Factsheet – EEAS Mediation Support Project – Knowledge Product

Mediation and Dialogue in transitional processes from non-state armed groups to political movements/political parties

This factsheet is designed to provide a brief “snapshot” of insight to EU officials engaged in advising, planning or implementing mediation and dialogue activities related to transitional processes from armed groups to political movements/political parties, either in a cross-cutting fashion or in relation to specific contexts. In particular, this factsheet refers to specific dilemmas pertaining to the fields of transitional justice and counter-terrorism legislation.3

This factsheet is a continual “work in progress” that is intended to evolve with feedback over time. More information and support on the issues presented are available from the Mediation Support Team of the EEAS K2 Division of Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation Instruments at: Email: K2@eeas.europa.eu

November 2012

01 Background and Scope

‘Non-state armed groups’ refers to groups who retain the potential to deploy arms for political, economic and ideological objectives, which in practice are often translated into an open challenge to the authority of the state. In principle, non-state armed groups and political parties/movements are perceived as two opposite models of approach to democratic political processes. However, given the highly political nature of non-state armed groups’ claims, it is likely that the resolution of a conflict where such actors are involved will be found in political agreements rather than military defeat.

Non-state armed groups and their representatives are a key feature in contemporary conflicts and therefore are often inevitable parties to any peace settlement and/or negotiation process. When dealing with mediation, dialogue and facilitation in such contexts, the EU thus finds itself confronted with the issue of inclusion of current and former non-state armed actors in political processes. Peace negotiations need to be open to all relevant actors concerned; however, engaging with non-state armed groups poses a series of dilemmas. If, on the one hand, the EU has to resolve the risk of interfering with domestic affairs or legitimising human rights violators, on the other it has also to ensure the participative nature of the negotiations, and ensure that the stakeholders involved put trust in the mediation.

In the pre-negotiation phase, having contacts with armed groups could contribute towards the end to hostilities and address the protection of local people. Even if this first engagement will not necessarily lead to political transition of armed groups and a negotiated solution to the conflict, it could be positive in the first phase for humanitarian reasons. Negotiations are then an opportunity to raise awareness and compliance of the parties with EU and International humanitarian and human rights commitments, including legal frameworks for the protection of children affected by armed conflicts. Addressing armed groups as parties to the conflict would make them aware of their negotiation potential and capacity to influence the peace settlement, which could positively impact the peace talks. This may be useful also as a first hands-on experience of the “rules of the game” around the table, with political competition, rather than weapons, as a tool for having influence. Moreover, taking into account non-state armed groups is a constructive means to limit the risk that exclusion might entail, for example disrupting the peace settlement.

However, in working to ensure an inclusive process, the EU faces a number of dilemmas, and there are various positive and negative indicators that the EU should look at when assessing an armed group’s potential for political engagement (see Table 2) in the context analysis. In line with the 2009 Concept on Mediation and Dialogue, the EU can perform five roles in relation to mediation and dialogue, all of which are relevant in the context of transitions from non-state armed groups to political parties/movements.

Box 1: Key Messages for EU Officials

1. Recognise and assess the potential benefits to peace building rather than only potential political risks to inform the EU’s engagement with armed groups in transitions to political movements/political parties. Recognise that listing, including by the EU, limits the option and credibility for EU mediation and dialogue so needs to be kept continually under review.

2. Invest in continued context (conflict) analysis and recognise the varied nature of the armed groups and their relation to ongoing conflict and peace dynamics – make informed decisions based on this and use a variety of methods to engage.

3. Encourage inclusive approaches to mediation and dialogue in the context of transition from armed groups to political parties... yet recognise the limits of the influence of outsiders such as the EU in these processes.

4. Approach the justice or peace dilemma in relation to mediation and dialogue with armed groups in a comprehensive way, avoiding possible solutions which favour exclusively one or the other.

5. Appreciate the full scope of instruments that the EU has at its disposal that may be relevant to engagement and transitions from armed groups to political movements/political parties – diplomatic, developmental, security-related. Value and cultivate the EU partnerships with UN and specialist INGOs and other civil society intermediaries to engage armed groups.

Important Disclaimer: This factsheet was produced by ECDPM for Cardno of the AETS Consortium of Lot 1 Framework Contract for the EEAS K2 Division. It should not be taken to as EU official policy on the issue or an official standpoint on the examples presented.
Table 1: EU various potential roles in relation to mediation and dialogue and transitional justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The EU in mediation and dialogue</th>
<th>Examples of potential EU roles</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. European Union as a mediator or facilitator to dialogue:</td>
<td>The EU High Representative Solana and a specially appointed EU mediator François Leotard, working with the US, were directly involved in the negotiation of the Ohrid Agreement between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia in 2001. Initially only the main political parties were present around the table, but then the process allowed for the transformation of the National Liberation Army (NLA), the main non-state armed group, into a Macedonian political party.</td>
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<td>2. Promoting mediation and dialogue:</td>
<td>As a peace project itself, the EU has the potential to make the difference when promoting mediation and dialogue with armed groups. The experience of Northern Ireland has been useful in enhancing the credibility of the international support (including the EU) to the Philippines (Mindanao) in promoting dialogue between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MLF) group.</td>
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<td>3. Leveraging mediation and dialogue:</td>
<td>In Indonesia (Aceh) the EU has been able to play a substantial role in supporting engagement with armed groups and monitoring the engagement. It leveraged its long-term development and humanitarian engagement in the country, and the fact it was not a regional power with major interests, to positive effect.</td>
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<td>4. Supporting mediation and dialogue:</td>
<td>The EU has a track record of engagement in support of mediation and dialogue initiatives involving armed groups. In Burundi the EU was supportive of the AU peace-building initiative which engaged armed groups and in particular, the EU was directly involved in facilitating the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. The EU Delegation in the Philippines (Mindanao) played a significant role in the ideas behind the creation of the innovative International Contact Group that engages the armed group. EU has also supported through diplomatic welcoming through a press release and statement of the HRVP the dialogue between the Colombian government and the armed group FARC in 2012.</td>
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<td>5. Funding mediation and dialogue:</td>
<td>When it comes to funding mediation and dialogue initiatives, the EU disposes of a series of financial instruments. In Sri Lanka the EU funded the government secretariat that was set up to deal with its counterpart representing the LTTE. In Uganda, to coordinate the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan's anti-LRA actions, the EU, through the African Peace Facility’s Early Response Mechanism, provided the AU mediator with monitoring and coordination means. In Burundi the EU financed essential livelihood assistance to armed groups and the army to prevent a return to war and enable dialogue during a ceasefire.</td>
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02 Key issues and dilemmas

**Context (conflict) analysis and perspectives of transformation** In the literature there is general agreement on the importance of **four main factors** to determine a smooth transition from non-state armed groups to political actors: the first group of elements are **motivation, structure and leadership** of a non-state armed movement⁵ (see Box 2); the second essential component is **inclusiveness of the negotiation process** as well as of the peace agreement; thirdly there have to be **social and institutional incentives to undergo the transformation**; and finally there should not be negative externalities such as neighbouring countries or international actors opposing the process.⁶ However, the experience on the ground showed that the picture could be far more complicated, in the sense that the process of transition might not follow a smooth path, multiple factors are there to influence the outcome of the transformation, and there is a possible risk of ending up with an empty-shell transition, without addressing the root causes of the conflict.

**Box 2: The legacy of structure**

As a general rule, armed groups’ organisational forms usually correspond to the organisational structure of the social environment from which they emerge. Studies on armed groups in Africa have shown that those that were much better organised came from contexts that had experienced political centralisation earlier, like in the case of kingdoms within the Great Lakes region. In nomadic societies, by contrast, armed groups were not able to build stable hierarchic structures (Source: A. Nissen and K. Schlichte. 2006).
Investing in understanding the context is key to delivering effective and timely support to such processes, and historical and societal structures have to be taken into account when planning projects and when evaluating the political performances of new parties. A useful framework for analysing armed groups and their potential to make a positive contribution to processes of mediation and dialogue and peace building is given in Table 2.

Table 2: Variables determining an armed group’s possible political engagement

| Armed group’s political engagement: Indicators of opportunities and constraints |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Negative indicators**          | **Positive indicators**          |
| **Political power**              |                                 |
| • Disregard for rule of law and elections | • Experience of political power |
| • Political assassinations       | • Respect for rule of law; service provision |
| • Intolerance of differences or change | • Political institutions, agenda, candidates |
| **Territorial control**          |                                 |
| • Engage in ethnic cleansing or destruction | • Sets up governing systems within held territory |
| • Is viewed by local population as primarily a predatory force | • Allows freedom of movement |
| **Social and economic support**  |                                 |
| • Isolated from wider society    | • Enjoy public support           |
| • Derived substantial profit from war economy | • Perceive economic benefits from settlement for region or constituency |
| **Use of military force**        |                                 |
| • Indiscriminate; high civilian casualties | • Controlled capacity for force |
| • Weak command and control       | • Observe humanitarian law and protect civilians |
| • Undisciplined troops           | • Disciplined troops             |
| • Force used to sustain illegal activities |                                 |

Source: Conciliation Resources

The variable of individual capacities and personal contacts The prospects for a successful transformation of an armed group also depends to a large degree on individuals. The analysis of biographies of members of armed groups that have then transformed into political parties show the importance of personal qualities, characteristics and abilities within the process of transformation. The EU would need to develop direct or indirect contacts with the senior personalities concerned or those close to them if it wants to have a more specific engagement with armed groups in relation to mediation and dialogue. The development of trust between these leaders and the EU while maintaining and not antagonising the government and diplomatic relations will in most circumstances have to be handled very carefully, yet this need not always be done at the highest levels – with political officers in Delegations potentially taking on this role.

Leadership and cohesion For what concerns the organisational structure, it is worth noting that in general initiatives that focus on bringing the leadership of former armed movements into power-sharing arrangements rely on the assumption that if leaders are “transformed”, their members will follow. This could be the case in many situations, but not always. In the case of a highly factionalised armed group, the choices made by leadership do not necessarily reflect the general preferences among the different groups, and once the leadership has dropped the arms and entered the political life, this does not mean that members of the armed movements have to follow (see Box 4).

Box 3: Burundi, internal and external variables to initiate the transition

The international community and the countries of the sub-region used various tactics to entice the CNDD-FDD to the negotiating table. Especially regional dynamics had an undeniable impact on the rebels’ decision to negotiate, however the single most decisive factor from outside the movement was clearly the intervention of Nelson Mandela, the new mediator. Mandela was convincing because of his past as a freedom fighter, his prestige and his extraordinary charisma. (Source: W. Nindorera, 2012)

Box 4: Followers and leaders

The peace process in Aceh where the EU was heavily involved was boosted when in 2006 Irwandi, a former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) ‘rebel’, was elected the new governor. Despite the split within GAM’s leadership, the elections encouraged the political reintegration of former combatants into society. Completely opposite was the case with the Khmer Rouge in the first elections in Cambodia in 1993, when local commanders led entire groups of combatants to vote contrary to the official line of the leaders of movement. (Source: Peacebuilding Initiative)

Box 5: NGO’s role in engaging with the support of the EU

- In Aceh, the mediating party supported by the EU was the Finnish NGO Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
- In the Philippines 4 international NGOs were members of the International Contact Group: Muhammadiyah, the Asia Foundation, the HD Centre and Conciliation Resources. The organisation Non-Violent Peace Force also had a key role.
**Beyond Track 1** INGOs and local civil society can offer a series of benefits for understanding the context and the dynamics of the conflict from a local perspective, providing privileged access to information, channels of communication and networks and enhancing the credibility of the EU in the eyes of public opinion. In other settings UN or regional powers could also prove to be an appropriate interlocutor and partner for the EU – the key determinant for which must be their credibility as having the requisite skills and experience as well as the personal contacts, credibility and trust necessary to be effective. The EU’s experience in the Philippines (Mindanao) (see Box 5) demonstrated how NGOs have been fundamental channels for confidential communication between the government and the MILF. In Myanmar the EU also works with civil society with direct links with some of the ethnic armed groups. Working with civil society organisations and either local or in some circumstances international NGOs with a track record can pave the way for a more direct EU engagement, or can be the operational partner when the EU is not willing or able to be directly engaged in mediation and dialogue with armed groups.

**External and internal legitimisation** International involvement in the domestic political arena is highly controversial, even if it is related to a wider negotiation process aimed at achieving long-term peace (see Box 6). Supporting transition processes from armed groups has relevance for peace building, however it can easily delegitimise either external actors such as the EU, as it entails the risk of interfering with domestic affairs or legitimising human rights violators, or the domestic actors, because they can be portrayed by their opponents as puppets of foreign powers. This is why external donors like the EU tend to avoid direct funding to transition processes of armed groups to political parties. Another crucial aspect the external actors should note while engaging in mediation roles is the importance of acting impartially and being perceived as such by the parties (see Box 6). On the internal side, commitment to the peace process is necessary, as there is always the danger of peace processes being spoiled by factions and single persons who see a better future in continuing war than in agreeing to peace. Also the external transformation of an armed group into a political party requires a minimum of legitimisation. Here the composition of the respective political system has to be taken into consideration, as it needs to be sustainable enough to integrate a new player formerly considered, at least by former government authorities, as illegitimate and to institutionally absorb the consequences of this process.

**Armed groups or terrorists?** The EU counter-terrorism legislation since 9/11 there has been an increased propensity to refer to or categorise armed groups as “terrorist organisations”, governments challenged by non-state armed groups have made ample use of this term with the aim of discrediting the political claims behind those with whom they are in armed conflict and to legitimise ‘zero tolerance’ reactions. Associating armed groups to terrorism has a direct impact on the EU and the international community’s capacity for mediation and dialogue in transition processes. If terrorism is a crime, then collaboration with terrorists will also be considered a crime, and this would impede the chances of offering constructive political alternatives to the use of force. The EU needs therefore to look closely at the structural roots and political causes behind the motivation of non-state armed groups (see Table 2), as most insurgency movements cannot be defeated by force, and therefore have to be considered as key stakeholders in any negotiation or state-building process.

Even tentative dialogue with those groups considered “terrorists” could cause difficulties for the EU with host governments or parts of the international community – even if at a later date dialogue is considered as legitimate (see box 8). Listing rules are a highly controversial tool when dealing with non-state armed groups, as they can have a number of negative side-effects on the EU’s overall capacity for dialogue and mediation. The perception of being marginalised, or that the EU applies double standards, are highly discouraging for mediation and dialogue with armed groups, and risk inflaming violent reactions and mistrust (see Box 9). Yet it is too simplistic to say that there can never be a justification for the listing of a particular group or that it is counterproductive in every single instance, however listing has the potential to reduce the scope for action of EU officials and mediators, as a mixture of the legal consequence of listing (travel bans, asset freeze and no direct funding), plus the political risk of association/reputation.

**Box 6: External support**

In the case of Sri Lanka, the ‘international community’ had gone beyond its mandate, by trying to force the outcome of negotiations between the armed group the LTTE and the government, and applying sanctions and incentives one-sidedly. On the contrary, the EU policy of conditional assistance for reconstruction and development in the North of Ireland was applied fairly and even-handedly (Source: Dudouet, 2006).

**Box 7: The case of El Salvador**

Although it was recognised in 1981 by the French and Mexican governments as a legitimate “representative political force” that should be invited to the negotiation table, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was later on retroactively added to databases of terrorist organisations, such as the “global terrorism” database set up by the US Department for Homeland Security (Source: Dudouet, 2012).

**Box 8: Engaging too soon or not soon enough?**

Michael Semple, a senior official of the EUSR’s office in Afghanistan, engaged with the Taliban in 2007 believing that initiating dialogue was necessary. When this was discovered he was expelled by the Afghan government and drew criticism from the international community. Yet within two years there was a growing consensus over the necessity of engaging the Taliban in dialogue as part of the search for peace and stability.

**Box 9: EU listing consequences in Colombia**

France and Spain were part of a group of facilitators for the peace process between the ELN and the Colombian government. However, when in 2002 the EU added the ELN to its terrorist list, this not only discredited the two countries’ engagement, but led to interruption of the government’s works. ...and Sri Lanka! The EU in 2006 proscribed the LTTE in a delicate phase of the peace process, undermining Norwegian mediators’ credibility and good offices. (Source: Berghof Peace Support and Conciliation Resources, 2011).
The EU’s counter-terrorism laws do not provide bans on direct contact with designated groups or individuals, however additional circumstances might make such meetings illegal. Such circumstances might include, for example, a national ban in the country where the meeting might take place. Several countries do maintain bans on meeting with groups which have been nationally designated as terrorists, whether or not provided for by any international designation mechanism.

Justice versus peace dilemma The EU, in line with the UN, generally observes ICC obligations and the international legal framework with regards to serious international crimes. However, when engaged in mediating with armed groups the EU could find itself confronted with a controversial alternative; justice versus peace. On the one hand the need to restore justice would entail the prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations, war crimes and other major crimes. On the other, the need to achieve long-term peace derives from an inclusive peace-building process, and it is fundamental to bring all parties around the negotiation table, with the possibility of having these actors then represented in the new political arrangement (see Boxes 10 & 11). The justice-versus-peace dilemma is a fundamental problem for the EU to consider, and it generally has to be dealt with in connection with other cross-cutting contexts. Possible solutions are to be linked for example to the issues of transitional justice, such as through considering the use of provisions and mechanisms to recognise the accountability for past crimes and abuses of all parties to the conflict.

Inclusion vs. exclusion: risks and benefits for political processes The inclusion of non-state armed groups may be relevant for peace agreements (see Box 12), but it also validates former combatants as legitimate parties, which may be problematic for political competition. Transition processes from armed groups to legitimate political actors can have serious impact on democracy, in the sense that these groups are given the chance to shape and influence the post-conflict agenda in ways that could bring about a recurrence of violence. On the other hand, failure to demobilise the warring parties and to integrate them into society could again lead to violence and risk the political settlement. As the case of the FSLN in Nicaragua illustratively shows, issues arise once a war is settled: the Sandinista movement came to power as a revolutionary movement to overthrow the Somoza dynasty; however its guerrilla legacy turned the FSLN into a sort of soft authoritarianism under Ortega. Similarly, former non-state armed groups turned into the party of government might be reluctant to open up the political system to genuinely democratic competition. This then becomes an issue of the EU’s on-going political dialogue and support to peace building or state building, democracy and human rights in any third country. Engaging or not armed groups therefore requires a conscious political choice for the EU in which the risks must be understood, and the context and degree of representativeness of the stakeholders to the conflict must be carefully assessed. In particular, inclusivity should not be interpreted to favour only the participation of armed groups to negotiations, as the EU will in this case replicate a typical dynamic of peace processes where the only ones around the table are men with arms.

The security challenge and Demobilisation, Disarmament and Re-integration (DDR) EU policy on SSR and DDR notes the importance of inclusive approaches including engaging non-statutory or non-state groups. Engaging with armed groups in different phases of the armed conflict entails a series of security risks from the perspectives of both the EU and the non-state armed group. On the one hand the EU has to set the level of risk to which its officials can be exposed; on the other it has to ensure the protection of its interlocutors, especially after they surrender their arms in any DDR process. In some cases, such as in Colombia, security schemes did not necessarily guarantee the avoidance of attacks against demobilised personnel. Indeed support to DDR provided by the EU and others may have a critical impact on the success of any process of dialogue with armed groups.

Box 10: Renamo in Mozambique

The international community recognised that building Renamo, the main armed opposition, up into a viable partner in the peace process in Mozambique was a condition for successful implementation. UN Special Representative Ajello, who later went on to become EUSR in the Great Lakes region, stated that “it was necessary to help Renamo to achieve a minimum level that could allow the functioning of the whole mechanism” of the peace agreement. Renamo insisted that there could be “no democracy without money,” and Ajello agreed: “Democracy has a cost and we must pay that cost.” After initial concerns from donors reluctant to fund a party with a particularly brutal reputation, a $19-million fund was established to help Renamo transform itself into a political party (Source: Lyons, 2002).

Box 11: Accountability in Uganda

In northern Uganda, the International Criminal Court (ICC) put out indictments against Lord’s Resistance Army leaders. When the group elected to participate in peace agreements, advocates divided on the issue. Some felt that it was best to encourage the continued peace talks at the expense of justice and supported turning instead to local justice rituals (the relative successes and drawbacks of which have also been debated). Others, such as Amnesty International, have been strong advocates against such measures, which they perceive as granting impunity to the worst criminals, signalling to others that this type of violence is permissible and undermining the authority of the ICC in a broader context. (Source: Peacebuilding Initiative).

Box 12: Inclusiveness in Macedonia

The coalition government formed gathering the main Albanian and Macedonian parties could not stop the conflict as the NLA, that was waging the war, was not represented in the coalition. In order to foster a common position between the Albanian parties in Macedonia, PDP and DPA, and the NLA, a National Committee was formed in Prizren, Kosovo. The US special envoy had a heavy influence in assembling the Committee. The Committee brought a programme which summarised the requests and common positions of the NLA and the Albanian parties in Macedonia. In that respect, the Albanian parties were empowered to fully represent the requests of the NLA during the negotiations with the parties representing the ethnic Macedonians. International actors supported the transformation and Kosovo, the most politically unstable neighbour at that time, aided the formulation of common goals between the Albanian parties and the NLA (Source: D. Taleski, 2011).
### Key questions

#### Table 1: Key questions to inform the EU's engagement with national institutions for mediation and dialogue

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<tr>
<th>The EU in mediation and dialogue</th>
<th>Key questions to inform the EU’s engagement</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual understanding</strong></td>
<td>What are the positions, needs and interests of non-state armed groups in relation to others (government and society) and what are the structural and proximate causes and triggers of violent conflict – how have these evolved over time? Is there room for inclusion of armed groups through mediation and dialogue? Are there creative solutions to the peace and justice dilemma? <strong>How to do it:</strong> Draw on analysis beyond political reporting to undertake a comprehensive conflict analysis involving both EUD stakeholders and those from EU institutions and headquarters as well as EUSRs where available; include supplementary analysis such as using the framework provided in box 2 as well as political reporting drawing on multiple sources of information.</td>
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<td><strong>Listing or engagement</strong></td>
<td>Is there room for an inclusive approach involving armed groups, which could help support peace while acknowledging the need for accountability? What is the current EU position on listing in relation to particular armed groups that could/should/might be involved in processes of mediation and dialogue either now or in the future? Are any armed groups in regions in which you are working that are not on this list likely to be added – if so what impact will this have on any processes of dialogue and mediation (even if the EU is not a party to that dialogue)? What scope is there to influence changes in EU counter-terrorism legislation (at either general or country level) as a means to encourage mediation and dialogue? <strong>How to do it:</strong> Assess EU terrorist list and ensure that information from HoDs, EU-HoMs and if relevant EUSRs has clearly informed the position on EU listing and its consequences for processes of mediation and dialogue and peace building more generally. Engage and inform EU member-states as these can request delisting at any time. <strong>Explore the limits of informal contact with armed groups through intermediaries; decide at what level this should be done and who should lead the engagement with armed groups (e.g. EUD Political Section officers) to this purpose where appropriate. Liaise with EU member-states, or other third parties who may have more scope or latitude to engage with relevant armed groups.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Promoting mediation and dialogue:</strong></td>
<td>What are the internal experiences the EU can draw from in order to promote mediation and dialogue in the context of engagement of armed groups (Northern Ireland)? How could these experiences be used in practice to promote mediation and dialogue? Are there lessons to be learnt from previous EU initiatives drawing from internal experiences? <strong>How to do it:</strong> EUD to contact relevant EEAS Officials at K2 Division or European non-governmental entities with this experience.</td>
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<td><strong>Leveraging mediation and dialogue:</strong></td>
<td>What political, economic, and funding weight and incentives does the EU have in leveraging mediation and dialogue in transitions from armed groups to political parties? What are the variables that can have an impact on the EU’s capacity to leverage mediation and dialogue (the geographical vicinity, the context of the conflict, the situation of the countries involved, the positive or negative perception of the EU as a partner, coherence of the EU position amongst member-states)? <strong>How to do it:</strong> HoD, EU-HoMs also working with Desk EEAS Managing Directorates, where appropriate engaging Council Geographic Working Parties and EUSRs by drawing on conflict analysis and a specific (political) analysis of armed groups. Then reflecting on the full range of EU instruments so as to choose the most appropriate – continue to monitor and revise options as the context changes (personal sanctions and lifting them, listings and lifting them, incentives towards government parties etc.).</td>
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<td><strong>Supporting mediation and dialogue:</strong></td>
<td>What potential role is there for the EU to support its own or third parties’ initiatives for mediation and dialogue with armed groups? What would the EU contribution consist of in practice (technical expertise, logistics, member states’ capacity on the ground, contacts, knowledge, experience, expertise)? If this cannot be done directly or swiftly enough by the EU can it instead provide support indirectly through INGOs, UN, trusted third parties? Can the EU move fast enough to provide the support necessary to mediation and dialogue involving armed groups? If the EU can’t fund engagement with armed groups directly what complementary measures can it support (facilitating travel, provision of expertise etc.)? <strong>How to do it:</strong> EUDs (Political and Operational Sections working together), EEAS K2 to share experience of how it has been done elsewhere, also engaging in dialogue with EU Missions in-country and with the wider diplomatic community and possible partners informally to explore options.</td>
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<td><strong>Funding mediation and dialogue:</strong></td>
<td>What potential role is there for the EU to fund mediation and dialogue in the context of transitions from armed groups to political parties? Is it through direct mediation and dialogue or complementary measures (such as DDR processes or Transitional Justice measures to unblock critical moments in the mediation and dialogue processes) or is it funding to actual dialogue (travel/accommodation/security provision etc)? Who are the most appropriate implementing partners of funded activities (e.g. INGOs, civil society with links to armed groups, UN, regional powers, mediators themselves)? What pre-planning is needed? Are the EU instruments flexible and rapid enough (even the IFS routinely takes six months), or long or substantial enough (for example DDR processes underpinning transition from armed groups to political parties may take significant resources over the longer term); if not who else (EU member-states, INGOs) has appropriate funding mechanisms? <strong>How to do it:</strong> EUDs (Political and Operations sections working together) with EEAS/DEVCO/FPI creatively looking at the menu of possible funding options; engage in scenario planning and create as much appropriate flexibility as possible within the financial regulations so as to achieve the most appropriate funding mix.</td>
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Endnote


In relation to mediation in power sharing, see the EESD Mediation Support Project - knowledge product on power-sharing produced for the EESD by MediaEU.


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Additional Sources

EC, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, Brussels, April 2001 and Thematic Evaluation on EC support to conflict prevention and peace building


