



DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION INSTRUMENT

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

中华人民共和国



MID-TERM REVIEW  
NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME  
2011-2013

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I – Executive summary .....	2
PART II – Conclusions of the MTR process .....	5
2.1. Political, economic, social and environmental developments .....	5
2.1.1 Political situation .....	5
2.1.2 Human rights.....	6
2.1.3 Economic situation.....	6
2.1.4 Social situation.....	8
2.1.5 Environmental situation .....	9
2.2. New EU policy initiatives and commitments .....	10
2.2.1 Relevance of new policy objectives and commitments .....	10
2.2.2 Aid effectiveness agenda .....	11
2.2.3 Non State Actors, Local Authorities and National Parliament .....	12
2.3. Results, performance and lessons learned .....	13
2.4. Quality improvements.....	14
2.5. Consultations with civil society .....	14
2.6. Conclusions.....	14
PART III – The Indicative Programme for 2011-2013 .....	15
3.1 Focal Area 1. Provide support for China’s reform programme in areas covered by sectoral dialogues, where EU experience can provide added value.....	16
3.1.1 <i>Strengthening the rule of law, access to justice and good governance</i> .....	16
3.1.2 <i>Supporting Social Protection Reform</i> .....	19
3.2 Focal Area 2. Assist China in its efforts to address domestic and global concerns over the environment, energy, and climate change.....	21
3.2.1. <i>Low carbon development, energy and climate change</i> .....	21
3.2.2. <i>Environmental sustainability</i> .....	23
3.3. Cross-cutting issues (all focal areas): .....	25
Annex 1: China summary table at a glance .....	26
Annex 2: Summary table of focal/non-focal areas .....	26
Annex 3: Donor coordination matrix.....	26
Annex 4: Description of the MTR document drafting process.....	26
Annex 5: Mid-term review checklist .....	26
Annex 6: Environmental profile .....	26
Annex 7: Migration profile.....	26
Annex 8: Evaluation and lessons learned .....	26
Annex 9: List of abbreviations and acronyms .....	26

## PART I – Executive summary

1. China is a multi-faceted, complex and rapidly changing country. Its **radical transformation** over the last 30 years from an agricultural centrally planned economy into an increasingly assertive economic powerhouse is unique in the world's economic history.
2. The new China, underpinned by political stability, faces **new socio-economic, energy and environmental challenges**. Although China is overtaking Japan as the world's second largest economy and on its own reckoning has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty since late 1970s, some areas of the country, especially the central and western provinces, have not yet benefited fully from economic development. Income inequalities and social pressures have also grown. While GDP per head in the coastal provinces compares with some EU Member States, comparisons for poorer provinces reveal GDP per capita on a par with developing countries in the medium human development class (as per UNDP definitions).
3. The Country Strategy Paper (CSP) drafted under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) takes account of the **duality of China's character**: on the one hand, that of a developing country in terms of traditional indicators and, on the other, that of a major player on the world stage in terms of its commercial weight, FDI flows, consumption of natural resources and contribution to the global climate change.
4. Prior to the preparation of the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for 2011-2013, the CSP underwent a **mid-term review**. This was based on consultations with the Chinese authorities at central and provincial levels and, in Beijing and Brussels, with civil society, including think-tanks, EU Member State representations and other international donors. This review upheld the continued validity of the strategic focal areas of the CSP and affirmed the need to fine-tune the MIP in line with China's changing priorities, especially those identified in the 12<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan for 2011-2015.
5. **Lessons** for the new MIP drawn from evaluations of DCI and ALA projects include the need to
  - (a) align interventions closely with China's own reform agenda,
  - (b) focus interventions in areas where the EU has a recognised comparative advantage, such as its depth of expertise and range of models,
  - (c) strengthen institutions to ensure sustainability rather than short-term standalone interventions,
  - (d) ensure a flexible and timely response, and
  - (e) better integrate cross-cutting issues such as poverty reduction, gender equality, equal opportunities, human rights and environmental sustainability in the EU-China cooperation

6. The **new MIP 2011-2013** takes account of the political, economic and social developments in China and the region as well as EU priorities – especially regarding the financial and economic crisis and mitigation of climate change - that have come to the fore since the CSP was prepared. The following changes are proposed which, if implemented pragmatically with due attention to Chinese specificities, should increase the **impact, ownership and visibility** of EU interventions:

- **Shift in emphasis of focal sectors:**

Resources originally allocated to Focal Area 3 ‘Human Resource Development’ should be integrated within the remaining two sectors, namely Focal Area 1: ‘Sectoral Dialogues’ and Focal Area 2: ‘Environment, Energy and Climate Change’.

- **Change of geographic focus:**

While continuing to engage central authorities and supporting high-profile flagship programmes, such as the China-EU School of Law in Beijing, the new MIP should target poorer provinces such as those in middle and western China. A vertical slice approach is proposed by working with both policy makers at central level and implementers at provincial level. Striking the right balance will be a challenge.

7. A total of €128m was set aside for MIP 2007-2010. Interventions under the three main focal areas are divided as follows:

- Focal Area 1:

EU-China Policy Dialogue Support Facility €2.8m, EU-China Policy Dialogue Support Facility II €12.2m, Support for Trade and Investment €20m, Institutional Capacity Building for the Civil Aviation Sector in China €6m, China-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II) €5m, EU-China Disaster Risks Management Project €6m, EU-China Project on Occupational Health & Safety in High Risk Sectors €9m, Civil Society Dialogue €1m

- Focal Area 2:

EU-China Clean Energy Centre €10m, EU-China Environmental Governance Programme €15m, EU-China Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy (ICARE) €10m

- Focal Area 3:

Erasmus Mundus China Window €26m, China EU Police Training €6m

8. The new MIP 2011-2013 attempts to **complement existing and planned activities**. As the EU financial contribution to EU-China cooperation is relatively small given the dimensions of China, it needs to focus on areas where the EU has a comparative advantage and target regions and themes where it can act as a catalyst and secure the maximum return on investment for China’s poor and disadvantaged population.

9. The proposed indicative allocation of ~~€45m~~ for 2011-2013 is as follows:

<b>MIP 2011-2013 (€45m)</b>	<b>Indicative amounts</b>	<b>%</b>
<i>Focal Area 1. Provide support for China's reform programme in areas covered by sectoral dialogues, where EU experience can provide added value</i>		
	<b>€20m</b>	<b>44%</b>
<i>Focal Area 2. Assist China in its efforts to address domestic and global concerns over the environment, energy, and climate change</i>		
	<b>€25m</b>	<b>56%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>€45m</b>	

## PART II – Conclusions of the MTR process

### 2.1. Political, economic, social and environmental developments

#### 2.1.1 Political situation

10. The primary focus of the government remains balanced, sustainable **economic growth and social development** while ensuring political stability and party discipline. The balance between high economic growth, social development, and environmental protection has attracted debate both within and outside China.
11. The blueprint for China's transformation is set out in its five-year plans. The MIP 2007-2010 is aligned with the **11<sup>th</sup> five-year plan** spanning 2006-2010, which is the cornerstone for any external development assistance. In addition to the economic targets<sup>1</sup> of GDP growth and increase in GDP per capita<sup>2</sup>, China has given prominence to 'scientific approaches to development' by focusing on how to foster 'independent innovation' and 'improve institutions and mechanisms' in a number of areas:
12. China has set its sustainable development goals that echo the MDG goals, as represented by the national vision for establishing "xiaokang shehui" (society of moderate prosperity) by 2020. China has made enormous efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals with its own means. As China emerges as a donor e.g. in Africa and Latin America, **MDG 8, a global partnership for development**, will receive increasing attention.
13. With regard to **MDG 3 on gender equality**, UNDP (2008) reports that 'despite steady improvements in terms of women's political participation, reduction in gender disparities in education and in employment and social security rights, gender inequality is still a challenge' - and 'the political participation of women in decision-making and administration lags behind that of men, and stereotypical working and living patterns are preventing women from realising their full potential as equal partners. Moreover, gender imbalances at birth due to preference for boys can potentially hinder the harmonious development of society in the long-term'<sup>3</sup>.
14. The implementation of the MIP 2011-2013 needs to be closely aligned with China's future priorities under its **12<sup>th</sup> five-year plan for 2011-2015**, to be unveiled in March 2011 at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress. Continuity is expected on state interventions in a number of areas, with each province responsible for the implementation of its own five-year plan in line with centrally set milestones. The main themes of the plan are already emerging, namely inclusive growth to bridge the growing economic divide, intensification of economic development in the relatively poor western regions, transforming the macro-economic model to boost domestic consumption by stronger social security

<sup>1</sup> GDP to rise by 7.5% annually from 18.2 trillion yuan in 2005 to 26.1 trillion yuan (€2.6 trillion) by 2010 and for per capita GDP to increase by 6.6% from 13,985 yuan in 2005 to 19,270 yuan (€1,898) in 2010

<sup>2</sup> [http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529\\_71334.htm](http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529_71334.htm)

<sup>3</sup> UNDP, Making Gender Equality a Reality, <http://www.un.org.cn> (analysis based on the Millennium Development Goals Progress Report (2008))

provision, pursuing green development such as energy efficiency, encouraging China to advance up the value chain and earmarking more resources to assure social equity.

15. A gradual, **conservative approach to political reform** is foreseen, given the unsettled economic climate. It is noteworthy that the 17<sup>th</sup> CPC Central Committee of 15-18 September 2009 focused for instance on intra-party democracy, anti-corruption, tackling the economic crisis, solving ethnic problems, and reinforcing national integrity. The fifth plenum of the 17<sup>th</sup> Communist Party Central Committee of 15-18 October 2010 endorsed the draft 12<sup>th</sup> five-year plan as the basis to ‘build a moderately prosperous society’, setting the general direction of economic and social reforms.
16. It is expected, by some quarters, that the current legal reform will further advance in the coming years as the five generation of leaders, trained in social sciences, are replacing the so-called fourth generation, who had a more technology-oriented training. Central government efforts to **improve policy implementation at local level** are likely to be maintained in 2011-2013.

### 2.1.2 Human rights

17. While China has made striking progress on economic and social rights, there is concern that this is not matched by progress on civil and political rights. Given China’s role on the world stage and its obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there is international expectation that China should live up to its internationally recognised standards.
18. In April 2009, China adopted its first **National Human Rights Action Plan 2009-2010**, which contains wide-ranging commitments on many human rights issues, including guarantees of (i) economic, social and cultural rights, (ii) civil and political rights and (iii) rights of ethnic minorities, women, children, elderly people and the disabled. The National Action Plan represents a comprehensive inter-departmental framework for the development of human rights protection in China. An assessment of the national human rights action plan will be an important step to feed into further cooperation between EU and China in the field of governance and rule of law.
19. Although the EU-China Human Rights dialogue is valued by both sides, it is recognised that this mechanism needs to be more operational. Complementary ways to foster dialogue between citizens and civil society organisations are to be explored, building further on the China-EU School of Law.

### 2.1.3 Economic situation

20. With an average annual growth of 9.3%, China’s GDP has multiplied six fold in 30 years to 30.6 trillion yuan (€3.6 trillion). China has overtaken Germany to become the world’s largest exporter and surpassed Japan to emerge as the world’s second largest national economy. While the global economy weathered an economic downturn in 2009, China posted real GDP growth of 9.1 %, with forecasts of 9.9% for 2010. However growth is expected to cool to 8.4 % in 2011<sup>4</sup>,

---

<sup>4</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit

as the effects of the RMB 4 trillion stimulus package starts to fade. Other areas of concern include the income disparities, the real estate sector and rising wages. Debates have been aired on the need to increase domestic consumption, with the expectation that this will rise in the longer term with the expansion of provision of more social services, in particular healthcare, education and pensions.

21. It is acknowledged that some areas of the country, notably in the central and western provinces, have not fully benefited from the recent economic development<sup>5</sup>. Comparing the GDP per capita in its 31 provinces with other countries shows China's three faces.
  - In the first tier: 420 million people, living in 9 leading eastern provinces, enjoy GDP per capita on a par with some EU Member States.
  - In the second tier: 9 provinces have from GDP per capita comparable to lower middle-income countries.
  - In the third tier: the remaining 13 provinces have a GDP per capita less than USD 1 000.
22. Regional imbalances are recognised and given prominence in the 11<sup>th</sup> five-year plan. **Regional development** aims to promote balanced development by advancing the western region, revitalising north-east China and other old industrial bases, and promoting the rise of central China.
23. At the G20 financial summit in Pittsburgh, on 25 September 2009<sup>6</sup>, President Hu Jintao called for international cooperation with new industries, especially on energy conservation, pollution reduction, environmental protection and new energies. China subsequently relaxed its exchange rate regime ahead of the G20 summit in Toronto on 26-27 June 2010<sup>7</sup>.
24. China is a critical success factor if the goals identified for the Seoul summit are to be achieved. The first goal is to implement previous G20 summit commitments, in particular on the Framework for Growth, financial regulatory reform, energy subsidies and trade. The second priority is to increase G20 credibility by reaching out to non-G20 countries and strengthening financial safety nets.
25. China is emerging as a development actor with non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit as watchwords. Its main tools are trade, FDI, turn-key infrastructure projects and training in China, supported by loans and in-kind transactions. Although difficult to identify, it is estimated that ODA to Africa amounts to approximately €3 billion per annum. China cancelled US\$ 1.4 billion worth of debt owed by 31 countries in 2006, unveiling its White Paper on Africa ahead of the Summit.

---

<sup>5</sup> Embedding society in science and technology, European and Chinese perspectives, DG RTD L/3 European Commission, 2009

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/hujintaoG20fenghui/t607838.htmf>

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/argentina-argentine/highlights-faits/summit-g8\\_g20-sommet.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/argentina-argentine/highlights-faits/summit-g8_g20-sommet.aspx?lang=eng)



## 2.1.4 Social situation

26. Social tensions are addressed in the government policy of “**Building a socialist harmonious society**” (chapter 10 of the 11<sup>th</sup> five-year plan). This aims to improve living standards, including reform of the social security system. A further goal is to **build a new socialist countryside**: balancing urban and rural development including the development of a rural social security system. One target is to raise the per capita annual net income of rural residents from 3 255 yuan (2005) to 4 150 yuan per capita.<sup>8</sup>
27. Despite China’s large fiscal and monetary stimulus package, there are concerns that income disparities and rising unemployment especially in central and western provinces, compounded by environmental concerns, could increase social tensions. The long-term **social and economic impacts on population dynamics** including the strain on pensions and health services due to an ageing population and the potentially shrinking revenue base among workers, are recognised.
28. ‘Across China, there were over 400 million fewer people living in extreme poverty in 2001 than 20 years previously. By 2001, China had met the foremost of the [Millennium Development Goals](#) — to reduce the 1990 incidence of poverty by half — and it had done so 14 years ahead of the 2015 target date for the developing world as a whole’.<sup>9</sup> However, **income inequalities** have also grown markedly as China’s economy shifts gear. The richest 10 % of its population holds 34 % of its wealth, whilst the poorest 10 % has 1.6 % of its income<sup>10</sup>.
29. As stated during the Joint Conference with the Vice-Minister of Human Resources and Social Security, hosted by the Commission in Brussels on 12-13 October 2009<sup>11</sup>, China’s main social challenges include adapting its industrial sector to the global challenges, strengthening entrepreneurship among migrants and young graduates, and **improving the social security systems** to increase the level and coverage of assistance. Social reforms are progressing in China, and ambitious targets have been set to extend **social care** to all Chinese citizens. However, the vast geographical area of the country, the difference between urban and rural areas and internal migration to economic centres put strains on the achievability of these targets.
30. **Internal labour migration**<sup>12</sup> has proven essential to the joint development of China’s provinces sending and receiving migrants since the ‘Opening and Reform Period’. This has ensured a steady channel of remittances, facilitated skill and information exchanges, and provided a constant supply of cheap labour for China’s burgeoning economy.
31. Social security protection for migrant workers has been flagged as a key issue in China. In 2006, the total number of rural labourers working and living outside

<sup>8</sup> <http://bw.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/CHNDIP/t240245.htm>

<sup>9</sup> <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20634060~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:469382,00.html>

<sup>10</sup> [www.oecd.org/els/social/indicators/asia](http://www.oecd.org/els/social/indicators/asia)

<sup>11</sup> ‘The impact of the global crisis and the role of recovery measures on employment and skills in China and the EU’, p.12

<sup>12</sup> Using the definition of Huang Ping from CASS, “‘internal migration’ primarily refers to the voluntary movement of rural labourers who leave their home villages for urban areas (ranging from townships, county towns and other small cities within or outside the province of original residence, provincial capitals and major cities), seeking non-agricultural work opportunities, usually temporary or seasonal, at least three months a year, sometimes together with their family members.”

their original townships (*hukou*) was estimated at over 130 million. China faces the challenges of how to **integrate better concerns such as migration, urbanisation, and vocational education** within future plans for development in the upcoming 12<sup>th</sup> five Year Plan. With the move towards a more 'scientific' decision making, there is a need for along-term scenario mapping in order to better inform future development decisions.

### 2.1.5 Environmental situation

32. China's rapid growth is now a driving force in the global economy and is reducing poverty at an unprecedented rate. However, growth is also seriously damaging the natural resource base and generating major environmental liabilities. The country's environmental problems include (i) rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emissions, (ii) biodiversity loss and degradation of ecosystems, (iii) land degradation, (iv) deteriorating water quality and water scarcity, (v) severe air pollution, and (vi) increasing use of hazardous chemicals and heavy metal pollution. These problems threaten the health and prospects of current and future generations, and potentially undermine the sustainability of long-term growth.
33. The current five year plan (chapter 6) recognised the importance of **resource conservation and environmental protection**. China aims to enforce national policies for energy, land and water conservation and for lower consumption and reduction of emissions, including reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20% over 5 years and reducing the discharge of major pollutants by 10% over the same period. Conserving and developing **marine resources** is identified as one of the challenges.
34. China is implementing its **National Climate Change Programme** which includes mandatory national targets for reducing energy intensity and the discharge of major pollutants, and increasing forest coverage and the share of renewable energy from 2005 to 2010. At the Copenhagen UNFCCC Climate Change Conference China announced the following voluntary domestic commitments: a) 40-45 reduction in carbon intensity per unit of GDP on 2005 levels by 2020; b) around 15% non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption by 2050 (NB this target includes nuclear energy, so is less ambitious than previously announced Chinese targets); c) increase forest coverage by 40 million ha and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion m<sup>3</sup> by 2020
35. China has recently set up the **National Energy Commission** (NEC) demonstrating how high energy is on the Chinese agenda. It is also currently drafting the Energy Law which will be the first piece of legislation that encompass the greater energy and policy orientation tackling thus inconsistencies between individual energy laws which limit the effect of implementing the sectoral legislations
36. The **Chinese building sector** has been identified by the Chinese Prime Minister as the one responsible for greenhouse gas emission growth in China and where major reforms are to take place.

## 2.2. *New EU policy initiatives and commitments*

### 2.2.1 Relevance of new policy objectives and commitments

37. The EU and China have developed an elaborate web of 56 dialogues and working groups. Ten dialogues deal with political issues, ten are trade related and the remaining 36 focus on external dimensions of internal policies. EU policy commitments in particular in areas such as climate change, cooperation effectiveness and regional cooperation, are highly relevant to China. Cross-cutting issues, including environmental issues and gender equality, need to be mainstreamed in the implementation of the response strategy.
38. In 2006 the European Commission adopted a major policy strategy (Partnership and Competition) towards China, pledging to accept Chinese competition while pushing China to trade fairly. A part of this strategy is the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive **Partnership and Cooperation Agreement** (PCA) which started in January 2007, to replace the 1985 EC-China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement. The PCA will provide an opportunity to establish a broad and comprehensive framework for the EU-China strategic partnership and further improve the framework for bilateral trade and investment relations.
39. The **High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue** was launched in Beijing in April 2008. The HED deals with issues of strategic importance to EU-China trade, investment and economic relations and provides impetus to progress concretely in sectoral dialogues. Under the new Commission, the HED will be providing a broader platform for dialogue on issues of mutual concern in a broad range of economic and trade areas. The second meeting of the HED took place in Brussels on 7-8 May 2009, while the third HED is planned to take place in China before the end of 2010.
40. A number of **environmental** dialogues are underway, including on illegal logging and deforestation and the resultant environmental damage. Starting from 2009, the European Commission is implementing jointly with the European Forest Institute (EFI) the Regional Support Programme for the EU FLEGT Action Plan in Asia ('FLEGT Asia'), aimed at improving forest governance and thus at contributing to poverty reduction, sustainable natural resources management and reduction of the effects on climate change in Asia. FLEGT Asia supports work with China under the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism.
41. **Energy** is now on the top of the EU-China relationship with no less than three ongoing dialogues upgraded at ministerial level (energy policies, energy technologies and energy in the building sector). This focus was reiterated during the EU-China Summit on 6 October 2010 (Brussels).
42. The EU – China biodiversity dialogue is supported by the EU – China biodiversity programme that runs until 2011. It allows the EU and China to exchange views and best practices on biodiversity policies. Through the programme the EU and China have also cooperated in drafting a national biodiversity strategy for China.
43. **Climate change** is a key issue under President Barroso's five-year mandate and a major aspect of both the internal and external policy of the EU. The EU has closely engaged with China on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change context (UNFCCC), as China is both one of the largest emitters

and a strategic partner in the negotiation of a post-Kyoto agreement. The EU's own commitments and internal policies are also closely observed by other countries including China. The European Emission Trading Scheme in particular is closely monitored by local stakeholders interested in exploring the potential of carbon markets to control emission levels. The Commission and the NDRC have also organised joint workshops on emission trading to present the European experience.

44. In 2005 the EU agreed to cooperate with China on a range of climate change issues, including CCS (carbon capture and storage), under the EU-China Climate Change partnership. On 25 June 2009<sup>13</sup> the Commission adopted a Communication for establishing an investment scheme to co-finance the design and construction of a power plant to demonstrate CCS<sup>14</sup> technology in China. The Commission set aside funding of up to €50 million for the construction and operation phases of the project, out of a total of €60 million that has been earmarked for cooperation with emerging economies on cleaner coal technologies and carbon capture and storage.
45. On 10 September 2009, the Commission adopted communication COM(2009) 475/3 entitled 'Stepping up international climate finance: A European **blueprint for the Copenhagen deal**' which argues for international finance to help developing countries combat climate change. It recognises that the financing issue is central to prospects for reaching an ambitious agreement in Copenhagen.
46. On 3 March 2010, the Commission adopted communication COM(2010) 2020 entitled 'A Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth'. It puts forward three mutually reinforcing priorities (i) smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation, (ii) sustainable growth: promoting a more resource-efficient, greener and more competitive economy, (iii) inclusive growth: fostering a high employment economy, delivering social and territorial cohesion. This is a major ten-year programme for structural reforms that are key to growth and growth potential. Given the stronger economic ties between Europe and China, trade related issues such as bilateral trade, market access for goods and services, investment conditions are key ingredients in the relationship.

### 2.2.2 Aid effectiveness agenda

47. At the outset of reform and opening-up in 1979, Deng Xiaoping stated that '*China should take the initiative to absorb foreign capital, introduce advanced technologies and borrow foreign managerial experience so as to supplement socialist productive forces*'. This has been the *leitmotiv* of China's priorities for receiving multilateral assistance, which over the past 30 years has reached USD 6.7 billion, with around 2000 projects implemented by 23 international organisations and governments.
48. Aid effectiveness and donor coordination is a concern highlighted by the European Parliament in its democratic scrutiny. Ownership by the Ministry of

---

13

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1022&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

<sup>14</sup> Carbon capture and storage is a suite of technological processes that involve capturing carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) from the gases discarded by industry and transporting and injecting it into geological formations

Commerce of the development agenda, including the Paris Declaration, is strong. All development cooperation is coordinated by this key ministry and a Development Sub-Committee meets regularly to take stock of development and agree future plans. The Delegation coordinates with MS and other donors in the field. Further details on other donors are given in annex, revealing that a number of previously active donors have embarked on an exit strategy as regards development cooperation with China.

49. A recognised comparative advantage of the EU is the depth of expertise and range of models that it can draw upon, sharing the rich experience of Member States at central and regional levels in both public and private sectors.

### 2.2.3 Non State Actors, Local Authorities and National Parliament

50. The role of **Non State Actors** (NSAs) as development partners is recognised by the European Consensus on Development (2005) and needs to be enhanced. Humanitarian assistance is implemented through civil society organisations (CSOs), as witnessed after the Wenchuan earthquake on 12 May 2008, when public donations were collected and volunteer services organised. As part of its drive to move from an administrative government to a service-based government, the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs has stated that it attaches great importance to the development and administration of CSOs.
51. The emergence of an increasingly vibrant civil society sector in China has been a direct consequence of the changes to both the Chinese state and civil society since the beginning of the reforms in 1978. The Chinese government explicitly recognises the role civil society has to play in a reformed Chinese society. This is particularly true for those social sectors from which the state is rapidly withdrawing and which the market (or other social forces, such as family) cannot or will not address, and in those local communities that the government cannot effectively reach.
52. Areas of engagement of CSOs include **environmental protection, health, education, social services, poverty alleviation, women, children and legal aid**. NGO projects in China reach the most vulnerable populations through well-targeted interventions, mostly at local level, and concern health, human rights, education, protection of vulnerable groups, local economic development, environment and food security.
53. The European Commission is already supporting civil society at macro level through the ‘Governance for Equitable Development (GED)’ project implemented with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. This aims to broaden the involvement of civil society organisations and the recognition of their positive role.
54. Support to non state actors and civil society organisations is also provided through the thematic programme Non State Actors and Local Authorities (**NSA/LA**) in Development thematic programme". On 9 October 2009 the Commission allocated €2.5m to China under the NSA/LA thematic programme for Objective 1 - in country operations<sup>15</sup>.

The NSA/LA is an “actor-oriented” Programme aimed to supporting stakeholders' initiatives and building stakeholders' capacities in sectors not covered by the

<sup>15</sup> Ref. Ares(2009)272255 - 09/10/2009

geographic programmes. Through its *in-country component* the Programme supports actions that are subsidiary to country strategies and complementary to other relevant thematic or regional programmes. Through the *Multi-country component* it will support actions that cannot be supported through geographic programmes. Complementarity between this thematic programme and other EC-financed programmes shall always be maximised.

55. EU support for China under the **European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights** represents an important tool for supporting civil society activities in the area of the protection and promotion of human rights. The involvement of **local authorities** in development cooperation with China is essential but quite challenging and politically sensitive.

### 2.3. Results, performance and lessons learned

56. A country-level evaluation of the European Commission's cooperation and partnership with China (ref.1077 of April 2007), made a number of recommendations on the Commission's cooperation approach. The Commission, both in Headquarters and in the field, has drawn on these practical recommendations *inter alia* when defining China's needs regarding good governance, project modalities, coordinating with EU Member States, pursuing sector dialogues, applying lessons from Commission-supported projects, focusing on addressing poverty, and reflecting on a strategy for phasing out of development cooperation. Funding has indeed been decreased by over 50% from an original amount of €6m to €45m for the period 2011-2013.

57. A number of recommendations to Headquarters and the Delegation, as well as to MofCOM and Chinese counterparts to address these issues in existing and planned projects include the following:

- a. Knowledge of procedures: practical **training** for beneficiary counterparts and closer cooperation at the design stage.
- b. Programme/project design: Design should be simple and focused. **Peer review** is required before documents are submitted to the quality support group, and **coaching** by AIDCO is welcome on the drafting of key documents by the Delegation, such as project identification fiches and action programmes are welcome.
- c. Modalities: Increased use of **grants** rather than service contracts with preference for working with **Member States institutions and European Agencies** rather than the private sector consultants.
- d. Experts: **More systematic interviewing** of key consultants proposed under service contracts to ensure compliance with terms of reference and knowledge requirements.
- e. Going beyond traditional development cooperation: As China itself increasingly becomes a donor on the world stage, the EU needs to move **beyond** its traditional **donor approach** to China and engage in a **dialogue-based relationship** based on higher-level political and technical exchange.
- f. Flexibility: It is important to retain flexibility and not to allow procedures to come in the way of delivering effective development cooperation. The PDSF instrument is better adapted to China's fast-moving situation since it can

mobilise support for dialogues on a faster timetable than traditional projects allow.

## **2.4. Quality improvements**

58. **Coherence:** It is widely recognised that development policy alone will not enable developing countries to progress. Policies other than aid policy are at least as important as they are likely to contribute to or affect a country's achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.
59. Support for the government's poverty reduction strategy should concentrate on improving social services, in line with the government priorities set out in the 11<sup>th</sup> five-year plan and the upcoming 12<sup>th</sup> five-year plan.
60. **Concentration** – Projects under the current CSP projects need to be streamlined, moving away from covering different sectors to concentrate on two focal areas. During programme identification, the Delegation should ensure that activities are aligned with the government's development strategy and the activities of other donors.
61. **Coordination** – Activities should be aligned with other donors where possible and where they will remain active, as well as with the government's development strategy. EU programmes under the CSP should support country ownership and make greater use of country specificities. Donor coordination takes place on a regular basis through MS Cooperation Counsellors meetings, which have been incorporating the Chair Statement from the 8th ASEM Meeting. This entails moving beyond aid and focussing on trilateral cooperation as well as sustainable cooperation instruments, among others together with the private sector, which in fact already reflects the present donor landscape, with MS disengaging from classical development cooperation. Regular donor coordination also takes place within the wider donor community, including the US, Australian, the World Bank and other key donors in China.

## **2.5. Consultations with civil society**

62. The EU Delegation consults non-state actors on a regular basis on ongoing issues, enabling CSOs to play a crucial role in contributing to the programming and implementation of the Commission's development policy. To prepare the Mid-Term Review, the Delegation consulted CSO representatives in January and September 2009 and in January and May 2010, inviting contributions on the internet to gather comments on the Country Strategy Paper and views on possible future cooperation projects. The results are enclosed in an annex.

## **2.6. Conclusions**

63. The three focal areas established in the CSP are confirmed. However, although the CSP remains valid, **fine tuning of programming** is required to
- (a) take account of developments within China brought about by internal, regional and external events and
  - (b) coordinate with other donors to ensure complementarity.

The main endogenous and exogenous components are the impacts of the economic downturn, social pressures and the effects of climate change, especially

on the less well-off sections of China's 1.3 billion strong population residing in the ecologically fragile regions<sup>16</sup>.

64. A challenge will be how to translate wishes for institutional strengthening and capacity building into reality, especially at implementation and service delivery level. The involvement of the civil society, the private sector and local institutions should be strengthened.
65. With this MIP, the EU aims to contribute to the growth and balanced development of China by supporting the implementation of China's national reform plans. The MIP builds upon existing development cooperation both under the ALA and DCI regulations and where the EU has acquired a strong presence and a comparative advantage over other donors.

## **PART III – The Indicative Programme for 2011-2013**

### **Main priorities and goals**

66. The primary and overarching objective of cooperation under the MIP has to be in line with the **DCI objectives**, namely the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (**MDGs**), as well as the promotion of **good governance** and the **rule of law**. Accordingly, cooperation must foster **sustainable development** – including sectoral, environmental and human resource aspects – and more particularly targeting the more disadvantaged.
67. Considering the scale of China, and its own political will to eradicate poverty and hence ensure stability for its economic growth, EU-funded actions should focus merely on **amplifying the Chinese government's own efforts** in those areas and regions where it sees a high potential to achieve its goals. The EU can therefore focus on areas under the priorities of the 12<sup>th</sup> five-year plan 2011-2015, such as social infrastructure reform, social development, energy efficiency, low-carbon development and human resources development. This is in line with political priorities identified by the EU where it has developed strong policies, such as combating climate change and building on the model of nurturing institutions, such as research, legal capacity and energy.
68. The three strategic objectives of the CSP 2007-2013 remain the overall foundations on which to build the new programming. These objectives are to:
  - Provide support for China's reform programme in areas covered by **sectoral dialogues**, where EU experience can provide added value;
  - Assist China in her efforts to address domestic and global concerns over the **environment, energy, and climate change**;
  - Provide support for China's **human resources development**.
69. The total bilateral DCI budget allocation for China for the period 2011-2013 is proposed to be a maximum of **€45 million** over three years, i.e. an average of €15 million a year, less than half the annual amount allocated for the period 2007-2010.

<sup>16</sup> The 2005 statistics of the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection indicate that 95% of people in absolute poverty live in ecologically fragile regions, in ethnic minority areas and in remote and border regions.



Given the reduction compared with the originally planned allocation of €6 million for the same period, it is proposed that the third strategic objective, namely human resource development, be integrated within the two remaining objectives. The rationale for allocating funding between the two main focal areas is explained under each priority area.

### **3.1 Focal Area 1. Provide support for China's reform programme in areas covered by sectoral dialogues, where EU experience can provide added value**

#### **3.1.1 Strengthening the rule of law, access to justice and good governance**

##### *i) Description/rationale*

70. Besides some special courts, the Chinese judicial system consists of four courts levels: local, intermediate, higher and supreme. Training is provided centrally by the National Judges College, also targeting judges from lower courts. Arbitration commissions and lay mediation committees have been established throughout the country. At local level in the countryside, courts have to cope with a fast-growing number of cases that county officials have not been able to resolve. Legal services at this level are still insufficient. China's political and social stability depends on the ability of these courts to meet the growing expectations of citizens with regard to strengthening the rule of law.
71. The EU has been supporting legal reform in China since the mid-1980s. Following the first comprehensive cooperation agreement of 1985, the European Commission has implemented a series of training and technical assistance programmes in the legal and judicial areas. The creation of the China-EU School of Law (CESL) in 2008 was a first attempt to institutionalise legal cooperation. Support for police training can facilitate further cooperation in the field of legal and judicial reform. Cooperation could be extended from judiciary and police sectors to support reform and development in all parts of the legal and judicial system.
72. Since 1979, the Chinese **legal system** has been undergoing a major reform process, with extensive implications for China's economy and society. Legal and judicial institution building has since led to key achievements in governance improvement, especially in strengthening the rule of law, setting a legal framework for a market economy, and creating a judicial system.
73. However, due to its vast dimensions and its complex set up, China has not yet fully achieved a reliable and secure level of rule of law. Conflicting legislation and enforcement by central government and by provincial and local authorities have further impeded legal governance. Due to the unique multi-level governance complexity of the state, interpretation, harmonisation and enforcement of the law have to be further developed.

74. The **legal profession** is gradually growing, encompassing today between 140 000 and 160 000 lawyers and 14 000 registered law firms. Additionally, several non-governmental legal assistance organisations have been created, achieving remarkable progress in different legal areas. Furthermore, **legal education** has become a unique dynamic force in Chinese academic life, based today on more than 620 law schools. However, there remain over 200 counties in China without a single lawyer. Public awareness of the law in these areas remains low, and access to justice is limited.
75. Most efforts to support the development of China's legal system have concentrated on engaging with relatively high-level policy-makers, and training mid- to high-level officials. Such project work has tended to be carried out either in the capital or in the richer eastern coastal provinces, where officials are more receptive to piloting new approaches. Consultation with stakeholders has indicated that the EU could make a more valuable contribution in future by focusing its resources on those localities where the rule of law is least developed.

*ii) Specific objectives*

The overall objective is to continue to support the Chinese Government in its efforts to develop a society based on the rule of law.

The specific objectives include:

- supporting Chinese legal professionals at central, regional and local level in the implementation of China's legal reform programme, in particular through continued support for the China-EU School of Law<sup>17</sup>;
- further expanding the knowledge and experience of Chinese law students and legal professionals with regard to the European legal system, legislation and international best practices, including by providing scholarships to Chinese students to study the European legal system in EU universities through a specific China lot under Erasmus Mundus Action 2;
- strengthening access to justice, improving the efficiency of the justice system, supporting mediation and arbitration and the enforcement of decisions.

*iii) Expected results*

Recalling the need to keep the design simple and focused, a number of suggestions are made which might be taken up during the project identification phase.

(a) **Access to justice:** Strengthening systems to ensure access to justice, especially for marginalized groups and in regions with a less developed legal infrastructure, for example by training lawyers or paralegals, supporting legal aid centres, and raising rights awareness among marginalized groups. (target groups: lawyers, paralegals, law students, marginalized groups, judges, prosecutors).

---

<sup>17</sup> At the China University of Political Science and Law CUPL.

**Professional self-regulation:** Strengthening the capacity of legal professional associations, such as the Bar Association, to undertake regulation of the legal profession.

(b) **Procedural rights**

- Procedural guarantees and ‘equality of arms’ in particular in tax proceedings, anti-dumping cases and competition law proceedings. (target groups: government officials and policy-makers, lawyers)

- Procedural guarantees in criminal proceedings: Issues such as the right to avoid self-incrimination, access to judicial appeal proceedings, importance of professional legal assistance and legal aid, the right to summon and examine witnesses, time and facilities to prepare the defence, the right to defend oneself, the right to free assistance from an interpreter. (target groups: criminal law judges, prosecutors, policy-makers)

(c) **Legal capacity** (target group: policy makers, lawyers, judiciary, prosecutors)

Through the master’s programmes, professional training, research and consultancy, experience and knowledge are shared in a number of governance related areas of Chinese, European and international law, including the following, adapted to the Chinese legal context:

(i) **Competition law:** including competition rules governing companies, merger controls and anti-trust procedures;

(ii) **Intellectual property rights (IPR)** law, in particular its enforcement;

(iii) **Product safety:** to ensure open markets, free movement of goods, effective competition and consumer protection, a number of legislative initiatives at EU level have been taken in the field of product safety;

(iv) **Commercial transactions:** legal aspects of international commercial transactions;

(v) **Environmental law:** exchange of experience on Environmental Impact Assessments and ensuring that they further the interests of society;.

(vi) **Labour law:** areas to be covered include working hours, collective redundancies, temporary agency workers, gender equality and non-discrimination.

*iv) Indicators of achievement*

Although challenging it will be important to identify indicators that are SMART<sup>18</sup>. A number of possible indicators are given below.

- Number of talented people with limited economic means or limited access to personal development opportunities receiving support from the EU or China.

---

<sup>18</sup> SMART = Specific, Measureable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound.

- Number of women, members of disadvantaged groups and persons with limited economic means involved in project activities.
- Number of cultural exchanges between EU and China in this area within and beyond the project.
- Number of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, judicial officials and masters students trained in different fields, broken down by female and male participants;
- Number of policy makers involved in the activities, by number of female and male participants;
- Number of lawyers or paralegals in underdeveloped areas trained in basic law.
- Number of marginalised communities having received rights awareness training.
- % of marginalised and disadvantaged people having access to legal aid, broken down by number of female and male participants, socio-economic class, ethnicity and age;
- Perception of gender-related content of education, training, research and consultancy and other knowledge sharing activities;
- Number of partnerships between Chinese and EU education institutions successfully created.

### **3.1.2 Supporting Social Protection Reform**

#### *i) Description/rationale*

76. China has launched an ambitious reform to create an **integrated and universal safety net for all citizens**, to be implemented in phases. The Chinese government is aiming to establish a universal social security system across the whole country by 2020. It is envisaged that the 12<sup>th</sup> five-year plan will mobilise resources to tackle the following priority areas:
- (i) Improving the current social security system to ensure the sustainable development of economic society;
  - (ii) Increasing coverage;
  - (iii) Raising the level of social insurance and gradually reducing the gaps between provinces and between urban and rural areas;
  - (iv) Increasing financial investments from various resources;
  - (v) Improving the management and service delivery of social insurance schemes.
77. Key priorities have been identified for specific action including harmonisation of social insurance schemes. The protection of **migrant** workers is also an issue of concern.
78. As regards **rural pensions**, the percentage of pilot counties for implementing the new scheme has been increased from 10% in 2009 to 23% in 2010. The original goal of rolling-out the scheme nationwide by 2020 will probably be brought forward to 2018. This is a major project, given that rural workers do not currently have a sound social protection scheme, apart from residual social assistance. China attaches great importance to this reform as part of its policy and financing of reducing inequalities between rural and urban areas. The main challenges include financing schemes for rural and urban pensions to increase benefits for people with low incomes.
79. As for **health insurance**, a new system of medical insurance has been in place in China since 2000, which addresses the principal medical insurance needs of

China's urban and rural populations. The medical insurance system is being implemented step-by-step by widening the coverage of insured persons and by widening of the scope of benefits with the objective of eventually aim of reaching universal coverage by 2020. Issues of concern are the level, pooling and portability of medical insurances schemes, cost containment, the improvement of health-related services and benefit packages, and insurance for migrant workers. The latest health care reform in China focuses on community health care reform (2009 – 2011) and hospital reform (2010- 2020). The ambitious objectives of the reform cover organisations/institutes, the pricing system, financing and quality of services.

80. **Rural or migrant** workers do not currently have sound social protection schemes, apart from residual social assistance. The Chinese government attaches great importance to this reform as part of its policy of reducing inequality between rural and urban areas. Unprecedented internal migration has in part been exacerbated by the (well documented) **unequal patterns of regional development** between the provinces, as well as the growing income gap between cities and the countryside. In 2009 the country's urban-rural income ratio increased to 3.33 to 1, the biggest gap since 1978.

*ii) General and Specific objectives*

General objective: to support China's reforms of pensions, health care/medical insurance, and support migrant workers

Specific objectives to :

- Draw up roadmaps for the transition and financing of sustainable pension and health care systems in China which guarantee accessible, adequate and affordable benefits for all Chinese citizens, with a particular focus on migrant workers (a section of the Chinese population who are currently not adequately covered by the system);
- Increase and institutionalise public involvement in decision making and implementation in pension schemes for urban, rural and migrant workers increased and institutionalised;
- Recommend adequate financing provisions to ensure adequate retirement income in the light of demographic and labour market changes in the coming decades;
- Assist in the monitoring and promoting the goals of the Chinese government;
- Support the opening up of the insurance and pensions sector to foreign firms which goes hand in hand with the reforms of these sectors.

*iii) Expected results*

- Cooperation between Government and Non State Actors is strengthened and institutionalised. Public is mobilised for assisting in achieving the 2020 goal.
- A notional target business environment, i.e. what the pensions system should look like in 2020 is developed with the support of the programme.
- An action plan for the implementation of the pension system over the period 2011 to 2020 with specific targets for pension coverage for migrant workers including portability of pensions between provinces, pooling levels for pensions has been developed by the Chinese authorities and uses inputs from the programme.

- Means of developing a longer-term strategy for retirement income in the light both of European best practice and lessons on demographic changes are introduced in the Chinese policy papers with assistance of the programme.
- The best practices in bringing a convergence between the current separate arrangements for rural, urban and migrant workers to provide a common contribution and pension system were introduced in the national policy papers with the inputs of the programme.

*iv) Indicators of achievement*

- Channels for systematic consultation of civil society are used on a regular and consistent basis for consultation on draft legislation by the Chinese authorities
- Policy outcomes (e.g. specific levels of rural pension coverage to be achieved, % of migrant workers covered for pension entitlements).
- Number of project outputs (i.e. number of training courses organised, number of evaluations of existing pension system completed).
- Adoption of a strategy for addressing the demographic impact of ageing and labour mobility and statutory implementation by the Chinese government.
- Establishment of an appropriate regulatory regime and regulating institution.
- Level of poverty for persons over pension age, including migrant workers, decreased by % through assessing average retirement income and comparison with income level of working population

### **3.2 Focal Area 2. Assist China in its efforts to address domestic and global concerns over the environment, energy, and climate change**

#### **3.2.1. Low carbon development, energy and climate change**

*i) Description/rationale*

81. **Climate change** and energy have risen to the top of the global agenda. China also faces significant energy and development security challenges. China will be one of the countries that will be adversely affected by climate change and it has acknowledged in its 11<sup>th</sup> five-year plan that climate change can cause significant damage to its economic and social plans. Furthermore, China's efforts are crucial for the success in keeping global warming within the 2°C bracket. The first meeting of the National Energy Commission focused on development and use of renewable energies to ensure the country's energy security and better cope with climate change.
82. Both the **political and business community** have realised that there are low carbon opportunities for China. According to the Swedish Commission on Sustainable Development<sup>19</sup>, China accounts for nearly a quarter of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Roughly one third of China's emissions can be attributed to exports. If China's emissions peaked around 2020, the world might remain on track towards the 2°C target. Private-public partnerships should be promoted to achieve this goal.

<sup>19</sup> A balancing act: China's role in climate change, Regeringskansliet, Sweden, March 2009

83. China could be encouraged to work with the EU on its way to a **low-carbon development path** and be given opportunities to bring down the cost of mitigating climate change. It is important that the investments made in China now are not locking the country into a development path based on polluting and high energy consuming technologies. The EU has accumulated valuable legal, regulatory and research experience that can be used by China as its provinces pursue their own local five-year plans for 2011-2016 to achieve energy efficiency targets.
84. On energy, the EU-China relations have entered a new stage of cooperation, attested by a genuine trust has been built over the last few years and the desire by China for more cooperation. Ultimately, the development of the energy sector is a key concern and national priority. China is trying to address the challenges it faces, but lacks the technology, the know-how, the administrative capacity and regulatory tools.
85. The regular meetings of the **policy dialogues** between the Commission and the Chinese government, (e.g. the Environment Policy Dialogue, the EC-China Cooperation Framework on Energy Efficiency in the Building Sector, Climate Change Partnership, EU-China Energy Dialogue and the EU-China Transport Dialogue) have paved the way for enhanced cooperation on items such as clean coal, renewable energies, energy efficiency and smart grids, and energy-efficient transport. Such a government-to-government cooperation should be backed up by concrete pilot projects.
86. The EU is willing to share experience with its range of market-based and regulatory policy instruments to shift toward low carbon economy and foster green growth. A good example is the cooperation initiated with the NDRC on emission trading. The EU is also willing to share its experience in the area of Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV). New projects should not replicate but rather draw upon the results of relevant projects such as the EU-China Clean Energy Centre, the EU-China Environmental Governance Programme and the EU-China Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy (ICARE).

*ii) General and Specific objectives*

General objective: To support China in its transition towards a low-carbon economy and to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions

Specific objectives to:

- support China in implementing its domestic policies aiming at reducing greenhouse emissions such as use of market mechanisms including emissions trading
- support capacity building for the implementation and monitoring of its domestic climate change policies – including at the provincial level
- for the deployment of renewable sources of energy and enhance energy efficiency by facilitating appropriate pilot projects, complemented by the relevant human resource development plans and support for ICT policies;
- provide support to the deployment of renewable sources of energy as well as speed up the introduction of clean coal technologies and to enhance energy efficiency through appropriate policy and regulatory support, economic incentives development, capacity building and pilot projects;

- support the integration of these new forms of energy to the grids and the deployment of smart grids (through capacity-building and standardization cooperation) so as the new energy policy delivers real changes to Chinese society;
- support China's effort in transforming its building sector into a less energy-intensive one through capacity-building and regulatory cooperation;
- support the drafting of the framework energy law China is currently preparing;
- support China in implementing its domestic policies aiming at reducing emissions such as use of market mechanisms including emission trading;
- foster public-private partnerships through such projects;
- provide scholarships to Chinese students to follow environmental studies in EU universities through a specific China lot under Erasmus Mundus Action 2.

### **3.2.2. Environmental sustainability**

#### *i) Description/rationale*

87. China's rapid social and economic development is being achieved at the expense of its natural resources. Increasing urbanisation can lead to worsening of the environmental situation if it is not done in a sustainable manner. Water resources are already scarce because of inefficient usage and continuing pollution. In particular industrial pollution and unsustainable agricultural practices are continuously contaminating arable land and water resources. Air pollution continues to be major problem in particular in urban and industrial centres. Both pollution and over-exploitation are having a dramatic impact on China's rich biodiversity and its ecosystems, including marine life. The depletion and degradation of natural resources also have direct negative consequences for human health and put an ultimate limit on economic development, thereby further affecting the poorer population.
88. The impact of these problems is particularly acute in the western provinces of China, which are not only home to the majority of poor people in the country, but which also host very fragile ecosystems. These areas are also more vulnerable to climate risks and therefore more likely to be most affected by climate change. The western provinces are thus confronted with urgent challenges and could benefit from increased political and financial support to face them.
89. The government of China has taken action to address these challenges, notably through comprehensive legislation (including economic and fiscal incentives), stricter regulations and massive investments in infrastructure. Despite these efforts, the potential positive impacts of these policies and measures are not being entirely realised because of obstacles to implementation.
90. Lack of capacity on the part of by local administrations (at provincial, municipal and district levels) to understand, implement, enforce and monitor the regulations, a fragmented system of authority and difficult vertical (national, regional, local levels) and horizontal (inter-institutional) cooperation and coordination represent a fundamental barrier to achieving the environmental policy targets.
91. The focus has for decades been on pure economic development rather than on sustainable economic development, and there is now an urgent need - also identified by the Chinese authorities - to change the mindset not only of local decision-makers, but also of the main consumers of natural resources (like



industry and agriculture) and of the public at large. Promotion of sustainable consumption and production patterns are critical for ensuring environmentally friendly development strategies.

92. While the EU is already assisting China through several projects, e.g. on natural forests management, river basin management and biodiversity, China needs to do more especially in the western provinces. Any future assistance can build on the experiences acquired during these projects but must be triggered first by Chinese financial commitments.

*ii) General and Specific objectives*

General objective: To promote environmental sustainability and the sustainable management of natural resources

Specific objectives:

- Ensuring awareness among decision makers (at the various administrative levels) and other stakeholders (including rural communities, consumers and polluters of natural resources) of environmental sustainability and sustainable development policies, including sustainable natural resources management;
- Enhancing the capacity of decision makers/administrators at various levels and other stakeholders to implement and enforce measures effectively and efficiently;
- Proposing effective and innovative environmental policy instruments and designing mechanisms to monitor and enforce environmental policies and measures.

*iii) Indicators of achievement*

- Number of policies being drafted on low-carbon development and climate change being drafted.
- Number of policies on natural resources being drafted.
- Number of reports drafted and issued by the GoC on natural resources.
- Number of reports drafted and issued by the GoC on low carbon development and climate change.
- Number of corrective measures being implemented by the local authorities with regard to sustainable development.
- Number of officials in central and local authorities made aware of low carbon development, climate change and sustainable use of natural resources.
- Number of stakeholders actively involved in planning and implementation of policies and programmes concerning water, soil, forest and biodiversity, particularly at the local and provincial level.
- Number of stakeholders actively involved in planning and implementing policies and programmes concerning low carbon development and climate change.
- Amount of data and information shared between different stakeholders relative with regard to focal area 2.
- Progresses and impact indicators measured in relation to cross-cutting issues.
- Number of actual beneficiaries reached out and benefiting of the above mentioned activities (broken down by female and male participants, socio-economic background, ethnicity)

### **3.3. Cross-cutting issues (all focal areas):**

Cross-cutting issues such as gender equality, environmental sustainability, public health, social justice and capacity building will be integrated in the design of interventions, and in programme implementation and evaluation, as relevant, e.g. in relation to:

- Awareness raising actions targeting policy makers, professionals and the public;
- Education and training programmes as well as research and, research and consultancy activities;
- Policy and technical advice;
- Support for policy implementation (e.g. through pilot actions);
- Gender-related indicators will be identified , in the context of individual programmes, to monitor the gender impact and ensure that both men and women benefit from capacity building opportunities as relevant to their needs
- Support civil society, including Non State Actors and Local Authorities, to facilitate their involvement in the policy making process and enhance their capacity to deliver basic services to the poorest people in developing countries

Cross-cutting issues will continue to be integrated in actions funded under the thematic programmes (e.g. Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development)

List of Annexes:

---

**Annex 1: China summary table at a glance**

**Annex 2: Summary table of focal/non-focal areas**

**Annex 3: Donor coordination matrix**

**Annex 4: Description of the MTR document drafting process**

**Annex 5: Mid-term review checklist**

**Annex 6: Environmental profile**

**Annex 7: Migration profile**

**Annex 8: Evaluation and lessons learned**

**Annex 9: List of abbreviations and acronyms**