and supported by the know how of the EUMS, to discuss and share ideas, in order to achieve a common goal.

cussions. The EUMCWG is important for its reach out, to all Member States and to relevant stakeholders.

Meetings must always be an opportunity for real deliberation. The strength of common culture and the quality of meetings are intertwined, as meetings are the primary forum in which professional norms/views are expressed, and sometimes a different culture needs to be consolidated. The good reputation and every success of the EUMCWG in achieving consensus, shows that



MISSION - RCA

EUFOR RCA: restaurer la sécurité pour faciliter le retour à la vie normale de la population de Bangui



Patrouille à pieds dans les quartiers et collecte de renseignement d'ambiance.

L'Union Européenne (UE) est présente en République centrafricaine (RCA) depuis de nombreuses années, notamment à travers sa Délégation ainsi que par ses projets soutenant les autorités locales dans le domaine du développement et de l'assistance humanitaire. Les sursauts d'instabilité, observés depuis le mois de décembre 2012, ainsi que les graves exactions perpétrées à l'encontre des populations civiles ont décidé les Etats-Membres à agir aussi sur le plan sécuritaire.

Le Conseil Européen de décembre 2013 invitait la HR/VP¹ à présenter, dans le cadre d'une approche globale, des propositions d'action incluant le recours aux instruments de la PSDC². Le 20 janvier 2014, le Conseil

approuvait un concept de gestion de crise³ et l'opération EUFOR RCA était établie le 10 février. Le 1^{er} avril les moyens gagés par les Etats-Membres sont suffisants pour lancer l'opération: les premières tâches du mandat sont réalisées sur le terrain dès le 30 Avril.

Un mandat clair reposant sur une force robuste...

Les Etats-Membres ont défini une lettre de mission très claire: agissant dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, la force européenne doit conduire, dans Bangui, une opération dite de transition (*bridging operation*) contribuant à l'instauration d'un environnement sûr et sécurisé, pendant quatre à six mois, à partir de la déclaration de sa pleine capacité By Lt Col Arnaud Drier de Laforte, EUMS

opérationnelle⁴. Au terme de son mandat, ses tâches seront reprises par la Mission intégrée multidimensionnelle de stabilisation des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine⁵ (MINUSCA).

L'esprit de la mission est triple:

- Protéger les populations menacées par les groupes armés et restaurer les conditions permettant aux déplacés banguissois de rentrer chez eux;
- Permettre aux acteurs humanitaires d'opérer dans des conditions de sécurité acceptables;
- Permettre à la Force de l'Union Africaine d'atteindre sa pleine capacité opérationnelle le plus rapidement possible.

Le Général de Division Philippe PONTIÈS commande l'opération depuis son Etat-Major (OHQ) basé à Larissa. La force comprend plus de 850 soldats dont près de 730 sont déployés en République centrafricaine aux ordres du Général de Brigade LION. Dix-neuf nations européennes sont représentées à Larissa et treize à Bangui, auxquelles doivent être ajoutées les contributions géorgienne, près de 160 soldats, serbe, 1 équipe medicale et celle à venir de la Turquie. EUFOR se compose de deux compagnies et demie d'infanterie, d'une compagnie de gendarmes, générée par la Force de Gendarmerie Européenne, et de tous les

appuis et soutiens nécessaires lui permettant de remplir pleinement son rôle sur le théâtre (CIMIC, EOD, soutien santé, logistique...).

une lettre de mission très claire Depuis son déploiement à Bangui, EUFOR a progressivement pris la responsabilité de la sécurité de l'aéroport puis des arrondissements 3 et 5 qui s'avèrent aujourd'hui les zones les plus complexes de la capitale. Dans ces secteurs, malgré une amélioration significative du niveau de sécurité, les soldats européens font face à des conditions sécuritaires rudes et sont régulièrement pris à

partie par des groupes armés non contrôlés⁶.

Quelques semaines après la déclaration de sa FOC, intervenue le 15 juin, l'action d'EUFOR RCA est unanimement

¹ Haute Représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité et vice-présidente de la Commission européenne.

² Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune.

³ Crisis Managment Concept – CMC.

⁴ Full Operational Capability – FOC.

⁵ Initialement, la relève était prévue par la Force de l'Union Africaine, la MISCA, qui sera finalement absorbée par la MINUSCA à partir du 15 septembre 2015.

⁶ Depuis la déclaration de la FOC, quelque quinze soldats ont été blessés lors d'accrochages armés avec ces groupes armés, les deux-tiers ont fait l'objet de rapatriement sanitaire vers l'Europe pour être soignés.

reconnue par l'ensemble de ses partenaires, qu'ils soient civils ou militaires, ainsi que par la population des arrondissements où EUFOR est déployée.

...mais qui ne peut être efficace durablement que dans le cadre d'une approche globale, conçue dès la phase de planification et mise en œuvre tout au long de l'opération

En dépit d'un mandat relativement bref, six mois, l'impact qu'aura EUFOR RCA pour contribuer à résoudre⁷ la crise centrafricaine doit être replacé dans le contexte plus global des efforts réalisés par l'UE en RCA. Cette opération est l'une des composantes de l'action globale de l'Union. Dans ce contexte sécuritaire particulièrement dégradé, il faut bien reconnaître qu'elle en constitue une brique préliminaire essentielle. Elle permet, en effet, de restaurer un environnement sécuritaire favorable à la reprise des projets de soutien humanitaire et de développement, majoritairement suspendus suite aux troubles survenus depuis décembre 2012.

Dès le début de la planification, les effets potentiels des instruments non-PSDC ont été pris en compte: pour renforcer l'action d'EUFOR, pendant son mandat lui permettant ainsi d'atteindre ses objectifs plus efficacement, et pour prolonger ses acquis à son départ.

Par exemple, il convient de citer le projet visant à recycler et équiper 480 policiers et gendarmes centrafricains. Ce programme, amorcé sept mois avant le lancement d'EUFOR et financé par l'instrument contribuant à la stabilité et à la paix⁸ s'intègre pleinement à l'action d'EUFOR: il lui offre les interlocuteurs centrafricains idoines pour mener des patrouilles mixtes parmi la population. Ce travail

commun améliore l'efficacité d'EUFOR, et constitue un moyen d'assoir, de manière pérenne, les capacités et les compétences des forces de sécurité intérieure. Elles pourront, grâce aux bonnes pratiques acquises, poursuivre leur action au départ d'EUFOR.

La lutte contre l'impunité fut, elle aussi, identifiée rapidement comme un facteur devant conforter la crédibilité de l'action d'EUFOR, tout en renforçant son efficacité. Dès lors, simultanément à la génération de force, les services de la Commission, en liaison étroite avec le SEAE, ont réorienté des projets existants, au profit de la reconstitution d'une chaîne pénale d'urgence. Ceci permet à EUFOR de pouvoir bénéficier d'un système judiciaire complet (certes avec une capacité d'absorption limitée) permettant le traitement judiciaire et pénal des criminels qu'elle arrête. Ce projet, qui bénéficie directement à EUFOR pendant la durée de son déploiement, pose les bases d'une reconstruction ultérieure des instances judiciaire et pénale centrafricaines.

Les domaines de l'assistance humanitaire et du développement, furent eux aussi pris en compte dès les

premières étapes de la planification: à Bruxelles, parmi les instances de l'UE (bureau géographique, CMPD, EMUE, DG ECHO...), à l'OHQ à Larissa et à Bangui, des mécanismes de coordination, voire de coopération, ont été mis en place pour que, dans le respect des attributions et des spécificités propres à chacun des acteurs, militaires ou humanitaires, l'action globale de l'UE soit la plus appropriée pour répondre aux attentes locales.

L'action d'EUFOR s'inscrit donc pleinement dans une approche globale, c'est ce qui doit permettre aux effets militaires, de courte durée, de contribuer au redressement général du pays.

Le besoin d'une réponse rapide, l'autre caractéristique majeure d'EUFOR RCA.

L'urgence sécuritaire et la détresse humanitaire vécue par la population de Bangui ont obligé les Etats-Membres à réagir rapidement et, pour la première fois, la procédure de planification et de validation politique accélérée (FTP)⁹ fut appliquée. Dès lors que le principe d'une réponse urgente¹⁰ et que le FTP furent acceptés par les Etats-Membres, il aura fallu à peine deux semaines pour que le CMC soit approuvé par le Conseil et la directive militaire initiale¹¹ transmise

par le Comité Militaire au futur Commandant de l'Opération.

Permettre aux acteurs humanitaires d'opérer Ultérieurement, il sera temps de revenir sur toutes les leçons à tirer de l'usage du FTP dans de telles circonstances. Il doit cependant être noté, dès à présent, qu'il ne peut être conduit sous forte contrainte temporelle que s'il a été anticipé. D'un point de vue militaire, l'EMUE et le Comité militaire doivent maintenir une veille stratégique ciblée et permanente en conduisant notamment leurs propres travaux de planification préalable. Mais au-delà de ce premier niveau, ce travail n'est pertinent que

s'il est nourri des réflexions amont menées avec les autres acteurs des institutions européennes, en particulier: les directions géographiques, la CMPD et les services concernés de la Commission. Ces échanges d'information sont impératifs à la bonne compréhension des enjeux et permettent de proposer aux Etats-Membres, sous faible préavis, des options cohérentes, adaptées et réalistes. Ce fut le cas pour l'opération EUFOR RCA. La rapidité avec laquelle les Etats ont approuvé les propositions démontre la pertinence des travaux préparatoires réalisés conjointement. En outre, en aval, ce rythme fut entretenu par une procédure complète de transfert des travaux de planification à l'OHQ dont l'appropriation rapide a permis de conserver le tempo initial.

Pour conclure, lancée avec rapidité et détermination, EUFOR RCA atteint aujourd'hui les objectifs fixés lors de sa conception. En dépit d'une présence relativement brève sur le terrain, elle joue un rôle majeur pour permettre aux instruments non-PSDC de développer pleinement leurs effets au profit de la population et des autorités locales. EUFOR RCA incarne entièrement le concept d'approche globale prôné par l'Union Européenne. ■

⁷ Le mandat initial était prévu durer 6 mois. Toutefois, à la miseptembre, les Etat-Memebres ont donné leur accord pour une extension de trois mois (cette décision doit maintenant être officialisée par le Conseil de l'Union Européenne, à la fin du mois d'octobre 2014.

⁸ Anciennement «Instrument pour la Stabilité».

⁹ Fast track Process - FTP

¹⁰ Qui permet de s'abstenir de la rédaction du *Political Framework for Crisis Approach* – PFCA.

¹¹ Initiating Military Directive - IMD

Military Strategic Lift in Crisis Response – Making the most of the «Last Resort»

By Commander Paul Matthews Royal Navy, Logistics Directorate, EUMS



The EU Deployability Conference is an annual event, organised by the EUMS, Logistics Directorate. Its ambition is to get together the Movement and Transportation (M&T) experts from the EU Member States, EU institutions,

partner organisations and high level executives from the existing Strategic Lift deployment enablers. The conference aims to gain a holistic understanding of the deployment challenges that the EU faces and to update participants on key initiatives put in place or being explored by Member States, the EU actors and the Strategic Partners in order to address these challenges and to share best practice and experiences. Following the success of the 2012 conference,

this year's event took place in the United Nations Global Support Centre in Brindisi, Italy on 6 and 7 May and the theme for the event was «Military Strategic Lift in Crisis Response - Making the Best Use of the Last Resort». Using the global response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (November 2013) as the operational backdrop to the theme of this conference, the delegates sought to better understand the United Nations guidelines on the use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in crisis response (The Oslo Guidelines) and to examine ways in which the use of military Strategic Lift could be more readily incorporated into the Crisis Response arena.

It was clear from the outset of the global response to Haiyan that the extent of the military response to the disaster would vary significantly between Sovereign States and Crisis Response Co-ordinators. While OCHA¹ have provided clear guidance in terms of when and how military assets should be used, the response varied considerably on a case by case basis with varying degrees of co-ordination and communication. For example, some EU Member states responded on a bilateral basis with the Philippine authorities, while informing DG ECHO² of their activity while some Member States offered the use of military assets to ECHO but would not deploy them until specifically asked to do so. While the author does not wish to suggest that any of these approaches is inappropriate, it highlights the complexity of using military assets during times of Humanitarian Aid crises and that political agendas will need to be factored into any broader planning assumptions. From an EU Military Staff perspective, it is appropriate to emphasise that strong links have been established with DG ECHO over the course of recent years and ECHO fully understands what the military is able to bring to the table in support of their humanitarian operations. Indeed, the recently established Emergency Response Co-ordination Centre in Brussels has dedicated office space for EUMS

> liaison officers to use in times of crisis, considerably enhancing the ability of the military staff to provide a military perspective when called upon to do so. This was particularly evident during the early stages of the response to Haiyan which saw EUMS liaison officers attending regular meetings within ECHO, providing military advice to the Humanitarian Aid providers as part of the EU's comprehensive approach to the crisis.

The conference in Brindisi was very well supported by Member States, Strategic Partners and, most importantly in view of the context for the event, by the United Nations. With presentations delivered by representatives from UN OCHA, the World Food Programme and UN Department of Peace Keeping Operation's Movement and Transportation Officer, the challenges

deployment challenges that the EU faces

¹ OCHA – The United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

² DG ECHO – The European Union's Directorate General of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection



associated in the utilisation of military assets in crisis response were very clearly outlined. At the forefront of these challenges is the concept that the use of military assets in crisis response must be taken with due consideration to the core principles of Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality and should only be utilised as the «Last Resort» and when there are no other civilian alternatives.

UN speakers also highlighted that when a decision is taken to use military assets then their use should be clearly limited in time and scale, presenting an exit strategy that defines how the function could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel. The UN view was complemented by an excellent overview of DG ECHO's approach to military engagement in Crisis Response which further highlighted the close relationship that the EUMS enjoys with the EU's Humanitarian Aid providers.

Notwithstanding this, the aforementioned complexities associated with the deployment of military assets are significant and the use of military assets as part of ECHO's response to Humanitarian Aid is a decision that is not taken lightly. Perhaps the most thought provoking discussion followed a presentation by Dr Bas Rietjens, a professor from the Netherlands Defence Academy who has a deep interest in Civil Military (Civ/Mil) co-operation in Crisis Response. Dr Rietjens acknowledged the constraints of the Oslo Guidelines but very clearly articulated the potential benefits in enhanced Civ/Mil co-operation in the field of Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, particularly in the area of Strategic Lift where assets are able to make significant contributions without undermining the «neutrality» of the front line aid providers.

Civ/Mil co-operation in Crisis Response is a complex and sensitive issue and while the meeting served as an opportunity for the Humanitarian community to become better acquainted with military lift providers, no silver bullet was identified to enable greater engagement in Humanitarian operations. Despite this, it was clear that further opportunities exist in order for Humanitarian Aid providers and Strategic Lift entities to work more closely in the future and the UN Logistics Base positively encouraged future events to be held within their facilities at Brindisi. Furthermore, as a direct result of the conference, the author was subsequently invited to participate in UN OCHA's working consultative group on Humanitarian Civilian/Military Co-ordination in New York and it is anticipated that this invitation may be extended to

in support of their humanitarian operations

other key military strategic lift providers in the future. UN OCHA also acknowledged that tangible benefit was gained by the UN's participation in the event and that they would wish to be included on future conferences in order to maintain the cooperation between the key stakeholders. The next Deployability Conference will take place in Sofia, Bulgaria on 24 and 25 March 2015 by kind invitation of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence. It is anticipated that the

conference will focus on the strategic lift challenges associated with operating on the African continent and will include overviews from EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia and EUFOR CAR.



EU Missions and Operations





Since 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 30 missions and operations under CSDP. 9 are military operations/missions. The remainder are civilian missions. Currently, the EU is undertaking 16 missions and operations under CSDP (5 military missions and operations and 11 civilian missions).

Missions/Operations	Military	Civilian
MIDDLE EAST		EUJUST LEX-Iraq (Iraq), Mar 05 – 31 Dec 13 EUPOL-COPPS (occupied Palestinian territory), Jan 06 – 30 Jun 15 EUBAM Rafah (occupied Palestinian territory), 25 Nov 05 – 30 Jun 15
EUROPE	CONCORDIA (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Mar – Dec 03 EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Dec 04 – Nov 15	EUPOL Proxima (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Dec 03 – Dec 05 EUPAT (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) followed EUPOL Proxima, Dec 05 – Jun 06 EUPM BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 Jan 03 – 30 Jun 12 EUJUST Themis (Georgia), Jul 04 – Jul 05 EUPT Kosovo, Apr 06 – Feb 08 EULEX Kosovo, 16 Feb 08 – 14 Jun 16 EUMM Georgia, 01 Oct 08 – 14 Dec 14 EUAM Ukraine, A two-year mandate is foreseen
ASIA		AMM (Aceh Province, Indonesia), Sep 05 – Dec 06 EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (Afghanistan), 15 Jun 07 – 31 Dec 14
AFRICA	ARTEMIS (Ituri province, Congo RDC), Jun – Sep 03 EUFOR RD Congo (Congo RDC), Jun – Nov 06 EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad-Central African Republic), Jan 08 – Mar 09 Operation ATALANTA (EUNAVFOR Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia) Dec 08 – Dec 16 EUTM Somalia (Training Mission, Somalia), Apr 10 – Mar 15 EUTM Mali (Training Mission, Mali), 18 Feb 13 – 18 May 16 EUFOR RCA (Central African Republic, Africa) Apr 14 – Dec 14	EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo RDC), Apr 05 – Jun 07 EU SSR (Guinea-Bissau), Jun 08 – Sep 10 AMIS 11 Support, Darfur Province (Sudan), Jul 05 – Dec 07 EUVASEC South Sudan, Sep 12 – Jan 14 EUPOL RD Congo (Congo RDC), 01 Jul 07 – 30 Sep 14 EUCAP NESTOR, Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, 01 Aug 12 – 12 Dec 16 EUSEC RD Congo (RDC), EUMS provides a POC for all issues related to the execution of the mandate Jun 05 – Jun 15 EUCAP SAHEL Niger, 16 Jul 14 – 15 Jul 16 EUCAP Sahel Mali, A two-year mandate is foreseen EUBAM Libya 22 May 13 – 21 May 15

Note: Missions/Operations in bold are ongoing. Dates refer to agreed mandates and do not mean that missions/operations will necessarily close on dates indicated. Information correct at time of printing in October 2014.

MIDDLE EAST

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

EU BAM RAFAH

Туре:	EU Border assistance and monitoring mission.
Objectives:	To provide a «Third Party» presence at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP, on the Gaza-Egypt border, mandated to verify and evaluate the professional conduct of the Palestinian Authority (PA) border police and customs services at the RCP and to contribute to confidence building between Israel and the PA.
Mandate:	Operational phase began on 25 November 2005. However, operations at the RCP have been suspended since June 2007 due to Hamas' violent takeover of the Gaza Strip. The Mission has maintained its readiness and capacity to redeploy to the RCP once political and security conditions allow. The mission was recently extended until 30 June 2015.
Commitment:	The authorised and actual strength of the Mission is 4 international mission members, currently contributed by 3 EU Member States. (Currently $3 + 4$ local staff) The budget for the period of July 2014 to June 2015 is 0.965 million.
Acting Head of Mission:	Guy Rolin (FR)/ Selection process ongoing.

MILITARY MISSIONS

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

	EUPOLC PPS
EUPOL C	COPPS
Туре:	EU Police and rule-of law mission.
Objectives:	To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership, in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the EU's institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector, including Criminal Justice Reform.
Mandate:	Launched on 1 January 2006 for an initial duration of 3 years, the current Mission mandate was recently extended from an initial 1 year, until 30 June 2015.
Commitment:	Headquarters in Ramallah, the Mission has an authorised strength of 71 international and 41 local mission members. The current strength is 62 international mission members, including police experts, judges and prosecutors + 43 local staff). A total of 19 Member States and the third states of Canada (2) and Norway (1) contribute Mission personnel. The budget for the period of July 2014 to June 2015 is \notin 9.820 million.
Acting Head of Mission:	Major Rodolphe Mauget (FR).

EUROPE AND ASIA

MILITARY MISSIONS CIVILIAN MISSIONS

BOSNIA AND HERZGOVINA

	EUFOR
European	Union Force ALTHEA (EUFOR ALTHEA)
Туре:	Military EU-led operation.
Objectives:	Under the authority of the Council and in line with the mandate, EUFOR ALTHEA supports Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) efforts to maintain a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), and in parallel, conducts capacity building and training of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) in order to contribute to the stability of the state.
Mandate:	In December 2004, EUFOR took over responsibility of maintaining a SASE in BiH from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The EU-led military Operation EUFOR ALTHEA is a United Nations (UN) Chapter VII mission.
Commitment:	In October 2011 the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) decided to keep the executive role to support BiH's authorities' efforts to maintain the SASE. By September 2012, the operation had been reconfigured with forces which, in addition, will focus on capacity building and training. There are currently 907 troops from 17 EU Member States and 5 Third Contributing States ready to carry out these tasks. EUFOR is backed up by the Intermediate Reserve Forces and stands ready to respond to any security challenge. Common costs for the operation in 2014 are £14. 4 million.
Command:	The operation is conducted under Berlin+ arrangements, where EU Staff Group in NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) acts as an EU Operational HQ. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), General Sir Adrian Bradshaw (UK) is the EU Operation Commander. Major General Dieter Heidecker (AT) is the Force Commander (COM EUFOR) of EUFOR ALTHEA.
FOLIA	FUPOL

AFGHANISTAN

EUPOLA	FGHANISTAN	European Union Police Mession to Atghanistan
Туре:	EU Police mission with linkages into wider rule of law.	
Objectives:	To support the Afghan government in moving towa establishment of sustainable and effective civilian p arrangements that will ensure interaction with the justice system under Afghan ownership. Objectives through assistance in policy-level reform of the Mir training and capacity-building of the Afghan Nation leadership as well as through support to relevant ju	policing wider criminal are implemented nistry of Interior, nal Police
Mandate:	Launched on 15 June 2007, the mandate was exten December 2014. The Council agrees in principle on a the end of 2016.	
Commitment:	Headquarters in Kabul with 2 field offices (Herat, M the Mission has an authorised strength of 400 inter members, including police, legal and administrativ current strength is 277 International + 197 local sta EU Member States contribute personnel. The budge of 1 June 2013 to 31 December 2014 is €108.5 millio	national mission e experts. The aff. A total of 23 et for the period
Head of Mission:	District Police Commissioner Karl-Åke Roghe (SE). EUSR: Franz-Michael Skiold Mellbin (DK).	

GLOBAL MEMO

GEORGIA



EUMM GEORGIA

Туре:	EU civilian monitoring mission under the CSDP framework
Objectives:	Following the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, EUMM Georgia monitors the implementation of the ceasefire agreement brokered by the EU on 12 August and Implementing Measures of 8 September. EUMM has the following mandated tasks: <i>Stabilisation, Normalisation, Confidence building and Information</i> :
Mandate:	Launched 15 September 2008, the Mission's mandate has been extended to 14 December 2014.
Commitment:	Headquarters in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices in Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi, the Mission has an authorised strength of 282 international staff (Currently 262 + 131 local staff). A budget of \notin 26.65 million is allocated for the period up to 14 December 2014 (fifteen months). (23 contributing EU nations).
Head of Mission:	Toivo Klaar (EE). EUSR for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia: Herbert Salber (DE). Head of Delegation: Philip Dimitrov (BG).

UKRAINE EUAM UKRAINE Type: EU advisory mission for civilian security sector reform. **Objectives:** To contribute to the development of effective, sustainable and accountable civilian security services that contributes to strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine, for the benefit of all Ukrainian citizens throughout the country. An initial mandate of two years is foreseen by the Council Decision of Mandate: 22 July 2014, to start when the Mission is formally launched. Commitment: Operational planning and other preparations for the Mission are underway; a civilian response team was deployed in Kyiv in May 2014, followed by the Mission Advance Team and later the Core Team. Headquarters will be in Kyiv. A budget of € 2.68 million was allocated for the first four-month start-up phase of the mission until 30 November. Head of Kalman Mizsei (HU) was appointed on 24 July 2014. Head of Delegation: Jan Tombinski (PL). Mission:

козоvо		***
EULEX K	05070	Kesovo
Туре:	EU Rule of law mission.	
Objectives:	As the largest civilian mission launched unde Kosovo's task is to monitor, mentor and advis with regard to police, justice and customs, w responsibilities in specific areas of competen	se national authorities while retaining executive
Mandate:	Launched on 16 February 2008, the Mission's current mandate runs until 14 June 2016.	
Commitment:	Headquartered in Pristina, the Mission has an authorised strength of 800 international mission members (Currently 878 + 936 local staff). A total of 27 EU Member States contribute personnel and five Third State contributors Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA and Canada are supporting the Mission. A budget of €34 million is allocated for the period of 15 June 2014 to 14 October 2014 for the transition phase of the Mission. Preliminary steps are taken for the budget of €55.820.000 allocated for the period 15 October 2014 to 14 June 2015.	
Head of Mission:	AHoM: Joëlle Vachter (FR). EUSR and Head Zbogar (SI).	of EU Office: Samuel

GLOBAL MEMO



MILITARY MISSIONS

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

EUSEC RD CONGO

EUSEC R	DCONGO	
Туре:	Support mission in the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR).	
Objectives:	Provides advice and assistance on defence reform (as part of SSR) in the DRC with the aim of assisting the Congolese authorities in establishing a defence apparatus capable of guaranteeing the security of the Congolese people.	
Mandate:	The SSR mission was launched on the 08 June 2005. In September 2012 the PSC agreed on the need to extend EUSEC RD Congo for 1 year (mandate 7), followed by a final transition phase of 12 months (mandate 8, 2014). During this period EUSEC should strive for a finalisation or effective hand over of its tasks to the Congolese authorities, other EU instruments or bilateral or international actors with a view to sustainability of the result. The mandate has been extended until 30 June 2015 (press release ST 13310/14).	
Commitment:	The mission consists of 35 military and civilian personnel from 10 EU Member States and one from the USA + 29 local staff. The mission is located in Kinshaha and has 1 detachment in Goma. Bukavu detachment was closed on the 12 September 2013. The mission budget for 2014 is $\&$.5M million. A budget of $\&$ 4.6 million is available until 30 June 2015.	
Head of Mission:	Colonel Jean-Louis Nurenberg (LU).	

EUCAP SAHEL

NIGER		
Туре:	EU Capacity building mission.	
Objectives:	Through training and advising, the Mission aims to improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces (Gendarmerie, National Police, National Guard) to fight terrorism and organised crime in an effective and coordinated manner, with a view to contribute to enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in Niger and in the Sahel region.	
Mandate:	The initial two-year mandate starting on 16 July 2012 was extended by a further two years until 15 July 2016.	
Commitment:	Headquarters in Niamey, the Mission is staffed with 47 International + 27 local staff; 11 EU contributing states. An annual budget of €9.2 million was allocated for the period of 16 July 2013 to 15 July 2014.	
Head of Mission:	Police Commissioner Filip De Ceuninck (BE). Head of Delegation: Raul Mateus Paula (PT). EUSR for the Sahel: Michel Dominique Reveyrand-de Menthon (FR).	

MALI	
EUCAP	SAHEL *
Туре:	EU Capacity building mission.
Objectives:	The objective of EUCAP Sahel Mali is to allow the Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace in Mali, and to restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy throughout the territory of Mali by means of an effective redeployment of its administration.
Mandate:	The Council Decision establishing the mission applies for 2 years, starting from the day on which the mission is formally launched.
Commitment:	Temporary HQ in Bamako. Since 7 July 2014 the Core Team (23 international members) is on the ground. The budget for the first nine months is € 5.5 million. The second CfC has been launched on 29 July 2014, comprising 26 positions.
Head of Mission:	Ambassador Albrecht Conze (DE) was appointed on 26 May 2014. Head of EU Delegation: Ambassador Richard Zink (DE). EUSR for the Sahel: Michel Dominique Reveyrand-de Menthon (FR).

LIBYA



EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)

Туре:	EU Border assistance.
Objectives:	The objectives of EUBAM Libya are, in the short term, to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya's land, sea and air borders and, in the long term, to develop a broader integrated border management strategy.
Mandate:	The mission was launched on 22 May 2013 and has a mandate until 21 May 2015. (The mission has been temporary relocated out of Libya on 31st July 2014 and since October 2014 downsized to 17 people from the 57 initially employed from 17 EU contributing states.
Commitment:	The Mission operates from its Headquarters in Tripoli although its work is to benefit all the country's borders. The annual budget for the Mission's second year is €26.2 million. The Mission has an authorised strength of 111 international staff. The actual strength after the first year of operations is 61 international staff.
Head of Mission:	Antti Hartikainen (FI).

HORN OF AFRICA AND THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN



EUCAP NESTOR

LUCAI	
Туре:	Capacity building mission.
Objectives:	A regional civilian mission augmented with military expertise, aiming to assist countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean in strengthening their maritime security capacity in order to enable them to fight piracy more effectively. The Mission is complementary to Operation ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia, and follows a regional approach to address a regional problem. Currently 83 + 18 local staff; 15 EU contributing states + 2 non EU (Norway + Australia).
Mandate:	Current mandate from 16 July 2012 to 12 December 2016.
Commitmen	t: The mission has its headquarters and a country office in Djibouti and country offices in Seychelles. A Nestor liaison officer is embedded in the EU Delegation to Tanzania. The mission has staff in Nairobi who deploy on a semi-permanent basis to Somalia.
Head of Mission:	Mr. Etienne de Poncins (FR).

AFRICA

MILITARY MISSIONS

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC



Sec. Sec.	
EU FORC	E, Republique centrafricaine (EUFOR RCA)
Туре:	Military EU-led operation.
Objectives:	To contribute to the resolution of crisis in RCA, the EU decided to utilise a short-term military CSDP operation to contribute to a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), providing temporary support to facilitate the full deployment of MISCA (African Union-led operation).
Mandate:	EUFOR RCA is acting under the mandate given by UNSCR 2134(2014) for a period of six months from the declaration of its Full Operational Capacity (FOC). FOC having been declared on 15th June, the end of mandate is 15th Dec 2014.
Commitment:	On the ground, the composition of the Force is a battalion-sized grouping, consisting of 2.5 Infantry Companies, 1 Gendarmerie Company, together with appropriate Command and Control (C2), enablers (engineering, ISTAR), logistic and medical support. The approved budget is €31.2 million. As of 10 Aug 14, 12 Member States have deployed troops in Central African Republic and 2 Third States (Georgia, Serbia) contribute to the operation, providing 1 infantry company and medical team. (In total currently 732 in Bangui).
Command:	Major General Philippe Pontiès (FR) has been appointed EU Operation Commander. The OHQ of EUFOR RCA is located at Larissa, Greece. Brigadier General Thierry Lion (FR) is the Force Commander. The FHQ is located in Bangui, RCA.

SOMALIA

Operation ATALANTA – EUNAVFOR Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia

Туре:	Anti-piracy maritime operation. First EU maritime operation.
Objectives:	In support of UN Security Council Resolutions calling for active participation in the fight against piracy. The areas of intervention are the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean off the Somali Coast. The mission includes: Protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; protection of AMISOM shipping; deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast; protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis; in addition, Operation ATALANTA shall also contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. Currently 1332 staff members; 23 EU contributing states + 3 non EU states.
Mandate:	Launched on 8 December 2008, and initially planned for a period of 12 months, the PSC has approved an extension of Operation ATALANTA until December 2016.
Commitment:	Operation ATALANTA typically consists of 4 to 8 surface combat vessels, 1 auxiliary ship and 2 to 4 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Common costs for the operation in 2014 are €7. 5 million.
Command:	The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Northwood (UK). Major General Martin Smith (UK) is the EU Operation Commander. Rear Admiral Guido Rando (IT) is the Force Commander.

GLOBAL MEMO

MALI

	TRAINING MISSION
EU TRAII	NING Mission, Mali (EUTM Mali)
Туре:	Military mission to contribute to the training and advice of the Malian Armed Forces (MAF).
Objectives:	EUTM Mali responds to the invitation of the Malian authorities and to the UNSCR 2071 (2012) adopted on 12 October 2012, which expressed its grave concern about the consequences of instability in the North of Mali and stressed the need to respond swiftly in order to preserve stability across the Sahel region. It invited international partners, including the EU, to provide training to the Malian army and security forces, under control of the legitimate civilian political authorities.
Mandate:	The mission was launched on 18 February 2013 and initially planned for 15 months. During the mandate the Mission had provided military training and advice to the Malian Armed Forces (MAF). 4 Battalions, each consisting of 650 to 700 personnel, have been trained. EUTM Mali shall not be involved in combat operations and mentoring. Following the last Strategic Review (Nov 2013), the Mission is extended until mid-May 2016, with a renewed mandate aimed at strengthening Malian ownership on the rebuilding of Armed Forces, through an increase of the advising role and a Train the Trainer programme.
Commitment:	The mission comprises 550 personnel including 200 instructors, mission support staff, Force Protection and Air MEDEVAC (in total 22 EU contributing states + 3 non EU). The Mission Headquarters is located in Bamako and the Training area is in Koulikoro, 60 km north-east of Bamako. Common costs for the mandate are estimated at €27.7 million.
Command:	Brigadier General Marc Rudkiewicz (FR) was appointed EU Mission Commander on the 1 April 2014. The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander. Brigadier General Alfonso García-Vaquero (ES) took over on 24 October 2014.

SOMALIA



EU TRAII	NING Mission, Somalia (EUTM Somalia)
Туре:	Military mission to contribute to the training of Somali Security Forces in Mogadishu.
Objectives:	On 22 January 2013 the Council adopted the decision on a new mandate with the objective to contribute to building up the Somali National Security Forces accountable to the Somali National Government. In line with Somali needs and priorities EUTM Somalia will provide political and strategic level advice to Somali authorities within the security institutions (Ministry of Defence and General Staff), support and advise on Sector Security Development as well as specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain.
Mandate:	The mission was launched on 07 April 2010. On 22 January 2013, the Council adopted a new decision extending the EUTM Somalia mandate until March 2015.
Commitment:	The mission comprises currently 128 personnel from 11 Member States and 1 participating third state (Serbia) + 9 local staff. Estimated common costs for the extended mandate (Jan 2013 - March 2015) are €11.6 million. Since January 2014 all EUTM Somalia activities including advisory, mentoring and training are now carried out in Mogadishu with the support of a Liaison Office in Nairobi and a Support Cell in Brussels.
Command:	The Mission Headquarters is situated in Mogadishu. In February 2014 Brigadier General Massimo Mingiardi (IT) was appointed EU Mission Commander. The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.

EU High Level Conference. Military Lessons Learnt within the Comprehensive Approach

By Commander Ben Falk (UK), Concepts & Capability Directorate



Opening keynote speeches: Lt Gen Wosolsobe (DG EUMS), Mr Pierre Vimont (ESG EEAS), Gen De Rousiers (Chairman EUMC), Dr Antonio Missiroli (Dir EUISS).

Introduction

Identifying and learning lessons is a key activity that is directly linked to improvements in performance – of individuals, institutions and member states. A broad based acceptance that lessons are not a blame game but a value added endeavour, coupled with top down buy-in ensures that the cultural mind-set of continuous improvement is kept to the fore in all activities. The military lever of power has a well-developed system for collecting lessons and best

practices and to then take the necessary corrective and inclusive action. With the recognition that the comprehensive approach provides the optimum solutions in advance planning and execution the collection of lessons and best practice now focuses on a broader horizon. In this context, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) jointly conducted a high level lessons conference to identify potential solutions for improving the military contribution to the comprehensive approach, by raising awareness of the military lever and sharing

lessons and best practices from missions and operations. The rationale behind this event lay with the momentum created by the endorsement of the 'suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations', the joint European Commission-EEAS communication on the comprehensive approach and the conclusions of the December 2013 European Council on Defence, together with an increasing number of challenges to be addressed on the international scene and opportunities to seize, *inter alia*, the pooling and sharing initiative.

The EU High Level Conference, Military Lessons Learnt within the Comprehensive Approach, was hosted in Brussels

on 19 and 20 June by DG EUMS, Lt Gen Wolfgang Wosolsobe, and Dir EUISS, Dr Antonio Missiroli. Attendance included senior EEAS Corporate Board personnel, CSDP mission commanders, senior Defence Ministry personnel and representatives of international organisations. The conference was run with key-note speeches delivered during the mornings' plenary sessions and then specific themes were debated during three 'break-out' panels in the afternoon. This article summarises the conference report and the rapporteurs' round up of the experts' discussions. These can be read in greater detail on the EUISS website¹.

Expert Discussion 1 – Planning and launching military operations.

The impact and effectiveness of CSDP and, by extension, the comprehensive approach can be seen in the field through the operational contributions of individual missions. Here, mission experience shows that, particularly for the implementing actors, the key challenges when

> attempting to maximise operational impact are the levels of strategic guidance and the measure of engagement and investment in the comprehensive approach.

The recent series of military actions has reduced public support for further crisis management operations. Therefore it has become an imperative for European leaders to explain why CSDP operations are required and to specify the European interests that are being affected. To aid the debate on which EU interests are concerned and whether the action should be taken, the Political Framework for Crisis Approach

(PFCA) provides a useful starting point setting the parameters of further discussion. They demonstrate that CSDP action forms an integral part of a comprehensive European foreign policy and shows the evolution of European External Action Service activity.

Political will and military credibility go hand in hand where the dependability of leadership largely determines the effectiveness of military action. In the same sense it was

all military activitiesform the expression of political choices

¹ http://www.iss.europa.eu/activities/detail/article/learning-bydoing-military-lessons-learnt-within-the-comprehensiveapproach/

LESSONS LEARNT CONFERENCE

determined that unity of command in a military sense cannot exist independently from political unity; thus all military activities must ultimately form the expression of political choices.

In addition, the challenge of mutual understanding was made clear; where both the political and military operators require a comprehensive knowledge of how to engage with the other and maintain a mutual respect for institutional differences in order to deliver an effective European foreign and security policy.

Expert Discussion 2 – Assessing comprehensive effectiveness and impact

Analysing three case studies the discussion focused on two main themes; the reality of comprehensive approach on the ground and the challenges of measuring impact.

As military operations are instruments of strategy it is essential to embed CSDP in security policies and political processes. However, a general perception of a lack of strategic guidance from the EU political level either without specific or sufficiently detailed regional strategies can appear to weaken the method by which military objectives are derived and often produces further difficulties at field level. Different planning processes, funding and financial regulations, chains of command or reporting procedures can cause complex interaction between EU actors. This can be exacerbated by the limited extent to which the EU member states coordinate their own policies with the EU.

The measurement of impact was considered underdeveloped within the EU, and although benchmarks have been designed and regular reporting is mandated, dedicated personnel are often not in place to ensure the efficacy of the system.

Recommendations on how to improve the comprehensive approach included: better coordination between Brussels and the field for operations where there is no OHQ; the establishment of a single EU peace and security planning structure (involving both the EEAS and the Commission); harmonisation of EU budget mechanisms and sources of funding; better coordination of member states' policies with the EU wherever they are collocated with a CSDP operation; an increased role for the EU Delegation as the focal point of all EU activities at country level.

Expert Discussion 3 – Inter-institutional cooperation and coherence

As each crisis is unique, familiarity with conflict drivers and the socio-economic-political environment will determine impact. Hence, regular dialogue and training are necessary to achieve a joint understanding of the underlying issues of the comprehensive approach, within which the civilian and military instruments coordination mechanisms are vital. Yet different organisational cultures and funding structures between civilian and military instruments, designed to keep the two spheres separate, make coordination difficult. This drives a requirement for the comprehensive approach to be adopted and implemented from the beginning, as it cannot be applied retroactively.



This also requires a more flexible use of institutional instruments to find synergies between development and security instruments and funding mechanisms.

The discussions suggested that possible improvements in institutional cooperation and mission success depend in part upon improved early warning and response structures, a common understanding of what and who is on the ground and early contact with other international actors. Further investment is required in a networked approach to emergency response and all aspects of civilian and military crisis management tools. Naturally, EU Delegations play a significant role through their enhanced status and reporting structures and the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations should draw on resources already in place, and include them in conceptualising mission objectives.

In conclusion

With the launch of 30 CSDP military operations and civilian missions over the last decade lessons have been allowed to be observed, identified and sometimes learnt, especially in regard to the comprehensive approach. As it is used in the EU, the comprehensive approach aims to add value and increase efficiency when implementing the EU's external action through CSDP. The EU attempts to achieve this by bringing together the various instruments, organisations and processes at an EU as well as member-state level.

The contemporary security environment requires both 'hard' and 'soft' power tools, both civilian and military contributions. The military represents only one of many instruments at the EU's disposal and under specific circumstances it can provide invaluable support to peacebuilding. While its contributions to the comprehensive approach can be clearly defined, the civilian side is much more complex as it consists of multiple actors at various stages of preparedness.

There are a number of lessons to be drawn from the experience of the past decade which in turn raises not only questions surrounding how to assess the impact of CSDP, but also of how a lessons learnt process can or should be established. Although a sensitive issue, this process remains indispensable to improve the effectiveness of missions and allow them to make a difference.

Perhaps most importantly, the implementation and active learning of these lessons requires leadership and the establishment of a lessons learnt culture that relies upon a system of standardisation, objectivity, and senior leadership.

COMMUNICATIONS

Cyber Security and Cyber Defence in the European Union

By Wing Commander Rob Smeaton, EUMS and Wolfgang Roehrig, EDA



Opportunities, Synergies and Challenges-

The internet has brought enormous benefits, and vulnerabilities. Cyber incidents, either intentional or accidental, are increasing at an alarming rate threatening essential services.

The threat landscape escalates from Internet vandalism to physical damage including the abuse of Intellectual Property Rights and economic or state espionage. The prospect of physical effects through cyberspace represents a strategic shift. We can anticipate the development and use of more dangerous tools. Targeted attacks through Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) malware are becoming the most difficult threats to counter.

The EU Cyber Security Strategy

The EU heads of state and government recognised cyber defence as a priority for capability development during the 2013 EU Defence Council.

Cyber Space is widely recognized as the fifth military operational domain. The success of conventional military operations is enabled by, and dependent on the assured availability of, and access to, cyberspace. The difficult questions for the military are:

- From where will attacks originate?
- What is their motivation?
- What is their target?
- How will they attack?

We can assume the attackers will follow technological trends so the threat landscape must be seen in the context of technological trends and military implications:

- Conventional military activity relies on ensured access to Cyber Space;
- The military is increasingly dependent on civil (critical) infrastructures at home and in theatre;
- As forces are interconnected with internet technology, internet vulnerabilities get closer to the front line;

• The military cannot afford the cost and performance penalties of failing to adopt commercial internet technologies, as military capabilities are susceptible to the same threats, vulnerabilities and solutions as the civil sector.

The EU Cyber Security Strategy defines four major CSDP work strands:

- Building of Cyber Defence Capabilities with EU Member States (MS),
- Building the EU Cyber Defence Policy framework,
- · Promotion of the civil-military dialogue,
- Dialogue with international partners like NATO.

Cyber Security for CSDP – the role of EUMS and EDA

The EU is solely engaged in cyber self-protection and assured access to cyber space to enable conventional military activity. Offensive cyber capabilities are not part of EU CSDP activity.

The EU does not have standing military forces or military equipment for EU operations. When a CSDP operation is launched, the EU is dependent on force contributions, including cyber defence, from EU MS and third nations.

MS will be asked to provide Cyber Defence so it is in the interests of the EU to encourage MS in their efforts to develop and maintain cyber inventories. The MS must now invest in cyber defence capabilities so the EU can deploy robust in-depth (layered) CSDP cyber defence capabilities, from their national cyber defence capabilities.

The EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) are working to improve EU cyber defence capabilities.

The EUMS role, in Cyber Defence, is to develop doctrine and policy to ensure that several different MS cyber protection elements operating independently, in support of an EU military operation, provide robust collective protection of the EU force. The collective nature of the defence should not become a threat or vulnerability for the EU Force.

The EDA is a small agency, with a staff of about 130 employees from different EU MS. The EDA supports MS in different areas of military capability development. In 2011 the EDA created the Project Team (PT) Cyber Defence; a unique tool within the EU to identify options for inter-MS and civil-military cooperation.

The 2013 EDA Landscaping Study provided a detailed picture of capacities and concepts already in place across Europe that could be drawn upon to make CSDP operations

more «Cyber-resilient». The study also identified existing gaps and opportunities to close the gaps.

The «EU Concept for Cyber Defence for EU-led Military Operations» was agreed in December 2012. The Concept is the EU policy and guidance for operational CSDP commanders to establish and maintain cyber situational awareness.

Cooperation between EU Member States -Pooling & Sharing

Sovereignty should not be an obstacle to the enhancement of cyber self-protection cooperation among MS. Nations are finding it difficult to develop cyber capability on a national basis. Given the rapidly evolving cyber threat, it may not be possible to establish, maintain and use a cyber-defence capability effectively without cooperation. Cooperation is essential, rather than desirable, when developing and maintaining capabilities and is about trust amongst partners with shared interests and requirements. If there is trust, common interest and a willingness to cooperate, many options for synergies become real opportunities.

Other successful examples of defence cooperation should inspire us to tackle cyber defence in the same way.

Whether to cooperate, with whom to cooperate and the extent of that cooperation are sovereign decisions; sovereignty itself is not the decisive factor; trust and shared interest are more powerful drivers when deciding on the degree of cooperation.

With Pooling and Sharing, the EDA has established a framework for achieving more together without losing sovereignty. Cyber defence projects include training and exercises, ranges and cyber situational awareness packages have been initiated.

Civil-military cooperation in the EU

The EU rightly prides itself on its ability to deploy Comprehensive responses to global crises. It is important that the EU adopts a Comprehensive approach to cyber self-protection.

Military networks, both classified and unclassified, depend on internet technology, so to protect our networks; the military must use civilian training and standards. EU military operations have a high dependence on civilian actors. The EU military operation to the Central African Republic aims to enable civilian organisations to distribute aid so effective engagement via the Internet is essential. If we are to deliver effective protection, the military must be part of the civilian cyber protection activity.

Just as we strive to ensure national critical infrastructure, within the EU is resilient to the cyber threat, we must protect CSDP operations and missions outside of the EU.

Cooperation between NATO and EU

Twenty two nations are members of both the EU and NATO; each of these 22 nations has a «single set of forces» at

readiness that is available to serve on operations. In today's world we cannot, and will not, invest in capabilities that can only be used by one organisation. The EU and NATO have a dialogue in areas of common interest, such as converging NATO and EU standards in cyber security and defence, but the engagement must be intensified.

The future EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework

The EU Council on defence in December 2013 tasked the EEAS to develop a Cyber Defence Policy Framework that is anticipated to focus on;

- Development of MS cyber defence capabilities, research and technologies
- Reinforced protection of CSDP communication networks
- Mainstreaming of cyber security into EU crisis management
- Raising awareness through improved training, education and exercises
- Synergies with wider EU cyber policies and other relevant actors
 - Cooperation with relevant international partners, notably with NATO

Though the public perception is that cyber protection primarily is a technological issue, human factors are rapidly emerging as the priority. The synergies with civilian cyber defence (is there a substantive difference?) ensures a constant stream of technology for use by military and civilian defenders to counter identical, or very similar, threats. The military are unlikely to have unique cyber defence capabilities, so they will be in direct competition

with civilian (pay) for personnel.

A challenge for the military will be growing and retaining sufficient high quality cyber trained people in our armed forces. The pool of potential young cyber specialists is small. In this competitive market the military must make the military an attractive option for talented individuals if we are to succeed.

The challenge is not limited to technical specialists; all personnel require an increasingly sophisticated understanding of cyber space and how to operate effectively in cyber space. ICT users, so almost all personnel, have a role in cyber defence and so require up to date knowledge and awareness of the threat environment and how to react to an incident. The decision makers must understand the cyber options and the impact of cyber operations against us. A cyber defence focus during education, training and exercises is vital if we are to achieve an adequate operational cyber defence capability. The human being is, and will continue to be, our most precious cyber defence asset. The knowledge and expertise of our people is fundamental for an acceptable European Cyber Defence culture and operational capability in today's technological epoch.

Cyber Space isthe fifth military operational domain

Operation Atalanta Continues Fight Against Piracy with New Operation Commander at the Helm

By Commander Jacqui Sherriff (UK), EU Operation HQ, Northwood, UK



Major General Martin Smith MBE being briefed by the Commanding Officer, Captain Annunziata of the EU Flagship, Italian Navy destroyer, ITS Andrea Doria, with the EU Ambassador to the Republic of Djibouti, Mr Joseph Silva, and the Force Commander, Rear Admiral Guido Rando.

On Thursday 28 August 2014 Rear Admiral Bob Tarrant handed over command of the European Union's counterpiracy mission, Operation Atalanta, to Major General Martin Smith MBE.

Rear Admiral Tarrant commanded the European Union Naval Force between January 2013 - August 2014 and during this time the number of attacks on merchant ships by Somali pirates reduced significantly, with nine attacks in total, compared to 176 in 2011 and 35 in 2012.

Whilst the reduction in Somalia piracy was very much welcomed by Rear Admiral Tarrant, he recognised, like many, that to achieve a lasting solution to piracy, Somalia would require assistance from the International Community to help strengthen maritime security and develop coastal livelihoods.

As a result, during his time as the Operation Commander, Rear Admiral Tarrant built closer relationships with Somali authorities and hosted a meeting at sea with the Somali President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud and EU Ambassadors. This and other meetings with Somali officials on board EU Naval Force warships focused on how the EU can advise and assist the Somalis to develop their own maritime strategy in the fight against piracy.

As the Operation Commander engaged with regional partners, EU Naval Force warships continued their counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. They also continued their protection of World Food Programme (WFP) ships carrying much-needed humanitarian aid to displaced people in Somalia.

piracy continues to pose a threat

Furthermore, during port visits, Operation Atalanta sailors and marines have continued to assist staff from EU sister mission, EUCAP Nestor, to train local maritime coastal forces. Joint EU Local Maritime Capacity Building (LMCB) activities such as this have enabled regional coastal forces to develop and enhance their own maritime capabilities.

Speaking about his time in command, Rear Admiral Tarrant stated «It has been a privilege to command the European Union's counter-piracy operation. I am proud of my teams in the Operational Headquarters and those who have served in EU warships far out to sea. They have worked

MISSION – EUNAVFOR ATALANTA

tirelessly to help keep WFP ships and seafarers safe. Pirates are criminals, and when you consider that between 2005 -2012 their leaders received over 250 million Euro in ransom payments, I have no doubt that they will, if given the opportunity, try again to get out to sea to launch attacks. It is therefore essential that the International Community remains vigilant to the potential threat.»

Prior to taking up his new role, Major General Smith commanded 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines from November 2011 to June 2013. He then attended the Royal College of Defence Studies for a year. He became the Commandant General Royal Marines (CGRM) and Commander United Kingdom Amphibious Forces (COMUKAMPHIBFOR) in June 2014.

Following his arrival at the EU Naval Force Operational HQ in August 2014, Major General Smith stated «Operation Atalanta's success in the fight to suppress piracy speaks for itself, but I recognise that there is work to be done to secure a lasting solution to piracy. As Operation Commander, my focus will be on building on EU Naval Force's achievements and strengthening the cooperation with our regional and international partners to help reduce the permissive conditions that allowed piracy to flourish.

Shortly after taking command of the EU Naval Force, Major General Smith visited a number of countries in the Horn of Africa region which are key partners in the fight against piracy.

During his visit to Djibouti, the Operation Commander visited MV Douro, a vessel recently charted by the World Food Programme to carry humanitarian aid to the Somali people.

When MV Douro sails along the Somali coast, it will be protected from pirate attack by a Serbian Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment, or AVPD, operating under the Operation Atalanta flag.

Before Major General Smith departed MV Douro, he spoke directly to the Serbian Forces on board.

«The work of the Serbian team is crucial in ensuring the food aid reaches the people of Somalia. I am proud of the task this detachment will perform - it is a way in which we can help the WFP make a real difference to the lives of people in desperate need. I'm also delighted to see Serbia, although not part of the EU, operating within Operation Atalanta; a unique cooperation.»

Since its launch in December 2008, EU Naval Force warships have protected 277 WFP and 127 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vessels from pirate attack off the Somali coast. Indeed, no WFP ship that has been afforded protection by the EU Naval Force has been pirated.

During his visit to the Horn of Africa, Major General Smith also took the opportunity to embark in the EU Naval Force flagship, Italian Navy destroyer, ITS Andrea Doria, at sea off the coast of Djibouti. After being welcomed on board by the EU Force Commander, Rear Admiral Guido Rando, Major General Smith was given a tour of ITS Andrea Doria and briefed on her capabilities. A briefing in the Operations Room highlighted the warship's state of the art command and control and radar systems that are able to detect, amongst other things, small



EU NAVFOR Operation AIALAN IA personnel during joint exercises in the Gulf of Aden with the Japanese Navy.

vessels at sea, such as those commonly used by Somali pirates to attack merchant ships.

Major General Smith then flew on to Mogadishu, where he met the Somali Prime Minister, Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed and Minister of Defence, Mohamed Shiekh Hassan and others. The meeting was an opportunity to discuss face-to-face the on-going threat and importance of regional cooperation to help secure a lasting solution to piracy. Major General Smith was accompanied during the visit to Mogadishu by the head of the EU Delegation to Somalia, Mr Michele Cervone d'Urso; the Head of the EU Training Mission in Somalia, Brigadier General Massimo Mingiardi; and the head of EUCAP NESTOR, Mr Etienne de Poncins.

Before he departed Mogadishu, Major General Smith commented «I have welcomed the opportunity to visit the EU's regional partners. I am in no doubt that piracy continues to pose a threat to ships passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin. The criminal structures, the intent and capability are still in place and the International Community needs to remain vigilant.»

Operation Atalanta's counter-piracy mandate is expected to be extended in the coming months to December 2016.




Military Training and Education in the EU – Critical capability enablers for CSDP missions and operations

By Lt Col Alin Bodescu, PhD. AO, Exercise, Training and Analysis Branch/CONCAP



In 2010, within the context of financial crisis and continuous shrinking of national defence budgets, Member States, through the European Union Military Committee, identified military training and education, among other areas, as a promising potential framework for defence cooperation in the EU¹. The overall goal: to improve the efficient spending of resources allocated to building military capabilities required for EU CSDP. We can think of training and education as critical investments for the social growth of a community, but in this article we will approach them (and more specifically training) from a different perspective, that of critical enablers of military capabilities.



¹ Pooling and sharing, German-Swedish initiative, Food for Thought, Berlin and Stockholm, November 2010, http://www.europarl. europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/ sede260511deseinitiative_/sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf

In the military context, a capability is the ability to create certain effects where the sum of all military capabilities results in fighting power – the ability of an entity to fight (Figure 1). Military capabilities are dependent on the effectiveness of each of its individual components where optimal effect is dependent on maximising the component and its synergetic interaction. Figure 1 above demonstrates the interaction of both quantitative and qualitative elements, but while the quantitative elements are tangible resources, the qualitative elements are dependent on the training and education of human resources.

It is from this perspective that the EUMS regards training and education, where initiatives and modules are driven by the analysis of lessons and best practice identified from operations, planning activities and exercises critical contributors to capability development.

With the Ghent goals of finding ways of sharing expenses and burdens providing the context, the EUMC during 2011 to 2013 tasked the EUMS to scope Member States willingness to cooperate in specific training activities and to investigate options which would result in improving their national training activities. The EUMS conducted detailed analysis of MS responses to a series of questionnaires which culminated in a comprehensive study, which not only identified MS interests but provided a realistic image of the expanse of military training at EU level. The study identified 16 key training topics where MS were provided the opportunity to voluntary take the lead as focal points to coordinate the development of common training efforts including the proposal of new courses or other similar projects. The study further identified that significant added value would accrue if cooperation could be directed towards meeting common training and education requirements especially from the longer term and strategic perspectives.

This suggested the need for building up an EU military training system as part of a broader CSDP civil-military training system. The EUMS study defined this system as a functional framework configured by the relevant structures (EU Military Training Group), principles and processes (as described in the Training Policy under CSDP), tools (e.g. databases) and the intrinsic relationships among the members of community of practice and interests in the area of military training and education in the EU. While most of the building blocks of this system already existed, there was a need for them to be mutually coordinated and consolidated – these included common thinking framed by an appropriate revised



training policy, common training goals which would elaborate the military CSDP training requirements, a lead EU military training group which would define and manage these requirements, a modern and widely available EU training and education web-portal and the development of a community of interest that is informed and actively involved in the management of the military training requirements, all within the global training environment defined by a structured and harmonised EU-NATO dialogue between training authorities. The consolidation of these elements will create favourable conditions for

Member States to pool and share relevant training and education opportunities and facilities.

Looking in more detail at the main elements of this system, the EU Training Policy² and its subordinate concept³ are the first building block and have to be reviewed to reflect the innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of CFSP/ CSDP and the need for a substantiated

comprehensive setting and approach to crisis management in the EU external action. In an interservice setting, CMPD, CPCC and EUMS worked together to prepare a framework document as a basis for Member States consultation and dialogue towards a new Training Policy under CSDP. The draft of the new training policy, apart from revisiting the relevant institutional architecture, confirms the achievements in the last 10 years of CSDP training, defines clearer responsibilities and proposes a mechanism to run a requirement-driven CSDP training system, with its particular applications for civilian and military conditions. The second critical element was the definition of military training requirements for CSDP. Training must be focused and should answer the question: what is needed to make sure that armed forces are sufficiently prepared to undertake CSDP military operations. Moreover, harmonisation of military requirements (training requirements are a component) has been identified by the Member States as one of the possible fields for military cooperation. The EUMS study, while recognising the predominance of NATO in training for most of the basic tasks of the envisaged military scenarios, identified that the EU has distinct military training requirements but that the CSDP specific military training requirements had not yet been identified. The study concluded that national military

TRAINING & EDUCATION

capabilities made available to CSDP missions and operations could become more efficient if common training requirements for all forces assigned for such missions and operations are identified and implemented in national training systems.

Regular staff to staff dialogue between the EUMS and the NATO strategic training authorities ((Allied Command Transformation - ACT) emphasised that the best way to define the «specificity of utility» is to approach the development of training requirements from both organisations perspectives. This third building block avoids duplication where the EUMS has made use of the NATO approach to defining training requirements based on training disciplines.

While NATO has permanent strategic commands which act as training requirement authorities, the particular nature of decision-making for CSDP suggested a consensus-based forum for defining EU military training requirements. Imagined as an expert group, the EU Military Training Group (EUMTG) was established in June 2014, as a configuration of the EU Military Committee Working Group /Headline

Task Force (EUMVWG/HTF)⁴ with its main objective to define the EU military training requirements for the subsequent consideration and approval by the EUMC and PSC. The EUMTG has already selected a number of training disciplines where subsequent requirements analysis will be conducted by the discipline leaders. A by-product of this approach is that the EU and NATO ACT now share definitions and terminology in their respective military training systems and close cooperation has been maintained at staff-to-staff level.

It is worth mentioning that saving resources should not be regarded as an end in itself but rather as a simple means to achieve greater interoperability and that Member States do organise common training to this end. Exercises conducted at several levels (type Multilayer or MILEX), certification exercises conducted by Battle Groups or training of the EU Headquarters (CSDP Foundation Training or Operations Planning Courses) are relevant examples in this respect.

Conclusion

We cannot think of EU military training in isolation. Most of the EU Member States possess a pool of forces and personnel dedicated to conduct operations under various flags, of UN, EU, NATO, hence a common training audience for potentially different requirements. On the other hand, training is, like other goods, a global business. Within this framework, EU is not only a customer but has also the ambition to be a provider of rationalising this training global market and this requires from EUMC and EUMS an active stance, to help Member States in deciding on the right training to be delivered, at high standards, as far as possible in common.

The author would like to express his gratitude to BG Pascal ROUX (FR AF) and Colonel Kevin COTTER (IE DF) for their contribution to this article.

deciding on the right training to be delivered

² EU Training Policy in ESDP, doc. 14176/2/03 dated 7 Nov 2003 (approved by the Council on 14 Nov 2003).

³ EU Training Concept in ESDP, doc. 11970/04 dated 30 Aug 2004 (approved by the Council on 13 Sep 2004).

⁴ EUMCWG/HTF is a capability building format of the EUMCWG

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