The EUISS @ 15

Founded in January 2002, the EUISS will soon turn 15. Like all teenagers, its capacity to think and act autonomously has increased significantly – especially over the past few years – but it still needs intelligent, light-handed guidance from adults, particularly (but not exclusively) inside the family. And the Institute has now become an integral part of the institutional ‘family’ created by the EU treaties, flanking the work of the High Representative and supporting the evolving foreign and security policy ‘system’ with relevant analyses and events as well as dissemination of key documents and in-depth policy-related research.

Since 2013, in particular, the EUISS has acquired a new legal basis (Council Decision, 10.2.2014), new financial regulations (November 2014) and, now, also new Staff Rules (May 2016). It has opened up since 2013 with its gradual integration into the Lisbon Treaty ‘system’. If the ‘S’ (for security) has only gained in salience lately, the need to interact more closely with other EU institutions and bodies has also become ever more evident. The sheer complexity of the challenges facing the Union in its external action, coupled with the recent breakdown of the traditional boundaries between the external and internal dimension of many policies, make it all the more necessary to develop closer and more regular interactions with the relevant foreign ministry, culminating with the 2016 EUISS Annual Conference held in Paris on 22 April with the participation of HR/VP Federica Mogherini and French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault.

The Institute’s publications have further evolved in the direction of accompanying the Union’s foreign and security policymaking with relevant analysis and input on issues linked to CSDP as well as regional crises and global challenges – often stemming from seminars and task forces open also to external experts and officials from EU institutions and the member states. Shorter weekly Alerts and Briefs have been combined with more in-depth papers as well as information materials – such as the annual Yearbook of Security (YES) or leaflets on CSDP and CFSP which have been widely appreciated by the wider public also outside Europe.

The EUISS is not a think tank – certainly not in the conventional sense of the term. The number and the spectrum of think tanks dealing with the Union’s security-related issues, on the other hand, are vital to the effective functioning of the EU Council body I represent and its ability to carry out its role.

All items in the agenda were thoroughly discussed and provided a good opportunity to evaluate the development of CSDP Operations and Missions, EU-NATO cooperation, partnership, and military capabilities.

Thus, Chiefs of Defence of EU and Partner Nations (namely from Albania, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia), together with NATO and EDA representatives had the opportunity to share their perspectives on strategic issues of common interest as well as their experience and recommendations.

The last session was the means by which the Committee exercised its collective responsibility for leading the Organisation.

On a final note, I would like to express to Lt. General Wolfgang Wosolsobe my deep appreciation for the good preparation of this EUMC’s session, and as these are the last days of his tenure, for the continued action undertaken in running the EUMS.

General Mikhail Kostarakos

Message from the Chairman

I was honoured to host the Chiefs of Defence this month, chairing the EU Military Committee.

In this respect, I would like to express thanks and appreciation to all the members of the Committee for their cooperation and earnest endeavours to ensure the development and consolidation of the EUMC.

As we all know, Committee meetings are vital to the effective functioning of the EU Council body I represent and its ability to carry out its role.

It is now time to complete the transformation initiated in 2001 with the transfer of the ISS from the WEU to the EU, and speed up since 2013 with its gradual integration into the Lisbon Treaty ‘system’. If the ‘S’ (for security) has only gained in salience lately, the need to interact more closely with other EU institutions and bodies has also become ever more evident. The sheer complexity of the challenges facing the Union in its external action, coupled with the recent breakdown of the traditional boundaries between the external and internal dimension of many policies, make it all the more necessary to develop closer functional links and more intense regular exchanges with those departments and units across the EU institutions (including the Commission and the Parliament) and the Member States that operate in the same business and for the same stakeholders. An existential crisis – insofar as the Union is undergoing one – could indeed be a key driver to achieve full maturity.

Antonio Missiroli
Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies.

In this issue:
1. The cover story takes us to the EUISS’ Director General.
2. The newsletter also presents the EUMS’ Director General.
In this issue Lieutenant General Wolfgang WOSOLSobel, upon completion of his tour of duty as Director General of the EU Military Staff, shared with us some thoughts on the achievements and on the future of the EUMS.

Achievements
Since 2013, we have seen critical developments in Mali, in the Central African Republic, in Ukraine and in Libya, all with strong impact on the EU's crisis management. The potential of the military to contribute to a broad spectrum of threats, risks and challenges needs to be regularly evaluated. Against this backdrop, within a few years, the intensity of work and the responsibility of the EUMS have increased considerably. The years 2013-2016 were also particularly rewarding as the recently created EEAS had to hit the ground running in the difficult circumstances described above. This young and very modern institution managed to do so very well and showed the necessary degree of flexibility to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. This includes an improved understanding of the opportunities offered by the military dimension and I can clearly confirm that military considerations are taken into account at ever earlier stages of planning, and more broadly across the board.

These past years showed very well that a real Comprehensive Approach has to be much broader than just civ-mil cooperation. The latter remains an important building block of a much larger cooperation between EAS and the areas of the European Commission dealing with external relations. The years since autumn 2014 have seen a reinforced and fruitful effort, on the level of the HRVP, to harmonise lines of action across institutional boundaries. The European Councils on Security and Defence of 2013 and 2015 sent strong messages to Member States in order to improve their willingness to invest more in Defence, to cooperate in building new capabilities and to use the full potential of the EU to deal with the numerous security challenges we have to face. It was made clear that this potential includes the military and that only close cooperation between EU and NATO can unleash the full potential of European Defence and security capabilities. The process of strategic messaging on the highest political level will continue with the presentation of a European Global Strategy at the European Council in June of this year. This strategy is the condensation of the European Union's experience of the past years, blended with the analysis of how this experience will translate into the future.

Some thoughts for the future
It can be expected that the European Global Strategy, hopefully accompanied by clear messages of all Heads of States and Governments will become the starting point for a powerful process aiming at a real shift in European defence capabilities, in all respects. It will have to trigger a swift process to indicate how the EU intends to use its military instrument in the future. There are very clear indications that the EU will have to shoulder more responsibility for its own security. The Global Strategy and the documents derived from it will have to describe how the EU intends to do this. This is important for Member States’ planning and for their decision to choose the EU as a political framework for military action. For the future, it can be expected that this framework will be larger than CSDP, given the increasingly blurred separation lines between internal and external security. Our future thinking should not exclude defence aspects, in complementarity with NATO.

For these reasons, the EU has an interest in reinforced military capabilities of Member States, even if these were to decide to use non-EU political frameworks for deployment and action. What counts is the common security interest. This can also be effectively addressed within NATO and UN or in multilateral groupings. The Global Strategy, its follow-on documents and the European Defence Action Plan should provide the framework for more cooperation and cooperative action in security and defence. A sound level of cohesion and complementarity with NATO should be sought.

The conclusions to be drawn from the Strategy should not only relate to capability development in terms of armament and equipment, but also for command structures, rapid reaction and situational awareness. The higher risk and frequency of serious security incidents and hostile action require a more solid command structure. This especially applies to the non-executive military missions.

It will not be enough to prepare a better hardware, but we also have to improve our software. We can expect higher risk, higher tempo and higher complexity, as well as reduced predictability. This requires a quantum-leap in situational awareness and the EU's ability for strategic analysis. We need more Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) of all levels and we need to better connect these tools. This all should lead to improved and focused rapid response. Rapid response, again, is not about hardware in the first place, but the spirit of rapid response has to be integrated in the security policy software of 28 Member States.

The Comprehensive Approach has progressed, but remains to be further reinforced, particularly between EEAS and the European Commission. In addition, coordination between EU operational presence with non-EU actors is key, not only in terms of operational de-confliction and mutual support, but also in defining common objectives. The link between a steady situational awareness, early warning, security sector Reform and crisis management has to become more systematic and has to draw in all phases on all resources of the EU.

In this complex environment, the EUMS has to remain the unique provider of coordinated and consistent military advice, drawing on all sectors and layers of military expertise and knowledge. All military views expressed across EU-institutions and on behalf of EU-institutions have to be consistent. Maintaining a unique military voice will remain a strong responsibility with regard to MS providing SNE’s for the EUMS and contributions to military operations and missions.